A Discussion of Idealism v Realism Realpolitik

8/13/2019 A Discussion of Idealism v Realism Realpolitik

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Wemust be cautiousabout thinkingHeidegger as anidealist. In failing t oclarify i ts ontologicalbasis, idealism bas,along with realism,obscured the ontologicaldrffence between beingand entities.

In fail ing to differentiate between being and entit ies, realism has confthe independence of natural objects f rom human beings wi th the beinthese objects, and has thus portrayed these objects as being independeConsequent ly , r ea l ism has es t abl ished th i s indep enden ce as the pr imorien tation of i ts ontology. Realism , therefore, is essentially rooted ontology of th e present-at-hand.

As we dem onstrated above, however, an ontology of the present-at-hadi s rupt ive of the uni t ary phenomenon of human beings as be ing- in-world. In l igh t of this disrup tion, Heideg ger states, W ha t is decisivontology is to prevent the spl i t t ing of the phenomenon [of ~ a se in ) . 9primary encounter is with th e ready-to-hand. W ha t then is the relatiob e t w e en t h e r e a d y -t o -h a n d a n d t h e p r e se n t - a t- h a n d ? W h e n t h e r edisruption of our involvement w ith th e ready-to-hand, we are then confrowi th entities as extrinsic to our practices and concern-as simp ly there aentit ies they are in themselves. Th us, we discover the present-at-hand thro ug h a process of decon textualizing the ready-to-han d: To lay bare whjust present-at-hand and no m ore, cognition must f irst penetrate beyond is ready-to-hand in ou r concern. 1 O ur discovery of th e present-at-hatherefore founded upon ou r prior encounter w ith th e ready-to-hand. Awe have seen, this involvem ent with ready-to-hand entitie s is con stitutiour ontological structu re as being-in-the-world. On ly based on this structherefore, can we go on to reveal objects as distinct from our practicesconcern; that is , only on account of readiness-to-hand is there presenchand.

R e a l i s m , a s b a se d o n a n o n t o l o g y o f t h e p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d , i sfundamenta l ly incompat ib le wi th Heidegger ' s onto logica l under s t anShould we therefore classify Heid egg er as an idealist? Th is is a temop tion , especially given his statem ent in Being an d Time th at As comwith realism, idealism, no m atter how contrary and un tenable i t m ay be results , has an advantage in principle. 11 Th e advan tage is tha t idealimuch more amenable to the ontological thes is that being is dependehum an und ers tanding: I f idealism emphasizes tha t Being and Real i tonly ' in the consciousness ' , this expresses an understanding of the facBeing cannot be explained throu gh entit ies. 12 Yet even thou gh idepossesses this greater compatibility, it has also historically functioned wan inadequate ontological understanding:

s long s idealism fails to clarify what this very understanding of Beingmeans ontologically, or how this understanding is possible, or that itbelongs to Dasein s state of Being, the In terpreta tion of Reality whichidealism constructs is an empty one .l3We must be cautious, therefore, about thinking of Heidegger as an ide

In fail ing to clarify i ts ontological basis, idealism has, along with reaobscured th e ontological difference betwe en being and e ntit ies. Yet wreal ism was gui l ty of conf lat ing the independence of natural objectstheir being, idealism conversely confused the depen denc y of being w ith ens 6 t h a t t h e e n t i t i e s th e m s e l v e s w e r e s ee n a s d e p e n d e n t o n h uunde r s t and i ng . I t i s t h i s second m ove t ha t causes H e i deg ge r t o crit ically of idealism: if ' idealism' signifies tracing back every entity


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subject or consciousness .. then this idealism is no less naive in its methodthan the most grossly mili tant realism. 14

