Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Maximizing Transport Benefits … · 2016. 8. 9. · Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Maximizing Transport Benefits through Community Engagement

Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report

This consultant’s report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents.

Project Number: 46422-002 December 2015

Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Maximizing Transport Benefits through Community Engagement (Financed by the Technical Assistance Special Fund)

Prepared by the Mekong Economics, Ltd. and the Adventist Development Relief Agency Myanmar

For the Ministry of Construction and the Asian Development Bank

Kayin and Mon State Context, Stakeholders and Engagement

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Kayin and Mon States

Context, Stakeholders and Engagement

Guidance for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and implementing partners

December 2015

Mekong Economics / ADRA Myanmar


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Table of Contents

Acronyms ....................................................................................... 3

Introduction .................................................................................... 6 Terminology ......................................................................................... 8 A note on place names and administrative demarcation .................................... 8 Ethnographic overview ............................................................................ 9

Overview of Conflict and peace in Kayin and Mon States ........................... 10 The Peace Process since 2011 .................................................................. 12 Humanitarian impacts: refugees and Internally Displaced Persons ...................... 14

Ethnic Armed Organizations in Southeast Myanmar .................................. 16 Karen National Union (KNU) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) .............. 16 Democratic Karen Buddhist/ Benevolent Army (DKBA) ..................................... 20 KNU/KNLA Peace Council ......................................................................... 21 NMSP/MNLA ......................................................................................... 21 Ethnic Armed Organizations’ grievances and political aspirations/agendas ............ 22 Karen (and Mon) factionalism ................................................................... 24 Ceasefire Liaison Offices ......................................................................... 27

Civil Society In Southeast Myanmar ..................................................... 29

Development in the Karen and Mon context - opportunities and concerns ..... 32 Evolving Environment ............................................................................. 33 The legacy of state-led development .......................................................... 34 The political economy of armed conflict ...................................................... 38

Ethnic Political Parties and the November 2015 elections ......................... 39

The peace process since 2012 - a "contested peace", meaning different things to different stakeholders ..................................................................... 43

Recommendations when planning and implementing projects in Southeast Myanmar ...................................................................................... 46


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Acronyms

ADB Asian Development Bank

BGF Border Guard Forces

BMA Burma Medical Association

BPHWT Backpack Health Worker Team

CBO Community Based Organization

CSC Central Standing Committee

CSO Civil Society Organization

CIDKP Committee for Internally Displaced People

CLO Ceasefire Liaison Offices

DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent/ Buddhist Army (DKBA)

EAO Ethnic Armed Organization

IDP Internally Displaced People

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

JMC Joint Monitoring Committee

KAD Karen Agriculture Department

KDHW Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW)

KED Karen Education Department

KMSS Karuna Myanmar Social Services

KNU/KNLA Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army

KPC KNU/KNLA Peace Council

KPSN Karen Peace Support Network

KSEAG Karen State Education Assistance Group

KTWG Karen Teachers Working Group

KUPC Karen Unity and Peace Committee

NCA National Ceasefire Agreement

NMSP/MNLA New Mon State Party/ Mon National Liberation Army

NLD National League for Democracy

MNEC Mon National Education Committee

SDC Swiss Development Cooperation

WB World Bank


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Source from MIMU


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Introduction As in other ethnic states in Myanmar, Kayin and Mon States have experienced armed-conflict since the country’s independence in 1948. The conflict between EAOs and successive Bamar-led military governments and its humanitarian impacts on local populations, has been the main characteristic of the socio-political environment of Southeast Myanmar. The protracted conflict has had severe consequences on the lives of the Karen and Mon people and has resulted in the displacement of thousands of populations, with many of them surviving as IDPs or as refugees at the Thai-Myanmar Border. Both Kayin & Mon States have not only suffered from conflict and conflict-related human rights abuses, but also from a systematic structural discrimination and political repression by successive military-led governments, which has been reflected in government’s low spending on social services as well as development aid in general. The peace process, which emerged in Myanmar in late 2011, represents the best opportunity in many decades to address issues that have structured armed conflict in the country since independence.1 Bi-lateral ceasefire agreements with all Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) in both states have been important steps in peace making and have improved the situation of conflict-affect populations, including the freedom of travel and association. However, they remain nothing more than rudimentary military truces, which have not yet materialized into a stable post-conflict environment in both Kayin and Mon States. The improved political situation, a result of the bi-lateral ceasefires, has also opened up a new chapter for humanitarian and development aid in Kayin and Mon State. Where humanitarian aid was formerly restricted heavily by the government and was mostly carried-out by local organizations across the Thai-Myanmar border, more and more international non-governmental (INGO) and local non-governmental organizations (NGO) have been able to establish operations from within the country. In addition, International Financial institutions (IFIs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) as well as bi-lateral donors such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) have pledged support to the development of both states, including infrastructure development.

The signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, even though not all-inclusive and often regarded as controversial, will most likely open up new possibilities to provide international assistance in partnership and cooperation with the government, EAOs and civil society. However, Kayin and Mon States will remain characterized by a complex patchwork of different political and civil society actors, reflecting state-society tensions.2 In many areas local populations have limited trust in government authorities and generally perceive EAOs as more legitimate than the state, though this is sometimes contested. It is therefore of utmost importance for the international community and development actors to be aware of the complex socio-political environment and the impact development aid can have in conflict-affected areas and the peace process. Any focus on ‘state-building’ and development assistance must take into account the legitimacy of EAOs and ethnic CSOs

1 Myanmar Peace Support Initiative - MPSI (2014): Lesson Learned from MPSI’s work supporting the peace process in Myanmar, p. 6. 2 Ashley South (2011): Burma’s Longest War, Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, (Amsterdam, Burma Center Netherlands), p. 45


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and be sensitive to the lack of trust in government structures at community level. It should be understood that the better-established EAOs enjoy significant legitimacy among the ethnic communities they seek to represent, although their leadership roles are in most cases contested by other actors (ethnic parties or civil society groups). The peace process is perceived by conflict-affected communities and activist groups as still highly problematic. In this context, it is important that international actors entering the Southeast understand local concerns that the government and its development partners are “buying peace through development”, and that aid projects may be a distraction from communities and other stakeholders’ human rights and political aspirations and concerns. This report is part of the TA-8304 MYA, which was awarded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to Mekong Economics Ltd. in partnership with ADRA Myanmar. It provides the reader with an outline of the socio-political economy in Kayin and Mon States, with a special focus on the peace and conflict situation, including key actors and institutions. It also provides the reader with recommendations on how to engage with all relevant stakeholders in a conflict-sensitive way. While the report also looks at government actors, the main focus will be on ethnic actors, including EAOs, civil society and ethnic political parties.


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Terminology In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) junta re-named the state Myanmar Naing-ngan. In addition, existing English names of divisions, townships, cities and streets were replaced with more authentic Burmese names, e.g. Moulmein become Mawlamyine, Pa’an became Hpa-an and Rangoon became Yangon. This renaming also included the re-cast of several ethnic groups. E.g. the Karen became officially known as the Kayin (a Burmese exonym). While some new word resembled more closely local pronunciation than had the old colonial-era Romanization, other changes represented a “Burmanization” of indigenous names.3 Although the GoUM refers to the state as Kayin, Karen Armed Organizations, Karen Civil society Organizations and local communities prefer to use Karen State and local populations identify themselves as Karen People. This report will refer to the state as Kayin as in ADB policy, but will refer to the people as Karen.

A note on place names and administrative demarcation The government divides Kayin State into three districts, namely Hpa-an, Myawaddy, and Kawkreik as well as seven townships including Hpa-an, Hlaingbwe, Hpa-pun, Thandaung, Myawaddy, Kawkreik and Kyain Seikgyi. These are recognized on most available maps. However, the KNU however has different administrative boundaries and has organized the Karen free state of Kaw Thoo Lei into seven districts, each of which corresponds to a KNLA brigade area: Thaton District (First Brigade), Taungoo District (Second Brigade), Nyaunglebin District (Third Brigade), Mergui-Tavoy District (Fourth Brigade), Papun District (Fifth Brigade), Dooplaya District (Sixth Brigade) and Pa’an District (Seventh Brigade). These seven districts are not only located in Kayin State, but also in Mon State and Bago Region, as well as the Tanintharyi Region. The majority of ADB’s supported projects will be implemented in Mawlamyine Township of Mon State and the Kayin State townships of Hpa-an, Myawaddy and Kawkreik, which correspond with the KNU’s Hpa-an (7th Brigade) and Dooplaya (6th Brigade) Districts.

3 South, Ashley (2008): Ethnic Politics in Burma: States in Conflict; (New York: Routledge), p. xv


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Ethnographic overview The term Karen includes 17 to 20 subgroups of the Karen language family, a Tibeto-Burman branch of Sino-Tibetan languages and the second-largest minority population group in Myanmar, whose members often speak mutually unintelligible languages. There are however two dominant dialects, namely Sgaw, which is predominantly spoken by Christian communities and communities in remote hill areas and Pwo, which is particularly spoken in lowland areas among Buddhist communities. The majority of Karen people are Buddhist, with around 25% Christians and a smaller proportion animist who settle in remote mountainous regions, as well as a few Muslims.4 Unlike other ethnic groups in the country, which tend to be geographically concentrated, the Karen are scattered throughout the Southeast of Myanmar, including Eastern Bago Region, Mon State and Tanintharyi Region as well as the Ayeyardwaddy Delta. In fact, the majority of Karen people are not living within the boundaries of Kayin State, which was officially established in 1952. There are also a significant number (more than a quarter-million) of Karen people living in the Kingdom of Thailand. Other groups living in Kayin State and adjoining areas, include Mon, PaO and Burman communities. Significant Muslim communities can also be found in Kayin State, mainly around urban centers such as Hpa-an and Kawkreik.

4 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung (2012): The “Other” Karen in Myanmar- Ethnic Minorities and the Struggle without Arms, p. 19.


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Resource from KHRG Overview of Conflict and peace in Kayin and Mon States Non-Burman communities make up at least 30 percent of Myanmar’s population. During the pre-colonial period, ethnic identity was diffuse, with ethno-linguistic characteristics being one among several markers of socio-political position. The political salience of ethnicity became reinforced during the colonial period. In the lead-up to independence, ethnic nationality elites sought to mobilize communities in order to gain access to political and economic resources, demanding justice and fair treatment for the groups they sought to represent. Burman and minority elites having failed to successfully negotiate a pacted transition to independence.5 By the time of independence from the British Empire in 1948, ethnicity had become a defining category of political orientation in Burma and years of ethnic tensions led to violence across the country. With the outbreak of armed conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the newly independent government of Burma in January 1949 during the battle of Insein on the outskirts of Yangon, the country had embarked on a civil war, which has lasted more than six decades.

