The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; Continuity or change

Aarhus Uni., Bachelor assignment; The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Continuity or Change? Jens Lindberg

1

Bachelor assignment

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Continuity or change?

Department of political science, Aarhus University, Denmark, 2008

Student: Jens Lindberg Jensen

Adviser: Mette Skak, PhD

Grade: 12/A

The original version of the bachelor assignment was in Danish.

This version has been translated into English


2

Abstract

The 24th

of August 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany signed the fateful non-aggression pact,

that afterwards went down in history as the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. This quiet

event a late night in the Kremlin immediately sent gargantuan waves of shock through the

international community. Given this powerful emotional response from the outside world, it

becomes interesting to inquire, whether the treaty was in fact a break with Soviet strategic

culture at the time. If the treaty was not a break, then one should wonder, why the world

responded the way it did. From a traditional political perspective the treaty made no sense, with

the extreme left aligning itself with the extreme right, signaling a break in Soviet strategic

culture. However, this paper will make the claim, that this argument and others like it were

based on superficial and romanticized perceptions of the Soviet leadership. Instead, this paper

will argue, that the true nucleus of Soviet strategic culture throughout the 1920s and 1930s was

the survival and security of the Soviet Union. In the light of this the European governments –

instead of reacting with astonishment and indignation – should have foreseen the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty and the Soviet turn to Hitlerite Germany, as a logical consequence of the

failure of Great Britain and France to secure Soviet Security.

1 Introduction

The 24th

of August 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany entered into the fateful non-

aggression pact that would afterwards go down in history as the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop

Treaty – a title inspired by the two signatories, foreign minister for the Soviet Union Vjatjeslav

Molotov and foreign minister for Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop. This quiet event a late night

at the Kremlin immediately sent gargantuan waves of shock and indignation through the

international community (Read & Fischer, 1988: 258; Robert, 1995:93). This reaction also

makes it interesting to enquire, whether the treaty in fact was a break with Soviet strategic

culture at the time. If it was a break, then the shock, astonishment and anger was very well

justified. If it was not a break, then you may wonder, why the outside world reacted the way it

did.


3

From a traditional political left-right perspective, the treaty at first hand made no sense at

all: Hitler’s Germany was on the extreme right, and the Soviet Union on the extreme left. To this

you may add: 1) The Nazis continuous sabre-rattling towards the Soviet Union ever since

Hitler’s takeover in 1933. 2) The Soviet Union’s repeated attempts to contain Germany. 3) And

that the Soviet Union from April 1939 and right up until the last days before the signing of the

treaty had been in extensive negotiations with France and Great Britain about forming a defense

alliance specifically against Germany. If you follow this line of arguing, it should be obvious,

that the treaty entailed a change in Soviet strategic culture (Roberts, 1995: 1, 9-10).

However, if we play the role of the devil’s advocate, you can argue that the above line of

reasoning is based on romanticized and superficial analysis of Soviet strategic culture, and that

you can really boil down Soviet foreign policy from the 1920s and to 1939 to one fundamental

rationale: Survival for the Soviet state by avoiding or postponing Soviet involvement in

international conflicts (Wren, 1958: 661; Martel, 1987: 174-175). In this light, the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty makes sense. In this light the treaty was an expression of continuity in Soviet

strategic culture. And in this light the outside world should not have been shocked, but should

have anticipated the signing of the treaty as a natural consequence of the British and French

leaders’ lack of will to guarantee the Soviet Union a waterproof defense alliance against

Germany. In this situation – according to this alternative analysis – the Soviet Union in reality

had no other choice, but to enter into a temporary non-aggression treaty with Germany (Roberts,

2006: 31, 35; Martel: 182).

Motivated by these thoughts, I have chosen the following question to be at the core of my

paper: Was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty an expression of continuity or change in Soviet

strategic culture?


4

2 Theory

2.1 Strategic culture as approach to studying international relations

The theoretical frame for this paper is the concept of ‘strategic culture’, which is a special

approach to the study of international relations. At the same time, it is also a relatively new

approach, which not until the early 1980s really started to develop a solid foundation for its

theories (Johnston, 1995: 36). What characterizes strategic culture as approach is a significant

focus on the security political culture that the foreign policy decision makers are operating in.

This strategic culture gives the decision makers cognitive limitations and shape the decision

makers’ view of internal relations and of the foreign policy that should be pursued (George,

1969: 197).

This approach stands in stark contrast to the more structural approaches to international

relations, such as neo-realism, liberal economic interdependence theory and neoliberal

institutionalism. In these more structural approaches, the decision makers to a much higher

extent are thought to have an objective rationality driven by self-interest through which the

states’ foreign policy becomes a simple reflection of the international environment’s material

structures (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 77, 104, 110; Waltz, 1979: 88, 91-92; Keohane, 1989: 2-

3). Strategic culture avoids this determinism without as such ruling out, that states can act

rationally and self-interest-maximizing. Still, strategic culture presumes, that if states are to act

like this, then these conditions – rationality and self-interest-maximization – must be embedded

in the state’s strategic culture (Johnston: 34-35). Paraphrasing Alexander Wendt’s famous

remark, you can say that “anarchy is what states’ strategic culture make of it” (Wendt, 1992:

395).

In addition to this, strategic culture is special in to the extent that traditional international

relations theories actually do incorporate the importance of culture, this tends to be more focused

on the general international culture between the states. With strategic culture however, the focus

is more on the culture in the individual state, where we are trying to understand foreign policy

through the specific cultural context that the decision makers are imbedded in (Howlett & Glenn,

2005: 131).


5

With the concept of strategic culture, we are thereby getting the opportunity to acquire

some much more nuanced analyses of states’ foreign political behavior. This can be an empirical

advantage because you attain much more nuanced explanations off states’ security political

behavior and a theoretical disadvantage because it becomes more difficult to formulate

theoretical generalizations over many cases.

Continuity and change

A strong trademark with the strategic culture approach is a strong awareness towards path

dependency and continuity in states’ foreign policy. In particular, this approach argues that it is

difficult for states to shift their foreign policy line, because it at the same time entails a conflict

with the present strategic culture (Heikka & Neumann, 1983: 7). Strategic culture as such does

not rule out, that change can happen. However, a condition for quick and radical change is, that

the existing strategic culture is exposed to very strong external influences (Lantis, 2005: 25).

The literature here points towards different options about what these strong external

influences might be. Lantis for example points towards dramatic events, which draw into dispute

the core assumptions of the current strategic culture. Furthermore, Lantis think, that it can

change a state’s strategic culture, if central values within the culture come into conflict with one

another.

On the other hand, Howlett points towards the importance of norm entrepreneurs, who

are trying to change the strategic culture. Furthermore, Howlett emphasizes the importance of

crew replacement, where change can happen, when some of the central decision makers are

replaced. Finally, Howlett makes a point out of the importance of generational change, where a

whole new generation of decision makers rises to power (Howlett & Glenn: 128).

Definition

One of the problems with strategic culture is a lack of consensus about what definition to

use. Among other things, this is caused by the fact that ‘strategy’ as well as ‘culture’ are very


6

broad categories (Lantis: 3-4, 12-13; Howlett & Glenn: 123-124). For this paper, I have chosen

to use Johnston’s definition of strategic culture:

“Strategic culture is a system of symbols (ways of arguing, language, analogies,

metaphors), which creates strong and lasting strategic preferences by formulating attitudes to

the role and utility of military power in intergovernmental affairs and by encapsulating these

attitudes in an aura of factuality, so that the strategic preferences appear realistic and useful

(Johnston: 46).”

2.2 Johnston’s strategic culture

The theoretical choice for this assignment is Alastair Ian Johnston’s theoretical

framework for strategic culture. The reason for choosing Johnston’s framework is that it contains

a number of clear, limited and exhaustive parameters, that gives this paper a clear structure.

2.2.1 Independent and dependent variables: Assumptions and preferences

What characterizes Johnston’s model is a strong positivism and a strong desire for

falsifiability. This causes, among other things, a clear distinction between independent and

dependent variables, where the independent variable is the state’s strategic culture, while the

dependent variable is the state’s actual behavior (Johnston: 46). Johnston have here been

criticized for, that the distinction between strategic culture and the behavior that it causes is far

from as clear as Johnston claims. Especially Johnston is criticized for overlooking the

constitutive element of behavior, where the actions, that the states undertake, are themselves a

part of the process of creating a certain strategic culture (Heikka & Neumann: 8-9; Rasmussen,

2005: 70-71). This criticism is justified, and something I will take into account in this

assignment.

