Robert Pape Why Japan Surrender

7/29/2019 Robert Pape Why Japan Surrender

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Why Japan SurrenderedAuthor(s): Robert A. PapeSource: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall, 1993), pp. 154-201Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539100 .

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WhyJapan Robert . PapeSurrenderedThe end of WorldWar II in the Pacific s the most successful case ofmilitary oercionamongmodern nation-states.On August 15, 1945, Japanunconditionally urren-dered to the United States, although it stillpossessed a two-million-manarmyin the home islands which was prepared and willing to meet anyAmerican nvasion, as well as otherforcesoverseas. Indeed, Japan'ssurren-derrepresents rare nstanceof a greatpowersurrenderingtsentirenationalterritoryo an opponent that had not captured any significant ortion of it.This coercive success saved the lives of tens of thousands ofAllied soldiersand many more Japanese.1From the standpointof understandingcoercion, what matters s not theexact date of Japan's surrender,but the fact that it surrendered withoutofferingast-ditch esistance.The key question is: why did Japancapitulatebefore nvasion and decisive defeat ofher home army?Debate has raged fordecades over this question. This prolific iteratureoffers hreeprincipalexplanations,all ofwhichassume that civilianvulner-

abilitywas the keyto coercion.The first rgues that the decisive factorwasfear of future punishmentfromatomic bombing: "It was not one atomicbomb, or two, which brought surrender. t was the experienceof what anatomic bomb will actually do to a community, lus thedreadof manymore,

Robert ape s anassistant rofessorn the chool fAdvanced irpowertudies,AirUniversity,axwellAir ForceBase,Alabama.I thank Robert Art,Mark Clodfelter,Michael Desch, MatthewEvangelista,Paul Huth, AkiraIriye,JohnMearsheimer,David Mets, and Stephen Waltforhelpful comments. also wish toacknowledge an extraordinary ebt of gratitude o Chaim Kaufmann for all the help he gavewiththis article.1. Contrary to exaggerated claims at the time thatJapan's surrender saved a half millionAmerican ives, Rufus Miles persuasively estimates that the invasion ofKyushu, the southernmost of Japan's fourmain islands, would have cost perhaps 20,000 Americandeaths. WhileestimatesforJapanese casualtiesareunavailable, theywould likelyhave resembledthoseduringPacific opetations fromMarch 1944 through May 1945, in which Japanese losses were overtwentytimeshigher than Americancasualties. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., Hiroshima: The StrangeMyth of Half a MillionAmerican Lives Saved," Internationalecurity, ol. 10, No. 2 (Fall 1985),pp. 121-140.Internationalecturity,ol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 154-201(? 1993 by the President nd Fellows of Harvard College and theMassachusetts nstitute fTechnology.

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that was effective."2 apan surrendered, t is argued, to avoid the risk ofhaving itspopulation centers nnihilated.The second focuses on the effects f conventional strategic ombing onJapan's population. This position s largely dentifiedwiththeUnited StatesStrategic ombingSurvey USSBS): "Itwas notnecessaryforus toburneverycity, o destroyevery factory, o shoot down every airplane or sink everyship, and starve the people. It was enough to demonstrate hat we werecapable of doing all this."3 The decline in moralehad a profound effect nJapan's political eadership, according to theUSSBS: "At the time surrenderwas announced, [low morale]was rapidlybecoming of greater mportanceas a pressure on the political and militarydecisions of the rulers of thecountry."4The third xplanation tressesAmericandemands, contending hatJapan'sdecision resultedfrom concession by the United States, permitting apanto retainthe emperor.This concession reduced the costs of surrender, ndso made Japanwilling to give in rather hanfacethe continuedsufferingfits society.5The principal mplication f all threeof thesearguments s thathad Amer-ican air power not driven up the costs and risks to civilians,Japanwouldnothave surrenderedpriorto invasionof the home islands.However,none of these explanations s consistentwiththefacts.First, heargumentthatthe threatof atomicattackcoercedJapan fails,because con-ventionalbombing had alreadyachieved such a high evel ofdestruction hatatomicbombs could not inflict ramaticallymoredamage; the"hostage"was

2. Karl T. Compton, "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used," AtlanticMonthly,No. 178(December 1946), p. 54 (emphasis in the original); Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use theAtomic Bomb," ForeignAffairs, ol. 35, No. 2 (January 1957), pp. 334-353; Herbert Feis, TheAtomic omb nd theEnd of WorldWar I (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1966).3. United States Strategic ombingSurvey USSBS), Japan's truggleo End theWar Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government rinting ffice U.S. GPO], 1946), p. 10. Air Force Chiefof StaffGeneralHenry Arnold later contended, "the Japanese acknowledged defeat because air attacks, bothactual and potential, had made possible the destruction f their apability nd will forfurtherresistance." Quoted in Martin Caidin, A Torch o theEnemy:The Fire Raidon Tokyo New York:BallantineBooks, 1960), p. 23.4. USSBS, TheEffectsfStrategic ombingnJapanese orale Washington,D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1947),p. 6. The USSBS also claims thatstrategic ombingof industry,while itdid not cause Japan'ssurrender,helped accelerate t by hastening the collapse of theeconomy.As discussed below,it was the blockade rather than bombing that gutted Japanese industrial production, a factrecognized by the USSBS itself n several subsidiaryreports.5. Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic urrender: he Politicsof Victory nd Defeat Stanford:StanfordUniversity ress, 1958), p. 198. See also Feis, TheAtomic omb.



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already dead. Second, theargument hatbombingcollapsedJapanese moraleis also wrong. Despite being subjected tothe mostharrowing error ampaignin history,Japan's civilianpopulation did not pressure the government osurrender,ndustrialworkers did not abandon their obs, and Army disci-pline remained excellent.Third, the argument hat a reductionof Americandemands can explain the outcome misreads the facts. The United Statesnever communicated ny commitment o retainthe emperor,or willingnessto reduce any other demands.6I argue that a fourthexplanation is correct. Militaryvulnerability, otcivilianvulnerability,ccounts forJapan'sdecision to surrender.Japan'smil-itaryposition was so poor that its leaders would likelyhave surrenderedbefore nvasion, and at roughlythe same time n August 1945,even iftheUnited States had not employed strategicbombing or the atomic bomb.Rather hanconcernfor he costsand risks othepopulation,or evenJapan'soverallmilitaryweakness vis-a-visthe UnitedStates,the decisivefactorwasJapanese eaders' recognition hat their trategy orholdingthemostimpor-tantterritoryt issue-the home islands-could not succeed. As Japaneseleaders came to doubt whetherthey could preventthe home islands frombeing invaded and overrun, heypreferredurrender o the costsof continu-ing the war.Three key events persuaded Japanese leaders that theirmilitary ositionwas untenable.First, nd most mportant, ythe summerof1945,the Alliedsea blockade had completely ut off ll outside sources of supply, cripplingthe key economic and military illars supportingJapan's strategy. econd,the fall of Okinawa in Juneplaced American tactical ir power in range ofthe southernmosthome island ofKyushu. Finally, herapid collapse of theJapanesearmies n Manchuria under Sovietattack ndicatedby analogythat

6. Leon Sigal's work s perhaps themost mportant ince theearly 1960s.He debunksthe myththatAmerican concessions on the emperor nduced Japan's surrender.Contrary o the widelyheld view, the United States made no such concession prior o Japan'sacceptance ofthe Potsdamdeclarationon August 15, 1945. His second major argument ffers new explanationbased onJapanese domestic politics. Japanese decision makers were motivated,he argues, by theirowninterests n preserving their nstitutions nd domestic power, and thus, intervention y theemperorto overcome the domestic log-jam accounts forthe surrender.A problemwith thisargument s that t is inconsistentwith the first:factors behave accordingto domestic consid-erationsand if theUnited Statesmade no concession to preservethe imperial nstitution, hentheemperorwould have acted against his own interestnpreserving hethrone ysurrendering.Leon V. Sigal, Fighting oa Finish:thePolitics fWar Terminationn theUnited tates ndJapan,1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1988).



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the home army was unlikely to perform s well against the Americans ashad been expected.7To establish which of these fourexplanations is correct, hree questionsmust be answered. First, what were the American coercivestrategies ndhow faithfully nd capably were these strategies xecuted? Second, whatwere the relationships among the progressof the Americancoercivecam-paigns, changes in the prospectsforJapan's diplomatic nd military trate-gies, and changes in Japanese eaders' willingnessto surrender? inally, analternative xplanations account forJapan's surrender?

