Regulating Commerce: Will the Supreme Court Strike Down the Affordable Care Act’s Minimum Coverage Provision and other Economic Regulation?

8/2/2019 Regulating Commerce: Will the Supreme Court Strike Down the Affordable Care Acts Minimum Coverage Provision

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120018th

Street,N.W.,Suite1002,Washington,D.C. 20036 www.theusconstitution.org

RegulatingCommerce:WilltheSupremeCourtStrikeDowntheAffordableCareActs

MinimumCoverageProvisionandotherEconomicRegulation?

TheConstitutionataCrossroads

IntroductionPowerfulandingeniousminds,taking,aspostulates,thatthepowersexpressly

grantedto

the

government

of

the

Union,

are

to

be

contracted

by

construction,

intothenarrowestpossiblecompass,andthattheoriginalpowersoftheStates

areretained,ifanypossibleconstructionwillretainthem,may,byacourseof

welldigested,butrefinedandmetaphysicalreasoning,foundedonthese

premises,explainawaytheconstitutionofourcountry,andleaveit,a

magnificentstructure,indeed,tolookat,buttotallyunfitforuse.

ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallinGibbonsv.OgdenAsthisquotefromChiefJusticeJohnMarshallintheSupremeCourtsfirstmajor

opinioninterpretingtheConstitutionsCommerceClausemakesclear,thefundamentalissueof

thescopeofthefederalgovernmentspowerhasbeendebatedsincethefoundingofour

Republic. Italsoshowsthat,throughoutournationshistory,opponentsofbroadfederal

powerhavereliedonanarrowconstructionoftheConstitutioninattemptstoimposelimits

uponCongressspowersundertheCommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClause

threatening,perhaps,toexplainawaytheconstitutionofourcountry,andleaveit,a

magnificentstructure,indeed,tolookat,buttotallyunfitforuse.1

ThelatestskirmishinthisdebateistheconstitutionalchallengetothePatient

ProtectionandAffordableCareAct(ACA),particularlyitsminimumcoverageprovision,which

requiresAmericanswhocanaffordittoeitherpurchaseaminimumlevelofhealthinsuranceor

payapenalty.

To

the

powerful

and

ingenious

minds

of

the

laws

challengers,

the

ACA

is

a

novelexpansionoffederalpowerthatgoesbeyondwhatwascontemplatedorpermittedby

theFounders. Toothers,2thehealthcaremandateisaregulationofcommercethatisclearly

constitutionalunderthetextoftheCommerceandNecessaryandProperClausesandSupreme

1Gibbons,22U.S.1,222(1824).

2See,TestimonyofCharlesFried,BeforetheSenateCommitteeontheJudiciaryHearingonTheConstitutionalityoftheAffordableCareAct,February2,2011.


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Crossroads:CommercePower Page|2

CourtinterpretationsofthesetextsinearlydecisionssuchasGibbonsandMcCullochv.Maryland.

3 Althoughoneconservativecommentatorinitiallypredictedthatthereisaless

than1%chancethatcourtswillinvalidatetheindividualmandateasexceedingCongresss

ArticleIpower,4thelowercourtshavesplitonthisquestion,andnowsomearepredictingthat

anideologicallydividedSupremeCourtwillstrikethemandatedown.

Thechallengerstothemandaterelyheavilyuponaseriesofideologicallydividedrulings

issuedoverthepast15yearsinwhichtheCourtsconservativeblocarticulatednewlimitson

CongressspowerundertheCommerceClause. Mostsignificantly,inUnitedStatesv.Lopez5andUnitedStatesv.Morrison,6theCourtinvalidatedtheGunFreeSchoolZonesActandpartoftheViolenceAgainstWomenAct,holdingthatthesefederallawsdidnotregulateactivities

sufficientlytiedtointerstatecommerce.

