RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted

Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.

However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted. SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]

Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

HELD:The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

BORJA v MENDOZA[SUPRA, PAGE 78]PEOPLE v PRESIDING JUDGE OFURDANETA125 SCRA 269RELOVA; October 26, 1983NATUREPetition for certiorariFACTS- Private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. is chargedwith murder before the RTC of Pangasinan, inUrdaneta. He is out on a P30,000.00 bail bond whichcontains the following conditions: The aforenamed, as bondsmen, hereby jointly andseverally undertake thatthe above-mentioned defendant, as principal therein will appear and answer the charge above-mentioned in whatever Court it may be tried, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court,and if convicted, will appear for judgment, and render himself to the executionthereof; or that if he fails to perform any of theseconditions will pay to the Republic of thePhilippines the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos(P30,000.00) ...- After his arraignment, Valdez, thru his counsel,manifested orally in open court that he was waivinghis right to be present during the trial. Theprosecuting fiscal moved that Valdez be compelled toappear and be present at the trial so that he could beidentified by prosecution witnesses.Respondent judge sustained the position of privaterespondent who cited the majority opinion in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 and held that "hecannot be validly compelled to appear and bepresent during the trial of this case."- Petitioner prays that the order of respondent judgebe annulled and set aside and that privaterespondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. be compelled toappear during the trial of the criminal case wheneverrequired to do so by the trial court.- Private respondent claims that Sec 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution grants him absolute right toabsent himself from the trial of the case filed againsthim despite the condition of his bail bond that he"will at all times hold himself amenable to the ordersand processes of the Court."ISSUEWON the judge erred in granting privaterespondents manifestation to waive his right to bepresent during trialHELD YES- Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, Section 19thereof provides:SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accusedshall be presumed innocent until the contrary isproved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard byhimself and counsel, to be informed of the natureand cause of the accusation against him, to have aspeedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet thewitnesses face to face, and to have compulsoryprocess to secure the attendance of witnesses andthe production of evidence in his behalf. However,after arraignment, trial may proceednotwithstanding the absence of the accusedprovided that he has been duly notified and hisfailure to appear is unjustified.- The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permitstrialin absentiaeven of capital offenses, providedthat after arraignment he may be compelled toappear for the purpose of Identification by thewitnesses of the prosecution, or provided heunqualifiedly admits in open court after hisarraignment that he is the person named as thedefendant in the case on trial.- The reason for requiring the presence of theaccused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to beabsent in all the stages of the proceedings withoutgiving the People's witnesses the opportunity toIdentify him in court, he may in his defense say thathe was never Identified as the person charged in theinformation and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal.- Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may notknow the name of the culprit but can Identify him if he sees him again, in which case the latter'spresence in court is necessary.Dispositive petition granted and the assailed orderof respondent judge is ANNULLED and SET ASID

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC TRIAL PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE, accused-appellant.

FactsThe case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.

IssueWhether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case.

HeldThe court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

CASE NO. 7 A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors. RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA. PONENTE: JUSTICE VITUG FACTS: The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings. On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis: "The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of. "There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings. "Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada." Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not to grant the request for Radio-TV coverage of the trial of in the Sandiganbayan of the plunder cases against the former president Joseph E. Estrada.

RULING: DENIED. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information outweigh the fundamental rights of the accused along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it DEPRIVES THE COURT OF THE DIGNITY which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. An accused has a RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL BUT IT IS A RIGHT THAT BELONGS TO HIM, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs.PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.1

The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur. So ordered.

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATIONTHE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.LAZARO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in Batangas. On the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused.

As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of this character is that, although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be properly convicted of the crime. In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.

What is wrong is exhibit B or the sworn statement of sergeant Presa who was deceased. The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, WHOSE SIGNATURE was identified, before the justice of the peace. Accused's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination.

RATIO: 1) It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. 2) The tribunal may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while testifying. It is for us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some exception thereto.

ISSUE: Is right of confrontation applicable?

HELD: No.The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again NOT THE TESTIMONY of a WITNESS DECEASED, given in a former action between the same parties relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. NOR is the statement of Presa A DYING DECLARATION or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination.

Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.

With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find this to be reversible error and REMAND the case for a NEW trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.

AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with ESTADA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS for having allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. These cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed.They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

In its decision, "the respondent court said that it allowed separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, the court can only consider, in deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for the, prosecution as wen as their own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused CANNOT BE TAKEN UP.

It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said three accused.

We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid story related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor to call Ulat and put him on he stand as part f its rebuttal evidence. Had this been done, there would have been no impediment to the consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused."

The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution.

While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against an the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8

The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11

We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Thus:

If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor participation in the conspiracy to defraud, he would have questioned this obvious irregularity. He would have asked whoever was following up the vouchers why two biddings were conducted, why the awards to "D" Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.

The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino. While his duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of funds may have been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his complicity in the conspiracy.

Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers (including three made out in favor of "D" Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought to him for his certificate as regards the availability of funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the afternoon of the same day, three other vouchers were also presented to him for certification as to funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" which he had earlier signed but which, according to Talino, were disallowed and cancelled, Talino claims that he had examined the supporting documents of the last three vouchers the RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at least the abstract of bids submitted in the morning, where "D" Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder, must have been different from the ones submitted together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would have raised his suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively) when it was only that morning that the abstracts containing the name of "D"; Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was facilitating an irregular transaction.

It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond doubt the participation of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in the informations. 13

The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat and was not even required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner's part in the offenses.

The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ALBERTO ESTOISTA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The firearms with which the accused was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the accused took a shot at a WILD ROOSTER and hit DIRAGON DIMA a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not perceived by the accused.

Bruno Estoista said that his son told him that there were wild chickens on the plantation "scratching palay and corn" plants and asked if he might shoot them. Bruno told his son (ACCUSED) to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it over to Alberto who is a "sharp-shooter" and "shoots better," and walked about 20 meters behind the young man. Bruno was that far from Alberto when the latter fired and accidentally wounded their servant.

Issue: Is confinement from 5 to 10 years cruel?

HELD:No. EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER, reasonable within the rampant circumstances.It is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the PREVALENT CONDITIONS which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.

The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to IMPRISONMENT OF 5 YEARS. However, considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. the appellant will pay the costs of both instances.The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA A. ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897.

After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried IN ABSENTIA. On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the DEATH PENALTY.

The accused remains at large up (naka-wala) to the present time.

ISSUE: Should the court proceed automatically to review her death sentence?

HELD:

YES.

The State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court.

We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.

History of Death Penalty in Philippines

1910 U.S.v. Laguna: The power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts.

The 1935 Constitution: did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Its section 2(4) of Article VIII provided for review by this Court of death penalty cases.

1953 People vs. Villanueva: The withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to review his conviction

The 1971 People vs. Cornelio: involves the escape of a death convict; The escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction.

1973 Constitution: which likewise did not prohibit the death penalty. Section 9, Rule 122 continued to provide the procedure for review of death penalty cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of review. Significantly, it expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court.

1987 Constitution: prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides.

December 13, 1993: Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option.

The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new period of thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to file the Brief of the accused Josefina A. Esparas.

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RULING ON RIGHT AGAINST PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS

Issues: Whether or not(1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) the Congress can review the capital punishment

HELD:1) Yes. The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.

2) The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

3) the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

4.) The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATIONTHE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Tan Teng was charged with the crime of rape of a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age.

Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was, in 1910, staying in the house of her sister, in Manila. A number of Chinamen were gambling and had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended partyOliva Pacomio, after having taken a bath, returned to her room and Tan Tengfollowed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave himAfter using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister that she was raped. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her.

Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea (human sexually transmitted infection; The usual symptoms in men are burning with urination and penile discharge. Women, on the other hand, are asymptomatic half the time or have vaginal discharge and pelvic pain.). The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs.

From that sentence, Tan Teng the defendant appealed and said it was wrong for the court to admit the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.

The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some moments. The defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva constructed said obnoxious disease from the defendant is not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION INVOKED: In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself.

Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question in his sentence, said:The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined. The substance was taken from the body of the defendant WITHOUT HIS OBJECTION, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease.

RATIO/ANALOGY: If he is found with stolen property upon his person, the stolen property can be taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof.

ISSUE: Can the right against self-incrimination be invoked?

HELD:No. The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not AN EXCLUSION OF HIS BODY AS EVIDENCE, when it may be material.

The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.

