Report No. 176- Tareas Ocupacion Alemania

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•NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regardedas authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy inall aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarilythose of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est p r ~ l i m i n a ; r e et n'a aucun c a r a c t ~ r e officiel.On n'a pas v ~ r ; f ; ~ son exactitude et les interpretationsqu';l contient ne sont pas n ~ c e s s a i r e m e n t celles du Servicehistorique.

Directorate of HistoryNational Defence Headquarters

Ottawa, CanadaK1A OK2

July 1986



- .• R E S ~ \ . 1 { t t >c . ~ N C .

R E P 0 R T N O. 1 7 6 7 D - . ~ e "t.,. I '-O-n'"',O-=-'-lJA _DHOW

RISTOR ICAL SECTION by C);!'L "" DH_ MOHO

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQ,UARTERS Da'" - ~ f iCA-'lADIAN PA-J<TICIPATION IN CIVIL A-"FAIRS/

MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

PART V: GERMANY. GENERAL HISTORICAL SURVEY.

CONTENTS

ORGANIZATION

GE&\'JIN C I V I L l A i ~ POPULATION

POLICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY"

DISPLACED PERSONS

CIVIL MAINTENANCE

FINANCE

Page

25

5

8

11

14



- .Part ic i ation in Civi l

ar ' Government.Canadian

a rs

arSurvey.

c ~ \ i \ . . £ OREP 0 R T NO. 1 7 6 Die l·A •• 0"'1\"11 ~

, _ , . A - " : OHO 34HISTORICAL S-ECTION- by Q<O\. ... OH" "OHa

C ~ " ' , D : w i MILITA.'lY HEA.W,UMlTERS : - - - ~ 8 &19 Jun 47

armany, ,ener.a l .storical

(d) Report No. 172:

(a) Report No. 140:

(b) Report No. 148:(c) Report No. 149:

1. This i s the f i f th and f inal report on the Canadiancontribution to Civi l Affairs!Military Government. Previousreports have been:

Part I : Background and

Beginnings;Part II : Planning and Training;Part III: France, General

Historical Survey, July-October 1944;

Part IV: Belgium and theNetherlands, GeneralHistorical Survey.

An add it iona l repor t was pre;:>ared by the Historical Officer(Civil Affair s) from information available a t Army Headquarters,Ottawa, and was distr ibuted as Report No. 9 of the Histor ica lSection, Army Headquarters, on 8 Oct 46.

2. When it is desired to coordinate the history of theCanadian qontribution to Civi l Affairs, i t i s suggested that



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a short time it was found in nearly every 'case that theadministrative machinery had been severely dislocated by theevacuation or suspension of i t s more compromised elements.An immediate problem was the threat to pUblic safety whichresulted from tens of thousands of Displaced ?ersons beingsuddenly set free and roaming the countryside. This ~ r o b l e mwas encountered and dealt with by the Uilitary GovernmentStaff of 2 Cdn Corps during their period of responsibi l i ty.

The other problems - labour and foods h o r t a ~ s ,

fuel andhousing shortages, etc . - had not become cr i t i ca l unti l2 Cdn Corps had been withdrawn from the area.

ORGANIZATION

6. In order to enforce the terms of surrender which

wil l ultimately be presented to Germany, i t hasbeen agreed by the Governments of the UnitedStates , the Union of Soviet Social is t RepUblicsand the United Kingdom (acting also on behalf ofthe Dominions) that Germany Shall be occupied bythe forces of the Throe Powers.

The code word ilECLIPSE" i s defined as :lPlans and

preparations for the operation of occupying Germany':.The above quotation comes from the Preface to the -:ECLIPSE'Pamphlets issued by 21 Army Group in January 1945 (Rist Secf i le , AEF 45/21 Army Gp/C/I, Docket IV).

7. At that time the process of occupation had alreadybegun in the course of operations, and the pol ic ies , lNhich



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Military, Government, and the prinoiple responsibi l i t ies ofOommanders and Staffs a t a l l levals" (Ibid1. This instruction

. was based on policy d ire ctiv es fo r AllreTCommanders-in-Chief.which had been issued in October 1944. reviewed in the l ightof subsequent ~ e n d m e n t s J and was to be read in conjunctionwith the ·{ECLIPSE!! Pam:phlets to 'i/hieh i t made re,eated 'references.

