It is a decade since the establishmentof the Scottish Parliament and WelshAssembly and just over thirty yearssince the Scots and Welsh first votedon devolution in the ill-fated 1979

referendums. While the Scots and Welsh,along with the Northern Irish have eachvoted twice on their constitutional status ordevolution, one part of the UK – England –has not voted once. This means that while16 per cent of the UK’s population live innations with devolution, 84 per cent of thepopulation do not.

This situation has given rise to whatsome commentators have labelled the‘English Question’. In fact, there are severalEnglish Questions which relate to issuesfrom the rise of a more prominent sense ofEnglishness to the way in which Englandshould be governed post-devolution.

This essay explores the background andterrain of the English Question(s), investi-gates what is the essence of the issue andasks if it is growing in salience, and consid-ers the factors and dynamics that are likelyto influence it in the near future.Importantly, it looks at the likely environ-ment after the 2010 UK election and con-siders ways in which the Question(s) can beaddressed in the immediate and longerterm.

The�environment�of�theEnglish�QuestionThe asymmetrical nature of devolution hasled some English commentators such asJeremy Paxman (1998) and Simon Heffer(1999) to suggest that England is somehowlosing out. This touches on concerns abouthigher public spending per head in thedevolved parts of the UK versus England, butalso on wider issues of identity, expressed as acry for a lost rural idyll (Scruton 2001), or asthe passing of a more civilised, humane age –see Pink Floyd’s lament for the post-war con-sensus on their 1983 album ‘The Final Cut’.

Others have gone overboard on a populistand reactionary track articulating a xenopho-bia against immigrants or in some cases non-Englishmen: George Monbiot, for example,has said that England is ruled by ‘foreignmercenaries – Scottish, Welsh and IrishMembers of Parliament – to suppress parlia-mentary revolts over purely English affairs’(Monbiot 2009). The singer-songwriter BillyBragg has taken a more interesting position.He suggests that the English could learn a lotfrom the Scots who he praises for developinga civic, sober, progressive nationalism that hassucceeded in reshaping their politics (Bragg2006).

English sensibilities post-devolution areundoubtedly antagonised by Scottish, ©

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ReimaginingEnglandEnglish�voices,�spaces�and�institution�building

Gerry�Hassan�asks�whether�the�factors�that�have�givenrise�to�the�so-called�English�Question�are�concernedwith�identity�and�culture�or�governance�and�legitimacy–�or�both�–�before�looking�to�possible�solutions

Welsh and Northern Irish MPs voting onwhat are seen as ‘English matters’ – the so-called West Lothian Question. This is par-ticularly controversial when those MPs areseen to overturn English majorities on con-tentious issues. Then there is the anomaly ofScottish MPs enacting legislation inEngland that is not applied in their ownconstituencies – such as John Reid whenHealth Secretary and Home Secretary.

Behind much of this rests a concernabout growing inequities, both perceivedand real, across the UK, especially in termsof social rights and diverging citizenshipentitlements that have arisen since devolu-tion. This is particularly acute in relation todifferences in public service provision, giv-ing rise to the potential for conflict as somevoters feel dissatisfied at what they may per-ceive as preferential treatment for others.

Politics,�culture�andidentitiesElectoral politics is an important driverbehind the English Question’s growingsalience. Territorial politics cuts across partypolitics with Labour strongly represented inboth Scotland and Wales, in contrast to theConservatives whose representation is prin-cipally confined to England. This condi-tions Labour’s reluctance to engage withaspects of the English Question, particularlyany changes that might restrict the votingrights of its Celtic MPs. Equally it explainswhy the Conservatives have been motivat-ed to denounce the West Lothian Questionas a constitutional outrage.

Importantly, however, it is the first pastthe post electoral system which exaggeratesboth national differences between thenations of the UK, and the territorial powerbase of the parties. England is not as histori-cally Tory as some commentators believe.The Tories have only once in post-wartimes achieved a majority of the Englishvote: 1955, the same year they won a majori-ty in Scotland as well as Northern Ireland.Scotland is not as Labour as is commonlythought, with the party never once havingwon a majority of the vote. A more propor-

tional electoral system would reduce thepotential for conflict between the nations.Without it the prospect for such conflictremains a real threat: by the return of aConservative Government with little Scotsor Welsh support, or a Labour administra-tion at some point in the future with lesssupport in England raising the profile of‘the English dimension’.

