Requiem for the Aral Sea

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Requiem for the Aral Sea Author(s): Norman Precoda Source: Ambio, Vol. 20, No. 3/4 (May, 1991), pp. 109-114Published by: on behalf of Springer Royal Swedish Academy of SciencesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4313794Accessed: 23-07-2015 14:00 UTC

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Article Norman Precoda

Requiem for the Ara e

Heavy withdrawals of irrigation water from the Syr and Amu, the Aral Sea's two main tributaries, have for all practical purposes eliminated their spills and led to a sharp decrease in the level of the sea. This and the disruption of ecological equilibrium in this immense region have had catastrophic consequences for both the inhabitants of the region and for the environment. The circumstances leading up to and important features of some of the principal consequences are described.

THE BLUE SEA Located to the East of the Caspian Sea in the heart of arid Soviet Central Asia (Fig. 1), the Aral Sea is at the junction of the bar- ren Plato Ustyurt and the Kyzylkum and Karakum deserts, its shores interrupted in the northeast by the delta of the Syr Darya (River) and in the south by that of the Amu. Its many hundreds of islands were the basis for the name given it by the Kirgiz, "Aral Dengiz" (Sea of Islands), and the deep blue color of its waters for the earlier Russian name, "Sinyeye Morye" (Blue Sea) (1). As

one of the planet Earth's most ancient seas, the Aral is of particular interest because of the remarkable changes that have occurred in both area and volume of the sea in geo- logically recent times.

For millennia the enormous expanse of the Aral protected Central Asia from the cold north winds "Such an enormous basin," wrote Academician L.S. Berg in his Opyt Fiziko-Geograficheskoy Monografi, 1908, "must without doubt have a moderat- ing effect on the surrounding climate. To clarify this one must have a number of me-

teorological stations at the shores of the sea." Such stations were subsequently established and the collected synoptical data confirm Berg's ideas (2). Upon meeting the immense column of evaporation from the sea's surface the cold air was lifted to great heights and, travelling thousands of kilometers, came down to replenish the etemal snows and glaciers of the distant Pamirs and Tyan-Shans. Melting snows gave life to mountain rivers and thus water, and life, to the land and people. "In every drop of water," goes the old Central Asian saying, "there is a grain of gold."

For centuries the boundaries of the Aral Sea remained essentially unchanged, the sea level fluctuating between approximately 50 and 53 meters above sea level (4). From 1850 to 1965, for example, the lowest level observed was 3 meters below the 52 meters above sea level observed in 1943. Thus, the 900 millimeters thick layer of water lost to evaporation (0.9 km3 per 1000

Figure 1. Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

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km2 of surface), the precipitation of approximately 6 km3, and the surface and subsurface inflows were in stable equilibrium (3). Although the Aral Sea has no out- let the waters were only moderately saline: 1.0 to 1.1%, far from the mouths of its two tributaries and up to 1.4% on the southeast shores (4).

Before the 1950s, the Aral Sea had an area, including islands, of approximately 64 500 km2 and at 53 m above sea level contained a little over 1000 km3 of water. Geographically, the sea can be divided into three sections (Fig. 2), in terms of area, depth, and bottom relief. The relatively small body in the northeast called Maloye Morye (Little Sea) is separated by Kokaral Island from the Bolshoye Morye (Big Sea). The latter is practically divisible along a north-south meridian, from Muynak in the south to Kulanda Peninsula in the north, into eastem and westem parts. Maloye Morye, about 9% of the area, had an average depth of 18 m. The westem part of Bolshoye Morye, about 21% of the area, 60 m at its deepest and averaging 22 m, contained more than 28% of the total volume. The eastem part with more than 70% of the area and two-thirds of the volume was relatively shallow, the 10-m isobath running some 60 km from the shore. The eastem shore is low and sandy with a great number of shallow bays and offshore islands (4-6).

Not only did the Aral Sea constitute an important, and economical shipping route between Muynak and Aralsk, the chief ports and economic centers of the region, but it was also the source of annual catches of 45 000-50 000 tons of fish (sturgeon, carp, bream, pike-perch, barbel, roach and others) and more than a million muskrat pelts. The seemingly limitless reed growth on the shores provided the raw material for the Kzyl-Ordinsk Cellulose and Carton Combine. More than a quarter of a million hectares of tugay forests (fringing forests of moisture-loving trees and shrubs) in the Amu delta, where migrant birds nested and rare animals lived, provided highly productive nearly year-round pastures and were a natural barrier against all forms of erosion (5, 7, 8).