The Karen Nationalist Movement For the next 50 years, the KNU was able to operate as a de facto government across many parts of Southeast Myanmar/Burma and the Ayeyardwaddy Delta, where many Karen populations can be found. For many Karen living in remote mountainous areas, then KNU has been the only administrative governance authority they have known until today. Even though some early battle successes were achieved, the KNU and its armed wings, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) have been fighting a defensive battle, with loosing much of their once controlled areas by the 1990s. This decline was further intensified with the establishment of the government-aligned Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which evolved through a split within the KNLA in 1994. Within a few years and with the support of the Myanmar Army, the DKBA had overtaken the KNU as the most powerful Karen non-state actor. This saw the KNU loosing many of its once exclusively controlled areas, although the organization still exerts great influence over contested areas through its administrative system.6 The organization was further weakened by various breakaway fractions during the late 1990’s and in 2007, through the creation of the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, led by the aging KNLA 7th Brigade commander. With the peace process, which emerged in late 2011, and the transformation of the DKBA majority into a Border Guard Force (BGF) under Myanmar Army control, the KNU saw itself re-emerging as the leading organization of the Karen national movement and a major stakeholder in the Myanmar peace process. In general over the past few years, DKBA leaders have been satisfied to acknowledge the KNU’s leadership in the political domain - in exchange for DKBA commanders’ continued authority on the ground, and in relation to local

5 On the history and historiography of the 1947 Panglong Conference, see Matthew Walton, "Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: the myths of Panglong," Asian Survey, 48.6: 889-910, 2008. 6 Ashley South (2011): Burma’s Longest War, Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, (Amsterdam, Burma Center Netherlands, 2011), pp. 8-10.


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political-economic matters. The shifting balance of power has been exacerbated by the expansion of government and Myanmar Army presence and authority into many areas previously more-all-less controlled by the DKBA.

The Mon Nationalist Movement Since the 1950s, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) has been the main Mon EAO operating in Mon State (where KNU is also active) and also controls some areas in southeast Kayin State and Northern Tanintharyi Region. It was established in 1958 after its predecessor the Mon People’s Front (MPF) surrendered to the government on the previous day. In its early years, the NMSP was heavily supported by the KNU and was able to establish its own administrative governance structure, including the establishment of and education system. During the 1990s the NMSP and its armed wing the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) came under immense pressure from the Myanmar Army, during the construction of the Ye-Dawei railway and the Yadana and Yetagun Gas pipelines. In the attempt to protect constructions, the Tatmadaw utilized counter-insurgency strategies against the NMSP and the KNU and forced thousands of local populations to work in the construction of military base camps, while others were forced to flee to refugee camps on the Thai-Myanmar border.7 Due to military pressure by the Tatamdaw and political pressure from neighboring Thailand, the NMSP agreed to ceasefire in 1995 and was given ceasefire areas, largely along the Ye River. While the ceasefire had been stable over the years, resulting in increased security for local populations and the (re-) emergence of Mon Civil society and expansion of NMSP’s social service departments, it was far from being perfect. There have been extensive debates within the Mon Nationalist, regarding the wisdom of engaging with the government and integrating NMSP’s ceasefire zones with government areas.8 The organization came under immense pressure in 2010, when it refused the government’s proposal to transform its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA), into BGF under the Myanmar Military’s control. The situation was finally calmed when both parties renewed the ceasefire in the beginning of 2012.

The Peace Process since 2011 The peace process, which emerged in Myanmar in late 2011, probably remains the best opportunity in decades to address political, social, economic and cultural issues which have driven conflict between the government and ethnic groups since independence. However, the situation in Kachin and Northern Shan States remains deeply problematic - with government forces having re-launched military operations against Kachin and allied EAOs in northern Myanmar. Nevertheless, over the past four years, southeast Myanmar at least has seen a significant and historic peace-making effort.9 However, a number of serious issues remain unresolved. The peace process is unlikely to result in a substantial and sustainable process of peace-building, unless these are addressed. This will be difficult, given the long history of mistrust

7 Paul Keenan (2012): By Force of Arms, pp. 215-216 8 Ashley South (2007): Ceasefires and Civil Society: The case of the Mon, in Mikael Gravers, Ethnic Diversity in Burma, p. 165 9 "Peacemaking” may be defined as ending violent conflict, through the agreement of a ceasefire or truce.


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among key stakeholders, and the failures of understanding and action evident among key external actors, including international actors who ostensibly support the peace process.

The election of a semi-civilian government in November 2010 represented a break with the past, despite the continued role of the military in government and politics. Although opposition groups (including most EAOs) continue to object strongly to elements of the 2008 constitution, the political transition process has nevertheless seen the introduction of limited decentralization to seven predominantly ethnic nationality-populated States. In late 2011 and through 2012, the new government under President (and ex-general) Thein Sein agreed, or re-confirmed, preliminary ceasefires with 10 of the 11 most significant EAOs. The new round of ceasefires focused particularly on southeast Myanmar. This included all EAO in a range of different situations:

A number of armed groups with longstanding ceasefires, including the NMSP;

Organizations with a number of groups that did not have a ceasefire, including the KNU;

Groups, which ceasefire had recently broken down, including the DKBA. Despite great skepticism among EAOs towards the government and its peace agenda, the government was able to sign bi-lateral ceasefire agreements with most EAO, including all Karen Armed Groups and the NMSP. The January 2012 agreement with the KNU has temporarily ceased the longest-running armed conflict in the world. While the bi-lateral ceasefires include agreement points and resolutions, it should be noticed that most of them have not been addressed or implemented in the last 3 years and that agreements remain nothing more than military truces. However, ceasefires have greatly contributed to increased stability and security in Kayin and Mon States. The National Ceasefire Accord (NCA), which was signed in November 2015 will hopefully move the process to an inclusive political dialogue and establish a sound ceasefire monitoring mechanism under the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). It will be interesting to observe if and how the Myanmar Army continues to engage in the JMC - the other main structure coming out of the NCA, which has already begun work. The new NLD- led government will have a say in this, but probably not a decisive one. If the JMC can demonstrate the implementation of credible monitoring procedures, the NCA will remain relevant. EAOs which did not sign the NCA (the majority) will be watching closely. It is highly significant that former President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi have endorsed a federal solution to the country’s protracted ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, in many areas, ceasefires have resulted in significant improvements in the lives of conflict-affected communities. Civilians can travel more freely, and livelihoods have begun to improve in some areas, with villagers having better access to their fields, and decreases in predatory taxation by military authorities.10 With the election results of November 2015, it seemed unlikely that the peace process as configured by the NCA will result in a substantial and sustained political dialogue. Myanmar's next NLD-led government will have a packed agenda, and may not priorities the peace

10 Myanmar Peace Support Initiative - MPSI (2014): Lesson Learned from MPSI’s work supporting the

peace process in Myanmar, available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report_Lessons-learned-supporting-the-peace-process_MPSI_Mar2014.pdf.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report_Lessons-learned-supporting-the-peace-process_MPSI_Mar2014.pdf

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report_Lessons-learned-supporting-the-peace-process_MPSI_Mar2014.pdf


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process in the same way as its predecessor. The concerns and aspirations of ethnic nationality communities will not go away, but the opportunity to address these through a structured peace process may be diminishing. However, Aung San Suu Kyi announced in January 2016, that building peace will be the first priority of her democracy’s party’s administration and that the NLD would seek to improve the current NCA.

Humanitarian impacts: refugees and Internally Displaced Persons The majority of communities living in Kayin and Mon State have been conflict-affected, as many have suffered from conflict-related abuses during decades of civil war in one way or the other. Poverty and displacement as well as human rights abuses have been widespread across the region with sever consequences on peoples’ lives.

Protracted armed conflict, and particularly the Tatmadaw’s “four cuts” counter insurgency strategy have had severe humanitarian impacts on Karen and Mon communities living in contested areas during decades of “low-intensity” armed conflict. The strategy was designed to cut-off insurgent organizations access to local populations and support by forcibly evicting local communities out of “black”, insurgent controlled areas, to “white”, government controlled areas, while contested areas where declared as “brown” areas and often designated as “free fire zones”. Hundreds of thousands of local populations were displaced and forcedly moved to white areas and ordered to establish new settlements near military installations and government controlled-towns. Others fled to EAO controlled areas or across the Thai-Myanmar Border, to seek refuge where the KNU and NMSP were instrumental in establishing refuge camps through negotiations with Thai authorities.11 Today, there remain an estimated 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Southeast Myanmar and approximately 110,00 refugees in seven refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border according to The Border Consortium (TBC). Another two to three million migrant workers plus their families from Myanmar currently live in Thailand, many of them without legal documents. Many of these migrants are ethnic Karen and Mon and have often left their home country for similar reasons to the refugees. In fact, some reports show that up to eighty per cent of young to middle-aged man and women have left their communities to become migrant workers in neighboring countries.12 This has profound consequences on local populations and their ability to determine their own development and foster social cohesion. Due to the current ceasefires, there are very few newly displaced IDPs in Kayin and Mon State. However, occasional skirmishes, which are often related to infrastructure developments, continue to cause displacement in parts of the region. Clashes between the DKBA and the Tatmadaw in October 2014 near the Hatgyi Dam site, which displaced around 2,000 people, and the fighting between the DKBA and the Tatmadaw and its aligned Border Guard Force (BGF) in July 2015 along the Asia Highway, which saw more than 1,000 people temporary displaced near the town of Kawkreik,

11 Ashley South and Kim Joliffe, Forced Migration: Typology and Local Agency in Southeast Myanmar (Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol.37, No.2 (2015), pp. 214-215 12 The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (2015): Listening to communities Karen (Kayin State), p.19

Clashes, which are related to infrastructure developments, continue to cause

displacement.


