Claremont CollegesScholarship @ Claremont

CGU Faculty Publications and Research CGU Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1994

Rethinking OOTWRobert J. BunkerClaremont Graduate University

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusionin CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contactscholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Recommended CitationBunker, Robert J. "Rethinking OOTW." Military Review 75.6 (1995): 34-41. Print.

Robert J. BunkerCopyright 1994

THE US ARMY’S AirLand Battle doctrine issignificant in the historical evolution of war-

fighting doctrine. 1 Since its doctrinal inception inthe August 1982 edition of US Army Field Manual(FM) 100-5, Operations, and the FM revisions inMay 1986 to include follow-on force int.diction andoperational maneuver, AirLand Battle doctrine hashelped tmnsform the US Army into a modem landwarfare force qualitatively second to none in theworld.2

To maintain the Army’s land warfare dominance,the June 1993 edition of FM 10&5 documents theCold War’s end, emphasizes shifting to a joint op-erations focus and anticipates the US need for aforce-projection Army in a rapidly changing world.3The inclusion of the operations other than war(OOTW) concept in the new FM 100-5 is regardedas vital to operations doctrine because it broadensthe Army’s mission capability across the operation-al continuum.4 The 00TW concept, however, isflawed.5

This article challenges the concept and, by default,the contiiuum shown in Figure 1 and the range ofmilitary operations in the theater strategic environ-ment (hereafter referred to as the RMO model),

which it helps defme.b To do so, it will ackhess therelationship between the 00TW concept and RMOmodel, the concept of war underlying AirLand Battledoctrine and 00TW as a flawed concept. It furtherargues that the RMO model should be replaced bynot one, but two new politico-military models as adoctrinal bridge. It is not within this article’s scopeto attempt to create these models, which shouldreflect recognized differences in current Westernand emerging non–Western approaches to warfare.Rather, its purpose is to call attention to a need forinterim models to address AirLand Battle futureconcepts. For this to occur, however, long-held USpolitical perceptions must change. As a result, therevolution in military affairs (RMA) concept must bebroadened to include a political dimension.

The 00TW Concept and RMO ModelThe 1982 edition of FM 100-5 introduced the

concept of contingency operations, an early foren.m-ner of 00TW. Contingency operations dealt primar-ily with urgent situations and crises below the levelof general war but which nq.hd armed force tosupport national policy in a Cold War environment.These operations requixed either light or heavy Army

1 1 I M-n

Iw

Det~wVarConflict Other ~ ~

Resolve Conflict Than war T ~

I Peacetime Ppg$e I OtherThan War ;

* Lararg:cale * Attack* Defend

operations... I* Strikes and raids * Antiterrorism* Peace enforcement * Peacekeeping* Support to insurgency * NEO

* Counterdrug * Peace building* Disaster relief * Nation assistance* Civil support

l-hestatesoffleacdm,tiandwaraalexistatoncernlhe—~ Sswagic ‘enwomKm Hemn3spondb~mawi&rangaofrnili@OpmtiOm.NOmonWOpmtimsmi@toccurd@gwar,justassumaoparatkmO#wrlhmviarmightreqtiaxnbat.

Ftgure1. RangeofMilitaryoperationsintheTheaterStrategicEnvircment,(FM100-5)

34 November - December 1995 s MILITARY REVIEW

forces and fimctioned within a strategic paradigmdesigned to prevent the global spread of cornmu-nism.7 The 00TW concept introduced in 1993expanded on the contingency operations concept,bringing it fully into the post-Cold War world, whichrequires more of such operations.

The continuum of military operations depicted inF@n3 1 portrays three environmental states: war,conflict and peace.8 00TW resides in both the con-flict and peacetime states. War, however, residesonly in the war environmental state. The US Army’srequirement in such a state is to fight and win.9

Under the OOTW concept, which seeks to over-come the problematic nature of the term low–intensity conjlict (LIC), US Army forces are de-ployed to resolve regional conflicts and directly deterwar. 10 According to Colonel Steven M. Butler, for-mer director, low–intensity conflict proponencies,“Problems with the term LIC have been recognizedfor several years. It is distinguished from war not byintensity of violence but by a difference in purposeand method. Some such conflicts may be quite vio-lent. However, the goal is to resolve apolitical prob-lem by political means, with the minimum necessaryuse of military force.” This concept also includespeacetime operations, such as disaster relief, humanit-arian assistance and counterdrug efforts, which theUS Army has increasingly found itself asked to per-form in support of national objectives to promoteglobal peace. ]1