The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.

We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal disease, as above stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof. Such crimes as the present are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in secret. Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the sentence of the lower court and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision correccional, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner, vs.RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:In a criminal case pending CFI Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with adultery. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if SHE WAS PREGNANT OR NOT. She refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

ISSUE: Can she invoke the right against self-incrimination?

HELD:

No. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.

Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

Facts:Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

Issue: Can he invoke his right against self-incrimination?

Held: Yes. He cannot be compelled absolutely and forever to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGNCE AND ATTENTION; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. ANALOGY: Similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. There is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to be entitled on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. He was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. The trial began by Chavez as being directly examined by the Fiscal.

During the trial, Chavez was presented as the first witness by the fiscal. The fiscal made clear that Chavez was just an ordinary witness but only a state witness. Atty Carbon, counsel for Chavez, objected to the move of making Chavez a witness as it will incriminate himself. Hence, Carbon was given a few minutes to communicate with Chavez before he can be asked on the stand.

Carbon said that Chavez will not testify as Carbon explained to him of such consequences. But the Court said what Chavez will testify doesn't necessarily incriminate him and that the prosecution has the right to ask anybody as a witness including the accused. The Court adds that the counsel can object WHEN CHAVEZ IS TO BE ASKED WITH INCRIMINATING QUESTIONS, but HE CAN'T OBJECT if CHAVEZ is called to the witness stand. Atty Carbon submits. The Court adds that the court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.

As to Roger Chavez's conviction, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-confessed culprit". The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum,

The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 1968, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.

ISSUE: Can he invoke his right against self-incrimination?

HELD:

YES. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand."

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.

WHY IS A PERSON CALLED TO A WITNESS STAND? For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People WOULD BE TO INCRIMINATE. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.

And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "IS NOT THE PROBABILITY OF EVIDENCE but IT IS THE CAPABILITY OF ABUSE." The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.And this statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case.

The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense.

It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice.

HOW WAIVER OF THIS RIGHT CAN BE MADE? There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence."

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs.BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON,

Facts:Arsenio Pascual, filed on 1965 with CFI Manila an action for prohibition preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. At the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, an objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, the petitioner would be called upon to testify as such witness

Petitioneralleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guiltyof grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.

On February 9, 1965, the lower court GRANTED the a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case.

Respondent Board alleged that the right against self-incrimination is available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness.

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

The lower court sided with the petitioner.

Issue: Can the right against self-incrimination be invoked?

Held:Yes.The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence.

It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy."In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

DOUBLE JEOPARDYTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.WILLY OBSANIA

Facts:

On 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, a 14-year old victim, and her parents, filed in the municipal court of Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, 1 alleging

That on November 1964, in the afternoon, Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, is charged with rape with violence on the roadside in the ricefields at the above-mentioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio

The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings. The assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".

The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity.

The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case."

From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.

ISSUEs: 1) Are "lewd designs" an indispensable element which should be alleged in the complaint?,2) Does the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?

HELD:Both no. HENCE the second prosecution can be done.

The accused, based his double jeopardy defense in People vs. Gilo, defining "lewd design" is

... an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as abduction, seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness ...

NONETHELESS, it is not required to SPECIFICALLY allege "lewd design" in a complaint for rape. In a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste motive". Lascivious intent IS INHERENT in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age.

HENCE, trial judge was wrong in dismissing the second complaint on grounds that the complaint was defective for failure to allege "lewd design". There was already sufficiency in form and substance of complaint.

2) No. AS A RULE, the prosecution cannot appeal in a criminal case if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy.

The REQUISITE IN ISSUE IS THE (dismissal of case WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF ACCUSED)

THE FF REQUISITES are present: The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the accused.

The dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his motion to dismiss. HOWEVER, he contends that under the prevailing jurisprudence, an erroneous dismissal of a criminal action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss, he can still raise the defense of double jeopardy in A SUBSEQUENT by the Government OR in a new prosecution for the same offense. The accused suggests that the CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE states that when a case is dismissed, upon motion of the accused personally or through counsel, THE DISMISSAL shall not constitute AS EXPRESS CONSENT of the accused (or cannot waive his right to raise defense of double jeopardy).