WhilethesecasesformthebasisfortheattacksontheAffordableCareAct,twomore

recentcasesjustifythepredictionthatthehealthcarechallengeswillbeeasilydisposedofby

theCourt. InGonzalesv.Raich,7JusticesAntoninScaliaandAnthonyKennedyjoinedtheirliberalcolleaguestoupholdfederalregulationofmedicinalmarijuana,evenifgrownina

backyardforpersonalconsumption,inaccordancewithlocallaw. InUnitedStatesv.Comstock,

8ChiefJusticeJohnRobertsandJusticesKennedyandSamuelAlitoagreedwiththe

CourtsliberalwinginholdingthattheNecessaryandProperClausepermittedCongressto

enactafederallawallowingthegovernmenttoholdmentallyill,sexuallydangerousfederal

prisonersbeyondthedatetheywouldotherwisebereleasedfromprison.9 Thequestionleftby

RaichandComstockiswhetherthesecasesareaccuratereflectionsorrefinementsoftheviewsoftheseconservativeJusticesaboutthescopeoffederalpowers,ormoreareflectionofthe

conservativepolicygoalsregulatingdrugsandsexuallydangerouscriminalsatissueinthese

cases.

Whatisclear,however, isthatwithachallengetothemostimportantlegislative

achievementoftheObamapresidencypendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,theConstitutions

CommerceClauseanditsNecessaryandProperClauseareatacrossroads.

317U.S.316(1819)

4Orin

Kerr,

What

Are

the

Chances

that

the

Courts

Will

Strike

Down

the

Individual

Mandate?,

The

Volokh

Conspiracy,availableat:http://volokh.com/2010/03/22/whatarethechancesthatthecourtswillstrikedowntheindividualmandate/

ProfessorKerrprognosticatesthatheexpectsa90(orpossibly81)votetoupholdtheindividualmandate.5514U.S.549(1995).

6529U.S.598(2000).

7545U.S.1(2005).

8130S.Ct.1949(2010).

9130S.Ct.at1954;id.at1965(Kennedy,J.,concurring);id.at1968(Alito,J.,concurring).


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TheTextandHistoryoftheCommerceandNecessaryandProperClausesThedebateoverthescopeoffederalpowerwascentraltoAmericasFoundingandhas

continuedthroughoutournationshistory. In1783,soonaftertheRevolutionaryWarwaswon,

GeorgeWashington

wrote

to

Alexander

Hamilton

that

unless

Congress

have

powers

competenttoallgeneralpurposes,thatthedistresseswehaveencountered,theexpenceswe

haveincurred,andthebloodwehavespiltinthecourseofanEightyearswar,willavailus

nothing.10

ReferringtothefailedArticlesofConfederation whichplacedthenations

foundationsuponamereleagueoffriendshipamongthethirteenindependentstates

WashingtonexpressedtoHamiltonthat[n]omanintheUnitedStatesis,orcanbemore

deeplyimpressedwiththenecessityofareforminourpresentConfederationthanmyself.11

Inthesummerof1787,delegatesconvenedinPhiladelphiatoholdaConstitutional

Convention,andthequestionofthescopeoffederalpowerwasacentralissuefordebate. On

onesidewasJamesMadisonandtheVirginiaPlan,whichproposedgreatlyexpandingfederal

power. OntheotherwasWilliamPattersonandtheNewJerseyPlan,whichadvocatedfora

weakernationalgovernment. JamesWilson,oneofonlysixmentohavesignedboththe

DeclarationofIndependenceandtheConstitution,explainedthatundertheVirginiaPlan,the

Natl.LegislatureistomakelawsinallcasesatwhichtheseparateStatesareincompetent,

whileundertheNewJerseyPlanthepowersofCongresswouldnotbeexpandedmuchbeyond

whattheywereundertheArticlesofConfederation.12

Withtheexperienceofthefailed

ArticlesofConfederationfreshintheirminds,thedelegatesoverwhelminglyapprovedthe

VirginiaPlan.13

WiththeprinciplesoftheVirginiaPlanasaguide,thedraftersoftheConstitution

createdalist

of

enumerated

powers

provided

to

Congress

in

Article

I,Section

8,

including

the

CommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClause. TheCommerceClausegranted

