referendums and demonstrations

Tilburg University – MSc Public Governance

Master’s thesis – Democratic Governance and Innovation

I.M. Witting

June 26, 2020

Supervisor: Dr. A. Maleki

Second reader: tba

REFERENDUMS

AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Comparative research into

Western European democracies

Master’s thesis

MSc Public Governance Master’s Thesis Irene Witting

Democratic Governance and Innovation

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Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Ammar

Maleki, who helped me gain insight into the matter and keep looking at

the bigger picture. Moreover, I am grateful for his dedication and

enthusiasm throughout the entire research process, which has been an

encouragement to me.

In addition, I would like to thank Professor Dr. Frank Hendriks for

imparting his knowledge and enthusiasm during the course Governance

and Politics, which has sparked my interest in democratic governance

in the first place.



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Table of contents

Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................................... 1

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 4

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5

1.1. Motivation ............................................................................................................................... 5

1.2. Problem Statement .................................................................................................................. 6

1.3. Relevance ................................................................................................................................ 6

2. Theoretical Discussion ................................................................................................................ 8

2.1. Central concepts ...................................................................................................................... 8

2.1.1. Referendums .................................................................................................................... 8

2.1.2. Demonstrations .............................................................................................................. 11

2.2. Relevant theory ...................................................................................................................... 12

3. Methodological Framework ...................................................................................................... 15

3.1. Research strategy ................................................................................................................... 15

3.2. Selection of countries ............................................................................................................ 15

3.3. Data collection and analysis .................................................................................................. 16

3.4. Quality and validity ............................................................................................................... 17

4. Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 18

4.1. Country selection ................................................................................................................... 18

4.2. Summarizing table ................................................................................................................. 18

4.3. Global analysis by country .................................................................................................... 21

4.3.1. Nordic countries and the Benelux ................................................................................. 21

4.3.2. Austria and Germany ..................................................................................................... 22

4.3.3. The United Kingdom and Ireland .................................................................................. 23

4.3.4. Switzerland, Italy, and Portugal .................................................................................... 26

4.3.5. Spain and France, and Greece and Cyprus .................................................................... 28

4.4. Findings ................................................................................................................................. 30

4.4.1. Bottom-up referendums ................................................................................................. 30

4.4.2. Topics of referendums and demonstrations ................................................................... 31

4.5. Other explaining factors ........................................................................................................ 32

4.5.1. Strikes ............................................................................................................................ 32

4.5.2. Political-cultural dimensions ......................................................................................... 35

5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 37

5.1. Conclusions of this thesis ...................................................................................................... 37

5.2. Limitations............................................................................................................................. 37



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5.3. Policy recommendations ....................................................................................................... 38

5.4. Recommendations for further research.................................................................................. 38

Literature ............................................................................................................................................... 39

Appendix ............................................................................................................................................... 43



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Abstract

Referendums and demonstrations, both forms of political participation, are on the rise. Different theories

exist on how these two concepts relate to each other. There are arguments for a negative relationship,

with referendums acting as an alternative mechanism or substitute for demonstrations, but also

arguments for a positive relationship, with referendums intensifying the occurrence of demonstrations.

Previous studies on this relationship are not conclusive and moreover solely focus on the subnational

and local levels. Furthermore, the effect the other way around, with demonstrations leading to the use

of a referendum, is also conceivable and was recently seen in Chile. In this thesis, the relationship

between referendums and demonstrations is further explored among Western European democracies, by

conducting mixed methods research. General trends are revealed, and more in-depth perspectives are

provided. In particular, this thesis shows that when bottom-up referendums are possible – either at the

national level or lower levels – lower numbers of demonstrations are seen. Current discrepancies

between topics of referendums and demonstrations highlight the opening and potential for bottom-up

referendums.



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1. Introduction

1.1. Motivation

Two phenomena regarding protests and referendums can be noticed these days. First of all, one can

hardly escape news reports about the occurrence of various protests. “As many times before, people

raised their voices and came together, appearing to seek to expand their rights, safeguard and improve

their living conditions, oppose oppression, challenge existing categories and boundaries, and assert their

identities and values” (Davies, Ryan & Pena, 2016, p. 2). Today, also in Western society, political

protests are of frequent occurrence – a phenomenon that social scientists are trying to get a grip on

(Ackermann, 2017).

Another phenomenon to be noted concerns the increase in the use of direct democracy, both at national

and subnational levels. This phenomenon is seen in many established democracies since the 1970s,

including an increase in the use of referendums (Donovan & Karp, 2006). Dissatisfaction with current

representative democratic systems is argued to cause the call for more participatory democracy and

direct political involvement, and in particular for more referendums (Dalton, Burklin & Drummond,

2001; Leininger, 2015).

Both protests and referendums can be identified as forms of political participation (Maleki & Hendriks,

2016). Protest participation is a form of non-electoral participation, with demonstrations as one

manifestation of it (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). Referendums, on the other hand, are a direct form of

electoral participation, allowing for direct voting by the public on particular issues (Leininger, 2015;

Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). There is a difference between the presence and use of referendums, as

highlighted by various authors: the presence of the possibility for referendums does not automatically

entail their use (Fatke & Freitag, 2013; Maleki & Hendriks, 2016).

The relationship between demonstrations and referendums has been studied before. As far as I am aware

of, however, only the effect of referendums on demonstrations has been studied, though an effect the

other way around, with demonstrations leading to the use of a referendum, is also conceivable, as was

recently seen in Chile (Bartlett, 2019). Regarding the effect of referendums on demonstrations, different

theories exist. There are arguments for a negative relationship, with referendums acting as an alternative

or substitute for demonstrations, but also arguments for a positive relationship, with referendums

intensifying the occurrence of demonstrations (Fatke & Freitag, 2013).

Previous studies are not conclusive and moreover focus on the subnational or local level (Ackermann,

2017; Fatke & Freitag, 2013; Kern, 2018) and on reported individual participation in demonstrations

(Ackermann, 2017; Fatke & Freitag, 2013) or reported intentions to demonstrate (Kern, 2018). To my

knowledge, national levels have not yet been studied, though the need for an international comparison

in this field has been expressed by previous researchers (Ackermann, 2017; Fatke & Freitag, 2013). The



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question whether and how the occurrence of demonstrations and the presence and use of referendums at

national levels are related remains pending. With this thesis, I aim to further study this relationship

among European democracies. In doing so, I focus on the actual occurrence of demonstrations rather

than intentions to demonstrate.

1.2. Problem Statement

The foregoing leads to the following research question:

How are the occurrence of demonstrations as a form of protest participation in European

democracies and the presence and use of referendums in these respective countries related?

The relationship studied could work both ways: the presence and use of referendums may affect the

occurrence of demonstrations, and the occurrence of demonstrations may affect the use of referendums.

Subsequently, the following sub questions are used as guidance in formulating an answer to the research

question:

1. Can the occurrence of demonstrations be linked to the presence and use of referendums as being

a response to them?

2. Can the use of referendums be linked to the occurrence of demonstrations as being a response

to them?

In the theoretical discussion, the concepts of demonstrations and referendums are elaborated, as well as

the theories and results of previous studies into the relationship between the two. Later, in the empirical

part of this thesis, the relationship is further investigated among European democracies.

1.3. Relevance

The scientific relevance of this thesis is twofold. First, this study adds to the literature an extension of

the research into referendums and demonstrations beyond the local level to the national levels – a need

which has been expressed by previous researchers (Ackermann, 2017; Fatke & Freitag, 2013). Second,

this study focuses on practices of demonstrations rather than the possibility of them. Actual occurrences

are mapped rather than an aggregation of individually stated intentions.

For society, this study could provide useful insights for democratic governments in Europe and even

beyond. If an effect of referendums on demonstrations or the other way around is established, an

indication for governments is provided as to how they may respond to demonstrations or what they may

expect from the use of referendums. If a negative relationship exists between the use of referendums

and the occurrence of demonstrations, democratic governments could utilize referendums in responding

to rising demonstrations. A positive relationship, on the other hand, could be an indication of

demonstrations to be expected when employing referendums, and inherently an indication to consider



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other means than referendums in acting upon demonstrations. In an era in which demonstrations seem

to be on the rise, such insights could prove meaningful.



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2. Theoretical Discussion

As appears from the research question, the concept of referendums, and the concept of demonstrations

as a form of protest participation are central. In this section, these concepts are first elaborated, after

which previous relevant research on their relationship is discussed.

2.1. Central concepts

Maleki and Hendriks (2016) operationalize two main dimensions of democracy, extending previous

research on models of democracy in action: contestation and participation. Their conceptualization of

participation as one dimension of democracy offers a useful base for conceptualizing the central

concepts of this thesis. Three components of participation can be identified, being “general-electoral

participation”, “referendum-electoral participation”, and “non-electoral participation”, with the latter

representing political action or protest participation (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016, p. 247). For this thesis,

the components ‘referendum-electoral participation’ and ‘non-electoral participation’ are of interest. I

use the conceptualization of these components by Maleki and Hendriks (2016) as a starting point in

discussing the central concepts, in addition to which I review insights from other studies.

2.1.1. Referendums

One indicator for political participation is electoral participation, which can be subdivided into

general-electoral participation and referendum-electoral participation (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). The

former comprises participation in general elections, while the latter comprises electoral participation in

a more direct way through referendums or comparable forms of direct voting (Maleki & Hendriks,

2016). Similarly, Leininger (2015) defines direct democracy as “institutional arrangements that allow

citizens to directly vote on policy themselves in referendums” (p. 2). Altman (2011) identifies

mechanisms of direct democracy, being “publicly recognized institution[s] wherein citizens decide or

emit their opinion on issues […] directly at the ballot box through universal and secret suffrage” (p. 7).

Referendums can be characterized in various ways and terminologies used are not consistent (Altman,

2011; Hug & Tsebelis, 2002; Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). I discuss three typologies and highlight their

similarities, on which I subsequently build in categorizing referendums in the analysis of this thesis.

Maleki and Hendriks (2016) first distinguish top-down and bottom-up referendums, which subsequently

can be divided into mandatory and plebiscitary referendums (top-down), and optional referendums and

initiatives (bottom-up). Mandatory referendums are required by the constitution or by law, while

plebiscites are referendums initiated by the authorities. Optional referendums, on the other hand, are

referendums initiated or activated by citizens in which laws or proposals already present are at issue,

while initiatives concern new proposals from citizens themselves. The latter category comprises both

those proposals that are directly put to the popular vote and those that are firstly revised by the legislator

and only then put to the popular vote (counterproposal) (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016).