Johnston’s strategic culture consists of two parts. The first part consists of the following

three basic assumptions that states make, about how the world of international relations works:

1) How high is the conflict level in international relations? 2) Are other states primarily a threat


7

or a possibly ally? 3) To what extent can you use violence and threats of violence to attain your

foreign policy goals (Johnston: 46)?

The second part of Johnston’s theoretical framework is the preferences of the strategic

culture, which is the strategic course of action, that the states’ leaders view as the most useful.

These preferences are drawn directly from the three basic assumptions about international

relations (ibid.: 46-47). This is illustrated in the below figure.

Figure 1: Assumptions shape preferences

Assumptions → Preferences

Preferences are ranked, which means that a state almost always will have more than one

preference, and that these preferences have different degrees of importance to the state. In

addition to this ranking being logical, it also provides methodological advantages in that the

state’s strategic culture becomes falsifiable: 1) If there is not consistency in the preference

ranking over different cases at one certain time in history, then the state does not have a

dominant strategic culture. 2) If the preference ranking over time and different cases stays the

same, then the state has a dominant strategic culture (ibid.: 48).

2.2.2 Theoretical operationalization of Johnston’s theoretical framework

In this paper, I will divide my operationalization of Johnston’s theoretical framework into

the following three parts:

1) The state’s view of international relations.

2) The state’s strategic preferences, especially considering (1).

3) Means to attain the strategic preferences.

By using these three categories, we obtain a very clear structure in the investigation of

states’ strategic culture, where the view of international relations creates state preferences, and

where the state then has some different means to attain these preferences.


8

The state’s view of international politics

In this category I have placed Johnston’s two first basic assumptions about 1) the conflict

level in international relations and 2) whether states are a threat to one another. It is here of

course worth pointing out the close correlation between these two assumptions.

In relation to Johnston’s third basic assumption – the use of violent means in international

relations – then I do not contest, that the view of means is a basic part of states’ strategic culture.

I have, however, placed this basic assumption in a separate section, because this gives a clearer

structure for analyzing strategic culture.

The state’s strategic preferences

Predominantly I agree with Johnston, that the preferences are created by the three basic

assumptions, where the preferences arise from both the state’s view of international relations (my

first main category) as well as what means should be used (my third main category). Still I have

the following objections:

1) Johnston’s theoretical framework ignores, that there is an interaction between the basic

assumptions and the preferences. Thus, the assumptions not only shape the preferences, but the

preferences also rotate back and – albeit to a less extent – shape the assumptions. This is

illustrated in the below figure:

Figure 2: Assumptions shape preferences and vice versa

Assumptions ↔ Preferences

Thus I would argue, that the preferences (2nd

main category) is not just influenced, but

can also influence states’ view of international relations (1st main category) as well as the means

(third main category). An empirical example of this was the US general staff during the Cuban

missile crisis. The general staff here had a preference for military action towards Cuba. This

preference to a high extent shaped the staff’s assumptions about the conflict and threat level in


9

international relations in regards to how the Soviet Union would react to an American military

action against Cuba (Allison, 1993: 361-364).

2) Johnston’s model claims, that the only thing, which can create a state’s preferences is

its basic assumptions. This causality will often be mostly correct, but rarely completely correct,

since the preferences can also arise independently of the basic assumptions through third

variables, that the model does not take into account. An example of this was Hitler’s strategic

culture’s preferences, which were not created by the basic assumptions, but by a desire for

German ‘Lebensraum’ (Kershaw, 1987: 229, 256, 259).

Means to reach the strategic preferences

In this category I have placed Johnston’s third basic assumption about the use of violent

means in international relations. Furthermore, I have added a parameter for non-violent means,

since I consider these to be equally as essential means in security politics.

How relevant though it may be, I will not focus on the Soviet Union’s means in this

paper. This is done due to paper space constraints and that the decision makers’ basic view of

international relations and their preferences all things considered are the most important elements

in strategic culture, because they lay the foundation, which the means are operating from.

Methodology

Criteria

Methodologically, Johnston puts up three criteria, which all need to be met, before you can claim

that a country has one dominant strategic culture.

1) Consistent ranking of strategic preferences over all cases in the presumed formative

period of the strategic culture.


10

2) Consistency of the ranking of the strategic preferences between the formative period

and the later period, that you are interested in.

3) A test of whether the decision makers’ ranking of preferences correspond to the

state’s politico-military behavior (Johnston: 53).

These preference stressed criteria will form the methodological frame for this paper. In

addition to this – apart from Johnston’s model – I will also assess, whether the Soviet Union’s

view of international relations is 1) consistent in the formative period and 2) between the

formative period and the later period. This is done, because I believe, that consistency in your

fundamental view of international relation is also very crucial to test in order to assess, whether

there was a change in strategic culture or not.

Primary and secondary sources

In the section about the formative period, I will due to space constraints predominantly

use secondary sources. In the following sections, I will to a higher extent use primary sources. I

will, however, still continue using secondary sources even in these sections. This is done because

the Soviet regime – which already Nathan Leites’ documented in his famous Soviet-studies from

the early 1950s (Leites, 1951: xiii; Leites, 1953: 27) – was an extremely secretive regime, where

it is crucial to be able to interpret, what the Soviet-leaders said and did, in order to come to a

realistic assessment of the leaders’ motives (Resis, 1991: ix). The same is the case with the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, which to a high extent needs to be read between the lines. In this

situation, I will of course allow myself to be inspired by the interpretations, that other people

have made about the same subject.

Choice of secondary sources

Among my secondary sources, I will in particular draw upon Geoffrey Roberts, who

certainly is one of the most thorough among the English speaking secondary sources in his

writings about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. However, this is also a disadvantage, since


11

Roberts – despite his thoroughness – tends to be biased towards only viewing Stalin as a very

careful and defensively oriented foreign policy leader. This methodological problem I will

compensate for through critical judgment of Roberts’ arguments, independent analysis of

primary sources as well as the use of an broad range of other secondary sources. In my use of

secondary sources, I will to the extent possible focus on literature from the 1990s, when many of

the Soviet archives were declassified.

Discourse and practice

Since the Soviet Union’s view of international relations and their strategic preferences are

very broad categories, it is necessary with some methodological considerations about how I will

investigate these subjects. A classical distinction within the strategic culture literature is between

discourse (what you say) and practice (what you do) (Heikka & Neumann: 11, Rasmussen: 71).

This I will also use as my method here:

1) As earlier mentioned, in the section about the formative period I will predominantly

use secondary sources. This is a methodological disadvantage, since I cannot guarantee that these

authors’ interpretations are correct. I will try to minimize this problem through critical judgment,

a broad range of secondary sources and the use of some primary sources.

2) In the sections about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty I will include the following

primary sources as discourse elements: Official foreign policy statements (especially from the

Soviet news agency TASS, the Soviet foreign ministry Narkomindel, Molotov and Stalin), the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, Komintern general secretary Dimitrov’s diary as well as Molotov’s

memoirs in Felix Chuev’s interviews with Molotov. As practice elements, I will analyze relevant

foreign political actions, which the Soviet Union undertook in the period around the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty.


12

The structure of the paper

Based on Johnston’s theoretical and methodological framework for strategic culture, the

structure of the paper will be as follows:

1) In the first section I will examine, whether the Soviet Union’s view of international

relations is consistent, and whether there is a consistent ranking of the strategic preferences over

all cases in the formative period. The formative period here is assumed to be the years from

October 1917 and until early August 1939. This assumption is made because of space constraints

and because there are good arguments, that the period around 1917 in part led to a different

strategic culture than the period before 1917. This can among other things be attributed to Lantis’

dramatic events (World War 1, the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War) as well as

Howlett’s norm entrepreneurs, crew replacement and generational change (out with Tzarism

and in with socialist revolutionary idealists led by Lenin) (Bell, 1997: 123-124).

2) In the second section I will examine, whether there is consistency in the view of

international relations and the ranking of strategic preferences between the formative period and

the period around the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. This later period starts early in

August 1939 and ends with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty the 24th

of August.

This time based distinction is drawn because it was only after the German-Polish Gdansk-crisis

early in August 1939 – which signaled a soon to come German attack on Poland – that the Soviet

Union seriously started to consider a German-Soviet deal (Roberts, 1989: 144).

3) In the third section I will test, whether the decision makers’ ranking of preferences in

the period around the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty corresponds to the Soviet

Union’s politico-military behavior. For this section, I have chosen to focus on the Soviet Union’s

behavior in the year after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. This is done because the

Soviet Union in this period exhibited a behavior with a clear relation to the newly signed treaty.

