Regional Security and Integration in South America

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[Second Draft]

Regional Security and Integration in South America:What UNASUR could learn from the OSCE and the Shanghai

Organization experiences?

Marco Cepik1

The Brazilian proposal to create a regional Security and Defense Council in SouthAmerica was the most controversial issue related with the Constitutive Treaty of the Unionof South American Nations (UNASUR), which was signed by the twelve South AmericanHeads of State and Government attending the summit held in Brasilia in May 2008.

The main concern and initial refusal to participate came from Colombia, worried

about the how its neighboring countries would treat the illegal armed group FARC(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Colombia also had expressed concernsabout the exact procedures to reach decisions in such a council. During the visit of theBrazilian President Lula da Silva to Colombia in July 2008, both concerns were addressedand the Colombian President Alvaro Uribe declared that Colombia would be a partner inthe security institutional building of the UNASUR. With the main political obstacles solved,the real conceptual work shall begin.

In order to contribute to this debate regarding the institutional design, operationsand strategic rationale of the UNASUR Security and Defense Council, this text will start theexamination of two different contemporary experiences of institutionalized securitycooperation, namely those of OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in order to evaluate howuseful and applicable those experiences would be for South America.

Since the UNASUR was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regionalorganizations such as the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN), it haspotential security roles in addressing common regional ills like drug trafficking, organizedcrime, militarized interstate disputes and high rates of interpersonal violence. A moreinstitutionalized regional order is also supposed to provide more room of maneuver for theSouth Americans facing the current U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization. 2

1Dr. Cepik is an Adjunct Professor of International Security and Comparative Politics at the Federal

University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (http://lattes.cnpq.br/3923697331385475). Paper presented atthe Second Global International Studies Conference, Ljubljiana, Slovenia, 23-26 July. This researchwas supported by the National Scientific Research Council of Brazil (CNPq). The author wishes toexpress his appreciation for the research contributions made to this work by Helena Jornada, LuizaSchneider, Paula Lazzari, Christiano Ambros, Thabita Abrahim, Lucas Sangalli and Felipe Machado,research assistants at the Strategic and International Relations Center (NERINT www.ufrgs.br/nerint).

2As one can read in the Preamble of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR: CERTAIN that integration is a

decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations


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As pointed by Kelly (2007:212-215), a normative desire for regional integration stilldrives most of the academic and political debate concerned with security in the so callednon-critical regions like Africa or South America. Assuming explicitly a normative desirefor a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, in this paper I have tried to examine theusefulness of two alternative models of security cooperation and integration in ratherrealist terms (Mares, 2001; Buzan & Weaver, 2003).

The general line of reasoning is organized as follows: The first section contains avery brief account of what are the main security threats in South America nowadays. Then,in section II the recently constituted South Americas Union is presented, including thesomewhat controversial proposal of a South Americas Security and Defense Council. Inthe following two sections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are discussed in order toevaluate in the concluding section - how useful and applicable those experiences wouldbe for South America.

I South America: unanswered threats and security concerns

South America is a violent region in the contemporary world, although it is alsorecognized by the low incidence of interstate warfare or even overt civil war. It hasexperienced just one conventional war since the end of Cold War (between Peru andEquator in 1995) and a total of three wars since the II World War. Colombias complexinternal armed conflict is a big one for all accounts, but is rarely described as a civil war inthe same way many contemporary African and Asian violent conflicts are. However, by nomeans South America can be considered a peaceful zone or a sort of security community(Adler & Barnett, 1998). 3

At least four types of threats and risks to the security of the region can be identifiedby any birds eye view of the region.

As David Mares (2001:29-51) has pointed out, the apparent paradox requires aproper conceptual toolkit to explain this region. He uses the term "violent peace", i.e.,"officially sanctioned use of military violence across national boundaries when war is notthe intended result" (Mares, 2001:07). The war might happen, as the result of a dynamicoften unwanted by actors, originated from a miscalculation that escapes their control. Thedecision to use military force must be understood more as a bargaining tool for the statesconstituencies than just as the desire to resolve a dispute through interstate war. Violentpeace among countries remains a pervasive feature of South Americas security equationas far as territorial disputes and other structural induced concerns about relative gains arepresent in the recent history of the region.

The South American countries also faces important internal threats as well, relatedto narcotics trafficking, transnational crime, localized urban and rural violence, The region

in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereign equality of Statesand a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weapons of massdestruction, the Union is not designed as a tool for balancing, but has balance and justice as corevalues.

3For further elaboration, see Herz (2008).


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was ranked as the second most violent in the world due to the increase of crime rates inthe mid 1990s. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela have crime rates threetimes higher than the world average, and high levels of violence related to street crime, caraccidents, drug trafficking, social clashes and organized crime. 4

The incapacity to deal with real and present internal security and safety threats,increased by the persistence of developing problems, which can be exasperated byincreasing levels of inequality of income distribution in many countries, may lead to furthererosion of the state legitimacy among citizens with raising expectations regarding theirsocial and economic welfare. All of this amounts for a third type of risk to the security ofthe whole region (Rojas, 2008:36).

A fourth type of risk is related with the regional role of United States after 2001 andthe commercial and diplomatic presence of other great powers in South America. There isno serious competition for military presence or security leverage in the region betweenRussia, China and United States, but the growing assertiveness of these three countriesas they defend their respective interests across the world cannot be dismissed as totallyunrelated to the security status of South America. Therefore, great power politics is part ofthe equation, whether we like it or not.

Taking the four types of risks and threats as context, the recent crisis started by theColombian attack to a FARC camp inside Ecuadors territory brought additional turbulencefor the South American integration project. As the militarized dispute between Colombiaand Ecuador-Venezuela passes its peak (reached in March 2008), and the possibility of anarmed conflict in Bolivia being less severe than it seems to be just a few months ago, amoderate optimism arises in the region. However, the two potential conflicts are stillserious enough to be dismissed by any actor or observer.

The tensions between Venezuela and Colombia go all way back to the Chavezopposition to the Colombian counterinsurgency strategies supported by the U.S. TheColombian government led by President Uribe and the average Colombian public opinionhave been very critical towards Venezuelas government led by President Hugo Chavez.The anti-imperialist discourse from Chavez also reaches fiercely the Colombias alliance

with President Bush in Washington. The Colombian offensive against the FARC inEcuadors territory resulting in the killing of Raul Reyes (FARCs spokesman and second-in-command) prompted President Hugo Chavez to mobilize troops to the Colombianfrontier. The March crisis has been diplomatically solved, but the Colombian internalsecurity problem, mainly related to the FARC and the Paramilitaries, still poses significantproblems to the whole region (Villa, 2005 and 2007).