Another driver is the growing disquietwith the overly-centralised nature of govern-ment within England, which has becomemuch more over-reaching and problematicin the early 21st century, and paradoxicallyeven more controlling and omnipotentpost-devolution.

The economic and political environmentof the first decade of devolution has been rel-atively benign and stable, allowing for thenew devolved institutions to bed in. But theeconomic crisis and the recession haschanged all this. Devolution will now be test-ed in a downturn and an era of spending cutswhich could provoke clashes between thenations over resource allocation.

Numerous other cultural and politicalfactors will shape the debate on England.There is the process of European integra-tion and the spectre of the European Unionand how it is perceived by part of theBritish political class. ‘Europe’ is seen as athreat to a mythical idea of ‘England’ and‘the British way of life’. Related to this is thearticulation of a certain kind of ‘grumpy oldman’ Englishness by the tabloid press,which welds together all kinds of popularanxieties about modern life with a sensethat England is being short-changed: by theScots, asylum seekers and immigrants, mul-ticulturalism, Europe, ‘the PC culture’ andso on. Some of this has spilled over intofears and worries associated with ‘the whiteworking class’ and the emergence of theBritish National Party as a serious electoralforce.

And there is the problem with ‘official’versions of Britishness and in particularthose accounts associated with the BrownGovernment. To some on the right, theseare seen as being part of a project to subju-gate ‘Britain’ to Europe, multiculturalism,

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the nanny state and so on. To other perspec-tives this is all part of a Machiavellian plotto deny the existence of ‘England’. Browngave some credence to the critics and cynicswith his 2007 Fabian Society pamphlet,published on the three hundredth anniver-sary of the Treaty of Union, which failed tomention ‘England’ (Brown and Alexander2007, Hassan 2009).

Scotland�pre-devolutionand�England�post-devolutionOne way to think about the EnglishQuestion is to compare the post-devolutionsituation in England with that of Scotlandpre-devolution. Such an explorationinvolves a little deconstruction of the natureof ‘the democratic deficit’ in Scotland – areference to the extent to which the UKgovernment carried a democratic mandatenorth of the border. It was not until the 1964election that a serious gap opened upbetween Labour and Conservative repre-sentation in Scotland, with Labour leadingthe Tories by 43 to 24. This suggests that thescale of ‘the democratic deficit’ seen in the1980s and 1990s was unprecedented and ofrecent import – resulting in a 56 Labourseat lead in 1997.

In the 1980s and 1990s ‘Scottish values’were widely seen by us Scots as beingunder threat from Thatcherism (Torrance2009). While this might in retrospect look abit overdone, it shows how intense and pas-sionate the times were and how big thechasm of incomprehension between Scotsmajority opinion and Thatcherism. At thesame time a counter-narrative began inwhich artists, writers and cultural figures

began to explore and imagine differentaspects of Scottishness, society, reclaim hid-den or difficult parts of history, and engagein a cultural nationalism which often madefor an uneasy bedfellow with politicalnationalism.

How would such an experience measureagainst the position of England today?What would have to happen for England tofeel itself so alienated and misunderstood bythe pervading political climate of the times?To ask these questions is to acknowledgehow far England as a political, cultural orany kind of entity is from such a sense offeeling.

England has at two points since theSecond World War seen the election of aLabour Government in which the Toriesled Labour in England in votes and seats– 1964 and February 1974; in 1964 theTory lead was 123,688 votes (0.6 per cent)across England and in February 1974666,509 votes (2.6 per cent) (Craig 1981).Both of these were incredibly narrowresults across the UK and produced veryshort-lived Parliaments, and can hardly becompared to the situation in Scotland andWales in the 1980s. In 2005 Labour werereturned with an overall majority of 66and had 92 more seats than the Tories inEngland, while the Tories actually led invotes by 0.2 per cent (Butler andKavanagh 2005).