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In another way, Hug and Tsebelis (2002) arrive at a similar typology. The authors take the veto player

theory perspective in classifying referendums, recognizing veto players as “actors whose agreement is

necessary for a change in the legislative status quo” (p. 466). In any case, governments can be considered

veto players, while the possibility of referendums allows citizens to become an additional veto player.

Distinctions between referendums can subsequently be drawn based on the actor triggering the

referendum and the actor actually asking the question. Accordingly, they propose a fourfold

classification of referendums.

First, required referendums are distinguished from non-required referendums. Second, further focusing

on non-required referendums, they pose the question whether or not the referendum is triggered by an

existing veto player. Finally, for referendums not triggered by an existing veto player, one can

distinguish referendums in which the question is asked by an existing veto player (popular veto) and in

which it is not (popular initiative) (Hug & Tsebelis, 2002). The popular veto “allows non-veto players

to force a return to the status quo ante”, while the popular initiative gives them the power to set the

agenda by “both asking the question and triggering” the referendum (Hug & Tsebelis, 2002, p. 485). It

can be noted that, while the perspective used is considerably different, similarities with the typology of

Maleki and Hendriks (2016) are seen in the identified types of referendums. In figure 1, the typology of

Hug and Tsebelis (2002) is shown.

Figure 1: Questions defining different categories of referendums (source: Hug & Tsebelis, 2002, p. 478)

A more detailed typology of so-called mechanisms of direct democracy is given by Altman (2011). Like

Maleki and Hendriks (2016) and Hug and Tsebelis (2002), Altman (2011) takes into account the

dimension of the initiator of the referendum. Additionally, Altman (2011) distinguishes between binding

and non-binding outcomes, and proactive and reactive mechanisms. This typology results in twelve



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categories, which are shown in figure 2. Seven categories are found in practice, while the remaining five

are not. The latter are indicated by the dotted boxes in figure 2.

Figure 2: Typology of Mechanisms of Direct Democracy (source: Altman, 2011, p. 11)



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The three typologies show similarities. Firstly, the mandatory referendum, required referendum, or

mandatory plebiscite (as identified by Maleki and Hendriks (2016), Hug and Tsebelis (2002), and

Altman (2011), respectively) can be identified. Secondly, plebiscites, the veto player referendum, and

the consultative together with the facultative plebiscites are similar. The optional referendum, the

popular veto, and the facultative referendum (which comprises the possibility to veto an adopted law

(Altman, 2011), also show resemblance, as do the initiative and the popular initiative of Hug and

Tsebelis (2002) and the popular initiative (described as an offered “alternative to the status quo” in the

form of “a proposed law, statute, or constitutional amendment” (p. 15)) and consultative initiative of

Altman (2011). However, in the definition of Altman (2011), the line between the third and fourth type

of referendum identified is thin. Altman (2011) highlights that the facultative referendum should already

be considered a popular initiative when the prescribed time to launch the facultative referendum has

expired, even if the initiative is to abolish a law. Finally, the legislative counterproposal is to be noted.

Altman (2011) notes this type of referendum is “to be voted on simultaneously against the citizen-

initiated measure” (p. 14). Maleki and Hendriks (2016) hence mention the counterproposal as part of

the initiative, as it requires an initiative to be made by citizens in the first place.

The two dimensions of democracy (contestation and participation) can be studied using two approaches:

constitutional facilitation on the one hand, comprising institutional capabilities, and actual incidence on

the other, comprising practical realities (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). These approaches should be

distinguished, as the presence or constitutional facilitation of participation may affect but does not

necessarily equal actual participation (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). In this thesis, both the facilitation and

use of referendums are considered.

Direct democracy in general and hence referendums are found appealing as it constitutes “the most

obvious institutionalization of democracy itself” (Leininger, 2015, p. 2). Additionally, referendums may

prove more decisive in resolving political matters than representative processes (Leininger, 2015).

Nevertheless, turnout in referendums is often low in comparison with turnout in elections, which sheds

a different light on the significance of their appeal (Leininger, 2015). As mentioned in the introduction,

direct democracy and hence referendums have been on the rise (Ackermann, 2017; Donovan & Karp,

2006). Both political dissatisfaction as well as interest in politics are mentioned as main explanations

for this (Dalton et al., 2001; Donovan & Karp, 2006; Leininger, 2015).

2.1.2. Demonstrations

Next to forms of electoral participation, non-electoral participation can be identified, which may include

“political involvement, party activities and protest participation” (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016, p. 246). Of

these, political involvement can be considered different as it concerns an interest rather than an activity

focused at influencing governmental processes. Furthermore, party activities can be considered

conventional and “merely expressive” (p. 246), for which reason they are not always included in



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considering political participation. Consequently, Maleki and Hendriks (2016) only consider ‘political

action’ or ‘protest participation’ to be covered by non-electoral participation in practice. Subsequently,

the authors note political action or protest participation can occur in three ways: “signing a petition,

joining in boycotts and attending lawful demonstrations” (p. 249). In this thesis, I solely focus on

demonstrations.

As for direct democracy, also for demonstrations the distinction between constitutional facilitation and

actual incidence can be made. For demonstrations, however, only actual incidence is considered in this

thesis. Furthermore, while Maleki and Hendriks (2016) only include lawful demonstrations, I do not

distinguish lawful and unlawful demonstrations, as to use a complete view when studying their

relationship with referendums.

Protest in general is considered to comprise actions of disapproval or objection (Davies et al., 2016). In

the literature, the focus has been on collective, irregular protest actions with the intention of influencing

other actors and effectuating change regarding singular political or social issues (Davies et al., 2016).

Like Maleki and Hendriks (2016), Ackermann (2017) recognizes protest as a form of political

participation, being “cause-oriented” (p. 23). Protest is related to specific issues or concerns

(Ackermann, 2017; Hutter & Braun, 2013). It is no longer seen as “disruptive and irrational behavior”,

as it has been in the past when it was considered a threat to the political system (Hutter & Braun, 2013,

p. 2). Rather, it has become “an alternative and legitimate channel for political action” and direct

participation (Hutter & Braun, 2013, p. 2). From an external perspective, protests influence democracy

in participatory, deliberative, and radical respects. Additionally, from an internal perspective, protesters

themselves conduct representation, participation, and deliberation (Davies et al., 2016).

2.2. Relevant theory

To start with the theory of the effect of referendums on demonstrations: according to the political

opportunity perspective, protest activities are strongly determined by their wider political context

(Meyer, 2004). More specifically, the openness of the political system is found to be important (Meyer,

2004). In line herewith, institutions of direct democracy, including referendums, are used as an indicator

of the openness of a political system (Hutter & Braun, 2013).

Focusing on the effect of direct democracy on demonstrations, two reverse effects can be identified

(Fatke & Freitag, 2013). There can be a negative effect, with direct democracy acting as a “valve” for

demonstrations because of integration effects, or a positive effect, with direct democracy acting as a

“catalyst” for demonstrations because of educative effects (Fatke & Freitag, 2013, p. 238). I will first

discuss the theory behind both effects, and subsequently elaborate on empirical findings of related

research done previously.

Starting with the negative or integration effect, Fatke and Freitag (2013) note the occurrence of

demonstrations when institutions of direct democracy are absent. As mentioned in the first paragraph,



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from the political opportunity perspective, the openness of a political system influences the occurrence

of demonstrations. The openness of the system is in turn increased by direct democracy, the argument

goes, which contributes to the inclusion of the opinion of the public (Fatke & Freitag, 2013). The public

can directly express its interest, set the political agenda, and advocate change (Ackermann, 2017). Thus,

direct democracy can be considered a “valve” for potential demonstrations (Fatke & Freitag, 2013,

p. 238). In the same vein, direct democracy is recognized as “an ordered and institutionalized

alternative” to or substitute for demonstrations (Ackermann, 2017, p. 26).

In this regard, it is important to note that the presence of one form of participation (either

general-electoral participation, referendum-electoral participation, or non-electoral participation) cannot

completely countervail the absence of another (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016).

Contrarily, in line with the positive or educative effect, the occurrence of demonstrations in the period

before and after referendums is noted (Fatke & Freitag, 2013). Direct democracy involves the public in

the political process, which enables them to “form, express and enforce their preferences” (p. 238). In

this view, direct democracy can be considered a “catalyst” for potential demonstrations (Fatke & Freitag,

2013, p. 238).

The relationship between direct democracy and demonstrations has been studied before at the

subnational or local level. Among Swiss cantons, a negative effect of both the presence and use of direct

democracy on individual protest behavior has been found (Fatke & Freitag, 2013). Additionally, another

study of the Swiss cantons shows the use of direct democracy has a significant moderating effect on the

relationship between openness to experience and protest participation (Ackermann, 2017). In the case

of a local Belgian referendum, it is found that voters of the referendum report more intention to

participate in future protest as opposed to non-voters (Kern, 2018).

The studies discussed above all focus at the subnational and local level. At the national levels in Europe,

it is found that the positive relationship between political distrust in national parliaments and likelihood

to participate in protest activities is even stronger in open political contexts (Hutter & Braun, 2013).

The theory discussed so far concerns the effect of referendums on demonstrations. However, the effect

can also be found the other way around: demonstrations may lead to the use of referendums. To my

knowledge, specific research into such an effect has not yet been conducted. Nevertheless, an example

was recently seen in Chile. Research into the so-called Chilean spring has been conducted by Somma,

Bargsted, Disi Pavlic and Medel (2020). In their study, the authors note that demonstrations “ranged

from peaceful actions to violent tactics to criminal behaviors” (p. 4). Repressions were carried out by

the police, but as the crisis continued and it not only constituted a threat to the government “but the

whole political class”, another route was taken by, amongst other things, deploying plebiscites (Somma

et al., p. 5).



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Despite this research, – as far as I am aware of – studies particularly focusing on the relationship between

referendums and demonstrations have not yet been conducted at the national levels. Whether findings

from the subnational and local level are generalizable to the national level is disputable as local direct

democracy and national direct democracy differ (Kern, 2018). Additionally, whether cases such as Chile

are also found in European countries neither is self-evident. Hence, a knowledge gap remains.