CongressthePower...ToregulateCommercewithforeignNations,andamongtheseveral

States,andwiththeIndianTribes.14

AndtheNecessaryandProperClauseprovidedCongress

thePower...TomakeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryinginto

ExecutiontheforegoingPowers,andallotherPowersvestedbythisConstitutioninthe

GovernmentoftheUnitedStates.15

ThedebateovertheappropriatescopeoffederalpowerintensifiedasAntiFederalist

opponentsofratificationexpressedconcernsthattheproposedConstitutiontippedthebalance

toofarinfavoroffederalpowerandclosertotheimperialBritishruletheyhadfoughtagainst

inthe

Revolutionary

War.

The

proponents

of

ratification,

led

by

John

Jay,

Alexander

Hamilton

1018TheWritingsofGeorgeWashington490(JohnC.Fitzpatrick,ed.1931)(LettertoAlexanderHamilton,March

4,1783)(emphasisinoriginal).11

Id.at505.12

1TheRecordsoftheFederalConventionof1787252,277(MaxFarranded.,rev.ed.1966).13

Id. at322.14

U.S.Const.art.1,8,cl.3.15

U.S.Const.art.I,8,cl.18.


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andJamesMadisoninTheFederalistPapers,answeredthoseargumentswithtwopoints. First,theylaidoutthecaseforthebroadpowersgrantedtothefederalgovernment,emphasizing

theimportanceoftheircontinuingfirmlyunitedunderonefederalgovernment,vestedwith

sufficientpowersforallgeneralandnationalpurposes.16

Second,theystatedthatthepowers

grantedtothefederalgovernmentundertheConstitutionwerefewanddefined,whilethe

powerswhich

are

to

remain

in

the

State

governments

are

numerous

and

indefinite.

17

Theprecisescopeofthosefewanddefinedpowersquicklyprovedcontroversial,with

twoprominentmembersofPresidentGeorgeWashingtonscabinetTreasurySecretary

AlexanderHamiltonandSecretaryofStateThomasJeffersonclashingsharplyoverwhether

theConstitutionpermittedCongresstoestablishanationalbank. PresidentWashingtonsided

withHamiltonandcreatedthebank,leadingtotheSupremeCourtsunanimousrulingin

McCullochv.Maryland,18upholdingthecreationofthebankagainstaconstitutionalchallenge.AsdidtheauthorsofTheFederalistPapers,ChiefJusticeMarshallrecognizedin

McCullochthatthefederalgovernmentisoneofenumeratedpowers. Marshallmadethispoint

even

more

forcefully

in

Marburyv.Madison,19inwhichheopinedthat[t]hepowersof

thelegislaturearedefined,andlimited;andthatthoselimitsmaynotbemistaken,or

forgotten,theconstitutioniswritten.20

ButmostofMcCullochisdevotedtoarticulatingthe

broadscopeofthoseenumeratedpowers:inordertoformamoreperfectunion,itwas

deemednecessarytochangethisallianceintoaneffectivegovernment,possessinggreatand

sovereignpowers.21

EvokinglanguagefromHamiltonsadvisoryopiniontoWashington,Chief

JusticeMarshallupheldtheestablishmentofanationalbankundertheNecessaryandProper

Clause,stating[l]ettheendbelegitimate,letitbewithinthescopeoftheconstitution,andall

meanswhichareappropriate,whichareplainlyadaptedtothatend,whicharenotprohibited,

butconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheconstitution,areconstitutional.22

ChiefJusticeMarshallsimilarlyunderstoodtheCommerceClauseasprovidingabroad

grantofauthoritytoCongress,asheexpressedinhisdecisionfortheCourtinGibbonsv.Ogden.