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continue to undermine stability in the region.13 Other IDPs continue to reside in long-established ceasefire areas since the 1990s such as the NMSP ceasefire areas in Mon and Kayin States and the Northern Tanintharyi Region. NMSP ceasefire areas show clear demarcations and are home to approximately 40,000 IDPs. Although sometimes forcibly displaced many years ago, these communities have often yet to find “durable solutions” to their plight. The situation of IDPs in government-controlled relocation sites has also improved as a result of ceasefires and where communities were mostly restricted to residing in these sites in previous years, these restrictions seem to have largely been lifted, allowing IDPs in some cases to begin moving back to their place of origin. Populations however remain vulnerable with limited access to land and an absence of social infrastructure and services. 14 While the ceasefires have improved the situations of IDPs and conflict-affected populations in Karen & Mon States tremendously, more needs to be done to achieve durable solutions for forced migrations. Therefore, the Southeast of Myanmar remains a site of chronic humanitarian crises.15

Further readings

Ashley South (2011): Burma’s Longest War, Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, (Amsterdam, Burma Center Netherlands, 2011)

Mary Callahan (2007): Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexistence, Policy Studies 31 (South East Asia), Washington D.C.: East-West Center

13 Retrieved online at http://khrg.org/2015/09/15-15-nb1/fighting-between-tatmadaw-and-dkba-soldiers-along-asian-highway-displaces 14Ashley South and Kim Joliffe, Forced Migration: Typology and Local Agency in Southeast Myanmar (Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol.37, No.2 (2015), p.225 15 Ashley South and Kim Joliffe, Forced Migration: Typology and Local Agency in Southeast Myanmar (Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol.37, No.2 (2015), p.235


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Ethnic Armed Organizations in Southeast Myanmar The main armed organizations with territorial presence in Kayin and Mon states are the KNU, the NMSP, the DKBA and the KNU/KNLA Peace Council and a number of BGF battalions under the authority of the Myanmar Army. In addition, there are also various small splinter groups from these groups, which have become people’s militias and are also known as “Peace Groups”.

Karen National Union (KNU) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) The KNU remains today the most influential and largest EAO in Southeast Myanmar and has won additional credibility and legitimacy by the government and the international community throughout the last 4 years of ceasefire negotiations, which is characterized by its leading role in EAO bodies such as the National Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and its strong engagement with the international community and diplomats. The pro-active engagement in the peace process by the KNU Chairman and his team has however not been welcomed by all members of the KNU and the organization has become fractionalized, with leadership and networks fragmented along ideological, personal, political-economic and geographic lines. The KNU organizes its administrative system into seven districts, which cover Kayin State, Tanintharyi Region, parts of Mon State and Eastern Bago. These districts are divided into 28 townships, which consist of various village-tracts and villages. Each district is chaired by a chairperson and its administrative committee, including a secretary and joint-secretary. This civilian administrative structure is paralleled by the KNLA’s military administration, which is headed by a Brigade Commander in each District/Brigade. The Brigade Commander is automatically the vice-chairperson of the district, giving him significant influence in the civilian-administration of the KNU. The fact that district administrations are elected every 2 years, while Brigade Commanders remain in most cases in their positions until retirement, shows the significance of the KNLA in the governance of the KNU and its administrated areas. Today, the KNU is no longer able to control the majority of areas in the seven districts, but continues to have a strong influence on rural Karen communities across the region, both in mountainous and plain areas, through its civilian administration and its provision of social services. The KNU’s decision-making structure is that of a one-party state, which is elected upwardly from the village tract level. The civilian administration, in which the KNLA has some automatic representation, is the primary governing body. Through congresses at village tract, township and district level every two years, township and district chairpersons and administrative committees are elected. Each district Chairperson and Brigade Commander select together a group of representatives from each district, who then attend every four-year the party congress to elect the ‘Central Standing Committee (CSC)’ and the ‘Central Executive Committee (CEC)’. Members of the CSC also provide the heads for the 14 KNU departments.16

16 Kim Joliffe (2015): Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, The Asia Foundation, pp.47-48.

The KNU continues to represent the main Karen armed ethno-nationalist

organization


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While the CSC is meeting annually and on special occasions, including emergency meetings, the 11-member strong CEC is responsible for the day-to-day management of the KNU. The KNU maintains 14 ‘ministry-like’ departments at HQ level, whose heads are automatically members of the central standing committee. Departments include the following:

KNU Departments

Agriculture Forestry

Alliance Affairs Interior and Religious Affairs

Breeding and Fisheries Justice

Defense Mining

Education Transport & Communications

Health & Welfare Finance & Revenue

Foreign Affairs Organization and Information

All departments except foreign affairs, defense, and interior & religious affairs are established at district levels and on a smaller scale on township and village tract levels. The most active departments include the health & welfare, the education, agriculture and forestry.17 Several of these departments have established policies, to which aid actors and the private sector need to adhere to, when working in KNU related areas. Next to these 14 departments, the KNU has also set-up four committees in recent time, in order to address the new political situation since the signing of the bi-lateral ceasefire in 2012. They include an Economic Committee, a Social Administration Committee, a Political Committee and a Military Committee.

17 Ibid p.47


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Karen Department of Health & Welfare (KDHW) The KDHW has been providing basic primary healthcare for populations across all seven KNU districts for many decades. It operates 48 mobile clinics, which provide very basic services to over 100,000 beneficiaries. The department has two core responsibilities, namely health care and welfare services and is responsible for the physical and mental well-being and the welfare of the people residing in Kawhtoolei.18 For a number of years KDHW has been working together with community-based organizations and International Organizations to reach conflict-affected populations throughout Southeast Myanmar. In the past, this has been done mainly from across the Thai-Myanmar Border. Activities have not only included service provision, but also research and surveys on health and human rights in Kayin State with the assistance of NGOs, INGOs and academic institutions. The organization maintains a head office in Mae Sot, Thailand but opened a liaison office in Hpa-an in 2013. Since then, KDHW and Kayin State Health authorities as well as INGOs have been cooperating and collaborating on a number of health projects. This has also included a regional initiative to combat drug resistance malaria supported by the Global Fund and managed by UNOPS.19 Such joint initiatives do not only contribute to better health care for populations, but ultimately build trust and confidence in the peace process. KDHW is also a member of the Health Convergence Core Group (HCCG), which brings four ethnic health organizations and four local NGOs together to formulate a strategy to increase coordination and collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MoH). Greater coordination and collaboration by these health actors and the MoH have also increased the confidence of donors and INGOs to support programs and projects with EAO-linked service providers and the state.20

Karen Education & Cultural Department (KED) The education landscape across Kayin State is highly diverse, reflecting the complex socio-political environment throughout decades of conflict. Next to the Ministry of Education (MoE), it is mainly the Karen Education & Cultural Department (KED), which is providing access to education for children in Karen areas of southeast Myanmar. Other support comes from civil society actors, mainly faith-based organizations, particular Christian denominations and monasteries. For many conflict-affected Karen populations, the KED education system has been the only accessible education system in the past. The system reproduces elements of the Karen culture, and valorizes the Karen ethno-nationalist movement, with little linkages to the government’s system. Currently, the KED’s curriculum does not prepare students for integrating with the government system. This divergence, is a result of efforts to support and improve a particularly Karen education system, under conditions of conflict, in a context where Karen communities have struggled for self-determination vis-à-vis a militarized state determined on forced assimilation/ ‘Burmanization’.21

18 Karen National Union Department of Health and Welfare- Health and Welfare Policy February 2013 19 Retrieved online at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/blog/2015-01-16_Global_Fund_News_Flash/ 20 Kim Jolliffe (2014): Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions, The Asia Foundation p.37-38 21 Journal of Contemporary Asia (2013): Comparing Models of Non-state Ethnic Education in


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Together with its partners, the Karen Teachers Working Group (KTWG) and Partners Relief and Development, KED has established the Karen State Education Assistance Group (KSEAG), which provides basic schooling support to 1,294 schools, which are attended by 141,632 students and operated by 6,154 teachers. Around 123,212 of these students are registered in Kayin and Mon State. These schools also include government and ‘mixed schools’, which include government teachers. In comparison, the Ministry of Education (MoE) administers around 1,860 schools, which are attended by 317,380 students in these areas.22 While KSEAG is supporting these schools, many of them are in practice being run by communities, with KED providing some curriculum inputs and ”authority” and KTWG often providing stipends for teachers.

Karen Agriculture Department (KAD) KAD was established in 1949 and aims to develop sustainable solutions for farmlands, food sufficiency and cash crop production. Historically, the main task of KAD has been the collection of taxes on agriculture products and farmland from local populations. This remains one of the main income sources for the KNU. As a result of increased land-grabbing problems since the 2012 ceasefire, KAD has started to issue land certificates to Karen populations in KNU administrated areas, mixed-administered areas and government administered areas. A great number of rural Karen populations lack land certificates, which are recognized by the government and rely on customary land ownership and KNU documentation. In the 2012 bi-lateral ceasefire agreement the government and the KNU ‘agree to acknowledge land ownership agreements existing within the KNU and other ethnic organizations and to find solutions in consultation for customary land ownership and other land rights issues for IDPs.’23 This pressing issue has however not been addressed and rural populations continue to live in an environment of land-insecurity and displacement. At then end of 2015 it has been reported that the KAD of Hpa-an District has been issuing land certificates for people along the East-West Corridor. This could be a precaution by KNU’s 7th Brigade authorities, in order to ensure that people will receive adequate compensation from government authorities in the event of land confiscation related to the upgrade of the East-West Corridor. Other organizations, which are aligned with the KNU include the Karen Youth Organization, the Karen Women Organization and humanitarian aid providers such as the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) and the Karen Office for Development and Relief (KORD), which have been providing lifesaving humanitarian aid to internally displaced people throughout Southeast Myanmar for a number of years and in partnership with international organizations.

Myanmar: The Mon and Karen National Education Regimes, Journal of Contemporary Asia, DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2013.823534

22 Kim Jolliffe (2014): Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions, The Asia Foundation, p.17 23 Paul Keanen


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The KNU has traditionally strong relationships with border based civil society actors, who have worked alongside and in partnership with the organization for many years. Cooperation has included assistance to conflict-affected communities and reporting on human rights abuses by the Myanmar Army and proxy forces. In recent years however, Karen CSOs have also become more critical towards the KNU and have heavily criticized the current KNU leadership’s peace process approach and its governance of natural resources and its tendency to neopatrimonialism.