It is of course methodologically problematic to analyze behavior in the period after the signing

of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty and not – as Johnston’s model requires – in the same period as

the treaty was signed. It is my assessment however, that this methodological problem is not

overwhelmingly big, considering that the time gap between these two periods is very short, and


13

because of which it is reasonable to presume, that the two periods were an expression of more or

less the same strategic culture.

4 Review of the formative period 1917-1939

4.1 Parameter 1: View of international relations

Conflict level

Soviet strategic culture viewed in the formative period international relations as highly

tense with a high risk of violent, inter-state conflicts. This conflictual view of international

relations was consistent through the entire period and across all cases (Roberts, 1989: 23-151)

and was strongly related to the Soviet threat perception (see the section below) (Bell: 124).

Threat perception

Through the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet strategic culture had a very pessimistic view of the

relationship between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world’s countries, where the Soviet

Union saw itself as a lone socialist island surrounded by hostile states (Murphy, 2005: 2; Bell:

124). Yet there were big variations about to what extent certain countries posed a threat. The

threat against the Soviet Union especially came from authoritarian, militant and expansionist

states like Germany and Japan and to a much smaller extent from democracies like France, Great

Britain and the United States. This is shown for example through Stalin’s famous distinction

between the capitalist camp’s democratic and fascist states, where the fascist states were to be

feared much more than the democratic.

The fear of Japanese expansion was heightened especially from 1932 (Wren: 665; Bell:

222), while the fear of Germany – which until then had been the Soviet Union’s most important

ally through the Rapallo-cooperation (Roberts, 1995: 9) – became imminent with Hitler’s


14

takeover in 1933 (Roberts, 1989: 43, 54, 57-58, 96). This threat perception was consistent

through the whole period and across all cases (Roberts, 1989: 23-151).

4.2 Parameter 2: Preferences

4.2.1 Preferences in the formative period

The Soviet Union had a consistent ranking of preferences in the formative period. The

primary preference was the survival of the Soviet Union, whereas the secondary preferences

were ‘neighbor imperialism’1 and an ideological preference for socialist world revolution. All

these preferences, though in particular the preference for survival, seems to correspond very well

with the assumptions about the level of conflict and threats in international relations. This fact

strengthens Johnston’s argument, that a strategic culture’s preferences are created by its

assumptions (Johnston: 46-47).

Opposition towards fascist regimes

Antifascism was in the 1930s a strong element of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy as

well as with Comintern. Antifascism was strengthened in the Soviet Union in particular after

Hitler’s takeover in 1933. In Comintern, antifascism became especially prominent after 1935,

where Komintern with the popular front policy encouraged communist groupings all over the

world to find allies from other parts of the political spectrum in the fight against fascism (Martel:

163; Roberts, 1989: 82).

Despite its importance, I will not include antifascism in my assignment as a preference of

its own. This is because I primarily see antifascism as a mean for the Soviet leaders to meet their

preference for survival: Militant and expansionist states like Germany and Japan were a threat

towards the survival of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviet Union needed to

avert this threat, and here the antifascist slogan – the way I see it – was used as a mean to

1 Neighborhood imperialism refers to a desire to dominate or influence the countries in the immediate vicinity of

the Soviet Union.


15

strengthen the international society’s resistance towards these states to the benefit of the Soviet

Union (Roberts, 1989: 117-118).

Theoretical overview of the preferences

To create a theoretical overview of the preferences, you can use the typology of the

English School, which categorize state’s foreign policy according to their realistic, rationalistic

and revolutionary elements. Thus states are realistic, when they are acting based on their own

self interests and view international relations as a zero sum game. States are rationalistic, when

they are acting in accordance with international laws and conventions. And finally states are

revolutionary, when they are trying to change the international society’s existing order to obtain

a higher ethical goal (Jackson & Sørensen: 133, 135-136).

The preference for survival was primarily an expression of realism and in part an

expression of rationalism, when it served the Soviet Union’s interests to follow the international

rules and norms. An example of this was the Soviet attempts to strike deals about collective

security in the League of Nations 1934-1938 (Roberts, 1995: 9). Neighborhood imperialism was

an expression of realism, whereas socialist world revolution was an expression of

revolutionarism. The preferences’ location are shown graphically in the figure below:

Figure 3: The Soviet Union’s preferences placed within the typology of the English school

Realism Rationalism Revolutionarism

1.

Survival

2.

Neighbor-

hood

imperialism

2.

World

revolution


16

It is here difficult to determine, how the ranking was between the secondary preferences.

This is so, because neighborhood imperialism and world revolution was used in different areas

and therefore very rarely would come into conflict with one another. A tentative estimate here is

though, that neighborhood imperialism and world revolution had more or less the same ranking.

The two paradigms

As the figure indicates, there appeared to be two different paradigms within the Soviet

preferences. The first realistic paradigm includes the preferences survival and neighborhood

imperialism. This paradigm is dominated by realism with a focus on national self interest and

international relations as a zero sum game. In this paradigm, the survival of the Soviet state is the

primary preference. The other revolutionary paradigm contains the preference about socialist

world revolution and is dominated by the desire to change the international order. The leading

paradigm is the realistic one, which the Soviet leaders considered more important than the

revolutionary paradigm.

4.2.2 Primary preference: The survival of the Soviet Union

The Soviet leaders’ consistent primary preference was the survival of the Soviet Union

(Wren: 661). This preference was to a high degree based on the impression, that the Soviet

Union was threatened. This impression was caused by especially five factors:

First of all, the Soviet leaders viewed international relations as having high levels of

conflict. Second of all, the Soviet Union was very isolated internationally, even though this

situation was improved from the mid 1920s (Roberts, 1989: 30). Thirdly, there was a risk of a

two front war against Japan and Germany; especially following the signing of the Anti-

Comintern Pact in 1936 (Roberts, 1989: 39, 73; Martel: 175, 181). Fourthly, the Soviet Union in

the 1920s and 1930s was in a very weak position militarily (Murphy, 2005: xvi; Wegner, 1997:

28; Wren: 661; Roberts, 1989: 30). Finally, fifth of all there was probably a cultural path


17

dependency, where the search for security in the time of the Russian empire was one if not the

most important preference in Russian foreign policy (Szamuely, 1974: 23, 27-28).

In relation to discourse, then the survival preference was expressed through the more

pragmatic foreign policy line, which the Soviet Union gradually shifted to after a revolutionary

period from 1917 to 1920, where the Soviet leaders in their foreign policy actively had sought to

promote world revolution (Roberts, 1989: 29). This more pragmatic foreign policy, where it

became legitimate to cooperate with and have peaceful relations with capitalist states, could

among other places be seen through Lenin’s doctrine about ‘peaceful coexistence’ between

socialist and capitalistic states (ibid.: 31-33) as well as in Stalin’s doctrine about ‘socialism in

one country’ from 1924 (ibid.: 31-33). Moreover the survival preference was expressed in

Litvinov’s speeches in the League of Nations for peace and against expansionist states

(Litvinov, 1939: 22-23, 32-33, 36-37, 50-51, 66-67, 88-89, 110-111, 114-115).

In terms of practice, the survival preference was expressed through the Soviet Union’s

attempts to break its international isolation by seeking diplomatic recognition from a broad range

of states from the 1920s and forward (Wren: 652-653). Similarly, the Soviet Union in the 1920s

and 1930s signed multiple non-aggression treaties (Wren: 658, Roberts, 1989: 42) and attempted

several times to establish regular alliance deals (Litvinov: 181, 187, 192; Roberts, 1989: 63, 68;

Wegner: 30). Finally, the economic Rapallo-cooperation from 1922 and onwards between the

Soviet Union and Weimar Germany was similarly a mean to break the isolation of the Soviet

state (Roberts, 1995: 147; Martel: 177).

4.2.3 Secondary preference: Neighborhood imperialism

A consistent secondary preference for the Soviet Union was neighborhood imperialism in

traditional Russian spheres of interest. During the time of the Russian empire there existed a

strong neighborhood imperialism, where Russia was seeking to exert influence in the immediate

vicinity of the empire (Szamuely, 1974: 23-24). This neighborhood imperialism continued in the

formative period of the Soviet Union. This was not expressed through Soviet discourse, but was

clearly expressed in Soviet practice – for example through the gradual extension of the Soviet

Union’s territory in the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly, Soviet Russia/RSFSR in 1920 used violent


18

means in trying to prevent the independence of the Baltic states. Furthermore, Soviet Russia the

same year tried to put into power a Soviet friendly government in Finland to prevent Finnish

independence (Cohen, 1996: 74-75). Finally, in the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union carried

through a strong Sovietization of its neighborhood state Mongolia (Morozova, 2002: 3-4, 14-15;

Murphy, 1966: vii).