By its turn, Bolivia is currently the crisis core and the place where the future ofSouth America integration process is being decided (Cepik, 2008:10). The easterndepartments (where are located the main resources, as mineral and energy reserves) arestruggling for greater autonomy, what could generate an escalation of the tension andeven turn out in a civil conflict (Malamud, 2008). Even if that extreme outcome is avoided,

the tensions posed by the popular referendum in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the otherdepartments clearly expose social antagonisms and institutional dilemmas of fundamentalimportance not only to Bolivia, but also to South American integration future. In the end ofthe day, if an armed civil conflict unleashes in Bolivia, it would be hardly carried out without

4According to the Health Ministry of Brazil, for instance, out of 125,816 deaths by external causes in 2005,

37.1% were caused by homicides, 28.4% by car accidents, and 6.8% by suicides. Cf.www.saude.gov.br.


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the covert or otherwise overt involvement of opposing South American governments andsocial groups (Sebben, 2007). In this sense, a strong institutional and socio-economicalternative has to be developed inside Bolivia, with strong support from countries likeBrazil and Argentina.

Considering the four structural risks and these two big recent crises, the SouthAmerican governments seem in need not only of an integrated strategy, but also of thebasic institutional and operational means to face those problems effectively and withlegitimacy (Estevez, 2001:08).

Therefore, the necessity of a greater coordination and cooperation in the securityand defense issues is not only associated with the new transnational threats posed bynon-state actors, but also may be related to the possibility of interstate conflicts. In thisway, the UNASUR, as the newest integration program in South America, has to developmechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts and much greater and stronger securitycoordination.

II South Americas Union and the Security and Defense Sectors

The creation of a South American Defense Council, proposed by the Brazilianpresident, even though rejected in a moment by Colombia, turns out to be a real attempt tofulfill the institutional emptiness. Nevertheless, it is necessary to go even further than theSecurity and Defense Council itself, deepening the coordination mechanisms,implementing public policies in a huge variety of areas, applying distributive justice andbuilding effective democratic controls.

Paradoxically in light of what was mentioned in the previous section, just a few lineshave been devoted to address the security challenges of the region in all institutionalarrangements so far designed to advance the integration process, from Mercosur andCAN to the OTCA and UNASUR. The Union of South American Nations is characterizedby a strong intergovernmental process, as UNASUR tries to converge and transcend the

two main blocks of the South American subcontinent (the CAN and MERCOSUR) as wellas the singular experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, in a much more robustsolution without necessarily repeat all the steps and features of the European Union..

The origins of UNASUR go back to the South American Presidential Summits, inprogress since 2000 in Brazil, where the Presidents reaffirmed their commitment whit theintegration of South America. The South American Community of Nations (CASA) wasborn in the third Presidential Summit, held in Peru in 2004, through the Declarations ofAyacucho and Cusco, its fundamental documents. CASA aimed at the convergence ofSouth America in a single block, strengthening the regional countries and increasing thebargaining power and international capacity to resist foreign pressures. CASAs intentionswere wide, from political and diplomatic coordination to physical integration through new

transport routes, energy exchange energy and communications improvement. Above all, itaimed at the creation of a free trade area, with a common currency and a regionalparliament (Taunay Filho, 2008:11-32).

The name of this new institutional framework changed from CASA to UNASUR withthe agreement of all member states during the first day of meeting at the South AmericanEnergy Summit held at Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in 2007. That meeting was important asit hosted significant additional agreements, including the creation of the Energy Council of


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South America (based on the principle that energy integration is an essential tool for theregions economic and social development).

On 23 May 2008, it was formalized as the Union of South American Nations,UNASUR, by a Constitutive Treaty signed in Brasilia. The treaty resulted in the creation ofan entity with international juridical character, based on the statements of Cusco (2004),Brasilia (2005) and Cochabamba (2006). The countries stated that South Americanintegration should be achieved through an innovative process, which would include theprogress achieved so far by the MERCOSUR and CAN processes, as well as theexperiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, going beyond the convergence among them.Topics as energy integration and development of an interconnection infrastructure of theregion are highlighted in UNASURs goals, using the economic and commercialmotivations as a reason for regional integration.

The security aspects of the integration are dealt with in the treatys three finalobjectives establishing measures for coordination among the member states specializedagencies in order to strengthen the fight against narcotics, corruption, human trafficking,small and light weapons trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime and otherthreats. It aims at, for this matter, the promotion of cooperation among the judicialauthorities of the Member States, the exchange of information and experiences in matters

of defense and the cooperation for the strengthening of civilian security.The highest organ of UNASUR is the Council of Heads of State and Government

that meets annually. The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR will be held successivelyby each of the Member States, in alphabetical order, for one year periods. UNASUR hastwo other mechanisms of regular meetings: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,which meets every six months, and the Council of Delegates, with bimonthly meetings.The Working Groups are set up by the Council of Ministers and coordinated by the Councilof Delegates. The General Secretariat is currently the only permanent organ of theorganization, with headquarters in Quito, Equator. The Secretary General shall beappointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following a proposal by theCouncil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a term of two years, renewable only once. The

Institutional Development is characterized by the Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, andmeetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other institutional levelsmay be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfill themandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report ontheir activities through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to theCouncil of Heads of State and Government or to the Council of Ministers of ForeignAffairs, as appropriate.

All the norms of UNASUR will be adopted by consensus. However, any MemberState may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, be it for aperiod defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from laterjoining the total or partial implementation of that policy. In the case of institutions,organizations or programs which are created, any Member State may participate as an

observer, or refrain from participating fully or partially for a definite or indefinite period.There is no specialized body for border dispute settlements, so any dispute that

may emerge between the Member States will be settled through direct negotiations incase of no solution, the dispute will be submitted to the consideration of the Council ofDelegates and, in the case of no settlement; the dispute will be taken by the Council ofMinisters of Foreign Affairs.


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The treaty underlines that one of the main objectives of UNASUR is thedevelopment of political, social and economical coordination among the regions differentcountries. Notwithstanding the deepening levels of interaction between those countriesover the last few years, a significant number of challenges remain even in the economicand social fields.

The economic asymmetry is a real problem. Brazil alone has a GDP of nearly half ofthe entire UNASUR, but hardly could afford to finance all of the investments required toelevate the per capita income in South America and drastically reduce poverty andinequality. 5 Besides, the infrastructural integration, the strengthening of productive chainsand the establishment of trade regulations are issues that must be solved. All three haveimportant security implications.

As a matter of fact, Brazil and Venezuela are both trying to convert the defensepolicies and the defense industrial basis in a more propellant engine for the entire regionalintegration process (Malamud, 2008:04).

The proposed Security and Defense Council would promote joint military training,improved defense bases, and military industrial cooperation in order to ensure the supplyof the necessary elements for defense. Dissuasive defense would be the aim, mainlythrough the exchange of information, joint training for peace-keeping, the holding of jointmilitary exercises and the participation in peace operations of the United Nations.6

There were already some attempts to develop effective mechanisms for securitycoordination in South America, although not fully institutionalized. The peace mission inHaiti, for example, shows that interoperability and joint action are possible. Despite the factthat it has encountered some difficulties, the mission helped in advancing policycoordination and cooperation through a 2x9 scheme, i.e., through the conduction of theMinisters of Defense and of Foreign Affairs of the countries involved (Argentina, Bolivia,Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay).