Democratic Karen Buddhist/ Benevolent Army (DKBA) Even though its influence and strength has been greatly decreased since 2010, when most of its battalions were transformed into BGF, the DKBA under the leadership of Saw Lah Pwe remains the largest EAO after the KNU in Kayin State. Though a signatory of a bi-lateral ceasefire agreement in 2011 and the NCA, the groups has enjoyed an uneasy relationship with the government and the Tatmadaw, reflected by various armed clashes along the East-West Corridor in Kawkreik and Mywaddy Townships and tensions around the proposed Hatgyi Dam site in Hlaingbwe Township. DKBA field commanders, who had been involved in these clashes, have since been sacked. These commanders however continue to cause instability across central Kayin State with negative consequences for local populations and have formed their own DKBA fraction in late 2015. As this fraction has not signed the NCA, it is most likely that the Myanmar Army and BGF will use force in order to eliminate this fraction in the future. After its establishment in 1994, the DKBA often acted as a proxy militia force for the Myanmar Army and used forced displacement as a means of controlling populations and resources, and to undermine the KNU. Like its counterparts in the KNLA, the DKBA have been heavily involved in war economy activities and have used military and political status as a means to personal power and enrichment.24 The group operated various trading gates along the Thai-Myanmar border, which are now under BGF control, relied on illegal taxation, was heavily involved in logging activities and was also often accused to play a role in the production & trade of narcotics (yaba). The DKBA does not maintain departments as the KNU, but often provides very basic health care and education services, often in partnership with CSO, in its administrated areas. Research indicates that the KNU’s civilian administration system is currently being re-established in areas under DKBA authority and that DKBA leadership has transferred all political affairs to the KNU. 25 This is especially apparent in the NCA process and its structures, where KNU members are assigned to represent DKBA as an organization, as the DKBA has limited capacity and human resources.

24 South, Ashley (2008): Ethnic Politics in Burma: States in Conflict, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asian Series, p.58 25 Kim Joliffe (2015): Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, The Asia Foundation p.51


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KNU/KNLA Peace Council

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC) was formed in 2007, after Brig. Gen. Htain Maung of the KNLA’s 7th Brigade split form the KNU and achieved a ceasefire with the government. The group, composed of about 400 soldiers and their family members, was granted a new headquarter at Htokawko village, site of the death of the legendary Karen Revolution leader Saw Ba U Gyi. This new base is located in the foothills of the Dawna Range about twenty kilometers north of Kawkareik. The ceasefire agreement met with harsh criticism and condemnation from exile opposition groups as well as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) at the Thai-Burma border. Many of them feared that the KPC would develop into a group similar to the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which has attacked refugee camps on Thai soil in the past and often acts as a proxy for the Tatmadaw.26

The KPC came under immense pressure to transform into a BGF under Tatmadaw control in 2010. It however managed to re-new a bilateral ceasefire in 2011 and signed the NCA in October 2015.

The organization is mainly engaged in small business activities, such as transportation, trade, small-scale mining and logging as well as agriculture. It manages a number of primary schools and basic health centers and has been collaboration with the KNU’s social service departments, local NGOs and INGOs to provide services for populations in its ceasefire area.

The KPC has recently acquired land next to the A1 Highway between Kawkareik and Kyondoe and has designated the land for development of a ‘Peace village’.

NMSP/MNLA The NMSP organizes the Mon-populated regions into three districts -Thaton, Mawlamyine, and its headquarters area, Dawei, which significantly overlap with some KNU districts. Each of the districts is further divided into three townships. The NMSP controls the majority of Mon State’s small border with Thailand, which falls under the government-defined Ye Township, parts of northern Tanintharyi Region along the border with Thailand and a smaller area in Kyainseikgyi Township in Kayin State. These areas are autonomous ceasefire areas from which the Myanmar Army is barred from entering without prior agreement. The NMSP is headed by a 27-member central committee and a 7-member central executive committee, which are elected every 3 years by party committees from each district. These district committees are elected by township committees, which are comprised of party members from each township. Through this membership system, the NMSP structure resembles a parliamentary political party. The MNLA has no automatic political representation in the elected bodies. Historically, the NMSP has more civilian control over politics than other EAO such as the KNU. The current NMSP chairman is however also a former MNLA commander. Only one woman has ever been and currently is a member of the central committee throughout the history of the organization.27

26 Paul Core (2009): Burma/ Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen State, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 28.

27 Kim Joliffe (2015): Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, The Asia Foundation pp.57-58.


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The executive committee oversees three main departments, including defense, party affairs and administration. The administration department oversees eight other departments:

- Education - Revenue - Agriculture - Health - Forestry - Logistics - Religious Affairs - Justice

A district chairperson, who administers the 3 departments through district-level departments with the same structure, heads each of the districts. The districts have significant authority over each of their three townships, but enjoy considerable freedom form the headquarter level. Mon National Education Committee (MNEC) The Mon national education system was developed in the NMSP controlled areas during the early 1970s, and extended its influence from the NMSP controlled areas to other parts of Mon State following the 1995 ceasefire. Even though the teaching of Mon language in government schools during school hours was not allowed, Mon has been taught as part of the curriculum in many ‘mixed schools’. Mixed schools are government-run schools, where MNEC provides one or more teachers, supports them financially, and gives input into the syllabus. This arrangement between state and non-state education systems is not officially formalized and varies between townships, districts, and villages. The depth of cooperation between the MNEC and state education authorities varies and is based mostly on personal relationship in the local setting. However, since the political reform process and renewed ceasefire agreement, MNEC has developed constructive relationships with key partners, e.g. UNICEF, and has increased its cooperation/ convergence with the government education department. A recent and unique success has been the development of a Mon language textbook by CBOs, MNEC and government for use in government classes through to grade 4. Currently, MNEC operates 142 Mon National schools and is further involved in 107 ‘mixed schools’ with a total number of 777 teachers and approx. 30,000 students. Other departments, which are involved in providing humanitarian and development aid to Mon populations, include the Mon Relief and Development Committee (MRDC), the Mon National Health Department (MNHD) and the Mon Women’s Organization (MWO). It should be noticed that in recent times, there have been tensions between Mon civil society, and NMSP which would like to control and restrict civil society’s engagement in its controlled areas.

Ethnic Armed Organizations’ grievances and political aspirations/agendas The major EAOs, such as the Karen National Union (KNU) or New Mon State Party (NMSP), enjoy significant political legitimacy and extensive support among ethnic communities, as representatives of ethnic interests and identities. This is reinforced by their often-extensive administrative structures and their social service provisions in conflict affected areas. Their political legitimacy is however not exclusive, sometimes contested and they cannot claim to be the sole representatives of their communities. They are joined by a range of community- based organizations (CBOs), local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political


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parties who claim to represent and speak for their constituencies. The increased engagement with EAOs over the past 4 years of ceasefire negotiations by the international community has reinforced the understanding that ethnic grievances are the key driver of armed conflict in Myanmar.28 The lack of rights to self-determination and self-reliance, political equality and local autonomy are key elements of these broader grievances and basic human rights. They are stressed at all levels of non-Burman societies and often linked to federal and nationalist concepts by ethnic elites.29 EAOs are demanding a political dialogue, which will focus on their concerns and aspirations and ultimately change state-society relationships in the future. With the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by all Karen Armed Groups and a few other EAOs, the organizations hope that a political dialogue on national level will commence in the near future. There however remain significant differences between EAOs and the government regarding the structure and legitimacy of the state. A successful political dialogue will ultimately require constitutional change and a federal solution to ethnic conflict in Myanmar. The KNU holds a strong position in favor of federalism. Within the KNU, there are a range of opinions regarding whether the organization should aspire towards quasi-governmental status, or rather should position itself as a political party, struggling for the interests of Karen (and other minority) communities in Myanmar. The NMSP has however refrained from signing the NCA on October 15th 2015, regarding the government’s move to exclude other EAO from signing the NCA as a “divide & rule” strategy, which weakens ethnic unity and bargaining power. While its bi-lateral ceasefire agreement continues to be valid, it remains to be seen if the organization and other EAO join the NCA at a later stage, when the NLD-led government will come into office. In January 2015 Aung San Suu Kyi declared that the new NLD-government will make the peace process its first priority, and has promised an all-inclusive ceasefire agreement. If and when substantial political dialogue starts – either as a result of the peace process, or in the context of a changing national political landscape following the elections – it will likely include political parties and civil society actors. In this context, there may be increasing challenges to the legitimacy of EAOs, as representatives of ethnic communities. Already, some voices are questioning the degree to which these groups really represent their claimed constituencies, and to what extent these are essentially warlord organizations. It should be acknowledged that most ethnic armed groups – and individual field commanders – do have economic agendas. It is hardly surprising, after de cades of armed conflict, that political economies in conflict zones sometimes involve activities that enrich both ethnic group and Tatmadaw personnel. Many of the longer-established ethnic armed groups do nevertheless enjoy very extensive – albeit sometimes contested – support among ethnic communities.

28 MPSI (2014): Lessons Learned, p.31 29 Kim Joliffe (2014): Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions, The Asia Foundation, pp.8-9

Ethnic grievances are the key driver of armed conflict in Myanmar


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Karen (and Mon) factionalism Today’s complex socio-political and fragile situation in Southeast Myanmar is also a result of past governments’ strategies to encourage factionalism among Karen and Mon nationalist movements, in order to significantly damage and weaken them. This has resulted in various splinter groups of the KNU and NMSP, of which some have transformed into BGF under Myanmar Army control in 2010 or become Special Region Peace Groups (local militias). Kayin and Mon States remain heavily militarized and contested and therefore cannot be regarded as post-conflict environments. Kayin State proves to be more complex and contested with multiple actors claiming control over populations and territories. In fact, inconsistencies and competition between government and EAO administrations are of high concerns for communities and contribute to the lack of security, establishment of rule of law and authoritative control.30 The most prominent and devastating example of factionalism in the Karen Nationalist Movement was the establishment of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in December 1994, which followed a conflict between Christian dominated leadership of the KNU and Buddhist soldiers in the KNLA. It can be regarded as one of the severest setbacks to the Karen Nationalist movement.31 Only a month after its formation and with the assistance of the Tatmadaw, the DKBA was able to capture the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw, which also sheltered the loose alliance of prodemocracy organizations along the Thai-Burma Border, and caused over 10,000 civilians to flee to Thailand as refugees. The emergence of the DKBA was a result of poor political skills at the top of the KNU, combined with deeply –held grievances among many Karen Buddhists, which resulted in years of interfaith disputes and neglects of the Buddhist majority within the KNU/KNLA by the Christian Sgaw Karen elite.32 Most influential in the emergence of the DKBA had been the monk U Thuzana, who promoted his vision of peace and tranquility around monasteries, sanctuaries and sacred spaces, with pagodas in the center, where displaced Karen people could take refuge and receive free food. This had been very much in line with Buddhist movements in previous centuries and traditional Karen millenarian themes and followed the example of the venerable U Thamanya, who established a famous monastic sanctuary near Hpa-an (between Eindu and Gyain). U Thuzana’s movement criticized the Christian dominated KNU leadership for ignoring the plights of the poor Buddhist Karen and their religion and demanded to construct a pagoda in the KNU’s headquarters.33 Aid actors need to understand that religious leaders in Kayin and Mon States, including Buddhist monks and Christian pastors, are highly respected and in many cases possess extensive authority and power over their communities. This also includes decision-making on development issues and the day-to day governance of village communities. It is therefore

30 CPCS (2105): Listening to communities –Karen (Kayin) State, pp.10-11 31 Mikael Gravers (2007): Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, pp.246-248 32 Ashley South (2011): Burma’s Longest War, Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, (Amsterdam, Burma Center Netherlands, 2011), p.19 33 gravers or south

Kayin and Mon States remain heavily militarized and contested and therefore cannot be regarded as post-conflict

environments.


