Report title

Summary of the London Fire Brigade role in the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Meeting Date

Authority 22 November 2012

Report by Document Number

Director of Operational Resilience and Training

FEP 2008

Public

Summary This report provides members of Authority with an overview and update on the London Fire Brigades’ 2012 Olympic and Paralympic planning and outcomes.

Recommendation(s) That the report be noted.

Introduction/Background 1. The London Fire Brigade’s role in helping to deliver a successful safe and secure Games is

defined by the Home Office Olympic Safety and Security Strategy. It states that safety includes “the protection of people and property from hazards caused by non-malicious incidents”, and that “safety requires not only the appropriate building of the Olympic venues and physical overlay but also adequate preparedness for events that might disrupt the Games”. The LFB ensured that all matters involving the fire service appertaining to the London Olympic Games and Paralympics both locally and nationally were managed, coordinated and implemented to effectively balance the response to identified or perceived risks, within agreed timescales and budgets.

2. The LFB led the delivery of:

• Effective operational contingency plans and operational resources for all Olympic venues and events, including those outside of London, based on the identified risks and the measures required to manage these risks, ensuring a safe Games for all.

• Coordinating a community safety programme by further developing relationships with local communities and targeting visitors to the UK over the Olympic period.

• Ensuring that regulatory fire safety and fire engineering measures were applied in the design and construction of all Olympic venues including temporary and permanent build to ensure a safe Games and lasting legacy.

3. Specific London Fire Brigade responsibilities covered by the concept of operations included

the provision of: • Temporary fire stations in the Olympic Park, Athletes Village, International Broadcast

Centre and Main Press Centre. • Multi agency Park Operations Centre (Forward Command Post) for the Olympic Park. • Multi agency Forward Command Posts in each venue.

• Olympic Park decontamination zones. • Accreditation of fire service personnel requiring access to Olympic venues.

• Compliance in venue design with fire safety.

• Regulatory requirements and fire safety engineered solutions (e.g. sprinkler systems). • Specific incident plans that take into account the threats and hazards outlined in the

Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSSRA). • Each emergency service provider implemented a Gold Command structure.

4. The London Fire Brigade as the UK Fire and Rescue Service (UKFRS) Olympic and

Paralympic lead, coordinated the UKFRS national assurance reporting to the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, Department of Communities and Local Government, the National Olympic Security Coordinator (NOSC) and ultimately providing the Home Secretary with the assurance that the UKFRS was ready for the Games and that commitments to the Games will be delivered. This process enabled us to develop very strong and positive relationships with the other Olympic host Fire and Rescue Services and this has considerably enhanced LFB’s reputation nationally.

5. The London Fire Brigade took a three stage approach to this assurance. The first stage was the assurance of local Fire and Rescue Service planning and preparedness to assess how each host Fire and Rescue Service had prepared to deal with the Olympic Games and Paralympics impact during the Games.

6. The second stage was the assurance of national Fire and Rescue Service planning and

preparedness to ensure that the UKFRS can respond to an event of national consequence during the Olympic Games and Paralympics operational period.

7. The third stage was the assurance that UKFRS planning and preparedness for the Games was

integrated with partner agencies at a national level. This stage ensured that national Fire and Rescue Service planning was integrated through the National Olympic Security Coordinator’s Board and that the UKFRS were embedded within the National Olympic Coordination Centre.

LFB Staff

8. LFB staff volunteered to work at many locations across London in order to ensure the Games passed off as safely and efficiently as possible. The use of volunteers meant that there was no additional recruitment to staff our Olympic commitments, and operational crews were able to work on some of their off duty days to provide the cadre of fire-fighters in the park and other venues. Some of these locations were:

• Olympic Park. • Police Special Operations Room at Lambeth.

• Olympic Venues as Liaison Officers. • National Olympic Coordination Centre.

• London Operation Centre.

• Inter Agency Liaison Officers at various locations. • Gold Officers based at Headquarters.

