REAGAN--1966 Gubernatorial Race in California

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIATOTTONJ. ANDERSON,University of Southern California

andEUGENE C. LEE, University of California, BerkeleyIN AN ELECTION which broughtabout the consolidationof the normallycon-servative forces in both major parties,motion picture actor Ronald Reagan ledthe Republicans to victory over Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, seeking his thirdsuccessivegubernatorial erm of office.' Closeto "sweepproportions," he dimensionof the Republicans'successwas indeed impressive, encompassingthe following: fiveof the six partisan,statewide offices (all but the attorney-generalship) 5 new Senateseats, narrowingDemocratic control 21 to 19; 7 additional Assemblyseats cuttingthe opposition majority 42 to 38; and a whittling of the Democratic ascendency inthe congressional delegation from 23-15 to 20-18. (The resultsare summarizedinTable 1.) Further indicating the extent of the G.O.P. victory was the fact that ineach of the three legislative arenas- Congress,state Senate, Assembly the com-bined Republican vote was greater than the Democratic, a feat not accomplishedsince 1952.2Of equal or perhapsmore lasting historicalsignificancewas the impact of the1965 reapportionmentof legislativedistrictsunderthe SupremeCourtrulingof "oneman, one vote." For the first time since becoming a state the balance of politicalpower in the California legislature has been relocated from northern to southernCalifornia. The eight southern counties from Santa Barbara to San Diego nowcontrol more Senate and Assembly seats than the fifty remaining counties in the state.Moreover,four of the six partisanstatewideelected officersare from the southland:1NOTE:For the last two gubernatorialelectionssee: Totton J. Anderson,"The 1958 Electionin California,"WesternPolitical Quarterly, 12 (March 1959), 276-300; and Totton J.Anderson and Eugene C. Lee, "The 1962 Election in California," bid., 16 (June 1963),396-420.2 Californiaparty balance, 1948-1966 -Democratic percentageof two-partyregistrationandvote formajoroffices:

VOTEFORYear Registration President Governor U.S. Senate Congress* Assembly*1948 ................. 60.2 52.6t 46.6 40.21950 .................. 61.2 35.1 40.8 45.8 43.01952 ............- . 57.3 43.1 $ 46.0 32.41954 .................. 57.4 43.2 46.1 51.5 49.01956 .................. 57.4 44.4 45.8 52.4 53.41958 .................. 59.2 59.8 57.1 60.0 58.91960 .................. 59.5 49.7 53.9 54.01962 .............. 58.8 52.6 43.5 51.8 53.91964 .................. 59.8 59.2 48.5 52.9 53.61966 .................. 58.5 42.3 46.8 46.3

* These figuresare based on the total of Democratic plus Republican candidates' votes. In the earlieryears, when a large proportion of legislators took their seats without a contest, the congressional andassembly totals are not as meaningful, since they include many voters who ratified the election of successfulcross-filers,mostly Republican incumbents.t Truman plus Wallace.: Knowland won by cross-filing.535


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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYthe governor,lieutenant governor,controller,and treasurer. Election of the Senateon a popular vote basis has given Los Angeles fourteen and one-third senators,whereas the county had previouslybeen represented by a single individual.This shift of the center of political gravity to southern California confirmsthetranspositionof popular voting strength in the region into political reality. Duringthe twenty-two yearssince World War II, the population of the state has increased130 per cent, from 8.3 million to 19.3million, the preponderantportionof this incre-ment settling in the eight counties of the southland. Since most of the historic issueswhich have divided the stategeographicallyhave been resolved,the evaluation of thefull significanceof thischangemust await futuredevelopments.A summation of the causes for the Republican success must account for achange in the temperof an electorate which firmlyendorsedDemocraticincumbencyand the statusquo in 1962. The key to the fact that the public was deeply disturbedand contemplating the possibilityof a change was the size of the "undecided" votewhich may have ultimately determined the outcome of the election. The resolutionof indecision for the Republican who had abandoned his party after the Goldwaterdebacle of 1964 was to return to the fold when the Democrats failed in their attemptto stigmatize Reagan as a prototype of John Birch conservatism. The troubledDemocrat, on the other hand, switched his vote after a fratricidal primary fightbetween Brown and Mayor Samuel Yorty of Los Angeles had proven the Governorto be politically vulnerable. An ineptly managed campaign was further marred byinternal dissension resulting from the rivalry for control of the party between

TABLE 1SUMMARY OF RESULTS, CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS - NOVEMBER 8, 1966

Democratic TotalPer Cent of (IncludesDemocratic Republican Two-Party Others)Registered voters ............................... 4,720,597 3,350,990 58.5 8,340,868Total vote cast .................................... 3,629,153* 2,808,304* 56.4 6,605,866Per cent of registeredvoters........ 76.9 83.8 79.2Governorvote.................................... 2,749,174 3,742,913 42.3 6,503,445Per cent of total vote cast .......... 98.4CongressTotal vote ................................. 2,937,862 3,336,943 46.8 6,278,601Per cent of total vote cast ........ 95.0Seats won ... ........................ 20 18Changefrom 1966 ................... -3 +3AssemblyTotal vote ................................ 2,835,177 3,294,210 46.3 6,131,813Per cent of total vote cast........ 92.8Seats won .....4....................... 42 38Changefrom 1966 ..................... -7 +7State SenatetTotal vote .................................. 2,996,234 3,174,658 48.6 6,184,098Per cent of total vote cast ...... 93.6Seats won ................................. 21 19Changefrom 1966 ...................... -5 +5

* Based on the January 1967 registration, which closely approximates the actual vote cast in November.t In both Alameda and San Francisco counties, two county-wide senatorial races were held in 1966. Theaverage vote for these elections has been used in these calculations.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIABrown's supporters and those of Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh. These surfacemanifestationsof the partychange-overare readily ascertainable,but two imponder-able issues certainly lay close to the root-cause of the action: the race problemaccentuated by riots in Los Angeles and San Francisco along with the invalida-tion of the Rumford Act mandating the sale of real property to white or Negroalike, and the war in Viet Nam, signalizing the unpopularity of the JohnsonAdministration.

