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William David RossFirst published Thu Aug 12, 2010; substantive revision Tue Aug 17, 2010

Sir William David Ross (18771971) made significant contributions tothe translation and interpretation of the works of Aristotle and to moralphilosophy. His work in ancient philosophy, especially his translations, isstill considered to be among the best. Many believe that Ross's work inthis area is his most important contribution to philosophy. However, hismain contributions to moral philosophy are of lasting value. His The Rightand The Good is arguably one of the most important works of moralphilosophy published in the last century. Although Ross's view appearedto suffer at the hands of critics in the middle and late parts of the lastcentury, recent interest in normative and meta-ethical intuitionism hassparked a renewed respect and admiration for his unique contribution toethics, which is the focus of this entry.

1. Ross's Life2. The Data of Ethics3. The Case Against Ideal Utilitarianism and Kant's Moral Theory4. Ross's Distinctive Moral Framework: The Right and the Good

4.1 The Right4.2 The Good

5. Moral Epistemology6. Moral Metaphysics7. Ross's Contemporary ImportanceBibliography

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1. Ross's LifeWilliam David Ross was born on 15 April 1877 in Thurso, Scotland. Hespent the bulk of the first six years of his life in Travancore, India, wherehis father, John Ross, was the Principal of the Maharaja's College, beforewhich he had been a schoolmaster in the county of Caithness in Scotland.Ross returned to Scotland for his formal education. He attended the RoyalHigh School in Edinburgh and Edinburgh University. In 1895, hegraduated from the latter with first-class honours in classics. He thenwent to Balliol College, Oxford, where he obtained first-class honours inclassical honour moderations in 1898 and in literae humaniores in 1900.He was then appointed lecturer at Oriel College, Oxford and at the sametime he was elected to a fellowship by examination at Merton College. In1902, he dropped the latter when he was elected tutor in philosophy andfellow at Oriel College, a position which he held until 1929. Ross joinedthe army in 1915, and by the time World War I ended he was DeputySecretary in the Ministry of Munitions, with the rank of Major. He left thearmy with an OBE. Following the war he remained in public service on apart-time basis, and for his efforts he was made a KBE in 1938. From1923 to 1928 he was the Deputy White's Professor of Moral Philosophywhile John Alexander Stewart was ill. When the position became vacantin 1927, Ross refused to stand because he thought H. A. Prichard a bettermoral philosopher and because (interestingly) he said that he wouldprefer working on metaphysics, ancient and the most modern (Clark1971, 534). Two years later, in 1929, he became Provost of Oriel College,a position he held until 1947. In 1927, he was elected Fellow of theBritish Academy, and he served as its president from 1936 to 1940.During this time he played an important part in helping foreign scholarsfleeing less liberal climates in Europe. In World War II he again playedan important role in the public service, serving on an Appeal Tribunal for

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an important role in the public service, serving on an Appeal Tribunal forConscientious Objectors (194041) and on the National ArbitrationTribunal (19411952). He served as Vice-Chancellor of Oxford from1941 to 1944. Following the war, in 1947, he became President of theUnion Acadmique Internationale, and, until 1949, the Chairman of theRoyal Commission on the Press. In his retirement Ross continued hiswork in philosophy. He died in Oxford on 25 May 1971.

Ross's contributions to various administrative positions and to publicservice were of no small importance. But it is his work in philosophywhich is of lasting significance. He made numerous contributions to thetranslation and interpretation of the works of Aristotle and to moralphilosophy. In his lifetime, Ross was considered a major figure in theinterpretation and study of Aristotle (Wiggins 2004). He was the GeneralEditor of the Oxford Aristotle translation series, first with J. A. Smith andthen alone, and to this series he contributed translations of Aristotle'sMetaphysics and his Nicomachean Ethics. In addition, Ross edited anumber of Aristotle's works in Greek for the Oxford Classical Textsseries, including the Rhetoric, Physics, De Anima, and Politics, and hepublished translations of Analytics, Parva Naturalia and Metaphysics withintroductions and commentaries. On the basis of this work he producedtwo full-length books, Aristotle (1923) and Plato's Theory of Ideas(1951). In ethics, Ross wrote only very few papers. His books The Rightand The Good and Foundations of Ethics comprise his main ethicalofferings. To these he added a critical commentary on Immanuel Kant'sGroundwork, Kant's Ethical Theory: A Commentary on the Grundlegungzur Metaphysik der Sitten, and a chapter on Aristotle's ethics in Aristotle.

In the introduction to the sixth edition of Aristotle, J. L. Ackrill maintainsthat Ross made his mark in public life and as a university teacher andadministrator, and he wrote influential books on ethics. But it is as theleading Aristotelian of the first half of century that he will be mostremembered (AT ix). This position is hard to maintain. First, most if not

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remembered (AT ix). This position is hard to maintain. First, most if notall of Ross's translations and commentaries have been superseded in someway. In his book Aristotle (2007), Christopher Shields does notrecommend a single one of Ross's translations or commentaries, thoughhe does recommend Aristotle. Second, although Ross received rather shortshift from rival moral philosophers in the last century (e.g., Warnock1960; Rawls 1971; Raphael 1981), his moral philosophy is nowconsidered a serious contender and in recent years many of Ross's mainmoral and meta-ethical doctrines have received sustained defenses (see,e.g., Hurka 2004; Stratton-Lake 2002a, 2002b, 2010; McNaughton 1988,1996; Shaver 2007; Audi 1996, 2004; Gaut 2002). Therefore, it is notunreasonable to think that Ross's legacy will depend more on his work inethics than on his work in ancient philosophy.

Ross was part of a group of thinkers dubbed the British Intuitionists. H.A. Prichard was its main figure, and Ross was heavily influenced by hisviews (see Prichard 1912, 1932). He was also influenced by G. E. Moore(Moore 1903, 1912). Ross subjected Moore's ideal utilitarianism tosustained attack. But he was more sympathetic to Moore's methodologyfor soliciting intuitions about goodness and with some of Moore's ideasabout the nature of intrinsic value and moral semantics. Finally, he couldnot have helped being influenced by Aristotle's treatment of ethical topics.He was in particular impressed with Aristotle's methodology (see Nielsen2007 for illuminating comparisons between Aristotle and Ross).

2. The Data of EthicsRoss writes that the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educatedpeople are the data of ethics just as sense-perceptions are the data of anatural science (RG 41). The verdicts that this body of moral convictionscomprises represent the moral reflection of many generations, which hasdeveloped an extremely delicate power of appreciation of moraldistinctions (RG 41). These moral distinctions are employed to test moral

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distinctions (RG 41). These moral distinctions are employed to test moraltheories; these are cases of knowledge that the philosopher neither provesnor disproves (RG 2021n1, 40). Ross takes the requirement to capturethese main common-sense convictions to be more important thansimplicity or systematisation (RG 19; FE 83). This puts him at odds withmoral philosophers who take the systematization, the explanation, and thecorrection of common-sense morality as the main function of moralphilosophy. Henry Sidgwick, for instance, claims that the philosopherseeks unity of principle, and consistency of method and that the role ofthe moral philosopher is to enunciate, in full breadth and clearness, thoseprimary intuitions of Reason, by the scientific application of which thecommon moral thought of mankind may be at once systematised andcorrected (Sidgwick 1907 373374).