To the end of the 1950s the Aral Sea could be described in these terms. Begin- ning in the 1960s, however, the large-scale expansion of irrigation agriculture in the basin, especially cotton crops began to have far-reaching consequences.

The Aral Sea does not exist in isolation but as an integral part of an immense and extremely complex ecological system of interconnected elements. Consequently, significant changes in the sea results in marked changes in other parts of the total system with the result that an ecological catastrophe is now unfolding in the Aral Sea basin and it is far from certain that these disastrous consequences will be limited to the basin.

It is useful, in discussing the many and complex interacting developments in the area, to divide them into 3 groups; i) the shrinking Aral Sea; ii) direct causes and consequences; iii) indirect causes and consequences.

Perhaps the principal factor distinguish- ing the indirect from the direct causes and consequences is that the former are not in- evitable, i.e. circumstances can be envi- sioned where one or a number of factors, might have played no role whatsoever or only a minor one. In the absence, of these factors, however, the ecological disaster would not have been averted, but would merely have unfolded more slowly.

The Shrinking Aral Sea For thousands of years the waters of the Syr and Amu were utilized by the people of Central Asia to grow crops in the desert oa- ses to which water was brought with the help of irrigation networks, "To the present time," says K. Chagylov, Turkmenia's Minister of Health, "I remember the inimi- table taste of the water of my childhood. I grew up in a small village in the desert. The water came to us from the mountains via a system of Kyariz (almost horizontal irrigation tunnels linking underground wells)

conceived and built by our forefathers, and the water was crystal clear and fresh. The mountains were then covered with forests; now they are bald and there is no water. The Kyariz have crumbled and fallen in" (9).

Previous development of irrigated agriculture did not reduce the river spill into the Aral, because the areas developed were pri- marily in valleys and river deltas, areas with abundant moisture. After draining and clearing these areas of reed growths they were transformed into granaries and often the water used was less than that utilized by the moisture-loving plants which grew in the area. Consequently, the water balance of the Aral Sea was not affected.

This situation however changed. Tech- nological advances made powerful equip- ment available for use in agricultural operations. The construction of huge canals be- came feasible, and permitted irrigation of lands at higher elevations and hundreds of kilometers away from the rivers and deltas.

The economies of the Central Asian republics and of Kazakhstan, especially in the

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Figure 2. Aral Sea at 53 meters above sea level (at the end of the 1950s) (5).

110 AMBIO VOL. 20 NO. 3-4, MAY 1991



postwar years, experienced unprecedented development. The drive for expanded agricultural output and in particular, for "cotton independence," was pressed hard under the slogans of the times: "Produce millions of tons of cotton at any cost, " and "fulfill The Plan, at any cost" (10-12). All attempts to point to the costs of achieving these goals were met with an "iron taboo" (9).

The areas of irrigated agriculture in Cen- tral Asia and Kazakhstan grew from 2.9 million ha in 1950 to the present 7.2 million ha. This meant heavy withdrawals from the Syr and Amu and their tributaries. Yet additional withdrawals are in progress. For example, the nearly completed 335-meter high Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River, tributary of the Amu, will enable storage of 5 km3 of water, providing for the irrigation of 300 000 ha (13). In the case of the Amu, moreover, water was also diverted via the Karakum Canal, westward across practically the whole of Turkmenia. Withdrawals from the rivers caused inflows to the Aral to fall an average of over 50 km3 annually between 1930 and 1960 (fluctuating between 33 and 64 km3), to 35.2 km3 in 1970, to 10 km3 by 1980 and 1-5 km3 in the 1980s. The last two years have been abundant water years in the basin. Together, the Syr and Amu spilled 10 km3 in 1987 and, so far, 18 in 1988. As a result the 85-90 cm yearly drop in the level of the sea (evaporative losses) fell to 23 cm. (To maintain the present level requires inflow to the Aral of about 35 km3 per year (14, 15).

By 1988, the level of the Aral had dropped by more than 12 meters, the volume of water decreased by 60%, the surface area nearly halved, and the salinity almost tripled. By early 1990 the sea's falling level had finally, and firmly, reduced the Aral to two waterbodies, separated by a belt of dry land more than a 100 meters wide at its narrowest point (16) (Fig. 3). The exposed former seabed is now covered by solonchak (white alkali soil). It has been estimated that by the year 2010 the Aral Sea will no longer exist (17).

