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Realpolitik, Punishment and Control:Thucydides on the Moralization ofConflictAlek Chancea

a Stockdale Center For Ethical Leaderhip, United States NavalAcademy, Annapolis, MD, USAPublished online: 01 Nov 2013.

To cite this article: Alek Chance (2013) Realpolitik, Punishment and Control: Thucydideson the Moralization of Conflict, Journal of Military Ethics, 12:3, 263-277, DOI:10.1080/15027570.2013.848092

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REALPOLITIK, PUNISHMENT ANDCONTROL: THUCYDIDES ON THEMORALIZATION OF CONFLICT

Alek Chance

Stockdale Center For Ethical Leaderhip, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, USA

The pages of Thucydides show us many expressions of what one might call the amoral doctrine in

international politics, namely, that politics between political communities are not properly subject

to ethical evaluation. This article traces Thucydides’ understated critique of this idea. I first show

that concerns about transgression and punishment inexorably influence political action. Moreover,

Thucydides suggests a connection between the aspirations of realpolitik and the desire of the

political community to preserve the freedom to effect justice and not subordinate its will to the

dictates of necessity – especially necessities imposed by other political bodies. I then describe

Thucydides’ explanation for why political communities persist in regarding themselves primarily as

moral agents rather than security-maximizers. I finally describe what Thucydides regards to be a

more genuine realism. This truer realism maintains the possibility of constrained moral choice

while still engendering a prudent pessimism about controlling human affairs. In the end,

Thucydides, while sharing in much of the realist tradition’s moral skepticism, disagrees with its

frequent subsequent focus on the theoretically unlimited acquisition of power.

KEY WORDS: Thucydides, realism, realpolitik, Hobbes, Machiavelli, punishment, power

… it is generally the case that… men are more willing to be called clever rogues thangood simpletons … and are as ashamed of being the second as they are proud of beingthe first.

Thucydides 3.871

Introduction

Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War provides us with some of the first examples ofwhat one might call a doctrine of amoralism in international politics. We hear from variousspeakers in the History that the rule of the weak by the strong or that violent action takenout of impulse are simply natural, ordinary, and thus, inevitable. It then follows, accordingto this line of reasoning, that ethical judgment is misplaced in international affairs, for it hasno purchase on inescapable behavior.2 The most overt expression of these ideas comesfrom the Athenian envoys to Sparta prior to the war, who claim that Athens expanded itsempire’s ‘influence chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well…no man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of thegravest dangers’ (1.75). These conjoined ideas have echoed through the history of political

Journal of Military Ethics, 2013Vol. 12, No. 3, 263–277, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2013.848092© 2013 Taylor & Francis

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thought ever since.3 Machiavelli repeats Thucydides’ Athenian ambassadors nearlyverbatim when he asserts ‘truly it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire,and always, when men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed’ (Machiavelli1998: 14, 61). Given that this is the inexorable state of humanity, one must learn to be bador fall to ruin. Hobbes (1985: 184, 188) finds that the quest for security takes priority overquestions of justice, and that where safety cannot be guaranteed, natural right justifies anybehavior, such as preventive attacks, taken in the name of security. More recentformulations of realism likewise seek to purge the realm of international politics fromethical influences on decision-making. Hans Morgenthau (1950, 1985: Ch. 1) wishesseparate the allegedly autonomous ethical and political ‘spheres’, recognizing both asource of weakness in idealism and grounds for immoderation in a crusading spirit. GeorgeKennan (1951: 87) laments the prevalence of the view ‘that state behavior is a fit subject formoral pronouncement’, and even contemporary neorealism, with its focus on behaviorismand structural causation rather than ‘unit-level’ characteristics, results sometimes in themaxim that ‘there are no good or bad states’.

From the foundations of this ethical pessimism, realism typically turns its attention tothe cultivation of power as the only true source of organization, restraint and relativecertainty in a dangerous world, often resulting in the doctrine of realpolitik, which claimsthat force is the only truly reliable means for negotiating world politics. Thus, Hobbes(1985: 161) claims under conditions of uncertainty that it is inevitable and justified that lifebecomes a ‘quest for power after power’. Machiavelli’s (1998: 101) bold plan to reorganizepolitical affairs according to how things are rather than how they ought to be ends innothing more modest than a plan to master fortune.

Because of its great comprehensiveness and its seminal nature, the History is a primeplace to begin any reassessment of the amoral doctrine in international politics. As it turnsout, while characters in Thucydides’ world at times promulgate such a doctrine, it isfrequently incomplete, self-serving and ultimately belied by the tendency of politicalcommunities to moralize their relationships with one another, even where a detachedrealism would be most appropriate. Because of the attention Thucydides gives toconnections between domestic and international politics, we are also able to begin tounderstand the origins of this tendency to moralize political relationships. In the end, aclose study of the History shows us the inadequacies of the amoral doctrine and thegenuine proclivities of ambitious states. He shines light on the elsewhere obscureconnections between moral skepticism and a Hobbesian or Machiavellian emphasis oncontrol through force. Finally, Thucydides guides us to a more honest and realisticstandpoint that is less rigid and dogmatic about the relationships between pessimism,uncertainty and power.

The Amoral Doctrine in Thucydides’ History

Just prior to the outbreak of war between Sparta and Athens, an impromptu embassy ofAthenians attempts to dissuade Sparta from war arguing that Athens’ rise to hegemonicstatus does not amount to a transgression worthy of war (1.73 ff.). According to thesespeakers, they have done ‘nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature… justbecause [they] accepted an empire when it was offered… and then, yielding to thestrongest motives – honor, fear, self-interest – declined to give it up’ (1.76). The wordhere rendered as ‘motive’ in the Greek connotes overpowering impulses, thus in effect, the

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Athenians suggest that the desires to acquire and then maintain power are not onlynatural but impinge upon voluntary action. Ethical judgment typically presupposesvoluntary action, and as the Athenians imply, in the realm of natural necessities it is quiteout of place. One might say that the Athenians here argue for a philosophy of toutcomprendre, c’est tout pardoner (Forde 1995: 151). The inoffensiveness of Athenian action,explained away by dint of the exculpatory nature of fear and other impulses, is repeated bythe aptly named Athenian Euphemus in his speech to the Sicilians (6.82 ff.). To Euphemus,the prospect of Athens being dominated by others necessitates (or perhaps justifies)4 theirown dominance.

