Research Article Mobile Device Based Dynamic Key ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/js/2015/827546.pdfResearch Article Mobile Device Based Dynamic Key Management Protocols for Wireless

Research ArticleMobile Device Based Dynamic Key Management Protocols forWireless Sensor Networks

Chin-Ling Chen1 Chih-Cheng Chen2 and De-Kui Li3

1Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering Chaoyang University of Technology Taichung 41349 Taiwan2Department of Health Policy and Management Chung Shan Medical University Taichung 40201 Taiwan3Department of Information Management Liaocheng University Liaocheng Shandong 252000 China

Correspondence should be addressed to De-Kui Li jerryinkoreagmailcom

Received 25 March 2015 Revised 28 June 2015 Accepted 6 July 2015

Academic Editor James J Park

Copyright copy 2015 Chin-Ling Chen et alThis is an open access article distributed under theCreativeCommonsAttributionLicensewhich permits unrestricted use distribution and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited

In recent years wireless sensor network (WSN) applications have tended to transmit data hop by hop from sensor nodes throughcluster nodes to the base station As a result users must collect data from the base station This study considers two differentapplications hop by hop transmission of data from cluster nodes to the base station and the direct access to cluster nodes databy mobile users via mobile devices Due to the hardware limitations of WSNs some low-cost operations such as symmetriccryptographic algorithms and hash functions are used to implement a dynamic key management The session key can be updatedto prevent threats of attack from each communication With these methods the data gathered in wireless sensor networks can bemore securely communicatedMoreover the proposed scheme is analyzed and compared with related schemes In addition an NS2simulation is developed in which the experimental results show that the designed communication protocol is workable

1 Introduction

In recent years wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have beenused to extensivelymonitor physical environments emergingas an important component in the fusion of wireless net-works These tiny sensors make use of wireless communica-tion to process data and require security protocols for safetyduring communication The sensor however has limitedscope as a result of its power supply and the distance ofthe wireless communication Due to this limited power anddelivery distance multihop methods are used to transmitdata Thus the sensor can monitor the environment andprocess the data collected from the networks transmitting itto cluster nodes or a base station Due to the use of wirelesscommunication latent attacks on data frequently occurduring transmission

WSNs [1 2] have certain characteristics that make themadaptable to various areas including their small size andlow costs The advantage of these sensors is that their smallsize with smaller memory size makes them portable butlimits their capabilities in high cost operations Due to theseproperties this study proposes a combination of low-cost

operation and user authentication to enhance security inWSN communication

A key management procedure is an essential constituentof network security Symmetric key systems require the keysto be kept out of reach of potential attackers Because ofthe resource constraints and the lack of the infrastructuresupport key distribution and management are much moredifficult in WSNs than in their traditional wired and wirelesscounterparts [3]

Public key-based asymmetric cryptographic algorithms[4] are not suitable for sensor networks This is why newsecurity protocols or mechanisms need to be proposed tomeet the new emerging security requirements for WSNsThe symmetric key approach is an appropriate cryptographyfor wireless sensors due to its low energy consumptionand simple hardware requirements but the distribution ofsymmetric keys into sensor nodes presents a significantchallenge [5] Many researchers [6ndash11] have focused on thisarea recently and proposed several key management schemesto establish the session key between sensor nodes Howeverthese schemes [6ndash11] do not support mobile users directlyaccessing cluster node data via mobile device For example

Hindawi Publishing CorporationJournal of SensorsVolume 2015 Article ID 827546 10 pageshttpdxdoiorg1011552015827546

2 Journal of Sensors

the administrators of farms or nuclear power plants can usemobile devices to gain access to the monitor data at any timefrom any place rather than logging into the monitor systemMoreover as sensor networks have energy and computationalconstraints it is therefore necessary to maintain a balancedsecurity level with respect to those constraints

Since sensor networks can be used in a variety ofapplications such as military sensing and tracking environ-mental monitoring patient monitoring and tracking smartenvironments and disastermanagement this study envisagesmany applications in which people could navigate throughsensor networks using common omnipresent devices (suchas a mobile phone or a personal digital assistant) at any timeand from anywhere Since a mobile device is more portableand personal than a personal computer it is more convenientfor operating certain applications

Some applications [12ndash14] have proposed novel solutionsto remote user authentication by using smart cards Thesmart card is a processor that can compute some low-costoperations such as one-way hash function and exclusion-ORoperation In the proposed system each user is issued witha smart card for login and authentication These lightweightoperations are similar to the processors of sensor nodes inWSNs In addition there have been authentication schemesbased on the ElGamal cryptosystem [15 16] that belong to apublic key cryptosystemOwing to their high operation coststhese schemes are not suitable for WSNs

Password-based authentication is the most widely usedmethod for remote user authentication Existing schemes canbe categorized into two types the weak password approachand the strong password approach The weak passwordapproach is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem Its advan-tage lies in the fact that it does not need a user ID-passwordtable to verify the validity of the user login Unfortunatelythe weak password approach places a heavy computationalload on the system and remote sensor nodes lack the capacityfor rendering the system applicable to WSNs The strongpassword approach is based on one-way hash function andexclusive-OR (XOR) operations The one-way hash functionℎ( ) has the following properties (1) ℎ(119909) is relatively easy tocompute for any given 119909 making both hardware and softwareimplementation practical (2) For any given value 119910 it iscomputationally infeasible to find 119909 such that ℎ(119909) = 119910 (3)For any given block 119909 it is computationally infeasible to find119910 = 119909with ℎ(119910) = ℎ(119909)This is sometimes referred to as weakcollision resistance Das et al [17] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme in 2004 It requiresmuch less computation and needs only simple operations Forthis reason this scheme has certain advantages when appliedto a WSN environment

In 2002 El-Fishway and Tadros [18] proposed a userauthentication scheme oriented for mobile users using theGlobal System for Mobile Communication (GSM) Theadvantage of usingGSM is that there is no central certificationauthority but the scheme requires high computation costs bythe public key system Thus a user authentication schemeof the public key system is unsuitable for WSNs In 2010Chen [19] proposed a mobile DRM mechanism based onPKI (Public Key Infrastructure) He also emphasizes that

the mobile device should be operated in a lightweightenvironment

In this paper we use some lightweight operations (such assymmetric encryptiondecryption hash function) to imple-ment a dynamic key management scheme The proposedscheme also supports a direct accessing of cluster node databy a user via mobile device at anytime from anywhere andprovides more security analysis refer to related works Theorganization of the remainder of the paper is as follows InSection 2 the proposed protocol is presented In Section 3several familiar attacks and the performance of the proposedscheme are analyzed Comparison is also made with otherrelated schemes in Section 4 Finally Section 5 offers conclu-sions

2 The Proposed Scheme

21 Notations The following is the introduction to thenotations that will be used in our scheme

ℎ( ) is a one-way hash functionCert119896 is the 119896th mobile userrsquos digital certificateIDmob119896 is the identity of the 119896th mobile userID119888119894 is the identity of the 119894th cluster nodeID119861 is the identity of the base stationRND is a random number generated by mobile userPW is the mobile userrsquos password