ExecutionfMilitaryOperationsMilitary ressure to end thewar progressed throughthreestages, as moreand more coercive implementsand strategieswere brought to bear. In thefirst tage, the United States employed an interdictiontrategy, ased on asubmarineblockade and precisionbombingof ndustrial argets.The secondstage, whichbegan in early 1945, incorporatedboth interdiction nd "Dou-het-style"8 ombing of cities. While the naval interdictionffortontinued,strategic ombing shiftedfrom nterdictionargets o a strategy ocused onattackingcivilian morale. In the final stage, in the summer of 1945, theinterdictionnd conventionalDouhet strategieswere supplementedwithan

7. On this point my argument grees with the British fficial istory,which says, "The Russiandeclarationof war was the decisive factor n bringingJapan to accept the Potsdam declaration,for t broughthome to all membersof the Supreme Council the realization hat the ast hope ofa negotiated peace had gone and that there was no alternative ut to accept the Allied termssooner or later." Major General S. Woodburn Kirby,The WarAgainstJapan, ol. 5: The SurrenderofJapan London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice HMSO], 1969), pp. 433-434.8. The city bombing strategy, avored by many Air Force officers, sed incendiaryraids onurban areas to compel Japan to surrenderby shattering he will of the Japanese people. I callthis a "Douhet strategy" ecause it rests on the belief made famous by the Italian air theorist,Guilio Douhet, that infliction f high costs can shattercivilian morale, unraveling the socialbasis of resistance, and causing citizens to pressure the government o abandon its territorialgoals. As the StrategicBombing Survey states, "the implicit trategy ow was to mountsuchan airoffensive hatJapanwould be forced o surrender ecause of the disruption f ts organizedeconomic, political, and social life, without an actual military nvasion of the home islands."USSBS, Effectsf Strategic ombing n JapaneseMorale, p. 34. For general discussion of Douhetstrategies nd detailed discussion in the Japanese case, see Robert A. Pape, PunishmentndDenial: TheCoercive se ofAir Power Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, forthcoming),haps.2-3.



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invasionthreat nd a mixed "Schelling-Douhet"9trategy ased on theatombomb.

INTERDICTIONOnce American forcesgained the initiative n 1943, coercionrather thaninvasionbecame the preferredmeans of ending the war.10 uccess in earlyisland operations,the growingsuperiority f the American fleetorganizedaround aircraft arriers, he progress of the submarinecampaign, and thenew B-29 ong-rangebomber all persuaded Americanstrategic lannersthatthe main pressure applied to Japan should come from the sea and air.Althoughmuch of the planning for blockade and bombardmentof Japanoccurred in 1943, these components of U.S. strategy ook some time toexecute fully.American submarines did notachieve greatsuccess in sinkingJapaneseships until ate 1943and 1944,while large-scalebombingcould notbeginuntil theMariana Islands were seized in mid-1944.

NAVAL INTERDICTION. The American naval interdictiontrategywas basedon commercewarfare.Under this strategy, he attacker implytriesto sinkas much merchantshipping tonnage as possible, reducingthe defender'sstockof shippingby destroying essels faster han theycan be replaced. Ifsuccessful,this proceeds exponentially, s fewersupplies are available toproduce replacementships while attacking orcescan concentrate gainst adwindlingnumberof targets.The ultimategoal is to reduce the defender'sshippingcapacitybelow the minimumneeded tomaintain ts war economy.9. The atomicbombings ofJapanwere intendedto compel surrender oththrough heir hockeffect n civilianmorale, as in a Douhet strategy, nd through hethreat fhorrendousfurtherdevastation, which I call a "Schelling strategy," ecause the idea of manipulatingthe riskofpunishment forpoliticalpurposes has largelycome to be identifiedwiththe work ofThomasC. Schelling. For generaldiscussion ofSchellingstrategies nd detailed discussionin theJapa-nese case, see Pape, Punishment nd Denial, chaps. 2-3. The landmarkworks regarding theatomicbomb decision are Henry L. Stimson,"The Decision toUse theAtomicBomb,"Harpers,No. 194 (February1947), pp. 97-107; Morton, "The Decision to Use the AtomicBomb"; LenGiovannitti nd Fred Freed, TheDecision oDroptheBomb New York:Coward-McCann, 1965);Feis, TheAtomicBomb; nd Michael S. Sherry,The RiseofAmerican irPower New Haven: YaleUniversity ress, 1987), pp. 300-316.10. The naval blockade actuallybegan on a small scale shortly fter earlHarbor, nd escalatedcontinuouslyuntilby the summer of1945 Japan was cutoff irtually ompletely.The blockadewas carried out primarily y submarines,operating inglyor in smallgroups. The goal was tosink as much Japanese merchant hipping tonnage as possible, rather han concentrating nstoppingespecially important argos. Karl Lautenschlager, The Submarine n Naval Warfare,1901-2001," nternationalecurity, ol. 11, No. 3 (Winter1986/87), . 121.



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Japanwas exceptionallyvulnerableto commerce warfare.First,seventy-fivepercent of the country'smost importantraw materials and high per-centages of otherbasic goods and foodstuffs ere importedfrom verseas.Second, theJapanesemerchant leetwas fairly mall,and highly ensitivetosmall osses because itwas alreadyused tonearlyfullcapacity t the start fthe war.1"Third,Japan's shipbuilding ndustrywas small, so hercapacitytoreplace osses was very imited.Japanhad 6million ons ofshipping vailablewhen the war began, and it builtor captured another4 milliontons duringthe war,making a total of only 10 milliontons, compared to the 85 milliontons ofAllied shippingconfronted y theGermancommercewarfare ffortin the Atlantic.12 ccording to Japanese pre-warestimates,Japanrequiredan absoluteminimumof 5 milliontons to continuea protractedwar. 3The U.S. strategy o cutJapanese lines of communications epended pri-marilyon submarines, which destroyed farmore tonnage than all otherinstrumentscombined, although land- and carrier-based ir power alsoplayed a role towards the end of the war. The submarinecampaign wasinitiallyhampered by problemsin weapons design, particularly orpedoes,and excessivelycautious tacticsbased on a submergedapproach rather hansurfaceattack at night.Also, fewmodern submarines could make the longvoyages fromCentral Pacific and Western Australian bases to the mainshipping lanes offthe Asian mainland. By mid-1943,however,these diffi-cultieshad largelybeen solved. The numberof U.S. submarineson patrolatany given timerose from n average of 13 in 1942 to 18 in 1943, to 27 byJanuary 944, and to 43 by October.14

By contrast,geographical imitations reventedair power from ontribut-ing much to the blockade until late 1944. Althoughthe 14th Air Force sta-tioned in China made limitedattacksagainst theJapanese shippingroutesbetween Singapore, China, and Japan, it was not untilthe capture of thecentralPhilippines in late 1944 that land-based air power could cut intoJapan'seconomic ifeline n a significantcale.15Carrier-based irpowerwas11. In fact,only65 percentof Japan's domestictradewas carriedby her own shipping n 1941.Jerome . Cohen, Japan's conomyn War ndReconstructionMinneapolis:University fMinne-sota Press, 1949),p. 251.12. These figures nclude all vessels of 500 tons or more. Lautenschlager, The SubmarineinNaval Warfare,"pp. 114, 119, 122.13. Cohen, Japan's conomy,. 104.14. ArthurHezlet, TheSubmarinend Sea Power London: PeterDavies, 1967),pp. 210-227.15. USSBS, TheEffectsfStrategicombing nJapan'sWarEconomyWashington,D.C.: U.S. GPO,1946), p. 36.



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allocated to major operations against Japanesenaval forces nd islandbases,and was hardlyused forcommerceraidinguntil 1945.The naval interdiction ucceeded completely, estroyingheJapaneseecon-omy. Shipping losses were so severe thatby August 1945Japan'smerchantfleethad been reduced to just half a million tons.16n fact,over 75 percentof the tonnage destroyedwas sunk priorto January , 1945.17Thus, sub-marineshad essentiallywon the tonnagewar beforeair power could inter-vene to help.The economic effects f the blockade were devastating, lthough theydidnot materialize mmediately ecause Japanhad stockpiled arge quantitiesofraw materials prior to the war. Despite heavy shipping losses, duringthefirst wo years of the war Japanwas able to ncreaseoutput nmostcategories.However, these reserves could be spent onlyonce. Bylate 1944, priorto theinitiation f strategic ir attacks,the raw materialbase of Japan'swar econ-omyhad been underminedand her industrywas in steep decline.By 1945, commodity mportshad practically eased, with disastrous effectson industrialproduction.Oil was themostcritical roblem. Japan dependedon overseas supplies ofoil for90 percentofherrequirements.Aware of thisweakness, U.S. forces gave priority o sinking tankers, drastically uttingJapan's import capacity;afterMarch 1945 no oil enteredJapan.18AlthoughJapan had a stockpile of over 40 millionbarrels in 1941 compared to anestimated nnual requirement f35 million, his had dwindled to3.7 millionbarrelsby the end ofMarch 1945 and just 800,000 by July.19inally,by July1945, with stockpiles of all majormaterialsexhausted and no more comingin, Japan's economywas completely hattered. See Table 1).

PRECISION BOMBING. Interdiction lso involved precision bombing againstkey Japanese war industries. The primary nstrumentwas the B-29, theproduct of an ambitious project to develop a very long range bomber by1944. A new bomber was needed because existingU.S. heavy bombers didnot have the range to strikeJapanfrom acific r Chinese bases, while carrier

16. Cohen, Japan's conomy, . 104.17. Kirby, Surrender fJapan,p. 475. Approximately6,835,000 tons of shipping were sunkbetween August 1, 1941and January , 1945,and 1,782,140betweenJanuary and August 15,1945.18. Hezlet, The Submarinend Sea Power, . 223.19. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, ppendix 11; Cohen, Japan's conomy, p. 134-135,144. In additionto the economic effects,ack of fuel drastically urtailedJapanese air and naval operations.