THE PRIMARY LECTIONSeveral aspects of the 1966 primarywere unique. For the first time in manyyearsthe RepublicansoutnumberedDemocratsamong the new registrants.The totalregistration of 7,855,102 was the largest in history, although the partisan ratioremained constant at 3:2 Democratic (4,485,777 or 57.1 per cent Democrats to3,125,884 or 39.8 per cent Republicans). The turnout of 5,079,911 or 64.7 per centwas the highest ever recorded for a gubernatorialprimary. When the Democratsswept into office in 1958 the figureswere 4,125,124 or 65.7 per cent. As in the past,Republicans substantiallyoutdistanced Democrats in registeredprimaryparticipa-tion, 71 to 61 percent.3For the first time in history a high-speed IBM 1440 computer added votes forthe largest field of candidates in any partisan election: 788. Twenty of the fifty-eight counties used either fully or partially automated voting or vote counting sys-

tems. Another historic first, in modern times at least, was the contention for 168of the 170 state and federal partisanoffices (neither U.S. Senate seat was at stake).The DemocraticPrimary CampaignThe June 8 primarywhereinBrown could musteronly 140,128votesmore thanthe combined opposition of his five Democratic opponents, dramatically revealedthe fissureswhich had developed within the party since the great triumph of 1958.The apparatusof the party had gone untended during the last gubernatorialterm:the California Democratic Council had been both alienated and politically ener-vated; quarrelingwithin the party hierarchyhad compromisedthe effectivenessofits leadership; and a renegade Democratic mayor of Los Angeles was permitted tostrikea lethal blow at an incumbentgovernor.The Messiah-like fervor which activated the 40,000 members of the CDC topre-primaryendorsements and registration and get-out-the-vote drives for AdlaiStevenson had long been dissipated. By November 1965 the organization was indebt; the Boardof Directorsfailed in a 29 to 18 vote to impeach its presidentSimonCasadyon a no-confidencevote, and he finallyresignedthe following Februaryon acensure vote of 1,001 to 859 taken in the state convention. Brown won an endorse-ment of 874 votes to 280, but faced both a heckling and a walkout by 200 delegatesin the process.3 The decline to state, 205,830 or 2.6 per cent, and miscellaneous,37,611 or 0.5 per cent. Theregistration iguretoppedall but that for the 1964 generalelectionof 8,184,143. In 1966the Republicansgained 225,516 registrantsor 7.8 per cent, while the Democrats ncreasedonly 207,012 or 4.8 per cent. Los Angeles County registered 1,722,827 Democratsand1,150,728 Republicans or the primary.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYThe strugglebetween Brown and SpeakerUnruh for influence within the partywas reflected in the organizationdown to the precinct level, and Unruh refused tocommit himselfopenly in the Brown-Yortyprimary. MayorYortyhad servedbrieflyin the state Assemblyand the Congress,and had twice been defeated (1954 and1956) in an effort to become the Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate. In 1964,he contested the "official"Brown-leddelegationto the Democratic national conven-tion and received nearly one-third of the votes. In 1960 he alienated party regularsby supporting Richard Nixon, but enhanced his support among conservativesbydefeating Representative James Roosevelt for mayor to win a second term in 1965.The Brown-Yortycampaign was personal and vindictive: the mayor stronglyinferring that Brown was supported by Communistsand lacked understandingofurban affairs, while the governor retaliated by calling Yorty a right-wing "fright

peddler"and implyingthat he had made a messof city government. WhereasBrownstumpedthe state, attackingReagan and Christopher,Yorty allegedlymade no over-night trips, remaining in the city and relying heavily upon television to reach thevoters. The Yorty showing in the Democratic primarywas impressive: he polled981,088 votes compared to 1,355,262 for Brown; lost Los Angeles County by only95,748 votes; won conservativeOrange County away from Brown by 57,176 votesto 47,564; was particularlyeffective in the Central Valley, actually winning KernCounty; and, significantly, showed strength in several San Francisco Bay Areacounties. His candidacy proved that anti-Brown sentiment was both statewide andpreponderatelyconservative. It also gave the mayor an embryonicorganizationtosupporta possiblethirdattemptto run for the U.S. Senate in 1968.4The Republican Primary Campaign

Faced with a major task of re-groupingits forces after the disasterof the bitterpresidential primary of 1964 which split the party virtually in half (Goldwater1,120,403 and Rockefeller 1,052,053), and the subsequent ossof the stateto LyndonJohnson,the Republican hierarchyperformeda minorpolitical miracle. State chair-man GaylordG. Parkinson,an obstetricianby profession,acted as mediatorbetweenthe warringfactions. The party organizationwas reinforcedon both state and countylevels with experts in administration, finance, research organizational techniques,and candidate sponsorship.The cohesion essential to victorywas achieved for several reasons. Two succes-sive gubernatorial defeats created a strong psychological incentive to unite. TheGoldwater conservatives were completely discredited in the loss of the state toLyndonJohnson,while the moderatesachievedsignalsuccess n electingU.S. SenatorGeorge Murphy over Pierre Salinger. Parkinson worked unceasinglyto implement4The four other Democratic and one Republican incumbents for statewide partisan office ledtheir principal opponents with comfortable margins: Lieutenant Governor Glenn M.Anderson (D) 1,308,735 led Robert H. Finch (R) 1,211,540 in a field of seven candi-dates; Secretary of State Frank M. Jordan (R) 1,626,646 led Norbert A. Schlei (D)

780,709 in a field of nine; Controller Alan Cranston (D) 1,866,771 led Houston I.Flournoy (R) 634,145 in a field of eight; Treasurer Bert A. Betts (D) 1,959,111 led IvyBaker Priest (R) 1,777,337 and Attorney General Thomas C. Lynch (D) led SpencerWilliam (R) 972,674 in a field of six. In the general election, the named Republicans wonall of these offices with the exception of that of attorney general. Incumbent Superin-tendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty (R) won this nonpartisan office by 2,925,401over his closest competitor, Willard Harper.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAhis eleventh commandment, "Thou shall not speak ill of any Republican." Con-siderable attention was paid to the party auxiliaries,all of which had been capturedby Goldwater forces. Finally, in a move reminiscent of the drafting of Eisenhowerin 1952, the party recruitedan attractive, conservative candidate with virtually nopolitical experience and placed him under the skilled management of one of themost successfulpolitical public relationsfirmsin the nation, which createdan imageof a political moderateacceptableto all. Ronald Reagan had held no political office,was a former president of the Screen Actor's Guild, a registeredDemocrat until1962, and state co-chairman for the California Committee for Goldwater-Millerin 1964.