Other important steps were taken in the Southern Cone, between Argentina andBrazil and mainly between Argentina and Chile. The work of the Standing Committee ofArgentine-Chilean Security (Comperseg) is an example of measures that build confidencein the region, as the creation of a combined peace force (Rojas, 2008:41).

Important as those experiences are, government officials, researchers and citizensshould discuss more explicitly in both normative and analytical ways the role of securityand defense in the current and future South America integration process. To addressthese questions thinking outside the EU model box, in the next two sections one shall findsome preliminary work on two specialized regional arrangements (OSCE and SCO)designed to address contemporary security issues.

5The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reported that the GDP of the twelve South

American countries $2.5 trillion in 2006. Brazil alone had a GDP of $1.06 trillion in 2006 and $1.3trillion in 2007.

6Cf. www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/04/080415_jobimvenezuela_cj_ac.shtml


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III The OSCE comprehensive approach towards security

The Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has its roots onthe Helsinki Process of the 1970s, which gave birth to the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe createda new dynamic to the security cooperation in the European continent, and the basic

agreements made on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were improved on the Charter of Parisfor a New Europe, signed in 1990. Only in 1995, though, the CSCE would be renamed asOSCE and gain a new institutional framework. Today, it counts 56 members from Europe,North-America and Asia.7

The highest-level bodies of the Organization are the Ministerial Council, whichmeets every year, and the Permanent Council, meeting weekly at the Secretariat inVienna, and the Forum for Security Co-operation. Summits with the presence of heads ofState may also be scheduled, but do not happen regularly. In addition to that the OSCEhas a Secretariat and a Parliamentary Assembly, with the intention of facilitating inter-parliamentary dialogue. This Assembly should further discuss the subjects dealt during theMinisterial meetings and assess the functioning of the Organization by issuing resolutionsand recommendations.

The OSCE has a comprehensive approach on security, dealing with it in threedimensions: the politico-military, the economic and environmental and the human. Withinthe politico-military dimension, the OSCE deals with classic security issues, such as armsand border controls, but also with conflict prevention, terrorism, combat of illicit narcoticsand arms trafficking and all other kinds of transnational criminal activities. The economicand environmental dimension, in which the OSCE works in close cooperation with otherinternational organizations, includes combating corruption and money laundering, as wellas the management of natural resources. The human dimension of the OSCE works onfields as democratization, education, electoral activities, minority rights and even freemedia, tolerance and non-discrimination, elections, environmental activities, genderequality.

In order to successfully deal with all those issues, aside of the organs referredbefore, the Organization counts with a High-Commissioner on National Minorities, aRepresentative on Freedom of the Media and an Office for Democratic Institutions andHuman Rights. Also, it counts with several missions and field activities throughout EasternEurope, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to monitor stressful situations, facilitating earlywarning and conflict managing.

The OSCE is a landmark regional security organization, as it was the first one todeal with security problems in a multidimensional approach, as afore-mentioned, and as itis the most comprehensive regional security organization, both in scope and membershipfrom different continents. This Organization has achieved, through its predecessorinstitution the CSCE an alternative way of treating security problems by not staying

restricted only to politico-military questions, so present during the Cold War, and beingable to see through the problems that reached the European continent during the 1990s ina more global way.

7For a list of member states, cf. Table 1.


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In the context of the end of the Cold War, the CSCE was the first Organization tounderstand the necessity of systemic and institutional cooperation for the combat and theprevention of threats and to develop mechanisms to deal with it more adequately, goingfrom informal mechanisms to treaties and other institutionalized ways of doing so. A goodexample of these mechanisms is the creation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).CBMs are aimed at assuring a more transparent relation between countries especiallywhen concerning military activities, and although they are not a formal treaty and do not

imply judicial constrains, they have a relevant pedagogical effect, being an important toolto enhance cooperation among countries and to establish the fundamental stones forfurther security cooperation (Haas, 2007b).

The CBMs are designed to help controlling military activity and to provide earlywarnings when any country starts to develop different military activities. Some simpleexamples of CBMs that proved to be effective would be: annual defense ministersmeetings; exchange of defense information; publication of Defense White Papers; priornotification of major military maneuvers; exchange of observers; exchange, by invitation, ofmilitary personnel including visits by foreign delegations; information on existing forces including structure, deployment, peacetime authorized strength and major weapons andequipment systems down to brigade/regiment level; information about the planneddeployment of major weapons and equipment systems and publication of annual militarybudgets, among others.

Although the later development of the OSCE and the European context in generalled to the establishment of the concept of comprehensive security, which states that themanagement of security issues should not be restricted to the politico-military dimension -but also include the economic, environmental and human dimension, the basis for theOSCE is the establishment of better military and political relations, as it regularly is forevery existent security organization. Due to that, the OSCE is a pioneer organization and amodel to be followed by other countries wishing to have the same reach and breath.

However, exactly because of the wide range of aspects and activities proposed bythe OSCE, and mainly because of the vast number of countries that participate on the

Organization, it has seeing its scope of action and the very effectiveness of its actionsdiminished. First of all, there are other organizations that deal with the same sort ofsubjects addressed by the OSCE in Europe competing with the OSCE. The North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) is the most important of them, even if does not work the sameway or follows the same principles that OSCE. For Human Rights and the Rule of Law, theEuropean Union has the Council of Europe with its charter.

The first signs of failure and weakness of the OSCE can be traced back to the latenineties, during Yugoslavian wars, where the Organization was overshadowed by thosestructures aforementioned. Besides, as the OSCE is formed by 56 countries, with the riseof new security problems, it is getting harder to reach a common ground betweencountries that participate in specific regional structures such as those from Central Asia(Hopmann, 2008).

Although the OSCE is an important model for other regions wishing to establishsimilar structures, the European experience has to be adapted to suit other continents.Although it is important to expand the dimensions of security as made by the OSCE, forthe South American continent this could be a very delicate matter, especially when relatedto democratic control, because imposing a political agenda to South American politicalleaders could lead to the disintegration of this initiative. The complexity of the OSCEstructure is another point that has to be viewed with some criticism, although some


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important aspects, such as the creation of different branches of activities, could beadapted to South America. The same caveat is obviously valid to the next organization tobe considered here.

IV - The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its security focus

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent intergovernmentalorganism established in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan andUzbekistan. Its current institutional design evolved from the Shanghai Five established in1996, an initiative comprised by five of the aforementioned countries, except Uzbekistan.

According to Marcel de Haas (2007a:07-10), the institutional development of theSCO could be divided in three phases:

1o) Confidence and security building measures (1996-2001), when the basicobjectives were related to increase trust in the border regions and reduce military forces inborder regions of countries that were used to be hostile to each other (China versus formerSoviet Union) throughout most of the Cold War.

2o) Regional security against terrorism, separatism and extremism (2001-2004),when the Shanghai convention was signed, the first cross-border anti-terrorist exerciseswere conducted, and the two permanent organs of the OCS were established, aSecretariat (in Shanghai) and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), in Tashkent,Uzbekistan.

