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The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement N° 305169. Tools to improve the performance of African Swine Fever surveillance in free countries RiskSur case studies 1

RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

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Page 1: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement N° 305169.

Tools to improve the performance of AfricanSwine Fever surveillance in free countries

RiskSur case studies

1

Page 2: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

ASF has serious and irreversible consequences

No vaccine Erradication in the past:

Cuba Rep. Dom.& Haiti

BR

ES & PT

FR

BE & NL

IT

ASF spread 1960´s-1990’s

Africancountries

Total depopulation: Cuba, Rep.Dom, Haiti, BR, Malta Adequate surveillance and

control of transmissionES, PT: 32-35 yearsIT (mainland): 1967, 1980FR: 1964, 1967, 1974BE: 1985-1986NL: 1986

Malta

Present since 1978 withouttransboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradicationplan (2015-2017)Genotype I 2

Page 3: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

ASF has serious and irreversible consequences

No vaccine Erradication in the present:

Present with transboundary spread:

Caucasus: since 2007 RF: since 2007 UKR: since 2012 BY: since 2013 UE countries: since 2014 African countries: 22 genotypes

present!

Africancountries

Georgia

ArmeniaAzerbaijan

RUEELVLT BY

UKRPL

Genotype II

FAR AWAY!!!

ASF risk of spread today

3

Moderador
Notas de la presentación
ASF at origin, classification depending on geographical cluster/relations, whether there is information and control management
Page 4: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

What to look for?

Sampling and Testing dead orsick wild boar Sampling and

Testing suspectpig holdings*

BIP Inspectionpersonal luggage

InspectionC&D procedures

Sampling and Testingmeat and products

animal origin

Testing home slaughter

Sampling, Testingand quarantineimported pigs

Sampling and Testing hunted

wild boar

* Suspect pig holdings: with clinical evidence, epi link to ASF+, untreatedswill feeding, probability of exposure, vectors (CD2003/422/EC)

Surveillance components for ASF early detection used in 2013

• ASF tests were carried out only in symptomatic/dead animals

4

Moderador
Notas de la presentación
De todos ellos, el riesgo de transmisión puede medirse de manera más temprana en los tres en naranja.
Page 5: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

What to look for?

Evaluation of the level of ASF threat

Geographically close

Socio-culturally close

Close by trade

Environmentally close

Connected throughplane or boat

Distance to ASF outbreaksWhat to

look

threat

Routes of introduction

Threat at origin

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Page 6: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Where to look for?Mapping of ASF high risk areas in 2013

LithuaniaLatvia

Poland

Only borders with infected countries are considered at high probability of exposure

• Surveillance carried out only in those areas6

Page 7: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Evaluation of the routes of introduction and spread For each administrative unit or disaggregated in the country

Assessment of ASF routes of introduction (Mur et al., 2014) according to country-specific scenarios

Where to look?Legal

tradeIllegaltrade Fomites Wild boar

Live pigs Meat and products

What is the probability that at least one infected wild boar survives, moves and enters?What is the probability that wild boar hunters transport the virus elsewhere?

Evaluation of “transport” until destination7

Page 8: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

(cont.)

For each route of introduction, identify population at risk of exposure For each route of introduction and population at risk, identify

routes of spread, super-spreaders and maintenance characteristics

Evaluation of the routes of introduction and spread

Evaluation of exposure and consequences

Where to look

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Page 9: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Pig holdings: classified by biosecurity (proxy: number of pigs/farm) Free-ranging pigs Feral pigs Wild boar shared habitat (proxy abundance) Local spread (direct and indirect):

Distance between and from pig holdingsDistance from wild boar corridorsDistance from free-range pigs

Local and long distance spread(direct and indirect): Contacts between pig holdings

Local and long distance spread (untreated swill feeding): need to know habits!!