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important to consult and engage these religious leaders during project planning and implementation and ensure their approval and consensus. Factionalism has not been unique to the Karen nationalist movement but has also occurred in the Mon Nationalist Movement. Between 1995 and 2001, five splinter groups emerged from the NMSP and resumed conflict with the Myanmar Army, undermining security across Mon State.


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Main Ethnic Armed Organizations in Southeast Myanmar

Ethnic Armed Organization

Main locations, troop numbers

Identities, interests, positions

Karen National Union (KNU) Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO )

7 KNLA Brigades – Kayin State, eastern Bago Region, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region Approx. 4.000 soldiers. 7 KNDO battalions in each KNLA Brigade + 2 HQ battalions Approx. 1.000 soldiers

- Ceasefire since January 2012. Largest Karen armed ethno-nationalist organization. - Current leadership is divided on the peace process and political strategy - Significant revenue from taxation of border trade in the past, more recently from logging, mining and taxing of local populations.

Democratic Karen Benevolent (previously, ‘Buddhist’) Army (DKBA)

Kawkreik, Myawaddy, Kyainseikgyi and Hlainbwe Townships, parts of Mon State. Main faction app.1500 soldiers; app.1000 soldiers in smaller groups, some of which recently expelled from DKBA.

- Refused to transfer into BGF into 2010. Singed a ceasefire in 2011 after heavy fighting in 2010 and 2011 - Limited political agenda and administration, relies heavily on the KNU in the peace process -Substantial vested economic interests (including some commanders involved in drugs trafficking). - Has been further marginalized, after clashed with Myanmar Army and BGF along the Asia Highway, which led to the dismissal of field commanders

KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC)

Hlaingbwe, Myawaddy and Kawkreik Townships c. 400 soldiers.

- Former members of the 7th Brigade of the KNLA, who signed a ceasefire in 2007. - Refused to become a BGF in 2010, but managed to renew its ceasefire. - Controls a small number of villages in central Kayin State, and along the Thailand border. Involved mostly in trade, taxation and agriculture

Karen Border Guard Forces (BGF)

Central and Southern Kayin State, and parts of Mon State. c. 2500 soldiers, in 13 Battalions.

- Former DKBA and Karen Peace Force battalions, which transformed into BGFs in 2010 under direct control of the Tatmadaw. - No political body and limited agenda but heavily involved in illegal and legal cross-border trade. Has been accused of drug production. Stronghold (Shwe Koko) in Myawaddy Township. - Has been fighting especially against former DKBA comrade-in-arms around Kawkreik (Asia Highway) and near the proposed Hatgyi Dam Site in Hlaingbwe


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Township.

New Mon State Party (NMSP) Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA)

Mon State, parts of Kayin State and Northern Tanintharyi Region One battalion per district and two mobile battalions Approx. 1800 soldiers

- Ceasefire since 1995, which was renewed in 2012. - Long-standing alliance with KNU and other EAOs and commitment to federalism. - Controls three main ceasefire areas. - Did not sign the NCA, and regarded as one of the more ‘hard-line’ EAOs (key member of United Nationalities Federal Council).

Ceasefire Liaison Offices Many of the bilateral ceasefire agreements make reference to the establishment of Ceasefire Liaison Offices (CLOs), in order to work together and co-ordinate the ceasefire implementations. Hence, all EAO in Southeast Myanmar had established CLOs during 2013. These offices fulfill an important coordination and collaboration role and include:

Military liaison and communication of troop movement and positioning

Roles in joint-ceasefire monitoring and verification

Liaison points for co-ordination with both government officials and external agencies seeking to provide assistance under “interim arrangements” in EAOs areas of control

Focal points for information, general assistance and welfare offices for local ethnic communities.

CLOs functions play especially an important role in the lives of conflict-affect communities, as CLOs’ handling of local conflicts is an essential part of the peace process on the ground. For many communities and other stakeholders, CLOs are the peace process, on the ground, where community grievances, concerns and request for assistance are received and often addressed. The fact that ethnic community issues and concerns are brought to CLOs supports the perception of EAOs’ legitimacy and position within ethnic communities.34 Research suggests that in a number of cases development and humanitarian programs have by-passed or insufficiently consulted CLOs on project proposals for areas under their influence or administration and that international actors were not coordinating their activities with each other. Many aid organizations were perceived to come to CLOs with a programming agenda already set and in possession of ‘a Government letter of approval’, not seeking to have meaningful consultations on intended programming in or near areas under the control of EAOs.35

The engagement by international actors with CLOs therefore seems to need improvement, as the perception of being by-passed or consulted with insufficiently are damaging the perception of how the peace process is being understood and supported by the international community.

34 EPRP, MPSI (2015): Ceasefire Liaison Offices- Observation on Roles and Functions, p. 4 35 EPRP, MPSI (2015): Ceasefire Liaison Offices- Observation on Roles and Functions, p. 25


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Key EAO Liaison Offices in Southeast Myanmar

Ethnic Armed Organization

Main locations Contact

Karen National Union Hpa-an, Myawaddy, Thaton Central liaison office Hpa-an: Major Shee Sho -09425032474

Liaison Office Myawaddy: Major Zorro – 09792507079

Democratic Karen Benevolent Army

Hpa-an & Myawaddy

New Mon State Party Moulemein,

KNU/KNLA Peace Council

Hpa-an, Kawkreik Liaison office Kawkreik:

Contact: Saw Kyaw Win (liaison officer)- 09425002674; Saw Ku Ku (deputy liaison officer)- 09425032284; Zar Ni (deputy liaison officer): 09789365125

Further Readings

Jolliffe, Kim (2014): Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions, The Asia Foundation; available at: http://aisafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1375

Jolliffe, Kim (2015): Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar, The Asia Foundation; available at: http://asiafoundation.org/publications

http://aisafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1375

http://asiafoundation.org/publications


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Civil Society In Southeast Myanmar A previous round of ceasefires in the 1990s brought considerable respite to conflict-affected civilian populations across the country. These truces (25 agreements in total) provided the space for civil society networks to (re-)emerge within and between ethnic nationality communities. Villagers along the East-West Corridor between Eindu and Kawkreik reported that human rights violations by the Tatmadaw, such as forced portering, decreased after 1995 when the DKBA made a ceasefire with the government and started to control their area. These truces also allowed civil society organizations affiliated with EAOs to (re-) emerge, often acting in the role of service providers in the health and education sector. Prominent examples can be found particularly in Kachin state, with NGOs such as the Shalom Foundation and the Metta Development Foundation with informal relations to the Kachin Independence Organization.36 Despite some positive developments, such as the reemergence of civil society networks within and between ethnic communities, the ceasefires in the 1990s proved to be nothing more than “military truces”, as the government was unwilling to accept ethnic nationality representatives’ political demands and aspirations. In addition, ceasefires saw an increase of unsustainable natural resource extractions and land confiscations for large-scale commercial agriculture projects. Trust was further eroded in April 2009, when the government proposed that the ceasefire groups transform themselves into BGFs, under the direct control of the Tatmadaw. Several of the less militarily powerful ceasefire groups accepted transformation into BGF formations. However, most of the larger groups resisted, including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), KIO and NMSP.37 Therefore, despite some positive developments, the ceasefires of the 1990s were not able to address political, social, economic and cultural issues everywhere; indeed, some have continued to drive armed conflict in Myanmar and have done little to dispel distrust between ethnic nationalists and the government. One of the most notable impacts in the Southeast of the reform process since 2011 has been the increased freedom of expression and freedom of associations, which has resulted in the renaissance of civil society. This is especially true for CSOs working on issues such as human and political rights and who were previously operating from Thailand. Many have re-settled their offices or have opened up field offices in Myanmar. Horizontal networks are emerging and are connecting to the wider civil society in Myanmar. Local groups inside the country, including Christian and Buddhist networks, have also expanded their actives since the reform process and have become more outspoken. While these are all positive outcomes, the space for civil society is still restrictive (more in Kyain State than in Mon State) and local organizations are still cautious and testing the boundaries of what is possible.38

36 ADB Civil Society Briefs- MYRM. 37 Transnational Institute, "Burma at the Crossroads: Maintaining the Momentum for Reform", Burma Policy Briefing No.9 (Amsterdam: Burma Centrum Nederland 2012). 38 Susanne Kempel and Aung Thu Nyein (2014): Local Governance Dynamics in South East Myanmar: An assessment for Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), p. 33.