3o) Comprehensive international organization (2004-present). During the thirdphase, SCO transformed itself into an organization pursuing international recognition andcooperation with similar organizations (Memoranda of Understanding with UN, ASEAN,OCSE, CIS etc). Likewise, its observers were raised from one admitted during theprevious phase (Mongolia) to four (India, Pakistan and Iran) and the organization

developed military exercises almost yearly since then, including the 2005 Russian-ChinesePeace Mission, the 2006 East Antiterror, and the 2007 Issik-Kul Antiterror conducted inthe northern Kyrgyzstan.

In general terms, SCOs institutional design is organized in the form of two basicmechanisms of interactions: one of periodic meetings, and a permanent structure. The firstmechanism comprises the meetings of the Council of Heads of States, and the Council ofHeads of Governments (Prime-Ministers), as well as meetings carried on by the officialrepresentatives of other sectors Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Culture, Economy, Defense,Transportation, and the Council of National Coordinators. 8

8There are some areas of cooperation and disagreement between SCO and OSCE, as well as between

SCO and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), or even between SCO and NATO, butthis is not the focus here. For a preliminary assessment, see: HAAS (2007a).


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Figure 1 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Main Structures

Source: http://www.sectsco.org/html/00027.html

As for more descriptive information on this system of periodic meetings, SCOsCouncil of Heads of States is the higher decision-making body in the Organization,followed by the Council of the Heads of Government, which annually discusses multilateralcooperation in Central Asia. The latter is responsible as well for approving theOrganizations annual budget. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs alsoholds regular meetings as to discuss the present international situation and theinteractions between SCO and other international organizations. Finally, the Council ofNational Coordinators co-ordinates the multilateral cooperation of the member states

under the scope of SCOs chart.The second mechanism of interaction, namely the permanent structure, is

composed by the two permanent bodies of the Organization the Secretariat, establishedin 2004 and located in Shanghai (China), and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS),created in 2002 and located in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). SCOs Secretariat is the mainexecutive body of the Organization. It implements organizational decisions, projects and


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documents (such as statements and agenda), functioning as the documental depositary ofthe Organization and managing all the activities addressed by SCO.

Through the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) the SCO member countriesalso take part in the Shanghai Convention on terrorism, separatism and extremism.Bearing in mind the objectives and principles of the United Nations related to peace andinternational security, good relations with neighbor countries and cooperation among

states, as well as perceiving that terrorism, separatism and extremism are a threat topeace and security of nations, Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan andUzbekistan decided to create a mechanism of joint control. Therefore, convinced of thenecessity of coordinating actions of common interest as to provide territorial integrity,security and stability, and to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism, RATS wasestablished. This structure has been successful in acquiring the capacity to deal withgroups that oppose to the governments of the member states.

Moreover, SCO contributes to stability in the vast Central Asian region, whichcomprises not only natural resources reserves, but also areas of conflict. A commonstrategy among great powers is to carefully include new actors as minor partners, eitherfor the purpose of tactical convenience or due to the necessity of reflecting new power

realities, decurrently from the international dynamics. As a part of the Chinese-Russianstrategy of co-opting the neighbor countries to their sphere of influence, China and Russiaintend to bring economic growth and cooperation to their regional partners in that sense,a Chinese credit fund was established to facilitate the SCO members access to financing.Furthermore, one could also mention the cooperation between China, Russia andKazakhstan in the energy field, as well as the economic and commercial cooperationamong SCOs members. 9

On the subject of the security field, SCO promotes stability to the governments ofthe member state, combating domestic and foreign insurgent groups that contest thecentral governments authority. Security is the key issue in SCO, since the main problemfaced in the region is the low level of control in border relations, as well as the presence of

alleged terrorist or extremist groups in their territories. For that reason, SCO has adoptedvery precise and rigid definitions for terrorism, separatism and extremism which aresomewhat rare among international organizations. In practical terms, SCO nations seek tocontend terrorism by combating separatism and religious (Islamic) extremism. Theregions emphasis in security matters is, therefore, the search for guaranteeing theterritorial integrity of each country, as well as the maintenance of secular regimes inCentral Asia.

Another growing security concern for SCO is the rising in the production of poppy inAfghanistan and the illegal commerce of heroin which originates there. On that matter,SCOs members signed in 2004 an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating IllegalTurnover of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the Precursors Thereof.

Despite SCOs tradition in addressing matters of security, it has been pointed outthat the future of the organization depends on its members ability to cooperate in theeconomic field as well. Since the region is extremely rich in resources that are increasingly

9The only Central Asian country that is not a SCO member is Turkmenistan, although its president

Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov did attend the SCO Bishkek Summit (August 2007) and might beinterested in joining the so called SCO Energy Club. Cf. HAAS (2007a:10)


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necessary, but tend to scarceness, the absence of cooperation in economic affairs couldinduce a level of competition that would obliterate any integration initiative. Formally, theorganization already works toward that type of cooperation, although the approvedprojects have yet to come to full implementation.

In short, the Shanghai Spirit symbolizes a new type of international securitycooperation model, less bureaucratic, less comprehensive and much more practical for

countries that are not among the richest ones. On the less brilliant side, the authoritariannature of the political regimes involved in the SCO process hardly could inspire blindconfidence in this model in South America, where one of the biggest challenges in thesecurity field reform is exactly try hard to find balance between state effectiveness inproviding safety and security to all citizens and strong legitimacy achieved byaccountability and democratic control of institutions.

V Conclusion

As one compares even briefly the institutional design, types of operations and thestrategic rationales of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a couple of recommendations can bemade for South America.

From the OSCE experience, it should be avoided the too broad defined missionbased upon a comprehensive concept of human security. It was important for OSCE atsome point in order to focus on citizens instead of states as well as to provide a commonagenda for very different types of states and regional security contexts. This type ofmissions, with a relatively low profile, have played a central role in managing all of theconflicts that have emerged in the broad European regions following the end of the ColdWar and the breakup of the large multinational states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

(Hopmann, 2008:03). With the renewed conflicts between secessionists and centralgovernments, civil wars and militarized interstate disputes in different parts east ofVienna over the last fifteen years, the very same comprehensiveness that was so usefulin the beginning became dysfunctional and the OSCE lost appeal for most stakeholders,including Russia, United States, and European Union.

In contrast, the areas where OSCE is still making a difference with its currentagenda (namely border control cooperation, education programs, and law enforcementassistance) are largely complementary or compatible with the less soft security agendaof SCO. Created to lesser the tensions between China and former soviet republicsbordering it, the SCO structures and raison dtre changed dramatically after 2001.Building upon a strong base of confidence measures in border issues and counter-

terrorism, the SCO is slowly expanding its cooperation agenda towards more conventionaldefense and military themes as well as economic ones, energy, and general state capacitybuilding.