It is here important to note, that neighborhood imperialism not necessarily is opposed to

the survival preference, but that it actually in some ways complement it. Russian expansionism

here had a curious duality, where it in addition to 1) expansion for the sake of expansion also

was about 2) securing the security of the empire by winning new territories. This can be related

to John Mearsheimer’s offensive neorealism, which points to, that many states act offensively

and aggressively to strengthen their own security (Mearsheimer, 2001: 362-363; Jackson &

Sørensen: 87; Ermarth, 2006: 4). Thus the neighborhood imperialism was a mixture of a real

preference for expansion for the sake of expansion as well as a mean to secure the primary

preference for survival. This is illustrated in the below table.

Tabel 1: The double meaning of Russian imperialism

The 2 aspects of neighborhood imperialism The 2 roles of neighborhood imperialism

Expansion for the sake of expansion Secondary preference to primary preference of survival

Expansion to increase state security Mean to obtain primary preference of survival

Sometimes, expansionist foreign policy contained both aspects at the same time, whereas

other times it only contained one of the aspects. An indication that this duality was continued by

the new Soviet leaders is found in Litvinov’s talk with journalist Richard Hottelet in 1946. In this

interview, Litvinov confirmed, that the Soviet leaders sought security through territorial

expansion (Resis: 6; Roberts, 1992: 49-50).

4.2.4 Secondary preference: Socialist revolutions in other countries

As mentioned earlier, socialist world revolution was an important part of foreign policy

in the early years of the Soviet state. In the following years, however, this preference had to be


19

downplayed in the Soviet Union’s official statements in order to break the international isolation

(Roberts, 1989: 29, 30, 32). The consistency was in part kept though, considering that the

preference for socialist world revolution lived on in the organization Comintern, which

especially from 1924 was dominated by the Soviet Union2 (McDermott & Agnew, 1996: 1-2, 14-

15, 42-46).

4.3 Conclusion

In this section, I have analyzed the Soviet Union’s view of international relations and the

corresponding preferences in the formative period 1917-1939. In regards to the view of

international relations I found great consistency: First of all in relation to the conflict level,

where the Soviet Union viewed international relations as generally having high levels of conflict.

And second of all in relation to threat perception, where the Soviet Union saw other states as

posing a threat to the Soviet state.

In relation to the Soviet Union’s preferences, I also found consistency in the preference

ranking with survival as the primary preference and neighborhood imperialism and world

revolution as secondary preferences. In this regard, it should be pointed out, that the secondary

preferences to some degree were acting as means to obtain the primary survival preference. To

what degree, this has been the case, is however a huge question that goes far beyond this paper,

which is also the reason why I will not delve deeper into these subjects more than what is strictly

necessary.

2 Comintern (Communist International) was an international organization founded in March 1919 and consisted of

communist parties from all over the world. Comintern’s official goal was to work for socialist takeovers in states all over the world.


20

5 Consistency between the formative period and the period

around the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty

5.1 Introduction to the treaty

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty consisted of an official and a secret part. The official part was

the non-aggression treaty. The secret part was an additional protocol, which divided some

Eastern-European areas into Soviet and German spheres of influence: Germany got West Poland

and Lithuania, while the Soviet Union got Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and the

Rumanian area of Bessarabia (Degras, 1953: 360-361). This is displayed in the below figure,

where ‘Map 1’ is the division of the spheres of influence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty,

whereas ‘Map 2’ are the actual territorial changes in 1939-1940:

Figure 4: Spheres of influences and actual territorial changes 1939-1940

Source: Peter Hanula, 2006. Gathered from www.wikipedia.com. Wikipedia is not a scientific source, but I have

checked, that the maps are correct in regards to the spheres of influence and actual territorial changes.

http://www.wikipedia.com/


21

5.2 Parameter 1: View of international relations

Conflict level

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty was basically a continuation of the Soviet Union’s

conflict based view of international relations. This was seen through the Soviet Union’s deep

mistrust towards Germany, who they feared would attack the Soviet Union, if the Soviet Union

did not sign this treaty. Also, this conflict based understanding of international relations was

evident in relation to Great Britain, which the Soviet leaders were suspecting of wanting to

appease Hitler and turn his aggression eastwards towards the Soviet Union (Roberts, 1989: 116;

Murphy: 23; Wren: 669; Resis: 9; Martel: 175, 181).

Threat perception

Before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty the Soviet leaders viewed the Soviet Union as a

lone socialist island surrounded by hostile, capitalist states. This perception continued with the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, which was signed exactly because the Soviet Union viewed these

states – and at any rate the great powers Germany, Japan, Great Britain and France – as not

having the best interest of the Soviet Union in mind. Thus the treaty was signed 1) because of the

risk of a German and possibly Japanese attack and 2) because Great Britain and France would

not offer the Soviet Union a real military alliance. In addition to this, it was also important for

the signing of the treaty, that especially Great Britain seemed accommodating about the idea of

turning Hitler’s Germany to the east (Martel: 175-176).

Second of all, before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty the Soviet leaders saw fascist

capitalist states as posing a much greater threat than democratic capitalist states. These attitudes

were also continued with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, with the treaty being signed 1) because

Germany was the biggest and most imminent threat in international relations, 2) because the

Soviet’s feared Japan on the Western front, while 3) the democratic states in Great Britain and

France were not posing any direct threat (Roberts, 1989: 116; Murphy: 23; Wren: 669; Resis: 9;

Martel: 175, 181).


22

5.3 Parameter 2: Preferences

5.3.1 Primary preference: Survival of the Soviet Union

Continuity or change

In the following sections I will present the various arguments for continuity and change,

respectively. This section will be finished off with a conclusion, where it will be discussed,

which explanations are more correct.

5.3.1.1 Continuity argument: Germany as a threat to the Soviet Union’s survival

There are strong arguments, that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty was consistent in

keeping survival as the most important Soviet preference. Here, the treaty should be seen as part

of a process, where the motive of the Soviet leaders was to secure the Soviet Union’s survival in

the light of a grave German threat.

Hitler had for many years – also before he came to power in 1933 and even all the way

back to ‘Mein Kampf’ (Hitler, 1926: 591, 605-608) – expressed a strong anti-Bolshevism. For

Hitler, this was combined with a desire for ‘Lebensraum’ east of Germany’s borders (Roberts,

1989: 40, 96, 100). Because of this, the Soviet leaders and their leading diplomats in

Narkomindel had a strong fear, that Hitler’s Germany sooner or later would attack the Soviet

Union (Roberts, 1989: 43, 54, 57-58, 96; Wegner, 1997: 30). To contain this threat, the Soviet

Union in August 1939 had two basic options: 1) Bilateral defense alliance with France and Great

Britain. 2) Obtain a temporary deal with Germany (Wegner: 31).

According to this continuity argument, the reason that the Soviet Union finally chose

option 2 and signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty was: 1) The Soviet Union in August 1939

had to make a decision to secure its survival and 2) at the time, option two was the only one that

was actually available.


23

The Soviet Union had to make a choice to secure its survival

Over the summer of 1939, the German-Polish conflict over the port town of Gdansk was

escalating. For the Soviet Union, this was interpreted as indicating, that a German attack was

imminent (Roberts, 1989: 144). This made the Soviet Union’s isolationist position untenable,

because the Soviet Union after Germany’s invasion of Poland would have the impressive

German Wehrmacht standing on the Polish-Soviet border. This would have entailed great risks

for a German surprise attack on the Soviet Union. This interpretation – without specifically

referring to the Gdansk crisis – is supported by Molotov in his memoirs (Resis: 9). Despite

reservations about the credibility of Molotov as a source3 (Resis: vii), the explanation seems

logical.

A deal with Germany as the only realistic option to secure Soviet survival

As it is shown in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy announcements, the Soviet Union

from mid April 1939 and up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty on August 24 1939 had

negotiations with Great Britain and France about a military alliance against Germany (Degras:

329, 330, 337, 340, 349, 352, 356). However, the Soviet Union was not convinced, that France

and especially Great Britain – among other things through their dilettante approach to the

negotiations (Degras: 365; Murphy, 2005: 20-22) – took this alliance seriously and actually

would come to the Soviet Union’s aid military if attacked by Germany. From the point of view

of the Soviet leaders, this ruled out the option, that the Soviet Union’s security could be secured

through a deal with Great Britain and France. That this interpretation is correct is supported in

Soviet discourse, where the Soviet Union in countless official statements both before and after

the break down of the negotiations exactly referred to this interpretation. These statements came

from prominent institutions and people such as TASS, Narkomindel, Molotov, Leningrad’s party

boss Zhdanov as well as the Soviet Union’s chief negotiator in the August-negotiations

Voroshilov (Degrad: 330-331, 336, 349-354, 356, 362, 363-365).

