SUP PLEME NT

No.6 .. March 16. 1954

RESULTS OFTHE BERLIN CONFERENCE

Statement by V. 1\1. l\lolotoy,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.H.

Printed in the U.S.S.R.

Results of the Berlin Conference

Statement by V. M. Molotov,Minister of Foreign AHairs of the U.S.S.R.

The conference of Foreig n ;\ \inistefs of France,Great Britain, the united Sta tes and the Soviet Unionwhich met in Berlin from January 2.:; \0 February ISexamined a number of major international problems.

The preceding confe renc e of Foreign ;\\inistcrs ofthe four PO\\WS \\",IS held in the spring of 19.f9, andthere had been no such conferences in the interveningfive years. The Berlin Conference, for its part, wasunanimous concerning the necessity of holding anotherconference, with the participation of the Foreign Min­isters of France, Grea t Britain, the U.S.A., theu.s.s. r~ . and the Chinese People's Republic, (Inc! thisis of definite international importance.

In the pns t fin' year-s the post -war trend of develop­ment in the camp of the capitalist countries has be­come distinctlv apparen t. It is now clear 10 all thatthe ruling circles of the United States claim to therole of leader of that camp. They lay to morethan that. Thcv nnccrernoniouslv declare that thcvhave taken llp~n themselves th~ "hutden of wor l~lleadership," that the United States is the "leader ofthe' world," though, it goes without saying, HIL're isno foundation whatever for these claims.

These ambitions han' found practical expression inthe North Atlantic bloc , founded in 1949 on the initia­tin' of the U.S. government and with the active sup­port of British ruling circles. The No rt h Atlantic pactwas signed by the following countries: the UnitedStates, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium. theNetherlands, Luxembourg , Denmark, Norway, Ireland,

Portugal. ltalv, Greece and T urkey. Some of thesecountr-ies signed the pad under direct outs ide pres­sure. Actuully, the pad is an instrument of th e Ang lo­American bloc: ill effect the United Stales is endeav­ouring to usc it for the establisluucnt of its wor ldsupremacy. The Xort h Atlantic pact resembles the"Ant i-Comintern Pact" which was concluded in 1937by Hitler Germany, militarist J apa n and fascist Ital y.and which was at first directed against the U.S .S. H.There is no reason to doubt that the fate of the Nort hAtlantic pact will be no better than that of the "Anti­Comintern Pact."

Besides laying frank claim to world supremacy. therliling' circles oi the United States, and of Great Brit­ain , began incr casingly 10 stress that they intendedt(\ conduct their foreign policy "from positions ofstrength." There is nothing' surprising' in this. Fr omem urge for world supremacy tu a "positions-of­strength" policy . or a "peace based on s trength"policy, is only one step.

;\O\\' "'C <Ill know perfectly \\"(,11 what the extollingof that policy has led to, not only in the United Statesand Great Brita in , but also in the other North Atlanticbloc countries.

,\ direct reflection of that policy is the ar ms dr-ivewhich has developed in recent years . Armament pilinghas attained unprecedented dimensions in the UnitedStates, Great Bri ta in, France, Belg ium, Xorway andother member coun tries of the bloc . The capi talistmonopolies of America and Europe haw already ma de!Jig fortunes out of rearmament. But it has laid ahcavv burden of unbearable taxation 'and inflatedprice's on the backs of the people, of the working folk.

Partlcu'ar importance was attached to all mannerof atom-bomb intimi dation. But that was not cflccfivclor very lonlt either. Everyone can now see that thecalcul<l'IOnS based upon the futile hope that theUnited States would retain a monopoly in this fieldhav c prove d abso lutely unfou nded.

Together with the arms drive, the United Slate ..._as well as Great Britain, began to build a network ofmilitary bases in Europe and adjacent territories. Thefact that these military bases are frankly directedlIgainst the Soviet Union and the People's Democra­cies on I} serves to empha ... ize that the cstablishm ntof American military ba ... s has nothing to do \\ ithpurposes of defence.

Devotion to the "positions-of-strength" policy led tothe signing, 1\\0 ~ ars ago, of the Paris treaty provld­ing for the Icrmati 11 oi a so-called "European DefenceComm unitv." which envisages the rebuilding of thearmed strength of western Germany. P lans <Ire nowon foot for the r vival of G rman militarism. whichuntil vcrv recently was opposed not only by Franceand other European countries, but also by the UnitedSta tes and Great Britain. This has giwn rise to new,and extremely sctiou ... , difficulties in the settlement ofthe German problem.

The "positions-of-strength" policy is reflected inma nv other actions of the United States in the sphereof i~ternational relations,

One cannot, for instance, close one's eyes to thediscri mina tion in international trade which the UnitedStates, in conjunction with Britain and other coun­tries of that camp, have been practising in recentyears against th l-.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Re­public and the People's Democracies. In spite of thefact that that policy has already caused great damageto the United States and Great Britain themselves.pressure is still being exercised by var-ious means andunder various pretexts with the object of furt her ham­pering normal international trade and of restrictingand impeding commercial intercourse with the coun­tries of the democratic camp. That policy, however. ishaving a contrary effect, inasmuch as cconornic rela­tions between the G.S.S.R., China and the People'sDemocracies han in this period become much strong­er. and their economic progress has gained momen­tum from year to year.

Even-one can now see that the "positions-of­streng-t-h" policy conducted by the ruling circles oithe United States .1!1d Great Britain has not been pro­ductive of positive results either in the politica l or theeconomic sphere. \nd it is meeting with failure in themilitary sphere too,

In the first place, that policy fa iled to sta nd the testin Korea. It did not br ing the United State s military\ ictcry. Having involved itse lf in arme d interventionin Korea , the United States began to suffer a loss ofmilitary prestige and mora l aut hority. That policy wasboun d to end in failu re when levelled against a peoplewhich was st aunchly fighti ng for its national rights,its independence and liberty.