In the military operations continuum, peace isconsidenxl to be the normal condition among andwithin nations. The maintenance or r-e-establishmentof peace is sought by means of national influence,suasion and, if need be, coercion by the United Statesin its foreign and defense policies. This process isnot discussed in the 1993 FM 100-5, yet it is implicitin the OOTW concept, as depicted in Figure 2.12

INFORMATIONOPERATIONS

This political perception regarding the primacy ofpeace among and within states represents the OOTWconcept’s raison d’?tre and the Western view of

/’l%e] tmditiondde+n of warhus prevaiki for nwre than 150 yeas. . . .Conventional mi&u=y opemliims thut are

based on tmdWzud Cihusew&ian objectivesseek to &simy opping mi&uy fomes, seizetedry and captun another nation+nlute%

leadership to obtuin dkckive viitay. . . .[Howeve~ tothyk] nzpiiii?ychunging worki. . . beam MU resembkuwe to the worki of

the Ckzusew&iizn panu@m

government’s natural order. This view, however, isfundamental flawed when applied outside Westerncivilization. 1J

Even as the US Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) was developing the RMOmodel to reflect post-Cold War realities, military andacademic perceptions of the global security environ-ment changed. Scholars increasingly recognizedthat war is no longer the exclusive domain of thenation–state. 14

A qualitatively different war form has developed,challenging the central tenets of how modem war-fare is conducted by armies in the West in generaland by the United States in particular. These centraltenets are structurally built upon technological domi-nance in military equipment. The non-Western formof warfare eschews such technology. Modem war-fare is undergoing a simultaneous metamorphosisbased on information and advanced technologiesthat will result in a qualitatively new form of Westernwarfare.

�Fightand Win War Levelof Violence(War)

ConventionalTheaterOperations

Hostilities�DeterWar Short of War

(Conflict)

Paacetim NationAssistancePromotePeace Engaganwrt For~~ Counterdrug

l%W$!l@~AcMUr3a Arrtiterrorism(Peace) Peacekeeping‘.

\

I � Desiredend state of use of force includesa returnto the environmentof peaceI

Re@ted IIUTILTCEdwatdE. Thunnm, USA“S@@ m Amy Ior Pe&x, Cr@sd War TheComiium OfMdiiv @walii,” mtheA@ 1992M&ry Rewew

Figure 2, (Minuum of MilitaryOperations,

MILITARY REVIEW . November - December 1995 35

k IDepibying US ;ombatfo;es with the expec@ilm of stopping conventional war k

unrealistic because k many cases, an indigenous infrastructure no longer exists to suppotikuge-scale combat operations. One example is Somalia, where nothing even remotely resem-

bling Western conventiimal fomes couki have been jiekkd by the waning pmtiks.

In many cases, a st@? of war based on rwn-Westem polilical conditibns+libal andreligibus domhumce or conjlikt between subnatiorud and lbcal groups4eady exists. . . .

Doctrinally, these potentialities are not even considered Embracing the 00TW concept thusconcedes the political and mili@y initiative to the opponent, who is thereby initiidly

pendkd to condkct non-Western mdikuy opemtkms again@ US fomes.

While the 00TW concept can be viewed as a boldand important shitl in emerging US Army doctrinebased on’’... reftig the understanding of how to usemilitary force, “ its perception of the non–Westernconflict environment is inaccurate and inherentlyflawed. 15 The 00TW concept became officialArmy doctrine with the publication of the 1993 FM100-5, but by May 1994, it had almdy become dis-ctiited. “The next edition of FM 10&5, Opera-tions. . . [will] . . . describe the seductively flaweddistinction between war and operations other than

“lb Before we can explore this conceptual flaw,~~concept of war underlying AirLand Battle doc-trine must be addressed.

US Army Concept of WarThe US Army’s concept of war is based fully on

the traditional Western definition, Clausewitzian inorigin, which views war as an extension of politicsby other means. 17 Under this definition, war is con-

ventional; the nation-state, or coalition of nation-states, is the wielder of political violence; and nation-alism fbels ideology. Ww’s puqmse in this context isto preserve and extend national sovereignty. 18

This definition of war is a product of the historicalperiod when it was developed. Carl von Clause-witz’s On War skillfidly explains the monumentalmilitaxy and political changes in European societyafter the French Revolution. Clausewitz’s definitionof war fit hand-in-glove with the new deftition ofwealth developed in 1776 by Adam Smith in Wealthof Nations. Together, these two works accurately de-scribed the shift, albeit at times temporally extenddin European society after the demise of the ancienn?gime in France and the rise of the nation-state. *9