• Muster location officers. • Greater London Authority.

9. LFB staff demonstrated exemplary commitment and dedication. Many members of staff worked long hours, and chose not to take leave during this period to maintain a consistent representation at these locations. All of the staff groups have been formally recognised for their commitment.

10. The ability to utilise fully trained operational staff to fulfil additional roles meant that training costs were avoided and negotiation of fixed contractual arrangements for these staff provided a cost effective staffing model representing excellent value for money.

Olympic Project Team

11. The Olympic project team was created in 2006 with a dedicated Project Manager. Later in 2006 a project co-ordinator post was created in order to provide project management support to the project manager. An internal project management system was put in place with a recognised governance structure in order to formally monitor and audit the various work streams contained within the Olympic Project. The purpose of the Olympic project was to ensure that the London Fire Brigade was fully engaged in planning for the 2012 London Olympic Games and Paralympics. This meant that the Project team were responsible for planning internally, as well as externally involving the nine other FRS hosting Olympic events to ensure a coordinated approach to planning for 2012.

12. The aim of the project was to ensure the provision of a safe Olympics and Paralympics and

was an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that the London Fire Brigade is a “world class fire service in a world class city.” The scope of the Olympic project was as follows; • Delivery of event and contingency plans for Olympic competition and non-competition

venues. • Delivery of operational resources both human and physical to support Games time

operations.

• Delivery of training for all personnel involved and a programme of exercising and testing of all games time operations.

• Delivery of fire safety and engineered solutions for all Olympic venues.

• Working with the Fire Safety Order in taking a risk based approach to educate, inform, assist and if necessary enforce non-compliance.

• Investigating previous Olympics and future similar events to establish the Fire Service involvement, with particular regards to the identification and subsequent use of good practice in planning and providing operational resilience.

13. The above scope allowed the project in 2007 to be formed in a comprehensive project plan

detailing each internal work stream and recording all deliverables which were required to deliver the project. These work streams were divided into separate work packages which were allocated to a specific department outlining clear deliverables and deadlines which had to be met. In order for the Olympic project team to ensure that targets were being met, a monthly checkpoint report was prepared by the work package leads and submitted to the Olympic project team prior to the status report being submitted to the Project Support Office. This ensured that relevant information contained within the checkpoint reports were contained within the status reports when submitted. A RAG status reporting system was used to ensure that work package leads gave a clear indication on the delivery of their Olympic work.

14. The work package leads met with the project co-ordinator on a monthly basis to ensure that any risks and issues were escalated to the appropriate person (often the Olympic project manager) to resolve prior to it affecting the deliverables.

15. The Olympic Project Team increase in number over the years to meet demand, this enabled us to have dedicated staff on the Olympic Park and an officer embedded in London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG).

Planning during the construction phase

16. The Project Team ensured that regulatory fire safety and fire engineering measures were applied in the design and construction of the Olympic site including temporary and permanent buildings to ensure a safe Games and lasting legacy for the people of London.

17. LFB was fully engaged in the safe design and development of Olympic venues throughout London and developed effective links with contractors and security staff on the Olympic Park by having a consistent presence. This ensured that all risks were identified and that in the event of any incidents local fire station personnel were as best informed as possible on what is a dynamic, changing environment.

Accreditation

18. LOCOG required a central point of contact to co-ordinate the accreditation process on behalf of the fire service nationally. This role of Accreditation Liaison Officer (ALO) was carried out nationally by the LFB for all UK Fire and Rescue Services requiring accreditation.

19. The ALO was responsible for collecting the personal data required by the Home Office to carry out substantial background checks on each individual working in an Olympic or Paralympic venue. This involved the collection of details from approximately 850 UKFRS staff across the country, including 450 from London. It was also necessary to establish the different roles that LFB would have in venues and agree with LOCOG the level of access the individuals carrying out these roles would need to the zones within the venues.