10. Both these publications - the 'ECLIPSE" Pamphlets andFirs t Canadian Army"Military Government Instruct ion No. I were of a general rather than B technical nature. Innumerablepamphlets, handbooks and instructions had from time to timebeen issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ex?editionary Force,through ~ ~ i l i tary Government channels and these were coordinatedby the s taf f a t Headquarters 3"irst Canadian Army and as':Punctional Ins true tiona for }·:ill tary Government Officers, FirstCanadian ArmyH were issued to Detachment Commanders and

special ist off icers (Ibid: April 1945. Appx }9; ~ a y 1945.Appendices 1. 6. 7, 1 2 8 t a l l .

" - -11. In preparation for the added responsibi l i t ies which theCiv il A ff air s staff would have to assume for ~ i l i t a r y Government in Germany an increased ''far Establishment was authorizedin the winter of 1944-45 ( . ~ Cdn III!4F!}) . By tho beginninof J'ay 1945 42 officers held appoin tments as compared with the

tota l of 16 who had formed the Civi l Affairs Staff some ninemonths before (Ibid: May 1945. Appx 21; August 1944, Appx 10).

12. The increased s taf f was organized into two mainsections - Executive and Administrative - and each section wasdivided into sub-sections and made r e s ~ o n s l b l e for specif icfunctions. The organization of the s ta f f Which. with thechange over from Civi l Affairs to Wilitary G ove rn me nt , had



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•

•(W.D. ,

on 14 Jun 45 when responsibi l i ty for the area occupiad by2 Cdn Corps was handed o'ver to Headquarters 30 Bri t CorpsC.A., First CUn Army, June 1945: Appendices 4' and 8).

14. During these' four months, Headquarters :"irst CanadianArmy was located in the Netherlands and the Civil Affairs /Military Government s taff were simultaneously engaged withCivil Affairs in the B-1, C, and B-2 areas and with Military

Government in Germany.'Although

2 CdnCorps

was theformation directly concerned with Military Government, manyof the problems encountered were beyond the scope of a corpsstaff and these problems therefore became the responsibil i tyof/the s taf f at Army Headquarters.

15. The objects of Military Government In Germany were:

(a) to impose the wil l of the Allies upon occupied

Germany;

(b) to care for, control, and repatriate United'Nations Displaced Persons;

(c) to eliminate Nazism;

(d) to restore and maintain law and order;

(e) to orotect United Nations progerty Bod to assumecontrol of Nazi prOierty;

(f) to establish a suitable c iv i l administration;

(g) to apprehend war criminals.



(b)

..- 5 ..

IIL/R" Detachments to control the administrationof LandjRegierungsbezirk;

(e) .lIp. Detachments to supervise the administrationa t Provincia l lavel .

In addition there were :IR:l detachments to deal with D isplacedPersons and refugees, ·'iC n detachments to move forward withCorps (as they had doneCthrough !rance, Belgium and theNetherlands) and Court d·etachments to deal with the higher

~ i l i t a r y Government Courts and Prisons (R ist Sec f i l e ,AEF 45/Second Army/C/O, Docket'I, Chap VII).

GERJ!AN CIVILIAN POPULATION

20. The German population proved extremely docile throughoutthe campaign (W.D., C.A., ! i r s t Cdn Army, April 1945: Appx 29)and there was flnc outward show of f e e l l n ~ except indifference'towards Allied soldiers ' (Ibid, Vay 1945; Appx 2). I t wasonly when host i l i t i es had ceased that Prussian t ra i t s in thecharacter of the people began to reappear. On 15 ray 45,Brigadier "ledd wrote:

In a l l places the German popUlation continues to berelat ively orderly and obedient. I t i s noticeablehowever that there i s a great tendency to place theblame on the Nazi Party, Bnd not, in fact , acknowledgeany part of the blame themselves. There i s also anoticeable difference in the at t i tude of the peoplein the areas which were not fought over, as comparedto that in the more rural areas from which the enemy



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The German population remains dQcile, obedient andsomewhat fearful . MilitarY'Government 1s acceptedas their new master and in certain cases of f ic ia l shave even stated that Military Government is welcome,although, of course, this may be an a t t e m ~ t to gainfavour. At any rata, they regard Hil l tary Govern

~ e n t as a protector, for complaints of looting andrape are quickly reported to detachments, wi th theplea for protection against ~ o v l n g bands of displacedp e r s o ~ s , prisoners of war, etc. They ~ a r t i c u l a r l yshow·an obvious fear of Russians and Poles.