23 Onceagain,asastartingpoint,ChiefJusticeMarshallacknowledgedthatCongresss

powerwasnotunlimited,explainingthattheenumerationofpowersintheConstitution

presupposessomethingnotenumerated.24

Butagain,heemphasizedthebroadscopeof

16TheFederalistPapers,No.3,at36(Jay)(ClintonRossiter,ed.1999).

17TheFederalistPapersNo.45,at289(Madison).

1817U.S.316(1819)

191Cranch137(1803).

20Id.

at

176.

21Id.at403.

22Id.at421. HamiltonwrotetoWashington,Iftheendbeclearlycomprehendedwithinanyofthespecified

powers,andifthemeasurehaveanobviousrelationtothatend,andisnotforbiddenbyanyparticularprovision

oftheconstitution;itmaysafelybedeemedtocomewithinthecompassofthenationalauthority.ThePapersof

GeorgeWashingtonDigitalEdition(TheodoreJ.Crackel,ed.2008)(LetterfromAlexanderHamiltontoGeorge

Washington,OpinionontheConstitutionalityofanActtoEstablishaBank,1791).23

22U.S.1(1824).24

Id.at195.


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theseenumeratedpowers. Herejectedanarrowconstruction,whichwouldcripplethe

government,andrenderitunequaltotheobjectforwhichitisdeclaredtobeinstituted,andto

whichthepowersgiven,asfairlyunderstood,renderitcompetent.25

InMarshallsview,

[c]ommerce,undoubtedly,istraffic,butitissomethingmore:itisintercourse.26

Marshall

emphasizedthat[t]hepowerovercommerce...wasoneoftheprimaryobjectsforwhichthe

peopleof

America

adopted

their

government,

and

made

clear

that

the

attempt

to

restrict

it

comestoolate.27

UnderChiefJusticeMarshallsexpansiveviewoftheCommerceClause,

[t]hewisdomandthediscretionofCongress...andtheinfluencewhichtheirconstituents

possessatelections,are...thesolerestraintsonwhichtheyhaverelied,tosecurethemfrom

itsabuse.28

FromtheLochnerEratotheRobertsCourtJudicialdeferencetocongressionalactionundertheCommerceClausewastherulefor

Americasfirstcentury. ButasCongressbegantakingamoreactiveroleinregulatingthe

growingAmerican

economy

during

and

after

the

Industrial

Revolution,

the

Court

started

to

pushback,takingamuchnarrowerviewoftheCommerceClause. Whilethisperiod,knownas

theLochnerera,ismostoftenassociatedwiththeSupremeCourtsinvocationofsubstantiveDueProcesstooverturnstatelaborregulationsbasedonanewfoundlibertyofcontract,

equallyfarreachingwereitsdecisionsoverturningfederallawsbasedonarestrictive

understandingoftheCommerceClause. CreatingcategoricalexceptionsincasessuchasUnitedStatesv.E.C.KnightCo.29andCarterv.CarterCoalCo.,30theCourtruledthatproduction,manufacturing,andminingfelloutsideCongressspowersbecausetheCourtdidnotbelieve

thattheseactivitiesfellwithinthedefinitionofcommerce.

TheCourtalsoinvalidatedfederal

childlaborlawsandfederalwageandhourlawsonthegroundthatCongresscouldnot

regulateactivitiesthathadonlyanindirecteffectoninterstatecommerce.31

TheLochnereraendedin1937,withtheCourtjettisoningbothitssubstantiveDue

ProcessassaultonstatelaborregulationsanditsrestrictivereadingoftheCommerceClause.32

Withashifttowardanationaleconomydrivenbyincreasinglyrapidtechnologicalchange,the

Courtsdoctrinebegantoallowforgreaterfederalcontrols. Theresultwasareturntothe

broadCommerceClausepowersaffirmedbyChiefJusticeMarshallandjudicialdeference

towardtheelectedbranches.

25Id.at188.

26Id.at189.

2722

U.S.

at

190.

28Id.at197.

29156U.S.1(1895).

30298U.S.238(1936).