20. The LFB was also responsible for arranging for each member of staff across the country to

attend a Uniform Distribution and Accreditation Collection point (UDAC) to collect their Olympic and subsequently their Paralympic accreditation pass.

21. Paralympic accreditation had to be collected by all staff in the two week period between the

Olympics and Paralympics. Our Central Operations department coordinated the difficult task of arranging on duty staff to collect their identification, without impacting on front line cover. This was vital to our ability to deliver our Paralympic commitments.

Olympic Park Response Vehicles

22. Due to the specific risks and nature associated with the Olympic Park we provided dedicated LFB operational resources within the Olympic Park for the duration of the Olympic Games Time. This consisted of resources strategically located at three temporary fire stations located within the Park for the Games period. These vehicles consisted of two pumping appliances and five Initial Response Vehicles (IRV), the IRV’s were provided by BMW as a tier one sponsor and were liveried and adapted Mini Clubman cars. (appendix 1 illustrates).

23. The London Fire Brigade attended a total of 353 Calls on the Olympic Park during games

time, the majority of these calls were automatic fire alarms, a number of small fires and special service calls. The profile of calls received shows that the athletes village accommodation was the main area from which calls originated, and of these calls the majority were activations of automatic alarm systems. A number of calls were received which upon investigation revealed occupants behaviour as the cause through actions such as cooking or smoking in the accommodation rooms. In these instances our responding crews provided advice and guidance on fire safety. These incidents are summarised in appendix 2.

24. The visibility of response vehicles in provided an opportunity for a range of engagement

activities with members of the public and with athletes. Over the course of the games period a number of high profile athletes and VIPs were introduced to our crews in the park and many took advantage of photo opportunities and were able to learn about the Brigades contribution to a safe and secure games.

LFB Preparation and Response

25. Venue Operational Plans (VOPS) were developed for every venue to deliver effective operational contingency plans for all Olympic venues based on the identified risks and the measures required to manage these, and to ensure a safe Games for all, while continuing to provide an excellent service for the people of London.

26. The Brigade provided and resourced a command and control structure for the duration of the Olympic Games and Paralympics. This included a strategic level Gold Command structure, a dedicated team within the Olympic Park and appropriate level officers at each Olympic venue whilst they are operating.

27. Working in conjunction with wide range of partners such as:

• Cabinet Office

• London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games Ltd (LOCOG) • Government Olympic Executive (GOE)

• Olympic Delivery Authority for Transport (ODA Transport) • Greater London Authority (GLA)

• London Host Boroughs • Olympic Security Directorate (OSD)

• International Olympic and Paralympic Committees (IOC and IPC),

• Transport for London (TfL) • Government Office London and the London Resilience Team (GOL and the LRT)

• Metropolitan Police. • National Coordination Advisory Framework (NCAF)

• The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) • Dedicated Olympic Coordination Centre (DOCC managed by a ‘Fire Team’)

28. The DOCC was responsible for the coordination of the national fire and rescue service assets and dealing with incidents of national significance. It also coordinated the information picture across the fire sector, which was passed to the NOCC. In accordance with the NCAF protocols a National Strategic Advisor was nominated for each day of the Games. Although these Strategic Advisors did not physically attend the DOCC in ‘steady state’ they were available to respond during a ‘crisis’ situation to represent CFRA at the Olympics Committee and/or COBRA.

29. Mobilising protocols were developed for the Olympic Park and other Olympic venues which

had the ability to coordinate resources at all Olympic venues.

30. Existing Brigade facilities near to the Olympic Park were used to provide a one stop resource management function to manage all Olympic specific operational logistics ensuring that there was no burden on the normal Resource Management Centre functions.

31. A dedicated cadre of trained personnel to provide the operational response within the Olympic Park was established and the staffing of the command and control facility in the Park Operation Centre (POC) for the duration of the Olympic Games Time.

32. A dedicated operational senior officer was deployed to each Olympic competition venue outside of the Olympic Park whilst they were in operation as Liaison between the LFB, other blue light services and LOCOG staff.

