REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ? Rui Pestana IST - 25th October 2003

REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.

Can the California and New York Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ?crisis occur in Europe ?

Rui PestanaRui Pestana

IST - 25th October 2003IST - 25th October 2003

TopicsTopics

The California MarketThe California Market Portuguese outagesPortuguese outages International outagesInternational outages

– U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada– LondonLondon– Sweden & DenmarkSweden & Denmark– ItalyItaly

The California MarketThe California Market

Reserve MarginsReserve Margins– Unexpected increase of unit Unexpected increase of unit

unavailabilityunavailability California ExportsCalifornia Exports

– Buy at any cost & Price CapBuy at any cost & Price Cap




California Exports

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

Mar-99

Mai-99

Jul-99

Set-99

Nov-99

Jan-00

Mar-00

Mai-00

Jul-00

Set-00

Nov-00


Buy at any cost & Price CapBuy at any cost & Price Cap– The exports were bought back at The exports were bought back at

higher price, giving big revenues to higher price, giving big revenues to market players.market players.

– The final customer was protected by The final customer was protected by the price cap.the price cap.

– The TSO became bankrupt.The TSO became bankrupt.– The market design was wrong.The market design was wrong.

Portuguese OutagesPortuguese Outages

9-May-2000 : Lisbon & South9-May-2000 : Lisbon & South 6-September-2001 : South6-September-2001 : South 2-August-2003 : South2-August-2003 : South

Portuguese OutagesPortuguese Outages

Energy Not Supplied

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

MW

h

9-May-20009-May-2000

External cause : StorkExternal cause : Stork Internal causeInternal cause

– Inadequacy Maintenance ProcedureInadequacy Maintenance Procedure– Incomplete Commissioning of the bus Incomplete Commissioning of the bus

bar differential protectionbar differential protection– Design philosophy of backup Design philosophy of backup

protectionsprotections

9-May-20009-May-2000

9-May-20009-May-2000

9-May-20009-May-2000

9-May-20009-May-2000

Internal causeInternal cause– Inadequacy Maintenance ProcedureInadequacy Maintenance Procedure

(line fault -> bus bar fault)(line fault -> bus bar fault)

– Incomplete Commissioning of the bus Incomplete Commissioning of the bus bar differential protectionbar differential protection(bus bar fault -> double bus bar fault)(bus bar fault -> double bus bar fault)

– Design philosophy of backup Design philosophy of backup protectionsprotections(double bus bar fault -> Station fault)(double bus bar fault -> Station fault)

6-September-20016-September-2001

Lost two 400kV lines -> Network splitLost two 400kV lines -> Network split External cause : live insulator External cause : live insulator

washingwashing Internal causeInternal cause

– Backup protection with a wrong Backup protection with a wrong orientationorientation

– Lost thermal stability of a coal power Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW).station (1200 MW).

2-August-20032-August-2003

Lost two 400kV lines -> Network splitLost two 400kV lines -> Network split External cause : bush FireExternal cause : bush Fire Internal causeInternal cause

– Lost thermal stability of a coal power station Lost thermal stability of a coal power station (1200 MW).(1200 MW).

Restriction in supplying the loadRestriction in supplying the load– The fire prevented to reconnect the linesThe fire prevented to reconnect the lines– The thermal units took 4 hours to The thermal units took 4 hours to

synchronisesynchronise

U.S. & CanadaU.S. & Canada

14 August 200314 August 2003 70.500 MW load lost70.500 MW load lost 50 million people 50 million people

– Ohio, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts.Connecticut, Massachusetts.

– Ontario, Quebec.Ontario, Quebec.


The Network has to carry big The Network has to carry big quantities of energy to great quantities of energy to great distance.distance.– Any contingency causes voltage drop, Any contingency causes voltage drop,

limiting the capacity to carry power, and limiting the capacity to carry power, and it may evolve to a it may evolve to a Voltage CollapseVoltage Collapse..

The great Lakes didn’t helpThe great Lakes didn’t help– Increased the transport distance.Increased the transport distance.– Amplified the Amplified the power swingpower swing..