This traditional definition of war has pnmi.ikxi formo~ than 150 years and has worked well throughoutthe 19th century, during World Wars I and II, duringthe Korean War and as a basis for possible confronta-tion with the Warsaw Pact in central Europe. Con-

36 November - December 1995 � MILITARY REVIEW

ventional military operations that are based on tradi-tional Clausewitzian objectives seek to destroyopposing military forces, seim territory and captureanother nation–state’s leadership to obtain decisivevictory.20 The Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine andarmored and mechanized force structure is based ont.hk definition of war.21 while the US Army still has

a significant light infantry mission capability, itwould be de-emphasized if the Army’s combat roleand mission were focused solely on armored andmechanized combat as part of its downsizing.22

00TW’S Conceptual FlawThe 00TW concept’s fundamental flaw is that it

is based on—and is a derivative of—the Army’sClausewitzian definition of war. It is a definitionnow seriously challenged by recent historical eventsand military scholarship.23

As a result, one can infer that the US Army, and inturn the defense establishment, is inadvertently usinga Western concept of war to form the basis of mili-tary organization and policy in a rapidly changingworld that now bears little resemblance to the worldof the Clausewitzian paradigm.” It is no coinci-dence that the decades-old Western economic para-digm is also being seriously challenged with reengi-neering concepts. It can be argued that what curnmtArmy doctrine defines as a conflict environmentalstate for 00TW is actually a non–Western war envi-ronmental state, as portrayed in Figure 3. This can beviewed as “a blurring of the distinction between warand operations other than war.”25

This non–Western war environmental state has itsorigins in the past and can be viewed in manyresp@s as a means by which the militarily weak canchallenge the militarily strong. However, in theOriental tradition of war, as seen in Sun Tzu’s writ-

26 Best thought of asings, this is not always the case.a form of “militaty Akido,” the greater strength of anopposing force is used against it by an enemy wellversed in deception, indirect fighting methods andflexibility. US Special Operations Forces (SOF)understand this form of warfare. However, becauseit is the “other fbture warkue” that is developing,instead of the RMA-based one, SOF’S future con-tributions have been generally overlooked.27

NoMlauaawikian Variable Clausawikian(NOA’wm @pmm.S) (usAmy)

Non-WesternWar Environment Ccdlii

Achii Pdw Eds Goal DeterWar-ResolveCcdlii

Nww Oowations MilitarvODS 00TW

Figu~ 3. ConfIiiversusNon-Western War Environmental State

INFORMATIONOPERATIONS

Traditionally based in agricultural settings in the20th century and usually linked in modem militaryliterature to Lin Piao and Mao Tke-Tung, this evolv-ing form of warfare has blended with terrorism and

Instiad of a stnukgic asse~ asjidurkt$ Alvin and Heti To~r have sug-

gested, information technology is more oflenan Achilles heel of Western (and speclfially

US) anniks. News media broaakasts are ofienused as effective politkal took by nuli@ily

weak opponents. CNN real-time pictures ofbody bags, fig-draped cofins and injured

and dying US servicemen and local civiliansgreatly injluencepublic opinwn and pose

signljicantpmbk?ms for US laden.

the urbanization of the less-developed world tocreate something new. “The future killing groundsin the less-developed world will not be the impene-trable forests or remote mountain areas whereguerrilla wars have traditionally been fought, butthe crowded, built-up areas in and around the less–developed world’s burgeoning urban centers.”x

While the geographical context of this emergingform of war is changing, it is the recognition that it isan environmental state of war, not of conflict, that isimportant. Such a ndity destroys the whole conceptbehind 00TW, which seeks to avoid conventionalwar in a crisis situation and return the environmentback to peace. The American use of suasion in sucha scenario to deter war and resolve conflict is totallyinappropriate.29

In fact, deploying US combat forces with the ex-pectation of stopping conventional war is unrealisticbecause in many cases, an indigenous infrastructureno longer exists to support large-scale combat opera-tions. One example is Somali% where nothing evenremotely resembling Western conventional forcescould have been fielded by the warring parties.30

More important, however, is the fact that in manycases, a state of war based on non–Western politicalconditions—tribal and religious dominance or con-flict between subnational and local groups-a.lmdyexists. Because the warb is not between states, suchconditions are often overlookd. Doctrinally, thesepotentialities are not even considered. Embracingthe OOTW concept thus concedes the political andmilitary inhtive to the opponen~ who is thereby ini-tially permitted to conduct non–Western militaryoperations against US forces. It is of little wonder,

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1995 37

UUimately,theWest%vulnembilily inthis regani k best understood by rememberingthat in an @riiibn waq a local warkwd knows

he can affoti to lose hundkedi of sokiim,unkke a US Army commande~ who sltzndkto

f~e a huge public outcry back home ifUS casudies are high.

then, that most recent experiences under 00TW’Smbric have been political and militay failures.