Despite all the assistance the United St ates isgiving France in Indo-Chin a , the "p ositions-of­strength" policy has not led to a nything good ther eeither. French colonial policy, and, with it . the Un itedState ... policy of supporting "colonialism," is sus­taining defeat after defeat in Indo-China. The pro­tr acted war agains t the people of Indo-China, who arcfighting for their liberty, has not glorified the " posi­tions-of-strength" policy, but only discredited it com­plete ly.

To al l this shoul d be added the fact that the pastfive years have witnessed not only the establishment,but ulso the consolidation of the Chinese People'sRepublic, which has delivered the Chinese people fromforeign imperia list domination, Tha t fact has radicallyaltered the situation throughout Asia and is of car­dinal importance for the whole futu re trend of inte rna­tional developments.

It is against China that the " posi t ions-of-s trength"policy is being applied with particula r obsti nacy a nd\\ ith rnanv absurd excesses. But it is precisely herethat the f~ilure of that policy is being most convinc­ing ly demonstrated,

In the past few years the entire camp of socialismand people's democracy has grown much firmerand stronger. During this period there was formeda second wor ld market , emb raci ng both the highly­industrialized and the agrarian-industrial countriesof the democratic camp. The trend of politica l rela­tions betwee n these countrie s is towa rds ever closerco-operation an d firmer friendship .

What does the "positions-of-stre ngth" policy of theruling circles of the United States and the other coun ­tries of the t\nglo-i\merican bloc imply? In the finalanalysis. it implies the conduct of a foreign and do­mcstic policy which facilitates the engi neer ing of"mother \\ ar. It can have no other implication. Suc h apolicy cannot enjoy the firm sup port of the peoples.

Unli ke the policy or the United Stat es, the foreignpolicy of the Soviet Union aims at promoting peacemd international co-operation. The fundamenta l prin­ciple of the Sovie t government's policy is that the rearc no internationa l iss ues which cannot be settl ed bypeaceful means. It is a policy or promoti ng peace.It conduces to friendly co-operation among nation s

and helps to unite the peace-loving forces of all thenations of the world.

Until wry recently. the foreign policy of the UnitedStates and Great Britain referred to above set a dcfi­nile tone for the majority of the countries of thecapitalist camp. The "positions-of-strength" polk)Incvitablv made for greater international tension. That\\ as to be felt both in Europe and in Asia. It was, andI". to be felt in every part of the world.

The international situation was materially chang dbv the initiative of the Chinese People's Republic andthe Korean People's Democratic Republic which ledlast vear to the termination of the war in Korea.

Th-e conclusion of the Korean armistice helped tolessen international tension. This enabled the SovietUnion to raise the question of a further reduction ofinternational tension. The convening of the BerlinConference was in itself proof that there is a pcssibil­ltv of achieving that under present conditions.

-The Berlin Conference was preceded by a long dip­lomatic correspondence between the Soviet govern­ment and the governments of the United States,Great Britain and France. The exchange of notes wasof value. It improved the conditions for the holding ofthe Berlin Conference.

\\'hat the three Western governments in effect pro­posed was that the conference should confine itself tothe discussion of certain questions relating to the Ger­man problem, and of the question of the Austriantreaty. They were anxious to avoid discussion of otherissues and the g-eneral question of lessening interna­tional tension.

The Soviet government. however, believed thattermination of the war in Korea and the conclusion ofart armistice had created favourable conditions for theexamination of measures that would conduce to ageneral relaxation of international tension, includingreduction of armaments and prohibition of foreignmilitary bases on the territories of other countries.

The Soviet government proposed a conference ofthe Foreig-n Ministers of the five Great PowersFrance. Great Britain, the U.S.:\., the U.S.S.R. andthe Chinese People's Republic-e-tc discuss measuresfor lessening international tension, and a conferenceof ,\\inisters of the four Powers to discuss the Germanquestion. including the problem of restoring Ger­many's unity and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The diplomatic correspondence conducted up to theclose of last year failed to produce full agreement.inasmuch as the United States, Great Britain andFrance objected to the proposed conference of the fiveGreat Powers, with the Chinese People's Republicparticipating. The Soviet government then declared

that it would raise this question at the conference ofrepresentatives of France. Great Britain. the L'.S.,\<'HId the U.S.S.R. in Berlin, concerning which agree­ment had ulrcndy been reached.

At the B rlin Conference, we proposed the follow­ing agenda:

I. ,\\ea:.ur{'-. for lessening international tension, andthe convoninu of a conference of Foreign ~\\inisters ofFranco. Gr ,II Britain, the U.S ..\ .. the Soviet Unionand the Chinese People's Republic.

2. The German question and the safeguarding ofEuropean security.

1. The Austrian stale trectv.This agenda \\ as accepted by the conference, albeit

\\ ith certain rcscrv at ions.We must not forget what was being done before the

Berlin Conference to mould public opinion in the \\'(st·ern countries. There. too, we saw the influence of theba sic line of Anglo- \merican foreign policy to whichI have referred.

,\\('a5ures of every kind were employed by the rulingcircles of the United States. as well as of Great Brit­nin. 10 increase pressure on the U.S.S.R. It was as­scr ted nol only by their press. but by leading states­men as well, that it was useless to negotiate with theSoviet Union and that the Berlin Conference wasdoomed to inevitable failure. But while resorting tovarious moans of pressure, up to and including thedirect threat of torpedoing the conference. the rene­tionary press was unable to conceal that the U.S.:\.,Great Britain and France were interested in the BerlinConference.