In the famous Melian dialogue, a group of Athenian envoys give their mostunabashed and unpitying statement of their theory about the compulsory nature of theappetites and the subsequent limits of justice and honorable action in the world – the so-called ‘Athenian thesis’. At its core, the thesis claims that it is simply the nature of thingsthat ‘the strong do what they will; the weak suffer what they must’ (5.89);5 therefore it is anatural fact that Athens will rule over Melos. They attempt to convince the Melians thatacquiescing to this reality is in their true interest, for futile expectations of justice can onlylead to danger. The Athenians wish to portray their need to subjugate Melos as inexorableand then forbid the Melians to even discuss the issue of right (5.89). According to theAthenian argument, however, there is an upside to this amoralization of their politicalrelationship. In fact, the Melians should not be ashamed of subjugation at all, for shameand honor only apply between equals (5.101). In other words, Melos simply should notconceive of itself as a moral agent, at least vis-à-vis the much stronger Athens. Thelanguage of nature and necessity would excuse Melian capitulation just as much as itjustifies the aggression of Athens. Moreover, the Athenians argue, the false prospects ofjustice and equal respect can only lead the weak astray, and if only the Melians couldrelinquish hopes for such basic moral goods, Athenian rule in the Aegean, and Meliansafety can both be assured (5.103).

The Corruption of the Amoral Doctrine

Unable to accept subordination and hopeful that the justice of their cause can help themprevail, the Melians risk everything to preserve their liberty. The Athenians’ Newtonianpicture of human relations clearly takes no hold upon the Melians’ minds. In their refusal toaccept either the Athenians’ argument or their ultimatum, the Melians show the limits ofsuch naked talk of power and the limits of power itself. For Athens, it is critical to convinceMelos that it has no pride on the line – as a much weaker state, the question of nationalhonor cannot be on the table at all. The only relevant issue, as the Athenians would have it,is power, yet the Melians will not reconceive of their political relationship in this amoralizedmanner. Melos will not relinquish its claim to the worthiness that attends asserting one’sfreedom – even in vain – over exigent circumstances, nor will it treat Athens as theimpersonal force of nature it wishes to present itself as. Despite the great disparity inpower between the two, Melos regards Athens in human terms, as something to bereasoned with, appealed to, and to whom it would be shameful to willingly becomesubject. In so doing, it implicitly asserts a sort of moral equality that in the end clearly gallsthe Athenians.

Thus, even while the Athenians portray the Melians’ hopes to be folly – natural andtypical human errors – and even while they argue that honor and shame are irrelevant

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factors in their relationship, the Melians’ intransigence clearly touches a nerve. Afterputting down the brief ensuing revolt, Athens massacres the surviving men and enslavesthe rest of the population. While such a ruthless decision may not have been taken by themen who are portrayed in the dialogue, one can nonetheless see the dialogue asbecoming infected with a certain punitive tone (see Orwin 1997: 117 ff.). For all of thedebunking of moral concerns in the generals’ speeches, the assertions about Athenianpower cannot help but become an assertion about a broader Athenian superiority.Consequently, Melos’ tacit assertion of equality comes to be regarded as an act of hubristhat elicits Athenian indignation, rather than as an inconvenience or pitiable error. If poweris thus connected with deeper aspirations for worth or superiority, then the amoraldoctrine becomes corrupted. Upon reflection, perhaps we should not be surprised to seethe Melian affair end in a punitive rage, for even Athens’ initial statement of the amoraldoctrine to the Spartan assembly was immediately corrupted by talk of superior Athenianworthiness, proven in part by its willingness to run great risks (1.73). The claim that Athensdeserves to rule because it is accepting of risk is rather problematically at odds with theidea that Athens’ imperialism is excusable because it is the unavoidable product of anoverpowering fear.

Thucydides’ remarkable recounting of the debate within Athens concerning the fateof another rebellious city, Mytilene, (3.37–3.48) constitutes yet another example of how theamoral doctrine and the tout comprendre thesis are susceptible to self-serving anddisingenuous application. The free Athenian ally Mytilene, having grown apprehensiveabout Athenian expansionism, had defected but was quickly retaken, due in part to theultimate refusal of the people to participate in the revolt (3.27). At first the Athenianassembly, caught up in the passionate wrath of the moment,6 condemns all the men ofMytilene to death and the women and children to slavery. The passage of time diminishestheir anger, and the following day the Athenians decide to reconsider their decision (3.36).

Cleon, the most powerful man in Athens, speaks in favor of upholding the previousday’s grim decision, and in so doing, shows the extreme weakness of the amoral doctrinein the face of anger, indignation and expectations of controlling events. Schooled in theAthenian brand of realpolitik, Cleon does embrace the idea of the exculpatory nature ofnecessity but works to limit its applicability. Were the circumstances of Mytilene’s revoltdifferent, an examination of the city’s freedom of choice would in fact be relevant. Cleontells the Athenians, for example, that he ‘can make allowance for men who resorted torevolt because they were unable to bear your rule or were compelled by your enemies todo so’ (3.39). However, he cannot find that Mytilene was burdened by such necessities, butwas in fact treated by Athens ‘with the highest consideration’7 (3.39). To Cleon, the relativeease of the Mytilenians’ subordination not only renders the question of necessity moot, butturns their revolt into a ‘rebellion’,8 and one of particularly heinous proportions. Invokingthe logic of the Athenian thesis, Cleon even suggests that the pursuit of power as such isexcusable. Yet he pushes his charge against Mytilene to the point where he presents it as agratuitous act of spite towards its hegemon. As a result, it would behoove the Athenians topunish in proportion to the sheer gratuitousness of Mytilene’s transgression, not only tosatisfy justice, but to deter future revolts. Thus to Cleon, the harshest and mostimpassioned vengeance overlaps entirely with the dictates of an expedient deterrent.Cleon’s claim about the utility of indignation reminds us of a similar statement aboutaction and justice given by Corinthian ambassadors urging Sparta to attack Athens: ‘peacestays longest with those who are not more careful to use their power justly than to show

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their determination not to submit to injustice’ (1.71).9 According to this view, sensitivity toslights promises to be a more effective deterrent than attempting to uphold commonrestraining principles.