Arguments against the existence of such non–Western military operations can be easily madebecause they conflict with traditional W=tem opem-tional pnxepts. Such arguments can be made inele-vang however, because what ultimately matters is theoutcQme of an operation-the prognxs toward a de-fined political end-not the form the operation takes.

Four operational characteristics support this line ofinning about the existence of such non-Wwtemwarfare operations:

� The denial of red-time information to Westernmilitary forces.

� The use of real-time information against West-ern governments.

� Nonacceptance of Western laws governing war.. The ability to defeat advanced Western weap-

onry.The fnt two characteristics directly neutralize the

West’s superior information-based systems and per-mit the use of local knowledge as a political toolagainst the West. Non-Western combatants are de-ployed within the general populace, negating Westernintelligence gathering from satellite imagery andremote sensing. For effective intelligence gather-ing to be conducted under these circumstances, labor–intensive human intelligence is ~uimd.s 1

Due to ineffective local intelligence–gatheringcapabilities, military commanders are unable toobtain a battlefield picture of enem troops as they

Jwould on a conventional battlefield. 2 Non-Westerncombatants are thus able to effectively frustrateWestern forces by spreading out across the battlefieldto reduce their vulnerability while using a relativelyhigh organic and inherent stealth capability to mistWestern detection. In Somali% as in other non–Western scenarios, it was almost impossible to dis-tinguish civilians from insurgents.33

Instead of a strategic asset, as futurists Alvin andHeidi Toffler have suggested, information technol-ogy is mom often an Achilles heel of Western (andspecifically US) armies.~ News media broadcasts

ate often used as effective political tools by militarilyweak opponents. CNN real-time picture of bodybags, flag-draped coffins and injured and dying USservicemen and local civilians gwtly influence pub-lic opinion and pose significant problems for USleaders. Given the graphic footage now transmi~this is mo~ true today than during the Vietnam War.In a nxent broadcast from Haiti, a machete attackvictim’s blood splattend a television camera lens.35Local warloxxisand digious factional heads under-stand these images’ effectiveness. The sensational-ized deaths of even a small number of US service-men, such as the Rangers in Somali% can erodepolitical support for military operations.36

The third characteristic is a denunciation of West-ern ideals and the portrayal of Western civility as aweakness.37 Because they ofkm place a much differ-ent value on human life than the indigenous combat-ants do, Western forces are constrained by ethicalinhibitions against indiscriminate killing. For exam-ple, women and childnm were used to shield militaryobjectives in Somalia and to carry suicide bombs inVietnam.38 Dead US servicemen being draggedthrough the street in Somalia and American prison-ers of war on public display in Iraq are other exam-ples of such propaganda.39

Ultimately, the West’s vulnerability in this rega.dis best understood by nmembering that in an attri-tion war, a local warlord knows he can tiord to losehundreds of soldiem, unlike a US Army commander,who stands to face a huge public outcry back homeif US casualties are high.

The fourth characteristic denies the West its mili-tary advantage based on advanced weaponry. Theimmense advantages offered by precision-guidedmunitions and air– and submarine-launched cruisemissiles in a conventional setting are lost in environ-ments when target acquisition is irrelevant and tar-gets can be destroyed more effectively by othermeans. Furthermore, urban battlefields and otherforms of restrictive terrain, such as jungles andmountainous countrysides, have historically beengreat equalizers of military forces.

Together, these non–Western operational charac-teristics erode many components of Western domi-nance in warfare because they require manpower–intensive operations rather than the technology–intensive operations the West relies on. Manpower–intensive operations often ~sult in high casualties,making them politically unacceptable. In time,advances in intelligent robotic systems, weaponry,individual soldier protection and informationaltechnologies will overcome this disadvantage for

38 November - December 1995 � MILITARY REVIEW

l%e 00TWconceptkjknved nature highlights thejhct thdthe C’kUWWi&ZUI viewof the traditiimul baitlefild, where decisive viktiry impossible, k now mpiiily becoming obsolkte

in con.icts against non-Western foes who possess many notiitiorud advan@ges over the WesLBut many Western and Western-inspired s~s are still conducting war in the tmdiliimalsense.