The governments of these countr-ies could not hutreckon with the increasing pressure of democratic opin­ion, which demanded that the conference of rcprcscn­tativcs of the four Powers take into account thepopular desire for relaxation of international tension.The growth of the people's national-liberation move­ments, especially in Asia. operates in the same dircc­tion. Developments have confirmed that France. Brit­ain and the United States were deeply interested inhaving" the Berlin Conference take place.

Before speaking of the areas of agreement reachedat the Berlin Conference, it is necessary to dwell onthe differences which the conference revealed in thpositions of the IT.S.S.R. and the three WesternPowers.

II

Th great('~t attention was given at the conferenceto the German problem. That. as everyone knows. isth cb: f of the problems. which have remained un­settled since the end or the war. Yet the lour countries

c-hich were rcprcsontct! at the Ber-lin Conference bearall ospcc'al responsibility for the proper solution ofthat problem, That means that the German questionmust be' settled in a wav which \\ ill gu;mmtee PN1'::l'

and security in Ellrop,,: and which \\"ill nlso accordwith the national interests of a democratic

The discussion brought out Iullv the natureOw differences on this question the SovietLnion on the one hand. and the United States, GreatBritain and France on the other. That. however. docsnot mcnn thai till' attitude to the German problem inFrance Iullv coincides with that of the ruling circlesof the United States and Great Britain.

The Soviet Union held. and hold t-. that the sale­gU:Jrcling of European peace and security requires,above all, that D rcsurucncc of German militarismshall not be permitted.

From this it follO\\',;, that the measures necessary forthe rcstorution of Germany's unity on a democraticand peaceful basis must not he postponed, That atti­tude fully accords with the aprecments concluded h~

the countries of the anti-I Iitlor coalition-the UnitedStates, Great Britain and the U_S.S.R" with the sub­sequent adhesion of France-s-both during and immc­diatolv after the war.

I1o~\'e\'er, the gO\-crnllll'nt~ of the United States,Great Britain and Fr-ance have retreated from thisposition. ,H\: dishonouring cardinal internationalnprcemcnts to which they put their signatures, andhan' adopted the course of assisting the revival 01German militarism, Since this cannot he done todaywith respect to all Germany. they are per-sistcntlvpaving the way for the remilitarization of the West­ern part of Germany. In this they arc relying also 0'1

the Adcnaucr gO\'ernnlent in Bonn,If the gowrnmenb of Fr-ance. GrC';1t Britain and the

United States agreed with the government of theSoviet Union tha1 there must ll(' no revival of Germann.ilitarisnt. settlement of the remaining' controver-sialivsucs would he much easier. That implies that thezovcmmcnts of the four Powers must rely ill this 1113t­

tel' not 0)] the Gcrtnuu militarists and rcvanchists. buton Gcrmanvs dcmm-rubc and peaceful clements. who

the real will oi the CJ~'rnJaIJ peopleBerlin Conic renee confirmed that the Germa,l

problem, too, b atTected by th~' foreign policy uf th ..Anglo-American bloc, as expresstd in the "positions­of-strl'ngth:' or the "pearl' h:Jsed on ::.trC'llgth," policy,

This is at1L'sted b~ such fads :IS tlll' signing of thl'Paris and Bonn In',ltie" in ,\\(ly I 9,')2, Th{'se treiltie"­han' made the datlgL'r of a revinJ1 of Gcrman mili­tarism espf'cially ::Inllc,

UndC'r the Paris trcdly, a SIJ·c(\[1ed Europ(':-!']

Defence Community b to be set up for a period ,Iffifty ycars. and. under its auspices. a European armvis 10 he [or-rued. consisting of the armed forces (;fFrance, ltafv. Belgium. the Xcthcr-lands and LuxellJ_bourg, as well as of West Germany, It will thus beseen that out of a total o! approxiruatclv thirtv Euro­pcan StDt('S, six, including Wcvt Germany. h;l\:e !l1'Hleit their aim to form a narrow and restricted militarvalignment Oil which thl'y have unluwfullv clapped ~J

"European" label. despite the fact Ihat four-fifths oftho European states do not belong to it. That trcatvlegalizes the creation of ;J West-German army (\\'{'h~­

macht} and its integration in the aforesaid militarvalignment. II is proposed to form twelve \\'est-Germa~l

divisions as an initial force, hut there arc already»ians to increase that number. And that there is talkof forming 25 and evert GO West-German divisions isnot without its significancC'. In this connection the fadcannot be ignored that the other dav the West-Germanpar-liament (Bundestag). in defiar;cf' of the existingConstitution. passed decisions which permit the intro­duction of rnilirurv conscr-iption in West Gcrrnanv formales of 18 years-and over. This is an attempt to'givethe Adcnauer jzovcrnmcnt a free hand 10 form anarmy.

Besides the Paris treatv. signed bv six countries,the Bonn treaty was concluded at thosarno time andsigned by the United Stales, Great Britain andFrance, as well as by West Germany, The Bonn andParis treaties complement one another.

,\('cording to the Bonn treaty, U.S" French andBritish armed forces are to be stationed in West-Get­man territory for severn! decades to come, thus turningWest Germany into a semi-occupied country. Thattreaty also benr-, the signature of the Adcnaucrpnvcmmcnt. which is now the chief bulwark of theWest-German rcvanchists. who \\',H1t to clear the \\'ayfor the re-emergence of German milibu-istn. Today theWest-German rcvanchists haw affixed their signatureto the Bonn treaty, which is humiliating to the Ger­mart people, But there can he no doubt that when. inaccordance \\'ith the Paris trcatv. an armv headed hv\'azi general" \\'ill have been 'created in' \Vest Ger'­many, tlll'y will cease to honour their signature, Thenth{'ir real ;Ji111~. their aggressin' re\'illlchist designs,\\'ill bc rC\'e:J1ed ~,l1ld the Jleighb::.lUring countries \\[[1

be the first to feel it.SiJl1ultarwously \\'ith th" signing of the Paris and

Bonn treaties. (he LTni\{'d States, Great Britain :HldFrance issued iI tripartite declaration, the c.'prcss pllr­l'0~e of \\'hieh \\'as to support and accvlNate the crea­tion of the "European Defence Community" and,he11(,(', of the l:ufoppan arllly,