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3. Methodological Framework

3.1. Research strategy

I will formulate an answer to the main research question by taking as guidance the sub questions as

stated in the introduction. I do so by conducting mixed methods research, as I analyze both quantitative

and qualitative data (Creswell & Creswell, 2005). Quantitative data allows for observing “generalizable

trends” (p. 318) in the presence and use of referendums and the occurrence of demonstrations.

Qualitative data, on the other hand, provides “in-depth perspectives” (p. 318) within the specific

country-setting and makes it possible to determine (the absence of) specific connections between

referendums and demonstrations. More specifically, the design of this research can be classified as

triangulation: the quantitative and qualitative data is simultaneously collected in order to converge the

two and “compare the particular with the general” (Creswell & Creswell, 2005, 320).

Additionally, this study is a multiple-case study analysis, as I analyze both within each country-case and

across country-cases (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This research can finally be characterized as exploratory

and descriptive (Yang & Miller, 2008). The relationship between referendums and demonstrations is

further explored while describing the situation in and across various countries.

3.2. Selection of countries

The first focus of this thesis are European democracies. The Democracy Index of the Economic

Intelligence Unit provides information on the status of democracy for each state (The Economist

Intelligence Unit, 2018). Based on this index, I identify the countries for the analysis. I use the Index of

the year 2017, as 2017 is the most recent year included in the time period of study.

In the Democracy Index, Western and Eastern European countries are distinguished (The Economist

Intelligence Unit, 2018). These two groups of countries considerably differ in their democratic index

scores. In Eastern Europe, hybrid and authoritarian regimes form the majority, while no full democracies

are present at all. In Western Europe, on the other hand, full democracies dominate. Particularly

considering their scores for the functioning of government, political participation and political culture,

flawed democracies in Eastern Europe score considerably lower than democracies (both full and flawed)

in Western Europe (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). Hence, for comparability reasons, I solely

focus on Western European democracies. All Eastern European and Western European countries not

being full or flawed democracies are not included in the analysis.

Furthermore, Western European democracies for which either no referendum data or protest data is

available are logically excluded from the analysis.



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3.3. Data collection and analysis

Inherent to the research strategy – particularly because of the qualitative approach and case study

analyses – multiple data sources are used to collect data (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yang & Miller, 2008).

Data analysis is performed simultaneously with data collection (Baxter & Jack, 2008).

After the selection of countries outlined in section 3.2, I analyze all countries included. For this analysis,

I use the database on direct democracy of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance (hereinafter: IDEA) (IDEA, 2020a) as well as the database C2D (C2D, 2018) for information

about referendums. The former provides – among other things – extensive per-country information on

the presence of referendums, while the latter provides specific information on referendums held.

Additionally, regarding demonstrations, I use the database of the Mass Mobilization Project (hereinafter:

MMP), which provides data on more than 10,000 protests in 162 countries from 1990 up till March 31st,

2018 (MMP, 2019a; MMP, 2019b).

The MMP database contains for each protest information on, amongst other things, the location and size

of protests and protester demands (MMP, 2019a). Only protests in which at least 50 people gathered,

who targeted their own government, are included in the database (MMP, 2019c). Thus, protests in one

country targeted at foreign governments are not included for that country, neither are inter-communal

demonstrations (MMP, 2019c). Finally, labor-related action is only coded “if the people take to the

streets” (and again: the government must be involved) (MMP, 2019c, p. 3). Thus, strikes in themselves

are not included, only if an actual protest, an actual gathering of people, is part of it.

Protests in the MMP database were identified by searching newspaper sources using Lexis-Nexis. First,

four main sources were searched: the New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor,

and Times of London. If these sources did not yield at least 100 articles, also regional sources and other

sources were included. If still not 100 articles at least were returned, wire-reports were searched too

(MMP, 2019c).

Thus, an extensive search has been performed, which makes this source suitable to use for this thesis in

gathering information on protests. In the MMP database, notes for each protest are made, in which facts

about each protest are mentioned as derived from the news source. As the specific topic and demand of

the protest are also (often) mentioned, these notes are useful in themselves for the global analysis in this

thesis and additionally provide a lead for deeper research. In establishing the topic of each protest, I

focus on these notes rather than the categories the coders of the database already assigned to protester

demands, which do not provide information specific enough for this analysis.

The focus of this thesis are the national levels. While only national referendums are taken into account,

demonstrations at all geographical levels are included, not only nationally organized or nationwide

occurring ones. In the end, also demonstrations at the regional or local level may target the national

government. However, demonstrations targeting issues which do fall under the authority of the regional



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or local government are still included as they cannot easily be filtered in the MMP database. Because of

the scope of this thesis and the rather limited information provided in the database, I do not consider it

feasible to establish for each demonstration the targeted government level and manually filter them. If,

however, it is clear that multiple demonstrations are regional or local and make up a significant part of

the total number of demonstrations, I will mention so.

As the latest year completely available of the database of the MMP is 2017, the time period studied in

this thesis is 1998-2017. I opt for a time period of twenty years because the frequency of national

referendums is often limited. Within this time period, it is possible to identify clues for the relationship

studied.

In addition to the sources mentioned in the foregoing, I use complementary sources, which may include

– but are not necessarily limited to – legislation, policy documents, reports, academic studies, news

articles, and other archival materials. Analysis of such data will reveal in-depth non-numerical

information and provide more context to the findings of the global analysis.

3.4. Quality and validity

This thesis will naturally come with limitations, which are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Prior

to the findings, two limitations can already be noted. The first concerns internal validity. With this thesis,

I study the relationship between referendums and demonstrations. Doing so, I look at the presence and

use of referendums, and the occurrence of demonstrations. However, besides the presence and use of

referendums, there are other variables influencing the occurrence of demonstrations, as well as other

variables than demonstrations influencing the use of referendums. Though I will take these other

variables into account as far as possible in the analyses, their effect cannot entirely be controlled for.

The second limitation concerns external validity. Though focusing on Western European democracies,

the context within each country will still be considerably specific and comparability between countries

may be limited. The extent to which the findings will be generalizable to other countries is therefore

questionable. However, as multiple countries are included in the case study, this threat is partly

counteracted, and findings can still be useful for other countries too.



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4. Analysis

In this section, I analyze Western European democracies with regard to their referendums and

demonstrations. First, I elaborate on the selection of countries which are included in this global analysis,

after which I present an overview of characteristics per country in section 4.2. In section 4.3, I

descriptively outline findings per country or group of countries. Based on this analysis, I highlight some

overall findings in section 4.4. Additionally, I discuss two other factors to further elaborate on the

findings and place them into context.

4.1. Country selection

As mentioned in chapter 3, I solely focus on Western European democracies. Out of all Western

European countries, only Turkey knows a hybrid regime, making it the only Western European country

not being a full or flawed democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). Therefore, only Turkey

is not included in the analysis on this basis.

From the remaining Western European democracies, Iceland and Malta cannot be included in the

analysis, as the database of the MMP (MMP, 2019b) on demonstrations does not provide any data for

these two countries. The countries finally included can be found in table 1 in the following section.

4.2. Summarizing table

In table 1, per-country characteristics concerning referendums and demonstrations are summarized. In

the second column, the population of each country on January 1st in 1998 and 2018 (Eurostat, 2020) is

noted to account for differences in country-sizes in further interpreting findings.

In columns 3 to 5 of the same table is shown per-country the types of referendum for which legal

provisions are present (IDEA, 2020a), with the number of each type of referendum actually held noted

in parentheses (C2D, 2018). Based on the data provided by the IDEA database and the theory on types

of referendums as discussed in the theoretical framework, the following types of referendums (all at the

national level) are distinguished: mandatory referendums, optional referendums initiated by an authority

(here labelled as plebiscites), and bottom-up referendums – including both optional referendums

initiated by citizens, and citizens’ initiatives. Only one column for both types of bottom-up referendums

is included in the table as it was found that for all countries in this analysis, either none or both are

present. Mandatory referendums are defined as “a vote of the electorate which is required under

circumstances defined in the constitution or in legislation” (IDEA, 2020b). Optional referendums, on

the other hand, are “a vote of the electorate which is not required by the constitution or by law”, which

can either be initiated by an authority or citizens (registered electors) (IDEA, 2020b). Finally, the

citizens’ initiative is defined as “a direct democracy procedure that allows citizens to initiate a vote of

the electorate on a proposal outlined by those citizens. The proposal may be for a new law, for a



19

constitutional amendment, or to repeal or amend an existing law” (IDEA, 2020b). Counterproposals –

which can only be done in countries in which citizens’ initiatives are provided for and used - are only

found in Switzerland (C2D, 2018), and are included under plebiscites.

In the C2D database on referendums held, some referendums are listed as national while in fact being

regional or local. In Sweden, the 2006 referendum on the introduction of congestion charges in

Stockholm was not held nationally, but only in Stockholm (OECD, 2006). For the Netherlands,

referendums held only among the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are listed among

national referendums in the C2D database. Similarly, for France, referendums held at Sark (one of the

Channel Islands, which are dependencies of the British Crown but not part of the United Kingdom) are

listed as well as two unofficial (one of which was moreover regional) referendums. One of the

referendums listed for Cyprus was only held among Northern Cyprus. As all these referendums cannot

be considered national referendums, they are not included in this analysis.

In column 6, the presence of legal provisions for bottom-up referendums at the regional or local level is

indicated. The IDEA database is not entirely complete nor accurate with regard to regional and local

referendums, and other data appeared to be more difficult to access. Sources used and details of the

provisions are listed at the bottom of this page1.

1 Norway: (Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2007). Sweden: Citizens may raise a matter in the assembly concerning the

holding of a referendum – both at the municipal and county level. The assembly finally decides whether the

referendum is to be held (chapter 5, sections 23 & 25 of the Swedish Local Government Act; Sveriges Riksdag,

2018). Denmark: (IDEA, 2020a; The Danish Parliament, 2020; Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2007). Finland: Citizens

may submit a referendum initiative in their municipality. The local council finally decides whether to hold the

referendum (chapter 5, section 25 of the Finnish Local Government Act). Belgium: Citizens’ initiative

referendums are possible at the municipal level. The municipality council may reject such requests. (Goethals,

2018; Venice Commission, 2005; Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2007). The Netherlands: The provincial and municipal

referendum in the Netherlands are not generally provided for by law. Municipalities and provinces may do so in

their regulations and hence whether bottom-up referendums are possible differs locally (Van der Krieken, 2015).