(Ibid. May 1945: Apux 19)- .23. Following the cessation of host i l i t ies , the carpet;;of ~ 1 1 i t a r y Government detachments moved in to take overresponsibi l i ty a t their respective levels . They found that

the 901ice forces had remained "almost entirely intact"· (Ibid,Appx 20), and the vett ing of the police. undertaken in orderto purge those who had been active Nazis, was completed by26 ~ a y (Ibid. Appx 16). At that time the newly appointedsenior of?!Cials J having accepted their responsibi l i t ies ,were reported as ilworking very hard to prove satisfactory toMilitary Government" (Ibid).

24. Although the Germans are characteris t ical ly amenable

to discipl ine, there can be no doubt that the speed andrigour with which offences against 1:il i tary Governmentproclamations and enactments were dealt with by the ~ i l i t a r yGovernment Courts acted as a deterrent and contributed to theremarkably low incidence of crime.

25. The f i r s t Summary Court was established a t M e p ~ e n on



•.' - 7 - -

part ia l ly successful', was provided by arranging for smalldetachments fran adjacent 'uni ts to patrol the roads ands t ree ts in the neighbourhood of the camps. This ledinevitably to clashes between our troops and the Russians.On one occasion, the local commander, e x a s p e ~ a t e d by thefact that h is pa trols had been forced to arres t 30 RussianDisplaced Persons in one night and fearfu l of the effectthat his obvious lack of control might have on the civi l ianpopulation, threatened to search

the camp anddisarm the

inmates ('II. D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps, 3 Jun 4H. The seriousness of the si tuat ion i s refle cte d in the following extractfrom the ~ i l i t a r y Government report for the period 20-26 l/ay 45:

The problem of proper discipline in DisplacedPersons Camps and particularly those conta in ingRussians i s causing some concern, as while these

cit izens may be kept more or less in orderduring the daytime, there are many complaints ofbands of marauders raiding farms, etc , by night.Patrols have been carried out by units of nearbyformations, and marauders have been apparentlya l l ar.med with some sort of weapon, particularlysawed-oft r i f l e s and found with various items ofloot , chiefly food. The Russian off icers in

charge of the camps are being urged to takestrong discipl inary action, but so far withoutmuch success insofar as strong measures areconcerned. ,

The off icer in charge at the large c a m ~ atADELHZIDE has r e c o ~ ~ e n d e d tha t he be providedwith a certain number of r i f les in order to. arm



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27. On 4 Jun 45, the head of.the U.S.S.R. Mission,accompanied by several assistants,cal led at Headquarters2 Cdn C o r p ~ . The . ~ u e s t i o n of discipline was discussed ful lyand the Russians undertook to ensure:

'(a)' tha t anns would not be carr ied by Russiantroops and Displaced Persons outside theprecincts of their own camps.

(b) tha t no purchasing or requisitioning wouldbe authorised.

("1.D., C.A., 2 CooCorps, 4 Jun 45)

Although no further instances o f lawle ssne ss on the part ofDisplaced Persons are recorded during the remaining ten daysthat 2 Cdn Corps were responsible for the area, when 30 Brit

Corps took over an additional task of the occupying troopscontinued to be ",to control and curb the number of crimescommitted by Displaced Persons" (Rist Sec Report No. 174,para 63).

26. During the entire period the policy of non-fraternizat ion was maintained. Although this policy waEl a te r relaxed (Ibid, nara 74), i t was noted:- -

Few cases of fratern izatio n by troops have beenreported, and very few have been prosecuted.There have baen more cases of rape than fraternizat ion.

(W.D., C.A., Firs t CdnAnny, May 1945: Appx 20)



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slow. This .wae fortunete from the Military Governmentpoint of view for i t geve the ' s teffs e t Headquarters 2 CdnCorps and a t Headquarters Firs t Canadian A:rmy an opportunityto organize the necessary machinery to absorb the expectedflow of D i s p l a c e d ~ e r s o n s . This machinery consisted of aBarrier Zone along the geographical frontier between theNetherlands and Germany and the preparation of assemblycentres on the l ine of the rivers Rhine and I j s se l (Ibid,April 1945: Appx 29). -

33. The establishment of Frontier Control Posts wasundertaken by the Netherlands Military Administration andthe following quotation from a report made by the MilitaryGovernment s ta f f of 2 Cdn Corps indicates that this wasproceeding sat is factor i ly:

(Ibid, quoted from2 ~ Corps report)

Organisation by the Dutch i s in the process of

completion for the establishment of FrontierControl Pos ts and Assembly Centres for a l lstragglers a ttempting to cross the Frontierregardless of nationali ty. They wil l be

retained at the frontier and moved to AssemblyCentres at Enschede, Haegelo, Ondenzaal, Almeloand HardenbergJi,.