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Table 1. 1945 Production in Key Industries as Proportionof Peak.Industry Peak Production 1st Quarter, 1945 2nd Quarter, 1945 July 1945

Rubber 1944 (1 st qtr) 18% (4thqtr) 10%Aluminum 1944 (2nd qtr) 26% 15% 8%Oil Refining 1941 27% 9%Steel 1943 32% 1 %aMotorVehicles 1941 18% 6% 0%Ordnanceb 1944 (3rd qtr) 42% 31% 22%Aircraft ngines 1944 (2nd qtr) 42% 39% 29%Airframes 1944 (3rd qtr) 67% 61% 36%Explosives 1945 (1st qtr) 100% 75% 45%SOURCE: Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction Minneapolis: Uni-versityof Minnesota Press, 1949), pp. 125-126, 129, 133, 134, 155, 185-186, 231, 235-236,243, 247, 248, 249.NOTE: Where quarter is specified for peak production, his is the only quarterforwhich datais available.aThe quality of what steel was produced declined due to increasingshortages ofhigh-gradecoking coal, cobalt, nickel,chrome, and molybdenum.Aluminumquality also declined asan increasing proportion of productionconsisted of reprocessed scrap. Cohen, Japan'sEconomy, pp. 125-126, 156.b"Ordnance" includes small arms, artillery, anks, half-tracks, mmunition, and militaryelectronics,by yenvalue at 1945 prices; calculated fromdetailed figuresfornaval ordnanceand reported fractionoftotal spending accounted forbythe Navy.

aircraftacked theweightofstriking ower for ustainedbombardment famajor industrial tate ikeJapan.20Precisionbombingbegan inJune1944 and ended inMarch 1945. It startedwith ProjectMatterhorn,which used B-29s of XX Bomber Command sta-tioned in India and staging throughforwardbases at Chengtu in China.From this distance the bombers could just reach the southernmosthomeisland ofKyushu, but not the main industrial reas on Honshu. As a result,Matterhorn ropped a mere 800 tons of bombs on Japanin nine missions;forty thermissions were flownagainsttargetsn China,Manchuria, Korea,and South East Asia. Matterhorndemanded excessive logistic support in20. Wesley FrankCraven and JamesLea Cate, TheArmyAir Forces n WorldWar I, Vol. 5: ThePacific:MatterhornoNagasaki,June 944 to August1945 (Chicago: University fChicago Press,1953), pp. 3-33.



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relation to the weight of bombs dropped, and so was de-emphasized oncethe Mariana Islands became available.21The main Americanbombingeffort as based inthe Marianas, whichwerecaptured n the summerof1944.Heavy bomberbases were quicklypreparedand the XXIBomber Command began precisionbombing operations n No-vember, continuing until earlyMarch 1945. Even this was a small effort,amounting o ust 20 missionswhichdropped5400 tons of bombs(comparedtotheoverall totalof 160,800 onsultimately roppedonJapan, nd 1,360,000tons dropped on Germany).22The JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) target directive specified that bombersshould attack, n order ofpriority,ircraftngine manufacturers,irframes,port areas, and urbanareas.23 n fact,nearly ll theeffort15 of 20 raids)wasdedicated to attacking ircraft roduction.24The campaign was a failure, ortwo reasons. First, perationswere hind-ered by the long flying istances that restricted ayloads to three tons outof the nominalten, poor weather,Japanese fighter pposition,a sub-optimalordnance mix of too many high explosives and too few incendiariesand,initially, shortage of aircraft. hus, littledamage was done. Out ofJapan'snine principal aircraft ngine and assembly plants, only three suffered nylasting damage.25Second, and more important, ny damage inflictedby bombing couldcontribute ittleto reducing Japan's fighting apacity,because aircraft ro-ductionwas already in steep decline due to the shortages of key materialscaused by the naval blockade. Production of aircraft ngines had alreadyfallenoffsharply,and airframes lightly,n the last two months of 1944,beforehe plants were struckby B-29s.26n addition, the qualityofJapan's21. Gary J. Shandroff, The Evolution of Area Bombing n American Doctrine and Practice"(New York: Ph.D. dissertation,New YorkUniversity, 972), p. 130; Cravenand Cate, ThePacific,p. 175.22. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, . 574; USSBS, Summary eport PacificWar), Washington,D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1946), p. 16. Two additionalmajor B-29 missions were sent against Iwo Jimaas well as some minor raids against both Iwo Jima nd Truk.23. The Matterhorn argetdirectivehad included aircraft roduction, teel, ball bearings, elec-tronics, nd merchant hipping. n practice,however,only steel offered ignificantargetswithinrange of the U.S. forwardbase at Chengtu. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. 551-554.24. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. 554-574.25. Ibid., pp. 554, 573.26. For example, output at the Ota aircraft lant had fallen from peak of 300 per month toless than 100 before the plant was first ttackedin February.Allocation of aluminum to theindustryhad declined 70 percent by the first uarter of 1945. Craven and Cate, The Pacific,p. 570; Cohen, Japan's conomy, . 227.



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remaining ndustrialoutput had fallen so far that the equipment stillbeingproduced was highly unreliable. For instance, aircraftvailability ates fellfrom 0 percent at thebeginning of the war to 20 percent,while 40 percentofnon-combatferrying lights esulted n losses.27Thus, even ifleftunde-stroyed,Japan's remaining ndustries could contribute ittleto the combatcapability fJapanese forces.DOUHET: MARCH-AUGUST 1945Startingwith the fire raid against Tokyo on March 9, 1945, the Americanstrategicbombing effort hiftedfroman interdiction trategy o a Douhetstrategy ased on inflictingmaximumdamage on population centers.28The transitionn strategies an be dated by tracing hanges in targeting,mission profiles, nd munitions.An ideal interdiction trategywould pin-pointkeywar industries nd raw materials,while an ideal Douhet strategywould simply blot out residentialand commercialareas of whole cities.Interdictionmissions would be flown n daylight ormaximum ccuracy ndathighaltitude o avoid airdefenses,whileDouhet missions,requiringesseraccuracy, ould be flown tnightwhenairdefenses would be weaker.Finally,while bombloads forboth types of missions might nclude a mix of highexplosives and incendiarybombs, Douhet strikeswould employ a higherproportion fincendiaries.29The impetus for the change to a Douhet strategy ame from he air staffin Washington,which had come to favorarea bombingover precision n-dustrialattacks even before the bombingofJapanhad begun.30As soon astheXXIBomberCommand startedoperations, pressurewas put on itspre-cisionbombing-oriented ommander,GeneralHaywood S. Hansell, toadoptarea incendiarybombing. Test incendiaryraids were ordered as early as27. Cohen, Japan's conomy, p. 144, 230.28. The primaryreason that chemical and biologicalweapons were not used was strong op-positionby the British.Churchillfearedthatuse of gas against Japanwould encourage Germangas attacks against Britain. n 1944, the United States agreed not to initiate he use of gas orretaliateunilaterallywithout priorconsent by the British. igal, Fightingoa Finish, . 163.29. The high explosive bombs would break up structures o that the incendiaries ould set thepieces on fire.Since homes are normallymoreflammable han factories r the industrial quip-mentin them, fewerhigh explosives are needed forresidential rea bombing. For a detailedaccount ofthedevelopment of American ncendiary actics, ee JohnW. Mountcastle, TrialbyFire:U.S. IncendiaryWeapons, 1918-1945" Durham,N.C.: Ph.D. dissertation, uke University,1979).30. Shandroff, Evolution of Area Bombing," pp. 134-138; and Mountcastle,"Trialby Fire,"pp. 210-220.



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November 11, 1944,beforethe first trikeshad been flown.31 he pressureintensified fter successful incendiaryraid on Hankow, China by India-based B-29s on December 18. Finally, on January20, 1945, Hansell wasreplaced by General Curtis C. LeMay, who had commanded the B-29s inIndia, and was known as an advocate ofnight ncendiary ttacks.32Following a pair of small experimental aidsagainstKobe (February ) andTokyo February25), the incendiary ampaign began in earnest with a spec-tacular fire raid against Tokyo on March 9. This raid remains the mostdevastating air attack n history, xceeding even the atomicattacks on Hi-roshima and Nagasaki. 84,000 people died and 16 square miles (25 percentof the city)were destroyed.33 series offireraids was thenlaunched fromMarch 11 to 19 against Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe, which flattened nother16 square miles of Japan'smostimportant ities.3The fire litzwas temporarily altedonlybecause LeMay ran out of ncen-

diarybombs.35 or the next two months,theB-29s were diverted o supporttheOkinawa invasion by bombingairfields n Kyushu and aircraft actoriesin Japan, and miningJapanese coastal waters. Even so, LeMay managed tosend two major fire raids against Tokyo,which burned away another22square miles.36The nextmajor round of incendiaryraids, betweenMay 14 and June 15,soughtto finishoffJapan's six largestcities Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka,Yokohama, and Kawasaki). Attentionwas then turnedto secondarycities(with populations over 100,000),and 58 of62 were burned. The war ended

31. The first ireraids were flown against Tokyo on November 29 and Nagoya on January .Craven and Cate, ThePacific, p. 564-565.32. Shandroff, Evolution of Area Bombing," p. 136; Craven and Cate, ThePacific, p. 143-144,609, 612-614.33. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, . 617.34. Tactics for the fireraids were designed to incinerateJapanesecities most effectively.inceprecision accuracy would be unnecessary, missions were flown at night. n addition, LeMaydeveloped a set of special tactics to reduce fuel requirements nd enable the planes to carryheavier payloads. First, since the Japanese had very ittle hort- nd medium-rangeflak, thebombers flew at very low altitudes (5,000 instead of the usual 20,000 feet). Second, becauseJapan had no real night-fighterapability, ombers could attack ndividually nstead of flying nformation,nd carryno armament.Craven and Cate, ThePacific, p. 612-614; BrooksE. Kleberand Dale Birdsell, Chemicalsn Combat,Vol. 3 of U.S. Departmentof theArmy,Office f ChiefofMilitaryHistory,TheU.S. Armyn WorldWar I, Ser. XI: The TechnicalServices,VII: ChemicalWarfare ervices Washington,D.C.: Departmentof theArmy, 966), pp. 626-627; and Mount-castle, "Trial By Fire," pp. 135-165.35. Shandroff, Evolution of Area Bombing," p. 143.36. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. 627-635.