Western security forces in non–Western milita~environments. In the interim, however, a growingnumber of conflicts with non–Western peoples—which are conceived as other–than-war militaryoperations-wars are actually being waged and un-wittingly lost by the West.m

Current Army doctrine does not recognize thisfact, because it is generally outside of long–held USpolitical and military perceptions. These perceptionsview war, and hence the possibility of either politicalvictory or defeat, as existing solely within the legiti-mate domain of the nation–state. This is in line withformer Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sulli-van and Colonel James M. Dubik when they state,“Any use of America’s information-age Army in asituation in which one or more of the parties axeusingviolence to compel othm to do their will nx@res thatwe approach the situation as war and mquims verystrong civil-military and interagency links.”41

DoctrinalSuggestionsThe 00TW concept’s flawed nature highlights

the fact that the Clausewitzian view of the tradi-

tional battlefield, where decisive victory is possible,is now rapidly becoming obsolete in conflicts againstnon–Western foes who possess many nontraditionaladvantages over the W=t. But many Western andWestern-inspired states am still conducting war in thetraditional sense. As a result, I suggest that two newpolitico-military models, one radical and one tradi-tional, be created for the follow--m edition to the1993 FM 100-5. These models would serve as aninterim bridge to help facilitate the Army’s develop-ment of a capabilities-lwed 21st-century warflght-ing doctrine.42

The radical politic~military model should bebased on a “non-Western warfare model,” whichconceptually btis with the “war, conflict and peace-time” continuum of military operations. This modelwould be based on the premise that wark will be aconstant and endemic condition for opemtions in themajority of non–Western environments where the USArmy will operate in the future-a non–Westernworld where conflict and war represent the new natu-ral order of government. This realization conflictsdirectly with the politically based 00’TW principle of

MILITARY REVIEW . November-December 1995 39

legitimacy, whose ”... intent is to assist the legitimateregional governments to become self–sufficient,stable and peaceful neighbors.”43 It would con-ceptually draw upon some of Martin van Cnweld’sarguments in K& Trmq-forrnation of War.U

The failure of the Western form of the nation–stateto take hold in much of the non–Western world and

Until USpolit&dpemepli@ns change, theUS Army will be handicapped in its attemptstocometi gr@swith mdilary operations in

non-West4?m environments Once thesepolitical perceptions do change, ourpercep-

tbns concerning “legitimate government”must also change, because the [Clausewit-

zian] perceptin of the natibn-state kmonopoly on war will be sh@ered

the increasing rise of tribalism based on religious andethnic groups should be the centerpiece of thismodel. The model must address how a technologi-cally intensive West can efkctively operate in mili-tary environments requiring manpower-intensiveoperations in which the West is at ethical and eco-nomic disadvantages. Organized criminal groupsm another faction which must be taken into consid-eration,45 Possibly, it will be determined that theprice for attempting to obtain real political success insuch environments-creating the conditions for last-ing peace —is currently too high a cost in Americanlives and economic resources to justify repeatedinterventions.

This means we will only treat the secondaryeffects of strife, not the root causes, by means ofshort-duration and limited+bjective operations.tiThese are operations which would be carried outonly in direct support of well-defined national secu-rity objectives based on coherent foreign and defensepolicies —which the current pnxidential administra-tions have not yet established.47

Further, because current US Army doctrine is sobound to Clausewitzian though~ many doctrinal ques-tions such as “Have the principles of war changed?,”“What is victory?” and “What is the battlefield?”must be reexamined. Questions regarding forcestmcture, such as those focusing on the developmentof special division–size military police units, mustalso be M&wed as this model is developed.~

The traditional Politicmmilitary model, based ona derivation of the current RMO model where peacerepresents the natural order, would be developed for

US Army operations in Western industrial societiesand non-Western influenced states whose methods ofwaging war are similar to our own. This model wouldenable the Army to continue to operate effectively ina modem conventional warfare setting as it did dur-ing the Gulf War. The model should also incorporateenough flexibility to address the likely threat ofnuclear-armed outlaw states such as North Korea.

The creation of two models, a molutionaiy non-Clausewitzian one for operations in the non–Westernworld and a traditional Clausewitzian model foroperations in the Western and Western-influencedworld, should be considered a conceptual bridge tofacilitate Army doctrinal and force-stmctum reforms.

Western warfare is ultimately changing because ofthe emergence of advanced information and weap-ons technology embodied in the RMA and willrequire the development of a non-clausewitzianmodel in the future. A single model based on non–Clausewitzian concepts and encompassing Westernand non–Western approaches to warfare is m@redto ftiy support US Army follow-on doctrine toAirLand Battle in the 21st century.49

Such an encompassing politico-military modelcannot be created now, however, because new modesof emerging Western and non–Western warfare, andthe political changes they will bring, are still in theirinfancy. Further, the US Army needs time to preparefor the massive institutional shock the break with theClausewitzian paradigm will ultimately bring.