The precise degree to which Ross and Sidgwick are in disagreement isless than clear. Ross sometimes writes as though what he cares about isthe opinions of the thoughtful and well-educated (RG 41) or, whatcomes to the same thing, what we think (RG 40; FE 102, 104, 134,172). At others times he suggests that what he cares about is the opinionsof the plain man (RG 17, 2021n1, 28, 57; FE 186, 187, 188; KT 31). Ifthe opinions of the thoughtful and well-educated are distinct from thoseof the plain man, and Ross (with some justification) cares more about theformer than the latter, he may have a less conservative moral view andone closer on the matter of reform (though not of system) to Sidgwick's.This is not without certain costs. Ross faults rival moral views for notbeing close enough to what plain men think about moral questions. If heis open to revising a substantial portion of the moral views that arecommonly recognized, then he loses part of his case against rivals. Hedoes acknowledge that there are errors in our moral thinking and that weare not required to accept as absolute all the claims that are commonlyrecognised (FE 190; also 23; RG 41), though he thinks that mostdisputes concern media axiomata rather than fundamental moralprinciples (FE 1819, 190). However, he seems to invite more drastic

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principles (FE 1819, 190). However, he seems to invite more drasticpossibilities. He notes that inquiry into the historical origin of[ourmoral] beliefs and practices may show that the most strongly feltrepulsions towards certain types of conduct are relics of a bygone systemof totems and fetishes, their connexion with which is little suspected bythose who feel them (RG 13). This may lead to significant revision(Singer 2005). Whatever the case may be, the precise nature of Ross'sview will emerge only after a thorough account of its content is provided.About this data a number of questions emerge. What is its metaphysicalstatus? How is it known? What is its precise content? The answers thatRoss offers to these questions and his sensitivity to the dictates ofcommon-sense morality together make up his unique contribution tomoral theory.

3. The Case Against Ideal Utilitarianism and Kant'sMoral TheoryArmed with an account of the main convictions of common-sensemorality, Ross attacked ideal utilitarianism and Kantianism, though idealutilitarianism, the view that the only basic moral requirement is tomaximally promote a plurality of intrinsic goods, was his mainopponent.[1]

Ross's basic complaint about his rivals is that each, in a different way,over-simplifies the moral life (FE 189). Both Kant and ideal utilitariansfail to capture some salient element of the main moral convictions of theplain man (RG 2021n1). Ross contends that Kant oversimplifies themoral life in a number of distinct ways. First, Kant is wrong to think thatthe rightness or wrongness of an individual act can be inferred withcertainty from its falling or not falling under a rule capable of beinguniversalised (FE 189; also KT 25). Second, Kant is wrong to think thatthere is only one motive that has value, and that the moral life consists ina contest between one element which alone has worth [i.e., the good will]

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a contest between one element which alone has worth [i.e., the good will]and a multitude of others which have none; the truth is rather that it is astruggle between a multiplicity of desires having various degrees ofworth (FE 206; also KT 3, 18, 93). Third, Kant is wrong to think thatmoral rules have absolute authority admitting of no exception (FE 313;also 134, 173; KT 24, 95). The ideal utilitarianism of both Moore andHastings Rashdall is guilty of a number of distortions of common-sensethinking (Moore 1903, 1912; Rashdall 1907, 1913; Skelton 2010). First, itwrongly assumes that there is a general character which makes right actsright, that of maximising a plurality of intrinsic goods (RG 16). Second,in virtue of presupposing that there is only one thing that we ought allthings considered to do it distorts our understanding of moral deliberation.For example, when deciding whether to fulfil a promise we think muchmore of the fact that in the past we have made a promise than of theconsequences we might realise by fulfilling it (RG 17). Third, idealutilitarianism wrongly implies that the only morally significant relationin which my neighbours stand to me is that of being possiblebeneficiaries by my action (RG 19; OJ 125).

4. Ross's Distinctive Moral Framework: The Rightand the GoodOut of these criticisms emerges a distinct moral position, emphasizing thecomplexity of moral life. In a review of Foundations of Ethics, C. D.Broad writes that The Right and The Good was much the most importantcontribution to ethical theory made in England for a generation (Broad1940 228). The best explanation of Broad's praise is that the bookpresents a unique and compelling form of deontology, according to whichthere are a plurality of both moral requirements and intrinsic goods. Thereis no one master principle that explains why the particular things that webelieve are wrong/right are in fact wrong/right. Instead, there are anumber of basic moral requirements which cannot be reduced to some

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number of basic moral requirements which cannot be reduced to somemore fundamental principle. These are relied upon in making decisionsabout what we ought to do all things considered, though there is no sensein which this is deduced from principles. There is no one intrinsicgood/evil that explains why the particular things we think are good/evilare in fact good/evil. Instead, there are a number of goods which cannotbe reduced to some more fundamental good. These are relied upon inmaking decisions about the goodness or badness of a state of affairs allthings considered, though there is no sense in which this is deduced fromthese claims. It is his articulation of this particular view that makes Ross'swork a lasting philosophical contribution.

4.1 The Right

There is some dispute as to the precise number of principles to whichRoss subscribes. It seems that he holds that there are five duties each ofwhich rests on a separate and distinct ground and each of which specifiesa factor which counts in favour of or against an act (Stratton-Lake 2002a,2010; Pickard-Cambridge 1932b, McNaughton 1996; cf. Jack 1971). Rossbelieves that we have a duty of fidelity, that is, a duty to keep ourpromises (RG 21; FE 7677; KT 21); a duty of reparation or a duty to actto right a previous wrong we have done (RG 21; FE 76; KT 21); a duty ofgratitude, or a duty to return services to those from whom we have in thepast accepted benefits (RG 21; FE 76; KT 21); a duty to promote amaximum of aggregate good (RG 25, 27, 30; FE 67, 99, 130, 252, 257,271, 313; KT 21); and finally a duty of non-maleficence, or a duty not toharm others (RG 21; FE 75, 130n1, 272).

He does not see these duties as equally important. He holds that the dutyof non-maleficence is more important than the duty to promote amaximum of aggregate good (RG 21, 22; FE 75, 130n1), and he suggeststhat the duties of fidelity, reparation, and gratitude are in general moreweighty than the duty to promote the good (RG 19, 30, 4142; FE 77, 76,

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weighty than the duty to promote the good (RG 19, 30, 4142; FE 77, 76,90, 187). Unlike the duty to promote the good, the duties of fidelity,reparation and gratitude rest on personal relations with others, whichgenerate special rather than general duties (FE 76, 186). It is important toRoss that we can stand in the obligation-generating relations of promiseeto promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent,of friend to friend, of fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and thelike (RG 19; also 22; FE 76; OJ 124, 126). Rival views, as noted, ignorethese morally significant relations, or the highly personal character ofduty, at their peril (RG 22). Finally, although he does not say it, his viewwould surely be that the duty of non-maleficence is weightier than theduties of reparation, gratitude, and fidelity: it is (unless much is at stake)wrong to harm others in order to fulfil these duties.

Ross's major innovation is that these principles state prima facie ratherthan absolute obligations. This is an idea that simply had not occurred tocritics of deontological theories (e.g., Mill 1863; Sidgwick 1907; Moore1903, 1912; Rashdall 1907, 1913), and therefore represented at the time amajor advance in the dialectic existing between utilitarians and non-utilitarians. Ross claims that prima facie is an unfortunate phrase onwhich to rely (RG 20; FE 8485). It suggests that these only appear to beduties which further reflection might reveal to be illusory. This is not theview: these principles express real facts (RG 20; FE 85). There is afurther worry, for these are not really duties of any kind (FE 8485; RG20). He thinks instead that these principles simply specify factors orfeatures of a situation that speak in favour of or against, morally speaking,an act or what to set ourselves to do.[2] The fact that an act fails to fulfil apromise is a fact that counts against it, morally. The fact that an actpromotes a maximum of aggregate good is a fact that counts in favour ofit, morally. One way to state what Ross has in mind, though this iscontroversial, is to say that each principle specifies a fact that counts as amoral reason for or against an act (Stratton-Lake 2002a xx, 2010; also KT21). Ross suggests another, equally plausible view, that each of the

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21). Ross suggests another, equally plausible view, that each of theprinciples specifies a responsibility (FE 85). Therefore, we haveresponsibilities to express gratitude, to compensation for past wrongs, topromote the good, and so on. These responsibilities are what we arerequired to draw on to determine what we ought all things considered todo.