The Aral has experienced periods of both abundant waters and low waters, but long- term changes in the sea level were relatively limited (about three meters) and essentially due to the caprices of Nature. Recent changes, however, are anthropogenic. In- deed, the "destruction" of the Aral Sea was deliberately undertaken. Prominent people expounded on the sea's uselessness and pointed out that loss would be compensated for by greatly increased agricultural output, forecasting extensive pasturelands on the resulting exposed seabed and countless flocks and herds that these pastures would support. A. Babayev, former president of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, said; "I belong to those scientists who consider that drying up of the Aral is far more advanta- geous than preserving it. First, in its zone, good fertile land will be obtained. Accord- ing to preliminary computations this will provide for 1.5 million tons of cotton a year. Cultivation of this crop alone will pay for the existing Aral Sea with its fisheries, shipping and other industries. Secondly, many scientists are convinced, and I among

them, that the disappearance of the sea will not affect the region's landscapes" (14).

The proponents of this view prevailed and all plans worked out in the postwar years for the future use of the water and land resources of the Syr and Amu basins recommended utilizing the whole of their flows for irrigation (3, 18). The recommen- dations sealed the fate of the Aral Sea and also led to, but did not foresee, some of the disastrous and far-reaching consequences.

DIRECT CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES Disruption of the age-old natural ecological equilibrium in the Aral basin caused by marked shrinking of the Aral Sea has led, inexorably, to marked changes in numerous elements of the ecological complex.

Climatic Changes For millenia the Aral Sea has been a barrier protecting Central Asia from the cold north winds. On meeting the enormous masses of vapor rising from its surface and being lifted to great heights, the moisture-laden air was carried thousands of kilometers, re- plenishing the snow and ice on distant mountains. The marked depletion of the Aral Sea weakened this barrier against the cold north winds, exacerbating growing conditions for cotton. "Climatologists think that for cotton-growing, the Central Asian region will be lost permanently". (10).

The climate in the Aral Sea region, according to USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology data (Izvestiya, 15/9- 90), is sharply changing for the worse. The absolute maximum average daily tempera- ture is increasing and reaches 470C in the summer, minus 170C in the winter.

Wind Erosion The Aral Sea was also a baffier against the drying effects of the winds and, with the barrier weakened, drying winds and duststorms began to play havoc in Central Asia. Wind erosion is now common throughout the Aral region. Salty deposits coat the once productive agricultural lands of the Amu delta and more than a million ha of agricutural land are unproductive. In the southem and eastem parts of the sea where the water has receded as much as a 100 km, a salty fog is carried hundreds and hundreds of kilometers away by the fre- quently occurring dust storms. The Karakum and Kyzylkum deserts have now met on the Aral's exposed seabed (7, 8).

Reduction in the area covered by the Aral Sea has exposed great expanses of former seabed (nearing 30 000 km2 in 1988 (19) and the solonchak mounds which quickly form on the exposed bed are the greatest source of windbomne salts. The mean salt content in the top half meter of exposed seabed is about 120 tons per hectare (two- thirds to three-fourths of the salts in the upper half meter are sodium chloride and sodium sulfate). On the southeastemn shores the fall in sea level coupled with intensive evaporati.on have given rise to sal t accumu-

lations. The enclosed lacustrine depressions, narrow embayments and lagoons have gradually turned into wet solonchak, some of which have dried, becoming salt deposits of up to a meter thick with reserves of up to 4000 tons of salt per ha. Here the topmost 15-cm layer consists of sodium chloride that forms a hard crust over the loose sodium sulfate (8). The salt content of the young solonchaks and their windbome transfer eastward constitutes serious danger for the plants and soils of the agricultural areas. The salty dust particles settle on cotton plantations and ricefields and harvests de- teriorate. Scientists have estimated that up to 75 million tons (100 million according to more recent data) of fine dust particles and salts are transported by winds each year. In the Aral region, an average of as much as 520 kg of sand and salts fall on each ha of land (18, 20).

The upper soil horizons in the delta of the Amu with their deposits of fine-grained sands and loams that accumulated during the many channel shifts over the years are now being blown about by the winds form- ing sand dunes and hillocks, and giving rise to sandstorms which together with the dust also raise the salt crystals that are deposited at long distances (8).

Winds which previously brought moisture from the Aral Sea now transport millions of tons of salts. These plumes are already contaminating crops in Bukhara, Navoy and Samarkand. Hundreds of kilo- grams of salts fall on every hectare of irrigated land over the whole of Karakalpakia, Bukhara, Khorezm and Kzyl-Ordinsk oblasts (7) (large administrative divisions). Previously, the chief recipient of salts, the Aral is now the principal supplier of salts. It is estimated that with the Aral Sea drying up, five million ha of developed, irrigated land will become saline (14). The salts also settle on and damage electric powerlines, erode concrete structures, destroy fertile land, and undermine health (21).