Yet though both realism and idealism present problems, at least asexpressed within Being and Time, Heidegger expressed a much greateropenness to the latter. Both operate within an inadequate ontology; yet thereremains for idealism alone the possibility of rectifying this deficiency.Realism has been disqualified, not primarily because it obscures theontological difference, but rather on account of the ontology of the present-at-hand which Heidegger sees as intr insic to it . If, therefore, realismattempted to reconstruct its ontological foundation by establishing readiness-to-hand as fundamental, it would no longer-by definition-be realism.Idealism, conversely, never beginni ng w ith a notion of entit ies asindependent of human beings, did not lock itself into an ontology of thepresent-at-hand. Accordingly, if idealism was to clarify its understanding ofbeing, it alone would provide us with an adequate point of departure for ourfurther ontological investigations:

If what the term idealism says, amounts to the understanding thatBeing can never be explained by entities but is already that which is'transcendental' for every entity, then idealism affords the only correctpossibility for a philosophical problematic.'5Our intention in stressing the greater compatibility of idealism, however,

is not to press the issue as to which camp--realist or idealist-Heideggerbelongs to, but only to caution against the tendency to interpret his positionas a species of realism. In our day, as in the period of Being and Time,idealism is feared almost like the foul fiend incarnate. 16 Thi s fear,

Heidegger believes, has at least in part been responsible for our failure towork out a sufficient ontological understanding from which we may evencorrectly approach the debate between realism and idealism:

Viewed with minute exactitude, the anxiety that prevails today in the faceof idealism is an anxiety in the face of philosophy nd this does notmean that we wish to equate philosophy straightway with idealism.Anxiety in the face of philosophy is at the same time a failure to recognizethe problem that must be posed and decided first of all so as to judgewhether idealism or realism is tenable.17

Although idealism may prove to be untenable, Heidegger then states, realismis neither tenable nor untenable, because it has not yet even pressed forwardat all into the dimension of philosophical problems, the level where tenabilityand untenability are decidable. 18 Yet the fact that idealism may provide abetter starting point does not mean that we will end by endorsing it as aphilosophical position. Heidegger is more accepting of idealism, but only sothat he may press through idealism and go beyond the debate betweenrealists and idealists altogether. Ultimately, therefore, the dichotomybetween realism and idealism is not a helpful one for understandingHeidegger, and we must similarly force ourselves to think beyond both it andits underlying philosophical presuppositions.

We must now go on to consider three problems of interpretation that arisefrom a consideration of Heidegger's pojition. Heidegger's central thesis isthat, although natural objects are independently of human beings, the being ofthese objects is only in human understanding. Yet we now face a paradox: if


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I f language i sfounded upon thearticulation of intel-ligibility, then langzlagewill never be able t o getaround the under-standing of b e i n gimplicit in its structure,

e cannot speak ofsomething withoutsaying that it i s . 9

being is not apart from us, how is it that we can say (most properlentities re independently of us? Th e verb to be is itself the grammexpression of our unders tandin g of being. Th us the assertion that entiindependently of human beings does not achieve in itself the differenbetween bein g and entities. Wo uld i t be more correct to say, therefonatural objects are not apart from human beings? If we did , we woback in traditional idealism, where the entities themselves are reducedhum an subject. Bu t if natural objects indeed are independently of ucan Heidegger correctly say that being is only in human understanding?

H E P R O B L E M , I T A P P E A R S , IS W I T H T H E Lof hum an language and unders tand ing . Language , Heistates , is ontological ly founded upon discourse or tewhich Heidegger defines s the articulation of intelligibi

And intelligibility, on its part, is always the intelligibility of being: themaking an entity intelligible is the revealing of that en tity in its beitherefore, language is founded upon this articulation of intelligibilitlanguage will never be able to get around the understanding of being iin its structure. W e cannot speak of som ething witho ut saying that even when th at something is the present-at-hand. Th us the first asseHeidegger's thesis is in itself incapable of differentiating between entittheir being. Hence th e need for the second assertion, which qu alifies tby telling us that, although entities are independently of human beinbeing of these ent ities ncl ud ing th e to be of th e first assertion apart from human u nderstanding.