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Having assisted conflict-affected populations over many decades through cross-boarder engagement and from within the country, these civil society networks have strong connections with their communities and regard themselves as primary stakeholders when it comes to peace and development. Many are of the opinion that it is too early for large-scale development initiatives, which could potentially undermine the peace process. The establishment of the Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), a 28-member strong civil society network, reflects Karen Civil Society’s ambitions and desire to play a pivotal role in the development of Karen-populated areas and protection of local populations. The KPSN includes a variety of Karen CSOs from Kayin State, the Thai-Myanmar Border and Yangon, which are active in the fields of humanitarian aid & development, education and health, human rights, environmental protection and advocacy. They are joined by a number of service departments of the KNU. KPSN’s advocacy work became prominent in 2014, when it released a critical report about JICA’s blueprint for Development in Southeast Myanmar. KPSN claimed that JICA’s approach would legitimize and reinforce existing centralized government structures, which are far for being democratic, and that consultants had not conducted a comprehensive, and independent conflict analysis and that JICA’s assumption that development will bring peace was flawed. Furthermore, KPSN accused JICA of only having consulted elite levels within in the GoUM and EAO, but had ignored civil society and local populations during their initial assessment and consultations. JICA’s proposed development plan could in fact fuel the ongoing conflict rather than help creating sustainable peace and development. KPSN’s critic on JICA’s blueprint had produced much attention in the media and has led to a debate around international donors’ support to conflict-affected areas. With the support of the INGO Safer World, KPSN has engaged other donors such as the EU, World Bank and ADB to discuss their ongoing and planned projects in Karen populated areas across Southeast Myanmar. During these meetings KPSN was able to share about its understanding of the conflict, peoples’ needs and concerns as well as conflict-sensitive development approaches. The network recommends that donor agencies should work closely together with KPSN in order to strengthen local capacity, sustainability and ensure a conflict-sensitive approach in the region.39 Another example of the re-emergence of Karen Civil Society is the formation of the Karen Unity and Peace Committee (KUPC), a 60 members body with Karen representatives from the government, all Karen Armed Organisations, religious leadership, political parties and CSOs. The committee can be regarded as quite significant as it brings together a number of influential Karen leaders, who are representing their communities. The Committee was established with three main aims: 1) Promoting inter-organizational collaboration to preserve and promote Karen culture, language and literature, 2) Facilitating collaboration to identify actions to strengthen the existing ceasefire agreement and the creation of a constitution securing the rights of the Karen people, and 3) Developing a better and more unified nation for Karen, including appropriate administrative rule and legislative law.40

The KUPC has convened a serious of community consultations in Southeast Myanmar which collected opinions and suggestions from the local communities regarding issues on peace process and its consolidation. Feedback and findings have been compiled and shared with

39 Retrieved online at www.kesan.asia/index.php/resources/publications-media/reports/finish/4-reports/99- critique-of-japan-cooperation-agencys-blueprint-for-development-in-south-eastern-burma- myanmar-full-report-english

40 Quinn Davis (2015): Karen Unity Building Initiatives – Towards Sustainable Peace in Myanmar- A CPCS Learning Paper, pp.14-15.


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both the government and Karen Armed Organizations.

The KUPC is preparing to hold a Karen National Conference in 2016, which plans to capture Karen positions on a number of issues, including development, the peace process and human rights in Karen populated areas.

Civil society actors in Southeast Myanmar have developed extensive networks, often providing life-saving assistance to conflict-affected communities, and have advocated for human and political rights. This is particularly the case in border areas where EAOs and associated civil society actors have long received international support, especially in Southeast Myanmar, along the Thailand border. ‘Inside’ the country in government-controlled areas, there has been a significant revival of civil society networks over the past decade, including within and between ethnic nationality communities. The ‘convergence’ of these different civil society actors, and the negotiated integration of non-state and government service delivery systems and governance regimes, is one of the most significant challenges in the Myanmar peace process.


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Development in the Karen and Mon context - opportunities and concerns Plagued with decades of armed-conflict and government mismanagement, Kayin and Mon States have seen little investment in economic development and social services, leaving many populations struggling to make a living. While armed conflict has hindered development in general, both states have enormous economic potentials. These include, inter alia, tourism, trade and the development of the ethnic states’ substantial natural resources. Unfortunately however, much economic activity in these conflict-affected areas has focused on rather crude and often exploitative extraction of natural resources (e.g. logging and mining), often with negative social and environmental impacts. Thus the serious concerns which many ethnic stakeholders have, regarding increased economic activity and development initiatives, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks or a political settlement to decades of armed conflict.

The limited and antiquated infrastructure has further limited livelihood opportunities, trade and access to social services. In fact, sealed roads can only be found in lowland areas, which are under the firm control of the government or DKBA, which had a previous ceasefire in place since 1994. Furthermore, physical infrastructure, including school buildings and rural health centers are limited across the region, but especially scarce in contested and EAOs’ administered areas.

Conflict and low-income opportunities have also resulted in large-scale labor migration to neighboring countries, especially Thailand. Remittances to Kayin and Mon States continue to be a lifeline for communities strapped for cash and short of food throughout the region and contribute a high amount to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the two states.

The majority of populations in Kayin and Mon State continue to be employed in the agriculture sector and many continue to rely on their livelihood through subsistence and smallholder agriculture. Most predominant crops include rice, rubber, sugarcane, pulses and horticulture. Along the Thai-Myanmar border, especially Myawaddy Township, corn is grown through contract farming agreements with Thai merchants.

Migrant Remittances continue to be a lifeline for communities in Kayin

and Mon States.


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Evolving Environment The border areas of Southeast Myanmar have historically been remote from the centers of political and economic power in Myanmar and Thailand. This has however changed since the Thein Sein administration came into power in 2011 and embarked on an ambitious political and economic reform process, which included peace-making efforts with EAOs throughout the country. The successful signing of bi-lateral ceasefire agreements has brought greater stability to the region and has opened up a new chapter for humanitarian and development aid. International assistance has notability shifted ‘from the border’ to ‘inside the country’. This is best exemplified by the decreasing support to border based groups and the increasing number of INGOs, NGOs and international organizations, which have established office in the capitals, Hpa-an and Mawlamyine, as well as project plans by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as ADB and The World Bank (WB) and bi-lateral donors, e,g. JICA. According to MIMU, a total of 123 organizations have reported projects in Kayin (61) and Mon (62) States, with NGOs being the majority (101 agencies, 29 of whom are border based).41 It should however be noted that not all active organizations have been listed in this statistic and that a number of CBOs are missing. At the forefront of large-scale development initiatives, which will ultimately incorporate these previously marginalizes areas into significantly regional economies, is the Greater Mekong Sub-region Initiative of the ADB, including the “East-West Economic Corridor Eindu-Kawkreik Road Improvement Project” in Kayin State. Next to the road improvement project, ADB is also looking into improving the living conditions and livelihoods of communities in both states through initiatives in the sectors of urban and rural development, economic empowerment of women and capacity building for HIV/ADIS prevention and management. After decades of armed conflict and underdevelopment, there is a great need for economic development in the Southeast, including infrastructure development, investment in the health & education sectors, including vocational training and job creation. Throughout decades of armed-conflict, conflict related instability has limited private as well as public investments and has deprived local populations from income opportunities. International development actors however need to understand and recognize the complex socio-economic environment and conflict dynamics related to economic development. Both states show strong characteristics of a war economy, including the allocation of economic resources to sustain conflict (war economy), “black” and “illicit” (shadow economy) and populations that are coping or surviving (coping economy). In fact, research suggests, that the volume of illicit-drug trafficking and drug abuse has significantly increased since bi-lateral ceasefire were signed from 2011 onwards.42

The current cessation of fighting has opened up many previously inaccessible areas to businesses, including large tracts of productive land and rich natural resource

41 Retrieved online at http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Overview_SubSectorSummary_VT_Map_of_the_April_3W_SE_12May2015.pdf 42 Retrieved online at http://khrg.org/2014/06/chapter-drug-production-use-and-social-impacts-southeast-myanmar-january-2012-ceasefire

Many projects are moving forward, before the government and EAOs have reached agreements on key questions of

economic governance


34

deposits. Both foreign and domestic businesses are beginning to move into these areas, and are engaging in sectors including but not limited to agribusiness, mining, hydro power and tourism. Many projects are moving forward, before the government and EAOs have reached agreements on key questions of economic governance including resource sharing, property rights, and rules and regulations that form the regulatory environment for business. The existing legal and regulatory framework is opaque and arbitrary, centralizes decision-making, lacks mechanisms for local input, and provides little enforcement of regulations. These problematic aspects of the current framework have already contributed to negative consequences from projects in conflict-affected areas, including contested land acquisitions and unsustainable and environmentally damaging resource extraction.

The legacy of state-led development Past “development” projects have frequently been undertaken by the Myanmar Army or by “crony companies” associated with senior military commanders.43 These “development” projects can be characterized by the absence of any meaningful consultations with and compensations of local communities and have led to “State-Society Conflict Induced Displacement”, often related to land confiscation in the context of natural resource extraction and infrastructure projects (e.g. roads and bridges).44 It is therefore not surprising that villagers along the East-West Corridor, between Kawkreik and Eindu as well as Karen CSOs, have expressed great concerns about the road improvement project, as previous government-led projects have led to displacement, damaged livelihoods and increased populations’ vulnerabilities. While new roads allow freedom of movement, a chance to travel out of villages, and better access to health care facilities, they also allow the Myanmar Army to patrol more easily, criminal elements to enter and expose communities’ land, and their natural resources to the government and private investors.45 The implementation of development projects in such a contested environment will require a highly ‘conflict-sensitive” and flexible approach, which will engage with all relevant stakeholders and be “people-centred”. A distinctly technical approach to development in the Southeast Myanmar, without recognizing the legacy of conflict and the importance of putting politics at the centre of development, will ultimately ‘Do Harm” with negative consequences for local populations and the wider peace process. The fact that all Karen Armed Organisations have signed the NCA and have consequently been removed form the list of ‘Unlawful Association’, gives international actors the unique opportunity to engage and consult these EAO on program design/planning and project implementation. Meaningful consultations and collaboration with EAO, civil society as well as communities will contribute to improving project design and implementation, ensure conflict-sensitivity, and hence the overall sustainability and impact of any project.

43 Mary Callahan (2015): Guidance on consultations- ADB Internal document 44 Ashley South (2008): Ethnic Politics in Burma, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asian Series, pp.79-80 45 Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (2015): Listening to conflict-affected communities living in southeast Myanmar, p.10.

… will require a highly ‘conflict-sensitive and flexible approach, which will engage with all relevant stakeholders and be “people-

centred”.


35

Furthermore, a number of CSO actors have warned of potential redundancy, waste and ineffectiveness of international projects as part of larger inflows and scale of funding to Southeast Myanmar. A lack of coordination between international actors and a pervasive lack of transparency regarding aid allocations to communities contribute to this opinion. These perceptions therefore need to be taken seriously by international actors, as they could otherwise lead to ‘backlashes’ against international agencies.46

46 Susanne Kempel and Aung Thu Nyein (2014): Local Governance Dynamics in South East Myanmar: An assessment for Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), p.26.


36

Development options, and risks

Development opportunity/risk

Risk – likelihood

Risk - impact (on ADB and development

partners) Mitigating strategies

Rural road-building –

Expansion of rural road network is perceived locally as allowing increased access to Myanmar Army, expansion of government control and increased natural resource extraction

High Medium-high

Some reputational risk is inevitable, but need to understand that these are substantive issues of real concern to local stakeholders.