Is there some deeper, existential level inwhich the plights of pre-devolutionScotland and post-devolution England canbe compared? In Scotland a sense of nation-hood articulated itself into the democraticdemand and voice for self-government andhome rule in the form of a ScottishParliament. This was mixed between intrin-sic reasons – of nation, identity and pride,and instrumental ones – of a belief in bettergovernance and policy.

In England, while a tipping or breakingpoint has not been reached, there clearly isa sense of grumbling, of loss, and anxietywhich could boil over into a demand forchange in certain circumstances. The cru-cial difference between Scotland andEngland is the scale of demand for demo- ©

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One�way�to�think�about�theEnglish�Question�is�tocompare�the�post-devolutionsituation�in�England�with�thatof�Scotland�pre-devolution

cratic change. In Scotland in the 1980s and1990s opinion polls showed a consistent70–80 per cent support for a ScottishParliament; whereas there has never beensignificant support for an EnglishParliament and as importantly, the salienceof the issue appears very low (Curtice2009).

There are two inadequate responses tothe English Question. One is to say that theUK has always had anomalies at its heart. Itwas not seen as an adequate response to thegrievances of Scottish home rule campaign-ers, nor should it be now. Nor is the argu-ment that Scotland put up withConservative Government from 1979–97 ajustification for the English putting up withthe form of government they are now (seefor an example The Herald Editorial, 16February 2009). The other is to try torepackage the English Question into a boxmarked ‘English Parliament’ or ‘Englishregionalism’, when there is currently notmajority support for such change.

How�do�we�solve�theEnglish�Question?This question could soon become increas-ingly pressing, as the 2010 general electioncould produce a result that pushes theEnglish Question up the political agenda inthe form of either a Labour governmentthat is dependent on Scottish MPs for itsmajority, or a hung parliament. The latterwould occur following a swing to theConservatives from Labour of between 1.6and 6.9 per cent (Rallings et al 2008).Numerous commentators have acknowl-edged that the Conservatives have not yet‘sealed the deal’, and the electoral system isa significant hurdle for them. TheConservatives have never in post-war timesachieved a swing from Labour of 6.9 percent or more, their best being 5.2 per cent in1979; while on only one occasion has eitherof the two parties achieved more: Labour’s10.2 per cent swing from the Conservativesin 1997.

So what are the possible solutions? Anumber have been suggested.

English votes for English lawsThis is also known as ‘in/out voting’ andwould involve English MPs only voting onpurely English matters, debarring Scots,Welsh and Northern Irish MPs the right tovote on such matters. However, such a movewould create two classes of MP and wouldthreaten constitutional chaos if English/UKmajorities were out of sync by creating twogovernments of differing political persua-sions. It also carries with it immense techni-cal difficulties of defining what is an exclu-sively ‘English issue’ since strictly speakingthere is no such thing as ‘English law’: therebeing law which is either United Kingdom,Great Britain, or England and Wales. Somesee the solution to this as the creation of aspecifically English law-making dimension(Hadfield 2005).

Cutting Scottish and Welsh representationThis would entail the number of Scots andWelsh MPs being reduced post-devolution– along the precedent set by the establish-ment of the Northern Irish Parliament of1922–72 which saw the number of MPs cutby a third. Scotland has already had itsnumber reduced to cut its over-representa-tion from 72 to 59. A Scots and Welsh cutby one third on this logic would, accordingto Robert Hazell, see the Scots fall from 59to 40 seats, and the Welsh suffer a double-cut – from 40 to 33 to reduce their over-rep-resentation, and then, by one third to 22seats (Hazell 2006).

Such a cut would reduce, rather thanrestrict, the possibility of Scottish MPs beingable to overturn the view of English MPsand might therefore lessen the scope forconflict. However, it also carries with it theprospect that the Scots and Welsh couldbecome increasingly disenchanted anddetached from Westminster, fuelling calls forScottish and Welsh independence.