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Although UNASUR is still a fledgling organization, there are theoretical and politicalreasons to avoid modeling it exclusively after the European Union security institutions. 10

Theoretically, most of the critics of the SCO model wrongly assume that from stateweakness flows the internal security dilemma and from that, in turn, the sovereignty-reinforcing international organizations (Kelly, 2007:218). The link between weakness orstrength of a state apparatus and its alliance pattern seems to be just the opposite, not tomention the inherent problems with the concept of weak state. Politically, the same sort ofcriticism just assumes naively that the European Union ought to be superior for somehidden moral reason. The thinking goes like this: Regional security organizations do notpool sovereignty so much as amass it for joint, coordinated repression. Weak-stateregional international organizations are mutual sovereignty reinforcement coalitions, notintegrationist regional bodies like the European Union. The joint strategy regionalizes notsovereignty but domestic conflict and elite pushback (Kelly, 2007:219). It just doesntseem necessary that regional security organizations in the Third World will inevitably workthat way.

Even taking these somehow displaced caveats in full consideration, it does notexempt us of at least think about alternatives to the European Union model, which arecostly, heavily bureaucratic and regulated. As for the Defense or Security Council now in

study in South America, a sort of combination between a thin and broad normative basissimilar to the spirit of the OSCE pre-2001 (focusing on the civil rights of the citizens andconfidence building measures) and the effectiveness and priority (SCO style) rendered tothe actual security threats of the region (in opposition to a generic Global War onTerrorism type of agenda) might prove worth of trying. Hopefully this text will help to fosterthe debate about the options and timing.

10The under balancing behavior here can and should be explained in realist terms as well. For a first

attempt, see: SCHWELLER (2006).


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Table 1 Comparing UNASUR, OSCE, and SCO

UNASUR SCO OSCE

Year ofFormation

2008 2001 1995

Year ofPreviousInitiative

2004 1996 1973

Region South America Asia Europe-Asia-North America

Number ofMember States

12 06 56

State Members

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,Colombia, Chile, Ecuador,Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,

Suriname, Uruguay,Venezuela

China, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Russia,

Tajikistan andUzbekistan

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria,Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium,Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,

Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, CzechRepublic, Denmark, Estonia,

Finland, France, FYR Macedonia,Georgia, Germany, Greece, VaticanCity, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,Liechtenstein, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova,Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands,Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,

Russia, San Marino, Serbia,Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,

Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey,Turkmenistan, Ukraine United

Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan

Observers/Partners

Panama and Mexicoattended the Iran, Pakistan, Indiaand Mongolia

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan,Japan,

South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand.

Nuclear Powersas State

Members orobservers/partn

ers

NONE

Tlatelolco Treaty for theProhibition of Nuclear

Weapons in Latin Americaand the Caribbean

Russia and China;Pakistan and India

USA, Russia, France, UnitedKingdom

RelatedOrganizations

UN, OAS, CAN,MERCOSUR, OTCA

UN, CIS, CSTO UN, EU, NATO, CIS

Primary Focus Economic IntegrationState SecurityCooperation

Comprehensive Security Dialogue


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Objectives andActivities

Equitable social and humandevelopment, the

eradication of illiteracy, theuniversal access to qualityeducation and the regionalrecognition of courses andtitles; energy integration;

infrastructure for the

interconnection of theregion; financial integration;protection of biodiversity,

water resources andecosystems; cooperation in

the prevention ofcatastrophes; consolidation

of a South Americanidentity; universal access tosocial security and health

services; migratoryregularization and

harmonization of policies;reduction of poverty;

industrial and productiveintegration; cooperative

research and technologicaldevelopment; promotion of

cultural diversity; fightagainst corruption, theglobal drug problem,trafficking in persons,

trafficking in small and lightweapons, terrorism,

transnational organizedcrime and other threats;

non-proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction;

cooperation among thejudicial authorities of the

Member States of UNASUR,and the exchange of

information and experiencesin matters of defense.

Strengthening mutualtrust, friendship andgood neighborliness;

enhancement ofmilitary security by

promoting dialogue,

transparency, co-operation andcommitments onmilitary conduct;

disarmament and armscontrol; border security

and management;police and other law

enforcement assistanceprograms; conflict

prevention; combatingterrorism; combating

transnational organizedcrime such as drugs,

human beingsand arms trafficking;supporting economic

growth andcooperation; education

interchanges;counteracting

separatism andextremism;

counteracting illegal

immigration; regionalcooperation in culture,

sports, tourism, scienceand technology, trade,

energy, transport,credit, finance and

health care.

Anti-trafficking, arms control, bordermanagement, combat terrorism,

democratization, economic growth,education programs, election

assistance projects, environmentalactivities, gender equality, human

rights, media freedom, militaryreform, conflict prevention, minority

rights, policing and police reform, aswell as promotion of the rule of law,tolerance and non-discriminationbased upon racism, xenophobia,

anti-Semitism and so on.

Source: Adapted from Haas (2007:259) and complemented with information obtained athttp://www.sectsco.org; http://www.osce.org and http://www.mre.gov.br.


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Table 2 Armed Forces in South America

Country Total Army Air Force Navy

Argentina 72,700 42,500 13,200 17,000

Bolivia 33,500 25,000 4,000 4,500

Brazil 293,500 195,000 50,000 48,500

Chile 81,000 45,000 13,000 23,000Colombia 210,300 180,000 7,300 23,000

Ecuador 457,000 47,000 4,000 6,500

Guyana 1,630 1,500 100 30

Paraguay 18,600 14,900 1,700 2,000

Peru 110,000 70,000 14,500 25,500

Suriname 3,140 2,800 100 240

Uruguay 23,500 14,500 3,000 6,000

Venezuela 79,000 34,000 7,000 15,000

Notes:

1. Reserves not included.2. Including National Guard.

Table 3 - Defence Expenditure in South America

Country Defence expenditure (USDbillions)

Per cent ofGDP

Per head ofpopulation (USD)

Per member of armedforces (USD)

Argentina 1.53 1.04 40.2 21,309

Bolivia 0.12 1.6 15 3,700

Brazil 16.43 1.7 87.4 56,000

Chile 1.44 1.75 92 17,777

Colombia 4.0 3.9 95.23 10,816

Ecuador 0. 7 1.7 51 12,174

Guyana 0.017 2.2 23.1 5,766

Paraguay 0.52 1.2 15 4,166

Peru 0.9 1.35 33.6 8,181

Suriname 0.03 2.0 15.0 9,790

Uruguay 0.17 1.5 50.45 6,824

Venezuela 1.21 1.81 501 15,2271

Note:

1 - Latest available figure.


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Table 4 - Economic Indicators

Country GDP (USD billions) GDP Growth (annual per cent) GDP per capita (ppp USD)

Argentina 153 8. 9 7,482

Bolivia 8.7 3.6 1,036

Brazil 794 2.3 3,596

Chile 115.3 6.3 0 5,747

Colombia 122.3 5 7,304

Ecuador 30.3 6.9 1,459

Guyana 0.79 -0.65 951

Paraguay 7. 3 3.0 1,361

Peru 79.4 6.4 2,650

Suriname 1.1 4.6 2,369

Uruguay 16.7 6.6 4, 653

Venezuela 138.8 9. 33 4,939

Note: All figures from World Development Indicators.