Is this list of responsibilities complete? Ross intimates that this list is thebest representation of the core commitments of common-sense morality(RG 20; FE 190). He is confident that we have these responsibilities. Hestates, for example, that the existence of an obligation arising from themaking of a promise is so axiomatic that no moral universe can beimagined in which it would not exist (FE 77; also KT 42). He is notentirely confident that there exist only these responsibilities; he offers thislist without claiming completeness or finality for it (RG 20; also 23).His view is not meant to be hostile to the idea that we might recognise anew duty in light of new circumstances (FE 189). However, he doeshold that the general principles which it [i.e., intuitionism] regards asintuitively seen to be true are very few in number and very general incharacter (FE 190). He seems to think that most disputes about the abovelist would revolve around what should be added rather than what shouldbe subtracted or reduced, since the responsibilities listed above areauthenticduties (RG 23). But if new circumstances can lead to therecognition of new duties, why may they not lead to the recognition thatthere are fewer duties than we might otherwise have supposed? Thisseems to be the nub of the issue between Ross and his ideal utilitarianfoes.

Ideal utilitarians and others are keen to argue that Ross's view isproblematic because it is not systematic enough. In Some Problems inEthics, H. W. B. Joseph suggested that views like Ross's go wrong, sinceour obligations are not a heap of unrelated obligations (Joseph 1931 92;also 6768). Forty years later, Rawls registered the same complaint:

William David Ross


also 6768). Forty years later, Rawls registered the same complaint:without some account of how the plurality of normative principles are tobe weighed against one another using reasonable ethical criteria, themeans of rational discussion have come to an end. An intuitionistconception of justice [and by extension ethics] is, one might say, but halfa conception (Rawls 1971 41).

Ross is moved in part by this sort of worry. He initially lists what appearto be seven responsibilities, including a responsibility of justice (aresponsibility to bring about a distribution of happiness between otherpeople in proportion to merit (RG 26)) and a responsibility of self-improvement (a responsibility to improve oneself in respect of virtue andknowledge (RG 21)). He argues that these can be subsumed by theresponsibility that we should produce as much good as possible (RG 27;also 30; FE 28889). But beyond this reduction Ross will travel nofurther: loyalty to the facts is worth more than a symmetrical architectureor a hastily reached simplicity (RG 23; also FE 83; OJ 125). Indeed, hehas a very strong case against many of his critics, including Moore,Rashdall, and Joseph, since they adopt some form of pluralism for similarreasons. He has a further argument against Rawls. Rawls's theory containstwo principles of justice, lexically ordered. His first principle outlining aset of basic rights takes priority over his second principle outlining thecorrect distribution of social benefits and burdens. Rawls does not think itis ever right to violate rights in order to produce just distributions. Thisgets him a theory that is as systematic as his classical average utilitarianrival and more systematic than Ross's theory, but Ross can argue thatRawls achieves system at the expense of absolutism, which manyacknowledge to have counterintuitive results.

But it is not clear that Ross has a lock on the best representation ofcommon-sense morality. It is relatively clear that most hedonisticutilitarians are reformers of common-sense morality (e.g., Bentham 1789;Mill 1863, 1843; Sidgwick 1907). These philosophers may not be moved

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Mill 1863, 1843; Sidgwick 1907). These philosophers may not be moved(at the level of moral foundations) by claims that their view conflicts withcommon-sense morality. For their aim in part is to revise it. Ross giveshedonism short shrift because he thinks it obvious that pleasure is not theonly thing that is intrinsically valuable (RG 17, 99; FE 65). He oftenargues that ideal utilitarianism, like hedonistic utilitarianism, can bedismissed because it is at odds with common-sense morality (RG 17-19,38). Yet, it is far from clear that ideal utilitarianism is reformist likehedonistic or classical utilitarianism. The better way to represent thedispute between ideal utilitarians and Ross is over which view bestrepresents common-sense moral thinking. It is certainly the case that themain proponents of ideal utilitarianism took themselves to be aiming tobest represent common-sense morality (e.g., Rashdall 1907; Pickard-Cambridge 1932b 152; Johnson 1953).

As Ross conducts it, the main dispute between the two revolves aroundthe issue of whether ideal utilitarians can make sense of the obligation tokeep one's promises. Ross's view is that to make a promise is not merelyto adapt an ingenious device for promoting the general well-being; it is toput oneself in a new relation to one person in particular, a relation whichcreates a specifically new prima facie duty to him, not reducible to theduty of promoting the general well-being of society (RG 38). Heemploys the following example to illustrate his initial case (RG 3435).Suppose that by fulfilling a promise to Edward you will produce 100 unitsof good for him but that by breaking the promise and doing somethingelse that you have not promised to do you will produce 101 units of goodfor James. The ideal utilitarian view entails that it is wrong to fulfil thepromise: we must benefit James. But this is not the verdict of common-sense morality. According to Ross, it takes a much greater disparity invalue between the two to justify begging off on the promise (RG 35; FE77, 90). In reply, the ideal utilitarian argues that the common-senseverdict may be captured by noting that broken promises erode mutualconfidence and that kept promises increase mutual confidence (RG 38).

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confidence and that kept promises increase mutual confidence (RG 38).These goods and evils tip the balance in favour of keeping the promise.But Ross thinks this a lame response. There will no doubt be cases whereall the benefits of breaking the promise will outweigh (though only veryslightly) all the costs associated with breaking it, and in this case the idealutilitarian will have to admit that it is obligatory to break the promise (RG38). Ross thinks that this is not the verdict of common-sense morality.

In a set of engaging essays, W. A. Pickard-Cambridge pressed Ross onthe issue of whether ideal utilitarianism was actually as at odds withcommon-sense morality as Ross suggested (Pickard-Cambridge 1932a,1932b, 1932c). Pickard-Cambridge first argues that there are strong directand indirect reasons for taking promises very seriously (Pickard-Cambridge 1932b 153-159). He further argues that ideal utilitarianismaccounts better for our intuitions about the following kinds of cases:

1. Chuck has promised Peter that he will replace a string on his violinby 4:00 tomorrow, but Peter dies at 3:00 just before Chuck intends tofulfil the promise. There appears to be no responsibility on Chuck'spart to fulfil the promise. This is the verdict of the plain man and theverdict of the ideal utilitarian, but it is not the verdict that seemsentailed by Ross's view (Pickard-Cambridge 1932b 158).

2. A rich miser pretends to be a pauper in order to get Richard to agreeto pay him $100. Richard takes pity on him, and he agrees to payhim the money in six month's time. Richard discovers a few monthslater through newspapers reports that the miser is a fraud. Thereagain appears to be no responsibility to fulfil the promise. Again, thisis the verdict of the plain man and the verdict of the ideal utilitarian,but it is not the verdict that seems entailed by Ross's view (Pickard-Cambridge 1932b 166).

3. A poor man contacts Anne via the Internet asking her to please payhim $100.00 in six month's time. Anne agrees to give him themoney. Three months later, before Anne has paid the money, the

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money. Three months later, before Anne has paid the money, thepoor man wins the lottery and is rich. The ideal utilitarian says thatthere is now no reason to fulfil the promise and the plain man agrees,but this is not the verdict that is entailed by Ross's view (Pickard-Cambridge 1932b 166).

In response to (1), Ross argues that we must insist on some commonsense in the interpretation of the promise (FE 94; also 95, 96). Both Peterand Chuck assume that if the Peter is dead at 3:00, then the promise isnull and void. But the ideal utilitarian may see a weakness here and urgethat she can explain the need for an interpretation, that she can provide aninterpretation and that her interpretation and/or its explanation fits moreeasily with common-sense morality. Peter and Chuck assume what theydo because no good would otherwise come from insisting on the promisebeing fulfilled.