BUT THE SC HOLDS THAT THERE WAS EXPRESS CONSENT OF ACCUSED. The dismissal was effected not only with the express consent of the petitioner but even upon the urging of his counsel. SC is inclined to uphold the view of the Solicitor General. The petitioner and offended party had a conference in the office of fiscal AND THE RESULT OF WHICH the offended party filed a motion to dismiss. The dismissal order by the court is merely PROVISIONAL in character; this was because at first no action was done by the court on the motion for dismissal but it was urged by the counsel to make so.

RULE: Where a criminal case is dismissed PROVISIONALLY not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, THERE CAN BE NO double jeopardy.

The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.

RAMON S. PAULIN, ANGELA F. PAULIN and JOSE BACHO, -versus-

HON. CELSO M. GIMENEZ [In His Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu City, Branch 5], HON. MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES [In His Capacity as Judge of the MTC of Talisay, Branch IX, Cebu], CASTRO BELME and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

On 1989, the jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the Spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with dust. THe Bargy Captain then followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals in Cebu. Later, while the Brgy Captain was investigating some problems of his constituents, the petitioners pointed their guns at the brgy captain while Jose Bacho acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the Barangay Tanods to call the police block the exit of the petitioners. Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police station.

On the same date, Station Commander Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and ORAL DEFAMATION," against private respondent Mabuyo.

The cases were jointly tried and on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu [Branch IX], acting on a motion of the Spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case against them.

On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3, 1990.

At the hearing of Criminal Case against Mabuyo on July 5, 1990, petitioners sought the setting aside of the July 3, 1990 Resolution in Criminal Case against them, but the same was denied in another Resolution.

Not satisfied with the Resolution of respondent Judge Coliflores, petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, with relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Regionre-raffled to another brance in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Gimenez, who dismissed the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. BUT THEY DISMISSED THE CASE. Public respondent is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the two Crim. Cases

ISSUE: Did the MTC's dismissal of Criminal Case against petitioners BARS a reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal and hence IT would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy?

HELD:No. There was no violation of right against double jeopardy.

Petitioners argues that the June 13, 1990 decision of the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] is an ACQUITTAL since it was issued AFTER it had allegedly considered the merits of the prosecution's evidence.

SC: The MTC decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal from the charge CONSIDERING that no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.

In the case at bar, the original case was dismissed without the proper information having been filed, it appearing that the proper charge should have been, "disturbance of public performance," punishable under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code instead of "grave threats," under Article 282 of the same penal code.

AS A GENERAL RULE: Dismissal is HELD TO BE FINAL if made without the express consent of the accused (READ: if the dismissal is not made on his motion) --> right against double jeopardy can be invoked (EASIER SAID: acquittal is not dismissal)EXCEPTIONS (where dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the case, once and for all, even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself) --> right against double jeopardy can be invoked: (EASIER SAID: there is an acquittal even if it is dismissal upon accused's motion)[1] Where the dismissal is based on a DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE filed by the accused AFTER PROSECUTION has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.[2] Where the dismissal is made on motion of the accused, because of DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.

BUT IN THIS CASE, THE EXCEPTIONS WERE NOT SEEN IN the petitioners' motion to dismiss because when the MTC dismissed the case upon petitioners' motion, the prosecution STILL HAD TO PRESENT SEVERAL WITNESSES.

The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated December 19, 1991 is affirmed.SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. AURELIO BALISACAN,

FACTS:

On 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:

That on 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.

To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, HE WAS ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. Thereupon the accused testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.

Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a decision ACQUITTING the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed therefrom.

This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal was certified to SC by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966, We ordered it docketed herein.

ISSUE: Did this appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?

HELD:

No. 1) 2nd requisite absent; The plea was absent at the time the court rendered judgment of acquittal because at that time HE VACATED HIS PLEA. Plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of VACATING HIS PLEA OF GUILTY and the court should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

2) 4th requisite is absent; AN ACQUITTAL NOT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS IS NO ACQUITTAL AT ALL. The court decided the case upon the merits WITHOUT giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly ACTED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No costs. So ordered.

GENEROSO ESMEA and ALBERTO ALBA, petitioners, vs.JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY, City Court of Cebu City, Branch III, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and RICARDO B. TABANAO, as Special Counsel, Office of the City Fiscal, Cebu City, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their co-accused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with GRAVE COERCION in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the Php5,000 from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards.

