Review of Goodwin's "No Other Way Out"

Jay C Colburn II 3/30/11GOVT 731

A Critical Analysis of Goodwin's No Other Way Out

The study of revolutions, or of any phenomena involving the state, society, and their

relationship, is undoubtedly a complex task and one that is sure to encounter many difficulties

and critiques along the way. The number of methods or frameworks with which to approach

the study of revolutions indeed may even outnumber actual cases of revolution from history.

One popular method used in analyzing revolutions, their origins, paths, outcomes, and the

movements that make them happen is the state-centered approach. This approach is not

monolithic, though, as different scholars focus on different aspects, capacities, and institutions

of the state. Using a state-centric approach, Jeff Goodwin in No Other Way Out: States and

Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 is an ambitious study, both in terms of the scope of the

questions and the variety of cases under investigation. The two main questions Goodwin

explores throughout this book are: Why do revolutionary movements form and thrive in some

states and not in others? Why do revolutionary movements succeed in seizing state power in

some states and not in others? In his attempt to answer these questions, cases from three

different geographical areas are examined in different time periods, namely Southeast Asia

from World War II to the mid-1950s (Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya), Central

America from 1970 through the 1980s (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), and

Eastern Europe in 1989.

Being an important work in the comparative politics literature on revolutions, Goodwin's

book clearly identifies his dependent variable as "the formation (or absence) and subsequent

fate of radical revolutionary movements in peripheral societies during the Cold War era" (p.16).

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In an attempt at "good" social science, Goodwin chooses his cases with variation on the

dependent variable in mind; in order to uncover the factors that answer his key research

questions, negative cases, or cases where revolutionary movements and revolutions do not

occur, are compared with successful cases. The way the book is divided by region also has

methodological reasoning behind it; by comparing cases within the same region and time

period, it is possible to rule out or hold constant a number of factors that are similar across

each set of cases, like religion; if such factors are common among both positive and negative

cases, they need not be examined as possible explanatory factors.

A number of other factors are ruled out as Goodwin critiques various theoretical

frameworks, those of modernization theory and Marxist theory. The modernization approach

claims revolutions are more likely to happen in societies undergoing a rapid transition from a

traditional to a modern society, whereas the Marxist approach claims revolutions are more

likely to happen in societies undergoing a transition from one mode of production to another.

Both of these perspectives are criticized by Goodwin because of their neglect or

underestimation of the political context in which these processes (modernization) and

relationships (between classes) take place. Goodwin does not assert that these and other

factors, like economic, associational, or social-psychological ones, have no effect on the

outcomes of revolutionary movements; rather he asserts that all of these other factors are

filtered through the political contexts of states and their structures and practices.

While Goodwin explains a variety of state-centered approaches, he chooses to utilize

what he calls the state constructionism approach. This approach essentially claims that state

structures and practices actually construct revolutionary movements; in other words,

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Goodwin's state constructionism says that revolutions will emerge when states are configured

and act in certain ways. He identifies five characteristics or practices of states that contribute

to the development of revolutionary movements: 1) unpopular economic, social, and/or

cultural policies, 2) repression and/or exclusion of certain sectors of society from resources or

state power, 3) indiscriminate violence against opposition groups, 4) weak policing capacities

and infrastructural power, and 5) corrupt, personalistic rule that alienates, weakens, and/or

divides counterrevolutionary elites. It is clear in these characteristics include non-state actors

and factors, but their effects are directed through the state. Throughout the book, Goodwin's

investigation of revolutionary movements across the three geographic regions of Southeast

Asia, Central America, and Eastern Europe points to these five general characteristics and

practices of states as the common explanatory factors of why revolutionary movements either

succeeded or failed in these cases. His diagrams on pages 28 and 29 visually demonstrate the

types of state organization, political regime, and infrastructural power that are most likely to

"incubate" revolutionary movements and be overthrown by them.