Luxembourg: (The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2019). Austria: According to Verhulst and

Nijeboer (2007), the citizens’ initiative is provided for in all municipalities. Germany: All states and

municipalities allow for bottom-up referendums (IDEA, 2020a; Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2007). United Kingdom:

“With the exception of a referendum on governance arrangements […], no power is available to local electors

either to force their local authority to hold a referendum […] (Sandford, 2016, p. 6). Electors can only petition the

council to hold a referendum “on whether there should be an elected mayor” (Sandford, 2016; Verhulst & Nijeboer,

2007). As this is a rather limited option, I consider local bottom-up referendums to be not fully present. Ireland:

The report of the Venice Commission (2005) suggests only local referendums called by an authority are possible.

Verhulst and Nijeboer (2007) note that Irish citizens cannot initiate referendums, but they do not specify the

geographic level. IDEA (2020a) does not provide data on regional or local referendums for Ireland (IDEA, 2020a).

No other evident sources were found. Switzerland: (IDEA, 2020a; Venice Commission, 2005) Italy: (IDEA,

2020a; Venice Commission, 2005; Uleri, 2011). Portugal: Citizens may initiate a referendum, both at the

municipal and parish level. The municipal or parish council finally decides whether to hold the referendum

(Gouveia, 2018). France: (IDEA, 2020a). Spain: (Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2007; Venice Commission, 2005).

Cyprus: (IDEA, 2020a; Venice Commission, 2005). Greece: 1/3 of the residents of a municipality may initiate a

local referendum about the annexation of their municipality to another (Bouchagiar & Gousgounis, 2011). As this

is a rather limited option, I consider local bottom-up referendums to be not fully present.



20

The total number of demonstrations is noted in column 7 (MMP, 2019b). In the appendix, an additional

table can be found which shows per-country, in addition to the number of referendums held, the

according years, as well as the according years of the demonstrations that occurred.

Table 1: Per-country characteristics concerning referendums and demonstrations (data sources: The Economist

Intelligence Unit, 2018 (countries); Eurostat, 2020 (population); IDEA, 2020a (legal provisions for national referendums;

C2D, 2018 (numbers of referendums held, unless other references are made); MMP, 2019b (protests)).

Country

Population

(in millions of

people)

Presence of legal provisions for types of

national referendums and number of

referendums held per type (if applicable)

Presence of

legal

provisions for

regional/local

bottom-up

referendums

Number of

protests in

1998-2017

1998

2018

Mandatory

referendums

Plebiscites2 Bottom-up

referendums

Norway 4,4 5,3 - ad hoc (0) - + 5

Sweden 8,8 10,1 - + (1) - + * 10

Denmark 5,3 5,8 + (4) + (1) - - 6

Finland 5,1 5,5 - + (0) - + * 9

Belgium 10,2 11,4 - - - + * 17

Netherlands 15,7 17,2 - - (1) - (1) + ** 7

Luxembourg 0,4 0,6 - + (4) + (0) + 0

Austria 8,0 8,8 + (0) + (1) - + 12

Germany 82,1 82,8 + (0) - - + 270

United Kingdom 58,4 66,3 + (0) + (2) - - 368

Ireland 3,7 4,8 + (19) + (0) - - *** 328

Switzerland 7,1 8,5 + (25) + (11) + (144) + 1

Italy 56,9 60,5 - + (4) + (23) + 120

Portugal 10,1 10,3 + (0) + (3) + (0) + * 20

Spain 40,1 46,7 + (0) + (1) - - 106

France 59,9 66,9 + (1) + (1) - - 254

Greece 10,7 10,7 - + (1) - - 272

Cyprus 0,7 0,9 - ad hoc (1) - - 111

* Citizens may initiate referendums at the regional/local level, but the final decision on whether to hold the referendum

lies with the authorities.

** The provincial and municipal referendum are not provided for by general law. Municipalities and provinces may

provide for referendums in their regulations and hence whether bottom-up referendums are possible differs locally.

*** The IDEA database provides no data on regional or local referendums (IDEA, 2020a). The Venice Commission

(2005) and Verhulst and Nijeboer (2007) suggest no bottom-up referendums are possible. In the C2D database, no

subnational referendums are listed for Ireland (C2D, 2018). No other evident sources were found.

2 Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2020); Luxembourg: IDEA (2020a); The Government of

the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, (2015).



21

4.3. Global analysis by country

In this section, I outline the situation regarding referendums and demonstrations for each country.

Considering the scope of this thesis, I cannot discuss in detail all legal provisions for referendums, nor

every referendum or demonstration held. I endeavor to include all relevant occurrences of both, and

situations which are emerging (to different extents) in various countries, in order to identify general

trends.

In discussing demonstrations per-country, I occasionally mention the number of demonstrations per

topic, in order to present the relative share of particular topics. I base these numbers on the notes made

for each protest in the MMP database. However, for some demonstrations, the category of their main

topic is arguable, and hence the numbers mentioned, though carefully determined, are not infallible.

The discussion is based on information derived from databases IDEA (legal provisions for referendums),

C2D (referendums held), and MMP (protests) unless other references are made.

4.3.1. Nordic countries and the Benelux

For the Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, and the Benelux countries Belgium,

the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the following can be noted.

Firstly, in the Netherlands, referendums have been used while no provisions are present according to the

table. This can be explained by the fact that, although provisions are currently absent, temporary

provisions have been in place in previous years (Parlement.com, 2020a; Parlement.com, 2020b).

Many of the referendums held in these clusters of countries concern constitutional or legal matters of an

administrative nature (Denmark: 1998: Enlargement of the European Union; 2014: Accession to the

European Unified Patent Court; 2015: Abolishment of exceptions of collaboration of the police and

justice department with the European Union. The Netherlands: 2005: European Constitution; 2016:

Association agreement between the European Union and the Ukraine. Luxembourg: 2005: European

Constitution; 2015: lowering the voting age, right to vote for foreigners, term limit for ministers (which

more specifically can be labelled as electoral matters)). Other referendums were related to the

introduction of the Euro as the national currency (Denmark, 2000; Sweden, 2003), and the ambisexual

succession to the throne (Denmark, 2009).

The number of demonstrations in all countries is low, also when considering their population size. With

regard to the topics at issue, the demonstrations do not show any connection with the referendums held.

Only three demonstrations3 can be noted that target other constitutional or legal issues. Most

3 NL (2001): an anti-monarchist demonstration during the inauguration of the new queen; BE (2011):

demonstration demanding to form a government; BE (2016): demonstration by Flemish people demanding a break

from the French-dominated government.



22

demonstrations, however, are in some way targeted at the budget (17)4 or labor matters (6)5.

Furthermore, particularly in the Nordic countries, several demonstrations relate to political ideologies

and involve (anti-) far-right or (anti-) far-left (anarchistic) protesters, some of which are targeted at

immigration, about which topic also demonstrations are coded without the notion of involvement of

particular political groups (18 demonstrations in total)6. Only few demonstrations concern fundamental

rights: there has been a pro-life demonstration in the Netherlands in 2001 after the decriminalization of

euthanasia, and, also in the Netherlands, a demonstration supporting gay rights in 2017.

Given the low numbers of demonstrations, which moreover do not show any connection with the

referendums, no relationship between the use of referendums and demonstrations is expected for these

countries. Regarding provisions for referendums, however, the following can be noted.

Only in Luxembourg, national bottom-up referendums are possible. The number of demonstrations in

this country is even zero, which is remarkably low, even when considering its extremely small

population size. However, regional and/or local bottom-up referendums are provided for in all countries

except from Denmark. The low numbers of demonstrations in these countries could hence be explained

by the presence of the possibility for citizens to initiate a referendum at the regional or local level. Other

possible explaining factors are discussed in section 4.5.

4.3.2. Austria and Germany

Like the countries discussed in foregoing section, the plebiscite held in Austria (in 2013, about the future

of the army) does not show resemblance with the demonstrations in the country, although it should be

noted that protest data for Austria for the years 2016 and 2017 is missing. Relatively many

demonstrations (7)7 coded for the remaining years are anti-right-wing protests after the prospected

participation of one rightist party in government. Only one demonstration relates to immigration (2007),

and two demonstrations are labor-related (2003, 2013).

In Germany, no mandatory referendums were held in the time period studied. Mandatory referendums

are used in the case of the constitution being entirely revised or replaced – which situation did not arise

(article 146 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany). At first sight, the number of

demonstrations is considerably high. However, many demonstrations coded, particularly in more recent

years, are anti-immigration demonstrations8 – almost all of them being part of the weekly

demonstrations by Pegida in Dresden from 2014 to 2016. Noteworthy, at the time of the first

anti-immigration demonstration coded in the time period studied (2000), the possibility of holding a

4 NO (2000), SE (2000), FI (2000, 2015), NL (2000), BE (2000, 2002, 2007, 2008 (3), 2009, 2014 (2), 2015, 2016

(2)). 5 NO (1999), FI (2000, 2007), NL (2000, 2004), BE (2013). 6 NO (2001), SE (2010, 2016 (2), 2017 (2)), DE (2007 (2), 2008 (2), 2009), FI (2015, 2016 (4), BE (2016 (2)). 7 AT (1999, 2000 (6)). 8 DE (2000, 2013, 2014 (10), 2015 (56), 2016 (42)).



23

referendum on the matter was raised: in the news article about the demonstration is referred to a demand

by the German Christian Democratic opposition to change the constitution to allow for a referendum on

the regulation of immigration (MMP, 2019b, referring to The Times London, 2000, November 6).

Furthermore, in 2017, 39 weekly demonstrations were held in Stuttgart, against the large rail project,

also named Stuttgart 21, which can be considered a regional or local matter rather than a national one.

According to the notes in the database, demonstrations have taken place for seven years, and hence

comprise even more demonstrations than coded in the database (MMP, 2019b, referring to The New

York Times, 2018, February 28). Only in 2010, five other demonstrations about the matter have been

coded. Remarkably, the matter has been subject of a regional referendum in the German state

Baden-Württemberg in 2011, in which almost 60 per cent of the voters voted in favor of the project

(Deutsche Welle, 2011).

Apart from these two particular protest waves, the number of the remaining demonstrations (116) can

be considered relatively low, given the country’s large population size, and compared with other

countries. Of these demonstrations, 30 are labor-related9, while 17 demonstrations concern prices, taxes,

or the budget10. Other notable demonstrations are various demonstrations11 about nuclear power and

nuclear waste. Furthermore, the involvement of (anti-) far-left, and (anti-) far-right groups, including

neo Nazis, in at least 30 demonstrations12 throughout the entire time period studied is to be noted.

