R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Response to Request for ... · Fax: 585-771-3943 Email: [email protected] January 29, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC

Joseph PacherSite Vice President

CENG.a joint venture of

ConstellationEnergy eDr

Office: 585-771-5200Fax: 585-771-3943

Email: [email protected]

January 29, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001

ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Document Control Desk

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantRenewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-l 8Docket No. 50-244

Response to Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment totransition to NFPA 805

(a) Letter from Mr. Joseph E. Pacher (Ginna LLC) to Document Control Desk(NRC) dated March 28, 2013, Subject: License Amendment RequestPursuant to 10 CFR 50.90: Adoption of NFPA 805, Performance-BasedStandard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric GeneratingPlants (MLI 3093A064)

REFERENCES:

By Reference (a), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant, LLC (REG) submitted a request for the adoption of NFPA805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants.On October 9, 2013, the NRC requested additional information regarding this submittal. Attached pleasefind the second in the set of three responses to the staff's questions. There are no regulatory commitmentsidentified in this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Thomas Harding at 585-771-5219.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 29, 2014.

Sincerely,

JP/KCAttachment: (1) 90-Day Responses to Request for Additional hIfonrnation for NFPA 805 (72 pages)

P 0 01,4R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC PýK

1503 Lake Road, Ontario, New York 14519-9364

Document Control DeskJanuary 29, 2014Page 2

cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region IN'RC Project Manager, GinnaNRC Resident Inspector, GinnaA.L. Peterson, NYSERDA

Attachment (1)

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805


FM RAI 03

Section 4.5.1.2, "Fire PRA" of the Transition Report states that fire modeling was performed aspart of the Fire PRA development (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2). Reference is made toAttachment J, "Fire Modeling V&V," for a discussion of the verification and validation (V&V) ofthe fire models that were used. Furthermore Section 4.7.3, "Compliance with QualityRequirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805" of the Transition Report states that "calculationalmodels and numerical methods used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) wereverified and validated as required by Section 2.7.3.2 of NFPA 805."

1. LAR Table J-1 lists Detection Activation Model (Heat and Smoke Detection), which is notvalidated in NUREG-1824 (as the other referenced models in Table J-1). Table J-1 has afootnote that states that the model "is the prevailing model for estimating activation times."This statement does not provide sufficient basis to determine the adequacy of the V&V.Provide additional information and documentation to determine the acceptability of themodel.

Response:The general approach for crediting automatic detection and suppression in the R.E.GinnaFire PRA is:

Automatic detection is credited in every fire zone where the system is available. Thisapproach is consistent with crediting manual suppression using the manual suppressionfailure probability curves in Chapter 14 of Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850, as the systemwill provide indication to start the fire response.

Automatic suppression is credited only when necessary based on the risk contribution (i.e.,CDF and LERF contribution) for the individual scenario.

The smoke detection model used in the Fire PRA is the Method of Mowrer described inChapter 11 of NUREG-1805. The heat detection model used in the Fire PRA is the modeldescribed in Chapter 10 of NUREG-1805. These models are not part of the Fire Modelingverification and validation (V&V) study in NUREG-1824. As a consequence, a quantitativeV&V for determining whether the model was used within its range of applicability, orjustification for why the model was used outside the range, was not performed. In addition,the fire scenarios at R.E.Ginna are characterized by complex configurations that would notbe covered by the limited testing validating these models.

The activation models have been applied conservatively. Automatic detection andsuppression capabilities are not credited to protect the initial target set in fire scenarios.These systems are credited only after the initial target set is damaged by fire. From a firemodeling perspective, this approach assumes that the ignition source and the first target set(i.e., cable trays) are on fire before the system starts. For the automatic sprinkler systemsthis is a conservative approach as the sprinklers are located within the cable trays.Therefore, assuming that some cable trays are on fire before the sprinklers start is boundingas the damage and ignition of cables occurs at higher damage thresholds compared to theactivation temperature of the sprinklers. A similar approach is applied to the Halon systemcredit in the Relay Room (Fire Compartment RR-C1). The ignition source (relay panels inmost cases) and the cable tray(s) immediately above the ignition source are failed withoutsuppression credit. Credit is then assigned to subsequent scenarios (which include

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additional targets) to which the fire propagates from the initial target set. Given that thesystem is activated by a smoke detection signal, this is a conservative practice because arelatively large fire (ignition source and cable trays) is postulated before the Halon system iscredited in applicable scenarios.

In summary, the scenario configuration has been considered to ensure that relatively severefire conditions in close proximity to the activation device and initial target set damage arepostulated before the automatic suppression is credited. That is, the specific timing resultsfrom the activation models are not explicitly used. They are only used as indications that thesystem can activate before the ignition source and the initial target set are assumeddamaged, so that they can be credited for subsequent fire scenarios.

2. LAR Attachment J (page J-2) refers to the draft RG DG-1218 published in March 2009 forthe acceptability of the fire models that were used in the application. Draft RG DG-1218 isthe preliminary draft to RG 1.205 and therefore is not the approved guidance. Clarify that themodels used in the application are in accordance with the approved guidance.

Response:The first paragraph of LAR Attachment J, Section 1, "Fire Models," will be revised to state:

"Fire modeling tools are used in the R.E. Ginna NFPA 805 transition process in theFire PRA only. The fire models listed in Table J-1 of the LAR were used within theFire PRA to assess the extent of fire generated conditions for the different firescenarios postulated and quantified for CDF and LERF. Table J-1 includes the modelidentification, the technical references for the model, and the validation workavailable for it. The selected models are listed in NEI 04-02 (Revision 2 Section5.1.2), and are considered acceptable by the NRC if each model is shown to havebeen appropriately applied within the range of its applicability and V&V (RG 1.205Revision 1, Section 4.2). The appropriate use of each model listed in Table J-1 ofthe LAR is demonstrated in the document titled "Verification and Validation of FireModels Supporting the Fire PRA at R.E. Ginna" (G1-FSS-F006)."

3. The licensee states on page J-4 of the LAR that "The dimensionless parameters for theCFAST files were not evaluated against the available V&V criteria in NUREG-1824. Itshould be noted that in some calculations, particularly those associated with the reactor andturbine buildings, there are relatively complex configurations not explicitly covered by theV&V criteria in NUREG-1824." This statement does not provide sufficient basis to determinethe adequacy of the V&V. Provide additional information and documentation to determinethe acceptability of the model, in particular in terms of its use in the NUREG 1824 validationrange.

Response:A document titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA atR.E. Ginna" (G1-FSS-F006) will be prepared to provide the V&V documentation for CFAST.The V&V methodology evaluates whether CFAST is used within its V&V range ofapplicability as defined in NUREG-1824. Normalized parameters describing the firescenarios in the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA are calculated and compared against the model

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validation ranges. When parameters fall outside the validation range, sensitivity cases areevaluated to determine the impact on the conclusions and to provide justification for the useof CFAST in the particular fire scenario.

4. Based on review of Attachment J to the LAR, no reference to the use of FDS is provided.However, based on discussions during the audit, it is clear that FDS was used to conductthe main control room abandonment fire modeling. Confirm that this is the only locationwhere FDS was used. If it was used in other fire areas, describe how (what was objective)and where (fire areas/zones) it was used.

Response:

Table J-1, "Fire Models used in the Analysis," has been revised to include Fire DynamicsSimulator (FDS). FDS is used solely in the Main Control Room analysis in the R.E. Ginnafire PRA. The Main Control Room analysis notebook, G1-FSS-F004 documents theapplication of FDS to determine hot gas layer conditions. All remaining hot gas layercalculations for areas outside of the Main Control Room utilize CFAST as documented inappendices I through AS in the detailed fire modeling notebook, G1-FSS-FOO1.

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FM RAI 04

Section 4.7.3, "Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805," of theTransition Report states that "Engineering methods and numerical models used in support ofcompliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are used and were used as required by Section 2.7.3.3 ofNFPA 805."

Regarding the limitations of use:

1. Algebraic models cannot be used outside the range of conditions covered by theexperiments on which the model is based. NUREG-1805, "Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs),"has a section on assumptions and limitations that provides guidance to the user in terms ofproper and improper use for each FDT. The general limitations of use for the algebraicequations that has been utilized for hand calculation was discussed. It is not clear, however,how these limitations were enforced on the individual fire areas or for the multi-compartmentanalysis. Provide a description of how the limit of applicability was determined for each firearea.

Response:The validation for algebraic models used at R.E. Ginna will be addressed in Appendix B ofthe report titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA at R.E.Ginna" (G1-FSS-F006). The algebraic functions are validated using NUREG-1824 as thebasis. Supplemental validation is provided in certain cases that do not fall within theNUREG-1824 non-dimensional parameter space. This supplemental validation includescorrelation ranges on which the original models are based and validation efforts conductedby the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) for the Point Source Model. The resultsof the verification and validation study indicates that all R.E. Ginna Fire PRA applications fallwithin the NUREG-1824 validation space, the original correlation range, or the validationspace of the SFPE. The R.E. Ginna Fire PRA is being updated to reflect the results of theverification and validation study.

a. Include a list of all areas, zones, transient zones and scenarios for which algebraicmodels were used to calculate flame height, plume temperature and point sourceradiation. Specify for each use whether the model was used within its range ofapplicability, or, justify why the model was used outside the range.

Response:Sections 8.2.1 through 8.2.3 of the Verification and Validation of Fire ModelsSupporting the Fire PRA Fire Scenario Selection and Analysis, G1-FSS-F006 willdocument the validation of the flame height, plume temperature, and point sourcemodels. A summary of the results of the validation process for each algebraic modelis below.

Flame Height:The validation of the flame height calculation as used in the R.E. Ginna fire PRA isnot necessary because it can be explicitly shown that the plume temperature isalways the limiting condition when determining the critical fire size for targets locatedabove the plan area of the ignition source. That is, the heat release rate necessary

FM RAI 04

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for generating a damaging plume temperature at a given height is always less thanthe heat release rate necessary to generate a flame height reaching that sameheight. Consequently, the severity factors calculated following the guidance inAppendix E of NUREG/CR-6850 are always higher when the plume temperature isselected as a model for determining the lowest heat release rate value that wouldgenerate damage above the fire source.