Home-killingHunting practicesDistance to slaughterhouses, hotels, ports waste…

Suitability or vulnerability maps For each administrative unit or disaggregated in the country

Where to look

Population at risk(Target population)

Factors that favor spread/maintenance

De la Torre et al., 2014

Evaluation of exposure and consequences

Page 10: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Many tools availableMapping of risk factors (adding risk factors or weighted risk factors) Association of risk factors with risk of infection (classical stats,

bayesian) Spatial association of risk factors with risk of infection (cluster

analysis) Transmission potential (SEIR models) with risk factor mapping Etc,etc

Quantitative

Qualitative

Semiquantitative10

Page 11: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Risk-based ASF early detection surveillancePlenty of analytical tools available….but not under one

same ToolBox yetWe’re probably a step behind…exploratory tools and

understanding the epidemiology of the disease are equally importantThese tools have to be integrated in the design and

evaluation framework to obtain the best efficiency at theleast cost

Page 12: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

How to look for ASF?

“The short viremia and high mortality associated with ASF make it virtually impossible to detect the disease through active surveillance”.

Generalized concepts lead to a misconception of the disease epidemiologyi.e. source of virus is not considered

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Page 13: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

‘Early detection’ at a high biosecurity farm in Lithuania

Antibodies

Estimated date of infection: 3-5 July

ASF suspicion: 21 July ASF confirmat: 24 July

During the high risk period, pigs for slaughter were shipped to Poland

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Moderador
Notas de la presentación
From 1 June to 22 July, 1704 pigs for slaughter were shipped to Poland
Page 14: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

How to look for ASF? “Numbers of found dead animals and number of wild boar sampled

and tested prove the high efficiency and efficacy of the passivesurveillance in the early detection of ASF”

Efficiency measured by number of samplestaken rather than by evaluating a high levelof performance relative to inputs

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Page 15: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Cost-effective surveillance programme

Risk ranking transmission scenarios:

Probability of source being infective: amount of infective virus at sourceHigh probability of visible clinicalsigns, particularly if infectiousanimal is symptomatic and susceptible animal is young

Symptomatic and asymptomatic pigs

+++

+

Direct contact with infectedanimalsPigs fed with uncookedinfected meatIndirect contact with fomites(tools, vehicles, clothing,equipment, other animals….)Biological vectors -Ornithodoros ticks

Probability of contact between infective source and susceptible Probability of the susceptible animal developing infection and being infectious

Evaluation of surveillance options according to feasibility and risk of missinginfection early

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Page 16: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5HOW to

look?

Movements

IntraherdEnviron

ment

Concentrationareas

Directcontact

Contaminated feed

Movements

Transport Environment

Directcontact

Contaminated feed

Transport Environment

TICKS

Wild boar-to-farm transmission Farm-to-farm transmission

TRANSMISSION SCENARIOS

CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE OPTIONS

Avoidmassivehunting

Eliminatinginfected

material (ifpossible)

Live animal testing

Wastemanagement

Heattreatment

Tissuetesting

C&DC&D

Biosec

C&D

Biosec

Paper workcheck

Dead or symptomatic animal testing

Tissuetesting

Live animal testing

Dead or symptomaticanimal testing

Paper workcheck

Logistically challenging

Higher risk of missing ASF infection

Very costly

Improvedinfrastructure

All of the WB-dom measures

Live animal testing

Dead or symptomatic animal testing

Populationstudies

Live animal testing

Dead or symptomatic animal testing

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Page 17: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Risk-based ASF early detection surveillance

Identifying areas at higher probability of exposure (probability of becoming an index case)

Identifying consequences (number of secondary cases, duration of outbreaks) for each type of index case

Identifying the number of subjects that need to be covered over a certain time period to ensure detection at 95% confidence level

when where how

Passivesurveillance

Always Whole country Awareness, training, speed,new diagnostic methods

Active surveillance

Increased level of threat

Areas and means depend on transmissionscenarios and consequences!

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Page 18: RiskSur case studies...Malta Present since 1978 without transboundary spread: IT (Sardinia) current erradication Genotype I plan (2015-2017) 2 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement N° 305169.

ContactProf. José Manuel Sánchez-VizcaínoMarta Martínez Avilés, PhD, MScVISAVET Centre-Universidad Complutense de MadridSPAINwww.sanidadanimal.info

[email protected]; [email protected]

www.fp7-RISKSUR.eu

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