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before the tertiary ities (those with populations over 30,000) could bebombed.37The extent to which the Douhet strategywas implemented can be mea-suredbythedegree of destruction oJapan's populationcenters.38n all, 178square miles were razed, amounting to 40 percent of the urban area of the66 cities attacked. Twenty-twomillionpeople, 30 percentofJapan's entirepopulation, were rendered homeless. 2,200,000civiliancasualties were in-flicted,ncluding900,000fatalities. hese morethan exceeded Japan'scombatcasualties in thePacificofapproximately 80,000.39MIXED DOUHET/SCHELLING: THE ATOMIC BOMBThe finaldecision to drop the atomic bombs was taken by PresidentTrumanfollowingJapan's rejectionof the Potsdam Proclamationon July28, 1945.Hiroshimawas bombed on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. Some 80,000died atHiroshima and thecitywas leveled; atNagasaki 35,000 died and partof the citywas destroyed.40Evaluatingthe effectiveness f the atomicbombings as a Douhet strategyrequires assessing theiradditional contribution eyond what was alreadybeing done by conventional firebombing. This can be measured in tworespects:morale or shock effect, nd the additional damage and sufferinginflicted n the population.Surprisingly,he shock effect f the atomic bomb was minor.Due to theJapanese government'stight ontrolof information, ews of the bombingsspreadonly slowlyand the war ended beforemuchofthepopulation earned37. The best shortoverview of the urbanarea attacks s Craven and Cate, ThePacific, hap. 20.38. The degree to which the Douhet strategywas executed s oftenunappreciated.One reasonmay be thatpolitical eaders understated tsmagnitude n memoirs, nd media coverageat thetime argelyneglected the counter-cityampaign. Both Churchill nd Truman hardly mentiontheconventional ttacks and, when they do, they give the impressionthatcounter-cityttackshad just gotten under way when the war ended. Likewise, press reportsduring the war paidscant attention o the incendiary ampaign against Japanese civilians.Sherry,Rise ofAmericanAir Power, p. 315-316.39. Cravenand Cate, ThePacific, p. 643, 674-675; USSBS, EffectsfStrategicombingnJapaneseMorale, p. 34; and USSBS, Summary eportPacificWar), pp. 17, 20. OfficialJapanese figures,based on unscientific ata collection nd reporting rocedures,wereconsiderably ower 930,000totalcivilian asualties). The USSBS MoraleDivision built ts estimatefrom sample survey ndis probablymore accurate. For a detaileddiscussion of Japanese casualtyestimates, ee Sherry,Rise ofAmerican ir Power,p. 413.40. Nagasaki suffered ess because the city tood among a number of hillsthatshadowed largeparts of the cityfrom he blast. Figures forboth citiesdo not include deaths due to long-termradiationeffects.Craven and Cate, ThePacific, p. 724-725.



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what had reallyhappened atHiroshimaand Nagasaki.41Whiletheemotionaleffects n the survivors were devastating, t is not certain thatcitizens ofunattacked cities would have been equally affected ven if there had beentime forthe news to spread.42As faras damage is concerned, atomic bombs could contributemuch lessthan is commonlythought.The two bombs that were dropped killedabout1/7as many people as the conventional ncendiaryattacks. The StrategicBombing Survey later estimatedthatdamage equivalent to thatcaused byboth atomic bombs could have been matched by 330 B-29 sorties usingincendiaries;XXIBomber Command was flying ourtimes thatmany sortieseveryweek by August 1945.43To be effective s a Schelling strategy, he atomicbombingsshould havemet two main requirements. First, they should have been employed tothreatenvast futuredamage, rather han to maximizecurrent amage. Sec-ond, the timebetween detonations should have been long enough to allowthe bomb's import o sink in, and fortheJapaneseto reconsiderwhethertoaccede to Americandemands.Neitherof these criteriawere met. The first ould not be met,because thefirebombings had already inflicted uch tremendousdamage. By the timethe atomic bombs fell, a vast portion of the urban population had eitherbecome casualties or had fled to the countryside.By the end of the war,Japan's 66 largest citieshad become shadows of theirpre-warselves; thosew4ithver 100,000 had lost 58 percent of their 1940 populations, and thosewithovera millionhad lost two-thirds.fone definesthe "hostage" as majorand secondarycitieswith over 100,000 people, thenthehostagewas nearlydead beforetheatomic bombs fell.44

41. Few people outside the target reas had any real comprehension f what the atomic bombsmeant. For discussion ofJapanese control f the mediaand confusion fthepopulation regardingthe atomicbombs, see Ben-Ami Shillony, olitics nd Culture n Wartime apan New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1981), pp. 91-109; and MichihikoHachiya, Hiroshima iary:TheJournal faJapanese hysician, ugust6-September0, 1945 (Chapel Hill: University f North Carolina Press,1955).42. USSBS argues that morale effects f both conventional nd atomic bombing were similar nthat those closest to the blast were affected ubstantiallymore than those not in the immediatevicinity.USSBS, EffectsfStrategic ombingnJapanese orale,p. 34.43. 210 B-29s would have been needed forHiroshima,and 120 forNagasaki. USSBS, TheEffectsofAtomic ombs n Hiroshima nd Nagasaki,p. 33.44. More than 10millionJapanese, one seventh the nationalpopulationand one fourth f urbandwellers,fledto farmsfor refuge. Thomas R.H. Havens, Valley fDarkness: heJapanese eopleinWorldWar I (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 154-173.



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WhyJapan urrendered 67

Withoutmany morebombs-perhaps dozens-that theUnited States didnot have, atomicbombing certainly ould nothave overshadowed theeffectsof incendiary ttacks.45 robably the most damaging use foratomicbombswould have been in re-striking he largestcities, which had already beenbadlyburned but stillhad people living mid therubble. These targetswouldhave been quicklyused up, forcing he atomiccampaign to turn to smallercities where its advantage over conventionalbombing would have beensmaller.The timing equirementwas also not satisfied. ince theSchelling trategyaims to coerce by increasing futurerisks, t is necessary to permitthe op-ponentto assess those risksand act accordingly.However, the second atombomb was dropped only threedays after he first, arelysufficientimefortheJapanese government o carry ut a quick investigation f the effects fa wholly revolutionaryweapon, and not enough to develop a reasonedassessment of the danger itpresented.

Despite these weaknesses, the atomicbombings mighthave been an ef-fective chellingstrategy, roviding hat theJapanesedid notguess thattheUnitedStates had no more bombs. This strategy sually depends on signalingfairly learlythe scale ofpunishmentthat the attackerntends to inflict, utthecoercivepotentialofthe atomicbomb depended precisely n the fact hattheJapanesehad no way ofknowinghow much destructionwould be visitedupon them.Having no way to estimatehow manybombs were in the U.S.arsenal, they mighthave believed that we had an unlimitednumber,andtherefore eared thatthey would suffer evastationon an even greater calethanthey had already.INVASIONIn fall1944, thetimetable or ndingthe war against Japanwas disruptedbyevents in Europe, when it became clear that the collapse ofGermanywasnot imminent. Since the invasions of Kyushu and especially Honshu de-pended on redeploymentof large numbersof troops fromEurope, whichwould require four to sixmonths,plans forthese operationshad to put onhold. Hence, during the winter and springof 1945,air and sea operations45. In fact,no more bombs were on hand at the end ofthe war and onlytwowere producedbythe end of 1945. "U.S.-Soviet NuclearWeapons Stockpile,1945-1989:NumbersofWeapons,"The Bulletin ftheAtomic cientistsNovember 1989), p. 53.