3 For example denies Molotov in his memoirs blatantly the existence of the secret protocol (Resis: 13).


24

In the light of this break down in the negotiations the Soviet Union almost had no other

options than – in trying to secure the preference for survival – to go into a temporary alliance

with Germany (Martel: 181). This was confirmed by Molotov in a speech to the Supreme Soviet

on August 31 1939 and later on in his memoirs (Degrad: 365; Resis: 5, 9). If this interpretation is

correct, then the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty is an expression of continuity.

5.3.1.2 Change arguments

Contrary to the above continuity arguments, you can also argue that the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty contained offensive and expansionist elements. This could indicate change

rather than continuity, since these elements went against the defensive rationale in the survival

preference. These arguments will be presented in the following three sections.

Change argument 1: An ideological desire for a West European war, which introduced

more offensive elements in Soviet strategic culture

The first change argument is ideological, where the offensive motives goes back to

Marxism-Leninism and to Lenin’s imperialism theory, which said that war between capitalist

states was unavoidable. The argument here is, that the real cause for the Ribbentrop Treaty was,

that Stalin was a Marxist-Leninist ideologist, who wanted to provoke a West European war

between the capitalist states. This war would weaken these states and increase the Soviet Union’s

power in Western Europe (Radzinsky, 1997: 440-442; Martel: 176-177; Roberts, 1989: 31-32).

Whether this theory is correct is incredibly difficult to determine, because you have to

know what Stalin was thinking and nobody knew that with certainty (Bell: 126). That the theory

may have some merit is supported in Soviet discourse. This happened first of all in Stalin’s

speech to the Politbureau August 19 1939, where he directly confirmed this theory (Murphy,

2005: 24-26). This happened several places in the speech, but is most clearly done in the last

section: “It is in the interest of the Soviet Union (…) that a war breaks out between Das Reich

and the capitalist Franco-British alliance. We have to do all to make sure, that the war continues

as long as possible with the purpose of tiring both sides. For exactly this reasons, we must


25

approve the pact suggested by Germanu (Murphy, 2005: 26).” However, the authenticity of this

speech is disputed, which limits its value as a source (Murphy, 2005: 26-27; Roberts, 2006: 35;

Degrad: 406).

Second of all, indications that this theory is correct is found in Stalin’s conversation with

Comintern General Secretary Dimitrov in September 1939. At this meeting, Stalin said that an

inter-imperialistic war between capitalist states in Western Europe was something that did not

bother the Soviet Union. Also these comments can be interpreted as supporting that Stalin with

the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty wanted to provoke a West European war (Dimitrov, 2003: 115;

Murphy, 2005: 27). On the other hand, you can also argue that Stalin in the Comintern

community was only trying to justify the approaching Soviet Union invasion of Eastern Poland.

Furthermore, you can argue that Stalin’s comments do not necessarily show that he wanted a

West European war. Instead, they could indicate that Stalin was aware, that a European war was

inevitable and if war came, then it all things considered was better if it broke out on West

European soil than on Soviet territory (Roberts, 2006: 36-37).

Change argument 2: Neo-realistic desire for a West European war, which introduced more

offensive elements to Soviet strategic culture

The other change argument is, that even though Marxist-Leninist ideology did not play

any significant role, the Soviet decision makers – in a more apolitical and neo-realist perspective

about relative gains – could still have wanted a war between West European countries. This war

– together with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty – the Soviet Union could have used to increase

its power in Western Europe (Weinberg, 2005: 98-99).

The most common interpretation here is that Stalin actually never wanted an alliance with

France and Great Britain, since this would prevent Hitler’s West European war. According to

this interpretation, the alliance negotiation from April to August were insincere and was only

done among other things to give the Soviets a stronger negotiation position vis-à-vis a German-

Russian deal (Radzinsky: 440, 442; Martel: 176-177). The indications for and against this change

argument 2 are more or less the same as with change argument 1.


26

Change argument 3: The offensive logic of different spheres of interest introduced more

offensive elements in Soviet strategic culture

The last change argument is about the offensive logic of the secret protocol of the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. According to this argument, this promoted Soviet expansion into its

sphere of interest, which introduced more offensive elements in Soviet strategic culture in

opposition to the survival preference.

My overall view of this argument is, that the division of spheres of interest in the secret

protocol – and the offensive elements that it contained – did not compromise the survival

preference. For this there are four main reasons: First of all, the division of spheres of interest –

as will be explained in section 6.1 – was based on the survival preference, and a Soviet desire to

protect itself from the German threat through a number of East European buffer states (Roberts,

1989: 162, 184). Second of all, should the Soviets act offensively in their sphere of interest, it

would now happen with the accept of the great power Germany (Degras: 359-361; Roberts,

1995: 103). Third of all, the Soviet Union was convinced that the other two European great

powers – France and Great Britain – would not let themselves be drawn into large scale conflicts

because of Soviet pressure against governments in Finland, the Baltic countries, Eastern Poland

or Bessarabia (Roberts, 1989: 183-184). Finally fourthly, the countries in the Soviet sphere were

small and weak and – at least in the Soviet mind – could easily be defeated by the Red Army if it

came to that (Roberts, 1989: 166; Roberts, 1995: 104).

As this shows, the division of spheres of interest did not break with the survival

preference. Still, I would argue that the division of spheres of interest probably to some extent

reshaped the survival preference:

With the spheres of interest in the secret protocol, the Soviet leaders likely realized that

they to some extent could act more offensively in their sphere, without necessarily compromising

the survival preference. This was not a break with the survival preference, since the spheres of

interest did not mean, that the Soviet leaders downgraded the importance of survival vis-à-vis

other preferences. However, it was a reshaping of the way that the Soviet leaders understood the

survival preference, because it limited the set of factors, which could threaten Soviet survival.

The secret protocol in this regard likely created a greater space for the secondary preference for


27

neighborhood imperialism, exactly because this local imperialism was no longer to the same

extent viewed as a threat to Soviet survival.

5.3.1.3 Conclusion

In this section, both continuity and change arguments were brought into play.

Considering the lack of primary sources, it is difficult to clearly say, which interpretations are

more correct. The decisive question here is though whether the Soviet leaders saw Germany as a

threat in August 1939. If yes, then it is difficult to consider the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty as

anything but a continuation of the most important Soviet preference of survival. If no, then the

Soviet Union likely had more offensive motivations with the Treaty. All in all, my view here is

that the Soviet Union actually did see Germany as a threat, which supports continuity. This view

is based on two indicators.

First of all I believe that the alliance negotiations with France and Great Britain were

sincere from the Soviet side (which the negotiations would not have been, if the Soviet Union

had seen Germany as a threat), and that the Soviet Union only left the negotiations, because they

did not trust, that France and Great Britain could secure Soviet security. This view is based on

the fact, that Germany ever since 1933 had been the Soviet Union’s biggest threat (Roberts,

1989: 43, 54, 57-58, 96). This created a path-dependency within Soviet culture, which nothing

indicates should have been broken in 1939. Furthermore, it is my view, that the Soviet demands

to France and Great Britain mostly were quite reasonable4 (Degras: 329, 330-331, 336, 340-341,

349-350). This again indicates that the Soviets were serious about these negotiations. If it then is

correct, that the alliance negotiations were serious and based on the Soviet survival preference,

then it at the same time seems unrealistic, that Soviet strategic culture with the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty suddenly should turn 180 degrees and replace the so far superior preference

(survival) with an until then inferior preference (Soviet power over West European countries)5.

4 With the exception of the demands of securing the Red Army free movement across Poland and Rumania on the

road to Germany (Degras: 361; Taylor, 1961: 256-258). 5 In relation to none of Howlett’s or Lantis’ change premises being present (Lantis: 25-26; Howlett & Glenn: 128).


28

Second of all it is my view – based on Molotov’s memoirs and the high international

attention to the Gdansk crisis – that the Soviet leaders in August 1939 realized, that Germany

soon would attack Poland, which would leave the Soviet Union in a very vulnerable position

(Resis: 9; Roberts, 1989: 151).

Henceforth, it is my overall view that the clear, primary goal with the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty was to secure the Soviet survival preference, which at the same time

expressed continuity in Soviet strategic culture.