In reply to (2), Ross contends that the promise arose out of conversationwith the miser, which was conducted under the implied contract to telleach other the truth (FE 97). Therefore the promise is null and void. Butit is not clear that the plain man thinks that this is the explanation, for it isnot clear that he can be assumed to hold the somewhat nuanced view thatwhen one speaks one promises to use language to state facts (at least inthe sort of case that Ross envisions) or that when we speak we promisethat we shall not without notice use words in a meaning other than that inwhich they are generally used (FE 113). These explanations appear to beno more obviously those of the plain man than the explanation that theideal utilitarian provides, and the ideal utilitarian is able to produceclearer and more definite explanations of Ross's own explanation,especially if she includes truth or knowledge among her ideal goods. Forexample, she can explain what the (implied) contract to tell the truthrequires and why it is required.

William David Ross


In reply to (3), Ross contends initially that if Anne has a very delicatesense of honour, then she ought to consider paying the poor man onaccount of her carelessness in agreeing unconditionally in the first place(FE 97). This is not plausible. There is no reason to enrich already richperson simply because of carelessness (of this sort). Ross further arguesthat what is promised is not that Anne pay $100.00; rather, what ispromised is that she pay a poor man $100.00, and since the man inquestion is no longer poor, there is therefore no need to fulfil the promise(FE 9798). But what drives this interpretation of the promise? The idealutilitarian may argue that the reason we interpret the promise this way isthat doing so promotes the good. Furthermore, the ideal utilitarian canargue that even without thinking of this interpretation of the promise westill believe that we have no or only very weak reasons to pay, and thatthey can offer the best explanation of this fact. They can also explain whythis is (as Ross notes) a difficult issue to decide: there are utilitarianreasons on either side.

Pickard-Cambridge further argues that ideal utilitarianism gives the bestexplanation of the strength of a promise (1932b 159163). Ross agreesthat some promises are more binding than others, e.g., the promise to visita sick friend is stronger than the promise to attend the theatre with friends(FE 100). He suggests that the former is stronger because of the value ofwhat is being promised (FE 100). In discussing his view that a casualpromise is less binding and a recent promise is more binding he adds thatthis is due to the fact that the way in which and the time at which apromise has been made intensify the promiser's awareness of itsexistence and the promisee's expectation of its fulfilment (FE 101). Theseresponses seem to play right into the hands of the ideal utilitarian: thepromise is more binding in the first case because of the greater value atstake and in the second case because the expectation and thedisappointment are greater, all of which are goods of the sort that the idealutilitarian claims we need to balance in deciding what we ought all thingsconsidered to do.

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considered to do.

Ross has one final reply to Pickard-Cambridge, using the followingexample. A is dying. He entrusts his property to B, on the strength of B'spromise to give it to C. C does not know of A's intentions or B's promise.B's activities will not disappoint A or C, nor will his activities negativelyeffect the general mutual confidence. Suppose that D could make betteruse of the property than C. It follows on ideal utilitarianism that B oughtto give the property to D. Ross thinks this breach of trust outrageous(FE 105). Is he right? Pickard-Cambridge might reply that if C is wealthyor well off, it is not wrong to give the property to D if D is poor. Rossmight insist that this is a case in which D could make much better use ofthe property, and that if the gain to D is only slightly better than the gainto C it is wrong to give the property to D.

The ideal utilitarian can respond to Ross in the following three ways.First, it is not clear that the plain man's view is sufficiently rich to bedecisive in this case. Does the plain man have robust views on whatcounts as enough good to outweigh a promise of this sort? There seemsto be too little agreement here. Ross himself notes disagreement as to thedegree of obligation that attaches to promise keeping (FE 186187).Second, this may be a case where the plain man's view is in need ofrevision, something Ross insists is necessary from time to time (FE 23;FE 190). Third, Ross's own view seems to imply revision. He argues thatwhen we consider ourselves boundto fulfil a promise, we think of thefulfilment of the promise as the bringing into existence of some source ofpleasure or satisfaction for the person to whom we have made thepromise (RG 162). This seems to suggest that the rightness of thepromise depends on it producing some pleasure or satisfaction for A. Butsince A is dead when B fulfils the promise no pleasure or satisfaction canbe brought into existence for A, implying that B has no obligation byRoss's lights to fulfil the promise. Ross might drop this requirement andsuggest only that the fulfilment of a promise be bonific for someone

William David Ross


suggest only that the fulfilment of a promise be bonific for someone(e.g., C) (RG 36). Again it is not clear that the claim that the rightness ofkeeping a promise depends in part on it producing good outcomes is theview of the plain man. Consider a death-bed promise with a differentcontent, that A be buried with C, his wife. Suppose that this promise is notbonific. Ross will have to say that there is no reason to fulfil it. Hence,he'll have to advocate revision to common-sense morality. Perhaps he canargue that his revision is more conservative than the revisions required byideal utilitarianism. But this is a very thin difference, and may not beenough to give Ross the edge. Given these worries and the fact that idealutilitarianism seems quite close to the plain man or common-sensemorality in many of the other important cases, that it would entail that itis right to break the promise in the above case can hardly be considered amajor flaw.

These arguments may not be entirely satisfactory. Perhaps the moreappropriate route for the ideal utilitarian is not to opt for revision tocommon-sense morality. For this may in the end give Ross aphilosophical advantage, especially if he drops the claim that it is anecessary condition of act being right that it be bonific or promote somegood. Instead, perhaps the better strategy is to suggest that they cancapture the importance of promise keeping to common-sense morality byholding that promise keeping is intrinsically valuable or at least thatpromise breaking is intrinsically evil (Johnson 1953, 1959; Ewing 1957,1959; Brennan 1989; Shaver 2010). The general strategy is to subsume allof Ross's non-utilitarian duties in this way. This is a compelling response.To assess it, it is important to examine his theory of value.

4.2 The Good

In RG, Ross contends that four things are intrinsically good: justice(happiness apportioned to merit), innocent pleasure[3], knowledge andvirtue (or, virtuous disposition and action, i.e. action, or disposition to

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virtue (or, virtuous disposition and action, i.e. action, or disposition toact, from any one of certain motives, of which at all events the mostnotable are the desire to do one's duty, the desire to bring into beingsomething that is good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain toothers (RG 134)) (RG 134141). Virtue, knowledge and pleasure arestates of mind, while justice is a relation between states of mind (RG140).[4] These values are not of the same importance. Ross holds thatvirtue is the most important and that some virtuous motives are moreimportant than others (e.g., the desire to do one's duty is more valuablethan the desire to promote others pleasure) (RG 152, 153, 164, 166).Knowledge is the next most important of the values.[5] Knowledge ismore important than right opinion, since the former has certainty whichthe latter lacks (RG 138139, 146), and knowledge of general principlesis intellectually more valuable than knowledge of isolated matters of fact(RG 147). The least most valuable is innocent pleasure (RG 152). It is notclear where to place justice in this hierarchy, since Ross says only that itis less valuable than virtue (RG 153154). It is not implausible to thinkthat it should be placed between (virtuous) knowledge and innocentpleasure, and therefore that the values are ranked as follows: virtue,(virtuous) knowledge, justice and innocent pleasure.