Plume temperature:

NUREG 1824, Volume 3 provides a validation basis for the Heskestad plume modelas applied to nuclear power plants. The validation is applicable within specificranges of non-dimensional parameters, two of which are applicable to a thermalplume calculation:" Ratio of the target height to the dimensionless fire diameter (H/D*) between 3.6

and 16; and,

* A fire Froude Number (Fr) between 0.4 and 2.4.

Table 88 in G1-FSS-F006, will show that the ratio of the target height to thedimensionless fire diameter (H/D*) falls between 3.6 and 16 for the majority of thefire scenarios (i.e., 923 of 966 scenarios).

No scenario presented a dimensionless fire diameter below the validation range.Those Fire PRA screening scenarios in which the H/D* ratio exceeded the upperlimit of 16 have outcomes in which the plume temperature is lower than the damagecriteria for thermoplastic cable (i.e., no target damage). This is expected since thelarge H/D* ratio suggests that the target is relatively high in the plume zone. Thesescenarios were reassessed at a height corresponding to the upper H/D* ratio of 16.The exposure temperature at this height is less than the critical target temperature of2050C; therefore, the targets are not predicted to be damaged at a lower point withinthe same thermal plume. Because this lower point is within the validation basis, it isconcluded that target damage is not predicted for an application that is within thevalidation range.

Table 1, at the end of this RAI response, provides a list of all areas, zones, transientzones and scenarios for which algebraic models were used to calculate flame height,plume temperature and point source radiation. In the table, the H/D ratio representsthe target separation over the dimensionless fire diameter. The Froude number isalso listed to compare to the validation range in NUREG-1824, and Q215/D is thecritical fire size divided by the dimensionless fire diameter.

Point Source:

NUREG 1824, Volume 3 provides a validation basis for the Point Source Model heatflux as applied to nuclear power plants. The validation is applicable within specificranges of non-dimensional parameters, one of which is applicable to a thermalradiation calculation.

* Radial distance ratio (RID) between 2.2 and 5.7.

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The following table includes list of all areas, zones, transient zones and scenarios forwhich algebraic models were used to calculate flame radiation with the point sourcemodel. The RID ratio documents the parameter that validates the model. Rrepresents the target separation or the radial distance and D is the dimensionless firediameter.

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Scenarios Using Algebraic Models for Plume Temperature Calculations

Equipment Location Target Fire Critical RID WithinRoom ID/Equipment Factor Separation Diameter Fire Size Ratio Validation

Type (ft) (ft) (kW) Range?

TB-1 11-C-03-T1/TRTB 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes

TB-1 CSA03/AC 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes

TB-2 TEBDCPSC/EC 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes

TY-E TY-E-T2/TRPW 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes

TY-E TY-E-T2_TRWPW 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes

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The above table indicates all of the applications at R.E. Ginna have RID ratios thatare within the NUREG-1824 validation range.

b. Include a list of areas, zones and scenarios for which algebraic models were used tocalculate sprinkler, heat detector and smoke detector activation. Specify for each usewhether the model was used with its range of applicability, or, justify why the modelwas used outside the range.

Response:Algebraic models are not currently used in the R.E. Ginna fire PRA to determinewhen to credit sprinkler, heat detector, and smoke detector activation. Automaticdetection is credited in every fire zone where the system is available. The approachis consistent with crediting manual suppression using the manual suppression failureprobability curves in Chapter 14 of Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850, as the systemwill provide indication to start the fire response. Automatic detection capabilities arenot credited to protect the initial target set in fire scenarios. Detection is credited onlyafter the initial target set is damaged by fire.

Models for sprinkler activation were not explicitly used in the Ginna Fire PRA.Instead, sprinkler activation has been conservatively estimated. Automaticsuppression capabilities are not credited to protect the initial target set in firescenarios. These systems are credited only after the initial target set is damaged byfire. From a fire modeling perspective, this approach assumes that the ignitionsource and the first target set (i.e., cable trays) are on fire before the system starts.For the automatic sprinkler systems this is a conservative approach as the sprinklersare located within the cable trays. Therefore, assuming that some cable trays are onfire before the sprinklers start is bounding as the damage and ignition of cablesoccurs at higher damage thresholds compared to the activation temperature of thesprinklers. A similar approach is applied to the Halon system credit in the RelayRoom (Fire Compartment RR-C1). The ignition source (relay panels in most cases)and the cable tray(s) connecting to the ignition source are failed without suppressioncredit. Credit is then assigned to subsequent scenarios (which include additionaltargets) to which the fire propagates from the initial target set. Given that the systemis activated by a smoke detection signal, this is a conservative practice because arelatively large fire (ignition source and connected cables/conduits) is postulatedbefore the Halon system is credited in applicable scenarios.

In summary, the scenario configuration has been considered to ensure that relativelysevere fire conditions in close proximity to the activation device and initial target setdamage are postulated before the automatic suppression is credited. That is, thespecific timing results from the activation models are not explicitly used. They areonly used as indications that the system can activate before the ignition source andthe initial target set are assumed damaged, so that they can be credited forsubsequent fire scenarios.

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2. The range of the Froude number in the analyses for the plant calculations (with theexception of the MCR) ranges from 0.7 to 3.1, whereas the range of validation is between0.4 and 2.4. Hence, for larger heat release rates, the Froude number will exceed thevalidated range. Explain why it is acceptable to exceed the validation range.

Response:During post-LAR submittal analysis, the range of Froude numbers listed in Appendix G ofthe detailed fire modeling notebook, G1-FSS-FOO1 will be updated to 0.04 to 4.69 andreflect the ranges which will be documented in G1-FSS-F006, the verification and validationof R.E. Ginna fire modeling calculations. Section 8.2.2 of G1-FSS-F006 will calculate thefire Froude Number for each fire scenario in which an algebraic equation was used. Theresults indicate that the fire Froude Number does not fall within the NUREG-1824 validationrange for most fire PRA scenarios. The Froude number ranges from 0.04 to 4.69 for theupdated R.E. Ginna calculations, which envelopes the previous 0.7 to 3.1 values discussedin the question. The values above the maximum validation range of 2.4 are associated withconservative modeling of oil fires with a relatively high heat release rate in a relatively smallfire diameter. Such configuration produces larger flame heights which in turn, results in timeto damage of approximately 2 minutes. Within this 2 minute time frame, the full zone ofinfluence is failed as a conservative practice. In most cases in which the fire FroudeNumber is outside the validation range, it is lower than the minimum range value of 0.4. Itis shown that the low fire Froude Number applications at R.E. Ginna will over-predict thetemperature and flame height.

In the development of MCR abandonment times, it was indicated that the electric panel andtransient fire areas were chosen so that the Froude number is in the NUREG-1824validation range (0.4-2.4). Provide justification for fixing the fire areas in the analysis, suchthat the Froude number falls within the validated range. Also, confirm that fire areas used inthe simulation are consistent with actual panel configurations in the MCR, or explain why itis allowable to use a fire area inconsistent with plant configuration.

Response:The response to this RAI is divided into sections. The first section discusses electricalcabinet fires. The second section discusses transient fires.

Electrical cabinet fires:There is no simple or obvious way to compute a meaningful fire Froude Number for fires inelectrical panels (i.e., NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix E, Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4). This is becausethe combustion primarily occurs within the panel and the transfer of heat and mass to thesurrounding enclosure occurs across the panel vents and any gaps that may exist or formduring the fire. The current method for evaluating electrical panel fires per NUREG/CR-6850and NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1 is to assume an open configuration source fire with abase height equal to the panel height or 0.3 m (1 ft) below the panel top, depending on thepanel configuration. This is a conservative alternative to modeling the fire conditions withinthe panel and the mass and energy flows between the panel and the surroundings. Whenusing this method to bound the mass and energy transfer across the panel boundaries andthus into the thermal plume, it is assumed that the open configuration is such that the fire

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diameter produces a fire Froude Number within the NUREG-1 824, Volume 1 validationrange. Essentially, the method for modeling electrical panel fires is to treat them as an opensource fire that has a fire Froude Number that falls within the range considered by NUREG-1824, Volume 1.

Transient fires:As described in the R.E.Ginna Main Control Room Calculation, 32-9073294-002 the FroudeNumber for transient fires is set to the lower limit of applicability listed in NUREG-1 824,Volume 1. Given transient fires can have numerous configurations, the transient areas havebeen chosen so that the most conservative results within the validation range are obtained.The selected transient fire areas are consistent with the main control room configuration.When this occurs, the thermal plume that is expected from the ignition source fire could bewider than the range evaluated NUREG-1824, Volume 1. A wider thermal plume will have agreater entrainment rate than one associated with a similar heat release rate fire that has asmaller diameter. This means that the conditions relative to a source fire that falls within thevalidation range will be less severe both in terms of the concentration of combustionproducts and the temperature. The sensitivity analyses performed in section 6.2 of the MainControl Room Fire Modeling report, suggest that the use of a fire diameter associated withthe lower limit of validation for the Froude number and the transient heat release rate valuesrecommended in Appendix G of NUREG/CR-6850 resulted in bounding abandonmentconditions. It should be further noticed that in terms of fire risk contribution fromabandonment scenarios in the main control room, the electrical cabinet fires present ahigher contribution, given the higher fire intensities associated with these ignition sources.Therefore, the impact of determining fire diameters setting the Froude number to the lowestvalidation limit is further minimized.

3. Zone models may not suitable for compartments with a high length-to-width or height-to-width aspect ratio (e.g. the Cable Tunnel compartment, G2-EXT (N End Box) compartment).In addition, the hot gas layer temperature close to the fire might be significantly higher thanthe hot gas layer temperature calculated by a zone model. Verify that the CFAST model wasalways used within the range of acceptable room length-to-width and height-to-width aspectratio, or, if not, explain why it was acceptable to use CFAST.

Response:The justification for the use of CFAST with regards to the room geometries will be providedin G1-FSS-F006. The aspect ratios for each fire zone were compared against the validationrange for the experiments used in NUREG-1824. When the aspect ratio was outside of therange, a sensitivity analysis was conducted adjusting the room dimensions in theconservative direction so that they fell within the applicable range. In all cases, the resultsof the sensitivity analyses suggested no change in the conclusions made using aspect ratiosoutside the limits of applicability.