Contesting the gubernatorial primary was a former mayor of San Francisco,George Christopher,successful businessman and moderate Republican. Unsuccess-ful as a primarycandidate for U.S. senator in 1958,he became the partynomineeforlieutenant governor in 1962, but lost to the Democratic incumbent. He served asnorthern Californiacampaign managerfor Rockefeller n 1964. Christopherempha-sized his moderate Republicanism and attacked both Reagan's conservatismandBrown's alleged ineptness. In effect, he tried to capture the moderate Republicanvote while trading the conservative Republicans for conservative Democrats. Forhis part, Reagan either rationalized or ignored his public pronouncementsduringthe Goldwater campaign. He attempted to appeal to all Republicanswhile winningaway at least 25 per cent of the Brown dissidents. Thus his main campaign waswaged against Brown; he denied that Birchismwas an issue and sought to make avirtue of his alleged "inexperience" n government service,by classinghimself as a"citizenpolitician."A central issue of the primaryin the minds of the Republican voters was thequestionof which candidate could defeat Brown. Accordingto the State Poll, Rea-gan's lead over Christopher began with a substantial margin of 17 per cent inSeptember1965,but dwindled steadilyto 13per cent in January1966,to 9 in Marchand to only 6 on May 1. On May 3 the poll showed that Christopherwould havebeaten Brown by a greatermargin than Reagan (50 versus46 per cent). Christo-pher's strength represented30 per cent of the Democratic vote and Reagan's only23 per cent.Within ten days, syndicatedcolumnist Drew Pearsonprintedinformationaboutsupposedaltercationsthat Christopherhad had with government authoritiesregard-ing his dairybusinessin Marin Countymore than 26 yearsago. Among the chargeswas a misdemeanorconviction. These disclosurescontributedto the reversalof thetrend of Christopher'ssteady advance in the polls, giving Reagan a comfortable17 per cent lead days before the election. Christopher nitially charged the Reaganorganization with trying to "destroy"him. Later he alleged that the Democratichierarchyhad conspiredto release the politically damaging information to Pearsonafter having reached the decision that Reagan would be the easier candidate todefeat. Christopherand Pearsonexchanged law suits in the millions of dollars.Pre-primarypolls indicated that about one-half of the state'sG.O.P. registrantsclassedthemselvesas "conservatives" nd the remaininghalf as "middle-of-the-road"or "liberal." Of the formergroup, two-thirdsfavored Reagan, while an equal pro-

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYportion of the moderates favored Christopher. However, the conservative forcesappeared more strongly motivated to vote and contained fewer undecided votersthan did the moderates,thus accountingfor the over-all Reagan edge. Significantly,the polls indicated that Reagan'sefforts to portrayhimself as a moderatewere prov-ing successful. Where the CaliforniaPoll reported Christopherhad held an edge of17 percentagepoints over Reagan among moderate Republicans in April, this leadhad narrowed to just 2 points in mid-May. At the same time, his plurality amongconservativeRepublicans increased from 19 to 27 percentage points. The Reagantrend describedby the polls in mid-May was more than confirmedby the electionresults, the former actor easily defeating the former mayor 1,419,623 to 675,683.The extent of the Reagan victory in the G.O.P. primarydemonstratedclearlyhis appeal to a much broaderspectrumof Republicansthan was the case with Gold-water in 1964. Whereas Goldwater was able to achieve only a narrow 52 per centRepublican victory over Rockefeller in their 1964 presidential primaryrace, Reaganswept the 1966 primary with a smashing 63 per cent victory, dominated by near80 per cent margins in southern California. Only in the Bay Area was former SanFrancisco mayor Christopher able to obtain a majority, as Reagan captured allbut five of the state's 58 counties. While the deep north-southsplit in the Republicanparty continued to be demonstrated- Christopherled Reagan in the north - theprimaryreturns ndicated an equallysignificantdivisionamong Republicansbetweenthe Bay Area and the other northerncounties.In 1964, only 4 percentage points had separated the distribution of the BayArea G.O.P. vote from that of the rest of the northern half of the state, the twosectionsvoting 62 and 58 per cent, respectively, or Rockefeller. But in 1966the nineBay Area counties voted nearly 55 per cent for Christopher,while his vote in theremainingnorthern countieswas less than 38 per cent. Although there were distinctdifferences within regions of the state, a three-fold categorization of Republicanvoting- Southern California,CentralValley, Bay Area- seemedappropriatefol-lowing the June gubernatorialrace.Legislative Results

The 1966 legislativeprimaryelections were dominated far less by the statewideraces or even party politics than by a quite separate factor, a sweepingreapportion-ment of the California state Senate and, of much less importance, minor changesin the state Assembly. Following an order of the state SupremeCourt in mid-1965calling for reapportionmentof the two houses, the legislaturemet in special sessionin the fall, finally approving a plan which was signed into law by Governor Brownon October 27, 1965. Ratified by the state Supreme Court in December, the planreturned the state Senate to the strict population basis which had been in effectfrom 1850 to 1930, reducing the number of senatorsrepresentingthe 50 northerncounties from 31 to 18 while increasingsouthern California representationfrom 9to 22. Senate representationfor Los AngelesCounty, hitherto the most underrepre-sented districtin the nation, was increased from 1 to 14I/3. Minor adjustmentsweremade in the Assembly,with the main change a reduction in San Francisco'srepre-sentationfrom 5 to 4 seats.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAThe court order requiredthat all 40 Senate seats be contested in 1966, doublethe usual number. In 20 seats,mostly in the new districts n the southernhalf of thestate, there were no incumbentsseeking election. In contrast,in five districtsin thenorth a total of 12 incumbents thrown together by reapportionmentcompeted fortheir party'snomination. An additional 11 senatorsfound it advantageousto retirefrom office entirely. Of the 27 Senate incumbents choosing to run, only 3 facedopposition in the primaryfrom other than fellow senators. However, attracted bythe large number of "open"seats, a record number of 211 candidates competed inthe senatorial primary, nearly four times the usual figure. Included among theirnumberwere 19 assemblymen, ured from the lower house by the prospectof a four-year term (assemblymenserve only two years), the added prestige of a "senator,"and highly advantageous partisan districting in which they had participated only

a few months before. That the "case of the ambitiousassemblymen"was a successissuggestedby the fact that 16 of the 19 won theirprimarycontests and 14 went on towin Senateseatsin the generalelection.As a consequenceof the attemptedmove of assemblymen o the Senate and theretirementof severalothers,a total of 29 Assemblyseats were without an incumbentin the primary. Here, too, the lure of "open"seats attracteda record number of 385candidates. In contrast, relatively few incumbents faced opposition from withintheir own party primary. This pattern was equally true in the congressionalpri-maries in which 37 out of 38 incumbents ran for re-election; less than half of theincumbentsfaced oppositionfrom within their own primaryand the numberof con-gressionalcandidateswasmarkedlyfewer than in recentyears.In sum, the key variable in legislativeracesin termsof both numbers of candi-dates and contestedprimarieswas the number of incumbentscontestingthe election.That a decline would occur in intra-party competition in 1968 and 1970 as the"new" incumbents established themselves seemedlikely.And that incumbentswouldrarelybe defeated within their own primaryseemed equally true. In 1966, the onlyprimary losses suffered by incumbents were in senatorial races contested by otherincumbentsenatorsor, in one case, by an assemblyman eekinga senatorialseat.GENERALELECTIONRegistrationand TurnoutState and national polling data indicating the upsurge in G.O.P. strengthdur-ing the campaign were verified by the release of the fall registrationfiguresfor thetwo parties. In recentyearsDemocratshad always outgained the Republicansin thesummer registration drive by wide margins, better than two to one in 1964, forexample. In 1966, in contrast, the two parties were almost even in the number ofnew registrantsenlisted. In year-to-year comparisons,the Republicans gained some170,000 new registrants over 1964 while the Democrats lost more than 17,000,

droppinga percentagepoint to the Republicansin the two-partyratios.The total registration for the state of 8,340,868 was the largest in history,exceeding by more than 150,000 the previoushigh of 1964. While the vote actuallycast in 1966 fell below the 1964 figure, the turnout of 6.6 million voterswas a newrecord for a California gubernatorial election. The 79.2 percentage of voters to