Planned Outages (Generation and Planned Outages (Generation and Lines)Lines)– The network was less reliable.The network was less reliable.

Peak LoadPeak Load– Very humidVery humid

Computer problemsComputer problems– FirstEnergy had no alarms.FirstEnergy had no alarms.– MISO had the State Estimator down.MISO had the State Estimator down.



NERCNERC - - NNorth American orth American EElectric lectric RReliability eliability CCouncilouncil

Near-Term Actions to Assure Reliable Near-Term Actions to Assure Reliable OperationsOperations– Voltage and Reactive ManagementVoltage and Reactive Management– Reliability CommunicationsReliability Communications– Failures of System Monitoring and Failures of System Monitoring and

Control FunctionsControl Functions– Emergency Action PlansEmergency Action Plans– Training for EmergenciesTraining for Emergencies– Vegetation ManagementVegetation Management

LondonLondon

28 August 200328 August 2003 724 MW load lost724 MW load lost 410.000 customers410.000 customers

– London UndergroundLondon Underground– Network RailNetwork Rail

LondonLondon

Planned OutagesPlanned Outages

LondonLondon

““Buchholz alarm” at HurstBuchholz alarm” at Hurst

LondonLondon

Wrong Setting in a Backup Wrong Setting in a Backup ProtectionProtection

LondonLondon

N-1 criteria was usedN-1 criteria was used– but with 43.000 protection pieces, but with 43.000 protection pieces,

with 99,99% reliability, there are 4 with 99,99% reliability, there are 4 pieces malfunctioning.pieces malfunctioning.

The topology of the station The topology of the station requires that to remove a requires that to remove a transformer, it was first needed to transformer, it was first needed to remove a line.remove a line.

Sweden & DenmarkSweden & Denmark

23 September 200323 September 2003 3000 MW load lost in Sweden3000 MW load lost in Sweden 1850 MW load lost in Denmark1850 MW load lost in Denmark 1.6 million people in Sweden1.6 million people in Sweden 2.4 million people in Denmark2.4 million people in Denmark

– CopenhagenCopenhagen



N-1 criteriaN-1 criteria Double bus bar faultDouble bus bar fault

– Lost 6 lines, Lost 6 lines, – Lost 2 Nuclear units.Lost 2 Nuclear units.

The lack of generation (3000 MW) The lack of generation (3000 MW) and lines causes a and lines causes a voltage collapsevoltage collapse

Lesson to be learn - bus bar Lesson to be learn - bus bar faultfault

Bus bar fault is not a contingency used Bus bar fault is not a contingency used in the planning of the transmission grid in the planning of the transmission grid in Portugal.in Portugal.

REN has installed differential bus bar REN has installed differential bus bar protections.protections.

In the Operation handbook between In the Operation handbook between REN and EDIS, we have a description of REN and EDIS, we have a description of the regional blackouts related to the the regional blackouts related to the lost of one voltage level by station.lost of one voltage level by station.

ItalyItaly

28 September 200328 September 2003 21.000 MW load lost21.000 MW load lost 50 million people50 million people Frequency rose in the rest of Frequency rose in the rest of

EuropeEurope

ItalyItaly

ItalyItaly

3:01 - Line tripped in Switzerland (ATEL).3:01 - Line tripped in Switzerland (ATEL). 3:15 - Call from ATEL to GRTN to reduce 3:15 - Call from ATEL to GRTN to reduce

300 MW.300 MW. 3:25 - Line tripped in Switzerland (EGL).3:25 - Line tripped in Switzerland (EGL).

– 220 kV tielines IT-CH tripped by overload.220 kV tielines IT-CH tripped by overload. 3:27 - three 400 kV tielines IT-FR tripped.3:27 - three 400 kV tielines IT-FR tripped. 3:27 - 400 kV tieline IT-Slovenia tripped.3:27 - 400 kV tieline IT-Slovenia tripped.

– The Italian network became isolated.The Italian network became isolated.