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4. Identify uses, if any, of CFAST outside the limits of applicability of the model and for thosecases explain how the use of CFAST was justified. Include a list of areas, zones andscenarios for which CFAST was used to confirm hot gas layer development.

Response:G1-FSS-F006 will document the verification and validation of the use of CFAST using theguidance documented in NUREG 1824. The table below summarizes the scenarios inwhich CFAST is used to determine hot gas layer temperatures. The table also lists the

results of the evaluation of the applicable non-dimensional parameters. For the scenarios inwhich the CFAST calculation falls outside of the validation range, sensitivity analyses are

conducted adjusting the input parameters in the conservative direction so that all thenormalized parameters are within the validation range. The results of the sensitivity

analyses suggested no change in the conclusions made with the using aspect rationsoutside the limits of applicability.

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CFAST Files Names for V&V Study

Equivalence Ratio, (p, Compartment AspectFire Zone CFAST in V&V Range Fire Froude Number Flame Length Ratio based on Natural Ratio

Ventilation

Al-CHG

ABB-C1

ABM-C1

ABO-C1

BR1A

BR1B

CT

G2-EXT

IBN-1

K-EDG1A

K-EDG11B

RR-C1

SH-1

SH-2

TB-1

TB-2

Al-Z-AB15

CPB

SB-1

SH-1-CWP

TB-1 FP

TB-3

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

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CFAST Files Names for V&V Study

Equivalence Ratio, (p, Compartment AspectFire Zone CFAST in V&V Range Fire Froude Number Flame Length Ratio based on Natural Ratio

Ventilation

A1-L-10A No Yes Yes No Yes

Al -Z-AB04 No Yes Yes No Yes

Al-Z-AB06 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

A1-Z-AB07 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Al-Z-AB22 No Yes Yes No No

A2-Z-AC02 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

A2-Z-AC06 No Yes Yes No No

A2-Z-AC19 No Yes Yes No Yes

A3-Z-AD15 No Yes Yes No Yes

AHR No Yes Yes No Yes

Z1-SC No Yes Yes No No

TSC-1M No Yes Yes No Yes

SB-2 No Yes Yes No No

IBN-2 No Yes Yes Yes No

RC-1 No Yes Yes No No

RC-2 No Yes Yes No Yes

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5. Identify uses, if any, of FDS outside the limits of applicability of the model and for thosecases explain how the use of FDS was justified.

Response:FDS was only used to perform detailed hot gas layer calculations for the main control room.Appendix C of the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA-MCR Calculation, 32-9073294-002, documents theverification and validation of the FDS calculations performed for the main control room.The table below summarizes the validation of the R.E. Ginna MCR.

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Normalized Parameter Calculations for the Transient Fuel Package Fires in the R. E. Ginna MCR.

Quantity Normalized Parameter Calculation Validation In Range?Range

Fire Froude Number 0 .(W*) 1102D 5 -0.4es

Flame length to ceiling Lf -0.22height ratio H - Hf 0.2-1.0 Yes

Lf Df (3.7 •,/5 - 1.02) = 1.32

Ceiling jet radiusrelative to the ceiling Not applicable. 1.2-1.7 N/A

height

Equivalence ratiobased on opening area =° / 1 =1.04 0.04-0.6 No

((P) (AH02) (0.23 x ZOH-)

Equivalence ratio= - = 0.02-0.15 0.04-0.6 Yes/No (Scenariobased on HVAC (qoj) (oV - Ho02(p -V) Dependent)*

Compartment aspectratios L W

-=2.9; -- =2.1 0.6-5.7 Yes(fl• ) H H(H-Hf HHf

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Normalized Parameter Calculations for the Transient Fuel Package Fires in the R. E. Ginna MCR.

Quantity Normalized Parameter Calculation Validation In Range?Range

Target distance to fire R = At least 4.2 2.2-5.7 Yes/No (Scenariodiameter Df Dependent)*

*The normalized parameter calculation indicates the values will both fall within and outside of the validation range based on a variety of fire configurations and

room conditions. Where the values are outside of the validation range, the effect on the model is discussed in the paragraphs below.

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The table above indicates that the fire Froude Number is within the NUREG 1824 V&V range forall scenarios considered. This is by design as described in Assumption 4.16 and Section 5.5 of32-9073294-002. The flame length to ceiling height ratio is within the V&V range for allscenarios considered except for the lowest electrical panel fire bins. In these cases, the flamelength can be up to fifteen percent shorter than the NUREG 1824 V&V range. This is not aserious concern in this application because the flame shape is consistent with the NUREG 1824V&V cases (i.e., no flame impingement on ceiling boundary).

The natural and forced ventilation parameters suggest that there will combinations where theoxygen to fuel ratio (equivalence ratio) falls outside the V&V range. On the low end of the scale,the limit is not considered to invalidate the model results as the values simply indicate that thereis more oxygen available than even the most well ventilated fire test. Depending on the stage ofthe test fire, the oxygen ratio would have passed through a value comparable to the valuesobserved in the R. E. Ginna cases given the ratio is zero at the start of all fires. Cases wherethe equivalence ratio is too high generally occur for the larger heat release rate bins of the panelfire or the no forced ventilation scenarios for the transient fire. In these cases, a number ofobservations may be made. First, the largest panel fire having the greatest equivalence ratio(greater than one) result in abandonment in less than 10 minutes. At these times, the fire sizehas not reached the peak value and the equivalence ratio at the time abandonment is predictedis much lower, though possibly still greater than 0.6. Second, the initial oxygen reservoir in thecontrol room can support the fires in the absence of additional ventilation for the twenty minutefire durations considered in this calculation. An assessment of this potential may be made usingthe following equation:

Mo, = 0.23pc1oV

where M02is the initial mass of oxygen in the MCR (kg), po, is the density of the air (kg/m 3), and

V is the enclosure volume (M 3). The mass of oxygen is thus in excess of 318 kg. Thecombustion energy that the initial oxygen mass can support is given by the following:

E0 2 = Mo2 AH0 2

where E0 2 is the total amount of combustion energy that could be realized by the initial oxygenmass in the control room (kJ) and AHo, is the heat of combustion of oxygen (13,100 kJ/kg). The

total amount of combustion energy that could be realized by the initial oxygen mass is thus4,166 MJ.

This energy content could support a 317 kW transient fire for about three hours, or six timeslonger than the time interval of interest. A 1,462 kW panel fire could be supported for forty-seven minutes, about 2.5 times longer than the time interval of interest. This suggests that thepostulated fire scenarios are not large enough, nor do they burn long enough, to transition to a

FM RAI 04

14


ventilation limited condition. Since the actual fires do not become ventilation limited, theequivalence ratio within the enclosure is expected to remain within the tested range for the timescales of interest. This expectation is confirmed by the FDS results showing that the fire size isexactly as specified (i.e., the ventilation conditions do not cause a heat release rate reduction).It could also be asserted that based on these results, the equivalence ratio as defined in theabove table does not apply because there is a sufficient reservoir of oxygen within the enclosureto sustain the fires.

In the case of the radiant heat flux (target positions), the minimum distance in all casesconsidered is within the NUREG 1824 V&V range. Depending on the actual fire size (and firediameter) and the operator location, the distance could be greater than the NUREG 1824 V&Vrange. However, at these remote distances, the heat flux contribution from the fire diminishes.This is further amplified by the orientation of the target (upward) and the assumption that theoperators can adjust their position such that they are not located within the fire ZOI. This meansthat the parameter is not significant for the type of analysis conducted, and when it is outsidethe NUREG 1824 V&V range, it is at a remote distance where the contribution from this

parameter is minimal compared to other sources of heat flux (hot gas layer).

FM RAI 04

15


Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function

Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2/5 Q 2/5

Room Equipment IDIEquipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D/DType Factor Size Ratio within within at within

(kW) Range? Range? Range?

A1-CHG A1-CHG-T1/TRCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes

A1-CHG A1-CHG-T1/TRWCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes

A1-CHG PCH01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

A1-CHG PCH01A/ZO1 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes

A1-CHG PCH01A/ZO2 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes

A1-CHG PCH01 B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

A1-CHG PCH01B/ZO1 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes

A1-CHG PCH01B/Z02 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes

A1-CHG PCH01C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

A1-CHG PCH01C/ZO1 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes

A1-CHG PCH01C/Z02 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes

A1-Z-AB06 A1-Z-AB06-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

A1-Z-AB06 A1-Z-AB06-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

A2-Z-AC02 A2-Z-AC02-T1iTRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

A2-Z-AC02 A2-Z-AC02-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

A3-Z-AD15 A3-Z-AD15-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

A3-Z-AD15 A3-Z-AD15-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

A3-Z-AD15 PCH03B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABB-C1 A1-L-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C1 A1-L-7A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No



FM RAI 04

16


Table 1 : Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function

Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 22/5 02/5

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire H/D* Ratio Number DType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within(kW) Range? Range? Range?