But the damaging effects of the more fre- quently occurring salt-duststorms are not restricted to the Aral region. Aral Sea salts have been found in both the Pacific and Arctic oceans, and in the Ganges and Brahamaputra rivers in India (22). During summer the mountain peaks are scarcely visible because of aerosols settling on them,as much as 3-4 tons per ha of which 100-500 kilos are soluble salts which ac- celerate the thawing process. Glaciers are becoming noticeably smaller. Zerav- chanskiy Glacier, which was previously melting at the rate of about one meter a year is now disappearing at the rate of one meter per month. The centuries old line of Fedchenko Glacier, one of the largest in the world, has receded 50 meters or more (23).

Until relatively recently the reduction of the glaciers was not recognized or if so, not considered a matter for concern inasmuch as the levels of the rivers were virtually unchanged. But the rivers ran full because of intensive melting of snow and ice. Central Asia's giant waterway, the Amu, originates in and is nourished by the snow and ice- melt waters in the mountains and spurs of the Pamiro-Alays (23).

AMBIO VOL. 20 NO. 3-4, MAY 1991 1II



Figure 3. The shrinking Aral Sea (6,7,17, 18). 55

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Lower Groundwater Levels The drop in level of the Aral Sea has also led to substantially lower groundwater levels in the deltas: 3-5 meters in some loca- tions to as much as 7-8 meters, with miner- alization of more than 35 g per liter to as much as 100 g per liter and more (8).

Regulation of stream flows and cessation of flooding have led to drying out of an immense area in a band 25 to 100 km wide and about 500 km long along the course of the Syr. Along the channel of the Zhana River, for some 250 km, there was a 300 000 ha area of black saxaul woods (utilized for fuel and as pastureland) which owed their exist- ence to the periodic penetration of Syr floodwaters into the dry channel. When in- cursions from the Syr floodwaters ceased the saxaul began to die (3).

The tugay forests which as late as 1961 covered 260 000 ha in 5 to 6-kilometer wide bands along the arms of the Amu delta, were reduced to a fifth of that area in a little more than two decades. Similar reductions took place along the delta arms of the Aliaul, Zair, Bagguzha and along the shores of Lake Zakirikul. The approximately 300 000 ha of lakes and bogs that previously occupied the westem and central parts of the Amu delta have nearly all dried up, leaving tussocks of reed rootstocks and stems, and giving rise to typical solonchak (8).

Reeds which once covered some 700 000 ha have virtually all disappeared, except for about 30 000 ha in close vicinity to the lakes that are being intentionally flooded. The reeds have been succeeded by salt and drought-resistant vegetation, resulting in the loss of an immense area of what was previously highly productive pastureland and meadow (8). (Raw material for the Kzyl-

Ordinsk Cellulose and Carton Combine is now being brought from Siberia) (14).

The sharp reduction in stream flow through the arms of the Amu delta and the drop in sea level have led to drying-up of the delta, to disappearance of the soil-re- taining reed growth and tugay forests, and to deflation processes in previously water- logged areas. Wind erosion has become common (8) and of the 178 species of animals previously found in the delta of the Amu, only 38 species remain (24).

Fisheries and Navigation Fishing has ceased over the entire sea, as has navigation, and the shores of the Aral are a graveyard of ships, barges, seiners, and other boats (7). The annual catches of 45 000-50 000 tons of fish are a thing of the past, and fish to be processed by the Muynak Cannery Combine are now brought from the Atlantic (25).

INDIRECT CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES The heavy withdrawals of water from the rivers for irrigation agriculture are directly responsible for the depletion of the Aral Sea and for disruption in the age-old ecological equilibrium in the basin. However, other factors have contributed, some of them greatly, to accelerating and intensifying the catastrophe.

High Water Losses Central Asian transport and irrigation canals are often only earthen channels with the result that a substantial quantity of water is lost through seepage. The largest losses are

from the local irrigation networks, mainly because of operating errors (10, 14). It is calculated that 65% to 70% (in some loca- tions 80%) of the irrigation water is lost before reaching the vegetation (23, 26, 27).