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYregistrantscomparedfavorablywith almost identical ratios in 1962 and 1958, whilein terms of partisan distribution, the G.O.P. once again demonstratedits superiorability to mobilize its registrants. Eighty-four per cent of registered Republicansvoted in 1966 comparedto 77 per cent of the Democrats. (In 1962, the comparablefigureswere 82 and 78 per cent for the Republicans and Democrats, respectively.)Coloring all of the statistics, however, was the fact that more than three millionCalifornia adults were unregistered,a commentary both on citizen apathy and theneed for registrationreform.The Republicans

The Republicans faced two major problems in planning the strategy of thegeneral election: party unity and management of the gubernatorialcandidate. Theannihilation of Christopheras a moderate candidate and the size of Reagan's pri-mary vote left no effective grounds for intra-party dissension. A state campaignexecutive committee was formed headed by two of the most prominentbusinessmenand party factionalists of the 1964 campaign: Henry Salvatori, wealthy, conserva-tive, proponent for Goldwater; and wealthy, moderate, proponent for Rockefeller,Leonard Firestone.5 Christopherwas hesitant personally to endorse Reagan, butmany of his key staff members immediately joined the conservative organization.Reagan also won a vote of confidence from every major Republican auxiliaryorganization.The decision was made earlyin the campaignnot to stirup old party antipathiesby inviting former Republican candidates to return to the scene of previous partybattles. Reagan visited Gettysburg to receive Eisenhower'sblessing, but publiclystated that he would not solicit speaking engagements during the campaign fromRichard Nixon or Barry Goldwater. Reagan did unsuccessfullyseek U.S. SenatorThomas Kuchel's endorsement. Kuchel had endorsed Christopher and Reaganrefused his request publicly to disavow support from the John Birch Society. ThusKuchel again contributed to his growing alienation from the conservativewing ofthe party, seriously jeopardizing his prospects for renomination in 1968.The meetings of the state party convention and central committee during theweekend of August 4 offered the first opportunity to test the temper of the partyorganization as a whole with reference to campaign issues. By instigating a moveto modify the statute requiring the election of a new state chairman between theprimary and general elections, the Republicans adroitly avoided the kind of fac-tional warfare which plagued the Democrats. Reagan set the guidelines imple-mented by the platform committee headed by conservative Assemblyman FrankLanterman, bridging the "issue gap" between the various factions of the party.The "extremism ssue"was met by the strategyof silence and the racial-discrimina-tion-in-housing issue, imbued with "white backlash"implications, was handled bya demand for "repealor amendment" of the Rumford Act, which prohibited suchdiscrimination.'Other members: John A. McCone, Marco Hellman and Arch Monson, former Christopherbackers; and Bernard Brennan and M. Philip Davis, leaders in the Goldwater campaign.Conservative members of the party provided the "seed money" to test Reagan's prospectsas a candidate.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAProfessionalcampaign management has become virtually a necessityin Cali-fornia gubernatorialelections and many observersbelieve that the skillful guidanceof Spencer-Robertsand Associatescontributedgreatlyto Reagan'ssuccess. The firmparticipated in all aspects of the campaign with the exception of fund-raisingandcontrolled the organization, schedule, itinerary, and the selection and timing ofissues.The campaign was conducted with occasional Hollywood flourishes,but withemphasis on the simplicity and sincerityof the candidate. Spencer-Robertsstead-fastly denied trying to change the Reagan image. Spencerdeclared that "thatking-maker stuff is a lot of bull. In politics you don't change a guy's image and get any-where. If you try . . . and put words in his mouth, people see right through him.A guy has X number of qualities, and you emphasize some and not others, that's

all."6Whatever the validity of such a political homily, three aspects of Reagan'sissue-behaviorrevealed skillful tactical maneuvering: he did not respondto repeatedchargesthat he was an "extremist"and was appealing to the "whitebacklash"vote;he settled for variations upon three basic themes; and his positions on key issuesmoved progressively rom the right to the center of the ideological spectrum.Believing that "normallyyou can't get through more than two or three issues,"Spencer-Robertshad Reagan play variations upon "three main ones ... morality;then taxes, spending, that whole ball of wax; and then the eight years of incum-bency."7 Subthemeson moralityincluded: tax scandals,nepotism,civil rightsvio-lations and riots, narcotics and crime control. On taxes and spending: the deficit,welfare-giveaway,home rule for allocation of federal funds and propertytax relief.For eight years of incumbency: third term, throw the rascals out, left-wing CDCdominance and so forth. One unplanned issue developed from the question andanswer sessions with crowds, "the mess at Berkeley." Reagan thereuponrepeatedlypromisedan investigationto clean up conditionsleading to the free speechand filthyspeech demonstrationsat the University of California. He succeededin politicizingthe problem which led subsequentlyto the precipitousdismissal of President ClarkKerr by the Regents of the University. The slogan adopted by Reagan for his cam-paign was "The CreativeSociety."The Democrats