33. A process to supplement resources within the Olympic Park and at other Olympic venues in the event of a large scale or complex incident was developed, this consisted of appliances reserved at strategic fire stations close to the Park. These appliances were still available should a serious incident occur, but minor incidents were attended by other resources.

Training Testing and Exercising

34. The Olympic Training, Testing and Exercising team provided assurance that the LFB would be ready to play its full part in the delivery of a safe and secure Games. The training team identified nine Olympic related topics that were not covered by business as usual training

packages. In order to address these gaps nine new training packages were developed. These packages were produced for both individual computer based training (CBT) and group learning with the assistance of Subject Matter Experts. The training packages were delivered in three different ways. • Trainer led Training (TLT) • Group Training

• Individual training

35. Both the group and individual learning packages were made available nationally through the National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) portal and have been shared with other FRS’s. Editable versions of the training packs were provided together with a training indemnity form so they were able to use the package but amend it to address their local training needs.

36. The Olympic Cadre and Liaison Officers were invited to attend an Olympic Park familiarisation day where they received specific training for their role in the Park.

Olympic and Paralympic Torch Relay

37. The Torch arrived in London on the 20th July and began its journey around London, it passed

30 fire stations over the seven day period. The LFB planned Strategic Resource on a rolling basis allowing appliances to become temporarily unavailable as the Torch passed our sites whilst ensuring fire cover was provided by locations away from the main route. Fire-fighters at these locations seized this opportunity to enhance their engagement with the community providing advice on Fire Safety in the home and generating Home Fire Safety Visits. At the end of each day a Torch Celebration took place, the Event Planning Team worked to ensure our staff were informed formulating event plans for each event.

38. Similar plans were made for the Paralympic Torch which was a 24-hour Relay from Stoke Mandeville to London. Torchbearers working in teams of five carried the Paralympic Flame to the Olympic Stadium to light the Cauldron at the Opening Ceremony of the London 2012 Paralympic Games.

Community Safety

39. The Olympic Safety and Security planning based on the OSSSRA Risk Assessment included building links with partners in engaging communities. Community Safety were required to help support the mitigation of the risks in the OSSSRA by:

• Giving communities some sense of control over how the Games will affect them.

• Allowing any emerging safety and security issues to be identified and addressed early.

• Ensuring that vulnerabilities are not accentuated by the Games.

40. There was a significant overlap between the Community Safety (CS) strategy and the enforcement of Fire Safety Regulation in the built environment and the CS Olympics team liaised with Fire Safety regulation to coordinate our approach to the areas identified in the earlier strategy paper such as:

• Unlicensed Houses of Multiple Occupation (HMOs) and poorly administered hotels and hostels were dealt with by Local Authority Delivery Teams who led on these for London City Operations Group. Any action required by LFB was overseen by Regulatory Fire Safety and monitored through the Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships by Borough Commanders.

• Owners and occupants letting single rooms within dwellings were targeted through press articles and other media reports that encouraged them to consider short-term letting of private dwellings for financial gain. Any licensing in this respect was undertaken by Local Authorities and Brigade community safety activity ensured that home fire safety visits were conducted where applicable.

• Use of unusual and unregulated sleeping accommodation such as garages, rough sleeping, use of tents, caravans, motor homes, barges, squats and cars was managed through Borough Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and with stations, particularly within host Boroughs, action was taken to remove or mitigate risks.

• Overseas visitors who may be unfamiliar with fire safety and escape procedures were targeted by working with LOCOG to identify a consistent international CS messages.

Statutory Fire Safety

41. LFB had a fire engineer seconded to the Olympic Delivery Authority for five years in the run up to the Games. The purpose of this role was to ensure that fire safety arrangements had been given due regard from the earliest stages of design. In addition, two fire safety inspecting officers worked full time on the Olympic Park in support of regulatory compliance, provision of advice, and provide a FSR contribution to venue and operational planning.