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against the Japanese homeland continued,butwithout fixedtime-table orinvasion.46The final debate over the timing of the invasion took place followingGermany's ollapse inMay 1945. TheNavy and ArmyAirForces still bjectedto invasion. ArmyAirForcesCommandingGeneralArnold tried opersuadeGeneral Douglas MacArthurthat air attackwould make invasion unneces-sary,while AdmiralWilliamLeahy lobbied PresidentTrumanforan exten-sion of the blockade.47Despite these objections,the finalschedule of am-phibious operations against the Japanese homeland was establishedin lateMay, and confirmedby Truman, the JCS, and senior civilianadvisors onJune18.The reasoning behind the decision was contained in a JCS staff tudywhich argued that while theJapanesehome army ackedaircraftnd fuel, thad 2 million men plentifullyupplied withammunition nd powerful dis-cipline. Although Japanwas virtually ut offfrom heAsian mainland,herfoodsupplies were thought o be adequate at least through1945.So, despitethe close blockade and intense bombardmentof Japan,the JCS "doubtedwhether hegeneral economicdeterioration ad yet reached, or would reachfor ome time,thepointat which it would affect he ability f thenation tofight rrepelan invasion."48Moreover, f he Allies weretoforgo ccupation,the Japanese governmentmightwithdrawfromoccupied territoryn theAsiatic mainland, yet not agree to unconditional urrender.Withsome mis-givings,Truman accepted the JCS recommendation lthough,according toSecretary f War HenryStimson: "He had hoped there was a possibility fpreventing n Okinawa from ne end of Japan to theother."49The invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic)was to begin on November1, 1945, followed by the invasion of theTokyo plain on Honshu (OperationCoronet) on March 1, 1946.50The last preliminary tep, completedin mid-46. Ray S. Cline, Washington ommand ost: TheOperations ivision Washington,D.C.: Officeof the Chiefof MilitaryHistory,U.S. DepartmentoftheArmy,1951), pp. 340-342.47. HerbertFeis, The Atomic omb, p. 5-8; Admiral ErnestJ. Kingand W.M. Whitehead, FleetAdmiralKing (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 605; William D. Leahy, I Was There New York:McGraw-Hill,1950), pp. 384-385.48. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, . 182.49. Stimson, quoted in Feis, The Atomic omb, . 11.50. Kirby,Surrender fJapan,p. 152. No formaldirectiveforCoronet was ever issued by theJCS, inceJapan urrenderedwell in advance ofthestart f Olympic.Planningfor hisoperationduring the summer and fall of 1945 involvedmorelogisticsthanstrategy-more about how toredeploy arge numbers of Armyformations romEurope than about how to employ them ntheJapanese theater.Grace Person Hayes, TheHistory f theJoint hiefs f Staffn WorldWar I:The War gainstJapan Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute ress, 1982),pp. 701-710.



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Why apanurrendered69

June,was the captureofOkinawa, withoutwhichAmerican tactical ircraftcould not reach Kyushu. The plan for Kyushu had three phases. First,strategic ir bombardmentwould continue the destruction f Japanese in-dustrial power and communications. Next, the southernpart of Kyushuwould be isolated from he rest of theisland, themainland,and Honshu bya close naval blockade and tactical air interdiction. inally,fourteenU.S.Army and Marine divisions would commence an assault against the esti-mated15-18Japanese divisionsdefending outhernKyushu.51 heAmericanforceswould enjoy greatersuperiorityn air, ground, and naval firepowerthaneverbefore n the Pacificwar, and were expected to overruntheobjec-tive area within30 days.52In summary, he interdiction, ouhet, and invasion strategies ll satisfiedtheirbasic requirements,but at different imes. Although air interdictioncontributedittle, he naval blockade had achieved mostof ts militarybjec-tivesbythe end of1944, making nevitableJapan'seconomic collapse in 1945.The Douhet strategywas implementedquite effectivelyrom ts nception nMarch 1945, largelydepopulating Japan's citiesby August. While it couldnotbe carried out beforeNovember, the invasion strategywas highlycred-ible, especially afterthe fall of Okinawa in June provided the necessaryforward ases. For itspart,the atomic bomb contributed ittle o the Douhetstrategy, ut could have been effective s a Schelling trategy, epending onJapanese estimates of the size of theU.S. arsenal.Explaining apan'sDecision oSurrenderIn order to determine whether t was military r civilianvulnerability hatplayed the decisive role in Japan's decision to surrender,first,we mustunderstand how the Japanese governmentmade consequential decisions.Second, we need to knowJapan'spoliticalobjectives n thePacificwar, andhermilitary nd diplomaticstrategiesforachievingthem.Finally,we mustmeasure the relationship between the increasing vulnerabilities f Japan'spopulation and of her military trategy, nd changes in Japanese leaders'willingnessto surrender.51. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, . 154.52. If the campaign took longer than 30 days, U.S. forcescould be reinforced romEurope atthe rate of 3 divisions a month. bid., p. 155.



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JAPANESE DECISION MAKINGUnlikesome cases inwhichthemilitarynd political alculations fthetargetstate's eadership cannotbe measured directlynd so must be inferred romthebehavior of the state as a whole, in theJapanese case there s sufficientevidence to reconstruct he analyses and positions of various groupswithinthe governing lite.53Japan was governed by an oligarchy composed of three principal ele-ments.54As itwas an authoritarian tate, popular opinion played no directrole in the process, and in practicewas merelyone factor o be consideredamong others by elites.55The first nd most powerful group was the military,which controlledstrategicplanning withoutcivilianoversight.Because the Japanese consti-tutionprovided thata cabinet could not be formedwithouta Warministerand Navy minister, he military lso had effective eto power over all gov-ernmentactions. Of the two branches, the Armywas by far dominant.Civilian, Navy and even seniorArmyofficialswho opposed Army nterestswere oftensimply assassinated by radical junior officers. n addition, theformation f theKwantung Army fter heseizureofManchuria n 1931gavetheArmy n instrumentwholly beyondcentral ontrol.The Navy was muchweaker, but did have the advantage over the civilians in that it had themilitarynformationnd skillsto raise an occasional credibledissent to theArmy.The second group was the civilian eadership, which included the seniorstatesmen erving n thecabinet, ome ofwhomwere retiredmilitary fficers,and the emperor's chief adviser,the Lord PrivySeal Kido. This group hadtheformal esponsibility orrunning he country, ut in practicedid not actagainstthe wishes of themilitary. heirmost mportant unctionwas to serveas counsellors to theemperor,who would occasionally ummonone or moreof themto offer nalysis and recommendations.Althoughthe emperordid53. However, while there s good evidence forthemajor coalitions,we do not have sufficientevidence for ll individualsto treat ach as a separate case.54. For discussion of pre-warand wartimeJapanesepolitics, ee Akira riye,Power nd Culture:TheJapanese-Americanar,1941-1945 Cambridge: HarvardUniversity ress, 1981); David J. Lu,From heMarcoPolo Bridge oPearlHarborWashington,D.C.: Public Affairs,961); Saburo lenaga,ThePacificWar,1931-1945 New York:Pantheon,1978); and Michael A. Barnhart, apan reparesforTotalWar Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1987).55. For descriptionsof the oligarchical nd consensual nature of Japanesegovernmentduringthisperiod, see Robert J.C. Butow, Japan'sDecision o SurrenderStanford: tanfordUniversityPress, 1954), pp. 10-17; and USSBS, Japan's truggleo End theWar.



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not express his own opinion directly, he simple factof an audience wouldlend weight to the summoned official's ecommendations.Last was EmperorHirohito,who served primarily s a religious symbol tounifythe national consciousness of the country.Although in principle hehad the power tomake law, in practicehe took no formal art n government,except that cabinetdecisions were required to be reported o him.In theory,national policy decisions were made according to a rule ofunanimous consent. The cabinet, which combined the Army and civiliangroups, worked out a decision and then presented it to the emperor,whonever departedfrom t. In practice, hisdid not work because ofthe Army'soverwhelmingdominance. The Armycontrolled hemilitary olice, a primeinstrument orrepressionof dissent. For nstance, nApril 1945WarMinisterAnami ordered thearrestof some 400 persons suspected ofharboring nd-the-war entiments, ncludinga formermbassador to England and a judgeofhighrank.56 iviliansrecognizedthedominantrole ofthe army.57JAPANESE GOALS AND STRATEGIESJapan'smainterritorial oals in theSecond WorldWar were drivenbya needforeconomic and military utarky.Japan sought to controlthe major agri-cultural nd raw materials-producing reas ofEast and SoutheastAsia, in-cluding Manchuria,much of China, and the Dutch East Indies.58War withtheUnited Stateswas precipitated artly ytheAmerican,British,nd DutcheconomicembargoofJuly 941,which cutoffmostofJapan'soil supplies.59

Duringthe waragainsttheUnitedStates,Japanese trategy assed throughfourphases. In the first, apanaimed at quick captureof the East Indies aswell as strategic oints along a defensive ringfrom heNorth Pacific ll theway toBurma, ncluding hePhilippines,CentralPacific slands,New Guineaand the BismarckArchipelago, Siam, and Malaya. This perimeter, heybe-lieved, would defyU.S. counter-offensivefforts, orcingt to accept Japan'sgains. This strategy njoyed some success until theJapanesetriedto extend56. Butow, Japan'sDecision o Surrender,. 75.57. After he war, Prime Minister uzuki said, "The Cabinet would have collapsed immediatelyhad the War Minister ubmittedhis resignation.Because Anami refrained rom ubmitting isresignation, he Suzuki Cabinet was able to attain ts major goal, namely, he war's termination."Ibid., p. 204.58. The Philippines, Malaya, and Burma all had some economic value, but were attackedforstrategic easons. Barnhart,Japan repares orTotalWar,pp. 237-262.59. For a recentdiscussion of how Western conomic coercionbackfired, ee JonathanG. Utley,Going o War withJapan, 937-1941 Knoxville: University f Tennessee Press, 1985).