In FE, Ross defends a slightly different view. He appears to maintain thatthere are four values: virtue, intellectual and aesthetic activities, justiceand (others) pleasure (FE 19, 73, 180, 262, 278, 288289). In RG, Rossmaintains that all intrinsic values are valuable in the same way: thegoodness of good things is intrinsic to them (RG 115, 118, 132; also KT1112; OJ 119). But in FE he revises this view. He contends that virtueand intellectual activities are fit objects of admiration or objects worthyof admiration (FE 282283). The goodness of these things is a qualityintrinsic to them (FE 278). The values of justice and pleasure are worthyobjects of satisfaction or things in which it is right to take satisfaction oran interest (FE 275, 278, 282, 283, 289). The goodness of these things isnot intrinsic to them; rather, it is a relational property, which depends on

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not intrinsic to them; rather, it is a relational property, which depends onour rightly taking an interest or rightly finding (some kind of) satisfactionin them (FE 278). This appears to follow from the fact that while it isself-evident that the only ground on which a thing is worthy of admirationis that it is good in itself, it is not self-evident that the only ground onwhich a thing is worthy of our interest or liking is that it is good in itself(FE 279).[6] This distinction allows Ross to explain why only innocentpleasures or pleasures that are not undeserved or taken in the misfortuneof others or in lust or in cruelty are good (RG 136137; FE 271272), andwhy only the pleasure of others is good and hence why we think that wehave to promote only them (FE 7475, 272, 276, 279, 283, 322).[7] Thereason that only innocent pleasure is valuable is that only it is worthy ofsatisfaction, and the reason that only the pleasure of others is valuable isthat only it is an object of sympathetic satisfaction (FE 276). One's ownpleasure is not an object of sympathetic satisfaction, since one cannot feelsympathy for oneself; instead, one's own pleasure is merely an inevitableobject of satisfaction (FE 75).

That Ross holds that there are four goods is controversial. It has beensuggested that in FE Ross rejects the view that pleasure is intrinsicallygood (Stratton-Lake 2002a xli-xlii, 2002b 130). This is hard to accept. Herepeatedly claims that the pleasure of others is good (FE 278, 279, 282,283, 322; KT 1112; AT 232).[8] He thinks we have a duty to promotethe pleasure of others and that the basis of this judgement is that theirpleasure is good (FE 283, 284, 288). Finally, it really would be contrary tothe plain man's view and to reflective thinking to deny that pleasure is agood and that pain is an evil.[9] The view that Ross thinks that justice isgood is also less clear. He often states that there are only three non-instrumental goods (FE 19, 180, 262, 278; KT 1112; OJ 119, 120, 121).In early writings he claims that justice is a requirement of duty not a value(OJ 123). However, since he suggests quite clearly at one point that hethinks that justice is good in the same sense that the pleasure of others isgood it is not unreasonable to think that he holds that justice is a good (FE

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good it is not unreasonable to think that he holds that justice is a good (FE288289). He suggests at one point that promise keeping is good in thesame way that justice and pleasure are good (FE 289). But he repeatedlyrejects the claim that promise keeping is good (FE 141, 142), suggestingthat not all things that are objects worthy of satisfaction are valuable.[10]

It is now possible to assess the second ideal utilitarian reply to Rossmentioned above. Some ideal utilitarians contend that his objections tothe view may be overcome by arguing that promise keeping, reparation,and gratitude are non-instrumentally valuable. The most plausibleargument of this variety states that Ross must accept that promise keepingis valuable (or at least that promise breaking is evil) because he acceptsthat knowledge and justice are valuable and there is no real distinctionbetween these values and the value of keeping promises or the disvalue ofbreaking promises (Shaver 2010). The characterisation provided above ofRoss's theory of value provides him with a defence. He insists that onlystates of mind or relations between states of mind have value. Promisekeeping, reparation, and gratitude are not merely states of mind orrelations between states of mind. Therefore, they cannot be good.

One worry is that knowledge is not merely a state of consciousness. InRG, Ross insists that knowledge has intrinsic value. He sometimessuggests this in FE. However, his considered view is that it is notknowledge but intellectual and aesthetic activities that have value (FE 19,27, 73, 180, 262, 266, 267, 278, 282-283, 284, 290, 296; also OJ 119, 120,121).It is not unreasonable to think that Ross moved away from thinkingthat it is knowledge that has value and to thinking that it is intellectual(and aesthetic) activity that has value because only the latter is properlycalled a state of consciousness. It might be objected that this saddles Rosswith a problematic view (Shaver 2010). If Ross rejects the idea thatknowledge is intrinsically valuable while accepting that intellectualactivities are intrinsically valuable, he cannot account for the fact thatknowledge appears to be more important than justified opinion. But Ross

William David Ross


knowledge appears to be more important than justified opinion. But Rosscan argue that knowledge is more important because of its instrumentalproperties, e.g., it helps us better promote justice or morality or pleasure.A fortiori the claim that it is intellectual activities that are intrinsicallygood explains why some knowledge is more important that otherknowledge. Ross says that different instances of this [intellectual]activity are good in proportion as they are conducted according to theseprinciples (FE 270), i.e., principles discovered by logic. Because morephilosophical or more general knowledge requires greater and moresophisticated use of the principles discovered by logic (FE 270), it isbetter. The value of the intellectual activities explains the value of theknowledge.

But what about the fact that justice is an intrinsic value? It is not a state ofconsciousness; it is a relation between states of mind(RG 140). If Ross iswilling to accept this as a good, why not accept that promise keeping, andso on, are good? It might be that he can still insist that justice is differentfrom promise keeping, reparation, and gratitude because it is compoundedfrom states of consciousness and that is why it and not these other thingsare good. However, perhaps the better reply is simply to drop justice fromhis list of values. He repeatedly contends that it is only states of mind thathave value (OJ 118; RG 122, 106107, 140; FE 259, 270, 322; KT 21),and justice is not a state of mind. He can insist on this view and block theideal utilitarian response. He is open to characterising justice as arequirement of duty rather than a value (FE 319), and he loses little bydropping it as a value. Further, he might argue that understanding justiceas a moral requirement is the best way to think of it if one wants tocapture what we think.[11] In this case, the burden of proof is on the idealutilitarian.

Ross relies quite heavily on the Moorean isolation method to defend hisvalue theory (Moore 1903). His value theory came under much lessscrutiny than did his deontic theory, and therefore he did not see fit to

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scrutiny than did his deontic theory, and therefore he did not see fit toconsider monistic responses to it. This may in part be due to the fact thatthere is agreement amongst his main rivals Moore, Rashdall, Pickard-Cambridge, Ewing, and Johnson that value pluralism is true. This mayalso be due in part to the fact that he considered the main monistic rival that is, hedonism a dead end (RG 98; FE 65). But hedonism lives on(Feldman 2004; Mendola 2006; Crisp 2006; Bradley 2009). Therefore, itmay be that Ross's value theory is in for a challenge that neither he norhis ideal utilitarian critics anticipated.

To get a taste of what this challenge may look like consider the followinghedonistic reply to Ross's argument for the idea that virtue is intrinsicallyvaluable. Hedonists hold pace Ross that while it is obvious that virtue isinstrumentally good and vice is instrumentally bad, it is far from clear thatthe former is intrinsically good and the latter is intrinsically bad. Inresponse, Ross asks us to imagine two worlds, W1 and W2. W1 and W2include the same quantity of pleasure. However, W1 contains agents thatare virtuous, who act from or who are disposed to act from the rightmotives, while W2 contains agents who are vicious, who act from or whoare disposed to act from the wrong motives. Is not W1 preferable to W2?Ross thinks it is, and he says that what explains this is that virtue isintrinsically good (RG 134).

But the hedonist has a reply. The situation envisaged is impossible, forsurely W1 would have more pleasure than W2 because typically virtuouspeople produce more pleasure than vicious people. Indeed, would not aworld with virtuous people be more likely to continue to be filled withpleasure and lack the possibility of descending into chaos than a worldwith vicious people? Is not this ultimately the reason why we desire orprefer it? In response, Ross reminds us that not all pleasure springs fromthe actions of virtuous people and not all pain springs from actions ofvicious (RG 134). Some issues from the operation of natural laws (RG134). Suppose, then, that there are two worlds, W1 and W2. W1 contains

William David Ross


134). Suppose, then, that there are two worlds, W1 and W2. W1 containsvirtuous people and W2 contains vicious people, and that the two worldscontain equal amounts of pleasure, because although W1-type worldsusually contain more pleasure than W2-type worlds, W1's extra virtue-generated pleasure is offset by a much greater incidence of disease,making the worlds equal in pleasure. Ross contends that it is still the casethat the virtuous world, W1, is better than W2.