The tradition of the Democratic party entering happily into internecine war-fare in the primary,only to emerge united for the general election, was shatteredin1966. The party never regained the unity requisite for a major campaign effort.Yorty refusedto endorse Brown and the vicious refrain of his earlierchargesechoedthroughout the campaign. Some of Unruh's key personnel were loaned to theBrown organizationto conduct "get out the vote" campaignsand to serveas liaisonbetween the partyand legislativecandidates. Unruh himself finallyendorsedBrownin the general election but remained out of the state until the last few days of the6Walt Anderson, "DynamicDuo of CaliforniaPolitics,"Los Angeles Times WestMagazine,December 1, 1966.7Ibid.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYcampaign, apparently believing that taking the "low road" against Reagan wouldcompromisehis own future ambitions.Misadventure seemed to trail Brown throughout the campaign. PresidentJohnson'svisit to California, scheduled for the first week in November in conjunc-tion with his trip to Manila, never materialized. Senator Robert Kennedy spoke invarious parts of the state, but the citizenrywas far more bemused with the famousKennedy personality than with listening seriously to Brown. The Governor wonthe endorsementof famous non-constituentssuch as HarryTruman, the New YorkTimes and even Life magazine, but Reagan won the support of the influential LosAngelesTimes and Oakland Tribune.The disjointed and sputtering effort of the Brown organizationwas no moredramatically displayed than in the sorry handling of the issues of the campaign.Forgettingthe old adage "what have you done for me lately,"Brownwas bewilderedwhen the mere recitation of the accomplishmentsof his first two administrationswas received with monumental indifference. He then tried to identify Reagan withextremismby linkage with the John Birch Society. The innocuous rationalizationsof his opponent delivered in the bland Reagan manner deftly parried the charge.Brown then indulged in a jejune gesture of offering to ban the four issuesfrom thecampaign which the Republicans found most viable: crime, the courts, the Rum-ford Act and the University of California! By the end of the first week in Octoberthe Democrats admitted the failure of the extremism issue and shifted tactics to the"impeachment of the witness," attacking Reagan's qualifications and credibility.Finally in apparentdesperation,Brownbrought the racism issueinto the open, stat-ing that Reagan was "ridingthe backlash."Conjecture on the reasons for the rather inept performanceof the Democratsin the gubernatorialcampaign centers upon several circumstances. There was nofirm comparable to Spencer-Robertsin charge of the total campaign.8 Baus andRoss with an enviable record of election victories including the Goldwater con-quest of Rockefellerin the 1964 primarywas employed only on an "adjunct"basis.Another firm, Harry Lerner and Associates,dealt with some "attackissues"againstthe opposition. The Democratic organizationexperienceddissension at the highestechelon of the decision-makingprocessand the personalanimositieswhich developedaffected the moraleof the entireorganization.In addition, a series of events in the administrationof public policy over thepast several years left a residue of ill-will among both the liberal and conservativewings of the Democratic party which undoubtedlycontributed to the defeat. Citi-zens in both camps sensitive to capital punishment criticized Brown vigorouslyforhis many attempts and ultimate failure to save convicted rapist-slayerCaryl Chess-man from execution in 1960. Neither faction was mollified whenhe signedthe Rum-ford Act (anti-discriminationin housing), was forced to use national guardsmen8 When asked how he would have handled the Brown campaign, Roberts (of Spencer-Roberts)replied: "In the first place I would never have attacked Reagan. ... I would have killedhim with kindness, I would have said he's a decent, fine person and no doubt has a futurein politics, but maybe he should start at a local level . . . the extremist issue . . . was a mis-take. That's an over-the-hill issue; it worked in '62 and '64 but not in '66. They finallydropped that, but by the time they'd shifted the issue, school was out." Anderson, ibid.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAto quell a racial uprising in San Francisco in September 1966, and subsequentlysponsored a "law and order" Riot Act. Internal party problems plagued Brownduringmost of his two terms in office: he was unable to deliver the Democraticdele-gation to the Kennedy organization in 1960, fought his legislative leaders in thestate Senate and Assembly almost continuously, felt compelled to repudiate theCDC and its position on key issues,carried on a running vendetta with Speakerofthe AssemblyJesse Unruh, and seemed incapable of mediating intra-partyconflictsor winning the confidence of the Johnson Administration. In short, despite manygovernmentaland administrativeaccomplishments,he was not politically adept atmobilizinghis party'sresources.Roughhouse Campaigning

California did not have a statewide, bipartisan fair campaign practices com-mittee in this campaign as it has had in recent elections. The Republican statechairman did appoint a party committee with that title to assist in mediatingbetween Republicans during the primaryelection.9The exhumation of the ancient misdemeanor charge against Christopherhasbeen widely interpreted as a lethal blow to his candidacy. The story firstappearedin two columns of Drew Pearson's, but was perpetuated in anonymous, black-borderedhandbillscarryinga picture of the candidate and a numberacross his chestand captioned "Wanted." Some were distributedin envelopesmailed from Sacra-mento containing both Reagan and John Birchliterature. Christopherclaimed thatothers were found in Reagan headquarters n Los Angeles and that still more weremailed by Brown'sBeverlyHills campaign staff. The net effect of the exposewas toplace Christopheron the defensive throughoutthe remainder of the campaign.The Brown forces made a determined effort to pin the John Birch label uponReagan. In anticipation of the chargeReagan had issued a 500-wordstatement thathe neither supported nor repudiated the organizationand that if individual mem-bersof the Society supportedhim, they accepted his views, but that he did not neces-sarily reciprocate. On August 11 Democratic state chairman Robert L. Coatereleased a "documentary"of over 20 pages giving "names, dates and places" pur-porting to prove direct collaboration between Reagan, the Society, and its frontorganizations. The report also alleged that members of the Society were in theReagan campaign organization and that money had been accepted from "easternextremists."

Reagan was offered a preview of the statement before its release to the press,but declined to join the issue. Brown forwarded a copy to the National Fair Cam-paign PracticesCommittee requestingan opinion as to whether or not the chargesconstituted a "smear,"as the Republicansclaimed.A follow-up on the same theme appeared for distributionin a "campaignkit"released by the California Democratic State Central Committee a month later.Entitled "Ronald Reagan Extremist Collaborator: An Expose," the 13-page docu-ment representeda facsimile of Time magazine.The Foreword claimed that "Ronald9The five membersof the Republican FCPC,all political sophisticates,were: Dr. Arnold Beck-man, Herbert Hoover Jr., former AssemblymanCasper Weinberger,and businessmenJ. S. Fluorand Lee Kaiser.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYReagan is an extremist'scandidate for Governorof California. He is the extremist'scollaboratorin California. He endorses their projects, promotestheir policies, takestheir money. He is their 'front man.' Meanwhile, he pretends he is a moderate,middle-of-the-roader. The record belies him. It shows that he has collaborateddirectlywith a scoreof top leadersof the super-secretJohn Birch Society."Other forays into the area of questionablepracticesfound Yorty charging thatBrown received supportfrom the Communistparty,an exchange of chargesbetweenChristopherand Brown that each owned bank stock, implying conflict of interest;Brown charging Reagan with bigotry for signing a "Caucasian only" restrictivecovenant in 1941, and Reagan reciprocatingwith the claim that Brown rented ahouse with a restrictivedeed while stayingin Los Angeles.10As a possible significant aftermath of such roughhouse tactics DemocraticNational Committeeman Eugene L. Wyman disclosed his intent to request a con-gressional investigation of the role of television and radio in election campaigns.Californiahas 33 television channels and 322 radio stations. Television "editorials"endorsing candidates and propositions have become commonplace; radio "talkshows" where persons call a station and engage in discussion with commentatorseither supporting or attacking a candidate are thriving; prediction of the outcomeof an election before the polls close is standardpractice on the major networks,and"newscasts"occasionally come perilouslyclose to outright endorsementof a candi-date. Wyman'scontention is "that as licenseesof the federal government,radio andtelevision stations should not be allowed to use the public airwaves to endorse acandidatefor public office."GubernatorialResults

Reagan's 58 per cent vote in his victory over Brown was almost as sweeping asBrown's 60 per cent vote in his win over Knowland had been in 1958. In that year,Brown had carried all but 4 of California's 58 counties. In 1966, Reagan won 55of the 58. Among the large counties of the state, only Alameda (by less than 2,000votes) and San Francisco voted for the incumbent Democrat; Brown'spercentagevote declined from 1962 by margins ranging from 4 per cent in San Francisco to16 per cent in Kern. Not since Earl Warren's65 per cent vote in his victory in 1950had a Republican candidate for governordemonstrated such strength.