42. In addition to the above, fire safety inspecting officers in local teams, Local Authority Building

Control Officers and the Crown Premises Inspection Group, ensured fire safety and management both of the Park and at other Olympic venues were provided and maintained to a satisfactory standard.

43. Away from Olympic venues, officers from the FSR (Transport Safety Group) have prioritised the risk-based audit program of subsurface railway stations and associated surface stations, prioritising identified transport hubs for additional audits. The Transport Safety Group liaised closely with officers from the Contingency Planning (Transport Team) to ensure appropriate operational planning and risk information was in place at identified transport hubs, and across the network.

44. FRS carried out fire safety audits of 30 000 premises between April 2010 and March 2012. In accordance with the risk based fire safety inspection program, these audits were a combination of known higher risk premises, including sleeping accommodation such as hotels, and active risk targeting. Fire Safety Teams dedicated significant resources to Olympic related risks focusing on: • Audits carried out on every commercial premises within a 200m radius of the Olympic

Park perimeter where records indicated an audit has not been carried out in the previous

12 months, including premises that had not previously been known to Fire Safety Regulation.

• Properties identified by other intelligence (local fire crews, LA, MPS, etc.) were also audited.

• In conjunction with LA partners, priority was given to tackling sub-standard accommodation through appropriate enforcement action by the appropriate Authority.

• The Brigade’s Operational Event Planning Team and Fire Safety Regulation Policy Department, and local Borough Commanders and Fire Safety Teams were engaged with Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) and Augmented Safety Advisory Groups (ASAGs) at Zonal, Borough and local premises levels, to ensure the Brigade was involved in assuring appropriate arrangements were in place for Olympic and Paralympic events and the numerous parallel events taking place across London during the Olympic period.

• Identified Olympic training venues were subject to audit where the use is fundamentally different to usual.

• Borough teams audited licensed premises, approved temporary and ad-hoc camping sites, provided appropriate fire safety guidance and information and enforcement as appropriate.

• Visual audits were carried out by local crews along the Olympic Route Network and Paralympic Route Network to reduce risk and identify premises that require a fire safety audit based on risk

• A similar process of visual audit risk based fire safety intervention was used for road race routes.

• Fire safety messages were an integral component of the Brigades Communication plan in order to promote compliance, provide information and reduce risk, messages were tailored to target a wide variety of groups across the spectrum of community and regulatory fire safety and coordinated nationally to ensure consistent messages at a National level.

Communications

45. A plan was developed to manage all communications (media, internal, public affairs and online), with a strong emphasise on making sure staff understood the Brigades role and become involved in opportunities to support a safe and secure Games. The communications department led a strategy to ensure staff received appropriate communications, including information relating to training (a training portal was developed for staff to gain the requisite knowledge for their role in 2012) and recruitment to the Olympics cadre.

46. Plans to communicate with external stakeholders how the Brigade was planning for the Olympics were managed in line with multi agency partners, including the police, LOCOG and other fire and rescue services (with London coordinating the latter). Opportunities ranging from media access to training exercises and media activity to promote fire safety regulation, successfully engaged external stakeholders to demonstrate our preparedness and responsibility.

47. During the Olympic and Paralympic Games time communications were very effective, with high numbers of staff accessing online information via the intranet (using daily updates of news and information) and external reach and engagement via the social media channels managed by the communications department.

Safe and Secure Games

48. The planning arrangements were implemented two weeks before the Games started, this meant that the LFB had staff based at the following locations and available throughout the Games: • The Olympic Project Team were at headquarters available to support Park operations and

prepare the morning briefing for the Commissioners Group. • The Park Operations Centre located at the Olympic Park, our staff were working closely

with on site security, LOCOG, Police, Military and Ambulance colleagues to deal with incidents on the Park.

• Liaison Officers were based at all Olympic venues including those outside of the Olympic Park.

• National Olympic Coordination Centre the LFB had six Deputy Assistant Commissioners working a rota to staff this on a 24 -7 basis.