No national bottom-up referendums are possible in Austria and Germany. Again, however, regional and

local bottom-up referendums are provided for in both countries. For Germany, referendums at the

regional level may even be more relevant than national referendums, given its federal state design. The

low number of demonstrations in Austria, and the relatively low number of demonstrations in Germany

could hence again be explained by the presence of the possibility for citizens to initiate referendums at

the lower levels.

4.3.3. The United Kingdom and Ireland

The two referendums held in the United Kingdom were about the use of the alternative vote system

(2011) and about remaining in or leaving the European Union (2016). No demonstrations were coded

about the former topic. About remaining in or leaving the European Union, on the other hand, 10

demonstrations13 emerged. One week before the referendum, three demonstrations, both pro- and

anti-Brexit, took place. The notes in the database (MMP, 2019b) are not conclusive as to whether the

demonstrations are part of the referendum campaign or whether they actually result from an educative

9 DE (1998 (3), 1999 (2), 2001, 2002, 2003 (4), 2004 (9), 2006, 2007, 2009 (3), 2010, 2012, 2013 (2), 2017). 10 DE (1999 (2), 2000 (6), 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015 (3)). 11 DE (1998, 2001 (5), 2004, 2010 (2), 2011 (4)). 12 DE (1998 (2), 1999 (2), 2000 (3), 2001 (3), 2002 (2), 2004 (7), 2005, 2008, 2009 (2), 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015,

2016 (2), 2017). 13 UK (2016 (7), 2017 (3)).



24

or catalyzing effect of the referendum. Up till more than one year after the referendum, seven other

demonstrations occurred, of which five were against leaving – the outcome of the referendum (C2D,

2018). This case in the United Kingdom can be considered exceptional and the consequences

far-reaching. Therefore, it is less comparable to and representative for other cases generally found.

All referendums held in Ireland – the second highest number of all countries included – have been

mandatory referendums, which are required in the case of amendments of the Constitution (article 46

(2) of the Constitution of Ireland). All referendums hence concern constitutional matters, though their

natures still differ. Seven referendums14 were held for the ratification of treaties. Two referendums15

concerned electoral matters. Four referendums16 were more of an administrative nature, while two others

were too but touched more far-reaching topics17. Finally, four referendums18 affected fundamental

rights.

Despite the variety of the topics of referendums, only about fundamental rights topics demonstrations

have occurred too. The protection of human life in pregnancy was put to popular vote in 2002, and

demonstrations about abortion occurred in various years, though not directly around the referendum. In

particular one decade later, when new legislation about abortion was proposed, demonstrations arose

and continued to arise over the years.19 Only in September 2018 (outside the time period studied), the

regulation on abortion was subject of referendum again (Irish Statute Book, 2020). This case supports

the argument of referendums and demonstrations as alternative mechanisms. Furthermore, one

demonstration (2013) is coded about same-sex marriage, another fundamental rights issue which has

been subject of referendum in 2015. The 2004 referendum dealt with the constitutional right to Irish

citizenship for children, while in the foregoing year, two demonstrations occurred about the threatened

deportations of immigrant parents of Irish children. Children’s rights, including child protection

measures to take by the government, were put to referendum in 2012. In 2006 already, one

demonstration occurred about the crisis in child protection legislation. Though the topics in these three

cases coincide, there are no evident clues for any effect of the referendum on demonstrations or the other

way around. The absence of demonstrations about the topics of other referendums, on the other hand,

14 IE: 1998: Treaty of Amsterdam; 2001: the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 2001, 2002: Treaty

of Nice; 2008, 2009: Treaty of Lisbon; 2012: Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic

and Monetary Union. 15 IE: 2013: abolition of the Senate; 2015: age of eligibility for election to the office of President. 16 IE: 1998: establishment of shared authorities on any part of the island of Ireland; 1999: recognition of the role

of local government; 2011: possibility to reduce the remuneration of judges; Houses of Parliament inquiries. 17 IE: 2001: prohibition of the death penalty and removal of references to it; 2013: establishment of a Court of

Appeal. 18 IE: 2002: protection of human life in pregnancy; 2004: Irish citizenship of children of non-national parents;

2012: children’s rights; 2015: marriage equality. 19 IE (1999, 2012, 2013 (5), 2014 (3), 2016, 2017 (2)).



25

again supports the argument for the use of referendums being an alternative mechanism or substitute for

the use of demonstrations.

The United Kingdom and Ireland have the highest numbers of demonstrations. Considering the

population sizes of the countries, these numbers are still high, especially in the case of Ireland. In

contrast with other countries, the variety in topics of demonstration in both countries is significant. Many

protests concern specific matters, which I found to be not categorizable within the focus of this thesis.

Important to mention in this regard for Ireland are multiple protests about (re)locations of hospitals and

particular hospital care services, and shortcomings in the health care system. Though the budget might

be indirectly involved in the latter topic, the main disputes appear to be about either (de)centralization

and hence accessibility for citizens, or deficiencies. Only when specifically referred to as such, I

included them in the count of demonstrations related to the budget or labor disputes. Additionally, the

matter can be assumed to have regional or local rather than national effects. Hence, if a referendum

could relate this, it would not be at the national level but at the regional or local level.

Other demonstrations in Ireland to note are 77 demonstrations20 related to prices, taxes, or the budget,

while 4421 are labor-related. Some of these demonstrations overlap, targeting both matters. Also, there

were several demonstrations22 relating to asylum matters.

In the United Kingdom, given the total number of demonstrations, labor-related demonstrations do not

constitute a particularly large share (45)23, while demonstrations in some way related to the budget are

present to some greater extent (69)24 (again, some of these demonstrations overlap, targeting both

matters). Also notable are demonstrations in some way concerning immigration issues25.

Demonstrations about fundamental rights are relatively scarce, though four demonstrations26 about the

legalization of gay marriage are notable, as this topic has been put to referendum in neighboring country

Ireland. In one of these demonstrations, protesters in fact demand a referendum to be held on the matter

(MMP, 2019b, referring to The Times London, 2011, December 1).

In the United Kingdom and Ireland, no bottom-up referendums are possible at either the national,

regional, or local level. The lack of all these provisions could explain the high numbers of

demonstrations. The variety of topics of demonstrations in these countries additionally supports this

20 IE (2000, 2003 (7), 2004 (2), 2005 (4), 2006 (3), 2007 (3), 2008, 2009 (2), 2010 (3), 2012, 2013 (8), 2014 (18),

2015 (19), 2016 (5)). The higher numbers in 2014 and 2015 are caused by protests against water charges. 21 IE (2003 (7), 2004 (3), 2005 (3), 2006 (2), 2007 (9), 2009, 2010 (2), 2013 (3), 2014 (7), 2015 (5), 2016 (2). 22 IE (2003, 2004, 2005 (5), 2006 (4), 2013, 2014 (6), 2015 (2), 2016). 23 UK (1998 (5), 1999 (2), 2000, 2002 (5), 2004 (2), 2005 (2), 2006, 2008 (2), 2009 (5), 2010, 2011 (5), 2012 (2),

2013, 2014 (3), 2015 (4), 2016 (3), 2017). 24 UK (1998 (3), 1999 (5), 2000 (6), 2001 (3), 2002 (2), 2003 (2), 2004, 2005 (3), 2006 (2), 2008 (5), 2009, 2010

(12), 2011 (7), 2012, 2013 (3), 2014, 2015 (6), 2016 (4), 2017 (2). 25 UK (2001 (3), 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2015, 2016 (4)). 26 UK (2011 (2), 2012, 2013).



26

explanation. Nor for national matters, nor for regional or local matters, citizens can participate by

demanding or initiating referendums, while for all such matters, participation in the form of

demonstrations is left at people’s disposal. The healthcare-related demonstrations in Ireland, which can

be considered regionally or locally targeted rather than nationally, are an example hereof.

4.3.4. Switzerland, Italy, and Portugal

Switzerland, of which its French-speaking part is counted as Latin Europe, and Latin European countries

Italy and Portugal all allow for bottom-up referendums at the national level. Switzerland can be

considered an outlier – not only in this cluster of countries but also in Western Europe in its entirety –

as the number of national referendums held between 1998 and 2017 is 180 (C2D, 2018), which is by no

means comparable to the number of national referendums held by any other Western European

democracy (see table 1). In the report of the Venice Commission on referendums in Europe, Switzerland

is also noted as an exception (Venice Commission, 2005).

Nevertheless, in addition to its exceptional use of referendums, the number of demonstrations being only

one (in 2014) is also to be noted. This number is extremely low, also when taking into account the

country’s population size of around eight million inhabitants. In the only one demonstration held,

demonstrators demanded higher minimum wages (MMP, 2019b, referring to The New York Times,

2014, May 17). This demonstration clearly positively relates to the use of a referendum: two days after

the demonstration, a referendum about the matter (upon citizens’ initiative) was to be held (C2D, 2018).

Because of the scope of this thesis, not all referendums held in Switzerland can be discussed. However,

some topics of referendums are notable. Over forty referendums in some way concerned prices, taxes,

or the budget, while about fifteen referendums were held about labor matters. Furthermore, more than

ten referendum related to immigration and asylum.

Italy knows the second-highest number of referendums held of the countries included: 25 in total. Two

referendums were launched by both the authorities and citizens, which explains the discrepancy between

the total number of referendums and the sum of the two numbers noted in table 1. In the majority of the

cases, referendums were initiated bottom-up. The topics of the referendums held vary considerably.

Some concern constitutional or legal matters (3)27, others in particular concern the electoral system (5)28,

the legislative system (2)29, or matters of justice (1)30. Like in Switzerland, some referendums related to

27 IT: 2000: abrogation of the electoral system for the composition of the Supreme Court; abrogation of the career

link possibility between prosecutor and judge; 2001: constitutional reform concerning regionalization. 28 IT: 1999, 2000: abrogation of proportional representation; 2009 (3): abolition of combined lists of elections for

both chambers and abolition of multiple candidacies for the House of Representatives. 29 IT: 2006: constitutional reform; 2016: constitutional reform, including changes to the referendum system. 30 IT: 2011: abolition of the duty of holders of top state offices to appear before court.



27

labor matters (4)31. Referendums in some way touching tax money have taken place as well (3)32. Four

referendums affect more fundamental matters33. Finally, there have been three referendums which relate

to different matters and cannot be placed in one of the aforementioned categories34.