IJ

" I'.,!ht (11 the f, a..hitlg" plan .... If

rc " f th I n ted Slat" Great Britainnd I " tc f If til further. nee of which th Pari" and

n01111 trc [ltit .... \\ l rc concluded. The I 'tutcd States al111(irc'lI Britain do not propose to include their cm11

I Iorcc- in til' European nrmv. hut t1w~ want t 1

l~ler" fill the .... am The onranizati inI hich nn rm~ If til \\ ...1

IT t ... \\ d an "11 (.!ra1 pi 1'1. can hX) I n h\ plan .. for the- mrin r"llg of nnothc

\ < in Er r lIlt' And it j ... bccominu obv iO\l-. that thrulinu circles ( f tho l lnih d States want to \\ "Ig'e lint\\ r 11\ the h nd uf "Europeans."

\\ . th [U"OI ean arll1~ is Ionnc I, Fraucc aloneI f Great PO\\('[" \\ 'lib, d prived of the pes­

fha' Ilg her 0\\0 national army. since hI ire .... \\ II h incorporat d in the European

rmv That thl armed Iurccs of \\'('"t Gcrmanv willoccupy the dOl1linatin/Z position in the Europl'an' armyis lx-vond all doubt. .\1 the same time. France isgro""ly tramplill/Z upon the \ cr~ princip l '" of theFran -Sovict treaty of 191-1, the object of which is to

n Iresh ads of a/zgTes~ion on the p: rt of Gcr-n IT Iitarism. There art' French .\\ini"ter" \\h(

,,,,, nt to all this. thoug-h it i" incornprc hcnsiblc howsuch all attitude call he reconciled with France'snational dig nity an d interests.

The Paris treaty has still not lu-cn approved hy thr­p rliamcnt- of Fr,IIlCl, Belgium and It aly. and hash refore not ~et enlend into forc But ill'reasin~

re LIn: is bll( I~ bein~ (xcrted h~ th I'nit d StatI Great Britain-,,"'p(dall~ on !-ranee to 11<l\l th,

lreat~ ratifiui ;lIul its impl('l1lUltatioll ~tartt'(1.

\t th' Berl in Confert'lll'(" not on 1\' D ull l' s <llltl Edell ,but <11"0 the Fn'nrh For( ig-n .\\inbh:r, Bida ult. adducedl'\'l'r~ ped£'" of 3rgumellt ill deh:llce of till' P a ri"

at d lh' "European Deienc' Communi!" .. Th ~

nl 0 far a" to a:''''C'rt th,lt. ft rmall , thl' tre::l.ti "nd ded \\ ith \\'esl G rman~ \\ ill n~t h binding­

P III the future unit"d (iermam. There \\ ill C.JIlIl'time' when OW"(' 'itatelllC'nb of O~e F rl nch , British .'lnd\lJ]eriC",lll ,\\ini'iters \\ill b~' relllt lllhered hv tht' (j,'r"Illiln l1lilitari"t~ and r"\.lnchi~t", 'illOUld' ttll'~ c\"Ir

c 1 '11 gh Il~ pr<lct'c Ii efftrt 0 th .pp lrtunit~

, r "'1 ltl d h\ th Pari" tn,ll\ fo art"' al of mil"ri~1IJ In \\ 1 ...1 Cit rmamflO\\ \ r, il I'" alreatl\ dtar th,lt the l.S, Briti ...h

,nd French g-O\ l'rnllll'llt~, ilntl till' .\d~'natJl'r g'()\em·mCllt. too , rule out the \'l' ry pos'iihilil\ of uniting" \Ve:-till1d Ea~1 GNlllll1\ into an inle~r;t1 Ci'nllLltl "late. In,'onf )fIlIit\ \\ ith Ihe Par'" treal~, th, ~ l\pliritl~ d'darhat nIt ...... lh;:l tr at~ j ... ntendltl to ttl(' unit tI (j,:lll~ It \ \\ jll 11 It C\l n permit h 1 nion of the 1\\

part ... of Germany and. consequently \~:ill not permitthe creation of a united and inde pen de nt German"tate. This glarin/ZI~ rewa Is how littl e im porta ncethey attach to all their other pro posa ls on the Germa nquestion

It miuht he presumed thut. at the Berlin Confer ence.th (·.S., British and French ,\\inbtcr~ were no t inter­l ... t d in a real ...olution of the German problem. lr\ ell in th St ttl mcnt of any practical issue of maj or

importance to the German people, They were pr e­occupied with only one aim. na me ly, to clear the wayfor the creation of the Euro pean army in accordancewith till' Paris trcntv. whic h wou ld open the floodga tesfor the revival If militarism in \\'e 'it Gerrnanv.