119870119888119894(119895) is the 119895th updated session keys of the 119894th cluster

node where119870119888119894(119895)

= ℎ(119870119888119894(119895minus1)

119870119888119894(119895minus2)

) with119870119888119894(0)

=

119886 119870119888119894(1)

= 119887 and 119886 and 119887 are the initial randomnumbers119872req is request message issued by mobile user119872119888 is the latest information received from the clusternode119872upd-key is the message of the updated key119864(msg 119870) is the symmetric encryption of the infras-tructure that makes use of key 119870 to encrypt msg119863(119862119870) is the symmetric decryption of the infras-tructure that makes use of key 119870 to decrypt theciphertext 119862

119883= 119884 compares whether 119883 is equal to 119884 or not

22 Environmental Conditions

(1) As a general rule hundreds or even thousands of sen-sor nodes are deployed in aWSN In this paper clustermanagement is used to transmit data Additionallythe deployed sensor nodes are divided into differentregions so that each sensor node can transmit data inthe effective range [9]

(2) In each of the regions a sensor node is chosenautomatically as a cluster node [20ndash22] These relatedalgorithms are similar to those used by Park and

Journal of Sensors 3

Base station

Mobile user

Sensor node

Cluster node

Figure 1 Transmission paths of the sensor network

Corson [23] Perkins and Royer [24] and Johnsonand Maltz [25] Once the cluster node has receiveda certain number of packets the data is transmittedto the base station The user can also use a mobiledevice to access data from the cluster node To achievebetter performance and security a heterogeneoussensor network model consisting of a small numberof powerful high-end sensors (H-sensors) (eg PDAsor cellular phones) and a large number of low-endsensors (L-sensors) (eg the small MICA2 sensorsmanufactured by Crossbow Technology) are adopted[26] L-sensors are ordinary sensor nodeswith limitedcomputation communication energy supply andstorage capability The transmission paths of thesensor network are shown in Figure 1 Additionallyin a heterogeneous sensor network (HSN) [27 28]more types of different nodes with different levelsof battery energy and functionality are employed Itmay be argued that by using a few designated nodeswith complex hardware extra battery energy andadditional functionalities while keeping the rest ofthe nodes simple the total cost of hardware in thenetwork can be minimized to offer a longer life span

(3) Once each of the cluster nodes is dispatched fromthe factory it is preset according to the parameters 119887119894and 119887119894minus1 A new key is generated by a one-way hashfunction (eg 119870119888119894 = ℎ(119887119894 119887119894minus1)) to communicate withthe base station

(4) When the cluster node has received a certain numberof packets the data is arranged encrypted andtransmitted to the backend base station When thebase station receives the packet from the clusternode it will update the cluster nodersquos key successfullydecrypting the ciphertext to the next communication

(5) Since the size of the sensor node is limited itsmemorycapacity is also limited The memory capacity of eachsensor node is 512 K bytes When the security of theWSN is enhanced the memory capacity of sensornodes should also be taken into account

(6) The CPU is fixed in the sensor node to handle andcalculate the data This limited size and power supplyonly allowed for a low-end CPU model such as theStrongARM [29] from Intel and ATmega [30] fromAtmel which are commonly used

23 Registration Phase In order to allow mobile users todirectly communicate with cluster nodes at anytime fromanywhere in the registration phase mobile users registerwith a base station which will send a certificate to the mobileusers After registering the mobile users can communicatedirectly with the cluster node

The cluster node will receive the authenticated data fromthe base station if a mobile user chooses to receive data Sincethe cluster nodes are predeployed in advance it is assumedthat the communication channel is insecure between thecluster node and the base station in the registration phaseUnlike the communication between the cluster node and thebase station the communication channel is secure betweenthe mobile user and the base station in the registration phaseThe proposed registration phase is divided into the followingsteps The scenarios are shown in Figure 2

(1) Mobile user rarr base station (119872req IDmob119896 PWRND)

When a mobile user wants to communicate with the clusternode it must obtain a digital certificate Cert119896 from the basestation in advance The mobile user makes a request message119872req and chooses a password PW and random number RNDThe mobile user transmits (119872req IDmob119896PWRND) to thebase station via the secure channel

(2) Base station rarr mobile user (Cert119896 ID119888119894 119870119888119894(119895)

)

Base station rarr cluster node 119862clu

Once the base station receives the above request messagefrom the mobile user the base station issues a certificationCert119895 to determine the correct cluster node ID119888119894 allowing themobile user to communicate and compute

119860 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (1)

The base station stores (IDmob119896 ID119888119894 119870119888119894(119895)

119860) in its databaseThe messages (Cert119896 ID119888119894 119870119888119894

(119895)) are transmitted to the

mobile user At that moment the base station uses 119870119888119894(119895)

to encrypt RND as a complete packet 119862clu in the followingmanner

119862clu = 119864 ((IDmob119895RND) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (2)

Then the 119862clu is transmitted to the cluster node

(3) Upon receiving the packet 119862clu the cluster node usesthe session key 119870119888119894

(119895) to decrypt 119862clu and obtainIDmob119895 and the random number RND

(IDmob119895RND) = 119863 (119862clu 119870119888119894(119895)

) (3)


Base station Cluster nodeMobile user

(1) Selecting (IDmobk PW RND)(Mreq IDmobk PW RND)

(21) A = h(IDmobk PWRND)

(22) Stores (IDmobj IDci A)

Cclu

(23) Cclu = E((IDmobk RND) Kci

(j)

Kci

(j)

)

Kci

(j))(3) (IDmobk RND) = D(Cclu

(Certk IDci K(j)

ci)

Figure 2 The registration phase protocol

Base station Cluster node

(11) Kci

(j)= h(a b)

(12) CBS = E(Mc Kci

(j))

(CBS IDcj)

(21) Mc = D(CBS Kci

(j))

(22) C1 = E(Mfinish Kci

(j)) C1

(31) Mfinish = D(C1 Kci

(j))

Kci

(j))(32) Kci

(j+1)= h(Kci

(jminus1)

(33) C2 = E(Mupd-key Kci

(j+1))

(41) Mupd-key = D(C2 Kci

(j+1))

(42) Kci

(j+2)= h(Kci

(j) Kci

(j+1))

(C2 IDcj)

Figure 3 The communication phase protocol between the basestation and the cluster node

24 The Communication Phase Protocol between Base Sta-tion and Cluster Node This study proposes a dynamic keymanagement mechanism with two keys preset in each sensornode cluster node and a new key for the next roundgenerated by the previous two keys

The new session key is updated after each round betweenthe base station and the cluster node The cluster nodesperiodically respond to the collected data sent to the basestation The proposed protocol is divided into the followingfour steps as shown in Figure 3

(1) Cluster noderarr base station (119862BS ID119888119895)

The cluster node uses the preset parameters 119886 and 119887 togenerate a session key

119870119888119894(119895)

= ℎ (119886 119887) (4)

When the deployed cluster node returns the collected infor-mation 119872119888 the cluster node will transmit the information tothe base station periodically The cluster node uses 119870119888119894

(119895) toencrypt 119872119888 as a complete packet 119862BS

119862BS = 119864 (119872119888 119870119888119894(119895)