In his defense of taking a state-centered approach, he notes that revolutions by

definition involve the overthrow of the existing state, whether the political regime alone or in

combination with the social, economic, and/or cultural order. Having been a student of Theda

Skocpol, known for "bringing the state back in" to such analyses of revolutions, it is no surprise

that Goodwin's emphasis lies in political contexts and various aspects of the state. However,

Goodwin does recognize that there are limitations to statist analyses in that they do not

account for nonstate or nonpolitical sources of: 1) associational networks, like civil society, 2)

material resources, and 3) collective beliefs, assumptions, and emotions (including strategies,

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identities, etc.). There are a number of approaches, including social network analysis, resource

mobilization and political process theories, and world-systems theory, social-psychological

approaches, or culturalist approaches, that could contribute to understanding revolutionary

movements and their successes or failures. Unfortunately, Goodwin does not include aspects

of these alternative frameworks into his state-centered investigation. While the state-centered

approach indeed has much explanatory power for analyzing certain political phenomena, the

complex of society and its many constituent actors, interests, and ideologies as well as various

economic actors, interests, and institutions all are seemingly obvious factors that need to be

included in any well-rounded attempt at understanding such social phenomena as revolutions.

The role of agency is sorely missing from Goodwin's analysis, as individuals are influenced by

and act in response to not only state structures and practices but a host of other competing

influences. Even though Goodwin understands that a state-centered approach alone cannot

fully explain why revolutionary movements form or not and succeed or fail in some states and

not in others, he still chooses not to incorporate these factors into his approach, claiming the

state is the most important factor and that other factors are filtered through the political

context of the state.

The first empirical section of No Other Way Out deals with the cases of revolutionary

movements in Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya, in

the period between World War II and the mid-1950s. The analysis in chapter three focuses on

the formation of revolutionary movements in the four states, determining that Western and

Japanese imperialist political institutions and actions created a political context that fostered

the joining or supporting of Communist revolutionary movements (except for Indonesia's

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nationalist movement). Goodwin points to the variation of political rule, either inclusionary or

exclusionary, as contributing to the revolutionary movements growth. It was only in Vietnam,

however, that the Communist revolutionary movement, the Viet Minh, successfully achieved

power. A number of counterproductive French colonial policies are identified as significantly

influencing this outcome, particularly their lack of political reforms towards decolonization,

their authoritarian and harshly repressive policies, and their failure to establish a non-

Communist pro-Western leadership to whom they could transfer power. The colonial policies

in Malaya and the Philippines such as reforms from above, gradual transitions to independence,

elections (even if not wholly competitive), and discriminate use of force, on the other hand,

undermined the appeal of revolutionary movements. Figure 4.1 on page 131, which shows

Goodwin's analytic trajectory of revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia, is a helpful visual

representation of the causal chain that he claims explains the variability of revolutionary

movement formation and success or failure.

Interestingly, Goodwin digs further into the analysis by trying to understand the reasons

for the variation in Japanese occupation and colonial policies; in doing so, a number of non-

state factors, like Japan's geopolitical interest and international alliances, the economic value of

colonies, and cultural and ideological differences between the different colonial powers, come

to the fore. Goodwin says that these non-state actors are influenced or filtered through the

state policies and actions, but the mere acknowledgement of these non-state explanations

seems to undermine his state-centered approach. Also, the use of Indonesia as a case, which

experienced a nationalist as opposed to Communist revolution, is problematic; Goodwin's

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reasons for this awkward comparison between the non-Communist and Communist

revolutionary movements are not well justified or explained.