The more than 1200 km long Karakum Canal, for example, (drawing 500 m3 per second from the Amu runs directly over loose sands for hundreds of kilometers and the resultant water losses are enormous. Seepage losses have led to the creation of an 800 km2 "sea" along the Karakum Canal in Turkmenia and to an increase in salinization (14). In 1912, the American hydro engineer, Davis, who had been in- vited by the Russian govemment for con- sultation on the project, stated that the waters would disappear into the sands and there was no point whatsoever in undertak- ing construction of the canal (28). In villages along the canal, water laps into cellars, communication lines are put out of order, buildings have collapsed because of the ground under them sinking, trees in valleys are drenched, and orchards and vineyards are dying. To protect the city of Ashkhabad, now literally surrounded by marshlands, 150 dewatering wells have had to be drilled (20). The numerous reservoirs in the zone of the Karakum Canal, holding more than 50- 60 km3 of water (reserves for low-water periods), add to evaporation and seepage losses. The 500 m2 Zeydsk Reservoir, near the start of the canal, also functions as a gi- gantic silt settling basin (29).

Bolshoy Andizhansk Canal in Balykchinsk rayon (an administrative divi- sion or district), with a flow capacity of 125-130 m3 per second, had no lining and more than 2000 ha of the nearby lands of collective farms are becoming marshes. The bed of Khauzkhan Reservoir (Maryysk

112 AMBIO VOL. 20 NO. 3-4, MAY 1991



Oblast, Turkmenia) in the middle of the desert was not prepared to hold water and the water seeps into the ground as through a sieve. In the drive for short-term profits, construction of collector and drainage nets has been put off and the used irrigation waters also join the groundwater helping to raise its level (27, 30).

High Water Use Rates Specialists have determined that 2000-3000 m3 of water will produce a ton of cotton, but in reality twice as much is being used and in some operations, 3-4 times as much. Con- servative water-use rates are exceeded by 1.6 times in Uzbekistan, 1.7 in Turkmenistan, 2.0 in Kazakhstan. In Cen- tral Asia as a whole, water-use rates are 1.25 to 1.75 times the established norm (10).

It has been estimated that up to 5.5 m3 of water are used annually per m3 of rice field in the lower reaches of the Syr. Rice is grown using half this quantity of water in the delta of the Volga. In the lower reaches of the Syr and Amu, the waters contain salts, herbicides, insecticides, fertilizers, and industrial and domestic wastes. The higher salt level the more water needed to achieve the same harvests (20, 31). Re- sponding to the question of why water has a zero cost for agriculture, the Minister of Land Reclamation and Water answered: "Depending on the quality of the soil, in ir- rigating one or another area the need may be for 5000 or 15 000 m3 of water per ha so that one activity would for the same task pay three times as much as another. This is not just. It is more just and simpler to provide water without charge to both" (32).

Secondary Salinization Nearly 40% of the irrigated land in Turkmenistan is subject to secondary salinization. Augmented by seepage losses from transport and irrigation canals and from reservoirs, and by the careless dis- posal of collector and drainage waters from the fields, the highly mineralized groundwaters rise toward the surface carry- ing with them the salt. More than 62 million tons of salts are estimated to have accumulated on about 80 000 km2 of land along the Karakum Canal. The situation has become alarming in Turkmenia where the annual rate of land-loss due to salinization now ex- ceeds the rate of development of new areas for agricultural production. While 912 000 ha were developed and brought into agricultural production in Uzbekistan in the 1975-1985 period, 552 000 ha were lost (14, 19, 33).

On nearly all irrigated land the salinity situation is worsening. In the fall and winter after the cotton has been gathered from Khorezm fields, the soil has to be flushed at least four times before planting or there will be no crop. Using large quantities of flushing water, as much as 40-60 tons of salts are removed per hectare. However, half of these are beneficial salts. Diminishing soil fertil- ity is countered by doubling and tripling the applications of fertilizers. The costs for the

flushing and for additional fertilizers are high, but the losses caused by a disrupted ecology are even higher. The Khorezm Oa- sis, for example, once perceived as an "earthly paradise" is now badly degraded. At the beginning of the 19th century the Russian ambassador, Nikita Muraveyev, having visited Khiva, wrote: "Not yet 5 versts from the city, the orchards begin.... A flowering land." Arriving at the Khiva For- tress, the ambassador slaked his thirst at the famous Khiva Spring, acknowledging its water was tastier than that in the spring which is the origin of the Volga. Travelling along that route today we don't see the beautiful orchards, cotton is everywhere. The Khiva Well, legendary source of the Khorezm Oasis, is badly polluted and saline, as is the surrounding ground (1 1).

Collector and Drainage Waters In the middle and upper reaches of the Amu, dealing with the highly mineralized drainage water from irrigated fields amounts to exporting it to other and low-lying lands, away from the irrigated areas. Some is sent to natural depressions in the steppe and desert creating many lakes (some of them, such as the Sarykamish and Amasay, thousands of km2 in area), aug- menting the groundwaters, tuming pasturelands into marsh and generally pro- moting the multiplication of insects (27, 31, 34).