Cleon chides the assembly for displaying an untenable democratic softness,reminding them that their rule constitutes an empire that is maintained by force andnot goodwill, thus expediency dictates that they must discourage defection in the harshestmanner possible (3.39). Athens must try to recapture the lost moment of wrath, which isportrayed as the touchstone of justice, and avoid the real transient passion: themomentary pleasure of leniency (3.40). Cleon argues that the anger felt at that momentwas the most suitable standpoint from which to view the situation, for otherwise, ‘theedge of the victim’s wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender, whereas thevengeance that follows upon the very heels of the outrage exacts a punishment that mostnearly matches the offence’ (3.38.1). To Cleon, speech and deliberation, then, can onlywork against both prudence and justice – what is needed, rather, is a kind of automaticreaction to the adversary’s actions. Cleon thus promotes a remarkable inversion of theconventional wisdom about the relationship between passions, prudence and the passageof time.

Cleon’s contamination of realpolitik calculations with visceral emotions can be butone instance of a broader pattern of Athenian indignation to the perceived hubris of itssubordinates. Just as Cleon seems to derive his wrath from a sense that Mytilene has bittenthe hand that feeds it,10 so too do the Athenian envoys to Sparta lament that their city’sliberality has rendered it vulnerable to ungrateful weaker cities (1.77). Even beyond theAthenian empire, we see Corinth responding to the hubris of its former colony, Corcyra,with a wrathful pronunciation of hard-line principles (1.71), and more generally, theprevalence of vengeance, anger and sensitivity to honor throughout the History cannot beignored.11 This admixture of wrath and indignation to a purportedly detached realpolitikmay not prove fatal to the idea of a rational realism. Yet readers of Thucydides mustcertainly question whether the repeated pronouncements of the deterrent virtues ofpunishment spring from rational calculation or a personalized animus.

Taking Cleon’s speech as a whole, we see that even the speaker is not entirelyconvinced of the harmony between vengeance and a rational policy of expedience. Cleoneffectively tips his hat to such notions that interests compel or that necessity constrainsvoluntary action, yet his disingenuousness comes through in the end. Seeking mainly topunish the Mytilenians, he must move away from language that amoralizes politicalrelationships and restore an element of punitive justice and collective guilt. This is done bytaking the personalization of political relationships to the extreme, resulting in a patentlyabsurd claim: Mytilene did not act out of its own interests but was instead bent solely onharming Athens – it acted out of spite. The language of inexorable interests and necessityis affirmed in theory only to be discarded in his analysis, as Cleon attributes a personalslight to Mytilene that demands an equally personal act of retribution from Athens. Evenafter toying with the idea that such punishment may not, in the last analysis, be fair, Cleonstill retains the connection between expediency and vengeance – thus continuing to hewto a one-sided justice shown by the Corinthians that is perhaps best described as asensitivity to slights and a proclivity to indignation.12 These features combine in anaspiration to true control over human affairs that simultaneously rejects the need toconsider the compelling interests of others.

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Pericles and Moralized Politics

The rhetoric of the Athenian leader Pericles gives us many clues as to the origins of thedifficulties of maintaining the amoral doctrine. Pericles, like Cleon, hedges around a centralambiguity related to the question of compulsion and volition. In Pericles’ case, thisambiguity can be summed up in the question: is imperialism a freely chosen project, or aresponse to a dangerous environment? In some sense, both views are correct: Periclesultimately portrays empire to be contingently necessary. If Athens wishes to be a greatpower rather than a ‘vassal state’ – even one enjoying ‘unmolested servitude’13 – thenempire is indeed necessary (2.63). Pericles roots the imperial drive in the quest for honorand glory, yet given that the pursuit of honor at the level of interstate politics is so deeplyproblematic and unlikely to be consummated,14 the true source of the concern must belocated elsewhere. An alternative locus is obvious given the function of Pericles’ oratory:Pericles’ main objective is to maintain political cohesion, and all three speeches encourageperseverance. As we see in his final speech, this task of statesmanship may be grounded inthe utmost necessity, but Pericles’ emphasis on perseverance nonetheless focusesattention on higher things.

Thucydides often portrays politics as a kind of chaos, and political man asfundamentally unruly.15 With such anarchic, indeed anti-archic dynamics in the Thucydi-dean world, the statesman’s task of reconciling private desires with public goods andconstraints is indeed difficult, and this difficulty is met in part by an emphasis on thepolitical body as being a conduit for the people’s desire for honor. Pericles does initially putforward a vision of political cohesion that is based more on self-interest. He argues that nomatter how well-off a man is, he cannot survive without his city, whereas if his city falls, hewill follow suit (2.60). Yet neither of these things is entirely true. Cities engage in conflictover their right to rule themselves, something that may or may not matter to the privateindividual, and we see many reasons to doubt that the city monopolizes the space in whichpeople can act. Like Hobbes, although in a different way, Thucydides is concerned aboutthe degree to which men will by nature be bound to their political communities. Quitecontrary to Hobbes, for Pericles the solution to this problem lies in the community’sattachment to honor.