Even the Soviet go\"('rnml'nr~ proposal "lhat theGerman... should be giwn a hcerinp. ...0 as to learn\\ hal the German people themselves think of the ur­t:C'nt til~k~ of uniting' Germany and the pa r ticipati onif the Ger man people ill gllaral1kl' i tl ~ pea ce an d

-ocuritv in Eur op e -evcn that proposa l wa s not 3 C­

coptcd at the Berlin Conference. The West -Germ anrrovcrnmcnt did nol want that either, because. you--t-e. it i" not disposed to "it down at one ta ble wit hthe covcrnment of East Germany-the goycrn me nt ofthe German Democratic Republic-s-which resists allplans to revive Germa n militarism, Yet. as th ings ar enow. it is the German Dem ocrat ic Republi c whic hvoices the real will of all peace-loving Germ a ns , then al de "ire of the German people for peace a ndIriendlj relations \\ ith other nations. The refusal ofthe LS., Britbh and Frt'nl'h reprt ~('ntati\"e:; to gin ah aring 10 rt'prt':-.cntatins of Germany shows howrt mott th,'y wert' frolll any ~l'rious intl'ntion of ('xa m­ining thl' Ger man question

The I '.S., Bri t ish and Frl'neh .\\inisters did not wa ntto examine thl' SO\ id draft peac(' Ireaty wi th Ger"lIIan~ 'or did Iht,~ suhmit any drilft peace treaty ofthe'r o\\n. Thl'~ t\("n rl'iu" ... d to examine wa~s andIT ean...of accelerating- the pn'paration of a pl'ace trc'1ty\\ith (ll'rJlWIlY, although ,I detailed exami nation ofthb qlJl'~tion had itireM ly hl'l'n U1Hkrt'lken at a con­lerence of lh,' .\\inbter..; of th" four P OWN S se\"eral~ t'ar~ ago.

Th thrl'e \\\"Il'rn "\ \illi~tl'rs dtdil1l'd to exnminC'the qu{'...tion of forming a pro\'bion<ll all-GermangOHrnn1l'llt comprising r"prc-"'entati\"es of the par­I:anwnt... of Ea:-.t and \\",,,t Germany, though this\\oul d han' heell an e!Tecth!' :-.tep t()\\ards the reu nifi­C<JtiOl1 of nerma ny on a dt'mocraliL' a nd peacd u l basi s .rhey Iikl'wise n'jcded the So\"iet proposal to se t upt\\O all·(Jlrman l"lHllmittt'{':-.: one to impro\"e economic

Ild atlmini"lr<llh t' relatiolb hetween East and \\'estG\.rn1all~, <lnd tilt' other tIl promote bl'tter conditions

for the deve lopment of German national culture. Theyavoided all practical steps to bring East and WestGermany closer together, though such steps \ ould bthe surest road to German reunification.

The U.S., Brit ish and French .\\ini"-Ier.;; declined toexamine the proposals made by the 50\ iet Union foreasi ng the fina ncial and economic obligations of Eastand West German y arisi ng out of the war. Theyknow, of course, th at in East Germany these measureshave alr eady been car ried out, and that occupationexpenditure, for instance, has already been reducedto 4.5 per cent of East Germany's national revenueIn West Germ an y, on the other hand, taxes art?"mounting and occupation expenses steadily increas­ing. This year occupation expenditure will amount tonea rly 35 per cent of West Germany 's total nationalreven ue.

The U.S., Bri tish and French Ministers made, ineffect, on ly one proposal on the German question, awlthat wa s the holding of so-called "free elections" inEast and West Germany. But even that proposal wasin no way designed to promote a settlement of th,German problem in the interests of European peaceand security, or the holding of reall y free elections.What is more, it was imbued through and throughwith dis trus t of the German people and their demo­crati c forces.

H was proposed that even this, purely internalaffair of Germanv should be taken out of the hand ...of the Germans' and entrusted to the occupationauthorities. The Soviet Union's proposal that the fourPowe rs help the Germans form a provisional all-Get­man government consisting of representatives of the'pa rliaments and democratic organizations of East andWest Germany, and that that gover nmen t shoul ditself conduct Irce all-German elections, was rejected.

Rejected, too, \\ as another of our proposals, namely,that a ll occupation forces, wit h the exception of strictly limite d contingents, should be \\ ithdrawn from bothEast and west Germany prior to the all-Germanelections. The object of this SO\ iet proposal \\ as toeliminate the possibility of the occupation authoritiesexerting pressure on the elections. But the advocatesof so-called "free elections" also rejected this pro­posal , which is in the highest degree calculated 10promote real freedom at the polls.

To this day Dulles is delivering speeches on theBerlin Conference in which he professes to be <Ill

ardent believer in "freedom" of nations and in "freeelectio ns." But we know that not all talk of "free­dom" is a defence of real freedom for the people, forthe working folk. Certain "defenders" of freedom havea fancy for the kind of "freedom" under which the

exploiters and militarists have a free hand and livein piping prosperity. \\ hiIe the working folk are con.stantly menaced with \\ ar and annihi la tion. It goeswithout sa~ ing that this is not the kind of " freedom"we stand for. \\'e stand for real freedo m, freedomunder \\ hich the militarists are deprived of the pos­sibility of plunging the people into new holocausts.

We know that lI it ler and his clique', in 1932-33also came to power by means of so-ca lled "free elec­tions." Hitler did not become Chancellor of Gprrnanvall at OIll'C. The road was cleared for him by th~

Adcnauets of the time, men like von Papcn, who be­longed to the same party as the present Bonn Prime.\\inister, Adenauer. It is wet! known that behindHitler and his lieutenants. men like von P apen , stoodthe German monopoly magnates, \\ ho \\ ere makinghuge fortunes by expanding the war industries. Andnow, too, behind the back of the Adcnauer clique,who are dreaming of accelerating the remi lita riza tionof West Germany, stand similar Germa n monopolymagnates, who are bas ing their hopes of additionalfat profits an d super-profits on anot her ar mamentsdrive, and who associate their interests prim arily withthe plans for revivi ng German mi litarism.

The U.S., British and French governments professto stand for free elections, but actuallv thcv refuse tohan any thing- to do with the democratic and peace fulforces of the German people. They calculate that thekind of "freedom" thev want to confer on Gcrmanvcan best be assured throug-h the occupation aut hori'­lies, backed by the forces of occupation. Far frompromoting- Germany's development on democra tic a ndpeaceful lines, such distrust of the German democrati cand peaceful forces amou nts to d irect sup port of theGerman milita rists a nd rcvanchists, who ar c a lreadyutilizing that support for the furtherance of their a imsin West Germany.