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theperimeter o includeMidway Island and Attuand Kiska in theAleutians,enablingtheUnitedStates to destroy heJapanesecarrier leet tMidway inJune1942.60Once the Japanese lost command of the sea, the initiativepassed to theUnited States. During the second phase, Japan foughta defensive war,seeking to "hold the ring" in the centraland southernPacific n order topresent the United States with the prospect of a long-drawn-outwar andthus induce it to abandon its counteroffensive.6'The third phase began in July1944. Following the loss of Guadalcanal,New Guinea, the Marshalls, and the Marianas, it became clear to mostJapanese elitesthatJapan could notachieve theoriginalobjectivesforwhichshe had waged war against theUnited States in the first lace. The cabinetof GeneralHideki Tojo, which had begun thewar, fell nd was replacedbya new governmentheaded by PremierKuniakiKoiso.62However, Japandidnot immediately ue for peace, because Japaneseleaders believed that con-tinued resistance would inflict nough costs on the Americans to inducethemto lightentheir erms.Japanespecially hoped to end the war with hermost mportantmainland possessions intact.63Towards this end, Japan began to seek intermediaries o facilitate egoti-ations, hoping to find an ally who would help moderate the unconditionalsurrender emands oftheUnitedStates.64 his, however,did not mean thatJapanwas willingto accept peace at any price.An indicationofthecommit-ments Japanstillbelieved itself apable of defending an be gained from heSeptember1944 cabinet discussions about theconcessions Japan would haveto offerthe USSR to "mediate" between Japan and the United States.65Estimating hatthe Soviets would demand much of Manchuria, nner Mon-golia, part of the Kuriles, and otherterritories,he Cabinet decided not toproceed at that time.6660. On Japan's nitial trategyntheSouthPacific, ee Butow,Japan's ecision oSurrender,p. 7-12; Paul M. Kennedy, "Japanese Strategic Decisions, 1939-1945," in Strategy nd Diplomacy(London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 179-196.61. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, p. 393-406.62. Although some of the Jushinhad begun to doubt Japan's ability o maintaincontroloverher newly acquired territoriess early as 1943, the fall of Tojo was the first eal opportunity ochange Japan'sfundamentalpolicy. Butow, Japan'sDecision oSurrender,. 15.63. Ibid., p. 43, n41.64. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, . 174.65. China, Sweden, and Britain were also approached as possible intermediaries,with noresult.66. Butow, Japan'sDecision oSurrender,. 89.



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Why apan urrendered73

The fourth nd final stage began with the U.S. invasion of Okinawa inApril 1945.Koiso fell nd was replaced byAdmiralKantaro Suzuki. Suzuki'scabinet,however, was not formedto produce a negotiated settlement.Al-though the Japanese expected that afterOkinawa the Americans wouldinvade the home islands, this did not trigger decision to open surrendernegotiations.To the contrary, he Army,the emperor, nd Suzuki himselfbelieved thatJapan's best strategywas tofight n intense battleon the homeislands rather han accept surrender.This plan had two tracks.The firstwas an approach to the SovietUnion,beginning nJune, n searchof diplomaticor military id.67The second trackwas to preparefor major battleagainstthe invasion forces.Japaneseleaders were divided over thegoals ofSovietmediation. For thecivilians, the purpose was to get help in encouraging the United States toreduce its surrender terms.For the military,which was not interested nsurrender, hepurpose was to ensureJapan's ability o continue the war. Inparticular, hey ought to purchase Soviet oil and aircraftnreturn or outh-east Asian rubber, tin, lead, and tungstenor, if necessary, for territorialconcessions. At best, some in theNavy hoped eventually o draw theSovietUnion into the war on Japan's side. At a minimum, heywanted to preventa Soviet attack.Because of the lack of consensus, contactwith the Sovietswas not pursued with any sense of urgencyor with a consistent set ofpriorities.n any case, the Soviets were unresponsive.68In April 1945, the Japanese military egan planning forhomeland de-fense.69Remarkablyprescient, Japanese Army intelligencepredicted thatAmericanforceswould followthe capture of Okinawa with an invasion,firstofKyushu and thenoftheTokyo plain area ofHonshu. Theyestimatedthatthe United States would invade Kyushu with 15-20 divisions and Honshuwithapproximately 0 divisions. While nvasion might ome as earlyas July,it was considered more likelythat the United Stateswould notbe preparedto attackKyushu until October 1.70Japan's strategywas to inflict uch heavy losses on Americanforces,bothat sea as theyapproached the landing zones and on the beach once they67. Statementsby some Japanese officials o the effect hat Japanfirst pproached the Sovietsin February1944 are erroneous,according to Butow, Japan'sDecision oSurrender,. 127.68. Ibid., pp. 77, 112-141.69. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, . 147.70. Ibid., p. 149; Donald S. Detwiler and Charles B. Burdick, ds., War n Asia and thePacific,1937-1949, Vol. 12: Defense f thei omeland nd End oftheWar New York: Garland Publishing,Inc., 1980), p. 75.



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landed, that the UnitedStates would be compelled to retreat.71The key wasnotto actually defeattheAmericanforcesmilitarily, ut to raise theprice ofconqueringJapaneseterritoryigher han American ocietywould be willingto stand. According to General Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief of the OperationsBureau, the Army"hoped to concentrate ts strength ntirely n the areawhere the Americanforceswould make theirfirstanding,and ithoped tostrike decisive blow, thereby orcing he enemyto abandon [its] ntentionofattempting second landingor else seriouslydelay this move."72The high command's defense plan, "Ketsu-Go," called for ugmenting hehomeland's existingdefenses with divisionsbroughtback fromChina andManchuria and newly raised divisions and air fleets, supplemented withlarge numbers of lightly rmed guerrillas.Operationally, he Americanas-saultwould be counteredby largeconventional orcespositioned n and nearthe ikely anding areas, while guerrilla orces overed ower-priorityegions.Accordingly, outhernKyushu and theTokyoarea were allottedmore thanhalfof the 67 divisions and 35 independentbrigadesavailable, while provi-sion was made for rapid reinforcementf the initial nvasion area. For in-stance, should Kyushu be attackedfirst,ts fifteen ivisions would be aug-mented with threeothers fromHonshu. GivenJapan's mountainousterrain,thepossible landingbeaches were well demarcated.These beaches were tobe heavilyfortified ithobstacles, mines,and entrenched roops nd artilleryemplacements. fpossible, theinvaderswere tobe defeated on thebeaches;otherwisemobile assault divisions would counter-attack nd destroythebeachheads.73

Ratherthanprovide close air support for hearmy,Japan'sairpower wasto be used in kamikaze (suicide) unitsagainst troop transports pproachingthe landing zones. Because of a dearth of trainedpilots and aviation fuel,kamikaze tacticswere expected to be moreeffectiven inflictingosses thanstandard types of air operations.74 t was estimated thatby cannibalizingreconnaissance nd training nits, some 800armyfighternd bomber ircraftand 3,000kamikazeaircraft ould be made available.75All thesepreparationswere to be completedby the end ofAugust.71. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, p. 96, 149.72. Quoted in Sigal, Fighting o a Finish, . 49.73. Kirby, urrenderfJapan, p. 147-148; Detwiler and Burdick,Defense f heHomelandnd EndoftheWar,pp. 1-255.74. Butow, Japan'sDecision o Surrender,. 99.75. Kamikaze air strength ctuallytotaled more than4,800. Detwilerand Burdick,Defense ftheHomeland, ocument No. 119, p. 2.



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Why apan urrendered75

CAUSES OF CHANGE IN JAPANESE BEHAVIORTo evaluate the relative ffects fcivilian nd militaryulnerability nJapan'sdecisionto surrender,we must trace theeffects f changes in vulnerabilitieson thepositions ofthemajor groups in theJapanese government egardingsurrender.To do this, the case is divided into a numberof discrete timeslices,and thedegree ofJapan'svulnerability oeach type ofthreat-nuclear,conventional fireattack, and invasion-is measured for each period. If thepreferences f one group changed at the same time as an increase in onetype of vulnerability,while the other type remained constant, thiswouldshow thatthe first nd not thesecond was thecause ofthatgroup's decision.Carrying out this analysis reveals that the only factorto influence, llprincipalgroups was Japan'smilitary ulnerability o invasion. Japan's vul-nerability o nuclear attack had some influenceon some groups but not ontheArmy, he criticalgroup. The vulnerability fJapanese civilians to con-ventionalattack had hardly any effect n any decision makers.INDEPENDENT VARIABLESThe two independentvariables are civilianvulnerability nd military ulner-ability.Civilianvulnerabilitys coded as "low" where civiliancostswere notsufficiento merit hecosts ofciviliandefenseprocedures,"medium" wherelarge civilian costs could be avoided with defensive steps, "high" wheremajorparts of thepopulation are uncertain bout whethertheywill surviveeven withdefenses, or "very high" wheremajorparts ofthepopulationarecertainnot to survivebecause avoiding theenemy's attacks s impossible.Measurement of military ulnerability ocuses on the home islands, be-cause controlof her national homeland was the most important alue thatJapanwas being called upon to surrender.Vulnerabilitys coded as "low"wheretherewas no riskofthehome islandsbeing overrun n theshort erm,"medium" where the risk was considerable but could be reduced by addeddefensivemeasures, "high" where the risksof osingwere greatdespite thebestavailable countermeasures, ut that tmight e possible to inflictnoughattrition o reduce the enemy's commitment o controlthe territory,nd"very high" where the likelihood of loss of control over the territory p-proached certainty ecause both defeat and heavy attrition fenemyforcesare impossible.

CIVILIAN VULNERABILITY. BeforeJune1944,Japanese societywas not vul-nerable to attack.76n October 1943, the government rdered non-essential76. Prior to June 1944 Japanwas never bombed, except for the fifteen-plane oolittle raid ofApril1942.