5.3.2 Secondary preference: Neighborhood imperialism

Also in relation to neighborhood imperialism, you can argue in terms of continuity for

Soviet strategic culture. As earlier mentioned, neighborhood imperialism had two aspects: 1)

Expansion for the sake of expansion and 2) expansion to increase Soviet survival. Sometimes an

expansionist foreign policy contained both elements and other times only one of them. In this

regard, there are several indications that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty contained clear elements

of expansion for the sake of expansion – among other things because of the emotional

attachment of Soviet leaders to areas within traditional Russian spheres of interest. A first

indicator of this is seen by looking at the historical context.

Historical context

One indicator that one of the purposes with the Treaty was expansion for the sake of

expansion is found by looking at the spheres of interest in a historical context: 1) The Soviet

Union’s territory in Eastern Poland is almost identical with the Congress Poland, which was a

Russian satellite state from 1815 to 1915 and the area that Soviet Russia lost to Poland in the

Polish-Russian war of 1920-1921 (Martel: 168, 188). Furthermore, there were emotional

attachments, because large parts of the population in Eastern Poland were Ukrainians and

Belarusians, who was considered to belong to the Russian empire (Degras: 375). 2) The Baltic

countries have been a part of the Russian sphere of interest for centuries; were from the 18th

century to 1920 a part of the Russian empire; and only achieved their independence reluctantly


29

from the Russian side (Cohen: 74). 3) Bessarabia was from 1812 to 1918 a part of the Russian

empire. After this, it was conquered by Romania which created a lasting conflict between

Romania and the Soviet Union (Roberts, 1989: 42; Murphy, 2005: 37; Haslam, 1983: 114-115).

Finally, Finland was part of the Russian empire from 1809 to 1917, and as with the Baltic

countries only achieved independence reluctantly from the Russian side (Cohen: 75).

New possibilities with the division of spheres of interest

As the above section shows, there are obvious reasons to assume, that the Soviet leaders

in the 1920s and 1930s were emotionally attached to these areas. However, before the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty it was impossible to act on these sphere of interest preferences. This was the

case, because an active Soviet neighborhood imperialism would have risked interventions from

other European great powers, which would have compromised the Soviet survival preference.

This changed with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, where Germany allowed the Soviets free

hands in Finland, the Baltic countries, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia (Degras: 359-361).

Buffer states as security

Against the above argument you could claim, that the purpose with division of spheres of

interest was not neighborhood imperialism, but was founded in the survival preference.

Henceforth, with the secret protocol the Soviet Union acquired a belt of buffer states, which had

the following advantages: Moving the Soviet line of defense many hundreds of kilometers west

with increased chance of stopping the German Wehrmacht, which at the same time would deter

Hitler from a spontaneous attack on the Soviet Union. This interpretation was confirmed by

Molotov in his memoirs (Resis: 9).

This “buffer state argument” can account for the inclusion of Eastern Poland, Estonia,

Latvia, Bessarabia in the secret protocol and the at the same time annexed northern part of

Bukovina (Murphy, 2005: 29). Here you can ask though why Lithuania – which would have

been an ideal bridgehead for German troops moving into the Soviet Union – belonged to the

German sphere of interest and not the Soviet. In this regard however, Soviet discourse as well as


30

practice indicates, that this point of the secret protocol was one point where the Soviets did not

get what they wanted (Read & Fischer: 254-256, 343-344).

Because of the offensive element in the buffer state argument it is at the same time

logical to link the survival preference with the other interpretation of the neighborhood

imperialism: Neighborhood imperialism as expansion to increase the state’s chances of survival.

In this version, the neighborhood imperialism actually had a function as a mean to secure the

Soviet survival preference.

Conclusion

As shown above, the division of spheres of interest can both be interpreted as the

neighborhood imperialism preference understood as expansion for the sake of expansion as well

as the survival preference. There are undoubtedly elements of both things, but overall it seems

more likely, that the survival preference was the far more important Soviet motive: Considering

the Soviet Union’s critical security situation in August 1939, then it does not seem plausible, that

the Soviet leaders could have taken the luxury to think about preferences for neighborhood

imperialism (Roberts, 1989: 144). The Soviet leaders likely have had emotional attachments to

these areas, which has strengthened the incentive to include these areas in the Soviet sphere of

interest. This was probably particularly the case with Eastern Poland with its Belarusian and

Ukrainian minority groups (Degras: 375; Roberts, 2006: 37) as well as Bessarabia with its

troubled political past (Resis: 10). Still, these emotional attachments have likely only played a

secondary role considering the critical security situation of August 1939.

As an objection to this argument, the Soviet leaders at the signing of the treaty had no

clear plans how they would use their sphere of interest to strengthen Soviet chances of survival

(Roberts, 1995: 104; Roberts, 1999: 658; Watson, 2005: 171, 172; Degras: 360-361, 372;

Wegner: 45). However, even though the Soviets had no master plan, then the only realistic

interpretation still is, that the Soviet leaders at least had some general thoughts about, how they

would use their sphere to strengthen their politico-military position before the German attack,

that would come sooner or later (Roberts, 1995: 104).


31

Henceforth, the division of spheres of interest expressed continuity of the ranking of

preferences, because the primary preference (survival) was weighted higher than the secondary

preference (neighborhood imperialism understood as expansion for the sake of expansion).

Whether the distance between the two preferences was altered is difficult to determine, since

both preferences was assured with the secret protocol. An argument in favor of increased

distance is that the secret protocol cemented that survival was the superior Soviet preference. On

the other hand, the division of spheres of interest – as mentioned in section 5.3.1.2 – also

introduced a strong neighborhood imperialism. As this shows, arguments favor both preferences,

which is why my overall view is, that the distance between the preferences remained more or

less the same.

5.3.3 Secondary preference: Socialist revolutions in other countries

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty did not deal with the preference about socialist world

revolution. Because of this, the Treaty did not directly express neither continuity nor change

(Degras: 359-361). Still, the Treaty expressed indirect change, since it reinforced survival as the

primary preference in Soviet foreign policy and not international events – including world

revolution – outside Soviet territory with no clear relation to the survival preference. With this

emphasis on the survival preference in the Treaty, it is a reasonable assumption that the relative

distance between these two preferences increased. This is illustrated in the below figure.

Figur 5: Preference distance before and after the treaty

Preference distance before the treaty Preference distance after the treaty

Primary preference: Survival Primary preference: Survival

Secondary preference: World revolution

Secondary preference: World revolution


32

Considering that also neighborhood imperialism was strengthened with the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty, it is similarly likely that the balance between world revolution and

neighborhood imperialism may have shifted as well, in favor of neighborhood imperialism.

Henceforth, world revolution seems to have lost importance both to the survival preference and

the preference for neighborhood imperialism.

5.4 Conclusion

The findings of this section were that overall there was consistency between the

formative period and the period around the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, while at

the same time being minor cases of change. The results are as follows:

In terms of the Soviet Union’s view of international relations, then I found consistency

between the two periods: In both periods, the Soviet decision makers viewed international

relations as generally based on conflict, where other countries were exhibiting threats to the

Soviet Union.

In relation to the Soviet Union’s preferences there was also consistency through survival

being the primary preference in both periods. However, also change was happening, first of all in

that the Treaty’s focus on survival meant that the distance between this preference and world

revolution increased. Second of all, the Treaty focused to some extent on neighborhood

imperialism, which meant that this preference became more important vis-à-vis world revolution.

Third of all, the decision of spheres of interest meant that the Soviet Union could act offensively

in its sphere without it necessarily compromising the survival preference.

6 Does the preference ranking correspond to the state’s behavior?

Overall, the Soviet Union’s political and military behavior after the Molotov-Ribbentrop

Treaty seems at first hand to correspond well with the ranking of Soviet preferences. This


33

behavior consisted of mainly two elements: Soviet actions in their sphere of interest and a stop

for anti-fascist rhetoric6.

6.1 Soviet actions in their sphere of interest

After the treaty, the Soviet Union conducted a number of political-military actions, where

the Soviet Union through political pressure with military undertones attempted to secure Soviet

influence in states within their sphere of interest in the secret protocol. The actions were as

follows:

In September 1939 Eastern Poland was invaded (Murphy, 2005: 30); in September-

October 1939 the Baltic states were forced to enter into alliance treaties with the Soviet Union

which included the building of Soviet bases and the stationing of Soviet troops on Baltic territory

(Murphy, 2005: 38; Weinberg: 100-101); in November 1939 a war broke out between Finland

and the Soviet Union on Soviet initiative; June 26th

1940 the Soviet Union demanded – with

threats of military intervention – that Rumania handed over Bessarabia; and finally in 1940, the

Baltic states were incorporated in the Soviet Union (Weinberg: 102).

The buffer state argument or neighborhood imperialism?