) (5)

Together with the code ID119888119894 of the cluster node (119862BS ID119888119895) istransmitted to the base station

(2) Base station rarr cluster node 1198621

When the base station receives the packet from the clusternode it confirms the code ID119888119895 of the cluster node and seeksthe session key 119870119888119894

(119895) of that cluster node in the database119870119888119894(119895) is used to decrypt 119872119862 as follows

119872119862 = 119863(119862BS 119870119888119894(119895)

) (6)

Therefore the base station can receive the collected data 119872119862from the cluster node It can then access this information andsend the finished message 119872finish to the cluster node At thatmoment the base station uses 119870119888119894

(119895) to encrypt 119872finish Theencrypted data 1198621 will be returned to the cluster node

1198621 = 119864 (119872finish 119870119888119894(119895)

) (7)

(3) Cluster node rarr base station (1198622 ID119888119894)

When the cluster node receives the returned data from thebase station it uses the session key 119870119888119894

(119895) to decrypt 1198621 asfollows

119872finish = 119863(1198621 119870119888119894(119895)

) (8)

The cluster node updates the session key and (119870119888119894(119895minus1) and

119870119888119894(119895)) are used to generate a new session key 119870119888119894

(119895+1)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895minus1)

119870119888119894(119895)

) (9)

At that moment the cluster node uses 119870119888119894(119895+1) to encrypt the

updated key message 119872upd-key as a complete packet

1198622 = 119864 (119872upd-key 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (10)

and sends (1198622 ID119888119894) to the base station

(4) The base station receives the packet from the clusternode and uses 119870119888119894

(119895+1) to decrypt and obtain themessage 119872upd-key as follows

119872upd-key = 119863(1198622 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (11)


Mobile user Base stationCluster node

(11) Creq = E((PW IDmobk IDci) Kci

(j))

(Creq IDmobk)

(21) (PW IDmobk IDci) = D(Creq Kci

(j))

(22) A998400= h(IDmobk PW RND)

(23) Cauth = E((A998400 IDmobk) Kci

(j))

(Cauth IDci)

(31) (A998400 IDmobk) = D(Cauth Kci

(j))

Kci

(j))(33) Cack = E((IDmobk ack)

(Cack IDB)

(41) (IDmobk ack) = D(Cack Kci

(j))

(j))(42) Cresp = E((Mc IDci) Kci

(Cresp IDci)

(5) (Mc IDci) = D(Cresp Kci

(j))

(61) B = h(IDmobk PW)

(62) C998400

user = E((IDmobk Certk) B)

(C998400

user IDmobk)

(71) (IDmobk Certk) = D((C998400

user B))

(72) Verify Certj(73) Cnewkey = E(K

998400

ci B)

(8) K998400

ci= D(Cnewkey B)

(32) Verify

(Cnewkey IDB)

A998400

A=

Figure 4 The communication phase protocol between the mobile user the cluster node and the base station

For the same reason the base stationwill use the119870119888119894(119895)

and 119870119888119894(119895+1) to update the new session key 119870119888119894

(119895+2) forthe next transaction

119870119888119894(119895+2)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (12)

25 Communication Phase Protocol between Mobile UserCluster Node and Base Station The mobile user can alsoobtain the data from the cluster node through the commu-nication phase When the cluster node receives the requestit authenticates the identity of the mobile user If the mobileuser is authenticated as legal the cluster node will transmitthe collected data to the mobile user When the mobile userreceives the data from a cluster node it can use the sessionkey of the cluster node to decrypt it If the key is overdue theuser should communicate with the base station to update thesession key and decrypt the received dataThese scenarios areshown in Figure 4

(1) Mobile user rarr cluster node (119862req IDmob119895)

When the mobile user wants to obtain data from the clusternode it uses the last transaction session key with the clusternode 119870119888119894

(119895) to encrypt password PW IDmob119896 and ID119888119894

119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (13)

The mobile user transmits (119862req IDmob119896) to the clusternode

(2) Cluster node rarr base station (119862auth ID119888119894)

The cluster node receives the packet from the 119896th mobile userand uses the last transaction session key with themobile user119870119888119894(119895) to decrypt and obtain the complete message

(PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862req 119870119888119894(119895)

) (14)

The cluster node computes 1198601015840 as follows

1198601015840= ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (15)

It then uses the key 119870119888119894(119895) to encrypt 1198601015840 as follows

119862auth = 119864 ((1198601015840 IDmob119896) 119870119888119894

(119895)) (16)

It then transmits the packet (119862auth ID119888119894) to the base station

(3) Base station rarr cluster node (119862ack ID119861)

The base station receives the packet (119862auth ID119888119894) from thecluster node which uses the key 119870119888119894

(119895) to decrypt the packet119862auth as follows

(1198601015840 IDmob119896) = 119863 (119862auth 119870119888119894

(119895)) (17)


The base station verifies whether or not IDmob119896 exists in thedatabase If it can be found the base station will verify

119860= 1198601015840 (18)

If the equality is not held the base station abandons thepacket otherwise the base station uses 119870119888119894

(119895) to encrypt theacknowledgement message ack as a packet 119862ack

119862ack = 119864 ((IDmob119895 ack) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (19)

and (119862ack ID119861) is then transmitted to the cluster node

(4) Cluster node rarr mobile user (119862resp ID119888119894)

When the cluster node receives the packet (119862ack ID119861) ituses the session key 119870119888119894

(119895) to decrypt the acknowledgementmessage ack to confirm whether or not the mobile user hasregistered with the base station

(IDmob119895 ack) = 119863 (119862ack 119870119888119894(119895)

) (20)

The cluster node then makes use of 119870119888119894(119895) to encrypt the

collected information119872119862 received from the sensor node andthe identification code ID119888119894 as follows

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (21)

Together with ID119888119894 (119862resp ID119888119894) is transmitted and sent to themobile user as a complete packet

(5) After the base station receives the packet (119862resp ID119888119894)it uses the session key 119870119888119894 to decrypt and obtain themessage 119872119862

(119872119862 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862resp 119870119888119894(119895)

) (22)

(6) Mobile user rarr base station (1198621015840user IDmob119896)

Since the base station and the cluster node communicateperiodically the cluster nodersquos session key 119870119888119894

(119895) is updatedfor each transaction Thus the mobile userrsquos key is likelyto be overdue and the key cannot decrypt 119862resp smoothlyThis means that the key should be updated The mobile usercomputes 119861 as follows

119861 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PW) (23)

Later 119861 is used to encrypt the IDmob119896 and Cert119896 as a completepacket 1198621015840user which is generated as follows

1198621015840

user = 119864 ((IDmob119896Cert119896) 119861) (24)

and (1198621015840user IDmob119896) is then transmitted to the base station

(7) Base stationrarr mobile user (119862newkey ID119861)

After receiving the message 1198621015840

user the base station uses 119861 todecrypt and obtain the message (IDmob119896 Cert119896) as follows

(IDmob119896Cert119896) = 119863 (1198621015840

user 119861) (25)

The base station uses its public key to verify the digitalcertificate Cert119896 and finds the current cluster nodersquos sessionkey 119870