Pericles recognizes the weaknesses of the argument for community based onenlightened self-interest and consequently leans much more heavily on the moralcomponent of political society, stressing the idea that the actions of the city constitute asource of pride. Pericles rewrites the social contract on terms more favorable to thesustenance of the community as such: ‘… you may reasonably expect … to supportthe dignity which the state has attained through empire – a dignity in which you all takepride – and not to avoid its burdens unless you resign its honours also’ (2.61). Thus, he callson the citizens not to be the dispassionate advocates of Athens’ interests that theAthenians elsewhere seem to think they are (e.g. at Melos). Such calculating men wouldnever be above treachery because without love of a country whose power is worthy of‘contemplation’ they can always be bought (2.60). The reflection of this glorious powerallows for perseverance to overcome fear and even seems to serve the purpose of cheeringup the people in the course of their miseries during the plague that comes with the war. Itis the promise of the honor which attends dominion – or at least indomitability – thatbrings Athens back to Pericles and the common good, and away from submission toSparta.

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The union arising from enlightened self-interest is notoriously weak; sharing in honorpresents a firmer bond. Unlike providing for his own needs, the glories of empire areunambiguously goods that can be attained only via the individual’s participation in the lifeof his community. Moreover, honor is something intrinsically separate from the morematerial concerns of fear and interest, and it can compete with and take precedence overthem insofar as it stands above the calculus of such interests. As Hobbes knows, amongmen who do not embrace any goods beyond those of security or gain, the only way to getcitizens to make necessary sacrifices for their political community is for it to become morefearsome than the enemy. Pericles accomplishes a more substantive transcendence of self-interest with what is ostensibly a transcendent good. Insofar as men are seekers of honorrather than simply concerned with security and gain, the city provides the opportunity forthem to immerse their individuality into a potentially greater whole.

What precisely is this transcendent good of which political community is the soleprovider? In Pericles’ three speeches, honor is closely associated with freedom, and freedomis arguably at the heart of each speech. The first speech stresses the single principle ofrefusing concessions and equates backing down from an equal with slavery. His famousfuneral oration focuses on the internal liberal character of Athens as a source of pridesufficient to demand the sacrifice of its citizens, and the third speech exhorts persistence inthe face of difficulty, the highest expression of liberty. Returning to the theme of oppositionto concessions, Pericles here notes that ‘if the necessary choice was either to yield andforthwith submit to their neighbor’s dictation or by accepting the hazard of war to preservetheir independence, then those who shrink from the hazard are more blameworthy thanthose who face it’ (2.61). Again prioritizing freedom over security, Pericles suggests thatliberty and danger go together more often than not. This emphasis on the issue of freedom,particularly vis-à-vis others, is repeated by many other speakers throughout the History.Corinthian envoys to Sparta claim that taking dictation from Athens is essentially slavery(1.122). The Spartan general Brasidas follows Pericles (2.63) in admitting that losing toAthens does not necessarily imply death or (literal) slavery at all (5.9), but something just asbad: subordination (5.9). The Syracusan Hermocrates also admits the possibility of whatPericles calls ‘unmolested servitude’, noting that while his fellow Sicilians’ subordination toAthens may be the safe policy, it is also the shameful one (6.80).

Both Pericles and Hermocrates stress agency when exhorting their respective publicsto persist in the maintenance of their free and powerful statuses. For Pericles, Athensgarners honor from the fame of her actions ‘both good and bad’ (2.41). To Hermocrates, apolicy of resistance to Athens will preserve the freedom of the Syracusans, allowing themto remain ‘arbiters of [their] own destiny, able to [requite] good or bad deeds with equaleffect’ (4.63). The ability to administer punishment and reward are then intrinsic elementsof liberty. In contrast to the Melians, who are expected to view the actions of others as apart of a given, unalterable and natural strategic environment, great states such asSyracuse or Athens afford their citizens something that is likely otherwise to be impossible:the ability to pursue justice and exercise moral agency, the ability not to be playthings offortune or the wills of others. As the Athenian generals at Melos indicate, honor and moralagency become joined through what liberty power affords. The sense of honor thatdominates here is that which appears as a spirited rejection of being subject to the wills ofothers and the impingements of their interests. Power and wealth, rather than beingobjects of intrinsic value, are instead in the view of a higher politics, the instruments of thestate’s freedom of action.

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Periclean liberty at its most extreme becomes the freedom not to regard otherpeople as being part of the realm of natural necessity. This is behind Pericles’ advice toAthens regarding their having to endure a plague and a war at the same time: ‘the hand ofheaven [the plague] must be borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude’(2.64). Pericles outlines a particular scope of fortune, and places the plague within it andthe Spartans without. Regardless of the fact that the two misfortunes were related, andthat the coincidence of the two was certainly outside the realm of human control, thepolitical challenge presented by the Spartans is different in kind and requires a differentresponse entirely. This limitation of the scope of fortune removes political challengers fromthe realm of environmental factors and places them in an inter-personalized world inwhich honor and justice can be pursued. Athens seeks overall to avoid Melos’ conundrum– it seeks not to have to reconcile an innate expectation of moral equality with an inabilityto effect it. To achieve such liberty, Athenians must focus intensely on the idea of the cityas providing moral agency and embody it: in the end, Pericles urges that when anAthenian soldier faces his enemy, he think of vengeance more than anything else (2.42).