Taking into account the country’s population and comparing with similar countries, the number of

demonstrations in Italy can be considered relatively low. Several demonstrations clearly relate to topics

put to referendum. In various years, there have been demonstrations (5)35 about a bill which would

protect Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and other senior leaders from criminal prosecution. Already in

2009, a referendum was launched against the bill, but this referendum was declared unconstitutional by

the Constitutional Court (C2D, 2018). After amendment of the law, a new referendum was requested,

which finally took place in 2011 (C2D, 2018). In 2016, there have also been three demonstrations

particularly targeted at Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and his constitutional reform proposal which was

put to referendum some days later.

Demonstrations related to the prices, taxes, or the budget (18)36, as well as labor-related demonstrations

(37)37 occurred throughout the entire time period studied (some of which overlap, targeting both matters,

leaving 44 demonstrations in total). Of these, particularly notable are – as their topic has also been

subject of referendum (in 2000 and 2003) – four demonstrations in 2002 against labor law reforms which

would ease the hiring and firing of workers, and two demonstrations in both 2011 and 2014 targeted at

law reforms, which, amongst other things, also included the easing of hiring and firing workers.

Furthermore, there have been demonstrations related to the hosting of the gay pride38 and law proposals

concerning gay rights39, as well as an already existing abortion law40. Immigration only was topic of

four demonstrations41, mainly around the refugee crisis.

Finally, the demonstration in Italy against the European Constitution in 2003 is remarkable: this topic

has been subject of referendum in several other countries, though not in Italy. Contrarily, one of the

31 IT: 2000, 2003: abrogation of restrictions on protection against unjustified dismissals; 2000: abrogation of

automatic salary deduction for trade unions and workers associations; abrogation of civil servants’ rights to have

a second employment. 32 IT: 2000: abrogation of the reimbursement of costs for referendum and electoral campaigns; 2011 (2): abolition

of the partial privatization of the water supply and the privatized profits hereof. 33 IT: 2005 (4): abolition of restrictions related to embryology and fertilization. 34 IT: 2003: abrogation of the obligation of estate owners to tolerate road rights for circuit lines; 2011: the planning

and construction of new nuclear power plants; 2016: and about the test drilling in the sea. 35 IT: (2002 (3), 2003, 2008 (pro-Berlusconi)). 36 IT (1998, 2004, 2005 (2), 2006 (3), 2008 (2), 2010, 2011 (5), 2012 (2), 2017). 37 IT (1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 (11), 2003, 2004 (2), 2005 (2), 2006 (3), 2007 (2), 2009, 2011 (4), 2012 (3), 2014

(4), 2017). 38 IT (2000 (2)). 39 IT (2007, 2016 (4)). 40 IT (2008). 41 IT (2014, 2016, 2017 (2)).



28

referendums in 2011 concerned the abolition of the planning and construction of nuclear power plants,

about which topic no demonstrations are coded for Italy, while for several other countries (Germany,

France, Sweden, Ireland) there are.

In Portugal, one referendum in 1998 concerned the regionalization of the country. The other two

Portuguese referendums (1998, 2007) were both about legalizing abortion, hence having a more

fundamental character. Contrarily to Switzerland and Italy, though possible, no bottom-up referendums

were actually held. In Portugal, one demonstration in 2007 clearly relates to the referendum about

abortion in the same year: antiabortion protesters urge the Portuguese people to reject the referendum.

Almost all remaining demonstrations relate to either labor matters, the budget, or both, and have mainly

taken place around the economic crisis, targeting austerity measures.42 In comparison with the numbers

of demonstrations of other Latin European and Southern European countries, the number of

demonstrations in Portugal is low – also when considering its population size.

As mentioned at the start of this paragraph, in Switzerland, Italy, and Portugal, national bottom-up

referendums are provided for. In Switzerland and Italy, these referendums were moreover frequently

used. Bottom-up possibilities for referendums are also present at the regional and local level in all three

countries. On the other hand, their numbers of demonstrations can be considered low – in Switzerland

even extremely low. For Switzerland, Italy, and Portugal, the presence of bottom-up referendums, both

at the national and lower levels, could be mitigating the occurrence of demonstrations. The case of

Switzerland moreover strongly supports the argument of referendums being an alternative mechanism

to demonstrations: while referendums were extensively used – on all sorts of topics, only one

demonstration occurred in the country.

4.3.5. Spain and France, and Greece and Cyprus

The referendums held France and Spain all concerned constitutional issues of an administrative nature

(France: 2000, abbreviation of the presidential term of office to five years; France and Spain: 2005,

European Constitution). Demonstrations in France and Spain do not concern these matters.

In Spain, relatively many demonstrations (25)43 took place about the dispute over Catalonia’s

independence. About this matter, two referendums among Catalonia were held: an informal referendum

in 2014, and a referendum in 2017 which was declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Spain

(BBC, 2019). Several other demonstrations in Spain (32)44 were about the budget, labor-matters, or both,

which in particular took place during the economic crisis, targeting austerity measures. Furthermore,

42 PT (2007 (2), 2008 (2), 2009, 2010 (2), 2011, 2012 (6), 2013 (2)). 43 ES (2012 (2), 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 (19)). 44 ES (1999, 2000 (3), 2002 (3), 2005 (1), 2008 (2), 2009 (2), 2010 (2), 2011 (2), 2012 (14), 2013, 2016).



29

around proposed changes to its abortion law, five demonstrations45 about this topic occurred, while one

demonstration (in 2005) took place against a bill which would legalize gay marriage.

In France, more than 100 demonstrations – occurring throughout the entire time period studied – are

related to labor matters. Particularly notable are the protest wave in 2006 by students against the

proposed youth labor laws, which would ease the hiring and firing of youth people, and later protest

waves in 2016 and 2017 about labor laws which included the loosening of restrictions on dismissals46.

About the legalization of gay marriage, 11 demonstrations47 occurred. Regarding immigration, only the

wave of protests in France48 around the refugee crisis in Calais is notable.

Turning to Greece and Cyprus, in which countries the referendum held was accompanied by multiple

demonstrations. The 2015 referendum in Greece concerned the bailout conditions for its debt crisis

proposed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary

Fund (Election Guide, 2020). About 150 demonstrations (out of the total of 272 demonstrations)

between 2009 and 2017 were caused by the debt crisis together with the related austerity measures.

Demonstrations started many years before the referendum. There has been another bailout agreement in

2010 already, which was not put to popular vote (MMP, 2019b, referring to The New York Times, 2010,

May 3). Furthermore, in 2011, in which year a new wave of protests occurred, a poll was held in which

half the country opposed to the austerity campaign of the government (MMP, 2019b, referring to The

Washington Post, 2011, June 19). Protest data also reveal that already by the end of 2011, the second

bailout agreement was planned to be put to referendum (MMP, 2019b, referring to The Times London,

2011, November 1), which plan was already cancelled few days later (Council of Foreign Relations,

2020). Around the 2015 referendum, some demonstrations particularly relate to the bailout deal and the

referendum itself. Nevertheless, also after the referendum in 2015, demonstrations have continued.

Though the result of the referendum was ‘no’ to the bailout terms, the deal was made anyway (Council

of Foreign Relations, 2020). Whether a referendum on one of the previous bailout agreements would

have mitigated the occurrence of further demonstrations remains hence questionable. Nor do the data

indicate that the referendum was held in response to the many demonstrations.

Other notable demonstrations in Greece are over 30 demonstrations in 2006 and 2007 by university

students against proposed reforms to the higher education system, and several demonstrations about the

refugee crisis in multiple years49.

The island of Cyprus has been divided into a Greek and a Turkish side of the island since 1974. Several

attempts to solve this problem have been undertaken ever since (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

45 ES (2009, 2013, 2014 (3)). 46 FR (2016 (19), 2017 (6)). 47 FR (1998, 1999, 2012 (3), 2013 (6)). 48 FR (2016 (18)). 49 EL (2015 (4), 2016 (9), 2017).



30

Republic of Cyprus, 2016). In 2004, two separate referendums were held among both parts of the island,

which are counted as one national referendum for this thesis. The vote was about reunification of the

island and sequential access to the European Union. Nine demonstrations50 from 2002 up till the day of

the referendum relate to the proposed plan for this reunification and the referendum finally held. All

were held by Turkish Cypriots, demanding unification. Furthermore, another eleven demonstrations in

various years51, though not directly targeted at the referendum, are about the disunified status of the

island. The demonstrations seem to be caused by the situation rather than the referendum about it. The

referendum, on the other hand, was not held in response to the demonstrations (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, 2016).

The remaining demonstrations in Cyprus are mainly labor-related (42)52, targeted at the budget (27)53,

or about immigration (8)54.

The circumstances in both Greece and Cyprus were exceptional. The topics of the referendums held also

are relatively unusual and more controversial. Their cases can therefore be considered less representative

for the types of topics generally found in both referendums and demonstrations.

Besides these observations of referendums and demonstrations held in France, Spain, Greece, and

Cyprus, the lack of provisions for bottom-up referendums can be noted. Nor at the national level, nor at

the regional and local level, bottom-up referendums are possible. Their absence could again explain the

high numbers of demonstrations in all these countries.

4.4. Findings

The discussion of section 4.3 shows various similarities and differences between (groups of) countries.

In this section, I highlight overall findings that can be deducted from the foregoing.

4.4.1. Bottom-up referendums

Firstly, findings regarding provisions for referendums can be noted. Only four out of eighteen countries

have provisions for national bottom-up referendums. In all four countries, the number of demonstrations

can be considered extremely (Luxembourg and Switzerland) or relatively (Italy and Portugal) low. For

Switzerland and Italy, the findings indicate that the presence and use of bottom-up referendums

mitigates the occurrence of demonstrations. The cases of Luxembourg and Portugal, on the other hand,

where no bottom-up referendums were held, indicate that the sole presence of bottom-up referendums

may be negatively related with the occurrence of demonstrations. At the same time, the contrary – the

50 CY (2002 (3), 2003 (3), 2004 (3)). 51 CY (2000, 2008, 2009 (2), 2010 (4), 2011, 2014 (2)). 52 CY (2005, 2009 (7), 2010 (5), 2011 (12), 2012 (8), 2013 (2), 2014 (7)). 53 CY (2000 (2), 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 (2), 2011 (6), 2012 (2), 2013 (10), 2014 (2)). 54 CY (2009 (2), 2010 (3), 2013, 2014 (2)).