ABB-C1 A1-N-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 7.3 201 14.42 Yes 0.63 Yes 13.68 Yes

ABB-C1 A1-N-10A-T1/TRWCAR 1 7.3 201 14.42 Yes 0.63 Yes 13.68 Yes

ABB-C1 A1-N-5A-T1iTRCAR 1 3 45 10.78 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes

ABB-C1 A1-N-5A-T1/TRWCAR 1 3 45 10.78 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes

ABB-C1 A1-N-6A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C1 A1-N-6A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


ABB-C1 A1-N-7A-T1ITRWCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes





ABB-C1 A1-Z-AB17-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C 1 A1 -Z-AB17-T1iTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C1 A1-Z-AB18-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C1 A1-Z-AB18-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC16-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC16-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC17-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


ABB-C 1 A2-Z-AC18-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

17


Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad FunctionFr Q 2l/ 5~l

Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2

ReEquipment DEquipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Froude N r DDRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Fude within R within


ABB-CI

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C"

ABB-C'

ABB-C'

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C'

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C'

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C1

ABB-C'

ABB-C1

BAECP/EC

GACP/EC

GSCP/EC

PAC03/PMP

PAC03/ZO1

PAC03/ZO2

PAC05/PMP

PAC05/ZO1

PAC05/ZO2

PAC07AIPMP

PAC07A/ZO1

PAC07A/ZO2

PAC07B/PMP

PAC07B/ZO1

PAC07B/ZO2

PSI01A/PMP

PS101 AZO1

PS101A/ZO2

PSI01 B/PMP

PSI01 B/ZO1

PS101 B/ZO2

PS101C/PMP

PSIO1C/ZO1

PS101 C/Z02

2.6

4.7

5.4

1

12.7

12.7

1

1

1

1

12.7

12.7

1

12.7

12.6

1

12.8

12.8

1

12.8

12.81

12.8

1

52

116

116

15

615

615

15

15

15

15

615

615

15

615

615

15

625

625

15

625

625

15

15

15

8.82

11.57

13.29

5.58

16.04

16.04

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

16.04

16.04

5.58

16.04

15.91

5.58

16.06

16.06

5.58

16.06

16.06

5.58

71.39

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

0.16

0.36

0.36

0.05

1.92

1.92

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

1.92

1.92

0.05

1.92

1.92

0.05

1.95

1.95

0.05

1.95

1.95

0.05

0.05

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

7.97

10.98

10.98

4.85

21.40

21.40

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

21.40

21.40

4.85

21.40

21.40

4.85

21.54

21.54

4.85

21.54

21.54

4.85

4.85

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85

FMV RAI 04

18



Critical H/D* Fr Fe/5Equipment ID/Equipment Location Tarat Fire HID* Ratio Fre Number DType Factor Sati Size Ratio within Number within R within


ABB-C1 PSI01D/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABB-C1 PSI02A/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

ABB-C1 PSI02B/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

ABB-C1 WDPW1/EC 1 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes

ABB-C1 WDPW2/EC 1 5A4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes

ABM-C1 90/MCCD/EC 1 3.3 60 10.57 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-L-7A-T1ITRCAR 1 8.2 252 14.80 Yes 0.79 Yes 14.98 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-L-7A-T1/TRWCAR 1 8.2 252 14.80 Yes 0.79 Yes 14.98 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-L-8A-T1ITRCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-L-8A-T1rTRWCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-L-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABM-C1 A2-L-9A-T1rTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABM-C1 A2-N-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-10A-T1/TRWCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-5A-TlrrRCAR 1 7.9 235 14.66 Yes 0.73 Yes 14.57 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-5A-T1/TRWCAR 1 7.9 235 14.66 Yes 0.73 Yes 14.57 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-6A-TIrTRCAR 1 7.75 225 14.63 Yes 0.70 Yes 14.32 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-6A-T1FTRWCAR 1 7.75 225 14.63 Yes 0.70 Yes 14.32 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABM-C1 A2-N-7A-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABM-C1 A2-N-8A-T1/TRCAR 1 6.6 166 14.07 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.68 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-8A-T1/FRWCAR 1 6.6 166 14.07 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.68 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes

ABM-C1 A2-N-9A-T1/TRWCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes

FM RAI 04

19




Tagt Fire H/D* Ratio NumberRoom Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fr /* Rto Froude Nubr DD

Type Factor Size Ratio within Fude within R within(ft) (kW) Range? Number Ratio(WRagRange? Range?

ABM-C1 ACPDPAB1O/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes

ABM-C1 ACPDPAB11/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes



ABM-C1 ARB1RC16/EC 1 3.6 60 11.53 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes

ABM-C1 BAXPump/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABM-C1 BUS16/11A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes







ABM-C1 MCCCABC/EC 1 6 191 12.10 Yes 0.60 Yes 13.41 Yes

ABM-C1 MCCD/01B/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes


ABM-C1 MCCD/03D/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes



ABM-C1 MCCD/06C/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes




ABM-C1 MCCD/1OC/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes

FM RAI 04

20



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr QZ/5 Q2/5Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Cite icalwtin Number Fir D

Type FactorSize Ratio within Fwithin withinRomTp atr (ft) (kW) Range? u r Range? Rto Range?







ABM-C1 MCCDABC/EC 1 6 191 12.10 Yes 0.60 Yes 13.41 Yes

ABM-C1 MCCM/01B/EC 1 4.3 255 7.72 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes

ABM-C1 MCCM/02C/EC 1 4.3 255 7.72 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes



ABM-C1 PHCC/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes

ABM-C1 PXABSS016/PX 1 3.6 60 11.53 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes

ABO-Cl A3-L-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABO-C1 A3-L-10A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABO-C1 A3-L-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No





ABO-C1 A3-L-9A-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABO-C1 A3-N-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABO-Cl A3-N-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABO-C1 A3-N-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

21


Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad FunctionFr .. /5/

Target Critical HID* Fire Fu br _2/5 /

Room Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D DType Factor S fti Size Ratio within umer ithin Ratio within


ABO-Cl A3-N-10A-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-C1

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

*ABO-C1

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

ABO-Cl

A3-N-3A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-3A-TlFTRWCAR

A3-N-4A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-4A-TliTRWCAR

A3-N-5A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-5A-Tl/TRWCAR

A3-N-6A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-6A-Tl/TRWCAR

A3-N-7A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-7A-Tl/TRWCAR

A3-N-8A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-8A-Tl/TRWCAR

A3-N-9A-Tl/TRCAR

A3-N-9A-Tl/TRWCAR

ARAl RC14/EC

BUS14/18A/EC

BUS14/19A/EC

BUS14/20A/EC

BUS14/21A/EC

BUS 14/22A/EC

BUS14/23A/EC

BUS 14/24A/EC

MCCC/01 B/EC

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

FM

RAI 04

22FMV RAI 04

22



Critical H/D* Fr ./Q5

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Target CiriticalRatio Fire Nubr 2/ QDTagt Fire HID* Ratio Frue NumberDRoom cto Separation Size Ratio within Number within RatioD within

Type Factor (kW) Range? Range? Range?

ABO-Cl MCCC/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No




ABO-Cl MCCC/06C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No











ABO-Cl MCCE/01B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No








ABO-Cl MCCI01 B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

FM RAI 04

23



Target Critical HID* Fire Fr 02/5 02/5

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Fd Number DType Factor Size Ratio within within D within

(ft) Size R wn Number ?Ratio(kW) Range? Range? Ratio?

ABO-Cl MCCL/02C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MCCL/03B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/ABEF1GNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/ABFTA/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/ABFTB/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/ABFTH/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/MTDP/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/PCF1ANSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 MO/PCF1BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-Cl MO/SAHU/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-Cl PAC02A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-Cl PAC02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-Cl PCH03A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 PCH08A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 PCH08B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-Cl PXABO05/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

ABO-C1 PXABSS014/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

AHR ACPDPCB04/EC 1 4 373 6.17 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.52 Yes

AHR AKF03NSS 1 8.75 15 48.80 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

AHR AKP05NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

AHR G1-F1-11-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

AHR G1-F1-11-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

AHR G1-F-11-T1/TRCAR 1 7.5 230 14.04 Yes 0.72 Yes 14.44 Yes

AHR G1-F-11-T1/TRWCAR 1 7.6 230 14.22 Yes 0.72 Yes 14.44 Yes

FM RAI 04

24



Critical HID* Fire Fr 2

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire HID* Ratio Firihe Number DatiRomType Factor Seartio Size Ratio within Frumber within Rai within


AHR PXCB005/PX 1 2 130 4.70 Yes 0.41 Yes 11.50 Yes

BRlA BTRYA/BAT 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BR•A BYCA/BC 1 1.4 19 7.10 Yes 0.06 No 5.33 No

BRI•A BYCA1/BC 1 5.2 15 29.00 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

BRIA DCPDPCB01A/EC 1 5.75 105 14.73 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes

BR1A DCPDPCB02A/EC 1 1 32 4.12 Yes 0.10 No 6.56 No

BRlA DCPDPCB03A/EC 1 4.5 15 25.10 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

BRiA DCPDPCB05A/EC 1 6.5 15 36.25 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

BR1A G1-F1-12-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

BRIA G1-F1-12-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

BR1A G1-F-12-T1FTRCAR 1 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes

BR1A G1-F-12-T1ITRWCAR 1 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes

BR1A INVTA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BRIB BTRYB/BAT 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BRIB BYCB/BC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BR 1B BYCB1/BC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BR1B CVTA2/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BR1B DCPDPCB01B/EC 1 5.75 105 14.73 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes

BR1B DCPDPCB02B/EC 1 7.5 94 20.08 No 0.29 No 10.10 Yes

BR1B DCPDPCB03B/EC 1 2.1 15 11.71 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BRIB DCPDPCB05B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

BR1B G1-F1-13-T1/TRCAR 1 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes

BR1B G1-F1-13-T1/TRWCAR 1 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes

BR1B G1-F1-13-T2/TRCAR 1 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes

FM RAI 04

25


Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad FunctionFr O/S Ol

Target Critical HID* Fire Fmr D52/

Rom EupetI/qimet Lcto eaain Fire H/D* Ratio Frue Number 02ID DType Factor Ratin Nude within D withinRoom Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Ratio within Number Range?TpFatr (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Ratio?