ItalyItaly

49.96049.98050.00050.02050.04050.06050.08050.10050.12050.14050.16050.18050.20050.22050.24050.26050.280

2:15:00

2:18:20

2:21:40

2:25:00

2:28:20

2:31:40

2:35:00

2:38:20

2:41:40

2:45:00

2:48:20

2:51:40

2:55:00

2:58:20

3:01:40

3:05:00

3:08:20

3:11:40

3:15:00

3:18:20

3:21:40

3:25:00

3:28:20

3:31:40

3:35:00

time

f (H

z)

Incident at : 28-Set-2003 03:25:34 [CET] Duration of the incident: 00:44:47 máx deviation: 260 mHz

ItalyItaly

The deficit of load wasThe deficit of load was– 300(Swiss)-3700(pump)=-3400 MW300(Swiss)-3700(pump)=-3400 MW

The deficit of generation wasThe deficit of generation was– 6700(imp)+3650(units)+2000(dist.)=12350 MW6700(imp)+3650(units)+2000(dist.)=12350 MW

Total deficitTotal deficit– -3400+12350=8950 MW-3400+12350=8950 MW

Remaining generationRemaining generation– 21000-6700-3650=10650 MW21000-6700-3650=10650 MW

Percentage of load to shedPercentage of load to shed– 8950/10650=84%8950/10650=84%

ItalyItaly

N-1 criteria, admits that some lines can N-1 criteria, admits that some lines can be temporarily overloaded.be temporarily overloaded.

The overload was not eliminated in The overload was not eliminated in time, due to the lack of communication time, due to the lack of communication between ETRANS (6 TSO) and GRTN.between ETRANS (6 TSO) and GRTN.– The GRTN control room has a button to The GRTN control room has a button to

loadshed 1000 MW of pumping.loadshed 1000 MW of pumping. The Italian under-frequency loadshed The Italian under-frequency loadshed

was unable to hold the frequency.was unable to hold the frequency.

Lesson to be learn - N-1 Lesson to be learn - N-1 criteriacriteria

The computation of the Interchange The computation of the Interchange Capacity is based in the N-1 criteria.Capacity is based in the N-1 criteria.– Any increase of security, implies a Any increase of security, implies a

decrease of interchange capacity.decrease of interchange capacity. With the creation of the Iberian With the creation of the Iberian

Market the need for interchange Market the need for interchange capacity is essential to avoid capacity is essential to avoid market splitmarket split..

Iberian SplitIberian Split

27 December 199927 December 1999– We were not connected to UCTE We were not connected to UCTE

during 1:51:17during 1:51:17 The frequency droppedThe frequency dropped

– Spain was importing from FranceSpain was importing from France– Spain became supplier of south of Spain became supplier of south of

FranceFrance

Iberian Split Iberian Split




49.55049.600

49.65049.70049.750

49.80049.850

49.90049.95050.000

50.05050.100

19:45 19:50 19:55 20:00 20:05 20:10 20:15

Split at 19:52:52 Split at 19:52:52


49.940

49.960

49.980

50.000

50.020

50.040

50.060

21:30 21:35 21:40 21:45 21:50 21:55 22:00

Synchronous with UCTE at 21:44:09 Synchronous with UCTE at 21:44:09

Iberian SplitIberian Split

Due to the reduced Interchange Due to the reduced Interchange capacity between France and capacity between France and Spain it was possible to control the Spain it was possible to control the frequency.frequency.

REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A.

Can the California crisis occur in Can the California crisis occur in Europe ?Europe ?

- No, because there are too many institutional - No, because there are too many institutional players working together (EC, ETSO, CEER, players working together (EC, ETSO, CEER, EuroPEX, …).EuroPEX, …).

Can the New York crisis occur in Can the New York crisis occur in Europe ?Europe ?

- Never in Italy (Berlusconi)- Never in Italy (Berlusconi)

- Yes (Rui Pestana)- Yes (Rui Pestana)

Documents

REN-Rede Eléctrica Nacional,S.A. Can the California and New York crisis occur in Europe ? Rui Pestana IST - 25th October 2003