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Table 5 - Social Indicators

Source: 2007 Jane's Information Group

Country Population(millions) Population growth (averageannual)

2005 UN Human DevelopmentIndex ranking

Argentina 38.7 1. 1 34

Bolivia

9. 0 2.1 113Brazil 183.9 1. 5 63

Chile 16. 1 1. 3 37

Colombia 44.9 1. 7 69

Ecuador 13. 0 1. 5 82

Guyana 0.75 0. 3 107

Paraguay 6. 0 2.5 88

Peru 27. 6 1. 6 79

Suriname 0.4 0. 8 86

Uruguay 3.4 0.7 46

Venezuela 26. 3 2. 0 75

Notes: World Health Organisation figures. Ranked out of 177 countries (1-575: high human development; 58-145: medium human development; 146-177: low human development).


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Abbreviations:

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CAN Comunidad Andina de Naciones / Andean Nations Community

CASA Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones / South American Community of Nations

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization of the CIS

EU European Uniion

MERCOSUR Common Market of South / Mercado Comum Del Sur

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAS Organization of American States

OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OTCA Organizacin del Tratado de Cooperacin Amaznica / Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization

RATS Regional Antiterrorist Structure of SCO

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

UN United NationsUNASUR Unin de Naciones Suramericanas / Union of South American Nations


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SOUTH AMERICAN UNION OF NATIONS CONSTITUTIVE TREATY

The Republic of Argentina, the Republic of Bolivia, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Chile,the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Ecuador, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic ofParaguay, the Republic of Peru, the Republic of Suriname, the Oriental Republic of Uruguay and theBolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

PREAMBLE

BASED on the shared history and solidarity of our multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural nations, whichhave fought for the emancipation and unity of South America, honouring the vision of those who forgedour independence and freedom in favour of that union and the building of a common future;

INSPIRED by the Cusco Declaration (December 8th, 2004), the Brasilia Declaration (September 30th, 2005)and the Cochabamba Declaration (December 9th, 2006);

AFFIRMING their determination to build a South American identity and citizenship and to develop anintegrated regional space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy andinfrastructure dimensions, for the strengthening of Latin America and Caribbean unity;

CONVINCED that the South American integration and South American unity are necessary to promote thesustainable development and wellbeing of our peoples, and to contribute to the solution of the problemswhich still affect our region, such as persistent poverty, social exclusion and inequality;

CERTAIN that integration is a decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of lawin international relations in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereignequality of States and a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weaponsof mass destruction;

CONFIRMING that both South American integration and the South American union are based on the guidingprinciples of: unlimited respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of States; self-determination of the peoples; solidarity; cooperation; peace; democracy, citizen participation andpluralism; universal, interdependent and indivisible human rights; reduction of asymmetries and harmonywith nature for a sustainable development;

UNDERSTANDING that South American integration should be achieved through an innovative process,which would include the progress achieved so far by the MERCOSUR and CAN processes, as well as theexperiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, and which goes beyond the convergence among them;

CONSCIOUS that the process of building a South American integration and union is ambitious in its strategic

objectives and will be flexible and gradual in its implementation, ensuring that each State honour itscommitments according to its own reality;

RATIFYING that fully functioning democratic institutions and the unrestricted respect for human rights areessential conditions for building a common future of peace, economic and social prosperity and for thedevelopment of integration processes among the Member States;

AGREE:

Article 1 - Constitution of UNASUR

The States Party to this Treaty decide to constitute the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as anentity with international juridical character.

Article 2 - Objective

The objective of the South American Union of Nations is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner,an integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizingpolitical dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, amongothers, with a view to eliminating socioeconomic inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion andparticipation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework ofstrengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States.

Article 3 - Specific Objectives

The South American Union of Nations has the following objectives:


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a) The strengthening of the political dialogue among Member States to guarantee a space for consultation inorder to reinforce South American integration and the participation of UNASUR in the international arena;

b) The inclusive and equitable social and human development in order to eradicate poverty and overcomeinequalities in the region;

c) The eradication of illiteracy, the universal access to quality education and the regional recognition ofcourses and titles;

d) Energy integration for the integral and sustainable use of the resources of the region, in a spirit ofsolidarity;

e) The development of an infrastructure for the interconnection of the region and among our peoples, basedon sustainable social and economic development criteria;

f) Financial integration through the adoption of mechanisms compatible with the economic and fiscalpolicies of Member States;

g) The protection of biodiversity, water resources and ecosystems, as well as cooperation in the preventionof catastrophes and in combating the causes and effects of climate change;

h) The development of concrete and effective mechanisms to overcome asymmetries, thus achieving anequitable integration;

i) The consolidation of a South American identity through the progressive recognition of the rights ofnationals of a Member State resident in any of the other Member States, with the aim of attaining a SouthAmerican citizenship;

j) Universal access to social security and health services;k) Cooperation on issues of migration with a holistic approach, based on an unrestricted respect for human

and labour rights, for migratory regularisation and harmonisation of policies;l) Economic and commercial cooperation to achieve progress and consolidation of an innovative, dynamic,

transparent, equitable and balanced process focused on an effective access, promoting economic growthand development to overcome asymmetries by means of the complementarities of the economies of thecountries of South America, as well as the promotion of the wellbeing of all sectors of the population andthe reduction of poverty;

m) Industrial and productive integration, focusing especially on the important role that small and medium sizeenterprises, cooperatives, networks and other forms of productive organisation may play;

n) The definition and implementation of common or complementary policies and projects of research,innovation, technological transfer and technological production, aimed at enhancing the regions owncapacity, sustainability and technological development;

o) The promotion of cultural diversity and the expression of the traditions and knowledge of the peoples ofthe region, in order to strengthen their sense of identity;

p) Citizen participation through mechanisms for interaction and dialogue between UNASUR and the varioussocial actors in the formulation of South American integration policies;

q) Coordination among specialised bodies of the Member States, taking into account international norms, in

order to strengthen the fight against corruption, the global drug problem, trafficking in persons, traffickingin small and light weapons, terrorism, transnational organised crime and other threats as well as fordisarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and eliminationof landmines;

r) The promotion of cooperation among the judicial authorities of the Member States of UNASUR.s) The exchange of information and experiences in matters of defence;t) Cooperation for the strengthening of citizen security;u) Sectoral cooperation as a mechanism to deepen South American integration, through the exchange of

information, experiences and capacity building.

Article 4 - Bodies

The Bodies of UNASUR are:

1. The Council of Heads of State and Government

2. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs3. The Council of Delegates

4. The General Secretariat

Article 5 - Institutional Development

Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, and meetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and otherinstitutional levels may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfil themandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report on their activities


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through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to the Council of Heads of State andGovernment or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as appropriate.

The agreements adopted by the Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groupsand other institutional levels will be submitted for consideration by the competent body which hassummoned or created them.

The Energy Council of South America, created by the Declaration of Margarita (April 17th, 2007), is part ofUNASUR.

Article 6 - The Council of Heads of State and GovernmentThe Council of Heads of State and Government is the highest organ of UNASUR.