BRlB

BR1B

BRIB

BR1B

BR1B

BR1B

BR1 B

CT

CT

CT

CT

CT

CT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

G2-EXT

IBN-1

G1-Fl -13-T2/TRWCAR

G1-F-13-T1/TRCAR

G1-F-13-T1/TRWCAR

Gl-F- 13-T2iTRCAR

G 1-F-13-T2/TRWCAR

INVTB/EC

INVTB/EC

C1-EW-T1/TRPW

C1-EW-T1/TRWPW

Cl-MID-Tli/TRPW

C1-MID-TI/TRWPW

Ci-NS-TlTRPW

C1-NS-T1/-RWPW

AKA05A/DR

AKA05B/DR

AKF10AIVSS

AKF10BNSS

G2-EXT-Ti-rTRCAR

G2-EXT-Ti/TRWCAR

MCCN/01 E/EC

MCCP/01E/EC

PPSPRCP12A/EC

PPSPRCP12B/EC

CRDMGACP/EC

5.1

8.75

8.75

8.75

8.75

3.4

3.4

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.51

i

1

0.5

0.5

1

1

12.4

105

285

285

285

285

55

130

1

1

11

1

1

15

15

15

151

1

1515

15

15

98

13.06

15.03

15.03

15.03

15.03

11.28

7.99

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

8.24

8.24

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

6.32

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.33

0.89

0.89

0.89

0.89

0.17

0.41

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.31

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

10.55

15.74

15.74

15.74

15.74

8.15

11.50

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

1.64

1.64

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

10.27

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

YesFM

RAI 04

26FMV RAI 04

26




Equipment ID/Equipment Location Targti Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D withinRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Number within Ratio


IBN-1 CRDMGBCP/EC 1 2.4 98 6.32 Yes 0.31 No 10.27 Yes

IBN-1 CRDMLC/EC 1 4.5 374 6.93 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes

IBN-1 CRDMPC1AC/EC 1 6.1 144 13.77 Yes 0.45 Yes 11.98 Yes

IBN-1 CRDMPC1BD/EC 1 4.1 144 9.25 Yes 0.45 Yes 11.98 Yes

IBN-1 CRDMPC2AC/EC 1 5 374 7.70 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes

IBN-1 CRDMPC2BD/EC 1 5 374 7.70 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes

IBN-1 HMSLCPA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 HMSLCPB/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 IBELIP/EC 1 4.9 98 12.90 Yes 0.31 No 10.27 Yes

IBN-1 MX5PS/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

IBN-1 P1-F-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-1 P1-F-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No



IBN-1 P1-G-03-T1iTRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-1 P1-G-03-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-1 P1-G-04-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-1 P1-G-04-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-1 PAF01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 PAF01A/ZO1 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes

IBN-1 PAF01A/ZO2 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes

IBN-1 PAF01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 PAF01B/ZO1 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes

IBN-1 PAF01B/ZO2 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes

FM RAI 04

27



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 _2/5

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire H/D* Ratio Number DRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D within


IBN-1 PAF03/PMP 1 5.3 15 29.56 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 PAF03/ZO1 1 5.3 875 5.81 Yes 2.74 No 24.65 Yes

IBN-1 PAF03/ZO2 1 5.3 875 5.81 Yes 2.74 No 24.65 Yes

IBN-1 PLO10/PMP 1 4 15 22.31 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 PLO10/ZO1 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes

IBN-1 PLO10/Z02 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes

IBN-1 RXTSWGR/EC 1 10 374 15.41 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes

IBN-1 SCI03A/PMP 1 4 15 22.31 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 SCI03A/ZO1 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes

IBN-1 SCI03A/ZO2 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes

IBN-1 SCI03B/PMP 1 4 15 22.31 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-1 SCI03B/ZO1 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes

IBN-1 SCI03B/ZO2 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes

IBN-2 AIF01NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBN-2 MSHAP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No


IBN-2 P2-F-03-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


IBN-2 P2-F-04-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


IBN-2 P2-F-05-T1iTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No




FM RAI 04

28



Fr /s Ql

Target Critical HID* Fire Fu br D/2

Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number D DType Factor ftSie Rto wtn Nubr within Rai withinRoom Equipment lD/Equipment Location Separation Size Ratio within Number Range?TpFatr (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Ratio?


IBN-2 P2-G-03-T1ITRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-2 P2-G-03-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-2 P2-G-04-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBN-2 P2-G-04-T1lTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBS-1 ASF07ANSS 1 6 15 33.46 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBS-1 ASF07BNSS 1 6 15 33.46 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBS-1 HRACP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBS-1 HRBCP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

IBS-1 P1-H-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBS-1 P1-H-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

IBS-1 P1-J-03-T1ITRCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

IBS-1 P1-J-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

IBS-1 P1-K-03-T1ITRCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

IBS-1 P1-K-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

IBS-1 P1-M-03-T1/TRCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

IBS-1 P1-M-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

KO-EDG1A KO-EDG1A-T1/TRCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No

KO-EDGIA KO-EDG1A-T1/TRWCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No

KO-EDG1B KO-EDG1B-T1/TRCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No

KO-EDG1B KO-EDG1B-T1/TRWCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No

KO-EDGAX KO-EDGAX-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

KO-EDGAX KO-EDGAX-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

K-EDG1A K1-EDG1A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

29




m Equipment DEquipment Location SFire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D DRT pe n Fctior S ti Size Ratio within Number within Ratio withinType Factor (kW) Range? Range? Range?

K-EDG1A K1-EDG1A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

K-EDG1A KDG01A/DG 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

K-EDG1A KDG01A/ZO1 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

K-EDG1A KDG01A/ZO2 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

K-EDG1A MCCH/01B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

K-EDG1A MCCH/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

K-EDG1B 52/EGlB3/EC 1 7.25 200 14.35 Yes 0.63 Yes 13.66 Yes

K-EDG1B K1-EDG1B-T1iTRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0,00 No 1.64 No

K-EDGIB K1-EDG1B-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

K-EDG1B KDG01B/DG 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

K-EDG1B KDG01B/ZO1 1 12.25 650 15.13 Yes 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

K-EDG1B KDG01B/Z02 1 12.25 650 15.13 Yes 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

K-EDG1B MCCJ/01B/EC 1 3.5 300 5.89 Yes 0.94 Yes 16.06 Yes

K-EDG1B MCCJ/02B/EC 1 3.6 300 6.06 Yes 0.94 Yes 16.06 Yes

PA-NE ACPDPWW15/EC 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No

PA-NE PA-NE-T1/TRPW 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No

PA-NE PA-NE-T1ITRWPW 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No

PA-NE PXYD24/PX 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No

RC-1 ACF09AIVSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 ACF09BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 ACO01A/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 ACO01B/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 ACO01C/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 ACO01D/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

FM RAI 04

30



Critical H/D* FireFr 2/

Equipment ID/Equipment Location arat Fire HD* Ratio F NumberRoomSize Ratio within Froude within D within

(ft) (kW) Range? Number Range? Ratio Range?

RC-1 ACPDPCV01/EC 1 1.83 25 8.32 Yes 0.08 No 5.94 No

RC-1 ACPDPCV08/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No


RC-1 MO/NCT02A/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 MO/NCT02B/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 POC02A/PMP 1 6.83 180 14.10 Yes 0.56 Yes 13.09 Yes

RC-1 POC02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 PSB02A/PMP 1 6.83 180 14.10 Yes 0.56 Yes 13.09 Yes

RC-1 PSB02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC,1 PSSO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-1 RCSFMDC-A/EC 1 1.83 25 8.32 Yes 0.08 No 5.94 No

RC-1 RCSFMDC-B/EC 1 1.83 25 8.32 Yes 0.08 No 5.94 No

RC-1 T1-NE-T1/TRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

RC-1 T1-NW-T1/TRHW 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

Ti-SE-T1/TRHW

Ti-SW-Ti/TRHW

TWD01A/HT

ACF08A/VSS

ACF08BNSS

ACF08CNSS

ACF08DNSS

ACP02NSS

ACP03NSS

ACP04NSS

0.5

0.5

1

1

1

1

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

8.24

8.24

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

1.64

1.64

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

FMV RAI 04

31



Critical HID* Fire Fr 02/5 ý2/,

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number DType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within


RC-2 ACP05NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-2 ACPDPCV02/EC 1 4.8 95 12.79 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

RC-2 ACPDPCV06/EC 1 4.8 95 12.79 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

RC-2 ACPDPCV07/EC 1 6 455 8.55 Yes 1.42 Yes 18.97 Yes

RC-2 ILRTATP/EC 1 4.8 95 12.79 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

RC-2 MO/SRCO1/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-2 MO/SRC02/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No



RC-2 SWD03A/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-2 SWD03BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-2 T2-NE-T1/TRHW 1 3.75 15 20.92 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-2 T2-NE-TlTRHW 1 3.75 65 11.63 Yes 0.20 No 8.71 Yes

RC-2 T2-NW-T1/TRHW 1 4.1 73 12.14 Yes 0.23 No 9.13 Yes

RC-2 T2-SE-T1/TRHW 1 9.8 15 54.66 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-2 T2-SW-T1ITRHW 1 4.1 73 12.14 Yes 0.23 No 9.13 Yes

RC-3 ACF02ANSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 ACF02BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 ACF03NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 ACF04NSS 1 1.25 17 6.63 Yes 0.05 No 5.09 No





FM RAI 04

32



Critical HID* Fr 2/5/

Equipment TDgEquipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Number DRoom Separation Froude D

Type Factor Size Ratio within within within(kW) Range? Number Ratio(f) (W agRange? Range?




RC-3 CFHRC02/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 CMCCP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No.

RC-3 COHRC01/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 CVE/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 MCC/CFHRC02/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 MO/CVFTH/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 PXCV003/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 PXCV006/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RC-3 T3-NE-T1ITRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

RC-3 T3-NW-T1/TRHW 1 7.42 215 14.27 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

RC-3 T3-SE-T1ITRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

RC-3 T3-SW-T1ITRHW 1 3.25 60 10.41 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes

RR-C1 ADFCS-RACK/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 ARA1CC14/EC 1 5.3 112 13.23 Yes 0.35 No 10.83 Yes

RR-C1 ARB1CC16/EC 1 5.3 112 13.23 Yes 0.35 No 10.83 Yes

RR-C1 CIAI/EC 1 8.3 258 14.84 Yes 0.81 Yes 15.12 Yes

RR-C1 CIA2/EC 1 8.3 258 14.84 Yes 0.81 Yes 15.12 Yes

RR-Cl CIBI/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C! CIB2/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 CVCS1/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 CVCS2/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

FM RAI 04

33



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr _2/5 _2/5

Tagt Fire H/D* Ratio Number QDRoom Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Rati witin Froude D

Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within(kW) Range? Range? Range?

RR-C1 EHCC1/EC 1 1.4 18 7.26 Yes 0.06 No 5.21 No






RR-C1 FOX1/EC 1 10.1 381 15.45 Yes 1.19 Yes 17.67 Yes

RR-C1 FOX2/EC 1 10.1 381 15.45 Yes 1.19 Yes 17.67 Yes

RR-C1 FOX3/EC 1 2.3 32 9.47 Yes 0.10 No 6.56 No

RR-C1 FOX3/EC 1 2.3 34 9.25 Yes 0.11 No 6.72 No

RR-C1 G2-F1-11-T1/TRCAR 1 7 186 14.26 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.27 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F1-11-T1/TRWCAR 1 7 186 14.26 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.27 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F1-12-T1/TRCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F1-12-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F-11-T1/TRCAR 1 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F-11-T1/TRWCAR 1 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F-12-T1/TRCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes

RR-C1 G2-F-12-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes

RR-C1 HMSRCPA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 IBPDPCBA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 IBPDPCBB/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 IBPDPCBC/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 IBPDPCBD/EC 1 .1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 MI/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes

FM RAI 04

34



Critical H/D* Fr 1 Q1Target Critical HID* Fire Fu br 2//

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire HID* Ratio Froude N r DDType Factor Sati Size Ratio within Fude within R within

(kW) Ra?(ft) Number Ratio(kW) Range? Range? Range?