Farmers are independently seeking ways to handle the mineralized drainage waters. The current practice is still to dump the contaminated highly mineralized drainage water into the rivers. In Turkmenistan alone about 10 km3 of drainage waters go into the Karakum Canal each year. Chardzhous Oblast, for example, where the Karakum Canal has its start, dumps back into the Amu about 30% of the volume drawn from the river for irrigation. In all Central Asia an estimated 30-40% of the water going to irrigation fields is simply dumped into the desert (18, 31, 32, 34, 35).

Central Asian soils are generally light and readily penetrated so that saline water penetrates freshwater wells and occasion- ally takes an underground route to emerge in another location.

Chemicals The limits for the use of chemicals in the region are exceeded severalfold (10, 12). Each year as much as 300 kg of mineral fertilizers and at least 50 kg of toxic chemicals are used per ha (36). According to 1986 data, about 13 kg of pesticides were used per ha in Turkmenia and in Ashkhabad Oblast up to 64 kg per hectare were used. In the Muynak area, pesticides are being used on the cotton fields at ten times the average of 3 kg per ha for the whole country (31).

By 1985, more than three billion m3 of toxic chemicals saturated collector and drainage waters from Uzbek and Turkmen fields together with untreated industrial and domestic wastes were being dumped into the Amu each year (9). Local soils are supersaturated with a variety of chemicals

and the harmful dust brought by winds from the drying Aral Sea, and it is becoming more and more evident that not only harmful insects are being affected by the pesticides. Pesticides, mineral fertilizers, and various nitrates and nitrites accumulate in the soil and find their way into the crops (9, 11). Izvestiya reported from South Sakhalin in October 1988, that a 148-ton shipment of melons from Uzbekistan was received on the island in August. The melons sold briskly for two days but on the third day, began to darken suspiciously. Official documentation accompanying the melons certified that nitrate content satisfied State Standards, but tests established that the nitrate content was two to four times the per- missible level and the entire shipment was sent to the dump. An earlier 270-ton shipment of cabbage from Tashkent, also ac- companied by official certification of quality, was similarly found unfit for human consumption and discarded (37).

Societal and Public Health Effects It has been established that even with strict adherence to regulations, 60% of the pesticides end up in the air, soil and water. In- vestigations carried out in Ashkhabad Oblast found a definite link between diseases of the liver, gall bladder, and pan- creas and the pesticide loading. A similar relationship exists between the use of mineral fertilizers and premature births and some, psychiatric disorders (9).

The medical and ecological situation in Turkmenia, according to Minister of Health, K. Chagylov, is reaching crisis level. The republic has the country's high- est infant mortality rate and there are fre- quent outbreaks of intestinal diseases. Most people drink water from the Karakum Canal which draws water from the heavily contaminated Amu, More than 60% of the water samples taken from the Karakum Canal has high bacteria concentrations. Above Ashkhabad Oblast the rate was 95%. In the last 10 years, for example, the incidence of typhoid in the area was more than 8 times the average for the country (9).

Historically, the Uzbek region was re- nowned for the high productivity of its soils, which provided as many as three crops a year. Monoculture agriculture (cotton) was introduced and insistence by the authorities was on immediate returns. Dec- ades of cotton growing, uninterrupted for 50 years on some fields, led to exhaustion of the soil and to the emergence of plant diseases and pests. This was countered by an increasing application of mineral fertilizers and the use of the toxic chemicals. Toxic chemicals often led to the death of the soil fauna. In humans, epidemics of yellow jaundice and intestinal diseases erupted and the death rate soared, especially among children (18, 19, 38).

In Kazakhstan, the situation is particu- larly tragic in the lower reaches of the Syr, where water quality has deteriorated rap- idly (20). In the lower Amu the water is un- suitable for drinking without thorough puri- fication but is being drunk by some resi- dents (31, 39). "At work," says L.G.

AMBIO VOL. 20 NO. 3-4, MAY 1991 113



Konstantinova, chief of the Nukus Water Microbiology Laboratory, "we drink dis- tilled water. We are even afraid to drink the piped water after it is boiled." (10). The situation threatens the health and lives of the nearly 3 million people residing near and in the area (20, 36).

The level of kidney and liver diseases in the vicinity of the Aral Sea is several times that for the country as a whole. There are places where infant mortality reaches 100 per 1000 births (20). In Karakalpakia, the rate is 92 per 1000 (36). Cancer of the eosophagus has become one of the most widespread diseases. Hepatitis and gastric diseases, outbreaks of which previously were unknown, are now rampant. About 40% of the Kazakh Republic's cases of epi- demic jaundice occur in Kzyl-Ordinsk Oblast alone (7).