31Hammerv.Dagenhart,247U.S.251 (1918) (federalchild labor laws);A.L.A.SchechterPoultryCorp.v.United

States,295U.S.495(1935)(federalwageandhourlaws).32

SeeWestCoastHotelCo.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937)(upholdingstateminimumwagelaws);NLRBv.Jones&LaughlinSteelCrop.,301U.S.1(1937)(upholdingNationalLaborRelationsActagainstCommerceClausechallenge).


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ThenewpostLochnerdoctrineofdeferencetowardCongresssCommerceClause

powersreachedwhatsomeconsideritshighwatermarkinCourts1942decisioninWickardv.Filburn.

33 Here,thequestionwaswhetherCongresscouldaddressthenationalproblemof

volatilityinthepriceofwheatbyregulatingwheatgrownonafamilyfarmforprivate

consumptionaspartofabroaderregulatoryscheme. WhiletheCourtconcededthatthe

impactof

the

individual

family

farmer

was

small,

it

upheld

Congresss

use

of

its

Commerce

Clausepowerbecause,intheaggregate,theeconomicimpactofallsuchactivitiesisfarfrom

trivial.34

TheCourtslogicwasthatwhetherthewheatwasintroducedtomarketorusedfor

privateconsumption,itwouldhavetheeffectofsuppressingthepriceofwheat.35

Evoking

ChiefJusticeMarshall,theCourtrespondedtothecriticismthatCongresswasforcingfarmers

intothemarketinordertostabilizepricesbyrecognizingthat[t]heconflictsofeconomic

interestbetweentheregulatedandthosewhoadvantagebyitarewiselyleftunderoursystem

toresolutionbytheCongressunderitsmoreflexibleandresponsiblelegislativeprocess,since

[s]uchconflictsrarelylendthemselvestojudicialdetermination.36

FormorethanfiftyyearsaftertheendoftheLochnerera,theCourtdidnotstrikedown

asingle

federal

law

as

exceeding

Congresss

authority

under

the

Commerce

Clause

or

the

NecessaryandProperClause. Then,inthemid1990s,adeeplydividedCourtstruckdownthe

federalGunFreeSchoolZonesActandpartoftheViolenceAgainstWomenAct(VAWA)as

exceedingCommerceClausepowers. InUnitedStatesv.Lopez,afiveJusticeconservativemajorityobservedthatthebanongunsinschoolzoneswasacriminalstatute,that,unlike

theregulationofwheatinWickard,isnotanessentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomic

activity.37

DecliningtoexpandfurthertheCourtsdeferencetowardCongress,theCourt

refusedtopileinferenceuponinferenceinordersustaincongressionalaction,arguingthatto

dosowouldfundamentallybluranydistinctionbetweenwhatistrulynationalandwhatis

trulylocal.38

Importantly,theLopezCourtdidnotoverruleanypriorprecedent,citingapprovingly

to

the

entire

post

Lochner

line

of

cases.

39

Nonetheless,

the

Lopez

Court

clearly

meanttodrawalineinthesand,emphasizingthatitwasunwillingtoconvertcongressional

authorityundertheCommerceClausetoageneralpolicepower.40

TheLopezmajorityconcludedthatbyenumeratingfederalpowerintheConstitution,ourfoundingcharter

withhold[s]fromCongressaplenarypolicepowerthatwouldauthorizeenactmentofevery

typeoflegislation.41

InUnitedStatesv.Morrison,thesamefiveJusticesfromtheLopezmajoritystruckdownVAWAscivilremedyprovision,notingthatgendermotivatedcrimesarenot,inanysenseof

33317

U.S.

111

(1942).

34Id.at128.

35Id.

36Id.at129.

37514U.S.549,561(1995).

38Id.at56768.

39Id.at55561.

40Id.at567.

41Id.at566.