RR-C1 M2/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes

RR-C1 MCCK/01B/EC 1 2 26 8.95 Yes 0.08 No 6.04 No

RR-C1 MRPI1/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes



RR-C1 MUX1/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-Cl MUX2/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 MUX3/EC 1 9.4 330 15.23 Yes 1.03 Yes 16.69 Yes

RR-C1 MUXATP/EC 1 9.4 330 15.23 Yes 1.03 Yes 16.69 Yes

RR-C1 RAI/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 RA2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 RA3/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 RB1I/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes

RR-C1 RB2/EC 1 0.75 15 4.18 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

RR-C1 RCS1/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 RCS2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 RLTR1/EC 1 3.9 67 11.95 Yes 0.21 No 8.82 Yes

RR-C1 RLTR2/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes

RR-C1 RR1/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes

RR-C1 RR2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 RVLMS1/EC 1 4.6 88 12.64 Yes 0.28 No 9.83 Yes

RR-C1 RVLMS2/EC 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No

RR-C1 RWI/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes

RR-C1 RW2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

FM RAI 04

35



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr ý2/5 ý2/5

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Tarat Fire H/D* Ratio Number D DType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within


RR-C1 RYI/EC 1 3.9 67 11.95 Yes 0.21 No 8.82 Yes

RR-C1 RY2/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes

RR-C1 SA/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 SIAI/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 SIA2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

RR-C1 SIBI/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes

RR-C1 SIB2/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes

RR-C1 SSA/EC 1 4.6 88 12.64 Yes 0.28 No 9.83 Yes

RR-C1 SSAUVLOC/EC 1 5.3 112 13.23 Yes 0.35 No 10.83 Yes

SH-1 DISC/PCD20/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-1 PCD20/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-1 UI1-BB-06-T1/TRPW 1 5 45 17.97 No 0.14 No 7.52 Yes

SH-1 U1-BB-06-T1/TRWPW 1 5 45 17.97 No 0.14 No 7.52 Yes

SH-1 U1-CC-06-T1/TRPW 1 6.3 155 13.81 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes

SH-1 U1-CC-06-T1/TRWPW 1 6.3 155 13.81 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes

SH-1 U1-EE-05-T1/TRPW 1 4 72 11.91 Yes 0.23 No 9.08 Yes

SH-1 U1-EE-05-T1/TRWPW 1 4 72 11.91 Yes 0.23 No 9.08 Yes

SH-1 U1-EE-06-T1/TRPW 1 4.3 80 12.28 Yes 0.25 No 9.47 Yes

SH-1 U1-EE-06-T1/TRWPW 1 4.3 80 12.28 Yes 0.25 No 9.47 Yes

SH-1 U1-F-05-T1/TRPW 1 8 255 14.37 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes

SH-1 U1-F-05-T1/TRWPW 1 8 255 14.37 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes

SH-1 U1-G-05-T1ITRPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

SH-1 U1-G-05-T1ITRWPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

SH-1 U1-H-05-T1/TRPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

FM RAI 04

36



Fr / 2/

Target Critical HID* Fire Fr 2

Tarat Fire HID* Ratio Froude NumberType Factor ftSie Rto wtn Nubr within Rai withinRoom Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Ratio within Number Range?TpFatr (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Ratio?

SH-1 U1-H-05-T1/TRWPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

SH-1 U1-l-05-T1/TRPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

SH-1 U1-I-05-T1/TRWPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No

SH-2 ACPDPSH05/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 ARA2CC18/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 ARA2RC18/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 ARB2CC17/EC 1 4.58 85 12.76 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 ARB2RC17/EC 1 4.58 85 12.76 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 BUS17/25A/EC 1 4.58 85 12.76 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 BUS17/26B/EC 1 4 85 11.15 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 BUS17/27A/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes

SH-2 BUS18/29A/EC 1 4.7 85 13.10 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes



SH-2 KFP01/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 MCCG/01 B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 MCCG/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No



SH-2 PCW01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PCW01A/ZO1 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PCW01A/ZO2 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PCW01 B/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PCW01 B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

FM RAI 04

37



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fir _/5 _2/5

Tagt Fire H/D* Ratio Frue Number D25 0/Room Equipment IDIEquipment Location Separation Size Ratio within within within

Type Factor (ft) Number Ratio


SH-2 PFP01/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PFP02/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PSW01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PSW01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PSW01C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PSW01D/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PXSH006/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No




SH-2 PXSHSS017/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 PXSHSS018/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

SH-2 TCD12/BO 1 2 26 8.95 Yes 0.08 No 6.04 No

SH-2 U2-B-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-B-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


SH-2 U2-B-02-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


SH-2 U2-B-03-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-B-04-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-B-04-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-BB-05-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-BB-05-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-BB-06-T1/TRPW 1 7.58 215 14.57 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

FM RAI 04

38



Target Critical HID* Fire Fr _2/5 _2/5

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number DTypeSize Ratio within Number within Ratio within

(ft) (kW) Range? Range? Range?

SH-2 U2-BB-06-T1FTRWPW 1 7.58 215 14.57 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

SH-2 U2-C-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-01-T1FTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-02-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-02-Tl/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-03-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-03-T1JTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-04-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-C-04-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-CC-05-T1fITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-CC-05-T1FTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-CC-06-T1iTRPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

SH-2 U2-CC-06-T1ITRWPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

SH-2 U2-D-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-D-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No





SH-2 U2-D-04-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


SH-2 U2-E-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-E-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-E-02-T1FTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

39



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr ý2/S Q2/5Equipment DEquipment Location TaFire H/D* Ratio Fre Number - D

Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D within(ft) (kW) Range? Range? Range?

SH-2 U2-E-02-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-E-03-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-E-03-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-E-04-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-E-04-T1iTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-EE-05-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-EE-05-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-EE-06-T1ITRPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

SH-2 U2-EE-06-T1fTRWPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes

SH-2 U2-F-01-T1FFRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-F-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-F-02-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


SH-2 U2-F-03-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No





SH-2 U2-F-05-TIFTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-G-01-TlITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-G-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-G-02-T1fTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-G-02-T1/FRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

SH-2 U2-G-03-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

40


Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad FunctionFr l5 Ql

Target Critical HID* Fire Fr DTagt Fire H/D* Ratio Numbede /O

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Ratio within Froue within D withinType Factor (ft) Size Range Number Rang Ratio within


SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2

SH-2TB-1

U2-G-03-T1iTRWPW

U2-G-04-T1/TRPW

U2-G-04-T1/TRWPW

U2-H-01-T1/TRPW

U2-H-01-T1/TRWPW

U2-H-02-T1/TRPW

U2-H-02-T1/TRWPW

U2-H-03-T1/TRPW

U2-H-03-T1/TRWPW

U2-H-04-T1/TRPW

U2-H-04-TliTRWPW

U2-H-05-Tl1/TRPW

U2-H-05-T1/TRWPW

U2-1-01-TifTRPW

U2-1-01-Ti/TRWPW

U2-1-02-T1/TRPW

U2-1-02-T1/1-RWPW

U2-1-03-T1/TRPW

U2-1-03-T1/TRWPW

U2-1-04-TliTRPW

U2-1-04-T1/TRWPW

U2-1-05-T1/TRPW

U2-1-05-T1/TRWPWi11-A-05-T 1/TRTB

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

6.33

i

1

1

1

i

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

155

FM RAI 04

41

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

13.87

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

1 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 YesTB-1 11-A-05-T1 RTB



Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 02/5

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number DType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio


TB-1 11-A-05-T1/TRWTB 1 6.33 155 13.87 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes

TB-1 11-A-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11 -A-06-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-A-07-T1FTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-A-07-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-A-08-T 1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-1 11-A-09-T1ITRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-A-09-T1 fFRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-A-10-H2/H2 1 32.8 1000 34.10 No 3.13 No 26.00 Yes

TB-1 11-A-10-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-A-10-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes


TB-1 11 -A-11 -T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-1 11-A-12-T1/TRVVTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-A-4E-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-A-4E-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-B-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-B-05-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No





FM RAI 04

42




Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D DTypeSize Ratio within Number within Ratio within


TB-1 11-B-09-T1/TRTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

TB-1 11-B-09-T1/TRWTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

TB-1 11-B-10-T1/TRTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

TB-1 11-B-10-T1/TRWTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes

TB-1 11-B-11-TIFTRTB 1 9 317 14.81 Yes 0.99 Yes 16.42 Yes

TB-1 11-B-1 I-TiITRWTB 1 9 317 14.81 Yes 0.99 Yes 16.42 Yes


TB-1 i 1-B-12-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-B-4E-T1 TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-B-4E-T1FFTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11 -C-03-T1i/TRWTB 1 9.25 15 51.59 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 11-C-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-C-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-C-05-T1FTRTB 1 2.5 146 5.61 Yes 0.46 Yes 12.04 Yes

TB-1 11-C-05-T1FTRWTB 1 2.5 146 5.61 Yes 0.46 Yes 12.04 Yes



TB-1 11-C-07-T1FTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-C-07-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No



TB-1 11-C-09-T1i/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11 -C-09-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-C-10-T1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

43



Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2

TEquipment IDEquipment Location Target Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D DRoom Typecto Separation Size Ratio within Number within Ratio