After more than two months investigat- ing at first hand the developing ecological catastrophe in the basin of the Aral a panel of scientists and writers concluded: "In Aralsk (rayon center in Kzyl-Ordinsk Oblast, previously an important seaport but now 70-80 km from the Aral), nearly all of the city's 29 low-lying areas are flooded by bitter, saline groundwater. Typhoid fever cases have increased 25-fold, hepatitis sev- enfold. Five thousand workers are now un- employed, some 10 000 have already de- serted the city."

Life for the villagers and townspeople of Karakalpakia is distressingly difficult. The earth and water are polluted (salts, pesticides, herbicides and defoliants), food is meager (8-10 kilos of meat per person per year), consumption of fruits and vegetables is a third or less the medical norm (slightly higher in Tadzhikistan where it is about one-half). In the two weeks the panel spent

in the Aral area, nowhere did panel mem- bers see fresh milk, fruit and vegetables, meat or butter in the stores.

Outbreaks of gastro-enteritis have increased markedly as have cases of typhoid fever, hepatitis and eosophageal cancer.

Upon examination of 12 845 inhabitants, in an area about 250 km south of the Aral Sea, 8049 were found to be ailing (of this number 3810 were children). In a number of areas the physicians recommend against breast feeding babies, the nursing mothers' milk is toxic (24).

Attempts by individual scientists and physicians to point out the link between the unprecedented increases in illness and the use of toxic chemicals, concentrations of which are many times the allowable limits in the soil and in the fruits and vegetables grown on them, have had other tragic consequences. There were instances where physicians were put into asylums to stifle dissent and conceal the true state of affairs; mass misinformation campaigns were carried out to create and propagate the myth of the good life of the Uzbek cotton growers (38).

In villages, other than the Potemkin villages, the cotton growers live in hovels, in highly unsanitary conditions. The monthly earnings of the cotton growers rarely exceed 60-70 rubles and on many collective farms, are even less. Peasants, who in the past prided themselves on their special attach- ment to the land are now fleeing it (38). The Muynak area has in recent years been aban- doned by thousands of its inhabitants (25). The brunt of the hard physical labor today rests on the shoulders of women and children. In some instances, suicide provides permanent escape from their troubles. Slightly over half of the Uzbek Republic's

5 365 000 tons of cotton harvested in 1988 was picked by hand, as was a third of the Turkmen Republic's cotton (12, 38, 41).

CONCLUSIONS The decades of relentlessly pressed drive for ever greater production of cotton in Soviet Central Asia under the banner of "Millions of Tons of Cotton-At Any Cost," has re- sulted in considerable progress along the road which ends in Catastrophic Costs and No Production Whatsoever.

It is clear that however important the various causes of the unfolding ecological catastrophe, the fundamental problem lies deeper and begins with the milieu itself, a milieu

- where administrative and decision- making jurisdictions are relatively independent of one another and are narrowly circumscribed;

- where administrative and decision- making jurisdictions have latitude with re- spect to what, and to what degree, legisla- tion and regulations bearing on their activi- ties are compelling;

- where the equation of costs and ben- efits for measuring performance and ap- praising projects, is skewed by omitting or giving little weight to costs that emerge in another jurisdiction (e.g., they are that jurisdiction's problem), and arbitrarily as- signing values to certain of the equation's parameters (decreeing, for example, that water and land are zero-cost resources in agriculture).

References and Notes 1. Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar (Encyclopedical Dictionary).

1890. St. Petersburgh, Russia, vol 3, p. 1-13. (In Russian). 2. Kruglov, L. 1974. Volny Araly (Waves of the Aral). In:

Selskaya Zhizn, Nov. 28. (In Russian). 3. Borovskiy, V.M. 1980. The drying out of the Aral Sea

and its consequences. Proceedings of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, Geographical Series, 1978. No. 5, 35- 44. In: SovietGeography. SilverSprings, MD. Feb. 1980. (In English).

4. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, (Great Soviet Encyclopedia). 1970. 3rd ed, vol. 2, p. 159. (In Russian).

5. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya(Great Soviet Encyclopedia). 1959. 2nd ed., vol. 2., p. 609-611. (In Russian).

6. Kuznetsov, N.T. 1981. Budushcheye Aral i Priaralya. (The future of the Aral and near-Aral). Priroda, No. 2. (In Russian).

7. Nurpeisov, A. 1988. 0 sudbe Arala (On the fate of the Aral). Ogonyok, No. 1, 1988. (In Russian).

8. Rafikov, A.A. 1983. Environmental change in the southem Aral region in connection with the drop in the Aral Sea level. In: SovietGeography. Silver Springs, MD, May 1983. (In English).