1015840

119888119894 The base station uses 119861 to encrypt 1198701015840

119888119894

119862newkey = 119864 (1198701015840

119888119894 119861) (26)

Along with the codes ID119861 it is transmitted to the mobile useras a complete packet (119862newkey ID119861)

(8) Once the mobile user receives the packet from thebase station and uses 119861 to decrypt and obtain the 119870

1015840

119888119894

1198701015840

119888119894= 119863(119862newkey 119861) (27)

The mobile user can use the new session key 1198701015840

119888119894to

decrypt the collected message 119872119862 from the clusternode

3 Analysis

31 Security Analysis

311 Prevention of Malicious Guessing Attack

Adversary Model 1 Attackers try to intercept sensitive infor-mation by guessing the sensitive information

In the proposed protocol dynamic key management isused between the cluster node and base station After agiven time the base station updates the session key with thecluster nodeThus even if attackers do intercept the sensitiveinformation they will gain no relevant knowledge about thesession key In this scheme the base station and cluster nodesupdate the session key at the end of communication for everyround This communication enhances the security betweenthe base station and the cluster node

312 Prevention of Replay Attack

Adversary Model 2 Attackers try to intercept data andretransmit it maliciously or fraudulently repeat or delay it toachieve the purpose of the attack

In the proposed protocol the encryption key 119870119888119894(119895) is

refreshed for each communication Therefore the attackershave no opportunity to achieve the purpose of the attack

313 Prevention of the Falsification Attack

Adversary Model 3 Attackers try to impersonate a legal userto achieve a falsification attack

In the communication phase protocol (Figure 4) themobile users use the session key 119870119888119894

(119895) to encrypt the PWIDmob119896 and ID119888119894 into a complete packet 119862req Once the

base station receives the packet it verifies 1198601015840

= 119860 If itis not correct the cluster node will abandon the packetThe base station can authenticate the mobile user via thisauthentication mechanism Therefore the proposed schemecan prevent the attackers from impersonating a legal user


Table 1 The time complexity of the proposed communication phase

Scheme Role Time complexityCommunication phase(base station and cluster node as Figure 3)

Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867

Communication phase(mobile user cluster node and base station as Figure 4)

Mobile user 2119879119863

+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867

Base station 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879COMP

Notes119879119863 the time complexity of using symmetric decryption algorithm119879119864 the time complexity of using symmetric encryption algorithm119879119867 the time taken to execute the hash function119879COMP the time for comparing operation

Table 2 The communication cost of the proposed scheme

Phase Rounds Communication cost Transmission time (ms)36Mbps 1Mbps

Registration phase(offline as Figure 2) 3 5|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + |119862| 0092 0332

Communication phase (base station and cluster node asFigure 3) 3 2|119872| + 3|119862| 0038 0136

Communication phase (mobile user cluster node and basestation as Figure 4) 6 6|119872| + 6|119862| 0093 0336

Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804

314 Prevention of Man-in-the-Middle Attack

AdversaryModel 4 Attackers have the ability to bothmonitorand alter or inject messages into a communication channel

A cryptography mechanism can be used between themobile user and the cluster node to encrypt data in order toprevent man-in-the-middle attacks such as

119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)

Thus malicious attackers cannot falsify the protected dataAt the end of the communication the cluster node updatesthe session key preventing the attacker from obtaining thenode and accessing the protected data For the same reasonthe attacker cannot obtain the protected data 119872119862 encryptedinto 119862BS (see step 12 of Figure 3) Therefore this scheme canprevent man-in-the-middle attacks

315 Dynamic Key Management Attack

Adversary Model 5 Attackers try to guess the key repeatedlyIn the proposed infrastructure for each data transmissiona new key is generated from the previous two keys Forexample if the session keys of the first transaction are119870119888119894(0)

= 119886 119870119888119894(1)

= 119887 where 119886 and 119887 are the initial randomnumbers the 119895th updated session key of the 119894th cluster nodeis 119870119888119894

(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)

) Because of the secure one-way hash chain an attacker in possession of the currentsession key cannot obtain the last session key This dynamic

keymanagement reduces the possibility of attackers correctlyguessing the key from the key chain and using it repeatedly

316 The Captured Node Attack Analysis

Adversary Model 6 Attackers try to capture nodes and thusobtain sensitive information

For the mobile user and cluster node transmission orcluster node and base station transmission the proposedscheme adopts the hash function to generate a one-waykey chain 119870119888119894

(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894

(119895+2) to encrypt messagesbecause the one-way hash function can prevent attackersfrom inverting the keyTherefore even if an attacker capturesa node heshe cannot gain access to sensitive informationThis mechanism is similar to point 5

32 Performance Analysis This study considers the ramifica-tions of using applications in two different environments hopby hop transmission of data from cluster nodes to the basestation (Figure 3 scenario) and mobile users directly access-ing cluster node data via mobile device (Figure 4 scenario)In Table 1 the time complexity in the communication phaseis analyzed and the communication cost of the proposedscheme is analyzed in Table 2

At the end of this section the communication valuesand data transmission times are summarized in Table 2 Thelength of hash function |119867| is 160 bits it is assumed that the256-bit pseudorandom number generator is used to generateRND In order to simplify the length of messages it is alsoassumed that the lengths |119872| of ID and PW are also 256 bitsthe length of digital certificate |Cert| is 1024 bits and thelength of symmetric ciphertext |119862| is set to 192 bits


Table 3 Parameters used in the simulation environment

Parameter ValuesSimulation tool NS2Operating frequency 245GHzTransmitting power 10 dBmReceiving sensitivity power minus103 dBmBattery type CR2303Simulation area 1000m times 1000mNumber of nodes 300 nodesAntenna model AntennaOmni antennaMac type Mac80211154Interface queue QueryDropTailPriQueueRadio transmission range 30msim50mData packet size 1456 bits608 bits1248 bitsData transmission rate 36MHz and 1MHzSimulation time 28800 seconds (8 hours)Sensor type TI CC2530 chip

As shown in Table 2 the two relative transmission ratesare 1Mbps and 36Mbps Note that within the environmentof 36Mbps the longest communication cost is required bythe communication phase while the data transmission timeis only 0093 ((6|119872| + 6|119862|)(3600 lowast 8)) milliseconds

The total transmission time of the proposed schemeis 0223 = ((13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862|)(3600 lowast

8))milliseconds Since only lightweight operations are usedthe transmission time of the proposed scheme is sound

A simulation based on NS2 (Network Simulation 2) isdeveloped as shown in Table 3

The IEEE 802154 standard is used in NS2 with an oper-ating frequency of 245GHz and 10 dBm for transmittingpower and receiving sensitivity for minus103 dBm The initialbattery type is CR2303 The mobility model is based on thead hoc model The sensor nodes are deployed uniformly in a1000m times 1000m field The simulation lasted for 10ms Eachsimulation was run 50 times (TCP Data Flow) The averagethroughput of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 5