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thephrase,economicactivity.42

TheMorrisonmajority,consideringthefederallawscivil

remedyprovision,concludeditcouldthinkofnobetterexampleofthepolicepower,which

theFoundersdeniedtheNationalGovernmentandreposedintheStates.43

Again,the

majoritybalkedatquestioningpriorprecedent,butreinforceditsstatementinLopezthat[t]he

Constitutionrequiresadistinctionbetweenwhatistrulynationalandwhatistrulylocal.44

ThedissentingJusticesinLopezandMorrisonbelievedtheCourtshouldgiveCongressgreaterdeferenceindeterminingwhetheraregulatedactivityhasasubstantialeffecton

interstatecommerce.45

Inthedissentersview,theCourtsdistinctionbetweeneconomic

activityandnoneconomicactivitywascontrarytopriordecisions,whichhadonlyemphasized

anactivityseffectoninterstatecommerce.46

Suchcategoricalexclusionshaveprovenas

unworkableinpracticeastheyareunsupportableintheory,accordingtothedissenters,and

harkenedbacktothediscreditedLochnerera.47

Tothedissenters,theappropriatesafeguard

forfederalisminthisareawasnotthecourts,but,asChiefJusticeMarshallhademphasized,

thepoliticalstructuresestablishedbytheConstitution.48

Citingtheamicicuriaebrieffromthe36StatecoalitioninsupportofVAWA,thedissentinMorrisonobservedthatitisnottheleast

ironyof

these

cases

that

the

States

will

be

forced

to

enjoy

the

new

federalism

whether

they

wantitornot.49

LopezandMorrisonweredecidedduringadecadelongperiodknownasthe

FederalismRevolutionoftheRehnquistCourt. Duringthisperiod,theCourtimposeda

numberofotherrestrictionsontheuseoftheCommerceClause. InSeminoleTribev.Florida,50theCourtheldthatCongressdoesnothavepowerundertheCommerceClausetoabrogate

statesovereignimmunityaffordedtothestatesundertheEleventhAmendment. InNewYorkv.UnitedStatesandPrintzv.UnitedStates51theCourtstruckdownfederallawsthatrequiredstateofficialstoparticipateinfederalregulatoryefforts,holdingthattheCommerceClause

couldnotbeusedtocommandeerstateandlocalofficials. Finally,inSolidWasteAgencyofNorthernCookCountyv.UnitedStates52andRapanosv.UnitedStates,53theCourttwiceused42

Id.at613.43

Id.at618.44

Id.at613,617.45

Lopez,514U.S.at61617(Breyer,J.,dissenting)(CourtsmustgiveCongressadegreeofleewayindetermining

theexistenceofasignificantfactualconnectionbetweentheregulatedactivityandinterstatecommerce both

becausetheConstitutiondelegatesthecommercepowerdirectlytoCongressandbecausethedetermination

requiresanempiricaljudgmentofakindthatalegislatureismorelikelythanacourttomakewithaccuracy.);

Morrison,529U.S.at628(Souter,J.,dissenting)(Thefactofsuchasubstantialeffectisnotanissueforthecourts

inthefirstinstance,butfortheCongress,whoseinstitutionalcapacityforgatheringevidenceandtakingtestimony

farexceeds

ours.).

46Lopez,514U.S.at628(Breyer,J.,dissenting).

47529U.S.at639,64244(Souter,J.,dissenting).

48Id.at64849.

49Id.at654.

50517U.S.44(1996).

51521U.S.898(1997).

52531U.S.159(2001).

53547U.S.715(2006).


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theprincipleofconstitutionalavoidancetolimitthescopeoftheCleanWaterActandthus

avoidCommerceClauseconcerns

FearsthatLopezandMorrisonwouldcascadeintoanevenbroaderjudicialreviewof

federallegislationweresomewhatstaunchedbytheCourts2005decisioninGonzalesv.Raich,which