Diodotus on Punishment and Expediency

Returning to the debate over the fate of Mytilene, we find a strong alternative to themoralized vision in the speech of the Athenian Diodotus. Directly confronting Cleon,Diodotus extends the necessity argument from the Athenian thesis to the point ofempathizing with the mistakes of the Mytilenians. In so doing he becomes, remarkably,one of the very few characters in the History to take the trouble of applying the amoraldoctrine to explain the behavior of an adversary. Having promised only to talk ofexpediency rather than justice, Diodotus does not overtly take up the cause of justifyingthe behavior of Mytilene. Instead, he evaluates the benefit of punitive justice as a deterrentand seriously doubts its utility. In his eyes, the deluding power of hope is the true root oftransgression. Hope both feeds the daring that springs from hardship and facilitates thegreed that arises from good fortune, therefore ‘it is impossible to imagine that whenhuman nature is wholeheartedly bent on any undertaking it can be diverted from it byrigorous laws or by any other terror’ (3.45).16

Diodotus overtly amoralizes and depersonalizes the situation between Athens andMytilene by widening the scope of human understanding. He includes the tendencies ofhope and desire under the concept of inexorable necessities that Cleon had so easilydisposed of. He includes no overt discussion of exoneration, but shows an understandingthat certain tendencies of human nature are in fact practical inevitabilities.17 Free peopleforced into submission will ‘naturally’ revolt – this is to be expected (3.46). The actions ofMytilene may not have been coerced, and thus are not explicitly excused. They are, rather,understood, and it is from the grounds of this understanding that Diodotus assesses themeaning of punitive justice. His entirely forward-looking discussion of punishment is onthe surface based in the principle of utility rather than guilt and punishment, and hefurther removes the question of right by announcing that the Athenian assembly is not acourt of law: ‘we are… not engaged in a law-suit with [Mytilene], so as to be concernedabout the question of right and wrong…’ (3.44).

Diodotus’ appeal to long-term expediency runs deeper than a simple pragmaticamorality or positivism, or a mechanistic view of behavior. This becomes evident once thereader has reflected that Diodotus in effect has the Athenian assembly consider the

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impulses of the Mytilenians while simultaneously containing their own punitive urges. Hegoes beyond this to directly raising the problem of collective guilt, indicating that the vastmajority of Mytilenians are ‘innocent’, and that in killing them Athens would be ‘guilty’ ofkilling their benefactors (3.47). Maintaining his theme of expediency, he stresses both thedetrimental effect of punishing the innocent as well as the practical utility of clemency.Given the uselessness of harsh punishment as a deterrent, it is in fact expedient to punishas few people as possible. Such a policy will both reduce the intensity of revolts by offeringthe rebels the opportunity to surrender, and maintain Athens’ popularity with commonpeople everywhere (3.46). In his distanced evaluation, one in which he looks to the futureand not the present (3.44), Diodotus takes error and transgression to be part of the naturalround of things, but so too is an appreciation for justice and clemency.

By its conclusion, the notion of justice has crept into his speech in a number ofinstances. Diodotus points us towards the fact that a consideration of extenuatingcircumstance and compulsion, as well as an examination of the probability of success inretribution are all components of a more complete moral consideration. Diodotus’ humaneconsideration of justice, compulsion and expediency takes a final transformation in turningthe deterrent logic of Cleon and the Corinthians on its head: ‘it is far more conducive to themaintenance of our dominion, that we should willingly submit to be wronged, than thatwe should destroy, however justly,18 those whom we ought not to destroy’ (3.47). Cleon’sclaims to achieving a marriage of justice and expediency fail, primarily because of the lackof expediency in punishment at all costs. Diodotus also firmly disputes the assertion of theCorinthians at Sparta, who claim that peace will attend those whoare intolerant of transgression more than those who avoid sins of commission (1.71).Both are guilty of being overly confident about the utility of firm, indignant action. Hisability to turn the other cheek allows Diodotus to escape the trap of contention thatfollows from the policy of sensitivity to slights. Rather, he urges Athens to swallow its prideand prefer to suffer the indignity of a setback than to act the ‘clever villain’19 who isinvulnerable to treachery.

Diodotus’ view of compulsion moderates his stance towards the Mytilenians withoutdenying that Athens has the moral responsibility to avoid following its own punitiveimpulses. By contrast, Cleon invokes a similar notion of necessity only to deny itsapplicability to Mytilene’s actions while simultaneously trying to convince the Atheniansthat to follow their impulses is both prudent and right. One might even say that Cleonaccepts the exonerating nature of necessity only to emphasize by contrast the out-rageousness of the Mytilenians’ allegedly un-necessary transgression. All the same, Cleon’sview overlaps considerably with that of his fellow Athenian, but he shows how thelanguage of interests can become appropriated by aggressive impulse. Both Cleon andDiodotus agree, for example, that the revolt was not strictly necessary for Mytilene, as theywere not immediately threatened by any act of Athenian oppression.20 Thus, they bothagree that there was something superfluous about the uprising, but Diodotus regards thetemptations and errors of the Mytilenians to be unavoidable whereas Cleon does not.

The critical difference between the two turns on the question of control over humanaffairs. Cleon hopes that violent punishment is an effective deterrent to future transgressors,but he must also assert that there is justice in it, and that those who might plot againstAthens can ultimately correct their behavior through a prospective fear of retribution. Inother words, Cleon presumes that punitive justice works in the service of a firm control overhuman affairs. Those justly punished must willfully have erred, those who might be

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punished can be convinced to avoid that fate, and those who carry out such justice canreinforce their influence over events. The central aspect of Diodotus’ insight appears bycontrast to be an essential pessimism about the possibility of control, especially via themeans of punitive justice. Diodotus presents the widest range of human motivation to beboth natural and practically inevitable, without suggesting an attending banishment ofculpability. The reflexive indignation of the aforementioned Corinthians is not an option, forpunishment is not guaranteed to work in the service of control and in fact can undermine it:Diodotus warns, ‘we must not be such rigorous judges of the delinquents as to suffer harmourselves’ (3.46). Because he retains a deep realism about human possibility, yet does notdogmatically reject the possibility of choice as Euphemus or the Athenian envoys to Spartaseem to, Diodotus navigates the same moral territory as Reinhold Niebuhr (2008: Ch. 2, 4)when he reminds us that we are both creatures and creators of our environments.