The chip rate of IEEE 802154 in a 245GHz frequencyband is 2MHz and the chip rate length is 32 when chipperiod 119879119888 = 05ms [31] If the chip period 119879119888 = 05msthen 119865 = 1119879 = 105ms = 2000 Otherwise the chiprate length is 32 and the transmission rate is 200032 =

625Kbps Because the symbol rate can transmit 4-bit datathe maximum transmission rate is 625Kbpslowast 4 = 250KbpsThe chip frequency is 200032 = 625Kbps

Based on the results above in the registration phasethe average throughput in the 36Mbps frequency bandis 2032 K bps In the communication phase (base stationand cluster node as in Figure 3) the average throughputis 8365Kbps In the communication phase (mobile usercluster node and base station as in Figure 4) the averagethroughput is 19171 Kbps

In the registration phase the average throughput in the1 frequency band is 72648Kbps In the communicationphase (base station and cluster node as in Figure 3) the

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300

Figure 5 The comparison of the average throughput of theproposed scheme in various different phases Remark 1 2 and3 denoted in the top row of the table are the transmission timeof the registration phase communication phase protocol betweenthe base station and the cluster node and communication phaseprotocol among the mobile user the cluster node and the basestation respectively

average throughput is 30351 Kbps In the communicationphase (mobile user cluster node and base station as inFigure 4) the average throughput is 623 Kbps

According to the IEEE 802154 standard in 245GHz themaximum transmission rate is 250KbpsThe communicationprotocol designed has a rate much lower than 250Kbps

In the following section A comparison of the averagethroughput of the related works for various different phasesin 36Mps and 1Mps frequency bands is shown in Figure 5

4 Discussions

In this section a comparison is made with the relatedworks in Table 4 A complete security analysis has beenpresented for the proposed scheme These security issuesinclude malicious guessing attacks replay attacks falsifica-tion attacks man-in-the-middle attacks dynamic key man-agement attacks and captured node attacks The securityanalysis of the proposed scheme is more complete referto ldquoCheng and Agrawalrsquos scheme [6]rdquo and ldquoLiu and Ningrsquosscheme [7]rdquo Compared with the partial analysis of ldquoChengand Agrawalrsquos schemerdquo and ldquoLiu and Ningrsquos schemerdquo theproposed scheme is more complete Moreover the proposedscheme also supports direct accessing of cluster node data bya user via mobile device at any time from anywhere Chengand Agrawalrsquos scheme did not propose a clear applicationThese works were not specific with regard to time complexitycommunication cost and storage cost The proposed schemeadopted the symmetric encryptiondescription algorithmthus making the time complexity communication cost andstorage cost of key computation are specific


Table 4 Comparison of the related works

Protocol Our scheme Cheng and Agrawal [6] Liu and Ning [7] Alcaraz et al[27]

Security analysis Complete Partial (only captured nodeattack analysis)

Partial (only captured nodeattack analysis) Yes

Provided mobile service Yes NA NA NA

Proposed application Yes NA Yes Yes

Time complexity analysis Yes NA NA NA

Communication costanalysis Yes NA NA NA

Stored cost(cluster node)

Two session keys itself IDbase station ID mobile userID and RND

One session key and twopolynomial functions

Not specific (it isdependent on the proposedthree schemes for examplekey predistribution schemeoverheads = 119888(119905 + 2) log 119902)

NA

The time cost of keycomputation(cluster node)

As shown in Table 1 (119899 times 119905poly times 119897)119898 Not specific Not specific

Alcaraz et al [27] offer a complete analysis of keymanage-ment schemes (KMS) which provides information on howdifferent protocols fit with the properties Apart from thisit also offers a comprehensive review on how the applicationrequirements and the properties of various key managementschemes influence each other However it does not provideaccessing of cluster node data via mobile device and give aclear illustration of time complexity analysis communicationcost analysis and storage cost

5 Conclusions

This study proposed two schemes for accessing collected datathrough dynamic key management in heterogeneous andhomogenousWSN environments In addition to allowing thebase station to periodically collect data from the cluster nodemobile users can also communicate with the latest clusternodes with immediacy and mobility

In this study we use some lightweight cryptographymechanisms (such as symmetric encryptiondecryptionhash function and randomnumber) to implement a dynamickey management scheme A performance analysis of timecomplexity and communication cost was also conductedCompared to related works this analysis is clearer AnNS2 simulation was developed in which the experimentalresults show that the designed communication protocol isworkable Therefore regardless of the security analysis timecomplexity and communication cost our dynamic key man-agement is an appropriate mechanism for wireless sensorsnetwork

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interestsregarding the publication of this paper

Acknowledgment

This research was supported by theNational Science CouncilTaiwan under Contract nos MOST 103-2632-E-324-001-MY3 MOST 103-2622-E-212-009-CC2 MOST 103-2221-E-324-023 and MOST 104-2221-E-324-012

References

[1] C-L Chen T-F Shih Y-T Tsai and D-K Li ldquoA bilinearpairing-based dynamic keymanagement and authentication forwireless sensor networksrdquo Journal of Sensors vol 2015 ArticleID 534657 14 pages 2015

[2] C-L Chen Y-T Tsai A Castiglione and F Palmieri ldquoUsingbivariate polynomial to design a dynamic key managementscheme for wireless sensor networksrdquo Computer Science andInformation Systems vol 10 no 2 pp 589ndash609 2013

[3] Y Cheng and D-P Agrawal ldquoAn improved key distributionmechanism for large-scale hierarchical wireless sensor net-worksrdquo Ad Hoc Networks vol 5 no 1 pp 35ndash48 2007

[4] C-L Chen Y-Y Chen and Y-H Chen ldquoGroup-based authen-tication to protect digital content for business applicationsrdquoTheInternational Journal of Innovative Computing Information andControl vol 5 no 5 pp 1243ndash1251 2009

[5] L Eschenauer and V D Gligor ldquoA key-management schemefor distributed sensor networksrdquo in Proceedings of the 9th ACMConference on Computer and Communications Security pp 41ndash47 Washington DC USA November 2002

[6] Y Cheng and D P Agrawal ldquoEfficient pairwise key estab-lishment and management in static wireless sensor networksrdquoin Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Conference onMobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS rsquo05) pp 544ndash550Washington DC USA November 2005

[7] D Liu and P Ning ldquoImproving key pre-distribution withdeployment knowledge in static sensor networksrdquo ACM Trans-actions on Sensor Networks vol 1 no 2 pp 204ndash239 2005


[8] C L Chen and C T Li ldquoDynamic session-key generation forwireless sensor networksrdquo EURASIP Journal on Wireless Com-munications and Networking vol 2008 Article ID 691571 10pages 2008

[9] C-L Chen and I-H Lin ldquoLocation-aware dynamic session-keymanagement for grid-based wireless sensor networksrdquo Sensorsvol 10 no 8 pp 7347ndash7370 2010

[10] C Xu and W Liu ldquoKey updating methods for combinatorialdesign based keymanagement schemesrdquo Journal of Sensors vol2014 Article ID 134357 8 pages 2014

[11] B Zhou JWang S Li andWWang ldquoAnewkey predistributionscheme for multiphase sensor networks using a new deploy-ment modelrdquo Journal of Sensors vol 2014 Article ID 57391310 pages 2014

