Upload
others
View
7
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
RMWI 4 – Risk Assessment Templates
RMWI 4 V1.0
150 mm ballast depth approaching fixed points – extend existing waiver to cover Broken Hill to Parkes Resleepering project.
Establish the context
Background
Where appropriate controls were complied with, it was found that on the N-S concrete resleepering project, ballast depth approaching fixed points like - major level crossings, transom decked bridges, turnouts, etc were satisfactory with 150 mm of ballast
Risk Statement
Review existing Waiver 600/TR/150607/102 (TR/102) in use for concrete resleepering on the North/South against new SFAIRP risk assessment principles. If necessary add /modify controls.
Risk Assessment Objectives
Review the effectiveness for the controls in previous Waiver TR/102. Consider any need for improvements or revisions.
Critical Success Factors of the activity/proposal being assessed
Ability on site to provide adequate drainage at these locations. Good rail surface condition. Free draining capability of ballast.
Scope (inclusions and exclusions)
• Extension of waiver to Parkes to Broken Hill resleeper project only.
• Only for specific fixed locations and up to 20m either side of them.
• Not applicable to plain open track. • Excludes minor Cocky’s crossings, hirail takeoffs, etc. • Special consideration to be given to any fixed points near
overpasses where clearance may be an issue Stakeholders
ARTC, Transfield Services (TS) Projects, TS Maintainers, Operators,
Stakeholder consultation
ARTC and TS (P) and TS (M) consulted. Other parties to be advised.
Assumptions
Previous waiver generally worked quite well – see attached feedback from M Barrett, N Sheedy and B Taylor. Heavy duty concrete sleepers generally at 600 mm centres
Constraints
Limited knowledge of some of this track and particularly ballast and formation depth and condition. Some sites may not allow for adequate drainage? i.e. very flat so no cross fall available.
Boundaries
Parkes to Broken Hill. Fixed points e.g. Major level crossings, transom decked bridges, turnouts, etc and 20m beyond only?
Qualifications/conditions
As per waiver TR/102 – 5 in number
Reference documentation and standards
Waiver TR/102. TCS02. ARTC CoP
Other clarifying commentary How much will existing turnouts be lifted? How far out should waiver apply and how do we “taper in”?
RMWI 4 – Risk Assessment Templates
RMWI 4 V1.0
RISK CONTROL PLAN AND SCHEDULE Nominated Risk Manager: Matthew Hart Compiled by: Matthew Hart Date: 19 November 2010 Title of Risk Assessment: 150 mm ballast depth approaching fixed points – extend existing waiver to cover Broken Hill to Parkes Resleepering project. Reviewed by: Tim Calver Date: _____________
Risk issue (in priority order from highest risk score to lowest) Proposed controls
Will controls be adopted – Y/N?
Reasons for discounting rejected options
Risk level after proposed controls
Person responsible for implementation
Expected date of implementation or review
How will this risk and the control options be monitored?
Differential settlement between
rigid fixed point and adjoining
ballasted track leads to track fault
Worst case – derailment
Most likely – additional repairs
Ensure controls of waiver
implemented – especially effective
drainage.
Drainage works in advance of
resleepering to complement
Refer RM01 Risk Assessment undertaken on 7th December 2010
Ballast depth is not sufficient to
support new axle loads leading to
increased maintenance and TSR’s
Ensure controls of waiver
implemented
Allowances within maintenance
works program to continue to
monitor and address these sites;
Refer RM01 Risk Assessment undertaken on 7th December 2010
Track subsides rapidly over weak
spot at fixed point leading to
TSR’s or train derailment (worst
case)
Ensure controls of waiver
implemented
AK Car 4 monthly and weekly
inspections by hirail;
Train Control Reports from
drivers;
Refer RM01 Risk Assessment undertaken on 7th December 2010
RMWI 4 – Risk Assessment Templates
RMWI 4 V1.0
Risk issue (in priority order from highest risk score to lowest) Proposed controls
Will controls be adopted – Y/N?
Reasons for discounting rejected options
Risk level after proposed controls
Person responsible for implementation
Expected date of implementation or review
How will this risk and the control options be monitored?