• Metropolitan Police Special Operations Room where the LFB have a trained Liaison Officer, Control Officer and Inter Agency Liaison

• The LFB had two dedicated Assistant Commissioners as Olympic Gold in order to deal with strategic decisions associated with the Olympics.

49. The LFB dealt with many incidents during the Olympic Games, including New Zealand's

Olympic hospitality house, Kiwi House, near King's Cross station and most notably the 40 pump fire at Dagenham which occurred on the day of the closing ceremony. This particular incident was the largest fire attendance since the 1970’s and initiated a Gold Coordinating Group chaired by the Metropolitan Police and LFB’s Strategic Response Arrangements were implemented.

50. All routine incidents that occurred in London throughout the games period were dealt with, without disruption to the Olympic Park, ORN and other Olympic Venues in London due to detailed planning and quick response to incidents.

51. The LFB was one of the few organisations who implemented their Olympic commitments

without resorting to mutual aid. We were able to maintain our ability to deal with planned, rising tide and spontaneous events. Most notably a 40 pump fire in Dagenham on the day of the Olympic closing ceremony.

Head of Legal and Democratic Services comments 52. The Head of Legal and Democratic Services has read this report and has no comments

Director of Finance and Contractual Services comments 53. The Director of Finance and Contractual Services has read this report and has no comments.

Environmental Implications 54. There are no direct environmental implications associated with the contents of this report.

Equalities Implications 55. There are no direct equality implications associated with the contents of this report.

List of Appendices to this report: Appendix 1 –Example of Initial Response Vehicles (IRV) provided by BMW Appendix 2 - Incidents on the Olympic Park site

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ACCESS TO INFORMATION) ACT 1985

List of background documents None

Proper officer Gary Reason, Director of Operational Resilience and Training

Contact officer Telephone Email

Steve Hamm 020 8555 1200 (ext: 30051) Steve.hamm@london-fire.gov.uk

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Incidents on the Olympic Park site at Stratford

Report covering period from 17 July to 11 September 2012 (midnight)

Incidents by stop code Reason for AFA

Incidents by time of day

Incidents by day (Olympic games period in orange, Paralympics in pink)

5

2

7

16

8

315

F

M

SF

SS

AC

AFA

010

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

Canteen

IBC

Other

Outdoors

Residential

Retail

Stadium/Arena

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Ca

ll p

oin

t

Co

ok

ing

Du

st

Fa

ult

Oth

er

Sm

ok

ing

Ste

am

Te

stin

g

Un

kn

ow

n0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

17/0

7/2012

18/0

7/2012

19/0

7/2012

20/0

7/2012

21/0

7/2012

22/0

7/2012

23/0

7/2012

24/0

7/2012

25/0

7/2012

26/0

7/2012

27/0

7/2012

28/0

7/2012

29/0

7/2012

30/0

7/2012

31/0

7/2012

01/0

8/2012

02/0

8/2012

03/0

8/2012

04/0

8/2012

05/0

8/2012

06/0

8/2012

07/0

8/2012

08/0

8/2012

09/0

8/2012

10/0

8/2012

11/0

8/2012

12/0

8/2012

13/0

8/2012

14/0

8/2012

16/0

8/2012

17/0

8/2012

18/0

8/2012

19/0

8/2012

20/0

8/2012

21/0

8/2012

22/0

8/2012

23/0

8/2012

24/0

8/2012

25/0

8/2012

26/0

8/2012

27/0

8/2012

28/0

8/2012

29/0

8/2012

30/0

8/2012

31/0

8/2012

01/0

9/2012

02/0

9/2012

03/0

9/2012

04/0

9/2012

05/0

9/2012

06/0

9/2012

07/0

9/2012

08/0

9/2012

09/0

9/2012

10/0

9/2012

11/0

9/2012

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9%

23

21

19

17

15

13

11

09

07

05

03

01

Location of incidents

Total number of calls 353

Appendix 2