[12] H-F Huang and W-C Wei ldquoA new efficient and completeremote user authentication protocol with smart cardsrdquo Inter-national Journal of Innovative Computing Information andControl vol 4 no 11 pp 2803ndash2808 2008

[13] C-L Chen Y-L Lai C-C Chen and Y-L Chen ldquoA smart-card-based mobile secure transaction system for medical treat-ment examining reportsrdquo The International Journal of Innova-tive Computing Information and Control vol 7 no 5 pp 2257ndash2267 2011

[14] C-C Chang and T-C Wu ldquoRemote password authenticationwith smart cardsrdquo IEE Proceedings E Computers and DigitalTechniques vol 138 no 3 pp 165ndash168 1991

[15] M-S Hwang and L-H Li ldquoA new remote user authenticationscheme using smart cardsrdquo IEEE Transactions on ConsumerElectronics vol 46 no 1 pp 28ndash30 2000

[16] M Kumar ldquoNew remote user authentication scheme usingsmart cardsrdquo IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics vol50 no 2 pp 597ndash600 2004

[17] M L Das A Saxena and V P Gulati ldquoA dynamic ID-basedremote user authentication schemerdquo IEEE Transactions onConsumer Electronics vol 50 no 2 pp 629ndash631 2004

[18] N El-Fishway and A Tadros ldquoAn effective approach for au-thentication of mobile usersrdquo in Proceedings of the IEEE 55thVehicular Technology Conference vol 2 pp 598ndash601 2002

[19] C-L Chen ldquoAn lsquoall-in-onersquo mobile DRM system designrdquo TheInternational Journal of Innovative Computing Information andControl vol 6 no 3 pp 897ndash911 2010

[20] C-M Liu C-H Lee and L-C Wang ldquoDistributed clusteringalgorithms for data-gathering in wireless mobile sensor net-worksrdquo Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing vol 67no 11 pp 1187ndash1200 2007

[21] M Chatterjee S K Das and D Turgut ldquoWCA a weightedclustering algorithm formobile ad hocrdquoCluster Computing vol5 no 2 pp 193ndash204 2002

[22] W R Heinzelman A Chandrakasan and H Balakrish-nan ldquoEnergy-efficient communication protocol for wirelessmicrosensor networksrdquo in Proceedings of the 33rd AnnualHawaii International Conference on System Siences (HICSS rsquo33)pp 2ndash10 January 2000

[23] VD Park andM S Corson ldquoAhighly adaptive distributed rout-ing algorithm for mobile wireless networksrdquo in Proceedings ofthe 16th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer andCommunications Societies (INFOCOM rsquo97) vol 3 pp 1405ndash1413 April 1997

[24] C E Perkins and E M Royer ldquoAd-hoc on-demand distancevector routingrdquo in Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Workshop onMobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA rsquo99) pp90ndash100 February 1999

[25] D B Johnson and D A Maltz ldquoDynamic source routing in adhoc wireless networksrdquo inMobile Computing T Imielinski andH F Korth Eds vol 353 pp 153ndash181 Springer 1996

[26] Crossbow Technology Inc httpwwwxbowcom[27] C Alcaraz J Lopez R Roman and H-H Chen ldquoSelecting key

management schemes for WSN applicationsrdquo Computers ampSecurity vol 38 no 8 pp 2257ndash2267 2012

[28] S MM Rahman and K El-Khatib ldquoPrivate key agreement andsecure communication for heterogeneous sensor networksrdquoJournal of Parallel and Distributed Computing vol 70 no 8 pp858ndash870 2010

[29] Intel company httpwwwintelcomcontentwwwusenhomepagehtml

[30] Atmel company website AVR 8-Bit RISC processor httpwwwatmelcomproducts

[31] IEEE 802154 Standard httpwwwieee802org15pubTG4html

International Journal of

AerospaceEngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

RoboticsJournal of

Hindawi Publishing Corporationhttpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014


Active and Passive Electronic Components

Control Scienceand Engineering

Journal of



RotatingMachinery


Hindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom

Journal ofEngineeringVolume 2014

Submit your manuscripts athttpwwwhindawicom

VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration


Civil EngineeringAdvances in

Acoustics and VibrationAdvances in



Electrical and Computer Engineering

Journal of

Advances inOptoElectronics


Volume 2014

The Scientific World JournalHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014

SensorsJournal of


Modelling amp Simulation in EngineeringHindawi Publishing Corporation httpwwwhindawicom Volume 2014


Chemical EngineeringInternational Journal of Antennas and

Propagation




Navigation and Observation



DistributedSensor Networks



the administrators of farms or nuclear power plants can usemobile devices to gain access to the monitor data at any timefrom any place rather than logging into the monitor systemMoreover as sensor networks have energy and computationalconstraints it is therefore necessary to maintain a balancedsecurity level with respect to those constraints

Since sensor networks can be used in a variety ofapplications such as military sensing and tracking environ-mental monitoring patient monitoring and tracking smartenvironments and disastermanagement this study envisagesmany applications in which people could navigate throughsensor networks using common omnipresent devices (suchas a mobile phone or a personal digital assistant) at any timeand from anywhere Since a mobile device is more portableand personal than a personal computer it is more convenientfor operating certain applications

Some applications [12ndash14] have proposed novel solutionsto remote user authentication by using smart cards Thesmart card is a processor that can compute some low-costoperations such as one-way hash function and exclusion-ORoperation In the proposed system each user is issued witha smart card for login and authentication These lightweightoperations are similar to the processors of sensor nodes inWSNs In addition there have been authentication schemesbased on the ElGamal cryptosystem [15 16] that belong to apublic key cryptosystemOwing to their high operation coststhese schemes are not suitable for WSNs

Password-based authentication is the most widely usedmethod for remote user authentication Existing schemes canbe categorized into two types the weak password approachand the strong password approach The weak passwordapproach is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem Its advan-tage lies in the fact that it does not need a user ID-passwordtable to verify the validity of the user login Unfortunatelythe weak password approach places a heavy computationalload on the system and remote sensor nodes lack the capacityfor rendering the system applicable to WSNs The strongpassword approach is based on one-way hash function andexclusive-OR (XOR) operations The one-way hash functionℎ( ) has the following properties (1) ℎ(119909) is relatively easy tocompute for any given 119909 making both hardware and softwareimplementation practical (2) For any given value 119910 it iscomputationally infeasible to find 119909 such that ℎ(119909) = 119910 (3)For any given block 119909 it is computationally infeasible to find119910 = 119909with ℎ(119910) = ℎ(119909)This is sometimes referred to as weakcollision resistance Das et al [17] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme in 2004 It requiresmuch less computation and needs only simple operations Forthis reason this scheme has certain advantages when appliedto a WSN environment