Heidegger expresses this same paradox, though cryptically, when hW hen Dasein does not exist, t cannot be said that entities are, no

be said that they are not. 20 Th e point here is not the trivial matterhuman beings did not exist, i t could not be said that entities are, bt h e r e w o u l d b e n o o n e t o d o t h e s a y i n g . R a t h e r , i t c o u l d n o t accurately e said tha t entities are, because this are is a moda litybeing of the entities, and consequently is not apart from hum an beingagain , neither could i t be said tha t entities are not; for even the n egationt o be is an expression of an und erstan ding of being . W e are left wp a r a d o x , a p a r a do x w h i c h i s r o o t ed i n t h e n a t u r e o f l a n g u a gunderstanding. However, as long as we bear in m ind these limitationsknow that one of the ways something can be made intelligible by upresent-at-hand-i.e., as tha t which is indep ende ntly of us. Based understanding of presence-at-hand, we can say that even if we did nonatural objects would still continue to be.*l W e simply need to remth at the being of these objects-and thu s the to be-has it s or ig in in understanding.

The above paradox may seem rather minor for Heidegger or us to aYet perhaps what is motivating Heidegger is the possibility that this o f la n g u a g e m a y c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e t e n d e n c y w e n o t e d i n r e alunderstand being as localized in objects, and thus as equally indepenhuman understanding. W he n we seek to investigate the nature of


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the present-at-hand. W h en we reveal entities as present-at-hand, we the m precisely as th at which they are in themselves. However, we stilto clarify the in-itself ontologically; for though the present-at-hand is wis in itself, the circum scribin g of the present-at-hand in itself, is a procesoccurs within hum an understand ing. Th e in-itself is thus a characteriour understanding of entit ies, and not of the entit ies themselves. It itha t Heidegger uses the term in-itself in ways that m igh t lead one to thunders tands i t as a quality of entities, as when he says the fact that R eaontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not signify thatwhen Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists can the Real be as that i t is i n i t ~ e l f . ~ 5uch uses, however, are explained by t he sa me limita tiu n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d l a n g u a g e d i sc u s se d a b o ve . A s w i t h t h e i s

independence , the in - i t se l f ' i s an on to log ica l charac te r iza t ion therefore dependent upon human beings and their understanding of bOn ce again , if we are not attentiv e t o the onto logical difference as it relthe in-itself, we will obscure the fact that the very determination we cap ture an en tity in its pur e, au ton om ou s nature-in-itself--is a charactof our understanding of the entity an d not of the entity i tself. Therea u t o n o m o u s i n - i t s e l f , b u t o n l y a n i n - i t s e l f - i n - r e l a t i o n - t o - h uunderstanding.T E S E C O N D TO P I C W E N E E D T A D D R ES S C O N Cthe ontological priority of readiness-to-hand. W e have seeour pr imary encounter is wi th the ready-to-hand, and thpresent-at-hand is uncovered by going through what is reahand. Bu t we have also observed that present-at-hand entities are as thin themselves before our disclosure of them, and even if we do not dithe m; fortiori, th e present-at-hand is prior to the ready-to-hand. Ho wcan Heidegger claim that presence-at-hand is founded upon readinehan d? Does th i s no t en ta i l a con t rad ic t ion? He ide gger addresseprob lem when he says, only by reason of som eth ing prese nt-at-ha nthere' an yth ing ready-to-han d. Does it follow, however,.. .tha t readinehand is ontological ly founded upon presence-at-hand? 26 W h at isserious, however, is the fact that if it should tur n o ut th at presence-at-hfundamental, then the ontological understanding of human beings as in-the-world will be refuted, and we will find ourselves back in an on tolth e present-at-hand. Frederick Olafson expresses this same concern whremarks:

once the concept of an independent vorh nden has been admitted, there isno way in which one can avoid treating the uorh nden as a necessarycondition for the zuh nden and the latter as thus a derivative, rather than aprimary ontological concept, as Heidegger evidently intended it to be.*This apparent contradiction dissolves, however, when we bear in mi