Hermocrates’ Normative Realism

Diodotus’ subtle foray into politics finds compelling support in the leadership of theSyracusan general Hermocrates. Much more a man of action, Hermocrates still embodiesmany of Diodotus’ insights into the scope of fortune and the necessity of demotingpunitive justice as a foreign policy ambition. This combination of features allows us to viewHermocrates as Thucydides’ antidote to Pericles – a man who can effectively lead and unitepeople without untethering politics from the realities of human vulnerability and the needsof everyday life. Hermocrates’ speech at Gela exhorts the feuding Sicilians to unite in theface of the impending Athenian threat. An intriguing counterpart to Pericles’ funeraloration, the speech presents a few striking contrasts.

Unlike Pericles, who vacillates between portraying war as a glorious act of freedomand a harsh necessity, Hermocrates begins his speech with an unambiguous pronounce-ment that war occurs by choice and urges his fellow Sicilians to choose not to fight amongthemselves. The various cities of the island must not regard war as a means to settle oldscores, and in particular, they certainly should not make the mistake of inviting Athenianintervention on the island towards this end. Hermocrates deals with this problem inlanguage similar to that of Diodotus – he emphasizes the futility of pursuing punitive justice:

[M]any men ere now, whether pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them,or in other cases, hoping to gain something by the exercise of power, have on the onehand, not only not avenged themselves, but have not even come out whole, and, on theother hand, instead of gaining more, have sacrificed what was their own. For revenge hasno right to expect success just because it is in the right, nor is strength sure just becauseit is confident. (4.62)

Hermocrates pairs the pursuit of punitive justice with the attempt to control one’senvironment through force, just as was the case in Diodotus’ discussion of deterrence.Pursuing justice, attempting to acquire more, or exercising dominion all suggest thepossibility of mastering the sequence of events, and like Diodotus, Hermocrates posits greatlimits on the human capability to do so. The Athenian mindset, shown by Pericles and thegenerals at Melos, suggests that the weak are well aware that only the strong can actualizejustice. Hermocrates, by granting unforeseen events greater influence, warns that even thepowerful should not take it for granted that they can exercise moral freedom either.

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Where Pericles dismisses the influence of fear and seeks to limit the scope of fortuneto the universe of nonhuman factors, Hermocrates welcomes an appreciation ofuncertainty and its attending fears: ‘it is uncertainty that for the most part prevails, andthis uncertainty, treacherous as it is, proves nevertheless to be also most salutary; for sinceboth sides alike fear it, we proceed with greater caution in attacking one another’ (4.62).Hermocrates in fact embraces fear and uses fear of Athens as a unifying principle for Sicily.Affirming the value of fear in this way, Sicily can bring about the unification that Periclesseeks at Athens, yet in a modestly constrained manner:

Let us feel assured that if my advice is followed we shall each keep our city free, and fromit, since we shall be arbiters of our own destiny, we shall with equal valour [requite21] himwho comes to benefit and him who comes to harm. (4.63)

By avoiding the temptations of mastery that an extended position of control might entail,Hermocrates suggests that in its own limited space, a city can retain some of that freedomof choice that Periclean Athens seeks to the extreme. To accomplish this, the cities of Sicilyin reality must forgo the opportunity to settle scores or perhaps even press their legaladvantage against one another. Fear counsels that the greater practicality of warding offAthens outweighs these satisfactions.

Hermocrates’ wisdom is grounded in a sentiment that has only a weak connection tothe mainsprings of human action. Uncertainty about the future – which to Hermocrates is a‘vague fear’ (4.63) – supports a policy of unity and moderate claims. But to many actors inThucydides’ work, uncertainty presents opportunity and is a spur to ambition, as isrecognized by Diodotus. Uncertainty of this kind appears as fear to Hobbes but it isprecisely the kind of fear that unsettles the state of nature, and which must be replaced bythe certain fear of negative consequences for transgression.22 Hermocrates’ amoralizing ofthe world of international politics must be propped up by a grounded view of politics thatcontrasts with that of Pericles. His attempt to eschew self-deceiving and self-destructiveindignation and impulse is to some degree normative. He takes the Periclean emphases onhonor and splendor and applies them to peace instead (4.62). Rather than ‘anesthetizing’death,23 Hermocrates describes war as ‘awful’ (deinon) (4.59). The city to Hermocrates isvulnerable and can be injured by an aggressive score settling or the pursuit of otherspirited satisfactions. Where Pericles urges the Athenians not to condescend to makingconcessions, to exile fortune from the realm of politics and think of nothing but vengeancein warfare, Hermocrates announces:

I deem it my duty… to make concessions, and not to harm my enemies in such a way asto receive more injury myself, or in foolish obstinacy to think that I am as absolutelymaster of Fortune, which I do not control, as of my own judgment; nay so far as isreasonable, I will give way. (4.64)

Hermocrates’ policies thus aim at many of the same values as those of Pericles, but in a moreconstrained manner, aware of the circumscribed nature of freedom of action. Byrecommending that we eschew punitive justice in international affairs, he casts doubt onhumanity’s ability to control its environment, but this acknowledgement in turn leads to agreater sense of control over a smaller scope of events. The power to effect both good andbad, which Pericles boasts is exercised by Athens on ‘every sea and every land’ (2.41), toHermocrates entails simply the ability to forestall foreign interference in the affairs of Sicily(4.63). Like the Athenian envoys at Sparta, he understands the propensity of the powerful to

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rule, yet like Diodotus he also acknowledges the other side of the coin: the powerful cannotbut expect resistance (4.61). He finds that there is something ‘natural’ in both impulses. YetHermocrates also seems to understand in a way that few Athenians do, that there is a certainnobility in both the freedom to rule and freedom from rule. In short, Hermocrates does notrelinquish the aspirations of Periclean politics, but more honestly situates these aspirations ina realistic world of necessity and compulsion. In a worthy ante litteram critique of Machiavelli,Hermocrates discourages fighting a futile battle to master fortune, and he allows that humanfactors are part of the uncontrollable natural environment in which he must operate.