34. During the month of April, as the enemy resistenceweakened and the speed of our advance increased, numerouscamps and groups of Displaced Persons were Wlcovered butthey were comparatively easy to control . A "stand fast ll

order had been issued and, on 24 Apr 45, Brigadier Wedd

wrote:



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responsibil i ty of the Army as a whole; that theMilitary Government Branch has not the resourcesto do more than direct the operations, and thatMilitary Government.must be given high priori ty1n i t s demands on the resources of the Army.

This was particularly evident in the matter ofthe transport so essential to care for the quickevacuation of westbounders, whether P , ~ or

Displaced Persons , and for the transfer or east bounders to camps organized by nat ional i t ies .

The si tuat ion in that p art of GEID:ANY wi thin thaArmy boundaries wi l l require a great deal oforganization and a l l the Military Governmantresources at our disposal have been sent forwardto supplement the very meagre number of detach-

ments provided 1n the general carpet for thisarea, and while a good many local decisions hadto be taken l1in extremisU, generally speaking,problems have been overcome. Individualoff icers o f M ilita ry Government Staffs and ofthe detachments have of necess i ty had in manycases, to operate alone, but the resources have,in general, been such as to keep the situationin hand.

("1l.D., C.A., Firs t CdnArmy, Way 1945: Appx 19)

37. In order to ass i s t 2 Cdn Corps the fU ll re sources ofthe ~ i l 1 t a r y Government Staff a t Army Headquarters were puta t their disposition. All the available detachments werebrought forward and o the IS • which had been deployed in theNetherlands, were withdrawn and sent into Germany until the



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42. By 14 Jun 45, when responsibil i ty w a ~ handed over to30 Bri t Corps, the segregation of Displaced Persons ande ~ - p ~ i ~ e r s of war as well as the f inal m o v e m e ~ t intonational areas was completed (Ibid, June 1945: Appx 2).

43. _ The U.S.S.R. Mission had arrived and taken overcontrol of the Russian camps (ili.D.) C.A. J 2 Cdn CorIls,4 Jun 45) and, since i t seemed probsble that the Polishpeople would remain in their stat ic area for some time,

arrangements were being made to have school books special lyprinted and a survey of the colony was made to select suitableteaching. personnel ("I.D., C.A., Firs t Cdn Army, June 1945:Appx 2).

44. The f inal report shows a to tal of 80,884 distributsdas follOW's:

Russians

PolesI ta l iansOthers

Ex-prisonersof War

19,7404,025

192,020

DisplacedPersons

24,99619,2509,6221,212

Totals 25,804 55,080

(Ibid: Appx 4)

CIVIL M A I N T ~ A N C E



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49. In order to" ~ r o v i d e the maximum farm labour and toconserve as much as possible the transportation of goodsfrom the rural areas to the towns, a plan was also drawnup for the evacuation to farms and rural areas of as largea proportion as possible of the rural populations (Ibid).

50. The. general si tuation following the surrenderappeared sat isfactory, as i s reflected in the report forthe week ending 12 May 45:

• •

•

Present indications are that food stocks areadequate in a l l areas except for local shortageswbere heavy influxes of Displaced Persons coincidewith temporary disorganization ce the localprocurement organizations. Agriculture i s goingahead well , plans being under way for supplementarysowing of vegetables Bnd pulses. Large foodstocks exist a t AURICH, OLDENBURG, EMDEN andWILllEIMSHAVEN.

Shortages of civi l ian transport and communicationsare proving a serious handicap in the organizationof food oollection from farms.

The Regional Office for the entire 2 CanadianCorps area, at OLDENBURG, has been taken over

complete with s taf f and records. This officecontrols an area of 19 Kreis and almost 2 millionpopUlation, and steps are being taken to continue,through this off ice, the control of food produc-t ion, d i s t r i b u t i ~ n , rationing and pric e con trol.