9. Chagylov, K. 1988. Vkus vody (The water's taste). Trud, Apr. 17, 1988. (In Russian).

10. Moroz, A. 1988. Morye Prosit Vody (The sea pleads for water). Komsomolskaya Pravda, Jan. 28, 1988. (In Russian).

11. Rabintsev, M. 1988. Trevogi Khorezm (Khorezm's anxieties). Selskaya Zhizn, Feb. 10, 1988. (In Russian).

12. Volkov, M and Totskiy, I. 1989. Usnuvshaya sovest. (The Conscience Asleep). Pravda, Feb. 12, 1989. (In Russian).

13. Sadovsky, S.I. 1988. Dam construction and hydropower development in the USSR. In: Water Power and Dam Construction. London Dec. 1988. (In English).

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Reka bez ustya, (River without estuary). Selskaya Zhin, Apr. 26, 1990. (In Russian).

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18. Izrael, Yu, A. 1988. Spasenye Morya, (Rescue of the sea), Pravda, Sept. 12, 1988. (In Russian).

19. Oreshkin, D. 1988. Sinye Morye u Obriva, (The blue sea at the edge of the precipice), Pravda, Aug. 13, 1988.

20. Yuriy, L. Mirazhi Arala, (Mirages of the Aral), Ogonyok, No. 41, 1988. (In Russian).

21. LG's correspondent. 1988. Morye mstit cheloveku, (The sea takes vengance on man), Literaturnaya Gazeta, Nov. 30, 1988. (In Russian).

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26. Kovalyev, V. 1972. Morye prosit vody (The sea pleads for water). Literaturnaya Gazeta, June 14, 1972. (In Russian).

27. Kondratovich, P. 1989. Voda co blago, voda co zlo (Water for good, water for evil). Selskaya Zhizn, Feb. 23, 1989. (In Russian).

28. Kamensky, A. 1972. Kara-Kum Canal. Moscow News, No. 35, 1972. (In English).

29. Grachev, A. and Morozov, N. 1982. Goryachiye berega (Hot banks). Pravda, Aug. 25, 1982. (In Russian).

30. Grachev, A., Grigoryev, Ye. and Pastukhov, S. 1985. Sol' Zemli (Salt of the Earth). Pravda, Aug. 19, 1985. (In Russian).

31. Yeshimbayev, D. 1988. Bol' Arala (Suffering of the Aral). Selskaya Zhizn, March 10, 1988. (In Russian).

32. Salygin, S. 1985. Vodnoye khozyaystovo bez stoymosti ...vody? (In the water economy, no charge ...for water?).LiteraturnayaGazeta, Oct. 2, 1985. (In Russian).

33. Sokolov, V. 1987. Sudba Arala (The Aral's fate). Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Nov. 18, 1987. (In Russian).

34. Grachev, A. 1985. Vkusna Ii voda v Amudarye (Whether water in the Amudarya is good lasting). Pravda, Aug. 13, 1985. (In Russian).

35. Gerasimov, I. 1978. Spory o morye (Controversies over the sea). Literaturnaya Gazeta, Dec. 20, 1978. (In Russian).

36. The Aral. Who is to blame and what is to be done? Editorial in: Moscow News, No 42, 1988. (In English).

37. Kulbakov, V. 1989. Ekh, yablochko! (Oh, little apple!). Izvestiya, Oct. 4.<m

38. Yakubov, A. 1988. S Veroy i nadezhdoy (With faith and hope). Selskaya Zhizn, Sept 1, 1988. (In Russian).

39. Kaipbergenov, A. 1989. Prokuror dlya zashcity Arala (Procurator for protection of the Aral). Pravda, March 18, 1989. (In Russian).

40. Kozhevnikova, K. and Sokolov, V. 1987. Chernaya ten' na 'belom zolote' (A dark shadow on the 'white gold'). Literaturnaya Gazeta, Feb 11, 1987. (In Russian).

41. Kozhevnikova, K. 1988. Ob Arale s nadezhdoy (About the Aral, with hope). Literaturnaya Gazeta, Aug 31, 1988. (In Russian).

42. FirstsubmittedAugust2l, 1989, acceptedforpublication after revision February 2, 1990.

Norman Precoda, MS, an independent engineer, has written on a variety of topics and published in professional journals. His address: 459 Foxen Drive, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93105, USA.

114 AMBIO VOL. 20 NO. 3-4, MAY 1991



Documents

Requiem for the Aral Sea