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civilians o evacuate urban areas, butfew did and no resourceswere devotedto enforcing heorder.77From June to November 1944, vulnerabilitywas low. During this period,China-based B-29s bombed Japanon severaloccasions,but onlya few citiesin Kyushu were affected nd damage was extremely ight.In November1944, civilianvulnerabilityncreased to medium, when Mar-ianas-based B-29s began bombing industries throughoutthe country.Al-though thousands of civilians were killed or injured, protectivemeasuressuch as air defenses, evacuations, and fire anes cut through ityneighbor-hoods helped keep costs and risks ow. For example,therelative neffective-ness of early experimentalncendiary aidsconvincedtheJapanesethattheirfire-preventionystemswere highlyefficient.78AfterMarch 1945, however, civilian vulnerabilitywas high. The massiveAmerican ncendiaryraids inflicted ighlevels of casualties whichJapaneseprotectivemeasures could not significantlyeduce.79As the summer woreon, the problemgrew as Japanese air defenses waned, Americanbomberstrength rew,and the campaign spread out to strike mallercities, so thatfewer nd fewersafe places remained.80Following the atomic bombingof Hiroshima,the vulnerability f Japan'spopulationto nuclearattackbecame veryhigh.Current ostsand riskswerenot significantlyigherthanthose fromncendiary ttack.The initial tomicbombs werenotmuch more ethal than the argest ncendiary aids, certainlynot by the orders-of-magnitudencrease in lethality hat has come to beassociated withhydrogenbombs. More people died in the firstmajorincen-diaryraidon Tokyo thanat Hiroshima.Despite this,theultimate isksfacedby Japanhad escalated markedly.Given sufficientime for he United Statesto produce weapons, Japan'svulnerabilityo nuclear attackwas unlimited.In fact,the degree of vulnerability erceived by Japanese leaders varied,depending on whetherthey understood mmediatelywhat these revolution-ary weapons implied and how many more they thoughtthe United Statesmightpossess. Some civilian eaders were immediately onvincedthatJapancould not sustain this new form of warfare,while some Armyand Navyrepresentativesdenied that an atomic bomb had been used at Hiroshima.

77. Havens, Valley f Darkness, p. 161-162.78. Craven and Cate, ThePacific, . 565.79. Alvin Coox, Japan:The Final AgonyNew York: BallantineBooks, 1970), pp. 28, 33, 41.80. Craven and Cate, The Pacific, . 658.



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Not untilAugust 10,after heNagasaki bombing,did the nvestigators inallyagree thatJapanfaced the prospectof an enemy now equipped withatomicpower.8'By then,however, the governmenthad alreadydecided to surren-der.MILITARY VULNERABILITY. PriortoJuly 944,military ulnerability as nil.

Japan's strategy orholding the defensive perimetern the Pacifichad notyetbeen decisivelydefeated.Japanese eaders stillhoped thatat some pointescalating losses would deter the United States fromcontinuingthe war,allowing Japan to keep its territorialains.Beginning n July 944, with the fallof theMarianas, military ulnerabilityrose, although tremained low. The Marianas were the first ositionsto fallinJapan's nnerdefensiveperimeter,nd the battlefor he slands destroyedmuch of herremainingnaval power. As a resultofthis defeatTojo's cabinetfell.Japan was clearly osing thewar, and invasion ofthehome islands hadto be considered as a remotepossibility.Also by thisdate, submarines hadstrippedJapan ofmuch of theshipping needed tocontinue protractedwar.In April 1945, military ulnerability ncreased to medium with the U.S.landings on Okinawa, the strategic ateway to the invasion of Japan.Withall imports of raw materialsblocked and stockpiles argely consumed, pro-duction n key war industrieshad fallen25 to 50 percentor more.While themilitary ecognized the risk of an invasion by powerfulAmerican forces,theybelieved thatJapan stillretainedsufficient esources tomake Ketsu-Goeffective.Withthemorale advantageof fightingnhomesoil, Japaneseforceswould be capable ofdefeating he attackers. n addition,therewas-stillhopethat the Sovietswould provide diplomatic nd military ssistance, althoughthey had announced on April 5 that they would not renew the Russo-Japanese Neutrality act when itexpired n April1946.82InJune1945,military ulnerabilityose to "high."WithOkinawa inAmer-ican hands, invasion had to be expected as soon as supportbases could bemade ready. The connectionwiththe Asian mainland was now completelycut, makingit impossible to bringback any forces to reinforceKetsu-Go.83Withstockpiles xhausted, productionofwar equipmentwas runningdownrapidly,fallingby55-100 percent n differentategoriesby July.A reportby81. Butow,Japan'sDecision oSurrender,p. 151-152.82. ImperialGeneral Headquarters argued thata decisive battle on Japan's shores would endin victory orJapan. bid., pp. 73-77.83. For a summary of a Japanese Army reporton "The PresentState of National Power," seeibid., p. 94. For a similarAmerican appraisal, see Sigal, Fighting oa Finish, . 109.



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the premier'scabinet secretary oncluded thatJapan could not continuethewar because of the decline in munitions, hipping,and food.84n addition,the Soviets had failed to respond to Japan'srequests for ssistance.Under theseconditions, twas clear thatJapancouldnotprepareforKetsu-Go as fully s was expected in April.85On June 12, AdmiralKiyoshiHase-gawa reportedto the emperorthattheNavy had notbeen able to carry utpreparations s planned. In particular, hekamikaze unitswould be unableto cope withthe demands of an invasion. At about the same time, GeneralYoshijiroUmezu, chief of staff f the Army,was forced to admit thattheArmywas encountering erious difficultiesn preparing ven basic defensesfortheTokyo plain.86Still, heArmyremained confident hat ven ifultimate ictorywas beyondany realisticpossibility, heJapanese strategy f inflicting unishing osseson the invading forceswould succeed despite these problems. LieutenantGeneral Seizo Arisue, chief of theArmy's ntelligenceBureau, said, "If wecould defeat the enemyin Kyushu or inflict remendous osses, forcing imto realize thestrong ighting pirit ftheJapaneseArmy nd people, itwouldbe possible, we hoped, to bring about thetermination fhostilities n com-paratively avorableterms."87The Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9 raised Japan's militaryvulnerability o a very high level. The Soviet offensive uptured Japaneselines immediately, nd rapidly penetrateddeep into the rear.88 ince theKwantungArmywas thoughtto be Japan'spremierfighting orce, hishada devastating ffect n Japanese calculationsoftheprospectsforhome island

84. USSBS, Japan's truggle o End theWar,p. 7.85. "While a full-scale uicide effort ould have been supported by the supplies on hand, theynot only would have been exhausted in a few monthsoffull-scale ombatbutwere qualitativelyinadequate, withsuch essential temsas tanks, heavyartillery nd fieldcommunications quip-ment largely acking. . . . Under these circumstances twas obvious that the invasion wouldfindJapan withoutmeans forprolonged resistance, nd that even if it were initially epelled,disintegration f the entire economy would occur in a shorttime." USSBS, Effectsf StrategicBombing n Japan'sWar Economy, . 41.86. Butow, Japan'sDecision oSurrender,p. 115-116, n13.87. General Shuichi Miyazaki was somewhat less confident, aying thatvictory was beyondall expectation.The best we could hope for was to nflict] majorblow on theenemy." Miyazakiand Arisue quoted in Sigal, Fightingo a Finish, . 228.88. For an excellenthistory, ee David M. Glantz, "August Storm: The Soviet 1945 StrategicOffensiven Manchuria,"Leavenworthapers,No. 7 (FortLeavenworth,Kan.: U.S. ArmyCom-mand and General StaffCollege, 1983); and Glantz, "August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Oper-ational Combat in Manchuria, 1945," Leavenworthapers,No. 8 (FortLeavenworth,Kan.: U.S.ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege, 1983).



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defense.89 ftheirbest forceswere so easilysliced to pieces, the unavoidableimplicationwas thatthe less well-equipped and trainedforces ssembled forKetsu-Go had no chance of success againstAmerican forcesthat were evenmore capable than the Soviets.As a resultofJapan'sdepleted ability oexecute Ketsu-Go, twas not ikelythatU.S. forces nvading Kyushu would meet strongopposition. Contem-porary American analyses estimated that conquering Kyushu would costabout 20,000Allied lives. Americanplannerswere stillmoreoptimistic bouttakingHonshu, which theyestimated would cost 15,000 ives, presumablybecause theyexpected that the battleforKyushuwould consume thelast ofJapan's war production.90 hese figures are not high compared with the13,000 ost at Okinawa againsta much smaller,butbetter-supplied apaneseforce.DEPENDENT VARIABLESThe dependentvariables are the policypreferences f each ofthe threemajorgroups in the Japanese government.To determinethe effect f increasingcivilian nd military ulnerability n Japanesedecisionmaking,the views ofeach major group on surrenderingmust be assessed foreach period whentherewas an increase in eithertypeofvulnerability. olicyviews are codedas "no surrender,"which means not willingto surrenderpriorto invasion;"limitedsurrender,"which means willing to surrendermost overseas pos-sessions butnotthe home islands; "flexible urrender,"whichmeans willingto surrenderbefore invasion, but not withoutattempting o obtain morefavorable erms; nd "immediatesurrender,"whichmeans willingto acceptunmodifiedAmerican terms t once.9189. The Kwantung Army'sreputationwas earned byitsperformancen the ate 1930sand early1940s, but by 1945 non-replacement f aged equipment and repeated draftsfor Pacific slandservice had reduced it to no more than a shadow of its formerprowess. Even so, it stillmaintainedbetterequipment and training han could be provided for most of the make-shiftKetsu-Goforces. See Kirby, urrenderfJapan, p. 193-196.90. BartonJ. Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. lives Saved," Bulletin f theAtomicScientists,une-July 986, p. 39.91. Much of the evidence for Japanese officials'views is problematic, ecause it comes fromstatementsmade by the principals toAmerican nterrogatorsfter hewar. The problem s thatevidence may be biased towardspresenting he officials s favoring urrender arlieror morestrongly han they n fact did. Given the anticipation fwar crimestrials, enior officials adpowerful ncentives to maximize the extent to which they personally, and the emperor inparticular, avored surrender, aintingthe militarys responsible forcontinuation f thewar.Also, because many of the interviewswere conducted by the U.S. StrategicBombing Survey,which was concerned to demonstrate he effectiveness f strategic ombing,the interviewees