An English ParliamentAn English Parliament would give Englandthe political voice it currently lacks. Theproblem with an English Parliament is

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three-fold: it has very little support amongEnglish political opinion-formers, has beenunsupported by a single senior politician inrecent times, and the English generally seeWestminster as their Parliament (Curtice2006). A more challenging concern is theissue of what an English Parliament coulddo to the union – representing 84 per centof the UK’s people. This could provide arecipe for conflict and instability betweenWestminster and any new institution. Nounion has ever been successful and contin-ued where one of the parts is so dominant.Examples of this include Jamaica’s predom-inance in the West Indies Federation, thefirst Nigerian federation, and Pakistan pre-1971.

English regionalismEnglish regional government would givethe English a variety of institutions andpolitical voices. Labour was committed toEnglish regionalism until the 2004 NorthEast referendum decisively rejected region-alism by a margin of four to one. TheLiberal Democrats are still formally com-mitted to regionalism, while theConservatives are opposed. There havebeen numerous institutional supporters ofEnglish regionalism: the KilbrandonMinority Report of 1973 making the casefor symmetrical devolution across the UK(whereas the Majority Report made thecase for devolution to Scotland and Walesalone).

Despite its failure in the North East,regionalism will not disappear entirely.

Creeping administrative regionalism is like-ly to continue apace given the need for gov-ernment to organise certain activities at thislevel, but in doing so serious questions willbe raised about the democratic accountabil-ity – and value for money – of such bodies,and the Conservatives have committed toabolish parts of the regional quango state,including underperforming RegionalDevelopment Agencies.

The Conservatives are also committed toanswering West Lothian. Ken Clarke wastasked with developing their responsewhich concluded that when a bill isdeemed ‘English’, Scottish, Welsh andNorthern Irish MPs would be able to voteon bills at their second and third readingstage, while restricting votes to MPs withEnglish seats when the detail of a bill isdebated in committee stage. A conventionwould be established where non-EnglishMPs would not overturn amendmentsagreed by English MPs at third reading.David Cameron recently underwrote theimportance of this policy with an interven-tion stating, ‘For English-only legislation, wewould have a sort of English GrandCommittee’ (Tait and Carlin 2009).

Gordon Brown, writing with the aca-demic Henry Drucker in The Politics ofNationalism and Devolution, supported such aposition back in 1980, commenting thatLabour had to address the West LothianQuestion:

Most of all, a raised Scotland Act could embodysome form of the ‘in and out’ principle. Undersuch a principle the remaining Scottish MPs atWestminster would not be allowed to take partin the proceedings of the House when it wasdebating English or Welsh domestic matters.The ‘in and out’ principle ought to be attractiveto Conservatives since it would ensure them asemi-permanent majority on most social issues atWestminster – no small prize. Labour remainsformally committed to devolution and may beexpected to consider a plan along these lines inthe future. (Drucker and Brown 1980: 127)

But the logic of Brown’s thinking, of sup-porting ‘English votes for English laws’ as ©

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It�does�seem�that�thecontemporary�answer�to�theEnglish�Question�lies�instarting�with�the�cultural�andidentity�realm�andrecognising�that�this�hasinstitutional�and�governanceconsequences

the quid pro quo for establishing a ScottishParliament, has never become Labour’sposition, and nor did it remain Brown’s forvery long. It is illuminating that Brown oncesaw the allure of a position which is now soassociated with an English Tory position.

Institution�building,�nationbuilding�and�EnglandWhere does this take ‘the EnglishQuestion’? First, we have to offer a descrip-tion and explanation of England. RichardRose has famously said, ‘England is a stateof mind, not a consciously organised politi-cal institution’ (Rose 1982: 29), and thisremains the case post-devolution. Englandremains as a nation a unitary polity in aunion state.

Second, there are many Englands andversions of Englishness. England is manythings, voices and ideas. It can be reac-tionary, progressive, radical, conservative,inward-looking or outward-looking: all,some or none of these things. At the heartof the English Question is a contest betweendifferent Englands of the imagination.Historically, the Conservatives have beenbetter at tapping into this than Labour(Aughey 2007).