31

absence of national bottom-up referendums – does not automatically entail higher numbers of

demonstrations (the Nordic countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria).

However, provisions for regional or local bottom-up referendums could additionally be an explanation

for the occurrence of demonstrations. These provisions are present in multiple countries and their

presence coincides with relatively low numbers of demonstrations. In the Nordic countries (except from

Denmark), the Benelux (with regional and local differences in the Netherlands), Austria, Switzerland,

Italy, and Portugal, regional and local bottom-up referendums are provided for, while the numbers of

demonstrations in these countries are low, as established in the foregoing section. In contrast, in the

United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, France, Greece, and Cyprus, these provisions are absent, while high

numbers of demonstrations are present. Hence, provisions for regional and local bottom-up referendums

could partly be explaining the number of demonstrations occurring.

An exception to this rule is seen in the case of Germany. Regional and local referendums are provided

for in Germany, but the relative number of demonstrations in the country is arguable. Excluding the

weekly anti-immigration demonstrations by Pegida and the weekly Stuttgart 21 demonstrations, the

number of demonstrations can be considered relatively low. However, the many Stuttgart 21

demonstrations concern a regional issue and have clearly not been resolved by the regional referendum.

Thus, on the one hand, the case of Germany can be considered in line with the argument that provisions

for regional and local bottom-up referendums may mitigate the occurrence of demonstrations. On the

other hand, however, the case highlights that their use does not crowd out all regionally or locally

targeted demonstrations, and moreover points out the substantial share that regional and local issues

may represent.

4.4.2. Topics of referendums and demonstrations

Besides the connection between bottom-up referendums and demonstrations as established in the

foregoing paragraph, the global analysis reveals insights about the topics of referendums and

demonstrations. Particularly, the difference between the types of topics predominantly present in

referendums and demonstrations can be noted. Various topics particularly occur in either referendums

or demonstrations but appear not to be subject of both. While referendums (mostly mandatory

referendums or plebiscites) often concern constitutional matters – either more administrative or more

far-reaching in nature – only relatively few demonstrations do so. Instead, demonstrations are often

targeted at topics more imminent to people, mainly being labor-related or concerning tax money.

Referendums about such topics are only found in Switzerland and Italy (often initiated bottom-up), and

(indirectly, about bailout conditions) in Greece. This discrepancy hence additionally explains the

potential of bottom-up referendums. Since topics found important by people are often not covered by

mandatory referendums or plebiscites, there is an opening for bottom-up referendums.



32

Additionally, besides such differences in topics between referendums and demonstrations, the global

analysis also shows differences in topics between countries. Some topics are more prevalent in one

country than in another. Hence, the use of referendums can turn out differently in different countries. I

will further address this in the section on policy recommendations in chapter 5.

Despite these dissimilarities between referendums and demonstrations, in some cases, resemblance in

their topics is clearly present. In the run-up to some referendums (United Kingdom (2016), Switzerland

(2014), Italy (2016), Portugal (2007), Greece (2015), and Cyprus (2004)), demonstrations have

occurred. This is in line with previous notions of demonstrations occurring around referendums.

However, as such cases are scarce (and sometimes moreover exceptional, as in the United Kingdom,

Greece and Cyprus), it cannot be concluded that referendums generally have an educative or catalyzing

effect for demonstrations.

Furthermore, this research has not revealed any cases in which a top-down referendum was used in

response to demonstrations. Only in few countries, demonstrators could do so themselves. In Italy, there

have been two cases in which firstly demonstrations against the proposed law are seen, while later, a

referendum on the abbreviation of this law was launched. However, based on the data used for this

thesis, it cannot yet be concluded that this referendum was used as an alternative by the same protesters.

4.5. Other explaining factors

In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I solely focused on referendums and demonstrations. However, there are other

factors that affect the occurrence of both and their connection. Therefore, I discuss two other explaining

factors in this section: strikes and political-cultural dimensions. In addition to these factors, there are

more factors which are of influence. This section is only to provide additional context to the findings of

the foregoing sections and does not entail an exhaustive discussion of all other influencing factors.

4.5.1. Strikes

While in various countries labor-related demonstrations constitute a considerable part of the total

number of demonstrations, they are practically absent in others. Some remarks can hence be made in

this regard. As mentioned in chapter 3 on the methodological framework, strikes in themselves are not

included in the protest data, only if actual demonstrations are part of them. Nevertheless, strikes – though

not being the focus of this thesis – can be considered to express disapproval too and hence to be another

form of protest. Strike numbers therefore provide additional insights into protest culture.

The European Trade Union Institute (hereinafter: ETUI) provides per-country information on strikes for

the years 2000-2018, which almost exactly covers the time period studied in this thesis (ETUI, 2020a).

Countries showing relatively low numbers of labor-related demonstrations might still show high

numbers of strikes, which indicates there is protest, though demonstrations as actual gatherings of people

are usually not part of it. Contrarily, the number of strikes in countries with (relatively) many



33

labor-related demonstrations might still be relatively low or average, which indicates that

demonstrations commonly occur as part of or instead of strikes and that protest culture is hence present.

The strike data should however be interpreted with caution, as the data do not solely concern strikes in

the public sector or strikes in which government action is required, but also private-sector strikes in

which the government is not involved in any way (ETUI, 2020b). As demonstrations solely targeted at

the private sector are not included in the protest data (MMP, 2019c), comparisons may be skewed to

some extent. Additionally, the gathering of data by the European Trade Union Institute also knows

several limitations itself (ETUI, 2020b). Nevertheless, I consider the strike data useful in interpreting

the data on demonstrations per country and highlighting some differences between countries.

In figure 3, the average number of days not worked due to industrial action per 1,000 employees is

presented per-country for the time period 2000-2018. The indicator “days not worked due to industrial

action per 1,000 employees” is considered the most sound for comparisons across countries (ETUI,

2020b, par. 1). The data of the ETUI provides averages for the years 2000-2009 and 2010-2018. I added

these numbers and subsequently divided them by two. Half numbers were rounded up for the sake of

readability of the figure. As the figure serves to show relative rather than absolute numbers, this is not

problematic for the purposes of this thesis. Data for the years 2010-2018 is missing for Luxembourg,

Italy, and Greece (ETUI, 2020a). The data for these countries may hence be skewed. Some other

important notes on the data are listed below.55

55 Belgium: Until 2002, strikes in the public sector are excluded. Austria: Extreme peak in 2003 because of a

strike against state pension reforms and a strike against railway restructurings. Portugal: Public administration

data is excluded. Hence, the numbers of days are underestimated. Data for 2008 and 2009 is missing. France:

Public sector data is only partly covered. Hence, the numbers of days are underestimated. Greece: Extreme peak

in 2002 because of a strike against labor market reforms. Cyprus: Extreme peak in 2013 because of an open-ended

strike in the construction industry (ETUI, 2020a).



34

While there are relatively few labor-related demonstrations in the Nordic countries, the Benelux and

Austria, strike data does not solely show low numbers for these countries. Strike numbers for Norway,

Denmark, Finland, and Belgium can even be considered high. This indicates that opposition by citizens

is present in these countries, though not in the particular form of demonstrations against their

government. In Germany, the number of labor-related demonstrations is considerable, and, when the

weekly demonstrations against immigration and the rail project are not taken into account, their relative

share is too. The country’s strike number, however, is low, which could indicate that demonstrations as

part of or instead of strikes are more common in Germany.

Switzerland, in addition to its extremely low number of demonstrations, shows extremely low numbers

for strikes. Given these data, protest culture (in these manifestations) can be considered almost absent

in this country. For Portugal too, the low strike number seems to be in line with its low number of

(labor-related) demonstrations. Protest culture seems only limitedly present in Portugal. Contrarily, in

Italy, the strike number is relatively high, as are the number and relative share of labor-related

demonstrations. This indicates that demonstrations are common during, or next to, strikes, which would

point towards a relatively strong protest culture. However, as established in the findings, the total

number of demonstrations in Italy is considered relatively low. The indication that protest culture is

present would consequently support the argument that bottom-up referendums in the country are

mitigating the occurrence of demonstrations, since more demonstrations would be expected for Italy.

For France, strike data confirm the extremely high number of labor-related demonstrations (+100). The

number of days not worked is relatively high throughout the entire time period. Based on these data,

54

11

76

58

12

84

32

22

16

24

29

3

88

14

101

124

314

161

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

NO

SE

DK

FI

NL

BE

LU

AT

DE

UK

IE

CH

IT

PT

ES

FR

EL

CY

Figure 3: Average days not worked due to industrial action per country per 1,000 employees between 2000-2018 (data source: ETUI, 2020a)



35

demonstrations seem to be common practice during, or even next to, strikes. Protest culture in France

can be considered strongly present. In Greece and Cyprus too, extreme high strike numbers are seen.

The case of Cyprus is similar to that of France. The number and share of labor-related demonstrations

are relatively high, and, despite one extreme peak, strikes are constantly occurring throughout the entire

time period. Demonstrations could hence be considered as common in Cyprus, either as part of strikes

or next to them, and protest culture can be considered present. For Greece, however, the strike data

provides no additional insight at this point, as the high number is caused by one extreme peak and data

for the years 2010-2018 is missing.

The strike number for Spain is high, while the relative share of labor-related demonstrations is

considerable. Many of these demonstrations relate to austerity measures in only few years, however,

while strikes occurred throughout the entire time period. This indicates that demonstrations are not

common practice in Spain, which is supported by the fact that the high number of demonstrations in the

country is partly caused by the said protest wave against austerity measures during the crisis and the

protest waves related to the Catalonian independence dispute.

For the United Kingdom and Ireland, the absolute numbers of labor-related demonstrations are high (45

and 44 respectively), though their relative share is low. Strike data for these countries do not show high

numbers. Given these circumstances and given the high total number of demonstrations in these

countries, it can be concluded that protest culture is strong in general in these countries.

4.5.2. Political-cultural dimensions

Besides strikes, the regime type and type of democracy in each country provide further context to and

can additionally explain some of the findings of section 4.3. Maleki and Hendriks (2016) have mapped

democracies for the years 1990-2009 on two dimensions: the integrative dimension and the participative

dimension (which also includes protest-participation). Combining the findings of this thesis and the

two-dimensional map of democracies of Maleki and Hendriks (2016), the number of demonstrations is

found to be high in aggregative or majoritarian democracies, while in integrative or consensus

democracies it is low.