2 Canadian Corps are putting into operation acomprehensive maintenance plan for a l l Displaced



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53... ,_ ,A '¥'+fofBl ration, scale had been established whichwas s i m i f ~ , t o that in operation prior to occupation. Thecalory v a ~ u a ; w a s :

calories per dayI I :1 \I

Children to 6 years7 to 18 years

, over 18 yearsHeavy workersVery heavy workers

Nursing mothers )Expectant mothers)

10331327112015801988

1700

""""

"

""

(Ibid)

"""

Small reserve stocks were in the possession of the localpopulation and these, together with vegetables and eggs,which were readi ly ava il ab le , ensured for the time beingthat minimum nutr i t ional requirements were met. (Ibid).

54. By the time that the area was handed over to30 Bri t Corps the feeding problem had been crystal l ized intothree main tasks:

(a) The feeding of United Nat ions Displaced •Persons and Prisoners of War Camps. Thiswas handled centrally by a special ControlHeadquarters, Commander, Royal Canadian

Army Service Corps which had been se t up incooperation with Military Government, 2 CdnCorps at Oldenburg and had three regionaldepots a t Oldenburg, Meppen and Leer. Allthe camps were eventually absorbed into this

central maintenance plan. The organizationworked' smoothly directing the supply of



• •

(c)" Lack of cO).d-storage andsa l t

and fuel forprocessing plants prevents the storin g ofpresent perishable surp lu se s fo r next winter.

(d) Lack of t ransport cuts down the haulage of~ v e cattle to slaughter houses and locallykil led meat wil l not keep without coolingfac i l i t ies .

(Ibid)

56. Included among the matters for which the MilitaryGovernment Regional Food Team were responsible was agriculture. I f acute starvation conditions were to be avoidedduring the next twelve months, i t was essential that, inaddition to the ration scale being str ict ly enforced, anintensive effort be made to bring a l l available land undercultivation. During the closing phases of the war some400 t ractors had been requisi t ioned by the Wehrmacht from2 Gdn Corps area, I t was considered that 350 was themlnioum essential replaceffient although the lack of tractorswas to a c e r t a ~ extent off -set by the manpower releasedtor ferm work br making available personnel of the surrenderedarmy end by the release to farmers of ex-Wehrmacht horses (Ibid).

57. In order to ensure maximum food production, thefollowing instructions were given to the German agricultural

authori t ies:

(e) Ploughing a l l availeble grass land.

(b) R e d u c ~ ~ of l ivestock end ploughing uppastures.

(c) Reduct ion of food crops in favour of



• ••

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60. In February and March, When the areas around Cleve,Goch and Udem vrere occupied, there were no financial problemswith which to cope since a l l f inancial inat i tut ions had beenclosed and evacuated in the autumn of 1944 (Ibid, February 1945:Appx 10, and March 1945: Appendices 2 and 8 ) : - - - C ~ t a i nall ied interests were, however, discovered and, underProperty Contro l, arrangemnts were madC3 ;lfor owners to takeprotective measures so far as conditions permit il (Ibid,March 1945: Appx 8). Eventually, when the battleJiiiQ passed

over this area and i t became necessary to attempt to set upmore normal cond ition s of l i fe , plans were made to establisha new central bank for the Kreis of Cleve. A representativeboard of seven directors was set up and by-laws governingthe new inst itut ion were drawn up but, before the bank openedfor business, r e s ~ o n s i b i l i t y for the area passed to SecondBri t Army (Ibid, April 1945: Appx 16).

61. Entry into Meppen and Elton in April was not accom-panied by the wholesale materi al des truc tion which hadpreceded and accompanied the taking of Cleve and Goch. By14 Apr 45 banks in both centres were open for business, havingbeen issued vdth Military Government instructions (Ibid:Appx 29). Wi thdrawals were l imited to 100 ReichmarK'Sperweek and deposits exceeded withdrawals ( ~ : Appx 41).

62. For a time, just before and following the surrender,

there was a great deal of looting and burning by German troops,ex-prisoners of war and Displaced Persons as well as by ourown troops (Ibid, May 1945: Appx 2). This resulted in loss oflarge sums or-currency Bnd the destruction of important documents and, althOUgh b a n k ~ in large centres ,rere opened asquickly as possible, small agencies in out of the way placeshad to remain closed unt i l their securi ty could be assured (Ibid).



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Documents

Report No. 176- Tareas Ocupacion Alemania