Following rain, mudholes form in
fouled ballast where there are
existing dipped welds and track
geometry deteriorates leading to
TSR’s and additional maintenance
work
Ensure controls of waiver
implemented, especially good
drainage
Weld correction program planned
under project;
Significant shoulder ballast
cleaning planned under project;
Additional maintenance work and
tamping required – allowance
made within maintenance budget
to cover hotspots.
Refer RM01 Risk Assessment undertaken on 7th December 2010
Many sections of weak track
(formation) result in too much
follow up work for maintenance
crews to handle leading to large
TSR delays, expensive reactive
tamping
Ensure controls of waiver
implemented
Project methodology is result of
continuous improvement
throughout past few years;
Project scope to allow a third tamp
following SBC where required.
Monitoring of track condition post-
project and early action addressing
emerging issues.
Refer RM01 Risk Assessment undertaken on 7th December 2010
RMWI 4 – Risk Assessment Templates
RMWI 4 V1.0
Risk issue (in priority order from highest risk score to lowest) Proposed controls
Will controls be adopted – Y/N?
Reasons for discounting rejected options
Risk level after proposed controls
Person responsible for implementation
Expected date of implementation or review
How will this risk and the control options be monitored?
Contaminated ballast results in
mudhole formation leading to
increased maintenance and TSR’s
Use SBC to allow ballast to drain.
Ensure controls of waiver
implemented
Monitoring of track condition post-
project and early action addressing
emerging issues;
New ballast that is added and
blended with old meets
specification and is on the larger
side.
Refer RM01 Risk Assessment undertaken on 7th December 2010
Risk Assessment held at ARTC/Transfield Productivity Works Office, BowdenPresent: Matthew Hart, Katrina Li, Tim Calver (ARTC), David Temby, Don Ristevski, David Harding (Transfield Services)Context: Initial context setting and risk brainstorming held on 19th November 2010 (refer separate Context Setting document)
1.0 Risk No.
1.01Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Ensure controls of waiver implemented - especially effective drainage
Engineering/ Design Yes
Drainage works with the resleepering to complement the works Engineering/ Design
Existing track inspection regime & driver reports through TCRs may pick up faults early
Administrative
Speed restriction Administrative
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
1.0 Risk No.
1.01Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Ensure controls of waiver implemented Engineering/ Design Yes
Allowances within maintenance works program to continue to monitor and address these sites
Engineering/ Design
Existing track inspection regime & driver reports through TCRs may pick up faults early
Administrative
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
Investigate the use of Geogrids with drainage work Engineering/ Design Minimal Moderate Investigate Transfield/ARTC
During the works
Investigate the tightening of sleeper spacing Engineering/ Design Minimal Minimal Investigate ARTC Prior to works
2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION1.0
Risk No.1.01
Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
1.3Leading to an Outcome
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.1Responsible
Party / Comments
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Ensure controls of waiver implemented Engineering/ DesignYes
AK Car 4 monthly and weekly inspections by hirail Engineering/ Design
Train Control Reports from drivers Administrative
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION1.0
Risk No.1.01
Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
1.3Leading to an Outcome
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.1Responsible
Party / Comments
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Weld correction program planned under project and was undertaken 4 years ago
Engineering/ DesignYes
Significant shoulder ballast cleaning planned under project Engineering/ Design
Additional maintenance work and tamping required - allowance made within maintenance budget to cover hotspots
Engineering/ Design
Drainage work conducted in the project Engineering/ Design
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
3.01Control type
SFAIRP TEST 4.0Revised
consequence
ARTC/Transfield
3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 5.1Do the decisions make sense?
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
ARTC to review AK car corrugation report & define worst sections
Minor Unlikely L
Resleepering Methodology
4 Track Deterioration of track geometry at fixed points
Poor rail weld geometry i.e. dipped/peaked welds
4.1Revised
likelihood
4.2Revised risk
levelIncreased maintenance/TSR's
Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION
TSR's Derailment
3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
3.01Control type
SFAIRP TEST 4.0Revised
consequence
Group determined this risk is the same as risk 1
4.1Revised
likelihood
5.1Do the decisions make sense?4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
#REF!