Wkh the 00TW concept’s abandonment, the ini-tial development of post<lausewitzian operationalconstructs and the creation of interim warfightingdoctrine based on two politico-military models willhelp the US Army achieve its ultimate vision: crea-tingan information-age Army to protect and defendAmerica’s vital interests in the 21st century.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, Fome XXI Opera-tions, was published in August 1994. Although it hasmany innovative concepts, Force XXI Operationsstill follows conventional Army wisdom, whichplaces 00TW in the environmental state of con-flict-not war. The pamphlet does break newground by viewing such conflict as existing outsideof current Western paradigmsoso Still, this inabilityto substitute war for conflict is problematic. It Esultsfrom TRADOC’s being subordinate to US govern-ment policy, which only recognizes the legitimateuse of “political violence” by the nation–state orcoalition of nation–states.

Herein lies the dilemma. Until US political per-ceptions change, the US Army will be handicappedin its attempts to come to grips with mili~ opera-

40 November - December 1995 � MILITARY REVIEW

lNFORMA~N OPERATIONS

tions in non–Western environments. Once thesepolitical perceptions do change, our perceptions con-cerning “legitimate government” must also change,because the perception of the nation–state’s monop-oly on war will be shattered.

Because of this, the simultaneous rise of non–Western warfare and the RMA must now be viewedtogether as bringing about a “Revolution in Political

and Military Affairs.” Hence, it is foreseen thatour government will be ~uimd to undergo signifi-cant changes just as surely as the Army defending it.As a prerequisite of this change, closer integrationof US foreign and defense policies is necessary.Only then can the suggestions for AirLand Battle doc-trinal reform outlined in this article be successfidlyimplemented. MR

NOTESl, Thaus Amns PrwWandBattfadounna Was based cflthamrlqxofadiws

$*** in Western urq agakrst a superiorWarsaw Pact threat ii a pmbabla dwmirxland fzwtkal nuclear amWrnrna@. Actrva defense was pditiilty motivated NATOSqulmmtia-rd-wtiw-d-~ek-e &ldoc-trina. SW US Army Fti Manual (FM) 100-5, @OMtkXIS (Wash on, DC: US Gmmm-

l’ aTmant Printii office [GPO Ju~ 1976] and IXvid Jabbn , “U Mihary Dodti andbe Re@ution h Mihtary ffairs~ Parameters (Autumn 1 ), 21-22.

2. FM 100+ (Washin@n, DC: GPO, !hy 1W6), 19-20 and 27-32.3. FM 100-5 (Washh@on, DC GPO, June 1993), vi.4. bid., 2-oto 2-1 and 13-oto 13+.5. ~ati~to*~ti*WttititimW(~~_

vhledevalr@nga lhaory Oxwerrr on western Ciuitiiion and~h.n-~w ~mti ,mx,

its relafiu’rah@vdththe currant ravolutii m mititaryaffairs ( MA. Sea Robert J. Bunker,7ha Trarxmii to Fwrth Efxxh War,” A4sri’Is Corps Gazeths (

“‘M ‘~(Jm’m)’’’”Fwa&m Mg””Ym +EZ:%”2,E.!(LY)% M!T:A :%:;ytbnk.” MMary~(@rii 1992), 27+x and Jannifar Moniam Taw and Robarl .,l-etht, 77?eA@w

RZ-M~-~~TAyC=l;~-~~w?~mW~ ‘d%1992).--—,.

7. FM 100+ (Washiion, DC: August 1962), 16-1 to 16-4. These operatbns*w#ala h overall wnrxpf h the May 1966 adii (169-172).

dsxssmn d the qwatii m-rtkwum and early ai&&rns, sea TIC [to+

&tit+ rxnfiii Convematirm Am Aftar-ktion Repat; LaswsnwxUr Papers (FortLeavarhvdh, K : Fora@n Mifiiry Studii Offbs, XI April-1 MSy 1991), 3-10.

9. FM 100-5 (June 1993), 2-0 to 2-1.10. COL Stewn M. Butter, “Reforxsing ArmY DOU* in a Changing V/odd,” Mitsry

12. Thuk, 26. ‘13. Wtii S. Lind, “Defend western Cukure,” Fore@ Pd’ (Fall 1991), 40+XZ

Tand Sarrruel f? Hmtin@rI, W lash of CMbtiOI#” Fmw.@ IZrks(Surnmer 1993,122-4!z and “ff Nd CMkzations, VWrat7 Fore@ AriWm (NovembarrDecembaf 1993,

166-194.14. Martin van CrewId, The Tmnskxrnatiar of Wsrpw Ymfc The Fraa press, 1991).