Its responsibilities are:

a) To establish policy guidelines, plans of action, programmes and projects of the South American integrationprocess and to decide on the priorities to be implemented;

b) To summon Sectoral Ministerial Meetings and to create Councils at Ministerial level;

c) To decide on the proposals presented by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

d) To adopt the political guidelines for relation with third parties;

The ordinary meetings of the Council of Heads of State and Government will be held annually. Upon therequest of a Member State, extraordinary meetings may be summoned through the Pro TemporePresidency, subject to the consensus of all Member States of UNASUR.

Article 7 - The Pro Tempore Presidency

The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR will be held successively by each of the Member States, inalphabetical order, for periods of one year.

Its responsibilities are:

a) To prepare, summon and preside over the meetings of the bodies of UNASUR;

b) To present to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and to the Council of Delegates the annualprogram of activities of UNASUR, with dates, venues and agenda of the meetings of its bodies incoordination with the General Secretariat;

c) To represent UNASUR in international events, with the prior authorization of the Member States;

d) To undertake commitments and to sign Declarations with third parties, with prior consent of the

appropriate bodies of UNASUR.Article 8 - The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has the following functions:

a) To adopt Resolutions in order to implement the Decisions of the Council of Heads of State andGovernment;

b) To propose draft Decisions and prepare the meetings of the Council of Heads of State and Government;

c) To coordinate positions on central themes of South American integration;

d) To develop and promote political dialogue and coordination on themes of regional and internationalinterest;

e) To oversee and evaluate the integration process as a whole;

f) To approve the annual Programme of activities and the annual working budget of UNASUR;g) To approve the financing of the common initiatives of UNASUR;

h) To implement the policy guidelines for relations with third parties;

i) To approve resolutions and regulations of an institutional nature or on other themes falling within itsjurisdiction;

j) To create Working Groups based on the priorities established by the Council of Heads of State andGovernment.


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The ordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be held every semester and may beconvened by the Pro Tempore Presidency on an extraordinary basis at the request of half of the MemberStates.

Article 9 - The Council of Delegates

The Council of Delegates has the following functions:

a) To implement, through the adoption of the appropriate Provisions, the Decisions of the Council of Headsof State and Government, and the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the

support of the Pro Tempore Presidency and the General Secretariat;b) To prepare the meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

c) To prepare draft Decisions, Resolutions and Regulations for the consideration of the Council of Ministersof Foreign Affairs;

d) To ensure the compatibility and to coordinate the initiatives of UNASUR with other existing regional andsubregional integration processes in order to promote the complementarity of efforts;

e) To establish, coordinate and oversee the Working Groups;

f) To oversee the political dialogue and consultation and coordination on issues of regional and internationalinterest;

g) To encourage the opportunities for dialogue so as to facilitate citizen participation in the South Americanintegration process;

h) To propose to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for its consideration and approval, the draftordinary annual working budget.

The Council of Delegates is composed of one accredited representative of each Member State. It will meetpreferably every two months, in the territory of the State which occupies the Pro Tempore Presidency oranother agreed venue.

Article 10 - The General Secretariat

The General Secretariat is the body that, under the leadership of the Secretary General, executes themandates conferred upon it by the organs of UNASUR and represents them accordingly. Its headquartersshall be the city of Quito, Ecuador.

Its responsibilities shall be:

a) To support the Council of Heads of States and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,

the Council of Delegates and the Pro Tempore Presidency in the fulfilment of their duties;b) To propose initiatives and to oversee the implementation of the directives of the organs of UNASUR;

c) To participate with the right to speak and to perform the role of secretary in the meetings of the organs ofUNASUR;

d) To prepare and submit the Annual Report and the respective reports to the corresponding organs ofUNASUR;

e) To serve as depository of the Agreements in the framework of UNASUR and to arrange for theirrespective publication;

f) To prepare the draft Annual Budget for the consideration of the Council of Delegates and to adopt thenecessary measures for its proper management and execution;

g) To prepare the draft Regulations for the functioning of the General Secretariat and to submit them for the

consideration and approval of the corresponding organs;h) To coordinate with other integration and cooperation entities of Latin America and the Caribbean with a

view to developing those activities requested by the bodies of UNASUR;

i) To execute, according to the regulations, all the legal acts necessary for the proper administration andmanagement of the General Secretariat;

The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following aproposal by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a term of two years, renewable only once. TheSecretary General shall not be succeeded by a person of the same nationality.


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During the exercise of his or her functions, the Secretary General and the staff of the General Secretariatshall be exclusively dedicated to UNASUR and will not request, neither accept, instructions from anyGovernment nor any authority other than UNASUR, and will refrain from acting in a manner inconsistentwith their status as international civil servants with sole responsibility to this international organisation.

The Secretary General shall be the legal representative of the General Secretariat.

In the selection of the employees of the General Secretariat, an equitable representation for each MemberState will be guaranteed, taking into account, as far as possible, criteria of gender, language, ethnicityand others.

Article 11 - Juridical Sources

The juridical sources of UNASUR are the following:

1. The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR and other additional instruments;

2. The Agreements concluded by the Member States of UNASUR as a consequence of the instrumentsmentioned in the item above;

3. The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government;

4. The Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

5. The Provisions of the Council of Delegates.

Article 12 - Approval of the Legislative Measures

All the norms of UNASUR will be adopted by consensus.The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers

of Foreign Affairs and the Provisions of the Council of Delegates may be adopted with the presence of atleast three quarters (3/4) of the Member States.

The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of the Council of Ministersof Foreign Affairs adopted without the presence of all Member States, shall be forwarded by the SecretaryGeneral to the absent States, which shall make known their position within thirty (30) days after receipt ofthe document in the appropriate language. In the case of the Council of Delegates, that deadline shall befifteen (15) days.

The Working Groups shall hold sessions and make proposals as long as they have a quorum of half plus oneof the Member States.

The legislative measures emanating from the organs of UNASUR will be binding on the Member States once

they have been incorporated into each Member States domestic law, according to its respective internalprocedures.

Article 13 - Adoption of Policies and Creation of Institutions,

Organizations and Programmes

One or more Member States may submit for the consideration of the Council of Delegates a proposal foradoption of policies, creation of common institutions, organisations and programmes which will beadopted in a consensual manner, on the basis of a flexible and gradual criteria of implementationaccording to the objectives of UNASUR and the provisions of Articles 5 and 12 of this Treaty.

Programmes, institutions and organisations in which Member States participate prior to the entry into force ofthis Treaty may be considered as UNASUR programmes, institutions or organisations, in accordance withthe procedures outlined in this article and in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty.

The proposals will be submitted to the Council of Delegates. Once approved by consensus, they will beforwarded to the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and, subsequently, to the Council of Heads ofState and Government, for approval by consensus. When a proposal has not obtained consensus, it mayonly be submitted to the Council of Delegates six months after its last inclusion in the agenda.

Once a proposal is approved by the highest body of UNASUR, three or more Member States may begin toimplement it, provided that the possibility of inclusion of other Member States in such a common initiativeis guaranteed and periodical reports of its implementation are presented to the Council of Delegates.