TB-1 11 -C-10-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1

TB-1

TB-1

TB-1

TB-1

TB-1

TB-1

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

TB-i

11 -C-11 -TI /FRTB

1i1-C-1i1-Ti/TRWTB

1i1-C-12-TiITRTB

1i1-C-12-TiTRWTB

11-D-03-T1/TRTB

11-D-03-Ti/TRWTB

11 -D-04-T1ITRTB

11 -D-04-T1iTRWTB

11 -D-05-T1iTRTB

11-D-05-T1/TRWTB

I i-D-06-T1/TRTB

11-D-06-Ti1TRWTB

11-D-07-Ti/TRTB

1 1-D-07-T1/TRWTB

11 -D-08-T1/TRTB

11 -D-08-Ti/TRWTB

11 -D-09-T 1TRTB

11 -D-09-T1/TRWTB

1i1-D-10-Ti/TRTB

11 -D-10-T1FTRWTB

1 i-D-1i1-TiITRTB

11 -D-11 -T1 /TRWTB

11 -D-12-TI/TRTB

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

6.42

6.42

6.42

6.42

6.42

6.42

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

1

1

165

165

1651

1165

165

165

1

1

1

1i

i

i

1

1

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

13.72

13.72

13.72

13.72

13.72

13.72

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.52

0.52

0.52

0.52

0.52

0.52

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

12.65

12.65

12.65

12.65

12.65

12.65

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

.1.64

1.64

1.64

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

FM

RAI 04

44FMV RAI 04

44



Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 02/5

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D witType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number Ratio


TB-1 11 -D-12-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-E1-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-E1-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-E1-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-E1-04-T1/TRVVTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-E1-05-T1/TRTB 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes

TB-1 11-E1-05-T1/TRWTB 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes






TB-1 11-E1-08-TiTRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes



TB-1 11-EI-10-T1/TRTB 1 7.58 165 16.20 No 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-EI-10-T1/FRWTB 1 7.58 165 16.20 No 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes

TB-1 11-E-11-T1I/TRTB 1 6.5 220 12.38 Yes 0.69 Yes 14.19 Yes

TB-1 11-E-11-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 220 12.38 Yes 0.69 Yes 14.19 Yes

TB-1 11-E-12-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 11-E-12-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 CIA02A/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 CIA02A/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

TB-1 CIA02A/ZO2 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

FM RAI 04

45



Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2/5 Q2/5Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number DType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within


TB-1 CIA02B/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 CIA02B/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

TB-1 CIA02B/ZO2 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes

TB-1 CIA02C/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 CIA02C/ZO1 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes

TB-1 CIA02C/ZO2 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes

TB-1 CSA02/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 CSA02/ZO1 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 CSA02/ZO2 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 CSA03/ZO1 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes

TB-1 CSA03/ZO2 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes

TB-1 DCPDPTBO1 B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 DCPDPTB03/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 FCD05/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 MCCA/01 B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes

TB-1 MCCA/02B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes






TB-1 MCCA/08C/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes


TB-1 MO/OERIB/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

FM RAI 04

46



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr _/_ _2/5

Tagt Fire H/D* Ratio Number -- /DRoom Equipm ent ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Rati witi n Froude Nur D Dan

(ft) Size Ratio within Number RatioTye acor (f) (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 PCD01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD01C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD02A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD02A/ZO1 1 5.75 130 13.52

TB-1 PCD02A/ZO2 1 5.75 130 13.52

TB-1 PCD02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD02B/ZO1 1 5.75 135 13.32

TB-1 PCD02B/ZO2 1 5.75 135 13.32

TB-1 PCD02C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD02C/ZO1 1 5.75 135 13.32

TB-1 PCD02C/ZO2 1 5.75 135 13.32

TB-1 PCDO3A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD03A/ZO1 1 11 465 15.53

TB-1 PCD03A/ZO2 1 11 465 15.53

TB-1 PCD03B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCD03B/ZO1 1 11 465 15.53

TB-1 PCD03B/ZO2 1 11 465 15.53

TB-1 PCD04/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCP01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PCP01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PGS03B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PLOO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

TB-1 PLO03/PMP 1 1 15 5.58

FM RAI 04

47

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.41

0.41

0.05

0.42

0.42

0.05

0.42

0.42

0.05

1.45

1.45

0.05

1.45

1.45

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

11.50

11.50

4.85

11.67

11.67

4.85

11.67

11.67

4.85

19.14

19.14

4.85

19.14

19.14

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No




Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D DRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within


TB-1 PLO04/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No




TB-1 PSBO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 PWT19/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 PWT21/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 SIA03G/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1FP 11-A-03-T1FTRTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes

TB-1FP 11-A-03-T1/TRWTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes

TB-1FP 11-A-04-T1/TRTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes

TB-1FP 11-A-04-T1/TRWTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes

TB-1FP 11 -B-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1FP 11-B-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1FP 11-B-04-T1IFTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 FP 11-B-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-1 FP FWTP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 FP MO/FPRSFNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1 FP PFP03/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-1FP PFW01A/MFWP 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes

TB-1FP PFW01B/MFWP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No




FM RAI 04

48



Fr /5 Q/


RoEqimn DEupet Lcto Seaain Fire H/D* Ratio Frue Number D2/DType Factor Size Ratio Froude within D withinRoom Equipment IDEquipment Location Separation Size Ratio within Number Range?TpFatr (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Ratio?



TB-2 12-A-05-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No







TB-2 12-B-03-T1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-2 12-B-05-T1/ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No






TB-2 12-B-10-T1iTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-2 12-B-11-T1iITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-B- 11-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-2 12-C-05-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


FM RAI 04

49



Fr Q 2lS /~5

Target Critical H/D* Firer

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Tarat Fire HID* Ratio Fre Number witi Q wRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D within




TB-2 12-C-08-TiITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-2 12-C-09-T1iTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-C-10-Ti/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No




TB-2 12-D-03-TliTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-D-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-D-04-TliTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-D-04-T1iTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-D-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TB-2 12-D-05-T1FTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No


TB-2 12-D-06-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No




TB-2 12-D-08-T1FTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No




FM RAI 04

50



Critical H/D* Fire Fr /)

Equipment IDEquipment Location STarget Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number DRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Number within within


TB-2 12-D-10-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-D-11-T1/TRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

TB-2 12-D-11-T1/TRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

TB-2 12-D-12-T1/TRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

TB-2 12-D-12-T1JTRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

TB-2 12-E1-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-EI-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-05-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-07-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-El-07-T1/TRW1TB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-08-T1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-08-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-09-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-09-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-10-T1/ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E1-10-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24

TB-2 12-E-11-T1ITRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

TB-2 12-E-11-T1ITRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

TB-2 12-E-12-T1/TRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88

FM RAI 04

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.44

0.44

0.44

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

1.64

11.84

11.84

11.84

11.84

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

11.84

11.84

11.84

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

51



Fr /5 Q/

Target C ritical H/D* Fire Fu br _ _/)

Rom Equipment lDlEquipment Location Seaain Fire HID* Ratio Frue Number D2/DRomTearaetion e HD* Rai Froude D

Type Factor S fti Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within


TB-2 12-E-12-T1/FRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes

TB-2 4KVBD11A-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 4KVBD11 B-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 BB-PPSA-12A-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 BB-PPSB-12B-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 BUS11A/01/EC 1 2.75 45 9.88 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes





TB-2 BUS1 1A/06/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes


TB-2 BUS11AN08/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes


TB-2 BUS11A/1O/EC 1 3.1 45 11.14 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes


TB-2 BUS11B/21/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes



TB-2 BUS11B/24/EC 1 2 45 7.19 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes




TB-2 BUS11B/28/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52, Yes

FM RAI 04

52



Fr / Q/

Target Critical H/D* Fire Fu br D/2

Room Equipment IDIEquipment Location Separation Fire HD* Ratio NumberwithN wih DiType Factor (ft) Size Ratio within within within














TB-2 BUS13/06A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes









TB-2 BUS15/05A/EC 1 3 60 9.61 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes

TB-2 ISOBDTB-2/ISD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MCCB/01B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes

FM RAI 04

53


Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad FunctionFr O/• Ol

Target Critical HID* Fire Fr D

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Number RaDRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D w

(f) (kW) Range? Nubr Range? Rto Range?


TB-2 MCCB/04C/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes





TB-2 MO/CLO02C-ANVSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MO/CLO02C-BNVSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MO/GEF/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MO/TWV1DNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MO/TWV1ENSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MOiTWV1FNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MOITVVV1GNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MOi--VV1 HNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MORTWVV1JNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 MX4PS/EC 1 8.9 290 15.18 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes

TB-2 PEHO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 PEH02/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 PXTBSS013/PX 1 6 15 33.46 No 0.05 No 4.85 No

TB-2 PXTBSS015/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

T-LOOPA POC01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

T-LOOPA PRC01A/RCP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

T-LOOPA PRC01A/ZO1 1 10.5 420 15.44 Yes 1.31 Yes 18.38 Yes

T-LOOPA PRC01A/ZO2 1 10.5 420 15.44 Yes 1.31 Yes 18.38 Yes

FM RAI 04

54



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 Q2/5Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D

Type Factor Size Ratio within Number within RatioD within(kW) Range? Range? Range?

T-LOOPA

T-LOOPA

T-LOOPA

T-LOOPB

T-LOOPB

T-LOOPB

T-LOOPB

T-LOOPB

T-LOOPB

T-LOOPB

T-PRZR

T-PRZR

T-PRZR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

T-REACTOR

TY-E

TY-E

TY-E

Ti-LOOPA-T1/TRHW

T2-LOOPA-T1/TRHW

T3-LOOPA-T1/TRHW

POC01 B/PMP

PRC01B/RCP

PRC01B/ZO1

PRC01 B/Z02

Ti-LOOPB-T1iTRHW

T2-LOOPB-T1ITRHW

T3-LOOPB-T1/TRHW

CJCRC08/EM

T2-PRZR-T1IFTRHW

T3-PRZR-T1/TRHW

CJCRC09/EM

CMRRC11/EM

MO/RCC/EM

PWD19A/PMP

PWD19B/PMP

Ti-REACTOR-Ti/TRHW

T2-REACTOR-T1/TRHW

T3-REACTOR-TliTRHW

TY-E-T1/TRPW

TY-E-T1fTRWPW

TY-E-T4/TRPW

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

8.5

10.83

1

1

10.5

10.5

0.5

8.5

0.5

1

0.5

0.51

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.50.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

317

15

15

15

420

420

1

317

1

15

1

1

15

15

15

15

15

1

1

1

1

1

1

8.24

13.99

60.40

5.58

5.58

15.44

15.44

8.24

13.99

8.24

5.58

8.24

8.24

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

5.58

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

8.24

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00

0.99

0.05

0.05

0.05

1.31

1.31

0.00

0.99

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

1.64

16.42

4.85

4.85

4.85

18.38

18.38

1.64

16.42

1.64

4.85

1.64

1.64

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

4.85

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

1.64

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

FMV RAI 04

55



Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 ý2/5

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number DRoom Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Fude within D within


TY-E TY-E-T4/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TY-W PXYD011/OXC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No

TY-W TY-W-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TY-W TY-W-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TY-W TY-W-T2/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

TY-W TY-W-T2/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

Zi-SC Z1-SC-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

Z1-SC Z1-SC-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

FM RAI 04

56


FM RAI 06

Section 4.7.3, "Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805" of theTransition Report states that "Uncertainty analyses were performed as required by 2.7.3.5 ofNFPA 805 and the results were considered in the context of the application. This is of particularinterest in fire modeling and Fire PRA development."