For a surxkw3 treatment of thii trend, see Stem Matzs review essay, “A wake for Clau-sewitz Tmrd a PMloaaW of 21aEGNrturY Warfare,” parameters (Mhter 1994-95),.1s132.

15. GENGordcn R. Sultiwand LTCJamas M. DuMk,’brKf Warfare rnthe21st CZ0tuw (Carfiils Barrads, PA strategic Studii Instiiute Comfarerwe Series, US Army WarCcillqa, February 1993),9.16.SuNvan and COL James M. Dubik, War h the Information Age,” bnd Power

ESSSVseries NO. 94-4 @dhofon. Vk ksdation of the Unii states ArrrIY [MEAInstiifie of land WatfarOJMa-1994), 11.

17 Carfva’r Ctausewtz, d kWr(Prirwetorr, NJ: Princeton UnMaraity P~1976)18. Bruce D. potter, Warandthe Rise oftfm State: Theh4bkvyFcxmcWions dkkdsrrr

Pdtics (Nw York: The Fma Press, 1994).

‘~;(~3AbflMa

rxand FriadrWI Engelsnthe /14m&sboftheCorrrmwist

2“ /(186 ddengadbourgaoi5capita iisrnandthefateoffhe -

Gtariat h western society+ al@a ttpt was, finalty defeated with the fwrnar

“FtiW&.evsd%”A=n~tiwA~R @*E@r-raai ~; mtegc Studas Instrtuteconference series, US Amy War Cdfaga, 15 Juty

_il.’’DMisIP. Bolger, “The Ghoata of Omdurman; Psramatws (Autumn 1991), 26-39.22. RkSwd L Kuglar, US Mi#ta and StmtegyandFona3 Posturish the 21si Century

K-= end ReqUinWWWS qxm MR-326-JS (Santa Mmii, CA NationalDefense Ftesaard’I Institute, The RAND Corporatkrn, 1994), 219.

23. Recant hMorbl awta bwkds the wars h Vi and A@aqistan and crisesiIbbanon, tha West W, Scinaliiand Bosnii Forpost-Clau aewlzantherMea, aeaMarth van Crebdd, “Non-Trinitarian Wart” in The Tmnsbrrrrati of Wsr(New Yortc TheFrea Preas, 1991} AM and Heidi Tofiter,”Wd Wabe War?ti WarandArrtAVec Sur-

S. Lhd atal., ‘F.ti -x(~~h~~~w’~=~~~~~’~kivslatffre Dswrofhe21st

Bmkar, “TtKI Tmnaitkm to FourUI Epxh War; 20-32.24. Patar Drud@r, Prx+Cs@akt Society (New York HarparB~, 1993). Atao

sea WWarn H. Davi&w and Mid S. Mabne, The Wtua/ Corporafim (New York: Har-pareuainass, 1992); and MieI Hammer and James CharnW, Ree@me@ the Cor-poration: A Manikto b the Busiress Rew4rtim (New York HarparSuakwss, 1993).

25. Sulli and Dubik, War in the Information Age,” 7.26. Sun Tzu, 7?mArt of War (lndon: Oxfcd Untirsity Press, 1971.27. Retired MG EM Moore, “Roles md MLSSkmSOparatims Other L war and

SOF:SCWCNews(Dacembar 1994),1.Ccmxm’ ~M-otvingfo+maof futurewarfare, sea Bunker, Ilw Tranaitii to Founh a

26. MeWrry @srabs ~ 7han Wq The**72, E#atxAR-5921-A (Santa Mmii CA The FtANDCqmratim,

u% ~t~m=~bphg h herbs should be takan as an ominb “*.

30: MG S.L’ Arnold: “Somali: Pn @amtion other Than War? MA!?aY Review(EkJern&l~),?6.

+tarwvahuman krteflii is a fam ~ ti~~s=yW_ashiiirthat iha Uniiad states is w-lprepared to carry out.

to a growing rafii on nonhuman m~ aud as autana@d &ink tafhara,aasembtyline *s, answering mar2mea, 9roc9rY scanners and autcnnatad mllaga ragietratioa!3@ems. - - -

32. CMOR Danii E. Moore Jr., 9oanii, Tanka and ‘...From the Sea,” ~(~y ~ 42+5.

and Dati T. Stahl, =APIYWPrOjarlkm Arm hQrarations O@rk War; Pammeters

i &X(Wtsar 1WH4),13andCOLGM Ha

other Than Wan Leading Sddiars h Qamtion Reatom Hqwy MiMerybar 1993),76.