Perhapsmost noteworthy in the Reagan victory was the blurringof the north-south split which featured the 1964 presidentialrace. In that year, 10 percentagepoints separatedthe vote above and below the Tehachapis. In 1966, the marginwasreduced to 5 per cent. Democrat Brown was able to run a close race only in theSan FranciscoBay Area, but even there trailed the G.O.P. challenger. The remain-0Under Proposition 14 the state and its subdivisions or agencies are enjoined from denying,limiting or abridging the right of an individual to sell, lease or rent his property to anyonehe chooses. The Supreme Court held (5-2) that the measure denies equal protectionunder the 14th Amendment and the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S.Supreme Court subsequently upheld this decision.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAing northern counties, which had provided him with a 64 and 55 per cent vote in1958 and 1964, respectively,voted only 43 per cent Democratic in 1966.11Whether the north-southdichotomy, describedby these authors in their 1964study, is undergoing change will require continued and detailed analysis. Perhapsthe main example of the split in 1966was in the vote on the so-called anti-obscenityamendment, Proposition16. Supportedby Reagan and an expensive campaign, theinitiative proposition was attacked by other leaders in both parties as unconstitu-tional and unworkable. The marked regional difference in the resulting vote, 53per cent "no"in the southand 62 per cent "no" n the north, suggeststhat differencesin political culturewithin the state areverymuch alive.Polls

The likelihood of a Reagan sweep had been suggestedby the pollsfor more thansix months preceding the November election. Whereas in January 1966 Brownenjoyed a small lead over Reagan in public preference, this edge was lost by Apriland never recovered. The polling data conclusivelydemonstrateReagan's inroadsinto Democratic ranks, the key, of course, to Republican victory. While in 1962Brown had commanded the allegiance of 82 per cent of decided Democratic votersin the last pre-election poll, the comparablefigurein 1966was 73 per cent. Republi-can strength,on the otherhand, remained as stronglyfor Reagan as it had for Nixonin 1962. Undecided voters were substantiallyhigher than in 1962, and of these72 per cent were Democrats, many of whom apparentlyvoted for the Republicancandidate.

Analysisof California Poll reportsover the past eight yearssuggeststhat basicrealignmentsmay be taking place within the Democratic party, despite the relativeconstancy of its 2-1 share of registrants. The data indicate that Governor Brownsufferedsubstantial losses in support among white working people, especiallyunionmembers,and among lower income and educationalgroupswhich had beenhis chiefDemocraticpercentageof two-partyvote forpresident(1960 and 1964) and governor (1958,1962,and 1966) - by region1958-66:

Region 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966NorthernCaliforniaSan FranciscoBayArea* ..................... 65 52 57 66 49Other .................................................. 64 51 55 63 43

Total .................... ............. 64 52 56 65 46Southern CaliforniaLos AngelesCounty.......................... 58 50 53 58 43Othert ........................................ 52 44 45 51 34

Total ........................................ 56 48 50 55 40California(wholestate) ............................ 60 50 53 59 42*Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, andSonoma.t Imperial, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Ventura.

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TABLE 2CALIFORNIA REGISTRATION AND VOTE BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT- NOVEMB

DEMOCRATIC PER CENT OF TWO-PARTY TOTAL

Total Per Cent VOTEFORDistrict Number and Location Registration Registration Governor CongresNorth Coast-Mountain1 North Coastal .............................................2 Sierra Nevada .............................................

Total .. ....................................Central Valley3 Sacramento .................. ........4 NorthCentralValley ....................................15 San Joaquin-Stanislaus..............................16 Fresno-Merced-Madera............................18 Kern-Kings-Tulare........ ........................Total ....--.......---- ... .......-------San Francisco Bay5 San Francisco .... ........ ..................6 San Francisco ........... ......................7 Oakland-Berkeley..............................8 Oakland-Alameda-SanLeandro ..................9 SouthernAlameda-SanJose ........................10 N. & W. Santa Clara ...................................11 San Mateo ....................................................14 Contra Costa -- ..............-----...............--

Total ...........................................Central Coast12 N. Central Coast .............. .....................13 Santa Barbara-Ventura.............................Total

285,207240,175525,382273,320149,603186,378216,685220,4211,046,407

55.060.157.463.463.860.966.562.763.5

130,365241,758191,038190,294216,060293,942253,210239,6681,756,335

185,469228,175413,644

41.1 34.939.6 70.940.4 51.349.144.141.746.238.944.3

72.463.163.265.676.851.756.559.661.154.554.354.4

66.855.259.147.345.342.946.344.949.4

67.559.557.071.444.160.371.323.464.465.463.230.940.656.448.7

38.5 22.737.9 32.538.1 28.1


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Los Angeles County17 Southern-Harbor .......................................... 170,588 68.0 41.7 60.819 Southern-Whittier ........................................ 173,152 63.7 39.3 62.320 Northern-Pasadena .................................... 226,993 41.3 30.9 26.621 Central ................................................. 141,453 88.0 85.5 84.822 Northwest-San Fernando ..............-.............. 222,092 55.6 38.0 53.523 Central .................................................190,960 65.4 38.1 32.624 Northeast-Pomona ....................................... 246,798 41.1 26.8 23.725 Eastern ......................... ................ 175,706 62.2 36.1 47.426 Western-Beverly Hills ................... .......... 221,241 70.3 62.7 62.327 North Central-Lancaster ......................... 188,827 59.8 39.3 34.728 Western-Malibu-Palos Verdes ................... 374,226 47.7 37.3 27.729 Central .......................................... 179,470 65.0 44.4 51.130 Central ..................................................... 160,623 67.2 58.9 66.431 West Central .............................................. 211,429 70.0 57.0 63.432 Southern-Long Beach .............................. 227,958 57.1 36.7 19.9Total .... .... .... ........... ... 3,111,516 59.6 42.7 44.3Other Southern California33 San Bernardino ..... .............................. 259,027 58.0 37.8 46.534 North Orange ....................... .- .... 307,099 52.9 31.2 55.835 South Coastal ......................... ...... 332,072 37.4 24.9 26.936 San Diego ...................... ........... 213,925 49.0 34.8 27.137 San Diego ........... .... ..................... 172,468 61.1 43.9 61.238 Riverside-Imperial ....................................... 202,993 54.9 37.2 54.5