The case was calendared on October 4, 1978 presumably for arraignment and trial. Upon the telegraphic request of Father Tibudan the case was reset 2 months after (on December 13, 1978). Because PETITIONERS were not duly notified of that hearing, they were not able to appear.

The two pleaded NOT GUILTY at their arraignment on January 23, 1979. NO TRIAL WAS HELD AFTER THE ARRAIGNMENT because complainant Father Tibudan REQUESTED TRANSFER of the hearing to another date.

In the meantime, THE FISCAL LOST his record of the case. So, the hearing scheduled was cancelled at his instance. On that date, respondent judge issued an order setting the trial "for the last time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning"

The fiscal informed the court that the private prosecutor received from complainant Father Tibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. The counsel for petitioners opposed the cancellation of the hearing. They invoked the right of the accused TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL.

Respondent judge PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. The case was continued as to the fifth accused who did not appear at the hearing. His arrest was ordered.

27 days later, the fiscal FILED MOTION for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979.

The fiscal justified that the case can be revived WITHOUT FILING A NEW INFORMATION, due to a ruling saying that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality. Respondent judge granted it in his order of October 8, 1979 (p. 26, Rollo).

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that THEY DIDN'T CONSENT to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal AMOUNTED ALREADY TO AN ACQUITTAL which placed them in jeopardy. Its revival would place them in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Were the accused placed in double jeopardy?

HELD:

Yes. WITHOUT CONSENT OF ACCUSED TO THE DISMISSAL.

Section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."

In the instant case, we the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.

EXCEPTIONS:(1) (EVEN IF THEY CONSENTED, the DISMISSAL will still put them in jeopardy) Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299).(2) The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated October 8, 1979, reviving the criminal case against the petitioners, and his order of December 14, 1979, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, are reversed and set aside. No costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA,Court of First Instance of Rizal, and CONSOLACION NAVAL,

FACTS:

Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years lateran application for registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her name but she allegedly disposed of the half portion of the property to nine other persons.

Consolacion Naval and her co-accused Anacleto Santos, was charged with estafa and falsification, separately:

ESTAFA: That on 1973 and soon thereafter, in the municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit and with intent to defraud, knowing that their parcel of land among others, situated in Taytay, Rizal was already sold to Edilberto V. Ilano as can be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion"; and the victim paid the partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused and without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, the accused executed and filed an Application for Registration over the same parcel of land among others, which document is designated as LRC Case No. N-7485, "Consolacion, Eduvigis and Apolinaria, all surnamed Naval" of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Rizal, as a result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No. 9332 in her name, which area was reduced to 10,075 sq. meters as appearing in item No. 2 in said OCT and subsequently referred to in TCT No. 370870 in favor of said accused Naval through Rodolfo Mendoza, sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel of land in her name in favor of Maria, Anacleto, Carmelo, Mariano, Cecilia and Teodorica, all surnamed Santos and Iluminada Tambalo, Pacita Alvarez and Pedro Valesteros which sales were registered and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Rizal at Pasig, Rizal; and likewise a portion of which was partitioned to herein accused Anacleto Santos; that despite repeated demands the accused refused and still refuse to return said amount and/or fulfill their obligations under said "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion", to the damage and prejudice of said Edilberto V. Ilano in the aforementioned amount of P130,850.00.The confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her name but she allegedly disposed of the half portion of the property to nine other persons.

FALSIFICATION: That on or about the 17th day August, 1971, in the municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private individual did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, committed as follows: the said accused on August 17, 1971, executed a document entitled "Application For Registration" for parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect that "She is the exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-248206 and that she "does not know any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land or that any person has estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or expectancy", as a result of which the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in fact the herein accused has already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion" dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V. Ilano has already paid partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused.

On 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the information for FALSIFICATION, premised, among other things, because she is CHARGED WITH an identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge of falsification and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her motion to quash.

ISSUE: Was she placed in jeopardy?

HELD:No. The charge for falsification must not be quashed. 4th requisite lacking (THERE WAS NO CONVICTION YET ON THE FIRST CHARGE, NOR THE FIRST CHARGE IS DISMISSED WITHOUT HIS CONSENT)

The mere filing of 2 informations charg