upheld

Congresss

power

to

regulate

medicinal

marijuana

grown

for

personal

consumption,inaccordancewithlocallaw.54

SixJusticesvotedtoupholdCongresssuseofits

CommerceClausepower,withJusticeAnthonyKennedysigningoninfulltothemajority

opinionandJusticeAntoninScaliaconcurringseparately. Asastartingpoint,themajority

opinionobservedthat[t]heCommerceClauseemergedastheFramers'responsetothe

centralproblemgivingrisetotheConstitutionitself:theabsenceofanyfederalcommerce

powerundertheArticlesofConfederation.55

Addressingpriorprecedent,itexplainedthat

[o]urcaselawfirmlyestablishesCongresspowertoregulatepurelylocalactivitiesthatare

partofaneconomicclassofactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstate

commerce.56

JusticeScalia

concurred

separately

in

Raich

to

emphasize

that

Congress's

regulatory

authorityoverintrastateactivitiesthatarenotthemselvespartofinterstatecommerce

(includingactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce)derivesfromthe

NecessaryandProperClause.57

DistinguishingLopezandMorrison,Scaliaexplainedthat

Congressmayregulateevennoneconomiclocalactivityifthatregulationisanecessarypartof

amoregeneralregulationofinterstatecommerce.58

CitingtoMcCulloch,Scaliaexplainedthat

theNecessaryandProperClause...empowersCongresstoenactlawsineffectuationofits

enumeratedpowersthatarenotwithinitsauthoritytoenactinisolation.59

Applyingthese

principlestothecaseathand,ScaliaagreedthatCongresscouldreasonablyconcludethatits

objectiveofprohibitingmarijuanafromtheinterstatemarketcouldbeundercutifthose

activitieswereexceptedfromitsgeneralschemeofregulation.60

Dissenting,JusticeSandra

DayOConnor,joinedbyChiefJusticeWilliamRehnquistandJusticeClarenceThomas,found

thecasemateriallyindistinguishablefromLopezandMorrison.61

WhileJusticeScaliapresentedabroadunderstandingoftheNecessaryandProper

ClauseinRaich,thelimitsofhisviewwerehighlightedbyhisdissentinUnitedStatesv.Comstock,

62inwhichtheCourt,bya72vote,upheldundertheNecessaryandProperClausea

54545U.S.1(2005).

55Id.at16.

56Id.at17.

57Id.at34(Scalia,J.,concurring).

58Id.

at

37.

As

Scalia

explained,

Lopez

and

Morrison

do

not

declare

noneconomic

intrastate

activities

to

be

categoricallybeyondthereachoftheFederalGovernment.NeithercaseinvolvedthepowerofCongresstoexert

controloverintrastateactivitiesinconnectionwithamorecomprehensiveschemeofregulation.Id.at389.59

Id.at39. Although,evenwhentheendisconstitutionalandlegitimate,themeans...maynotbeotherwise

prohibitedandmustbeconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheconstitution.Id.(quotingMcCulloch,17U.S.

at421).60

Id.at42(quotingLopez,514U.S.at561).61

Id.at45(OConnor,J.,dissenting,joinedbyRehnquist,C.J.,Thomas,J.).62

130S.Ct.1949(2010).


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federallawallowingthegovernmenttoinstitutecivilcommitmentproceedingsagainst

mentallyill,sexuallydangerousfederalprisonersbeyondthedatetheywouldotherwisebe

releasedfromprison. Inupholdingthelaw,themajorityopinion,whichChiefJusticeRoberts

joinedinfull,recognizedthattheConstitutionaddresse[s]thechoiceofmeansprimarily...