The Nordic countries, the Benelux, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy are all integrative

democracies, albeit to different extents (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). For all these countries, this factor

can additionally explain the low (or, in the cases of Germany and Italy, the relatively low) number of

demonstrations. Contrarily, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and France, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus

are aggregative democracies (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016), which can be an additional explanation for

their high numbers of demonstrations. In integrative or consensus democracies, consensus is built and

“the widest possible – ideally complete – agreement” is sought (Hendriks, 2010, p. 26). Hence,

disapproval by people and subsequently protest is less expected. In aggregative or majoritarian



36

democracies, on the other hand, decision-taking is more competitive, and the slightest majority may

overrule the greatest minority (Hendriks, 2010), which may trigger demonstrations to rise.

Portugal, however, is an exception in this regard. The country is an aggregative democracy, but, in

contrast with the other aggregative democracies, the number of demonstrations in the country is low.

This could be explained by the fact that Portugal can also be classified as a spectator democracy: political

participation besides general elections is relatively low (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). Little additional

political participation in Portugal is not only seen in the low number of demonstrations, but also in the

fact that no national bottom-up referendums were actually held. The latter circumstance is found in

Luxembourg as well, which country also is a spectator democracy (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016). Though

the case of Luxembourg does thus support the spectator democracy explanation for Portugal, it should

be noted that also Greece and Cyprus are classified as spectator democracies (Maleki & Hendriks, 2016),

while protest-participation in these countries is not low at all. Further research can provide deeper

understanding of the connection between demonstrations and integrative and participative dimensions.



37

5. Conclusion

5.1. Conclusions of this thesis

In this thesis, the relationship between referendums and demonstrations has been investigated among

Western European democracies. Mixed method research was conducted to be able to both show

generalizable trends and more in-depth perspectives and hence set side by side the particular and the

general.

Findings show that when legal provisions for bottom-up referendums are present, lower numbers of

demonstrations are seen. If people have the possibility to demand or initiate referendums, either at the

national level, the lower level, or both, their say can be channeled through the use of such referendums

instead of through demonstrations. The current discrepancy between the topics of referendums and

demonstrations endorses the opening for and the potential of bottom-up referendums. Nevertheless, this

is not to say that the presence and use of bottom-up referendums will entirely rule out the occurrence of

demonstrations. Holding such referendums may still cause demonstrations, before and after, in one case,

while in another case demonstrations will remain absent. The argument for an educative or catalyzing

effect of referendums on demonstrations in general, however, is not supported in this thesis.

Furthermore, no cases of top-down referendums as a response to demonstrations are found.

Other factors too influence the occurrence of referendums and demonstrations and their relationship. In

this thesis, strike data and political-cultural dimensions of countries provide further context to the

findings. In particular, combining the findings of the analysis with political-cultural dimensions revealed

that higher numbers of demonstrations are generally seen in aggregative rather than integrative

democracies. Less protest can be expected in countries where the broadest consensus is sought instead

of where the slightest majority is competed for.

5.2. Limitations

Two limitations of this study have already been shortly mentioned in the methodology section. The first

limitation concerns the inclusion of other variables that are influencing the presence and use of

referendums, the occurrence of demonstrations, and the relationship between them. Though in section

4.5, I have discussed two other aspects in this regard, there are more, which have not been included.

Hence, the effect of such other variables is not controlled for.

The second limitation concerns the generalizability of findings to all countries, due to context-specificity

within each country. Firstly, the focus of this thesis was already restricted to Western European

democracies only. Additionally, the analysis has highlighted various differences between these

democracies. Findings should therefore be interpreted with caution: subsequent implications for one

country may differ from those for another country.



38

Furthermore, for this thesis, I conducted mixed method research and used both quantitative and

qualitative information. The use of both types of data is a strength, as general trends could be identified

while at the same time more in-depth insights were provided. Inherently, however, the extent to which

both types of research could have been and have been conducted was restricted. I analyzed the

quantitative data in relative senses rather than conducting more advanced statistical analyses.

Additionally, the depth of the qualitative research is relatively limited too.

5.3. Policy recommendations

The findings of this thesis suggest that introducing provisions for bottom-up referendums and the

subsequent use of these referendums may mitigate the occurrence of demonstrations. However, the

effect of doing so will differ per country. In the Nordic countries, the Benelux, Austria, and Germany,

bottom-up referendums are already possible at the regional and/or local levels. The additional value of

introducing national bottom-up referendums might therefore be limited as regards to the occurrence of

demonstrations.

Any effect will also depend on the topics about which such referendums may be introduced. In

Switzerland, for example, many referendums relate to matters involving fiscal policies or the budget or

labor matters – topics about which in several other countries relatively many demonstrations were held.

The analysis additionally shows that other topics at stake in demonstrations are differing per country.

The topics for which it would be important to be able to initiate referendums hence differ from country

to country. If such topics may be put to referendums by citizens, the effect of introducing provisions is

likely to be larger than when such topics are excluded from this possibility.

5.4. Recommendations for further research

With this thesis, the start for comparative research into referendums and demonstrations at the national

levels is made. Considering the limitations of this research, one recommendation for further research

logically is the more extensive use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Advanced

statistical analyses can reveal exact causal relationships (or their absence), and more variables can easily

be added. More extensive in-depth research is needed to further investigate how referendums and

demonstrations interact and how one may or may not lead to the other.

The focus of this thesis were the national levels, for which the need was expressed by previous

researchers. This study however reveals that when focusing on the national level, the regional and local

levels cannot be disregarded. Further research should hence joint the national and lower levels.



39

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Appendix

Table 2: Per-country overview of the number of national referendums held and the number of demonstrations

that occurred per year between 1998 and 2017 (data sources: C2D, 2018 (referendums); MMP, 2019b

(protests)).

COUNTRY

NUMBER OF

NATIONAL

REFERENDUMS

IN 1998-2017

NUMBER

OF

PROTESTS

IN 1998-

2017

NORWAY 0 - 5 2015, 2001, 2000 (2), 1999

SWEDEN 1 2003 10 2017 (2), 2016 (2), 2013, 2010 (2), 2009,

2008, 2000

DENMARK 5 2015, 2014,

2009, 2000,

1998

6 2014, 2009, 2008 (2), 2007 (2)

FINLAND 0 - 9 2016 (4), 2015 (2), 2007 (1), 2000 (2)

BELGIUM 0 - 17 2016 (5), 2015, 2014 (2), 2013, 2011, 2009,

2008 (3), 2007, 2002, 2000

NETHERLANDS 2 2016, 2005 7 2017 (2), 2004 (1), 2001 (2), 2000 (2)

LUXEMBOURG 4 2015 (3), 2005 0 -

AUSTRIA 1 2013 12 2017 (ND), 2016 (ND), 2013, 2009, 2007,

2003, 2002, 2000 (6), 1999

GERMANY 0 - 270 2017 (46), 2016 (48), 2015 (62), 2014 (15),

2013 (5), 2012 (5), 2011 (8), 2010 (12), 2009

(5), 2008 (1), 2007 (6), 2006 (2), 2005 (4),

2004 (12), 2003 (5), 2002 (3), 2001 (10),

2000 (11), 1999 (4), 1998 (6)

UNITED

KINGDOM

2 2016, 2011 368 2017 (21), 2016 (35), 2015 (20), 2014 (13),

2013 (20), 2012 (15), 2011 (20), 2010 (16),

2009 (21), 2008 (10), 2007 (8), 2006 (14),

2005 (14), 2004 (17), 2003 (20), 2002 (33),

2001 (18), 2000 (18), 1999 (15), 1998 (20)

IRELAND 19 2015 (2), 2013

(2), 2012 (2),

2011 (2), 2009,

2008, 2004,

2002 (2), 2001

(3), 1999, 1998

(2)

328 2017 (6), 2016 (19), 2015 (32), 2014 (56),

2013 (27), 2012 (2), 2010 (4), 2009 (3), 2008

(1), 2007 (41), 2006 (38), 2005 (29), 2004

(27), 2003 (40), 2002 (1), 2000 (1), 1999 (1)

SWITZERLAND 180 2017 (7), 2016

(13), 2015 (6),

2014 (12),

2013 (11),

2012 (12),

2011, 2010 (7),

1 2014



44

2009 (8), 2008

(10), 2007 (2),

2006 (6), 2005

(5), 2004 (13),

2003 (11),

2002 (9), 2001

(11), 2000

(16), 1999

(10), 1998 (10)

ITALY 25 2016 (2), 2011

(4), 2009 (3),

2006, 2005 (4),

2003 (2), 2001,

2000 (7), 1999

(1)

120 2017 (8), 2016 (9), 2014 (6), 2013 (3), 2012

(5), 2011 (9), 2010 (7), 2009 (6), 2008 (7),

2006 (7), 2005 (7), 2004 (11), 2003 (3), 2002

(17), 2001 (6), 2000 (4), 1999 (3), 1998 (2)

PORTUGAL 3 2007, 1998 (2) 20 2016, 2013 (2), 2012 (6), 2011, 2010 (2),

2009, 2008 (2), 2007 (3), 2003, 2001

SPAIN 1 2005 106 2017 (24), 2016 (8), 2015 (1), 2014 (9), 2013

(5), 2012 (20), 2011 (3), 2010 (3), 2009 (3),

2008 (2), 2007 (3), 2005 (4), 2004 (2), 2003

(3), 2002 (5), 2001 (5), 2000 (3), 1999 (3)

FRANCE 2 2005, 2000 254 2017 (19), 2016 (49) 2015 (14), 2014 (17),

2013 (16), 2012 (7), 2011 (2), 2010 (10),

2009 (9), 2008 (6), 2007 (6), 2006 (12), 2005

(8), 2004 (5), 2003 (12), 2002 (9), 2001 (2),

2000 (12), 1999 (11), 1998 (28)

GREECE 1 2015 272 2017 (7), 2016 (23), 2015 (36), 2014 (7),

2013 (19), 2012 (26), 2011 (27), 2010 (34),

2009 (9), 2008 (10), 2007 (26), 2006 (17),

2005 (5), 2004, 2003 (6), 2002, 2001 (4),

2000 (2), 1999 (3), 1998 (9)

CYPRUS 1 2004 111 2014 (15), 2013 (14), 2012 (12), 2011 (25),

2010 (12), 2009 (17), 2008 (3), 2005, 2004

(3), 2003 (3), 2002 (3), 2000 (3)

Documents

referendums and demonstrations