This is a good response, but the hedonist has a rejoinder. Would not W1be on the whole better (hedonistically speaking) in the long run becauseof the virtuous people? Would not W1 be a place where it is more likelyto be the case that a cure is found or where it is more likely that pain istreated effectively and sympathetically or where it is more likely toremain stable enough to handle the disease and illness? Ross may rely onstrategies that are similar to the ones he adopts against the idealutilitarian's attempt to show that she can explain the importance ofpromise keeping (RG 38). But it is clear that proponents of Ross's view ofvalue may well have to contend with arguments of this variety given therecent resurgence of hedonism.

5. Moral EpistemologyHow do we acquire moral and axiological knowledge? Ross maintainsthat both in mathematics and in ethics we have certain crystal-clearintuitions from which we build up all that we can know about the natureof numbers and the nature of duty (FE 144). Our knowledge of the basicmoral and axiological propositions which are the object of our moralintuitions is non-inferential (OJ 121, 123; RG 29, 146; FE 144, 172, 262,320). They are non-inferentially knowable because they are self-evidentor knowable on the basis of an understanding alone (RG 20n1, 29; FE320). For example, that we have a responsibility to keep our promises isself-evident. It is by a process of reflection on this proposition that wecome to apprehend that we have this responsibility. Ross thinks we can

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come to apprehend that we have this responsibility. Ross thinks we cantrust our moral apprehensions, and since apprehension is a matter ofknowledge, and knowledge implies certainty, he is certain that we havethe above responsibilities and that certain things are intrinsically valuable(RG 146, 29, 30; KT 42; cf. Audi 2004).

That our responsibilities are self-evident does not entail that they areobvious to everyone who reflects on them. Ross maintains that aresponsibility is self-evident not in the sense that it is evident from thebeginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the proposition for thefirst time, but in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mentalmaturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evidentwithout any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself. It is self-evidentjust as a mathematic axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, isevident (RG 29; also 12, 32). The analogy with mathematics isinstructive, for we acquire our moral knowledge in the same way weacquire knowledge of mathematical axioms. We apprehend that 2+2 = 4by apprehending that 2+2 matches makes 4 matches and that 2+2 ballsmakes 4 balls, and so on. We apprehend the algorithm in the particularcases after repeated exposure to particular instances of its application, bya process of intuitive induction (FE 170). We apprehend that it is primafacie right to keep promises by apprehending that it is prima facie right tofulfill this or that particular promise. What comes first in time is theapprehension of the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual actof a particular type. From this we come by reflection to apprehend theself-evident general principle of prima facie duty (RG 33; also FE 170).

How do we decide what we ought to do, all things considered, in someparticular circumstance? What is the relationship between theresponsibilities we have and the actual or absolute duty to do oneparticular act in particular circumstances (RG 28)? Our self-evidentresponsibilities are not principles by the immediate application of whichour duty in particular circumstances can be deduced (FE 84; also 169; OJ

William David Ross


our duty in particular circumstances can be deduced (FE 84; also 169; OJ122, 127). Rather, one determines what one ought to do all thingsconsidered, that is, one's actual duty or one's duty proper, by reference toall the morally significant kinds it [the act] is an instance of (RG 20;italics in original; also FE 84, 186; OJ 126127). What one has mostresponsibility to do or what is most suitable all things considered belongsto an act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less than this (RG28; also 33, 132).

We never know what we ought to do all things considered. Instead, wehave a considered opinion or probable opinion regarding what weought all things considered to do in a particular situation (RG 19, 30, 31,33; FE 189, 190, 191; OJ 122, 123, 127). An example will help us here.Imagine that I can help my neighbour with his gardening project and thiswill produce a lot of good for both of us. I have also promised you that Iwill meet you to discuss an assignment, but this produces less good thanhelping my neighbour. Ross says that in this case we have to balance thetwo responsibilities. He thinks that typically the requirement to keep one'spromises is more stringent than the requirement to benefit other people(RG 19). In such situations what you ought to do is that thing of all thosepossible for the agent in the circumstances, [that has]the greatestbalance of prima facie rightness, in those respects in which they areprima facie right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those respects inwhich they are prima facie wrong (RG 41; also RG 46). The act which isone's actual duty or duty proper is the one for which one is mostresponsible or to which the weightier of one's responsibilities attach (FE85; RG 4142). This sense of our particular duty in particularcircumstances, preceded and informed by the fullest reflection we canbestow on the act in all its bearings, is highly fallible, but it is the onlyguide we have to our duty (RG 42). In the end, the decision regardingwhat to do, to use Aristotle's phrase, rests with perception (RG 42; OJ127; Aristotle1109b23, 1126b4). It is important to note that all of theresponsibilities have a valence, positive or negative, and this valence

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responsibilities have a valence, positive or negative, and this valencepersists even when a responsibility is outweighed by weightierresponsibilities.

This epistemology has been attacked from a variety of different angles.One main worry is that there is very little agreement in intuitions, and thissuggests that there is no fact of the matter as to what has value or whatone is responsible for. Ross concedes that there is a lot of disagreement.His response begins by noting that a lot of moral diversity rests not ondisagreement about fundamental moral principles, but partly ondifferences in the circumstances of different societies, and partly ondifferent views which people hold, not on moral questions but onquestions of fact (FE 18). He thinks that most of the differences concernmedia axiomata, i.e., attempts to apply general principles to particularcircumstances, which rest on different circumstances or different factualbeliefs (FE 1819). About these, he says that intuitionists must have anopen mind (FE 190).

There are many differences that cannot be explained away in this fashion,however (FE 19). There are differences as to the comparative worth ofdifferent goods (FE 19) and as to the stringency of the responsibilitiesRoss endorses (FE 186188). These disagreements should not, he thinks,undermine our confidence that there is objective moral truth. It is veryhard to see a resolution to these problems. He says that despite changes inscientific theories there is a sense that science progresses toward the truth.The same is true in ethics. There is no reason to doubt that manprogresses fairly steadily towards moral truth as he does towardsscientific (FE 20). The difficulty with this response is that whereas inscientific matters there is an independent way of establishing progress,there is no such independent or seemingly independent way ofestablishing this in ethics. Recent research in the social sciences on moraljudgement should not leave us confident (Greene 2008; Singer 2005).

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The problems with Ross's moral epistemology are compounded by thefact that he thinks that the principles of his framework best reflect themain elements of common-sense moral thinking, and that this is necessaryto an acceptable moral theory. This threatens to make his position appearparochial (Hare 1971). He is aware of this worry. He replies by notingthat the number of principles that intuitionism endorses is small innumber and general in content and that this leaves room to reject much ofwhat is commonly taken to be right (FE 190). This seems like the rightkind of move to make. However, it puts him in a rather awkwardposition. If it really is true that the number is small and that it is possibletherefore to reject much of what is commonly recognized to be morallyrequired, then the position has a more reformist edge, and to the extentthat it is reformist it is more rather than less like the other views that Rossrejects. In this case, it makes it much more difficult for him to fault hisrivals for not capturing common-sense morality. If he attempts to movemore toward the plain man's view, then although he can more easily raiseobjections to ideal utilitarianism and other views, he is much more likelyto lose his critical element and therefore fend off the charge ofparochialism. The point may be made another way. The more general andless robust his list of responsibilities and goods the less likely the chargeof parochialism may stick, but it is also less likely that the view is asclose to common sense as he suggests, in which case that his opponentsdeviate from it to some extent is not a mark against them or at leastcannot be used by Ross as a mark against them.