Labour has tended to be silent onEnglishness for most of its history, hopingall our different identities could be con-tained in an inclusive Britishness.Conservatives have traditionally found iteasier to navigate and negotiate betweenEnglishness and Britishness and did so, atleast until Thatcher, in a manner that didnot alienate the other nationalities of theUK. Both of these traditions seem to haveexhausted the way they think aboutBritishness, reducing it at points to cliché.As much as future political shifts and vot-ing, this matters for what happens to theEnglish Question.

Ultimately, the English Question doesnot need to be addressed unless Englishpeople want it to be. The English incremen-tal technocratic and managerial agenda ofregionalism is now stillborn. The anti-dem-ocratic stance of arguing that the future of

England and regionalism will be shaped byelites has been proved as spurious. A recentstudy of the future of England’s position inthe UK argued that: ‘Technocratic factorsare more important than popular pressures.Political and bureaucratic elites will deter-mine whether the regional tier continues togrow .’ (Harding et al 2008: 88). This per-spective has led into a cul-de-sac.

How does a different English approachbegin to emerge which values a democraticvoice and institutions? A more bottom-upapproach is the only viable way of develop-ing a regional set of identities and mindsetand landscape that can evolve into a region-al consciousness strong enough to wantdemocratic institutions. Any approachesalong these lines are not likely to bearimmediate results and will require a long-term perspective.

The English debate is, of course, takingplace in a fluid environment. The Scottishdimension in particular will influence theshape of the English Question from theCalman Commission recommendations tothe eventually inevitable Scottish inde-pendence referendum, which will throwup issues about the character and positionof England and the union itself. A numberof election permutations in an asymmetri-cal union, from a ConservativeGovernment with little Scottish or Welshrepresentation to other scenarios, couldbegin a train of events that radically alterthe union.

Finally, the difference between identityand culture and governance and legitimacyposed at the outset of this essay is ultimatelya false one, in that they are not completelyseparate, but cross-cutting and shaping ofeach other. It does seem that the contempo-rary answer to the English Question lies instarting with the cultural and identity realmand recognising that this has institutionaland governance consequences.

Two examples here would be the UKand Scotland. Fifty years ago the UKGovernment decided to ‘rebrand’ (in thedays before the term was used) ‘the UK’ as‘Britain’, noting the lack of recognition inthe terms ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘Great

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Britain’, and in the days before think tanksdid this – doing so quietly and successfully(Mitchell 2009). The other example is theslow journey of the Scots’ perception ofthemselves as a ‘nation’ leading to institu-tion building and then nation building: theestablishment of the Scottish Office andadministrative devolution in 1885 subse-quently culminating in the ScottishParliament and legislative devolution in1999.

Two lessons for the English Question canbe drawn from this: first, that to beginanswering the issues underlying it oneneeds to begin talking, using and articulat-ing a concept of ‘England’ within the publicdomain – this changes how it is seen andthought of. Secondly, across a range of areasand institutions England is still somethingthat dare not speak its name. There hasbeen some movement in recent years withthe emergence of the Arts Council ofEngland from the Arts Council GreatBritain in 1994 (with separate Scottish andWelsh entities created). Yet, across the pub-lic life of England there are anomalies andomissions. Why, for example, are thereBritish Councils for Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland and yet not a BritishCouncil England? Instead, the BritishCouncil based in London covers the UKand acts as the quasi-imperialist hub of itsinternational network: rather like a mini-version of the imperial state itself.

There has to be the beginning of anEnglish awakening which involves not justnaming, but the start of a reclaiming andreimagining of England as a place, territo-ry and nation, and then the thinking ofwhat consequences flow from that. Thismay sound like a dry and arcane exerciseas compared to those exciting grandioseideas of an ‘English Parliament’ and‘English regionalism’, but then the remak-ing of a nation is never usually a suddenprocess.

Gerry Hassan is a writer, commentator and policyanalyst. His latest book is The Modern SNP:From Protest to Power (Edinburgh UniversityPress, forthcoming October 2009)

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