- Extensive consultation, with EAOs, civil society and communities

- Possibility of projects not going ahead, if local agreement is not forthcoming

Health

Provision of basic health services through government staff into contested areas

High Medium

Potential backlash against ADB and development partners from EAO aligned health departments and associated CSOs. No permission to access populations living in ceasefire and EAO administrated areas

- Consultation with KDHW and ethnic health care providers and communities

- Encourage coordination and collaboration/ partnership between state and EAO-linked health care providers, which would substantively contribute to peace building and ‘convergence’

Education

Expansion of government education services into contested areas

High High

Potential backlash against ADB and development partners from EAO aligned education departments and associated CSOs. No permission to carry out projects in ceasefire and EAO administrated areas.

Highly sensitive as it is related to identity, language and culture

- Consultation with KED, MNEC and ethnic education providers

- Encourage coordination and collaboration between state and EAO-linked education providers, which would substantively contribute to peace building and ‘convergence’


37

Community Driven Development (CDD)

Expansion of government administration (GAD and DRD) into EAO administrated areas

High Medium-high

Perception by EAO that ADB and development actors are favoring the government and are unwilling to engage constructively with EAO

Potential threat of renewed armed-conflict, as EAO feel threatened by conflict-insensitive expansion of government services with the assistance of international donors

- Extensive consultations with EAO, civil society and communities

-Ensure joint-planning and implementation of a CDD project by an ‘interim authority’ comprised of the state, EAO, local civil society, the international community and community representatives

Support for tourism –

Outside power holders displaced local entrepreneurs, with perceived marginalization of local ethnic community

Medium-high

Low-medium

Reputational risks

- Ensure to support grass-root/community tourism initiatives and local businesses


38

The political economy of armed conflict While ethnic grievances are the key driver of armed conflict in Myanmar, the political economy approach to conflict cannot be dismissed. In fact, most EAOs and especially their individual field/brigade commanders have significant economic agendas, mostly characterized by natural resource extraction and taxation. KNLA Brigade Commanders e.g. often dominate economic agendas and enjoy more decision-making power than their elected civilian counterparts, the District Chairmen. Decades of armed conflict have created highly de-centralized war economies, many of which avoid regulation by the government and are dependent on external resources, networks, information and capital. Despite bi-lateral ceasefires in the last few years and the NCA of 2015, the Tatmadaw and its aligned BGFs as well as EAO continue to finance their activities by plunder, informal taxation (though reduced) and trade, and external assistance.47 In some cases, ethnic struggle seems to have transformed over time, as structural influences move away from the grievance-based causes, towards greed-oriented factors.48 This is especially true for smaller EAOs, which lack sophisticated governance structures and the capacity to engage in meaningful political dialogue and often rely on illegal business activities to survive. In many cases, a lack of distinction between private interests and public offices exist among EAO leaders and has lead to warlord type economies and neopatrimonalism. Tensions and skirmishes during the past 2 years between the DKBA and Government forces along the East-West Corridor between Myawaddy and Kawkreik can mostly be attributed to control of territory and the establishment of “illegal toll gates” along the highway by the DKBA and other Karen Armed Organizations.

47 Callahan, Mary P. 2007. Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexistence, Policy Studies 31 (South East Asia), Washington D.C.: East-West Center, p. 3.

48 Ashley South (2008): Ethnic Politics in Burma, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asian Series p. 72.


39

Ethnic Political Parties and the November 2015 elections Ethnic political parties have faced various challenges during the last few years and especially the time before the polls in November 2015. These have included the possibility of vote splitting between different ethnic parties (e.g. five Karen parties competed in the 2015 elections); institutional weakness, completion form the NLD; and disagreements on how far to participate in a political system, which is still dominated by the Tatmadaw.49 The National League for Democracy won a landslide victory on November 8th 2015. This was a massive and historic achievement. A big majority of Myanmar’s citizens voted for change in the 2015 elections. Although probably not entirely “free and fair”, most observers regarded these elections as credible. However, the context of ongoing conflict and instability had a major impact on the elections through the cancellation of polling in nearly 600 Village Tracks across border areas of the country. As during the 2010 election, the most extensively affected state in term of the proportion of areas where voting was cancelled was Kayin State (especially the northern part). Therefore, approximately up to half a million voters may have been disenfranchised for security and access reasons.50 While Karen and Mon political parties secured significant votes in the 2010 elections, they fared poorly in 2015 elections. Many citizens who identify with their ethnic nationality (i.e. are proud to be Karen or Mon) nevertheless voted for the NLD, the long-standing symbol of opposition to military rule. The ethnic vote was further weakened by the plurality of parties seeking to represent minority communities. Should ethnic elites be able to ensure a less fragmented offering to the electorate in the next elections, this may ensure that ethnic support does not risk being spread between different parties. Despite the euphoria over the NLD’s victory, some ethnic nationality activists and citizens have expressed disappointment regarding the poor showing of ethnic political parties - at least beyond parts of Rakhine, Chin and Shan States. The relatively small number of MPs elected from ethnic nationality parties might create an impression that ethnic issues are not so relevant in Myanmar. This would be unfortunate. One of the most important developments over the past four years has been the emergence of ethnic issues as central elements in the country’s political narrative - because of the peace process, and also the relatively large number of MPs from ethnic political parties elected in 2010. Over the next several months, international and domestic attention will inevitably focus on the transition from a USDP-led (military-backed) government, to one presumably under the authority of the NLD. Ethnic issues may slip back to the sidelines, and minority communities again experience marginalization and neglect of their aspirations and concerns.

49 Transnational Institute (2015): Ethnic Politics and the 2015 Elections in Myanmar, Myanmar Policy Briefing 16, September 2015, p. 2. 50 Transnational Institute (2015): The 2015 General Election in Myanmar: What Now for Ethnic Politics, Myanmar Policy Briefing 17 December 2015, p. 5.


40

State Hluttaw Results of 2010 and 201551

It should of course be noted that there are a number of ethnic nationality NLD MPs-elect, who will be keen to demonstrate that they can represent their constituents. Both Chief Ministers in Kayin and Mon States will be appointed by the President from among the States Hluttaw representatives and will therefore be NLD party members.

51 Retrieved online at http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/17642-state-and-region-hluttaw-results-graphics.html#.Vkv0mC4cAfw.twitter

6

71

2

4

21

Seats in Kayin State assembly 2010

Military

USDP

KSDDP

KPP

PSDP

AMDRDP

Ind.

6

3

1

13

Seats in Kayin State assembly 2015

Military

USDP

KPP

NLD

8

14

2

7

Seats in Mon State assembly 2010

Military

USDP

NuP

AMRDP

8

1

2

1

Seats in Mon State assembly 2015

Military

USDP

MNP

AMNP

NLD


41

The NLD’s first priority will be to sound out the military. The Myanmar Army remains a key player, not least through its retention of 25% of parliamentary seats and lock on three key ministries. These provisions give the old guard a stake in the future parliament and power dispensation. Meanwhile, networks from the decades of military rule remain entrenched in the economy, together with their crony partners. Turning to the peace process, there are questions regarding the future of a structured Political Dialogue coming out of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed by the government, Myanmar Army and eight leading EAOs on October 15 2015 in Naypyidaw. Will this be a priority for the new government, during a period of tense maneuvering leading up to the handover of power from the current administration at the end of March next year? There probably will be some kind of political dialogue or structured process of national reconciliation next year, but not necessarily linked explicitly to the NCA. The main EAOs will likely be invited, but perhaps as one among a number of stakeholder groups, together with civil society and other actors - rather than the primary interlocutor role they have played in relation to the present regime. The NLD has stressed that it is committed to federalism in Myanmar - a key aspiration of ethnic communities and EAOs - but it remains to be seen whether the party will prioritise this pledge among many other large and pressing issues facing the country. Given the relative failure of ethnic political parties in 2015, the main EAOs are presumably reassured that their role as primary representatives of ethnic communities’ grievances and aspirations has not been subsumed. On the other hand, Myanmar’s new leaders-elect are unlikely to accord EAOs a high degree of political legitimacy, given the NLD’s commitment to achieving political authority through democratic elections. Many pro-democracy and ethnic stakeholders continue to reject the 2008 Constitution as fundamentally illegitimate. Nevertheless, two elections have now been held under its auspices. While the 2010 election was neither free nor fair, the 2015 polls have generally been accepted by international observers as credible. Presumably, one of the main priorities of the future (NLD-led) government will be to revise the constitution, including provisions for the personage of the president. In the meantime, there is significant space to be explored within the provisions of the existing constitution. The 2008 Constitution does provide for some limited decentralization, although most authority (and revenue raising and distribution authority) continues to reside with the Union authorities in Naypyidaw. 52

52 Retrieved online at http://www.dvb.no/news/ethnic-aspects-of-the-elections-myanmar/59238


42

Ethnic Parties in Kayin and Mon States

Party Profile

KAREN

Kayin Peoples Party (KPP) Predominantly (not exclusively) Sgaw and Christian; main strongholds – Yangon/Insein and Bago Region - contested 2010 & 2015 elections

Ploung Sgaw Democracy Party (PSDP)

Predominantly (not exclusively) Ploung/Pwo and Buddhist; main strongholds – Kayin State - contested 2010 & 2015 elections

Kayin State Democracy and Development Party (KSDDP)

Aligned with DKBA and KPF Border Guard Forces - contested 2010 & 2015 elections

Kayin Democratic Party Faction of PSDP (more economically oriented) - contested 2015 elections

Karen National Party Predominantly Buddhist; main stronghold - Irrawaddy Delta - contested 2015 elections

MON

All Mon Regions Democratic Party (AMDP)

Contested 2010 & 2015 elections; presented by opponents as “close to government”; enjoys relatively good relations with parts of Mon civil society

Mon National Party (MNP) Boycotted 2010 elections; contested 2015 elections - more “hardline”, and generally closer to NMSP