In the present German policy of the U.S., Brit ishand French governments everything- is subordinatedto the plan for a "European Defence Community,"that is, a European army. and this is leading to therevival of militarism in West Germany. That cour-secannot promote peace in Europe. It would also closethe path to German reunification, ina "much as WestGermany would cease to be a peacefu l state an d itwould become impossible to re-establish Germa ny ona democratic and peacefu l basis.

The Soviet Unio n stands for a different policy, fora different course with regard to Ger many.

This found expression in its proposals for accele rat ­ing the conclusion of the peace treaty, for the reunionof Germany, the formation of a provisiona l all-Ger­man government and the holding of free all-German

electIOns. The purpose of these proposals is 10 ensurethe speediest possible unification of the German na­tion and German) 's subsequent development ond mocratic and peaceful lines. Quite obv iousfy. theU.S.S.R.'s proposals rule out the possibility of a situu­tlon arising in \\ hich Germany might again becomea dangerou~ scat of aggression in Europe. These pro­posals arc based on the principle that there must beno revival of German militarism.

Thus the settlement of the German question nowhinges on one fundamental problem: is Germanmilitarism to be rcoiocd or not?

It must be sa ill that the policy of creating a Eu­ropean rmy and of rev iving militarism in West Ger­man. is meeting with activ e resistance, outside ofgo\ernment circles, in such countries as Fr-ance andBritain, and even in \\'est Germany.

In France, for instance, opposition to this policy I"

mounting not only among the workers and othersections of the working population, but also in bour­geois circle.... That opposition is increasing in th·French Parliament. Dissatisfaction \\ ith this policy iswidespread among the British people. It is not with­out significance that nearly half the Labour ,\\.P.shave come out in opposition to this policy, which theRight-wing Labour leaders defend. And in \\'est Ger­many, the Social-Democrats, mindful of the sentimentof the masses, continue to oppose Adenaucr's policyof speeding up the rev i\ al of German militarism evenat the price of renouncing the unification of Germany.

And that is understandable. A policy \\ hieh leadsto the revival of German militarism arouses legiti­mate alarm in all European countries.

That policy raises the question foursquare: whereare matters tending-to the consolidation of peace, orto another \\ ar?

Where is the present German policy of the UnitedStates, Great Britain and France tending?

That policy is tending towards the creation of amilitary alignment of certain European states ag-ain ... tother European states. To follow that course is toabandon the task of promoting peace and security inEurope. To follow that cour c is to head for anotherwar in Europe, and that would lead to a third worldwar.

I~ it true that France, Italy. Belgium and the Europcan countries associated with them are compelled.in the interests of their sccuritv. to follow that course?Is it really necessary to create a "European DefenceCommunity" and. along with it, to r militarize WestGerman}, in order to safeguard their security andpeace in Europe?

It has been asked again and agai n late ly, especial­ly in France, whether there is no alternative to the"European Defence Community," whether that no­torious "Community" cannot be replaced by some­thing else, and whether European peace and securitvcannot be guaranteed without building a Europea~army based on the revival of militarism in West Ger­many. These questions have been raised again andagain, but usually in order indirectly to vindicatethe plans embodied in the Paris and Bonn treaties.

In opposition to the plans for military alignmentsin Europe, the Soviet Union put forward at the BerlinConference a concrete plan which would place thesafeguarding of the peace and security of all the Eu­ropean countries on a firm footing. That plan wasembodied in the Soviet draft of a General EuropeanTreaty of Collective Security in Europe.

The General European Treaty provides appropriatequar antces against aggression and violation of thepeace in Europe. The treaty would he open to a ll Eu .ropean countries, no matter what their social svstems.Both the German Democratic Republic and the Ger­man Federal Republic could be parties to it pendingthe reunification of Germanv and the united Germaneafter reunification had been- achieved. The treaty pro­vides that if any of the parties is subjected to armedattack, the other parties shal l assist it by all themeans at their disposal, including the use of armedforce, in order to re-establish and maintain interna­tional peace and security in Europe.

In addition, the Soviet proposals envisage an im­mediate substantial easing of Germany's position, in­cluding the \\ ithdrawal of the occupation forces ofthe four Powers, with the exception of strictly limitedcontingents, from all German territory.

The object of the Soviet proposals is to create, in­stead of mutually opposed military alignments ofEuropean states, an effective system of collectivesecurity in Europe.

.\ regional inter-American treaty of mutual as­sistance, to which the United States and all the Latin­American republics are party, has been in existencesince 1947. Such regional arrangements, providedthey arc of a strictly defensive character, may be ofpositive value, although, of course, the attempts ofU.S. ruling circles to use the before-mentioned treaty,under the pretext of combating communism, for thefurtherance of their own selfish interests cannot beregarded as legitimate. Rebuffing the objections raisedto the General European Treaty of Collective Secu­rit~ in Europe, the Soviet delegation made it clearhow untenable such objections were when directedagainst a European regional treaty. Such a

treaty, being of a genuinely defensive character. hfully compatible wit h the United Xuttons Charter.

It was sa id ti me and again at the Berlin Conferencethat LIe p re sent -da y world is divided, that there arcnow cou ntries with different social Fhal, ofcourse, is a fact, and must be \\ ith. II isimpossible to d isregard the fad that not only theSov iet Uni on , but a whol e number oi other countriesha ve emba rked upon the road of sociali,;rn andpeople's dem ocracy and arc successfully advancinga long that roa d,

We regard this as one of the greatest achievementsof the twe nt ieth centurv. We do not propose to dl'l1~

that the cam p of peacl': democracy and socialism 1l0\\

em braces countries with an aggf('ga\e population of800 mi ll ion. The gro\\ing strength of the dcmccruticcam p is obviou s, and, indeed, H'ry instrurtlvc.