34. Akin and t-bid Toflfer,WarandAn&lMx Survibdat the DsbwI of fha21st CmturyEtoatcrr’t Little, BrwuI & Cunmny, 19S3), 139-175.

35. The argument fw war~ bacornilg rxxr’batanta can be fcund h Rii-ard H. Sinmech, “The Changii Face of BattlefieldReportiirgY ARMY(Nmmmfmf 1994),3X34.

36. Frank J. S@d’1,Winning CNN Wars” Parametsm (Autumn 1994), 37-66.37. 7halEws of war A Can@rensk CdIactkMoffWrwyD OCWKWSCUIti-

m/ bw&m*timfi@ tid~w. M*-mtimti T-niou (New York Viga Books, 1934).

36. F. M. Lorarz tiw and Anarchy m Somali,” Paranwtws39. Martin van CraveId, The Persian Guif Cris!! d 1990-91 tiq~=~=s

Omatmti kW” Parameters (Swnmer 1992,2140.40. Walter s. clerks, %etrlg the world’s FLaotvernsomaw Psmvrmtem(ww

1-1994), 42-56.41. SuIlhan and DutrdL War in the Inforrnatbn Aga~ 9.42. Jemifar Merriam Taw, Pad AMcCarfhy and Uavirr Jack Ritey, The Armdmtr

Armiaa: 19sX3Report MR-379-A (Santa Monii, CA The Amyo Canter, ITte Fl+dD@KXXSti,1994),16. Alaoaea JamOSADOwSr Snd WkH. ~

‘wBasedRarrnirgtiArrrry 21, Raport R-4172+ (santa Mmii, cA ThakrqmTfwwR~E~ Cqxxatii, 1992).

?A Jcutwan, Qarationa CXher Than WC A ctNc’s P~,”

Mk~Revlaw( abruaryls94),9. Alsoaaa FMl44. BG Wastey B. Taylor Jr., Wn the Cmtiiuing d UC: /%w8r&s

(Autumn1994),123. In the magazirw’s cunmentary and @y section, Taykx disagreedwiththe smqfand tilrdmajwpohtsof~ Crewld’sthsawrthe sta&HxltrK

e#rdngthedsrntsedmwntmnalwarard harise ~asthedomiklant

tiure form of vm;~d~~-$!mpart of Taylor’s analysis but ako=%%E%#d’s argwnarrt. The atate+ntric system wftl ewntuaky fsda, not

bacauaeofan htarnaftranaformation of Weatam*baaedm anawanaKrYti-don. uc, onm'Ouwhand,ia'rl$@iaafha dommfCwllof nC+w@Bmw'ffaf'

Tnreqxxraetofha waafst adbantaga M war. Thus, onty van CrawkYs argu-mentaand kwi$ltsmgardmgthe taofthenm—WsWn worklwluk fbadravmufxulh the creatitm of thii model.

45. Graham H. TurtriviilaJr., ‘Qaratbns Otha# Than V/m Organii Crina DM-*1” Msyhjwb’ 1994), +7.,

46. m tar Jr., ‘?3hnc Conffrctand Operations Other Than Warj” A4Y-

Wai”t=’a—iwretem(Wntar 19$3-19!34), 19-23. . - ‘49. James ADawarand Morlia H. Levin, Asswn Pkmwnlm

Raoort R-4172-A (Salts Monica, CA The m-m1942),v.

50. US Ann Train’ and Do@irra Canrnand Psm@Ilst 525-6, FomeX/Qemtbna-mm, ~: G%, 1 AI@ust 1994), 1-4.

The author would like to acknowledge the individual contributions of Dr. Harold W.Rood; Dr. Mark T. Clark; 1st Lieutenant Daniel Cl Greenwood, US Marine Co~and Ca@n Joan M. Schafer, US Army and the organizational rxntributbns of TheRAND Cqmratkm, the Maociatii of the United states Army lnst&ute of Land WSr-fare, the Army War Coiiega Strategic Outreati Program, the Center for Army LessonsLearned and the government documents staff of HonnoWMudd Library of tlw Clare-mont colleges.

F

Robert J. Bunker is an adjunct professor in the National Securities Study Prv-gram at Gdifioti State University, San Bemad.no, and an adjunct professorwith American Militq Um”versity,W@ruh. He rvceived two B.A.s d a B.S.jbm Gd$omia State Polytechnic University at Pomona and an h4.A. and PhD.@m Ckvwnont Graduate School. Htk artkle ‘5%? To#k-i.an Paradox” waspublished in the May-June 1995 MilitaryReview “Insights.”

MILITARY REVIEW . November – December 1995 41