Any Member State may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, be it for aperiod defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from later joining the total or


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partial implementation of that policy. In the case of institutions, organisations or programmes which arecreated, any Member State may participate as an observer, or refrain from participating fully or partiallyfor a definite or indefinite period.

The adoption of policies and the creation of institutions, organisations and programmes will be regulated bythe Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal by the Council of Delegates.

Article 14 - Political Dialogue

The political consultation and coordination among the Member States of UNASUR will be based on harmony

and mutual respect, strengthening regional stability and supporting the preservation of democratic valuesand the promotion of human rights.

Member States will reinforce the practice of consensus-building on the central themes on the internationalagenda and will promote initiatives that affirm the identity of the region as a dynamic factor in internationalrelations.

Article 15 - Relationship with Third Parties

UNASUR will promote initiatives for dialogue on themes of regional or international interest and will seek tostrengthen cooperation mechanisms with other regional groups, States and other entities withinternational legal character, focusing on projects in the areas of energy, financing, infrastructure, socialpolicies, education and others to be identified.

The Council of Delegates with the support of the Pro Tempore Presidency and the General Secretariat isresponsible for overseeing the implementation of activities. For the purpose of achieving proper

coordination, the Council of Delegates shall be informed of and consider the positions that UNASUR willadopt in its relationship with third parties.

Article 16 - Financing

The Council of Delegates will propose to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for consideration andapproval, the draft Annual Ordinary Budget for the functioning of the General Secretariat.

The financing of the ordinary budget for the functioning of the General Secretariat will be based ondifferentiated contribution quotas of the Member States to be determined by a Resolution of the Councilof Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal by the Council of Delegates, taking into account theeconomic capacity of the Member States, shared responsibility and the principle of equity.

Article 17 - Parliament

The creation of a South American Parliament, whose seat shall be the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, will bethe subject of an Additional Protocol to the present Treaty.

Article 18 - Citizen Participation

Full citizen participation in the process of South American integration and union will be promoted by meansof dialogue and interaction in a broad, democratic, transparent, pluralistic, diverse and independentmanner with the various social actors, establishing effective channels of information, consultation andsupervision in the different bodies of UNASUR.

The Member States and organs of UNASUR will promote innovative mechanisms and spaces to encouragediscussion of various issues ensuring that the proposals submitted by civil society receive adequateconsideration and response.

Article 19 - Associate States

Other Latin American and Caribbean States that request participation as Associate States of UNASUR maybe admitted with the approval of the Council of Heads of State and Government.

The rights and obligations of the Associate States will be regulated by the Council of Ministers of ForeignAffairs.

Article 20 - Accession of New Members

After the fifth year of the entry into force of the present Treaty and taking into account the aim ofstrengthening Latin American and Caribbean unity, the Council of Heads of State and Government mayconsider requests for accession as Members States by Associate States, that have held such a status forfour years, by means of a consensual recommendation by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The


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respective Protocols of Accession will enter into force 30 days after the completion of the ratificationprocess by all Members States and the acceding State.

Article 21 - Dispute Settlement

Any dispute that may emerge between States Parties regarding the interpretation or implementation of theprovisions of this Constitutive Treaty will be settled through direct negotiations.

In the case where a solution is not reached through direct negotiation, the Member States involved willsubmit the dispute for the consideration of the Council of Delegates, which will formulate within 60 days,

the appropriate recommendations for the settlement of the dispute.If a solution is not reached by the Council of Delegates, the dispute will be taken to the Council of Ministers

of Foreign Affairs, which will consider it at its next meeting.

Article 22 - Privileges and Immunities

UNASUR shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Member States, the privileges and immunities necessaryfor the fulfilment of its functions.

The representatives of the Member States of UNASUR and the international employees of UNASUR willtherefore benefit from the privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of theirfunctions with relation to this Treaty.

UNASUR shall establish with the Republic of Ecuador the corresponding Headquarters Agreement which willestablish the specific privileges and immunities.

Article 23 - LanguagesThe official languages of the Union of South American Nations will be English, Spanish, Portuguese and

Dutch.

Article 24 - Validity and Denunciation

This treaty will have an indefinite validity. It may be denounced by any of the Member States by means of awritten notification to the Depositary, which shall communicate such notification to the other MemberStates.

The denunciation will have effect six (6) months after the date in which the notification is received by theDepositary.

The notification of the denunciation shall not exempt the Member State of the obligation to pay outstandingordinary contributions.

Article 25 - AmendmentsAny Member State may propose amendments to this Constitutive Treaty. The proposed amendments will be

communicated to the General Secretariat which shall notify the other Member States for its considerationby the bodies of UNASUR.

The amendments approved by the Council of Heads of State and Government will follow the procedureestablished in article 26 for entry into force.

Article 26 - Entry Into Force

The present Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations will enter into force thirty days afterthe date of receipt of the 9th instrument of ratification.

The instruments of ratification will be deposited before the Government of the Republic of Ecuador, which willcommunicate the date of deposit to the other States, as well as the date of entry into force of thisConstitutive Treaty.

For the Member State which ratifies the Constitutive Treaty after the deposit of the 9th instrument ofratification, the Treaty will enter into force 30 days after the date in which that State deposits itsinstrument of ratification.

Article 27 - Registration

This Constitutive Treaty and its amendments will be registered at the United Nations Secretariat.

Transitory Article


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The Parties agree to appoint a Special Commission, coordinated by the Council of Delegates and composedof representatives of the National, Regional and Subregional Parliaments, with the objective of preparinga draft of an Additional Protocol which will be considered in the IV Summit of Heads of State andGovernment. This Commission will meet in the city of Cochabamba. Such an Additional Protocol willdetermine the composition, attributions and functioning of the South American Parliament.

Done in the city of Brasilia, Brazil, on the 23rd day of the month of May of the year 2008, in original copies inthe English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch languages, the four texts being equally authentic.


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Abstract

As pointed by Kelly (2007:212-215), a normative desire for regional integration still drivesmost of the academic and political debate concerned with the newly created Union ofSouth American Nations (UNASUR). The main goal of this paper is to compare theinstitutional design, operations and strategic rationales of the Organization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in

order to evaluate how useful and applicable those experiences would be for SouthAmerica. Since the UNASUR was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regionalorganizations such as the Mercosur and the Andean Community, it has potential securityroles in addressing common regional ills like organized crime and high rates ofinterpersonal violence. A more institutionalized regional order is also supposed to providemore room of maneuver for the South Americans facing global centripetal forces such asthe current U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization. Although UNASUR is still afledgling supranational / intergovernmental union, there are theoretical and politicalreasons to avoid modeling it exclusively after the European Union security institutions.Assuming a normative desire for a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, thispaper examines in rather realist terms the usefulness of two other models of securitycooperation and integration (Mares, 2001; Buzan & Weaver, 2003).

Key words: Europe-South America-Integration-Cooperation-Security-Regional-Region-Organization

Documents

Regional Security and Integration in South America