Total ................................. ....... 1,487,584 51.0 33.6 43.9California ................. .......................8,340,868 58.5 42.3 46.8North ....................... ....... 3,513,593 60.9 45.9 51.3South ...... ................................................. 4,827,275 56.7 39.7 43.6

* Democratic Vote/Registration Ratio derived by dividing Democratic per cent of two-party vote for governor by Democratic


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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYsource of strength in 1958 and, to a lesser degree, in 1962.12 Whether this declinewas at least partially attributable to "white backlash" could not be conclusivelydemonstrated, but the high relationship between opposition to California's fairhousing act and support for G.O.P. candidate Reagan gave credence to the sup-position.The ingredients and implications of the G.O.P. swing can also be seen in areview of the issues found by the pollstersto be of public concern in mid-June 1966.Heading the list were crime,drugs,and juvenile delinquency (selectedby 57 percentof the public as important), racial problems (49 per cent), state taxes and financingstategovernments(44 per cent), and welfareprograms(40 per cent). Significantly,55 per cent of the surveysample credited newcomer Reagan as the candidate mostlikely to do a better job of handling the issueswhich were of importance to them,comparedto only 31 per cent who selectedBrown.This choice is particularlyrevealing in the light of a separate California Pollsurvey conducted in September which indicated overwhelming public agreement(71 per cent) that Reagan's greatest deficiencywas his inexperiencein government.Apparently,however, this was more than offset in the public'seye by its view of hisstrongpoints: 70 per cent of the sample surveyedindicated that the G.O.P. candi-date's personalityand speakingabilitywere among his most outstandingqualitiesasa candidate, followed by the fact that he representeda new face and new blood(49 per cent), and was honest, sincere, and a man of integrity (33 per cent). Incontrast,while 57 per cent of those polled indicated that Brown'sexperiencewas astrongpoint in his favor, only 30 per cent of the total sample (and only 42 per centof the Democrats) were willing to state that his "good record as Governor"wasamong his virtues. Offsetting even this modest affirmativesupport was agreementby 49 per cent of those polled (including 44 per cent of the Democrats) that oneof Brown'sweakestpointswas that he had been in office too long.In sum, the polls suggest that while there appeared to be general public agree-ment that the state was facing complex and difficult social and economic issues,therewas equal agreementthat a new administration regardlessof its lackof experience- should be entrustedwith their solution. Candidate Reagan's claim that he was a"citizen" politician, rather than a "professional"appeared to strike a Jacksonianchordin the public'smind.Legislative ResultsThe Republican trend which swept the nation and the state sharply reducedDemocratic margins in both the state legislatureand the congressionaldelegation.Five Democratic incumbents in the Assembly, five Democratic state senators andthree Democratic congressmenwere among the casualtiesresultingfrom the G.O.P.12 Brown's share of preference votes among white voters:

1958 1962 1966Union members and their family ........................... 78 72 57Less than high school education ........................... 71 60 53Lower income ...................... ... ........-.... ........ ... 71 61 62

Source: California Poll, October 1966.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAsweep.l3 As a result of reapportionment and G.O.P. gains, the turnover in theCalifornia legislature following the 1966 elections was one of the greatest in thestate'shistory. In the Assembly,only 46 incumbents returnedto Sacramento at thestartof the 1967 session. The patternin the state Senate was more complicated andmore interesting. While 18 incumbents were returned to office in the 40-manchamber, 14 ex-assemblymenwere also elected.l4 Significantly, there were moreDemocratsamong this number (9) than there were Democratic incumbent senators.And the 8 Democratic incumbents were also outnumberedby 10 returning Republi-can senators. As the 1967 legislaturecommenced, it seemed likely that normal pat-terns of organization and leadership in the tradition-bound upper house mightbecome unstrungas the variousgroups and factions - including the new assembly-men - vied for power.

That the Democrats retained power at all could be largely attributed to theirskillful drawingof district boundaries in 1961 and in the special sessionin 1965. Asshown in Table 1, the combined Republican votes for each of the three legislativechambers exceeded that of the Democrats. Nevertheless,the pattern of districtingresults in Democratic margins in all three instances. The lesson is most explicitlyseen in Los Angeles County, where the art of districting has been most expertlyapplied. Of the 14 Senate districtscreatedin 1965,for example, 8 were safelyDemo-cratic, 5 safely Republican and only 1 was competitive. The consequence of thispattern is seen in the fact that, while the combined Los Angeles G.O.P. senatorialvote exceeded the Democratic vote by over 50,000 votes, the Democratswon 9 of the14 seats.In summary, although Republicans were able to make serious inroads intoDemocraticstrength n 1966,the samegeneral patternof legislativepoliticsdescribedby these authors in earlier studies again prevailed. In all three chambers- Senate,Assembly,House of Representatives well over half the seats are so heavily regis-teredfor one partyor the other that generalelection competitionoffers little promiseof success.'5 Although an occasional Republican can win in a districtregistered63per cent or more Democratic and, on even rareroccasions,a Democrat in a districtregistered53 per cent or less Democratic, these are but exceptions to the generalrule. As in the national congressionalarena, shifts in the party occur in a relativelysmall numberof districts,and the ousterof an incumbent is regardedas noteworthy.Another measure of competitiveness,of course,is the closenessof the contest. Herethe distinction between the safe and competitive districts,as defined by registration,was equally as pronounced in the 1966 elections. Of the 51 competitive districts,13Four of the five Democratic senatorswere defeated by Republican senators,thrown into thesame district as a resultof the 1965court-ordered eapportionment.14One additionaldevelopmentarisingout of reapportionmentmay be an increase in the num-ber of state legislators,particularly n Los Angeles County, seeking congressionaloffice.As a result of the four-year term, a state senator will be able periodically to compete for

congressional office without risking his own seat, a tempting opportunity for an ambitiouspolitician.c In 1966, of the 158 legislative districts (38 congressional, 80 assembly and 40 state senate),50 were in the competitive class (54-62 per cent Democratic). Of these seats, 20 wereheld by Democrats and 30 by Republicans following the election. In contrast, 61 of the 68"safe" Democratic seats were held by Democrats, while all but 2 of the 40 G.O.P. districtswere represented by Republicans.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY31 (61 per cent) were won by marginsof less than 60 per cent. In the 107safe seats,on the other hand, 41 (38 per cent) involved contests which were this close.