Howe ver, we are consistent believers in the Leninprinciple of co-existence of countries with differentsocia l svstcm s.

We believe that notwithstanding (he different socialsys tems in Eur ope. fur instance, all the European nations a re interested in the preservation and con­solida tio n of peace, Our endeavour is that, in the matterof prot ect ing peace, there shall he no two camps eitherin Europe or ill the world gl'l1erally, We appeal to allthe Eu ropea n states to refrain frum creating milituryalignments directed against one another, since suchalign ments cannot but lead to war Instea d of that, wepropose the [ormation of a united camp of all Europeanst ates which are anxious to safeguard their securityand to promote peace in Europe. In such a system ufEuro pea n security, no state. however strong, mustenjoy a dominating position. The sovereignty uf eachand every party to this collective security system ruus:be guarantl'cd and protected from outside encroach­ment. It is on these principles that our draft of ,IGeneral European Treaty of Collective Security inEurope is based.

That draft did nut meet with the support of till'French, British and U.S. Foreign .\\inisters. But noministers can repudiate the idea of collective securityof th e European nations. It is an idea which thepeoples understand. It wins the sympathy of all peace­loving men and wome n.

Th e idea of a general European treaty of collectivesecurity in Europe will find its way to the hearts of themil lions throug h manv different channels, and that willcontribute in the surest way to the cause of peace andsecurity in Europe and, with it, throughout the worldgenerally. The Soviet Union, furthermore , urges that.pendi ng the conclusion of a peace treaty, the creationof German armed forces shall not be permitted, which

\ 0

would mean that during this period Germany would b(neutralized.

Ccrtu!n ministers J1Ia\, of course, continue Lu buildnil manner uf plans lor the creation of a "EuropeanDolence Community" and the reruilitarfzutton of WestGermany. Hut nothing will come of this except anotherunreliable military alignment ben-It of the support ofthe peoples. The idea uf collective security of the Eu­rcpoan nations, embodied in a general European trcatvor in some other form, is nuother matter. That ide;is winning increasing sympathy among the Euro peannations, because it is expressive of a deep desire topromote universal peace and security.

The Soviet government has never concealed iii;disapproval or" the North Atlantic pact, which is an expression of the urw' of the .\nglo-.\merican bloc forworld supremacy. The attempts to create a "EuropeanDefence Comrnunitv ,. which would be diroctlv in­strumental in revi'ving German militarism g~eatl)multiply existing differences. The Soviet governmentis against multtpf y ing' these differences. It is our desire\0 settle disputed issues in the interest of peace. III thisinstance. it is becoming wry deaf that the SovietUniun the thoughts and sentiments of all the

nations of Europe, and not only Europe.

The discussion of the German question at the BerlinConference showed that in this case the differencesbetween the Soviet Union and the three WesternPowers hinge primarily on the question of Germanmilitarism, inasmuch as there are plans for its revival.The Soviet Union, haying borne the main brunt of tll!'sinlggle against Xaz i aggression, cannot undcresli­mate the danger of iresh aggression if German mili­tartsm is allowed to re-emerge.

The gro\\ illg menace of West-German rcmlliturtza­tion could not but uflcct the Austrian question too,

lt was learned at the Berlin Conference that theI 'nitcd States, Great Britain and France \\ ere preparedtil withdraw their objections to those articles of thedraft with Austria to which they had beenobjecting the fin- years. That made it suffriently clear lll)\" those objections had been.

The Soviet side declared at the Berlin Conferencethat it was prepared to "igl1 the Austrian treatyforthwith. given the acceptance of two proposals whichwere rendered nccc-sarv by the signing of the Partsagreement for a "European Defen ce Community ,.

Here arc these \\\'0 proposals.

First, we proposed that Austria shall undertake notto enter into <lny military alignment directed againstany countrv which took part in the war againstIliilt'risTll an-d in the liberation of Austria, and that she

shall not permit the stabltshm nt of foreign m Warybases on I e- t rr.: Jr..

Sec n I, \ cin t! t tar r\d':on he inserted inthe A. l"1r:; n t r.-. I: .ilatint- tl. 1. in vicw of thedela_ In conclu lin <l I ca c :: ,t. \\ ith Ge man " themilitarv units of tl f ur Powers now stationed inAustri; shall be allowed to remain there, and that thequestion of their withdrawal from Austria shall bereconsidered not later than I!J,)3. If there were noplans for a European army, this r s vation we uld beurmeces :-. It has become I ClS < ry bee u e tht.n:cd St t 5 and Grc: t B~".Ll1 • r ex tin f ever

anncr I presst re on France and ot1 er c un rics tosecure II cir consent to a rev ival of militarism in \res'Germany, \\ hich, of course, increases the danger ofa new Anschluss (annexation of Austria}.

The U.S., British and French governments refused toaccept these two addenda to the Austrian treaty pro­posed b~ th SO\ ict Union. They thereby pr vented the\ustrian government from tr ating these pr posals',\ith the understanding they dcsc rv e. The result is thattl e Austrian treat· has not be n s gned.

The facts 1 have cited show that responsibility forthe failure to sign the Austrian treaty Ii s \\ ith thegovernments of the United States, Great Britain andFrance, inasmuch as they are UI1\\ illing to renouncetheir plans for reviving German militarism, which in­creases the danger of a new An chluss.

The attempts now being made by official spok smcnin the United States, Great Brita.n. France, and alsoAustria, to lay the blame on t ic 50\ ict Union for non­conclusion of the Austrian treat) are t tally unwarrant­cd. Conditions being \\ hat the) , rc at present, the So­viet government cannot close its eyes to the dangerof a revival of German militarism or to the threat of anew Anschluss, the prevention of which is expresslyprovided for in the Austrian treaty. The Sovi t Unionexpresses its readiness to sign the treaty \\ ith Austriaas soon as consent is r ccived to the alore-rn n tonedproposals, which are in the interest of the Austriansthemselves. as well as of the pc ce and security of allthe European nations.