For these actions to verify the preference ranking, the primary motive has to have been

survival and the desire for more security through a belt of buffer states. Whether this is the case

is difficult to determine, because the actions can also be interpreted as an attempt to attain the

secondary preference for neighborhood imperialism (understood as expansion for the sake of

expansion). All things considered, the buffer state argument seems to have more support

empirically (Roberts, 1989: 162; Roberts, 1995: 103; Murphy, 2005: 38).

6 Methodically you can object that stopping anti-fascist rhetoric is discourse (Johnston’s independent variable) and

not behavior (Johnston’s dependent variable). In this case I will however argue, that stopping this rhetoric meant a shift in policy, and that policy shifts – because of the active element in changing your policy line – is most appropriately interpreted as behavior.


34

First of all, the buffer state argument is supported in Soviet discourse through various

policy statements. An example of this was the following statement from Molotov to the Estonian

foreign minister in September 1939: We cannot allow that small states are used against the

Soviet Union. Neutral Baltic states – it is not safe enough. You can be certain, that the Soviet

Union (…) will make sure to provide for your security (Roberts, 1989: 163). A further indicator

is found in Stalin’s statement one month later in October 1939: Maybe the Germans will attack.

(…) We have to prepare for this in good time. Others, who were not prepared for it, paid a high

price (Roberts, 1995: 104, 167). Still, you need to be careful interpreting these statements too

literally, since they may also just have expressed the Soviet leaders’ attempt to secure their real

preference for neighborhood imperialism.

Second of all, the buffer state argument is supported by the speed with which these

actions happened following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. This could indicate a

Soviet fear for a soon to come German attack and the desire to as quickly as possible secure a

number of buffer states between Germany and the Soviet Union (Degras: 359-361, 374, 380-381,

403, 453-456, 458-460).

Third of all, the buffer state argument is supported in the path dependency argument,

where the Soviet leaders because of their strategic culture automatically tended to focus more on

survival than neighborhood imperialism. At the same time as neither of Lantis’ or Howlett’s

change conditions were present – which could have indicated that the Soviet leaders focused on

other things than survival – but that the situation because of its large and imminent German

threat actually favored a focus on security and survival, then the most likely thing is that the

Soviet leaders acted based on the survival preference and not the neighborhood imperialism

preference (Lantis: 25-26; Howlett & Glenn: 128). This path dependency argument seems to be

the strongest support for the buffer state argument.

Even though the data is by no means uniform, then there are all things considered more

speaking in favor of these actions being carried out as part of a buffer state rationale. Still,

neighborhood imperialism likely has played some – albeit secondary – role in certain actions and

especially in relation to Poland and Bessarabia (Degras: 375; Resis: 10).


35

The action against Finland

An objection to the continuity argument is the action against Finland. Finland was not a

buffer state, which could indicate more offensive and expansionist elements in the Soviet

behavior. Against this you can however argue, that the Soviet Union with its Finish mission only

wanted to increase the security of its second most important city Leningrad, which was only 30

kilometers from the Finish border (Roberts, 1989: 164). Henceforth, according to Geoffrey

Roberts and supported in Molotov’s memoirs, the Soviet leaders had strictly defensive reasons

for their Finish mission where the goal never was to take all of Finland (Roberts, 2006: 47-48;

Roberts, 1989: 164-165; Resis: 9-10). Far from all historians agree with Roberts, but at the same

time it seems unlikely that the Soviet leaders would be willing to risk their preference for

survival over Finland.

6.2 Stopping anti-fascist rhetoric

Soon after the signing of the Treaty, the Soviet Union significantly watered down the

anti-fascism in their official statements (Degras: 367-368). Similarly, on Stalin’s instructions to

Dimitrov September 7 1939, the Comintern had to give up its Popular Front policy and avoid

blatant anti-fascist rhetoric (Dimitrov: 115, 116; McDermott & Agnew: 193-194; Dallin &

Firsov, 2000: 148). The most likely interpretation is here, that the Soviet Union took these policy

shifts, because they did not want to provoke Germany, which could compromise the Soviet wish

to postpone the conflict with Germany for as long as possible. As in the previous section, this

supports that the Soviet Union was acting based on their survival preference, which again

confirms the ranking of preferences.

On another note, this shift in means – from a strong anti-fascism to a more

accommodating foreign policy towards fascist states – probably constituted the largest continuity

break in Soviet strategic culture as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty.


36

6.3 Conclusion

In this section we found consistency between Soviet strategic culture in the period around

the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty7 and the Soviet Union’s political-military

behavior. Henceforth, as expected, the Soviet behavior mainly reflected attempts to 1) secure the

primary preference for survival; 2) partially secure the secondary preference for neighborhood

imperialism and 3) the Soviet’s lack of focus on securing the secondary preference about world

revolution.

7 Conclusion

Theory and method

The theory and method for this paper has been based on Johnston’s models, which

overall have proven to be reasonable and useful models for this case. A theoretical advantage

with this has been, that Johnston provides this paper with clear, limited and relevant theoretical

parameters, which gave the paper a good, theoretical structure.

A methodological advantage of Johnston was, that the Soviet Union’s political-military

behavior was an excellent method to test, whether the observed continuity or change was a valid

finding or not. This distinction between strategic culture and behavior was particularly useful in

my case, since the Soviet Union’s political-military actions occurred after the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Treaty’s signing: In other words, a clear distinction in time between the independent

variable (the strategic culture) and the dependent variable (behavior). Because of this, I did not

have problems with the political-military actions’ constitutive importance for the strategic

culture, since the focus of this paper was the Soviet strategic culture during the negotiations and

signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty in August 1939.

The biggest shortcoming of using Johnston was theoretical. The problem here of course

is, that the clearly distinguished parameters did not correspond to the real world, where the

7 A primary focus on survival; a partial focus on neighborhood imperialism and a lack of focus on world revolution.


37

border areas between the Soviet preferences was much more muddy, as it indeed will be in

nearly all questions about culture.

Conclusions of the paper

If we look at what the paper actually was inquiring about, then the paper tried to find the

answer to the following question: Was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty an expression of

continuity or change in Soviet strategic culture? The overall answer to this question is, that the

Treaty in far the most cases expressed continuity in Soviet strategic culture. Still, in some areas,

the Treaty carried with it change.

The above question was answered by comparing Soviet strategic culture in a formative

period (October 1917 to early August 1939) and Soviet strategic culture in the period around the

signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. This comparison happened through two parameters:

1) The Soviet strategic culture’s view of international relations. 2) The Soviet strategic culture’s

preferences. Finally, the paper tested, whether the Soviet preferences corresponded to its

political-military behavior.

In terms of the Soviet strategic culture’s view of international relations, then the Treaty

mostly was an expression of continuity: Both before and after the signing of the treaty did the

Soviet leaders view international relations as based on conflicts and where each state was

maximizing its own interests, entailing large risks of international conflict. In relation to this, the

Soviet leaders before and during the period of signing the Treaty saw countries as threats rather

than as somebody you could cooperate with. Furthermore, before and during the period of

signing the treaty, the Soviet leaders saw other countries as having a hostile view of the Soviet

Union, with Germany and Japan being the biggest and most relevant threats and with a Great

Britain wanting to divert German aggression to the east towards the Soviet Union.

In terms of the Soviet culture’s strategic preferences, then the image is a bit muddier,

even though the overall impression is still one of continuity. Considering the very close

correlation between these two parameters, the continuity of the Soviet leaders’ preferences are


38

logical considering the continuity in the way, that the Soviet leaders understood international

relations.

The most important expression of continuity here is, that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty

mainly was signed to secure the primary Soviet preference for survival. In this matter, the non-

aggression treaty was signed in order to give the Soviet Union a temporary breather, where they

could re-build the Red Army before the German attack that the Soviet leaders thought would

come sooner or later. Similarly, the division of spheres of interest in the secret protocol was

mainly about survival, where the Soviet Union attained a number of buffer states, that in some

cases pushed the Soviet line of defense all the way up to 400 kilometers westward (Murphy,

2005: 43).

The change, which the Treaty did entail for the preferences, was that the focus on

survival and partly also on neighborhood imperialism became more important vis-à-vis the

preference for world revolution. Similarly, the Treaty probably meant, that the Soviet leaders

became more willing to act offensively in their sphere of interest, without these actions

necessarily compromising the primary preference for survival. Finally, the treaty resulted in a

stop of the anti-fascist policy line and rhetoric, which until then had been one of the Soviet

Union’s most important means to assure its survival.