Conclusion

While we encounter no sure grounds for optimism in Thucydides’ work, neither do we findhis pessimism doctrinaire. Enlightened views such as those of Diodotus and Hermocratescan be brought out in deliberation to check the impulses of reflexive indignation andpunitive justice. Thucydides never claims that more moderate behavior is out of place ordangerous in politics between states. Here he stands apart from more modern strains ofrealism, many of which emphasize a positive danger in not pressing one’s advantage to themaximum,24 or at least placing a premium on the demonstration of resolve.25 This brand ofrealism appears in the History, but we are given sufficient context to question its rationality.Cleon and the Corinthian speakers both emphasize the dangers of appearing soft,essentially invoking the ‘Munich analogy’ with regard to both great power politics andthe administration of empire. Spartan inertia invites Athenian aggression, argue theCorinthians. Cleon finds that Athenian kindness invites rebellion at Mytilene. Both speakers,significantly, are angry and indignant about having their superiority challenged, and thedesire to punish is intertwined with and corrupts these theories of deterrence. Diodotus’critique of Cleon’s deterrence-through-punishment argument implies that the cause/effectrelationship between harshness and deterrence is no more reliable than the ‘democratic’expectation of a link between fair treatment and compliance. Hermocrates continues thisline of critique and further spells out the close relationship between the desire to effectpunitive justice and the expectation of mastering causal relationships in the human realm.Like Pericles, Hermocrates shows that freedom of action is an ennobling goal for a politicalcommunity, but also that it must be constrained lest those like Cleon saturate politicalrelations with a personalized animus that works against the dictates of prudence.

Prudence, to Hermocrates, entails an embrace of uncertainty and fear, which to himintrinsically limits ambitions. By contrast, the idea of uncertainty as inspiring theoreticallyunlimited aspirations to power is clearly enunciated in Hobbes (1985: 161), and is given acontemporary voice in the theory of offensive realism.26 Former US Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara was greatly concerned by the fact that uncertainty about Soviet intentionselicited planning based around worst-case scenarios, which in turn meant greatly expandedconceptions of interest.27 In Hermocrates’ mind, uncertainty ought to have an entirelydifferent impact, one that undermines the logic of the Hobbesian drive for ‘power afterpower’. Thucydides’ work as a whole suggests that expanding interests as a result ofuncertainty would be better characterized as a kind of unwarranted optimism regarding theability to master the causal mechanisms of human behavior. Thus, the ‘realism’ of Cleon,which focuses on the surety of deterrent effect and the coincidence between expediency andexercising punishment, appears not to be too realistic in either sense of the word: it grounds adisguised optimism in an unwarranted confidence in prognostication.28

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The genuine realism of Hermocrates and Diodotus is cautious rather than ambitious. Itis wary of the temptation to pursue a radical freedom of action. In Diodotus’ case, thispessimism is transformed into a sort of ethical realism or humanism – by recognizing thepower that momentary impulse exercises over the human mind, Diodotus opens up a spaceinwhich to exercise the human potential to see beyond it. The consequence of his embrace ofhuman compulsion is – perhaps surprisingly – a rejection of the idea that action must be metwith reaction. He discards the doctrinaire automaticity encouraged by other proponents ofrealpolitik. By distancing himself from the expectation of controlling events, he gainsperspective on the relative values of punishment and clemency. Harsh treatment ofsubordinates will yield no certain benefits, but Diodotus need not claim that moderationwill either. His acceptance of the limits of control allow him to acknowledge the positive sideto softness and moderation, and the recognition that such a policy is not foolproof does notprove fatal to it, for in truth, no policy can be. This is not to say that the world is a safe place forthe inert or the scrupulously just. Rather, Diodotus seems to discourage the idea of a doctrineof realpolitik that posits the superior reliability of force and firm action. More significantly,Diodotus pushes us to realize that where Hobbes’s claim about the unavoidability ofexpanding interests loses traction, so too does its normative corollary of a right to all things.

In the Mytilenian debate, the difference between the politics of control and thepolitics of forbearance seems to turn not so much on a rational foresight as it does on akind of bias towards action. In the History, preferences for action and control – howeverillusory – clearly preponderate, despite the security dilemmas and self-fulfilling propheciesthat ensue. Without ignoring the role that reasonable fears play in this dynamic, we cannonetheless augment our understanding of this dynamic with Thucydides’ account of themoral side of politics – the spirited, ‘Periclean’ side. Understanding the great stakes that thecommunity places in superior freedom of action helps us to understand deeply situateddrivers of power politics and the moral underpinnings of hardline stances.

In the end we are left wondering whether men like Cleon and the Corinthians atSparta are more afraid of having moderation insolently thrown back in their faces thanthey fear the actual power of their rebellious subordinates. As Thucydides describes thecontentious men of Corcyra, slaughtering one another not from fear but out of purevindictiveness, he comments that they show that ‘…it is generally the case that… men aremore willing to be called clever rogues than good simpletons… and are as ashamed ofbeing the second as they are proud of being the first’ (3.82.7). It is tempting to think thatthe true accomplishment of Cleon’s realpolitik lies not in a superior grasp of expediency inhuman affairs, but in its ability to save his city from ever feeling the shame of playing thegood simpleton and having its liberality turned against it.

NOTES

1. All quotations, unless otherwise noted, are from Charles Forster Smith’s translation in theHarvard Loeb edition (Thucydides 1928).

2. A second, more formalistic tradition seen in both Hobbes and, surprisingly, Kant finds thatthe question of right is out of place prior to the establishment of the social contract;hence relations between states are exterior to questions of right.