FINANCEThe stress and strain of party campaign financing seemed more in evidencethan usual. The plight of the voluntary party worker was exemplified when Dr.GaylordB. Parkinson,Republican state chairman,acknowledgedreceipt of $30,000from a fund subscribed o by individual Republican donorsentitled SCORE, stand-ing for the Select Committee on Research and Education. The fund was raised tohelp reimburse him for loss of income because his medical practice had beenseriouslycurtailed since he became a party officer. He claimed that sums receivedfrom the Republican State Central Committee covered only travel and basicexpensesof the position.The difficulty of compliance with the State Elections Code which requiresacandidate to pay his bills within 25 days of the election was demonstratedby theDemocrats when several affluentmembers felt obliged to sign a $140,000 note tomeet the immediate expendituresof Pierre Salingerin the 1964 campaign and helda dinner a yearlaterto attemptto liquidatea $230,000 deficit.In the middle of March 1966 a mortal blow was struck at one of the primesourcesof party funds by an amendment to the federal tax bill which bans deduc-tions by corporationsfor advertisementsin political publications. With their 136-page "Tribute to Governor Edmund G. Brown" souvenirprogramdispensedat LosAngeles Sports Arena on March 2, the Democrats raised approximately$300,000.Advertising in gold ink was sold at $5,000 a page, while the silver pages brought$2,500 each. Under the new legislation, none of this advertising will be taxdeductible.

Finally, the candidates as well as the parties became extremely apprehensivewhen Internal Revenue Service agents appeared in September to scrutinize thebooks of public relations campaign firms handling hundreds of thousands ofdollars for both parties.Besides dinners ranging from $25 to $1,000 a plate, advertising, and largedonations from wealthy adherents, several other interesting sourcesof funds wererevealed. A month before the primary, the two state chairmen announced a plancalled the California Compact. A non-profit group, the California Good Citizen-ship Committee, was formed and serviced by a professionalstaff to raisemoney forboth parties. California businesses and industrieswere furnished plans to organize"in-plant political contribution programs." Employees were to contribute to theparty or candidate of their choice with the funds to be dispensedby the employer.16An in lieu source was revealed by the Democrats when State ControllerAlanCranston was asked to vacate his rent-free campaign headquarters in the LosAngeles Subway Terminal Building. The building is owned by an insurance com-pany headed by Louis Warschaw,whose wife was defeated for the Democraticstatechairmanship ast summer,allegedlywith the assistanceof Cranston.16The Aerojet-General Corporation, a pioneer in this area, reported that 12,835 of 20,000employees contributed $82,228 or an average sum of $6.40 apiece to 239 candidates andcommittees of both major parties.

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THE 1966 ELECTION IN CALIFORNIAAnotherinterestingsource,apparently tapped openlyfor the firsttime, were the300 lobbyistsregisteredwith the state legislature. Christopherbackers addressed aletter to "Dear LegislativeAdvocate"askingeach recipientto purchasea $100 ticketto a testimonial dinner for the candidate. The suggestion was made that tableswould not be reservedfor less than ten guests. The lobbyistswere told that "Christo-pher, in our opinion, has an excellent chance to become governor."Governor Brown'sadherents solicited hundreds of appointees to state boards,commissions, and departmental positions. Telephone callers reading a letter ofsolicitation by an executive of the campaign organization were followed by mailedcontribution forms in quadruplicate. A contribution chart was included suggestingthat gifts be scaled according to salary, the steps ranging from a minimum of $100for those earning less than $12,000 a year to $1,250 or $1,500 for those earning

$25,000 to $27,500. It was reportedthat over 1,000personswere solicited.California campaigns have attracted out-of-state funds for many years, butthe sources and amounts are cloaked in mystery. The Republican state financechairman in Connecticut, angry over lack of financial support, charged in Octoberthat wealthy Republicans in that state had contributed over $400,000 to Reagan,Senator John Tower of Texas and Representative Howard Callaway, candidatefor governor in Georgia. Brown charged that Reagan had had out-of-state con-tributors to his primary campaign and implied that many of these "angels"weremembersof theJohn BirchSociety; the allegationwas denied.Whatever the source,Brown reported expendituresof $561,876 in the primary,Reagan $544,199, Christopher $459,586, Patrick $332,140 and Yorty $311,238.Preliminaryand incomplete reportson the general election indicated that Reagan'sorganizationspent over $2.6 million and Brown's,over $2.0 million. This may wellhave beenby far the mostexpensiveelection in the state'shistory.CURIOSA

Every campaign in California has its quota of bizarre political incongruities.An ultra-rightistmovement sponsoredby a "Committeefor a ResponsibleCaliforniaSupreme Court" developed during the campaign to unseat four state SupremeCourt justices, three of whom had voted to invalidate a ballot proposition whichnullified the Rumford Act (one concurred but was disqualifiedfrom voting). Theplan was to mobilize the popular majorityof over 4.5 million which had supportedProposition 14 in 1964 to vote againstratificationof the gubernatorialappointmentsin the hope that a Reagan victory would bringa conservativemajorityto the court.The average vote against continuation of the five justice's tenure was 685,762 witha high of 818,033 and a low of 364,051.

CONCLUSIONIn concluding their study of the 1964 election, the authors stated that each

party had the potential to win in California in 1966, that each faced internal fac-tionalism composed of ideological differences and the clash of leadershipambitionsand that "the victorious party in the 1966 struggle for power would be the firstto have resolved these dilemmas successfully." Although it may well be that noDemocratic candidate for governor could have survived the national Republican

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYtrend in 1966, it is clear that the Republican party met this challenge more effec-tively than the Democrats. Yet as one looked forward to 1968 and beyond, it wasevident that, despite its impressive gains, the G.O.P. could not rest on its laurels.Confronting the party was the prospect of a bitter primarybattle in 1968 for theU.S. Senate seat currentlyoccupied by moderate Republican Thomas Kuchel. Inearly 1967, an effort to unseat Kuchel was being initiated by Republican backersunited behind the prospective candidacyof Max Rafferty,California'svocal, articu-late, and conservativesuperintendentof public instruction.Equally disturbingto exponentsof G.O.P. unity was the potential explosivenessof a contestedpresidential primary. That national candidatescould ignore the Cali-fornia primary,or that a Reagan favorite-sondelegation could remain united at asharplycontestedconvention,seemed doubtful. Memories of the ill-fated CaliforniaDemocratic delegationof 1960 loomed large among thinkingRepublican politicians,but their course of actionwas unclear.On the Democratic side, the future was even more uncertain. A relativelynon-political attorneygeneraland razor-thinmajoritiesin the state legislatureand Con-gresswere all that remainedof the 1958landslide which had markedthe renaissanceof the Democratic partyto whom victoryhad been so long denied. To whom did thepartyfuturebelong? SpeakerJesseUnruh and MayorSamuelYortywere the namesmost frequentlymentioned. Even more likely was the emergence of new personali-ties, related to the Johnson-Kennedy-Humphreyn-fightingalreadyevident in partycircles.

Only one thing appeared certain in 1967- a fundamental and permanentshift of political power to southern California. Predictions that there would neveragain be a governor or U.S. senator from above the Tehachapis were no doubtpremature. But that the future of California would increasinglybe dominated bythe decisions of Los Angeles and Orange County voters was the key political factof life in the Golden State.

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Documents

REAGAN--1966 Gubernatorial Race in California