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION
3 Track Track FaultTrack subsides rapidly over weak spot at fixed point
Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
4.2Revised risk
level
Significant increase of maintenance/TSR's
3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 5.1Do the decisions make sense?4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
3.01Control type
SFAIRP TEST 4.0Revised
consequence
4.1Revised
likelihood
ARTC/Transfield
Early detection & remediation will minimize impact
Minor Likely M
The group has assessed this risk as being SFAIRP, the medium risk level is
accepted due to prohibitive cost of lifting fixed points (to allow full ballast depth). Operational and safety risks
have been evaluated as being low, with the consequence rating due to
Financial considerations.
4.2Revised risk
level
Not rescoring as investigating only
1.3Leading to an Outcome
2.1Responsible Party / Comments
2 Track Track FaultBallast depth not sufficient to support new axle loads
Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
Resleepering Methodology
Small increase of maintenance/TSR's
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION
1 Track Track Fault
SFAIRP TEST 4.0Revised
consequence
4.1Revised
likelihood
4.2Revised risk
level
Unlikely L
Based on the derailment consequence will be moderate
Resleepering Methodology
3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 5.1Do the decisions make sense?
Resleepering Methodology
Moderate
Differential settlement between rigid fixed point and adjoining ballasted track where less than standard ballast depth is installed.
Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
Additional Repairs Derailment
4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
3.01Control type
5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION1.3
Leading to an Outcome2.1
Responsible Party / Comments
SFAIRP Risk Assessment 7/12/210 - Ballast Depth At Fixed Points
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Pg 1 of 2 Risk Assessment - Engineering Waivers
2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION1.0
Risk No.1.01
Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
1.3Leading to an Outcome
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.1Responsible
Party / Comments
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Ensure controls of waiver implemented Engineering/ DesignYes
Project methodology is a result of continuous improvement throughout the past few years
Engineering/ Design
Project scope to allow a third tamp following Shoulder Ballast Clean where required
Engineering/ Design
Monitoring of track condition post-project and early action addressing emerging issues
Engineering/ Design
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION1.0
Risk No.1.01
Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
1.3Leading to an Outcome
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.1Responsible
Party / Comments
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Use SBC to allow ballast to drain Engineering/ DesignYes
Ensure controls of waiver implemented Engineering/ Design
Monitoring of track condition post-project and early action addressing emerging issues
Engineering/ Design
New ballast that is added and blended with existing meets specification and is on the larger side
Engineering/ Design
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION1.0
Risk No.1.01
Element or Category
(column may be "hidden"
1.1Hazard or scenario or
circumstance
1.2Caused by
1.3Leading to an Outcome
2.0 Existing Control
2.01Control type
2.1Responsible
Party / Comments
2.2Current
consequence
2.3Current
likelihood
2.4Current risk
level
5.0Has this workshop adequately addressed this risk?
5.2Comments / clarification
Yes
3.1 BENEFIT
3.2COST
3.3Decision
3.4Responsible
Party
3.5By when
5.1Do the decisions make sense?4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION
7
4.0Revised
consequence
4.1Revised
likelihood
SFAIRP TEST
#REF!
4.2Revised risk
level
Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
3.01Control type
Controls of waiver require removal of contaminated ballast
ARTC/Transfield
ARTC3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 5.1
Do the decisions make sense?
4.2Revised risk
level
4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
Note that SBC may not be fully effective around fixed points
Minor Possible L
4.0Revised
consequence
4.1Revised
likelihood
3.01Control type
SFAIRP TEST
6 Track Mudhole Formation at fixed points Contaminated ballast
Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
Increased Maintenance/TSR's
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION
Expensive reactive tamping
Large TSR Delays
3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT
3.0 Proposed Additional Control
3.01Control type
SFAIRP TEST
Group determined this risk is the same as risk 25.1
Do the decisions make sense?4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP OUTCOMES
4.2Revised risk
level
1. RISK IDENTIFICATION
5 Track Track Fault
Weak track (formation) at fixed points resulting in too much follow up work for maintenance
4.0Revised
consequence
4.1Revised
likelihood
#REF!Most Likely (Credible) Outcome
Worst Case (Credible) Outcome
Pg 2 of 2 Risk Assessment - Engineering Waivers