6. Moral MetaphysicsLike many in his time, Ross took pains to undermine various definitionsof moral terms. He draws a distinction between naturalistic and non-naturalistic definitions. The former are definitions which claim to definean ethical term without using any other ethical term (FE 6). The latterare definitions which attempt to define one ethical term by the aid of

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are definitions which attempt to define one ethical term by the aid ofanother (FE 6; cf. 42). Ross rejects all naturalistic definitions of moralterms, including right and (intrinsic) good. In RG, he argues(following Moore 1912 and Sidgwick 1907) that the moral terms rightand ought are incapable of definition: right is an irreducible notion(RG 12). In FE, he suggests again that right is indefinable (FE 42),though he is sympathetic to the idea that right is definable in terms ofsuitable (FE 5255). On this view, this act is right means this act hasthe greatest amount of suitability possible in the circumstances (FE 53;also 55). This is not a naturalist definition, since suitability is itself aunique and indefinable ethical notion (FE 146; also 159). In RG, Rossappears to reject all naturalistic attempts to define good (RG 78ff.). Heis in particular keen to impugn views that provide relational accounts ofgood; that is, that define it in terms of some relation to a mental state,usually desire. His view appears to be that goodness is a quality whichcan no more be defined in terms of anything other than itself, than can thequality of the sensation which we describe as being one of seeingyellow(RG 86). In FE, he seems to affirm the view that good isindefinable (FE 262), though again he seems sympathetic to a non-naturalistic definition, according to which good is definable in terms ofadmirable or commendable (FE 271, 283). He says that this sense ofgood applies only to things that are intrinsically good in the sense ofbeing objects worthy of admiration, and (as noted above) only virtue andintellectual activity are worthy of admiration (FE 283). The notion ofgood as applied to the goods of pleasure and justice can be definedrelationally. These goods are not objects worthy of admiration but ratherfit objects of satisfaction. Both notions of good are in a sense definable,but the definitions are non-natural: in both cases good is defined interms of worthiness or rightness (FE 279, 282).

Ross suggests a number of arguments against various (naturalistic andnon-naturalistic) definitions of moral terms. He relies in part on thefollowing kind of argument, which is directed at Moore (RG 8). If right

William David Ross


following kind of argument, which is directed at Moore (RG 8). If rightand being productive of the greatest good in the circumstances mean thesame thing, then it is not the case that it is intelligible that the propositionthe right just is the act productive of the greatest good in thecircumstances should have been denied and maintained with so muchfervour; for we do not fight for or against analytic propositions (RG 8). Itis intelligible that these propositions should have been denied andmaintained with so much fervour. Therefore, it is not the case that rightand productive of the greatest good in the circumstances mean the samething. This argument can be generalised to reject the usual suspects, e.g.,right means approved of by me or right means approved of by themajority of society, and so on. But it is not the best argument, since wemay well fight over analytic propositions, especially when they areopaque or unobvious.

Ross seems to acknowledge this sort of worry. He writes that the fact thatwe accept some definition as correct shows that the term did somehowstand for a complex of elements; yet the fact that we are for some time indoubt about whether the term is analysable, and if so, what the correctanalysis is, shows that this complex of elements was not distinctly presentto our mind before, or during, the search for a definition (RG 9293). Inreply, he says that the only way to rebut the claim that right and goodare definable (naturalistically) is to examine all the definitions thatpossess any initial plausibility (RG 93). To these we should apply twotests (FE 259; RG 93). First, we should determine whether the definitionapplies to all things to which the term applies, and to no others (FE 259;also RG 93). Second, we should ask whether the proposed definitionexpresses explicitly what we had implicitly in mind when we used theterm (FE 259; also RG 93). Using these tools, Ross rejects (amongothers) the position that this act is right means all or most menreactto the act with a feeling of approval (FE 24). We often judge that an actis right even when we know that we are alone in holding this view (FE25).

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25).

These are not the only arguments on which Ross relies. Against the claimthat right means awakes in me the emotion of approval (FE 22), heargues that it is unable to explain the possibility of difference of opinionon the rightness of acts (FE 24). On this view, if I say incest isimpermissible and you say incest is permissible we are not disagreeing,since all I am saying is incest awakes in me the emotion of disapprovaland all you are saying is incest awakes in me the emotion of approval,two statements that appear to be perfectly compatible with each other(FE 24). But we want to say that the two statements are not compatible.Ross gives the same argument against the claim that X is good means Ihave a certain feeling toward X. If I say X is good and you say X isbad, then you are saying that you have a certain (negative) feeling towardX and I am saying that I have a certain (positive) feeling toward X, twostatements that seem to be compatible with each other. Yet, he urges, ifanything is clear, it is that we do suppose ourselves to be makingincompatible statements about the object (RG 83).

Ross also appears to reject various analyses of moral terms in order topreserve a certain way of conducting moral philosophy (Shaver 2007 286,295). He notes that there is a system of moral truth, as objective as alltruth must be, which, and whose implications, we are interested indiscovering (RG 15; also 20, 29; KT 60). The discovery of these truths isnot a matter of scientific (empirical) investigation. Ethical truths are notdiscovered by mere observation (FE 7; also 168). Instead, they aregrasped by an intuitive act of human reason (FE 3). The use of thesenses, and the physical sciences, give us no propositions in which rightor obligatory occurs as a term (KT 87). There are two types ofpredicate those that can be discovered by experience to belong to theirsubjects, and those that can be discovered by insight, and let us grant thatrightness belongs to the second class (KT 81). In science, sense-experiencefurnishesreal data (RG 40). In ethics, no such appeal is

William David Ross


experiencefurnishesreal data (RG 40). In ethics, no such appeal ispossible. We have no more direct way of access to the facts aboutrightness and goodness and about what things are right or good, than bythinking about them (RG 40; emphasis added; also 82). To entrench thisidea he draws analogies between mathematic and logical knowledge andethical knowledge (RG 29, 30, 32; KT 42, 85; FE 320). He is fan ofsynthetic a priori truths in ethics (and elsewhere) (FE 3536; also 320).Since it might be possible to arrive at ethical knowledge by means of(mere) experience if moral terms were reducible to natural terms, thisprovides Ross with an incentive to show that no such reduction ispossible. He wants in short to protect a moral methodology that prizesappeal to what we think, the thoughts of the best and most enlightened(FE 172), consensus amongst experts (OJ 119120; FE 191) and variouskinds of thought experiments. Indeed, it has been suggested that throughthe use of these tools it is possible to demonstrate that though right isnot synonymous with a natural property it nonetheless refers to somenatural property, e.g., what has the greatest balance of justice,beneficence, fidelity, and so on, over injustice, non-maleficence andinfidelity, and so on (Shaver 2007 289). (This may be controversial ifsuch notions as justice are incapable of complete naturalization. Ifcomplete naturalization is not an option, then Ross may be forced toendorse a less palatable metaphysics. )

Ross holds that the basic claims of morality express facts which are self-evidently necessary (FE 320; also 262). Are these objective facts of aspecial kind? The standard suggestion is that for Ross moral facts arenon-natural facts or non-natural properties (Stratton-Lake 2002a xxi;Frankena 1963 86-87; 1973 103). It is not clear that he actually holds thisview. He says very little about the nature of moral facts except (perhapsunhelpfully) to compare them to mathematical and logical facts. He doesnot appear to infer from the fact that naturalistic definitions of moralterms fail that therefore the terms refer to distinct properties. His focus isalmost entirely on definitions of right and (intrinsic) good. His concern

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almost entirely on definitions of right and (intrinsic) good. His concernis with what we have in mind not with properties (FE 13, 42), though,problematically, he often refers to good as a quality or characteristicor property (RG 82, 87, 88, 110, 122; FE 278, 279). He writes that thedifference between goodness or value and such attributes as yellowness isthere whereas the latter are differentiaeof their possessors, the former isa property (i.e. a consequential attribute) of them (RG 121; italics inoriginal). It is not clear that Ross intends this view to be an inference fromhis arguments against naturalistic or other analyses. That he offers noexplicit argument to this effect suggests that he likely did not intend theinference (cf. Stratton-Lake 2002a), and he nowhere rules out that moralproperties are natural properties. At any rate, he does not need to makethis inference to achieve the aims he has in rebutting the variousdefinitions he discusses. The arguments he uses are sufficient to preserve(in his view) plausible moral semantics, moral disagreement, and hismoral methodology. This should please the adherents of this view, thoughit still leaves Ross with the task of making sense of the nature of moraltruth if it is not to be understood as correspondence to the moral facts.