Part 3 of Goodwin's book deals with the revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, El

Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Similar to the cases of Southeast Asia, Goodwin finds that

revolutionary movements were formed and strengthened in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and

Guatemala because of 1) a militarized state with weak infrastructure, 2) exclusionary and anti-

reformist policies marked by electoral fraud, and 3) indiscriminate repression of political

opposition. Only in Nicaragua, though, did the revolutionary movement, the Sandinista

National Liberation Front (FSLN), take power. On the contrary, the lack of a strong

revolutionary movement in Honduras is explained in part because of that state's more

moderate civilian and military rule and their implementation of land reforms. There is an

emphasis on the institutionalized practices of these states, claiming that the ruling regimes

structures and practices had become a norm and were continued regardless of their

ineffectiveness or counterproductivity. Like in the explanation for Southeast Asia, the variation

of outcome of the revolutionary movements is attributed to the different structures of the

authoritarian regimes and their differing responses to the revolutionary movements; the

neopatrimonial and self-destructive rule of the Somozas, along with elite opposition,

international isolation, and a lack of political opening, contributed to the success of the FSLN,

while the more institutional bureaucratic authoritarian rule of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan

regimes combined with their loyal elites and semi-openness resulted not in the failure of

revolutionary movements but of persistent insurgencies that lasted for years (see Figure 6.1 on

page 211 for visualization).

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Goodwin's analysis of the revolutionary movements of Central America is the most

convincing and true to his theoretical framework laid out in Part 1. It would be beneficial to

add cases of revolutionary movements that failed (instead of resulted in civil wars) to coincide

more with the rest of the cases in the book and the original research question, which is framed

as the success or failure of movements. A number of perspectives, namely dependency theory

or other types of economic and cultural explanations, also seem to be a necessary additions to

Part 3 of No Other Way Out. As with much of the rest of this work, there is an underestimation

of the importance of international actors, especially the dominant Cold War powers, the US and

USSR, in the overall explanation of why certain movements succeeded or not under different

states.

The final geographic area explored by Goodwin is Eastern Europe in 1989. The common

explanations given for the revolutions in Eastern Europe, like economic factors (that the Soviet

Union's territories couldn't keep up with the capitalist West), the newly emerged civil society,

and Gorbachev's reforms, are not satisfactory for Goodwin. Again he relies on the state-

centered approach to explain the differences in revolutionary movements and outcomes in

Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Goodwin discovers that state

structures and practices, such as variations in regime type, once again seem to explain the

differences, but other factors, like the relative strength of civil society and whether hardliner or

reformist Communists dominated, are also part of his conclusion (see Figure 8.1 on page 287

for visualization).

This section differs the most from the rest of the book's investigation; Goodwin even

questions if these cases represent revolutions and not "refolutions." His format of analysis

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strays from the two chapter format of the other sections, which explore first the formation of

revolutionary movements and then the success or failure of them. Even the questions being

asked are different; much of the chapter is devoted to explaining why the Eastern European

states and revolutionary movements are comparable to the Third World periphery cases of

Southeast Asia and Central America as well as the relatively peaceful nature of these Second

World revolutions. It seems that Goodwin tries to fit these Eastern European cases into same

analytical structure as the other regions, but he does so unconvincingly.

Given these weaknesses, of the Eastern European section and of the work as a whole,

No Other Way Out does make a significant contribution to the study of revolutions. Despite his

lack of inclusion of non-state factors into his theoretical framework, his analyses and

conclusions about the role of the state and its structures and practices are clearly important

explanatory factors in understanding the formation and outcomes of revolutionary movements,

though not the only important factors. Ideally, the weaknesses described above should be

combined in some way with the contributions made from Goodwin's analysis and state

constructionist approach. It is clear, admittedly so by Goodwin, that his approach does not

provide a complete picture of revolutionary processes. No one perspective or unit of analysis,

whether state-centered, Marxist, economic, or socio-psychological, is sufficient in any analysis

of political phenomena, but only a combination of these various political, social, economic, and

cultural factors will be able to truly explain the formation (or absence) and success (or failure)

of revolutionary movements.

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Causal Chains

Southeast Asia

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Central America

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Eastern Europe

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Documents

Review of Goodwin's "No Other Way Out"