In 2002 El-Fishway and Tadros [18] proposed a userauthentication scheme oriented for mobile users using theGlobal System for Mobile Communication (GSM) Theadvantage of usingGSM is that there is no central certificationauthority but the scheme requires high computation costs bythe public key system Thus a user authentication schemeof the public key system is unsuitable for WSNs In 2010Chen [19] proposed a mobile DRM mechanism based onPKI (Public Key Infrastructure) He also emphasizes that

the mobile device should be operated in a lightweightenvironment

In this paper we use some lightweight operations (such assymmetric encryptiondecryption hash function) to imple-ment a dynamic key management scheme The proposedscheme also supports a direct accessing of cluster node databy a user via mobile device at anytime from anywhere andprovides more security analysis refer to related works Theorganization of the remainder of the paper is as follows InSection 2 the proposed protocol is presented In Section 3several familiar attacks and the performance of the proposedscheme are analyzed Comparison is also made with otherrelated schemes in Section 4 Finally Section 5 offers conclu-sions

2 The Proposed Scheme

21 Notations The following is the introduction to thenotations that will be used in our scheme

ℎ( ) is a one-way hash functionCert119896 is the 119896th mobile userrsquos digital certificateIDmob119896 is the identity of the 119896th mobile userID119888119894 is the identity of the 119894th cluster nodeID119861 is the identity of the base stationRND is a random number generated by mobile userPW is the mobile userrsquos password

119870119888119894(119895) is the 119895th updated session keys of the 119894th cluster

node where119870119888119894(119895)

= ℎ(119870119888119894(119895minus1)

119870119888119894(119895minus2)

) with119870119888119894(0)

=

119886 119870119888119894(1)

= 119887 and 119886 and 119887 are the initial randomnumbers119872req is request message issued by mobile user119872119888 is the latest information received from the clusternode119872upd-key is the message of the updated key119864(msg 119870) is the symmetric encryption of the infras-tructure that makes use of key 119870 to encrypt msg119863(119862119870) is the symmetric decryption of the infras-tructure that makes use of key 119870 to decrypt theciphertext 119862

119883= 119884 compares whether 119883 is equal to 119884 or not

22 Environmental Conditions

(1) As a general rule hundreds or even thousands of sen-sor nodes are deployed in aWSN In this paper clustermanagement is used to transmit data Additionallythe deployed sensor nodes are divided into differentregions so that each sensor node can transmit data inthe effective range [9]

(2) In each of the regions a sensor node is chosenautomatically as a cluster node [20ndash22] These relatedalgorithms are similar to those used by Park and


Base station

Mobile user

Sensor node

Cluster node












)



119860 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (1)






119862clu = 119864 ((IDmob119895RND) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (2)




(IDmob119895RND) = 119863 (119862clu 119870119888119894(119895)

) (3)






Cclu


(j)

Kci

(j)

)

Kci


(Certk IDci K(j)

ci)



(11) Kci

(j)= h(a b)

(12) CBS = E(Mc Kci

(j))

(CBS IDcj)

(21) Mc = D(CBS Kci

(j))


(j)) C1


(j))

Kci

(j))(32) Kci

(j+1)= h(Kci

(jminus1)


(j+1))


(j+1))

(42) Kci

(j+2)= h(Kci

(j) Kci

(j+1))

(C2 IDcj)






119870119888119894(119895)

= ℎ (119886 119887) (4)



119862BS = 119864 (119872119888 119870119888119894(119895)

) (5)





119872119862 = 119863(119862BS 119870119888119894(119895)

) (6)



1198621 = 119864 (119872finish 119870119888119894(119895)

) (7)




119872finish = 119863(1198621 119870119888119894(119895)

) (8)



(119895+1)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895minus1)

119870119888119894(119895)

) (9)



1198622 = 119864 (119872upd-key 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (10)




119872upd-key = 119863(1198622 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (11)




(j))

(Creq IDmobk)


(j))



(j))

(Cauth IDci)


(j))

Kci


(Cack IDB)


(j))


(Cresp IDci)


(j))


(62) C998400


(C998400

user IDmobk)


user B))


998400

ci B)

(8) K998400

ci= D(Cnewkey B)

(32) Verify

(Cnewkey IDB)

A998400

A=





119870119888119894(119895+2)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (12)





119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (13)




(PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862req 119870119888119894(119895)

) (14)


1198601015840= ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (15)


119862auth = 119864 ((1198601015840 IDmob119896) 119870119888119894

(119895)) (16)





(1198601015840 IDmob119896) = 119863 (119862auth 119870119888119894

(119895)) (17)



119860= 1198601015840 (18)



119862ack = 119864 ((IDmob119895 ack) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (19)





(IDmob119895 ack) = 119863 (119862ack 119870119888119894(119895)

) (20)



119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (21)



(119872119862 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862resp 119870119888119894(119895)

) (22)




119861 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PW) (23)


1198621015840

user = 119864 ((IDmob119896Cert119896) 119861) (24)





(IDmob119896Cert119896) = 119863 (1198621015840

user 119861) (25)


1015840


119888119894

119862newkey = 119864 (1198701015840

119888119894 119861) (26)



1015840

119888119894

1198701015840

119888119894= 119863(119862newkey 119861) (27)


119888119894to


3 Analysis


















Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867



+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867








Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804




119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)




= 119886 119870119888119894(1)


(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)






(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894
















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation










Base station

Mobile user

Sensor node

Cluster node












)



119860 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (1)






119862clu = 119864 ((IDmob119895RND) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (2)




(IDmob119895RND) = 119863 (119862clu 119870119888119894(119895)

) (3)






Cclu


(j)

Kci

(j)

)

Kci


(Certk IDci K(j)

ci)



(11) Kci

(j)= h(a b)

(12) CBS = E(Mc Kci

(j))

(CBS IDcj)

(21) Mc = D(CBS Kci

(j))


(j)) C1


(j))

Kci

(j))(32) Kci

(j+1)= h(Kci

(jminus1)


(j+1))


(j+1))

(42) Kci

(j+2)= h(Kci

(j) Kci

(j+1))

(C2 IDcj)






119870119888119894(119895)

= ℎ (119886 119887) (4)



119862BS = 119864 (119872119888 119870119888119894(119895)

) (5)





119872119862 = 119863(119862BS 119870119888119894(119895)

) (6)



1198621 = 119864 (119872finish 119870119888119894(119895)

) (7)




119872finish = 119863(1198621 119870119888119894(119895)

) (8)



(119895+1)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895minus1)

119870119888119894(119895)

) (9)



1198622 = 119864 (119872upd-key 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (10)




119872upd-key = 119863(1198622 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (11)




(j))

(Creq IDmobk)


(j))



(j))

(Cauth IDci)


(j))

Kci


(Cack IDB)


(j))


(Cresp IDci)


(j))


(62) C998400


(C998400

user IDmobk)


user B))


998400

ci B)

(8) K998400

ci= D(Cnewkey B)

(32) Verify

(Cnewkey IDB)

A998400

A=





119870119888119894(119895+2)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (12)





119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (13)




(PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862req 119870119888119894(119895)

) (14)


1198601015840= ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (15)


119862auth = 119864 ((1198601015840 IDmob119896) 119870119888119894

(119895)) (16)





(1198601015840 IDmob119896) = 119863 (119862auth 119870119888119894

(119895)) (17)



119860= 1198601015840 (18)



119862ack = 119864 ((IDmob119895 ack) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (19)