All in all, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, because of its focus on survival, carried with it

mainly continuity. This maintained the then current ranking of the Soviet strategic preferences,

while cementing that the realistic paradigm in Soviet strategic culture was more important than

the revolutionary paradigm. These results were confirmed in the analysis of the Soviet Union’s

political-military behavior in the period following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty.

Why was there more continuity than change?

The reason why the Treaty mainly brought continuity was, that none of the conditions for

radical change were present. Lantis in this matter emphasized the importance of dramatic events

bringing into question the basic assumptions of a country’s strategic culture. The critical

situation, that the Soviet Union was in during August 1939, was indeed highly dramatic.


39

However, this situation did not bring into dispute the Soviet primary preference – survival – but

only confirmed it.

Similarly – following Lantis – in the cases where Soviet preference did come into conflict

with each other, then the primary survival preference would win, which maintained the basic

structure of the ranking (Lantis: 25-26). Finally, there were none of those norm entrepreneurs,

crew replacements or generational changes, which Howlett emphasize the importance of: As in

the 1920s and 1930s, the central person in Soviet foreign policy and the central carrier of Soviet

strategic culture was Stalin, who in August 1939 was standing in an even stronger position with

the always loyal Molotov at his side (Howlett & Glenn: 128; Resis: 69, 77; Lantis: 18).

Know your opponent’s strategic culture!

Winston Churchill wrote in 1954 that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty “broke upon the

world like an explosion” (Roberts, 1995: 93, 165). The key lesson of this story however is, that

the world’s governments instead of being shocked should have seen the coming of the Treaty or

at least should have counted in the Treaty as a very likely outcome, considering the Soviet

strategic culture’s focus on security and survival.

This at the same time emphasizes the importance of your state’s leaders’ ability to

analyze other countries’ strategic culture correctly, because only by doing that will your leaders

maximize their chances of attaining your country’s strategic preferences. On the other hand, if

your state’s leaders consistently misinterpret other countries’ strategic culture, it can result in

disastrous consequences with repercussions very far away from your country’s strategic

preferences. This was seen with the Munich agreement in September 1938, where Chamberlain

and Daladier thought, that they could appease Hitler (Evans, 2006: 674; Taylor: 157, 185-186).

And this was seen a little less than a year later, when especially the British leadership hoped, that

the Soviet Union would accept a military alliance, which was not really a military alliance, and

where nobody believed, that the Soviet Union would go as far as to sign a deal with Germany to

obtain Soviet security (Martel: 182). With these fundamental misinterpretations by two European

great powers’ strategic culture, Great Britain and France – in complete opposition to their own


40

strategic preferences – had a big role to play in sending the world towards the Second World

War (Bell: 138).

8 References

Allison, Graham T. (2003): Conceptual models for the Cuban missile crisis. Brough in

‘International relations theory. Realism, Pluralism, Globalism’, Macmillan Publishing Company,

second edition 1993, edited by Viotti, P.R. and Kauppi, Mark V.

Bell, P.M.H. (1997): The origins of the Second World War in Europe. Addison Wesley Longman

Inc. Second edition.

Cohen, Ariel (1996): Russian imperialism: Development and crisis. Praeger Publishers. 1st

edition.

Dallin, Alexander and Firsov, F.I. (2000): Dimitrov and Stalin 1934-1943. Letters from the

Soviet Archives. Yale University Press, 1st edtion.

Degras, Jane (1953): Soviet documents on foreign policy. Volume III. 1933-1941. Oxford

University Press. 1st edition.

Dimitrov, Giorgi (2003): Diary of Giorgi Dimitrov 1933-1943. Yale University Press. 1st edition.

Ermarth, Fritz W. (2006): Russia’s strategic culture: Paste, present, and… In transition?

Prepared for ‘Defense threat reduction agency, Advanced systems and concepts office’.

Evans, Richard J. (2006): The Third Reich in power. How the Nazis won over the Hearts and

Minds of a Nation. The Penguin Group. Second edition.

George, Alexander L. (1969): The “Operational code”: A neglected approach to the study of

political leaders and decision making. Brought in ‘International studies quarterly’, Vol. 13,

number 2, June 1969.


41

Haslam, Jonathan (1983): Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-1933. The impact of depression.

Macmillan Press Ltd. 1st edition.

Hanula, Peter (2006): Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – political map of central Europe in 1939-1940.

Gathered from www.wikipedia.org, June 10 2008.

Heikka, Henrikki and Neumann, Iver B. (2005): Grand strategy, strategic culture, practice: The

social roots of Nordic defense. Brought in ‘Cooperation and conflict’, volume 40, number 1,

March 2005.

Hitler, Adolf (1926): Mein Kampf. Re-published 1970 by Askild & Kaernekull Publishers AB.

Howlett, Darryl and John, Glenn (2005): Epilogue: Nordic strategic culture. Brought in

‘Cooperation and conflict’, volume 40, number 1, March 2005.

Jackson, Robert and Sorenson, Georg (2007): Introduction to International Relations: Theories

and approaches. Oxford University Press. Third edition.

Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995): Thinking about strategic culture. Brought in ‘International

security’, vol. 19, no. 4, spring 1995, pagr 32-64.

Keohane, Robert O. (1989): Neoliberal institutionalism: A perspective on world politics. Boulder

Westview Press, 1st edition.

Kershaw, Ian (1987): The Hitler Myth: Image and reality in the Third Reich. Oxford University

Press, 1st edition.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. (2006): Strategic culture and threat assessment. Article presented at ‘Joint

threat anticipation center workshop II’, University of Chicago, April 4 2006.

Leites, Nathan (1953): A study of Bolshevism. The RAND Corporation, 1st edition.

Lettes, Nathan (1951): The operational code of the Politbureau. The RAND Corporation, 1st

edition.

Litvinov, Maxim (1939): Against aggression: The foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The

Camelot Press Ltd. 1st edition.

http://www.wikipedia.org/


42

Martel, Gordon (1987): The origins of the Second World War reconsidered. The A.J.P. Taylor

debate after twenty five years. Allen & Unwil Ltd. Third edition.

McDermott, Kevin & Jeremy, Agnew (1996): The Comintern. A history of international

communism from Lenin to Stalin. Macmillan Press Ltd. 1st edition.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): The tragedy of the great power politics. W.W. Norton & Company.

1st edition.

Morozova, Irina Y. (2002): The Comintern and revolution in Mongolia. The White Horse Press.

1st edition.

Murphy, David E. (2005): What Stalin knew. The enigma of Barbarossa. Yale University Press.

1st edition.

Murphy, George G.S. (1966): Soviet Mongolia. A study of the oldest political satellite.

University of California Press. 1st edition.

Radzinsky, Edvard (1997): Stalin. First Anchor Books. 1st edition.

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby (2005): What’s the use of it? Danish strategic culture and the utility

of armed forces. Brought in ‘Cooperation and conflict’. Volume 40, number 1, March 2005.

Resis, Albert (1991): Molotov remembers. Inside Kremlin politic. Conversations with Felix

Chuev. Terra Publishing Center. 1st edition.

Read, Anthony & Fischer, David (1988): The deadly embrace. Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet

Pact 1939-1941. Penguin Group. 1st edition.

Roberts, Geoffrey (1999): Ideology, calculation and improvisation: Spheres of influence and

Soviet foreign policy 1939-1945. Brought in ‘Review of international studies’, vol. 25, no. 4,

October 1999, page 655-673.

Roberts, Geoffrey (1989): Stalin’s pact with Hitler. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 1st edition.

Roberts, Geoffrey (2006): Stalin’s wars. From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953. Yale

University Press, 1st edition.


43

Roberts, Geoffrey (1992): The fall of Litvinov: A revisionist view. Brought in ‘Journal of

contemporary history’, vol. 27, no. 4, October 1992, page 639-657.

Roberts, Geoffrey (1995): The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War. Russo-

German relations and the road to war, 1933-1941. Macmillan Press Ltd. 1st edition.

Szamuely, Tibor (1974): The Russian tradition. Morrison and Gibb Ltd. 1st edition.

Taylor, A.J.P. (1961): The origins of the Second World War. Hamish Hamilton Ltd. 1st edition.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of international politics. Random House, 1st edition.

Watson, Derek (2005): Molotov. A biography. Palgrave Macmillan, 1st edition.

Wegner, Bernd (1997): From peace to war. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939-1941.

Berghahn Books, 1st edition.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. (2005): Visions of victory. The hopes of eight world war II leaders.

Cambridge University Press. 1st edition.

Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power

politics. Brought in ‘International organization’, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, World Peace Foundation &

MIT / The IO Foundation & MIT.

Wren, Melvin C. (1958): The course of Russian history. The Macmillan Company, 1st edition.

Documents

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; Continuity or change