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CIVILIANS. Given Japan's political ystem, nlya smallnumberof civilianscould influencepolicy on the war.The key figures n whomwe have detailedevidence are Kuniaki Koiso and Mamoru Shigemitsu,respectively remierand foreignministerfromJuly1944 to April 1945; KantaroSuzuki and Shi-genori Togo, who took over these positions in April;PrinceFumimaroKo-noye,an influential on-cabinet dvisor;92nd Lord Keeper ofthePrivy ealKoichi Kido, the emperor's personal adviser. Of these, Suzuki was themostimportant n the surrenderdecisions.Changes in these leaders' positionson surrender orrespond onlyweaklyto increases in Japan's civilianvulnerability.None of them changed theirviews in response to the escalationsof conventionalbombing n November1944 or March 1945, although several were influencedby the dropping ofthe atomic bomb on August 6. By contrast, ll ofthemwere stronglynflu-enced by the worsening of Japan's military ulnerability, articularly heinvasion of Okinawa in April 1945,and the collapse of Japan's war economyduring the summer.

had an incentive to agree that air power had played the decisive role in bringing bout thesurrender.For a collection of statements hat conventional ir power won the war assembledby the Air Force from postwar interviews, see Mission Accomplished:nterrogationsf JapaneseIndustrial, ilitary nd Civil Leaders fWorldWar I (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1946). Despitethese difficulties,he fact hatwe know the ikelydirection f any bias helps us develop methodswhich can separate more reliable from ess reliableevidence. First,we should be more confidentof views ifwe have corroboration rom wo or moresources. In particular,we should relymorestrongly n statementsmade in officialmeetings,whose date and attendance can be verified,and of whichmultiple ccounts often xist, han on theaccountsby single ndividuals of nformalconversations r of theirprivatepreferences. econd, we should give more credit o statementsthatcould not help the witness's war crimes iability r reputation.Accordingly,n individual'sstatement hathe did not favor urrender ntilwell after e assumed official esponsibilitye.g.,Premier Koiso, who consistently dvocated seeking a decisive battle ratherthan surrender)should be trusted,while a claim thathe worked forsurrenderfrom he startof his tenure noffice e.g., Premier Suzuki) should not be uncritically ccepted. Similarly, laims that theemperor was keptuninformed ntil ate in thewar mayreflect ttempts o preservehis repu-tation, lthough evidence frommajor governmentmeetingsofhis statements avoringnegoti-ations can probablybe considered reliable.Third,our assessments of individuals' statementsshould be affectedby evidence of theirprevious preferencespriorto their nvolvement nsurrender ecisions. For example, Togo was well known as a memberof the"peace party"froman early stage in the war. By contrast, uzuki was chosen as premierpartlybecause the Armysaw himas more reliably ommitted o continuing he war thanthemajoralternative andidate,Prince Konoye. Indeed, Togo initially eclined to enter Suzuki's cabinet forthisreason. Sigal,Fighting o a Finish,p. 48. Taken together, hese methods permitus to characterizeJapaneseleaders' views with fairlyhigh confidence. nstanceswhere codings remain uncertain despitethe best available evidence are noted in the text.92. Konoye had been premierthree times n the 1930s and was also consideredforpremier nApril 1945. Sigal, Fighting oa Finish,p. 46.



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The attitudes of civilian eaders were determined argelyby their oss ofconfidence nJapan's ability o execute theArmy'sKetsu-Go plan. However,some individuals requiredmore evidence thanothers.Togo and Kido seemto have lost confidence n Ketsu-Go in June 1945,while Suzuki appears tohave harboredhopes of nflicting majordefeaton Americanforcesup untiltheSoviet invasion of Manchuria.Toshikazu Kase, foreignminister fter hewar, emphasized the effect fmilitary ulnerability s the primary oncernofSuzuki: "The more the primeministerearned of the extensivedepletionof our war potential and our military elplessness the more convinced hebecame ofthehopelessness of our position."93 uzuki himself oldU.S. AirForce interrogatorshat the fire-bombing fthe citiesby B-29s had been hismain concern, but if this were so he should have advocated surrender nMarch,not August.94Further vidence of theirprimary ocuson themilitary ituation s thatthegovernmentnever sacrificedmilitary equirements to offsetthe miseriesbeing inflicted n thepopulace. WhileJapanese eaders frequentlyndicatedtheir ympathy or hehardships suffered ythegeneralpopulation npublicand private, they did not hesitateto shift urdens moreheavily to civilianswhen military equirementswere unfulfilled. or example, Japanese eaderswere well aware thatfood shortageshad caused per-capitaconsumptiontodeclinewell below 2000 caloriesper day during 1945,but theynonethelessorderedmassive quantitiesto be stockpiledfor hemilitaryo use in defend-ing the homeland.95Priorto July1944,when both civilian and military ulnerabilitywas nil,the civilian eadership did not favor surrender. ome senior statesmen ikeKonoye, Kido, and Shigemitsuhad growingdoubts about Japan's militaryposition in 1942 and 1943, and by the springof 1944 had come to believethatJapan could not ultimatelywin a war of attrition gainst the UnitedStates. A principalfactor n this change was a secret study completed inFebruary1944 byRear AdmiralSokichiTakagi, which showed thatair, fleet,and merchantmarine losses had led to inescapable difficultiesn acquiring

93. Toshikazu Kase, JourneyotheMissouri New Haven: Yale University ress, 1950), p. 148.94. Suzuki said, "It seemed to me unavoidable that in the long run Japanwould be almostdestroyedby air attack o thatmerely n the basis oftheB-29salone I was convinced thatJapanshould sue forpeace." Craven and Cate, ThePacific, . 756.95. Kase, Journeyo theMissouri,p. 196;' USSBS, Japan'sDecisionto Surrender; aburo Hayaskiand Alvin Coox, Kogun: TheJapanese rmy n thePacificWar Quantico, Va.: The Marine CorpsAssociation, 1959), p. 155.



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essential imported materials.96 espite this, these leaders had no concreteplans for surrender; nstead, they spoke and behaved as ardent supportersofcontinuing he war.Following the loss of the Marianas in July 944, several senior statesmencalled forTojo's resignation, eading to the cabinet's fall on July 8. By thispoint,some individualcivilianshad come to favor imited urrender, utthecivilians as a group stilldid not take action toward ending the war. LordKido, for example, suggested that the new governmentshould considerconcessions, but only ones that would provide some measure ofvictory orJapan; in particular,Japan would retainManchuria.97 higemitsu,the newforeignminister, uggested approachingtheSoviet Union concerningmedia-tion of a limited urrender, ut thecabinet rejected thison thegroundsthatexcessive concessionswould be required. However, Koiso, the new premier,favoredseekinga decisive victoryn battlepriorto opening negotiations.98The successive increases in civilianvulnerability ue to the escalationsinthe bombing in November 1944 and March 1945had no apparent effect nthe views of civilian leaders. For instance, during March the major topicamong the leaders was theprospect for separate peace withChina, not thedevastation caused by the firebombings. The negotiationsfell throughbe-cause theChinese demanded thatJapanwithdraw rom hina, open separatenegotiationsover Manchuria, and make peace with the United States andBritain.99here was stillno consensus among the civilian eadership n favorofany form f surrender.'00The civilian eadership first ccepted the idea of limited surrenderwhenOkinawa was invaded in April 1945, raising Japan's military ulnerabilityfrom ow to medium. The Koiso cabinet fell,and was replaced by a newgovernment hatrepresenteda compromisebetween civilianswho wantedto end the war and the Armywho wanted to fight o the bitter nd. WithSuzuki as premierto satisfy heArmyand the dovish Togo as foreignmin-96. Takagi concluded that Japancould not possiblywin the war and thereforehould seek acompromisepeace. Butow, Japan'sDecision oSurrender,p. 7-26.97. Kido recorded these thoughts n his diary n January 944,but did not act on themuntilthe fall of the government n July 944. Sigal, Fighting o a Finish, p. 30-31.98. Ibid., pp. 33-38.99. Butow, Japan'sDecision oSurrender,p. 53-54.100. One reason Konoye did not want to surrenderwas that he feared a leftist evolution nthe aftermath f defeat. He thought that the lower and middle ranks of the Army had beeninfiltrated y communistsympathizerswho would use surrender s an excuse to revolt. KidothoughtKonoye's fearsexaggerated, althoughnotwholly without foundation. t appears thattherewas never any evidence of actual leftist enetrationnto theArmy.See ibid., p. 50.



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ister, henew government'spolicywas to prepare for tenacious defenseofthe home islands while simultaneously exploring opportunitiesto obtainpeace on acceptable terms. Togo, supported by Kido and Navy MinisterMitsumasa Yonai, advocated approaching the Soviet Unio

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