Ross's appeal to self-evidence and his defence of the synthetic a priorimay seem problematic to many, though recent defences of these viewssuggest that their fortunes are improving (Stratton-Lake 2002a, 2002b;Audi 1996, 2004; Crisp 2002). To defend himself, Ross might simplyeschew appeal to self-evidence and certainty with respect to intuitionsabout general principles and replace them with appeal to moral beliefs ofhigh reliability or to considered convictions about moral claims (Griffin1996; Rawls 1971; Hooker 2000). This seems to give him what he needsmethodologically. The appeal to considered convictions allows him theability to say, for example, that we know directly that pain is bad and thatit is wrong to harm others without good reason; in addition, he can avoidthe defects of coherence theories of justification (FE 141). This(importantly) puts him on the same level as almost all moral theoristsworking today. It is less clear that Ross is able to divest himself of

William David Ross


working today. It is less clear that Ross is able to divest himself ofsynthetic a prior truths. But if his endorsement of the synthetic a prioritruths is one way of securing the standard way of doing moral philosophy,which involves appeal to thought-experiments, intuition, what we think,and so on, it is more difficult to reject. It is more difficult to reject still ifwe accept such claims in areas outside ethics and if we are not keen on(radical forms of) empiricism.

7. Ross's Contemporary ImportanceRoss's contemporary importance rests on the fact that he articulates one ofthe most plausible forms of deontology. He outlines a view that attemptsto avoid the alleged deficiencies of utilitarianism without embracing thealleged excesses of Kantianism. Indeed, it serves as an importantinspiration for those dissatisfied with either of these options. That theseare found by many to be uninspiring explains the recent resurgence ofRoss's view in ethics and applied ethics (Audi 2004; Beauchamp andChildress 2008). Ross also outlines a moral epistemology that is distinctfrom the coherentist reflective equilibrium that has held sway over moralphilosophy for the last forty years. He relies on the idea that at the core ofethics there are certain self-evident propositions that are made true bymoral facts, and which can be discovered by reflection on what we thinkabout moral and axiological questions. Those dissatisfied with thestandard model for doing moral philosophy but who at the same time findthemselves attracted to the idea that ethical theories should capture themain elements of common-sense morality do well to consult Ross'sunique contribution to moral epistemology.

BibliographyPrimary Sources

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[OJ] The Basis of Objective Judgements in Ethics, InternationalJournal of Ethics, 37 (1927): 113127.

[RG] The Right and The Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.[FE] Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.[KT] Kant's Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.[AT] Aristotle, sixth edition, London: Routledge, 1995.

Other Papers (in ethics) by Ross

Ross, W. D., 192829, The Nature of a Morally Good Action,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 29: 251279.

Ross, W. D., 1929, The Ethics of Punishment, Journal of PhilosophicalStudies, 4: 205211.

Secondary Sources

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, W. D. Ross, trans., in The Basic Works ofAristotle, R. McKeon (ed.), New York: Random House, 1941.

Audi, Robert, 1996, Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations ofEthics, in Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in MoralEpistemology, W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons (eds.),Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 101136.

, 2004, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and IntrinsicValue, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beauchamp, Tom L. & Childress, James F., 2008, Principles ofBiomedical Ethics, sixth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bentham, Jeremy, 1996 [1789], An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation, J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart (eds.), Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Bradley, Ben, 2009, Well-being and Death, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Brennan, Susan, 1989, Ross, Promises, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts,

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Lyceum, 1: 4356.Broad, C. D., 1940, Review of Foundations of Ethics by W. D. Ross,

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Other Internet Resources[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

Related Entriesconsequentialism | ethics: deontological | Moore, George Edward | non-naturalism, moral | pluralism | Prichard, Harold Arthur

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Robert Shaver for helpful written commentson a previous draft of this entry.

Notes to William David Ross1. This entry focuses mainly on Rosss engagement with idealutilitarianism.

2. In RG, Ross argues that what we are obliged to do is a certain act; thatis, we are obliged to bring about a certain state of affairs, e.g., that afriend receives a book one promised to send her (RG 4246). However,he changed his mind about this in FE, where he argues (followingPrichard 1932) that what we obliged to do is to set ourselves to do

William David Ross


Prichard 1932) that what we obliged to do is to set ourselves to dosomething rather than bring about a state of affairs (FE 108, 153154,160161).

3. Ross argues that pleasure is only prima facie good because somepleasures, e.g., those taken in lust or in cruelty, are bad (RG 136137).

4. In FE, he describes justice as a situational good: it does not involveactivities or enjoyments resident in individuals, but would involverelations between individuals (FE 286).

5. Ross notes that as a mere condition of the intellect knowledge is notbetter than pleasure. An instance of knowledge is better than an instanceof pleasure only in the event that it is to some extent the actualization ofa desire for knowledge (RG 151). This desire is virtuous and so makesthe knowledge better than the pleasure (RG 152).

6. In the case of pleasure, there are other reasons for thinking that it is notworthy of admiration, namely, that pleasant experiences are not admirablelike virtue and intellectual activity and that one is not consideredadmirable in respect of feeling pleasure, though one is in respect ofbehaving virtuously and in respect of intellectual activity (FE 271).

7. Initially, Ross thought that all innocent pleasures were good, includingones own, and that we ought to promote them (RG 2426). In FE, deniesthat we have reason to promote our own pleasure.

8. Stratton-Lake suggests that if both pleasure and virtue are intrinsicallyvaluable, they would be on the same scale (2002a, 129n54). This isprecisely what Ross denies. In RG, Ross thought that virtue and pleasurewere on the same scale, though virtue was (somehow) higher up on thescale than pleasure could ever reach (RG 150; FE 275). However, herejected this view in FE (FE 180, 275, 283). He argues that they are notvaluable in the same way and so not on the same scale. This allows him

Anthony Skelton


valuable in the same way and so not on the same scale. This allows himto vindicate the intuition that no amount of pleasure can outweigh someamount of virtue, which might happen when one takes a lot of pleasure invery small amount of cruelty or lust, while claiming that pleasure is goodin itself (FE 283284). That is, it allows him to say both that virtue isalways greater than pleasure and that pleasure is intrinsically valuable.

9. Stratton-Lake (2002 xlii, n.51) argues that it is unclear how Ross canbelieve that pleasure is good in any sense and avoid the conclusion thatwe have a prima facie duty to promote our own pleasure. But given thedistinction between goods that Ross draws in FE it is clear: my ownpleasure is not from my point of view an object worthy of satisfactiontherefore I have no reason or responsibility to promote it.

10. In his discussion of the idea that it is right to take satisfaction in apromise being kept he is careful not to say that promise keeping is good:indeed, he thinks that it is right to take satisfaction in this because it is aninstance in which a duty is discharged, not a good promoted (FE 289).

11. This seems to be the view he held in OJ; see 119, 123. He does, note,appear to rely on a different view of justice (OJ 123).

Copyright 2010 by the author Anthony Skelton

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