Women’s Party (Mon) Contested 2015 elections


43

The peace process since 2012 - a "contested peace", meaning different things to different stakeholders Different actors, from the military to donors to conflict-affected communities, have different understandings of what ‘peace’ is, and act accordingly. Because key stakeholders often fail to define what they mean by peace, dominant positions and actors tend to prevail. For most ethnic communities, the primary need is for structural changes to the state and real autonomy for ethnic communities (usually expressed as an aspiration for constitutional federalism). However, historically in Myanmar, the Army has opposed such changes as threatening to national unity and sovereignty. The government has sought to escape this thorny issue by focusing primarily on the perceived development needs of ethnic communities. Unfortunately, international support to the peace process has largely supported the government’s view of what peace-building means, proceeding in accordance with donors’ assumptions and agendas rather than an understanding of political concerns and local needs and realities.53 Communities’ experiences, aspirations and concerns The ceasefires in Karen and Mon States and the emerging peace process since 2012 are helping to transform the lives of populations affected by decades of armed conflict. In many areas, displaced people are beginning to return to their places of origin and are attempting to rebuild their lives. Increased freedom of movement, a significant decrease in level of taxation paid to the Myanmar Army and EAOs, improved livelihood opportunities and the (re-) emergence of civil society and civil society networks across Karen and Mon States have been identified as benefits of the ceasefire by conflict affected populations. Research has also shown that communities expressed a strong desire for peace and increased security. The need for assistance is consistently expressed as only being secondary to the need for peace and security.54 Communities substantially appreciate these changes, although worry whether the ceasefire and emerging peace process can be maintained over time. Temporary ceasefires and truces since 1948 have never led to permanent stability and security for local populations. Many communities have expressed their distrust towards the government and the peace process, as the Tatmadaw has not withdrawn frontline troops and continues its presence in the midst of communities. The peace process has been experienced by many ethnic communities as a vehicle for the expansion of militarized state structures – and the dubious benefits of ‘economic development’ – into conflict-affected areas, where the government has long been experienced as illegitimate, predatory and violent. In many areas, EAOs and associated civil society actors have long exercised more-or-less extensive governance administrations and service delivery regimes, which often enjoy considerably more local recognition and support than those of the government. Indeed, in many areas the only existing services, such as basic health care and education, are delivered by non-state actors, including CBOs associated with armed groups.55

53 Ashley South (2014): Steinberg… 54 MPSI (2014): Lessons Learned, pp.26-27 55 Ashley South (2014): Steinberg….

Peace and security is desired more than humanitarian or development assistance.


44

Problems associated with land-grabbing for commercial agriculture projects are among the greatest challenges for communities. These are compounded by the negative impacts of the 2012 Farmland Act, and 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Wasteland Act, which do not recognize customary upland tenure practises. If government authorities do not recognize customary land titles and land certificates issued by EAOs in the future, thousands of communities will be deprived of access to land and livelihoods. This will ultimately undermine communities and other stakeholders’ trust and confidence in the overall peace process. In addition, the peace process has been elite driven and has so far failed to involve local communities and especially women.56 Understanding the context and recognizing that communities’ histories, aspirations and needs are unique, and specific to their environment and experiences is extremely important. Development actors should directly engage and consult with local communities on their needs and aspirations and should avoid of consulting only with government and EAO authorities. Hiring local Karen and Mon staff, who are familiar with the context, speak local languages and have existing relationships with relevant stakeholders will be important to ensure a “conflict sensitive” approach.

International donors A number of international donors have pledged financial support to the peace process, and an EU-led multi-donor trust fund is in the planning stage (the Joint Peace Fund). Major donors are keen to expand their assistance, on the understanding that supporting the peace process can help to consolidate the wider government-led reform process. There are substantial needs among conflict-affected communities. Unfortunately, thus far international support to the peace process has mostly been characterized by strategic drift, with donors appearing content to provide funding channeled through traditional – and generally government-controlled – structures, as this is an easier approach than seeking out appropriate local partners on the ground. This situation is not unique to Myanmar. Aid donors tend to frame the concerns of vulnerable communities as technical problems to be fixed by professional aid regimes, rather than sites of contestation requiring political solutions. Exceptions exist in contexts where a state’s legitimacy is clearly and persistently challenged (as was the case in Myanmar before 2011), or when the interests of regional or global powers are directly involved. As a result, it is not uncommon for peace-support initiatives to fail to engage with the real issues affecting communities and other stakeholders; instead they fall in behind government-led development and rehabilitation projects. 57 However, the problem in Myanmar is not primarily one of a failing or weak state that needs to be strengthened or fixed, but rather an urgent need to re-imagine and negotiate state–society relations – and in particular mend relationships between the Burman majority and ethnic-nationality communities.

56 Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (2015): Listening to communities – Karen (Kayin State), pp.32-33 57 See Parks, Colletta and Oppenheim (The Asia Foundation 2013).

Engage and consult directly with local communities on their needs and

aspirations


45

Subnational-Engagement Many of the issues of concern to - and aspirations expressed by - ethnic stakeholders need to be addressed through a process of structured political dialogue. For EAOs which have signed the NCA, this is framed in part by the Union Peace Conference, the first iteration of which took place in January 2016. Depending on national-level politics, and in particular the position of the NLD and its leader (expected to assume governmental power on 1 April 2016), a process of political dialogue including multiple stakeholders should proceed over the next several months or years. Presumably, EAOs will be key participants in this process, as will at least some ethnic political parties and civil society representatives. Notwithstanding the importance of such Union-level political dialogue, many issues are unique to particular communities, or States /Regions. There is therefore a need for subnational (or State-level) political dialogue. Furthermore, there are a number of issues less concerned with political restructuring of the Union (towards a federal Myanmar?), and which do not necessarily require constitutional or legal changes - but rather agreement on needs and policy priorities, and require political and social settlements. Such issues might best be addressed by convening multi-stakeholder forums, at the subnational level (State-level initially, with agreement then to proceed at Township or District level). Such forms could begin to map issues of concern to local stakeholders (including government, Myanmar Army, EAOs, civil society and communities). A sub-national approach to dialogue and needs might begin to build common understanding (or at least a common vocabulary and framework of analysis) around needs and priorities, thus helping to foster trust and confidence (or at least a shared agenda). Among other topics which might be addressed are the identification of needs - and gaps - in service provision, including the overlapping systems of state and non-state (EAO, and related civil society) actors in the fields (for example) of health, education, access to justice etc. Subnational Engagement might also begin to address the overlapping (until recently, violently contested) governance authority of EAOs and the state (and military). In this way, subnational Engagement might help to steer negotiated ‘convergence’ between state and non-state governance regimes and service delivery systems.


46

Recommendations when planning and implementing projects in Southeast Myanmar Engaging Ethnic Armed Organizations

The NCA, the signing of which has removed all Karen Armed Groups from the list of ‘Unlawful Association” (law 17/1), provides a unique opportunity for international actors to engage these EAO and consult with them during program planning and implementation. It opens up the possibility of direct engagement, to build capacity for governance and service delivery, at least during the probably lengthy “interim period” between the agreement of preliminary ceasefires/NCA, and a negotiated comprehensive political settlement.

Projects in contested-areas of Southeast Myanmar should not only have an agreement with the GoUM, but also with EAOs, civil society and communities. International principles such as ‘Do No Harm’ and the ‘New Deal’ highlight the need for interventions to be shaped by the local context, and to engage with relevant local stakeholders. Merely ‘Informing’ stakeholders will not be enough. Envisioned sub-national engagements during the interim period, will provide for additional space to conduct joint-planning and implementation of development projects by the state, EAO, local civil society and the international community.

Ensure that projects have agreement from the Government, EAO, civil society and communities

Ensure meaningful consultations with CLOs according to ADB’s “Guidelines for Consultation Practice in Myanmar.” Consult with CLOs early in the project preparation stage and throughout the project cycle.

Where ADB programs focus on specific sectors, e.g. health, education, transport, etc., engage with respective KNU departments, such as the Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW), the Karen Education Department (KED), the Karen Economic Committee, etc.

Encourage coordination and collaboration between state and EAO-linked service providers, which would substantively contribute to peace building and ‘convergence’.

Importance of engaging with EAOs and other stakeholders “upstream”, to decide the type of activities that should be implemented, how and where - not only co-opting local participation and implementation, once major decisions have been made.

Importance of encouraging EAOs to engage constructively with a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society and communities.

Be sensitive to personal/political/economic tensions within and between EAOs and ethnic nationality communities, which have suffered decades of conflict and trauma.


47

Engaging Karen and Mon Civil society Karen and Mon Civil Society have assisted local communities during decades of armed-conflict and have developed strong ties with them during these times. One of the most notable impacts of the reform and ceasefire process in the Southeast, is the increased freedom of expression and association, which has resulted in the reemergence of civil society. Today, civil society roles include influencing and monitoring development policies and practices, providing basic services to poor an marginalized communities, responding to humanitarian emergencies, enabling people to claim their rights and contributing to public awareness of development issues. The majority of local civil society has not welcomed the recent influx of international actors and a lot of skepticism regarding the value and intentions of international engagement, particular from big aid actors, exist. Civil society regard themselves as primary stakeholders in the sectors of peace and development. Meaningful engagement with civil society and its involvement in development programs will ultimately improve program design and implementation; reinforce beneficiaries’ ownership and therefore the long-term sustainability of any action.

Be aware of the diversity, and varying relationships of civil society actors with EAOs and other power-holders

Ensure that project teams follow ‘ADB’s guidelines for consultation practices in Myanmar’, when engaging civil society in Southeast Myanmar

Establish meaningful long-term partnerships with civil society and engage and consult them during project development and implementation

Be aware that urban (particularly Yangon-based) national NGOs may also be outsiders in remote communities; Christian Karen from Yangon may not be particularly comfortable knowledgeable in remote Buddhist/animist Karen communities


48

Engaging conflict-affected communities When providing support to conflict-affect communities, interventions need to be better designed and implemented in accordance with the context. To do this, extensive consultations and engagements with communities in these areas will be necessary. Among conflict affect populations a widespread anxiety exists, that large-scale development aid can negatively affect the peace process and their livelihoods. In addition, it needs to be recognized that there is a fundamental and pervasive lack of trust between communities and government authorities. The dynamic and complex political situation in Kayin and Mon States and its affect on local communities need to ensure an extremely conflict-sensitive approach.

Recognize that communities’ histories, aspirations and needs are unique, and specific to their environment and experiences.

Ensure that communities are consulted during all project implementation stages and that they voices are taking into account. This will take time and resources.

Recognize that ‘development’ has a negative connotation for many conflict affected communities, as it has been related to human rights abuses such as land-grabbing, forced labor and extortion

Engage communities as much as possible directly, as national NGOs can sometimes act as gatekeepers vis-à-vis beneficiary communities.

Recognize the limited trust and confidence communities towards government departments such as the GAD and DRD and their roles.

Be aware that development is political and avoid a sole technocratic approach

Documents

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