5 a re f ul d i s t i n c t i o n H e i d e g g e r m a k e s b e t w e e n t h e t e r m s r e a dh a n d l p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d a n d readiness to handlpresence at hand.distinc tion is rooted in the ontological difference. H um an beings uboth present-at-hand and ready-to-hand entities; the modes of being inthey are disclosed are presence-at-hand a nd readiness-to-hand. As regare n t i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s , t h e p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d i s i n f a c t b o t h p r i o r t o


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necessary condition for the ready-to-hand. If it were not for the fact thatnatural objects like wood, glass and iron w r before human beingsencountered them, we could not have ready-to-hand entities such as houses,desks and chairs. Moreover, though present-at-hand entities are apart fromhuman beings, ready-to-hand entities are not; for the latter are first broughtinto being through their involvement with a matrix of human practices.However, presence-at-hand s the ontological characterization of thepresent-at-hand ecessarily comes after human beings; for, again, it ishuman beings alone who first reveal entities in their being, and this includespresence-at-hand as well as readiness-to-hand. But since our primaryexperience is of the ready-to-hand, readiness-to-hand is thereforeontologically prior to presence-at-hand. Thus, though Olafson is right instating that the present-at-hand is a necessary condition for the ready-to-hand, he is quite wrong in concluding that the latter is therefore a derivativeontological concept. The ready-to-hand is not an ontological concept at all,neither primary nor secondary. Rather, the ready-to-hand is characterizedontologically by readiness-to-hand. And though the present-at-hand is anecessary condition for the ready-to-hand, presence-at-hand is ontologicallyfounded upon readiness-to-hand.T E T H I R D I S S U E O F I N T E R P R E T A T I O Nconcerns the identity of natural objects as disclosed throughobjective inquiry with the natural world as it is prior to thisencounter with it .28 We have seen that we reveal the present-at-hand when we isolate entities from their involvement within a context ofhuman practices. This detached posture is perhaps most common in modernphysical science, where the specific goal is to investigate nature as it is initself. The question that is most frequently asked of science is whether itsunderstanding of the natural world in fact represents this world as it is initself. Again, Heidegger's answer to this question is yes; in the scientificprocess, he states, the struggle is solely directed to the entity itself andsolely in order to free it from its hiddenness and precisely thereby to help itinto what is proper to it, i.e. to let it be the entity which it is in it~elf. ~9Scientific inquiry, as a rigorous investigation of the present-at-hand,accurately represents the natural world as it is in itself.

Many in our day, however, have rejected this understanding of thescientific enterprise, fearing that it further licenses the scientific imperialismwe have witnessed throughout the modern era. Such a reaction, as HubertDreyfus notes, stems from the view that the natural world can be representedcorrectly in only one way.30 If the scientist's description of nature is true,then the word of the scientist becomes final. Any other description of realitywould have to displace that of modern science, by demonstrating that thescientific description is wrong and its own correct. The real problem,therefore, is not with the understanding that modern science correctlyrepresents nature, but with this restricted conception of nature as correctlyrepresentable in only one fashion. Conversely, Heidegger argues that Natureis itself an entity which can be discovered in various ways and at variousstages. 31 Reality admits of more than one true description. Thus thoughscience represents entities as they are in themselves, the correspondence is not

Heidegger arguthat 'Natzlre is itselfentity. . which candiscovered in varioways and a t var iostages. Thu s, reaadmits o more than true description.