3. For a more complete discussion of this history, see Cohen (1984).4. Euphemus and the Athenian envoys cannot but help make something of a moral

argument even in their talk of compulsion. Orwin (1997) and Cohen (1984) both bring out

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how the discussion of extenuating circumstances is indeed a relevant part of moraldiscourse.

5. I have used Richard Crawley’s more memorable translation here.6. The momentary nature of the wrath is made doubly explicit by Thucydides, for not only

does orge convey a passion in the fleeting sense, the construction he uses, hup’orghs,emphasizes that it is the feeling of a moment.

7. That is, time, or honor.8. That is to say, a more intimate and moral transgression. There is a clear note of

indignation related to this ‘consideration’.9. This is Crawley’s translation.10. For a detailed version of this argument, see Andrews (2000).11. Cohen (2006) discusses the tensions between what I call ‘visceral’ politics and

constructive or constraining politics.12. Here we are reminded of Kant’s description in Perpetual Peace of the tendency in

international affairs for right to become ‘one-sided maxims backed up by force’. Likewise,the Corinthian maxim is echoed by England’s first admirer of Machiavelli, Francis Bacon(1985: 153), who counsels that a great state must ‘always be prepared to be sensible (thatis, sensitive) to wrongs’.

13. In other words, Pericles tacitly admits that subjugation is not necessarily a security threat.14. The History as a whole shows virtually no instances where Athens is genuinely honored

rather than resented for its power. Pericles’ speeches tacitly admit this at times. See, forexample, 2.64 where we see ‘envy’ as the likely response to Athenian power.

15. This must be qualified in some sense: it appears that humanity becomes more unruly as it

becomes more civilized, as Diodotus points out (3.45).16. It is interesting to note that Diodotus here entirely rejects the underlying principle of

Hobbes’s political philosophy.17. Diodotus’ speech is suggestive of deep problems in the relationship between punishment

and free will taken up by Plato. This theme appears many times in his work, for example,in his absurd portrayal of retributive justice in Laws, which recommends punishment forinjurious roofing tiles and horses (Plato 1988: 873e).

18. That is ‘justly’ from the simpler retributivist perspective of Cleon.19. Here I refer to Thucydides’ maxim at 3.87 with which I began.20. The speech of the Mytilenians at Sparta admits this (3.9 ff.).21. Amunw means punish or reward, as in the sense of ‘return’. I have substituted Jowett’s

‘requite’ for Smith’s more confusing ‘punish’.22. Strauss (1952) and Slomp (1990) assert the centrality of fear-as-uncertainty in Hobbes’s

state of nature. Thus to Strauss, Hobbes’s politics are ultimately about a foolproof system

more than anything else. If so, his enterprise would find little support from Thucydides.23. Pericles’ greatest euphemism is his reference to the ‘unfelt death’ of the soldier in

glorious battle (2.42).24. The classic statement of this idea is found in Machiavelli (1998: 61): ‘for a man who wishes

to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good.’25. For example, Schelling’s (1966: 124) dictum that nothing is so worth fighting for as a

reputation for toughness.26. For the clearest statement of offensive realism, see Mearshimer (2002).27. A 1967 speech to the editors of United Press International, cited in Kegley and Raymond

(2011: 236).

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28. One is reminded here of Niebuhr’s (2008: 40) critique of realism during the Cold War:

Niebuhr finds in realism a latent desire to destroy evil through force. He clearly means

some irony here, for one of twentieth-century realism’s greatest laments was the liberal

aspiration to rid the world of evil by idealistic means.

REFERENCES

Andrews, James A. (2000) Cleon’s Hidden Appeals, The Classical Quarterly, 50(1), pp. 45–62.Bacon, Francis (1985) The Essays (London: Penguin).Cohen, David (2006) War, Moderation, and Revenge in Thucydides, Journal of Military Ethics,

5(4), pp. 270–289.Cohen, Marshall (1984) Moral Skepticism and International Relations, Philosophy and Public

Affairs, 13(4), pp. 299–346.Forde, Steven (1995) International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli

and Neorealism, International Studies Quarterly, 39(2), pp. 141–160.Hobbes, Thomas (1985) Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Ed) (London: Penguin).Kant, Immanuel (1983) Perpetual Peace, in: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, p. 117, Ted

Humphrey (Trans) (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing).Kegley, Charles W. & Raymond, Gregory A. (2011) The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World

Politics, 3rd edn. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth).Kennan, George (1951) American Diplomacy: 1900–1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).Machiavelli, Niccolo (1998) The Prince, Harvey Mansfield (Trans) (Chicago, IL: University of

Chicago Press).McNamara, Robert S. (1967) Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,

18 September, 1967, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23(10), p. 26.Mearshimer, John (2002) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton).Morgenthau, Hans (1950) The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs.

Moral Abstractions, American Political Science Review, 44(4), pp. 833–854.Morgenthau, Hans (1985) Politics among Nations, 6th edn. (New York: McGraw Hill).Niebuhr, Reinhold (2008) The Irony of American History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).Orwin, Clifford (1997) The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Plato (1988) Laws, Thomas Pangle (Trans) (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).Schelling, Thomas C. (1966) Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).Slomp, Gabriella (1990) Hobbes, Thucydides, and the Three Greatest Things, History of Political

Thought, 9(4).Strauss, Leo (1952) The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago

Press).Thucydides (1928) History of the Peloponnesian War, Charles Forster Smith (Trans) (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press).

Alek Chance completed a BA from St John’s College and a PhD in political science from

Boston College. He has taught international relations and political theory at Boston

College and Loyola University Maryland. He is currently Resident Fellow at the US

Naval Academy’s Stockdale Center, working on problems of risk and uncertainty

in foreign policy. Correspondence address: Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership,

United States Naval Academy, 112 Cooper Rd, Annapolis, MD 21402, USA. Email

address: alekchance@gmail.com

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