tothejudgmentofCongress.63

ReferencingChiefJusticeMarshallsdecisioninMcCulloch,the

majorityemphasized

how

[t]he

Framers

demonstrated

considerable

foresight

in

drafting

a

Constitutioncapableofsuchresiliencethroughtime.64

Indissent,JusticeThomas,joinedbyJusticeScalia,arguedforamorenarrow

understandingoftheNecessaryandProperClausethatwouldlimititsscopetotheexecutionof

Congresssenumeratedpowers. BecauseintheviewsofJusticesThomasandScaliathe

challengedfederalstatutedoesnotexecuteanyenumeratedpower,theywouldhavefound

itoutsideCongressspower.65

JusticeKennedy,inaseparateconcurrence,pushedbackagainst

thisunderstandingthattheNecesssaryandProperClausecanbenomorethanonestep

removedfromanenumeratedpower.66

Instead,[w]hentheinquiryiswhetherafederallaw

hassufficientlinkstoanenumeratedpowertobewithinthescopeoffederalauthority,the

analysisdepends

not

on

the

number

of

links

in

the

congressional

power

chain

but

on

the

strengthofthechain.67

Kennedybrokewiththemajority,however,inhisemphasisonthe

importanceofwhetheressentialattributesofstatesovereigntyarecompromisedbythe

assertionoffederalpowerundertheNecessaryandProperClause,somethinghewouldweigh

onthesideofconcludingthatthepowerisnotoneproperlywithinthereachoffederal

power.68

TheCommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClauseataCrossroads

WiththechallengestotheAffordableCareActpendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,the

CommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClauseareatasignificantcrossroads. While

casesasoldasMcCullochandGibbonsandasnewasRaichandComstockstronglysupporttheconstitutionalityoftheminimumcoverageprovision,casesfromCarterCoaltoMorrisonalsoindicatethataconservativemajorityontheCourtismorethancapableofimposingnewlimits

onthepowersofthefederalgovernmentwhenitchoosestodoso.

63130

S.Ct.

1949,

1957

(2010)

(quoting

Burroughsv.UnitedStates,290U.S.534,54748(1934)).

64Id.at1955.

65Id.at1974(Thomas,J.,dissenting,joinedbyScalia,J.). ThomasunderscoredhisbeliefthattheCourtsopinion

breathesnewlifeintotheNecessaryandProperClause,whichhecalledthelast,besthopeofthosewhodefend

ultravirescongressionalaction.Id.at1983(quotingPrintzv.UnitedStates,521U.S.898,923(1997)).66

Id.at196566(Kennedy,J.,concurring);seealsoid.at196970(Alito,J.,concurring)(acknowledginglegitimacyoffederalpowermorethanonestepremovedfromenumeratedpower).67

Id.at1966.68

Id.at196768.


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TheCourtsrulingontheACAcasewillbealandmarkrulingnomatterhowitcomes

out. AnopinionupholdingtheAct,joinedbyoneormembersoftheCourtsconservativebloc,

couldgoalongwaytoending,onceandforall,therecurringquestionofwhetherthefederal

governmenthasthepowersrequiredtosolveproblems,likeaccesstohealthcare,whichare

trulynationalinscope. ArulingstrikingdowntheActwouldbeahugestepbacktowardthe

Lochnerera,withaprogressivePresidentatwarwithaconservativeSupremeCourt. NotsinceCarterCoalhastheSupremeCourtstruckdownanypieceoflegislationnearthescopeandscaleoftheAffordableCareActasbeyondCongressspowersundertheCommerceClauseand

theNecessaryandProperClause.

Nearly200yearsago,ChiefJusticeMarshallwarnedaboutthosewhowouldexplain

awaytheconstitutionofourcountry,andleaveit,amagnificentstructure,indeed,tolookat,

buttotallyunfitforuse. Giventhatsomeoftherulingsauthoredorjoinedbyconservative

membersoftheRobertsCourtsupportabroadinterpretationoffederalpower,itdoesnot

seemthattheconservativeblocconsistentlyholdsasapostulatethatthepowersexpressly

grantedtothefederalgovernmentaretobegiventhenarrowestpossibleconstruction. That

said,itisunclearwhethertheconservativeJusticeswhovotedinsupportoffederalpowerin

RaichandComstockwilldosotoupholdanexerciseofcongressionalpowerthatdoesnotfitaswellwiththeirpolicypreferences. TheAffordableCareAct,andmanyotherfederallaws,hang

inthatbalance.

Documents

Regulating Commerce: Will the Supreme Court Strike Down the Affordable Care Act’s Minimum Coverage Provision and other Economic Regulation?