III

non, \\ here the discussion \\ as uc\otcd mainly to ques­tivns relating tv the first item on the agenda.

As ... res L of these d cussions, two decisions were<J ' eed u1J<.) 1 iJ~ the J\\ n sicrs.

It \ a::.;. l d that tile gO\ ernments of the u.S.S.R.,the L.S.,\., lruncc and ureat Britain would assist inpromoting a successful solution of the problem ofdisunnamcnt. or at least of a substantial reduction ofarmaments. I hat agreement did not fully satisfy theSU\ let delegation. It did not reflect our proposal tocom ene a \\ orkl Confere ice on General Reduction of.\ mam nts I us year. j cvertheless, the agreementmpo e~ c rtam 0 I gations on the four governments.

It is directed against the armaments race. It imposesthe obligation to promote at least a substantial rcduc­tion of armaments, upon which the Soviet Union hasalways insisted.

Agreement was also reached to convene a confer­ence in Geneva on April 26, I95.t. It will be a confer­cncc of representatives of the u.S.S.R_, the L.S.A ..France, Great Britain and the Chinese People's Re ­pubhc with the purpose of reaching-e-x ith the partici­p: iion of the Republic of Korea, the Korean People'sDemocratic Republic and the other countries thearmed forces of which participated in the hostilities inKorea, and which desire to attend-a peaceful settle­1TI nt of the Korean question: abo for the purpose­again \\ ith the participation of the interested states ­

I restoring peace in Indo-China.Thus a coni renee in which the the Great Powers

\\.1\ take part \\111 meet in Geneva on April 26 to ex­amine tw0 of the most pressing Asian issues: theKorean question and the situation in Indo-China.And the Chinese People's Republic will at this con­ference occupy its lawful place side by side with theother Great Powers.

The importance of this agreement reached at theBertin Conf renee cannot yet be fully assessed. Butthis agrcem.: I may make for the settl uent of two im­p rtant Asian problems, and that would contribute toa further less ning' of international t nsion.

1 he United I .ations General Assembly provedpowerless to settle the Korean question; here too itacted under United Stutes pressure, That pressure ledthe General Assembly to adopt incorrect decisions\\ hich frustrated the convening of the Political Con­fe nee on Korea. The L.S. representatives at thePartmynjon talks worked for this same end.

Th Berlin Conference helped to untie this knot. . '0\\

r r ~entat of the SO\ i t Union, the Chine..,ePc pie's Republ"c, the United States, Great Britainand france, together with representa!i\·es of bothparts of Korea, will lw abll' to exploH' a final ~ett1e·

11

ment of the Korea n quest ion. The task is (Q assist thenational reunification of Korea on a democratic basisand the tr ansition of Korea from truce to stable peace

The Fr ench representative at the Berlin Conferencedisplayed particular interest in the question or indo­China. Here Fr ench colonial policy is at an impassehaving encount ered the heroic resistance of the Viet­Xamese people, who are defending their right to peaceand nationa l libert y. That policy has moreover laid all

intolerable burden upon the Frenc h people and is con­tinuously demanding of them new, and futile, sacrifices.

The Geneva conference will be faced with the in­u-icat e problem of restoring peace in Indo-China andsafeguarding the national rights of its peoples. :·\uchwill depen d on the attitude of the French govem.nent,but much also on the attitude of the United States,which is interve ning more and more in Indo-Chinaaffairs. But most of all will depend on whether all theparti es to the- conference recognize the necessity ofrestoring peace in Indo-China not by continuing (I

hopeless war , but by agreemen t based upon theprinciples of the liberty and independence of nations.

The results of the Berlin Conference arc now twingwidely discussed. Opinions on the subject are beingexpressed in many countries by official spokesmenand by the press of various trends.

The other day the French Foreign .\\inister spoke ofthe s ignificance of the Berlin Conference, and es­pecia lly of the importance of the agreement to con­vene a conference in Geneva at which the restorationof peace in Indo-China will be discuss ed. Developmentsarc showing how urg ent a settlement of that problemhas become.

The Brit ish Foreign Secretary, speaking in theHouse of Commons last week, made a number ofcritical remark" about the Berlin Conference, but

12

adml ted at the same time that the conference had been"well worth while." He added that "the conferencecertainly has not heightened international tension .'·His statements betrayed diseatlsfaction at the fact thatcertain hopes of exercising pressure on the C.S.S.R.had not been justified.

We also know that in the United Stutes Dulles hasbeen attacked by several Sena tors, especially forhaving. supposedly, been too yielding in relation toChina. Those Senators nrc eager to return to the pastand would like to have the great Chine- ..e peopleremain in the old status of a semi-colonia l nation un­scrupulously exploited b~ foreign capital. But thosetimes haw passed Iorever. Let us hope that theSenators in question will come to realize it.

Certain definite conclusions rna) be drawn fromwhat has been said.

The results of the Berlin Conference should not, ofcourse, be overrated. The more so that it will bepossible to form a proper judgment oi them only fromthe outcome or the Geneva conference, which it wasagreed in Ber lin to hold.

However, the Iact cannot be overlooked that thelong interruption in the Great- Power conferences,which lasted five years, has now ended. The BerlinConference has been held. It has helped to elucidate anumber of international problems and has paved theway to a conference of the L'nited States. GreatBritain. France, the Soviet Union and the ChinesePeople 's Republic, together with other countries.

The measures being taken by the Soviet Union aredesigned to lessen international tension and, hence,to promote peace. The facts show that these measuresdo not remain without result.

Everything goes to show 1II<It the policy of the So­viet government helps to strengthen the internationalposition of the Sovie t l 'nion and of the entire demo­cratic camp.