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strictly one to one: Beings have stages of discoverability, diverse possibilities in w hich the y m anifest themselvest hem ~ e l ves . 3~cience captures natural objects under a part icular aspect; bu t i t is only one of many aspects in whthese objects may appear. Mo dern science's under stand ing of the na tural w orld, therefore, is neithe r exclusive of preeminent to other ways in which we may apprehend this world. One cannot say tha t , for example, physics hasgenuine knowledge of the solar sphere, in contrast to our n atural grasp of the sun. 33

We do not , therefore, have to discount the claims of the natural sciences in order to make room for otdescriptions of nature. Rather, we need to broaden our und ersta ndin g of the possibilities of representing th is reaDifferent cultura l practices disclose different aspects of reality. On e such practice is mode rn science; ano ther maymystical contemplation. Th e understan ding conveyed by each is sure to be different; bu t i t does not follow from difference tha t one is right and the othe r wrong. Both can be righ t in th at bo th can display for us different facetreality's ab ility to show u p.

In saying that different depictions of reali ty may each be rig ht, however, we are not su ggesting tha t these vardescriptions somehow add u p to one comprehensive picture of the whole. Such an interpretation w ould force us bto the naive view that real i ty admits of only one correct representat ion. Nature i s capable of presencing imu lti tude of ways, bu t these various ways are indepen dent from-and may even be incommensurable w ith- -oanother. Thu's, just as Scientific represen tation is never able to encompass the co m ing to presence of nature, sothe sum total of all hum an theories could never comp rehend this reality- theory never passes tha t wh ich presenby, but rather remains directed toward it. 34

W ith his paradoxical assertion th at , al though enti t ies re independently of human beings, the eing of entities inot apart from human unders tanding, H eidegger has thus established a new voice in regard to the deb ate betweenrealism and idealism. The re is an essential tension in this position, which spr ings from the ontolog icaldifferentiat ion between being a nd enti t ies. Thr oug h this differentiation, Heidegg er has collapsed the grou ndbetween realism a nd idealism an d has achieved, therefore, not so mu ch a balance between t he tw o as th e negation both . Conversely, if we lose this tension, we will necessarily be draw n back in to the debate. Yet wi th th e tensionmaintained, we can set a course tangen tial to this deba te and thereby clear th e ground for a new epoch in ourunderstanding of being a nd th e world.

'Martin He ideg ger, Being an d Time, trans.John Macquarr ie and Edward Robinson(New York: Harper and Row, 1962)25 1.

2 ~ a s e i ns Heidegger ' s te rm to designatehuman be ings , t aken bo th i nd iv idua l l yand collectively, as well as the manner ofb e i n g t h a t is u n i q u e t o t h e m . I w i l linstead speak of human beings, the humanbeing, we, us, our, etc.

3 ~ e i d e ~ ~ e r ,eing and Time 33.41bid 42.51bid 32; emphasis original.%bid 251.71bid 170.%bid. 2 5 1.91bid 170.1lbid 101.I l l b id 251.121bid.

l3lbid.141bid 251-52.l s l b id 25 1.16Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems o

Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter(Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1982) 167.

l7lbid.181bid.l 9 ~ e i d e ~ g e r ,eing a nd Time 204.*Olbid 2 5 5.

[bid.22 ~ ei de gg er , asic Problems 2 18.23 ~e id eg ge r, eing and Time 25 1.241bid 2 55.251bid.%bid 10 1.27~reder ick . Olafson, Heidegger and the

Philosophy of M i n d ( N e w H a v e n : Y a l e

University Press, 1987) 49-50.8 ~m indebted for much of this sectioHube r t L . Dreyfus ' unpub l i shed pa

Heidegger's Hermeneutic Realism, t o m y c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h P r o f eDreyfus.

2 9 ~ a r t i n eidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vo(Vittorio Klostermann:Frankfurt, 197

3 0 ~ r e y f u s , H e id e gg e r' s H e r m e n eRealism, 9.

3l ~ ei de gg er , eing and Time 92.3 2 ~ a r t i n e i d e g g e r, T he M e ta ph y

Foundztions o Logic, trans. Michael (Bloomington: Indiana University P1984) 167.

331bid.3 4 ~ a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , S c i en c e

R ef lec t io n, The Question ConceTechnology and Other Essays, trans. WL o v i t t ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R1977) 174.

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A Discussion of Idealism v Realism Realpolitik