(IDmob119895 ack) = 119863 (119862ack 119870119888119894(119895)

) (20)



119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (21)



(119872119862 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862resp 119870119888119894(119895)

) (22)




119861 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PW) (23)


1198621015840

user = 119864 ((IDmob119896Cert119896) 119861) (24)





(IDmob119896Cert119896) = 119863 (1198621015840

user 119861) (25)


1015840


119888119894

119862newkey = 119864 (1198701015840

119888119894 119861) (26)



1015840

119888119894

1198701015840

119888119894= 119863(119862newkey 119861) (27)


119888119894to


3 Analysis


















Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867



+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867








Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804




119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)




= 119886 119870119888119894(1)


(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)






(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894
















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation














Cclu


(j)

Kci

(j)

)

Kci


(Certk IDci K(j)

ci)



(11) Kci

(j)= h(a b)

(12) CBS = E(Mc Kci

(j))

(CBS IDcj)

(21) Mc = D(CBS Kci

(j))


(j)) C1


(j))

Kci

(j))(32) Kci

(j+1)= h(Kci

(jminus1)


(j+1))


(j+1))

(42) Kci

(j+2)= h(Kci

(j) Kci

(j+1))

(C2 IDcj)






119870119888119894(119895)

= ℎ (119886 119887) (4)



119862BS = 119864 (119872119888 119870119888119894(119895)

) (5)





119872119862 = 119863(119862BS 119870119888119894(119895)

) (6)



1198621 = 119864 (119872finish 119870119888119894(119895)

) (7)




119872finish = 119863(1198621 119870119888119894(119895)

) (8)



(119895+1)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895minus1)

119870119888119894(119895)

) (9)



1198622 = 119864 (119872upd-key 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (10)




119872upd-key = 119863(1198622 119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (11)




(j))

(Creq IDmobk)


(j))



(j))

(Cauth IDci)


(j))

Kci


(Cack IDB)


(j))


(Cresp IDci)


(j))


(62) C998400


(C998400

user IDmobk)


user B))


998400

ci B)

(8) K998400

ci= D(Cnewkey B)

(32) Verify

(Cnewkey IDB)

A998400

A=





119870119888119894(119895+2)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (12)





119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (13)




(PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862req 119870119888119894(119895)

) (14)


1198601015840= ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (15)


119862auth = 119864 ((1198601015840 IDmob119896) 119870119888119894

(119895)) (16)





(1198601015840 IDmob119896) = 119863 (119862auth 119870119888119894

(119895)) (17)



119860= 1198601015840 (18)



119862ack = 119864 ((IDmob119895 ack) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (19)





(IDmob119895 ack) = 119863 (119862ack 119870119888119894(119895)

) (20)



119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (21)



(119872119862 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862resp 119870119888119894(119895)

) (22)




119861 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PW) (23)


1198621015840

user = 119864 ((IDmob119896Cert119896) 119861) (24)





(IDmob119896Cert119896) = 119863 (1198621015840

user 119861) (25)


1015840


119888119894

119862newkey = 119864 (1198701015840

119888119894 119861) (26)



1015840

119888119894

1198701015840

119888119894= 119863(119862newkey 119861) (27)


119888119894to


3 Analysis


















Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867



+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867








Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804




119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)




= 119886 119870119888119894(1)


(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)






(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894
















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation












(j))

(Creq IDmobk)


(j))



(j))

(Cauth IDci)


(j))

Kci


(Cack IDB)


(j))


(Cresp IDci)


(j))


(62) C998400


(C998400

user IDmobk)


user B))


998400

ci B)

(8) K998400

ci= D(Cnewkey B)

(32) Verify

(Cnewkey IDB)

A998400

A=





119870119888119894(119895+2)

= ℎ (119870119888119894(119895)

119870119888119894(119895+1)

) (12)





119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (13)




(PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862req 119870119888119894(119895)

) (14)


1198601015840= ℎ (IDmob119896 PWRND) (15)


119862auth = 119864 ((1198601015840 IDmob119896) 119870119888119894

(119895)) (16)





(1198601015840 IDmob119896) = 119863 (119862auth 119870119888119894

(119895)) (17)



119860= 1198601015840 (18)



119862ack = 119864 ((IDmob119895 ack) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (19)





(IDmob119895 ack) = 119863 (119862ack 119870119888119894(119895)

) (20)



119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (21)



(119872119862 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862resp 119870119888119894(119895)

) (22)




119861 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PW) (23)


1198621015840

user = 119864 ((IDmob119896Cert119896) 119861) (24)





(IDmob119896Cert119896) = 119863 (1198621015840

user 119861) (25)


1015840


119888119894

119862newkey = 119864 (1198701015840

119888119894 119861) (26)



1015840

119888119894

1198701015840

119888119894= 119863(119862newkey 119861) (27)


119888119894to


3 Analysis


















Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867



+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867








Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804




119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)




= 119886 119870119888119894(1)


(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)






(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894
















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation











119860= 1198601015840 (18)



119862ack = 119864 ((IDmob119895 ack) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (19)





(IDmob119895 ack) = 119863 (119862ack 119870119888119894(119895)

) (20)



119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

) (21)



(119872119862 ID119888119894) = 119863 (119862resp 119870119888119894(119895)

) (22)




119861 = ℎ (IDmob119896 PW) (23)


1198621015840

user = 119864 ((IDmob119896Cert119896) 119861) (24)





(IDmob119896Cert119896) = 119863 (1198621015840

user 119861) (25)


1015840


119888119894

119862newkey = 119864 (1198701015840

119888119894 119861) (26)



1015840

119888119894

1198701015840

119888119894= 119863(119862newkey 119861) (27)


119888119894to


3 Analysis


















Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867



+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867








Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804




119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)




= 119886 119870119888119894(1)


(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)






(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894
















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation












Base station 2119879119863 + 119879119864 + 119879119867

Cluster node 119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 2119879119867



+ 2119879119864

+ 119879119867

Cluster node 2119879119863 + 2119879119864 + 119879119867








Total 13|119872| + |119867| + |Cert| + 10|119862| 0223 0804




119862req = 119864 ((PW IDmob119896 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

119862resp = 119864 ((119872119862 ID119888119894) 119870119888119894(119895)

)

(28)




= 119886 119870119888119894(1)


(119895)= ℎ(119870119888119894

(119895minus1) 119870119888119894(119895minus2)






(119895) 119870119888119894(119895+1) and 119870119888119894
















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation





















0

20000

40000

60000

80000

203258360 19170

72800

30350 62300

Aver

age t

hrou

ghpu

t

Transmission time

10M36M

1

36

(M)1

23

10M36M

1 2 320325 8360 1917072800 30350 62300





4 Discussions















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation






















NA




5 Conclusions





Acknowledgment


References



































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation




































RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation











RoboticsJournal of





Journal of



RotatingMachinery





VLSI Design



Shock and Vibration







Journal of



Volume 2014


SensorsJournal of





Propagation









Documents

Research Article Mobile Device Based Dynamic Key ...downloads.hindawi.com/journals/js/2015/827546.pdfResearch Article Mobile Device Based Dynamic Key Management Protocols for Wireless