Regarding the uncertainty analysis for fire modeling:

1. NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.5 states that, when a performance-based approach is used, anuncertainty analysis shall be performed to provide reasonable assurance that theperformance criteria have been met. According to NUREG-1855, Volume 1, "Guidance onthe Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making,"there are three types of uncertainty associated with fire modeling calculations:

a. Parameter Uncertainty: Input parameters are often chosen from statisticaldistributions or estimated from generic reference data. In either case, theuncertainty of these input parameters affects the uncertainty of the results of thefire modeling analysis.

Explain how the parameter uncertainty was addressed in the detailed firemodeling analyses.

Response:A discussion on uncertainty in fire modeling will be included in Section 6.2 of theDetailed Fire Modeling Fire PRA notebook (G1-FSS-FO01). ParameterUncertainty is addressed by: (1) using conservative inputs, or (2) varying inputsin sensitivity cases. The following response describes specific treatments ofparameter uncertainty throughout the analysis.

Main Control Room Abandonment Study

In the Fire PRA main control room (MCR) calculation, document 32-9073294-002, heat release rates are varied over the range of the probability distributiondescribed in Appendix E of NUREG/CR-6850. Specifically, the heat releaserates are varied from 17 kW to 1002 kW, with the upper value being the 98thpercentile of a case 5 electrical cabinet fire (table E-1 NUREG/CR-6850). Inaddition, the MCR calculation considers the potential for model error to affect theanalysis results. This is documented in Appendix C of the MCR abandonmentcalculation. The results indicate that there is approximately a 0% probability of amodel over-prediction based on temperature, suggesting that the results are notsensitive to model uncertainty.

Sinqle Compartment AnalysisFor the CFAST modeling, documented in Fire PRA notebook G1-FSS-001,bounding configurations of ignition source and cable trays, and 98th percentileheat release rates, are used. If predicted temperatures are close to damagetemperatures, then damage is assumed. In a new report being created, G1-FSS-F006 titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA at

FM RAI 061


R.E.Ginna," sensitivity cases are run which vary the room dimensions andventilation conditions.

For fire scenarios along a wall or in a corner, the 'image' method is implementedfor fire modeling using algebraic equations. The image method conservativelymodels the fire as an equivalent open fire that is two or four times larger in bothheat release rate and plan area. For the case of hand calculations usedthroughout the analysis, the 98th percentile heat release rates were used toensure bounding heat release rate values. The use of these equations was alsoincluded in the fire modeling verification and validation analysis to ensure the useis within the validation range.

b. Model Uncertainty: Idealizations of physical phenomena lead to simplifyingassumptions in the formulation of the model equations. In addition, the numericalsolution of equations that have no analytical solution can lead to inexact results.

Response:The fire modeling verification and validation analysis will be documented in reportG1-FSS-F006. This analysis covers all the fire modeling, including CFAST andhand calculations, used in the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA. FDS V&V is documented inthe R.E. Ginna main control room abandonment calculation, document 32-9073294-002. The verification and validation analysis determines whethermodels are used within their validated range. If the models are found to be usedoutside of the range, then the input parameters are varied in a conservativedirection (i.e., more challenging fire conditions) and the revised model results areused as input to the Fire PRA; i.e., the R.E. Ginna fire modeling analysis resultsare applied considering the model validation range. It should be noted that forfire models used outside the range of applicability, sensitivity cases are run, assuggested in NUREG-1 824 and NUREG-1 934.

c. Completeness Uncertainty: This refers to the fact that a model is not a completedescription of the phenomena it is designed to simulate. Some consider this aform of model uncertainty because most fire models neglect certain physicalphenomena that are not considered important for a given application.

Explain how the model and completeness uncertainty were addressed in the

detailed fire modeling analyses.

Response:Completeness associated with fire models is addressed in the R.E. Ginna FirePRA within the overall quantification process, as the PRA is an integratedanalysis. Fire Modeling provides inputs to a broad comprehensive Fire PRAwhich includes modeling of electrical systems, operator actions, and the plantsystems and components needed to shutdown the plan. One of the first steps inthe fire modeling process is to identify the fire scenarios that will be analyzed. Insome situations, the scenario analysis invokes fire modeling capabilities that arenot currently available, generating the completeness uncertainty situationdescribed in the question. When the fire modeling does not provide a full answeror an answer with sufficient resolution, the scenario definition and target mapping

FM RAI 062


within the Fire PRA conservatively compensates for the lack of information. TheFire PRA allows the analyst to conservatively compensate for the lack of firemodeling capabilities outside the fire modeling analysis so that the scenario isproperly modeled in the Fire PRA. Some examples are listed below:

* The determination of time to automatic suppression. The sprinkler activationmodel is not fully applicable to many of the postulated scenarios; therefore,as part of the scenario definition, targets are failed intentionally before theautomatic suppression is credited.

* Both zones of multi-compartment combinations are failed conservativelywhen fire modeling propagation calculations from one compartment toanother are not conducted.

* Full main control board panels are failed due to the lack of analytical firemodeling methods, with appropriate verification and validation studies, topredict flame propagation within a panel.

The three examples above illustrate how the completeness uncertaintyassociated with fire modeling calculations is addressed "outside of the firemodeling" by conservatively failing targets in the fire scenarios so that the riskcontribution is bounding.

FM RAI 063


PRA RAI 18

According to NUREG/CR-6850, where water from fire suppression efforts will likely enter apotentially vulnerable component (e.g., a panel with unsealed penetrations or an unshieldedelectrical motor), it is appropriate to include that component in the fire scenario damage set.Verify that the impact of suppression system activation on component operation has beenaddressed according to Section 11.5.1.2 of NUREG/CR-6850.

Response:

Fire suppression efforts can affect equipment operation. The two main areas of concern aremanual suppression efforts and automatic suppression efforts. The wide spray areas and non-discerning nature of the automatic systems causes this aspect of fire suppression efforts todrive the delta impacts between fire damage and fire suppression efforts damage. The manualsuppression efforts are directed by the fire brigade captain. The Fire Response Procedure set(FRPs) are structured such that the major equipment important for safe shutdown is identified inthe forefront of the procedure, along with hazard identification, and important notes relative tothe specific fire zone, such that the impact to the equipment from fire fighting activities isminimized if possible. With this knowledge, the fire brigade is able to focus on fire suppressionefforts to the extent necessary to control the fire without damaging equipment unnecessarily.

Areas where automatic water suppression systems are installed were reviewed for potentialimpacts in the event of a fire.

For areas where a hot gas layer (HGL) could form and reach a temperature above that requiredto set off the sprinkler heads in the area, PRA equipment in the area were either conservativelyassumed to be failed or individual equipment was inspected relative to the sprinkler headlocation to determine if spray could affect the equipment. Note that areas SH-2 and TB-2cannot generate a hot gas layer hot enough to set off sprinkler heads so only sprinkler headsthat could be set off by individual ignition sources were assessed. It should also be noted thatfull compartment burn areas already assume the loss of all equipment. As such, these areasare not reviewed for additional impacts as all equipment is already lost.

In some fire scenarios, sprinkler heads are activated by localized fires but area wide sprinkleractivation does not occur. As with the HGL evaluation, either all equipment in the area wasconservatively considered failed or individual equipment was inspected relative to each sprinklerhead. In the cases where individual equipment was inspected, ignition sources, includingtransient packages, were identified and it was determined, based on the zone of influence (ZOI)for the source, whether the source could cause one or more sprinkler heads to actuate. TheZOI used was that of sprinkler head activation which is much lower than the thermoset damagepoint (e.g. 65 C versus 205 C). From these evaluations, it was determined whether any PRAcomponents would be impacted by the spray. If components were impacted, an additionalscreening was done to determine if the component could be affected by water. If a componentwas impacted, but not affected, the explanation is documented (e.g. spray block by interveningobject, spray shields installed to prevent impact, etc.). The details are documented in GinnaKey Input 89 and the associated files.

This will impact the delta risk calculations. The delta risk calculations are not available at thistime. This information will be provided as part of PRA RAI 44 which combines all the effectsfrom the RAIs that effect the delta risk calculations.

PRA RAI 181


PRA RAI 25

Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA 805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall beacceptable to the NRC. RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodologyfor conducting a fire PRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, revision2, as providing methods acceptable to the staff for adopting a fire protection program consistentwith NFPA-805. RG 1.200 describes a peer review process utilizing an associated ASME/ANSstandard (currently ASME/ANS-RA-SA-2009) as one acceptable approach for determining thetechnical adequacy of the PRA once acceptable consensus approaches or models have beenestablished for evaluations that could influence the regulatory decision. The primary results of apeer review are the F&Os recorded by the peer review and the subsequent resolution of theseF&Os.

Address the following questions on the dispositions to the fire F&Os and SR assessmentidentified in Attachment V of the LAR that have the potential to impact the fire PRA results anddo appear to be fully resolved.

a) CS-Al-01. According to discussion with the licensee, Ginna contains currenttransformers (CTs) with a turn ratio greater than 1200:5. The phenomena identificationand ranking table (PIRT) panel results, documented in NUREG/CR-7150, has notconcluded that such CTs are not risk significant. Provide a sensitivity study thatevaluates CDF, LERF, delta-CDF and delta-LERF for CTs of turn ratios greater than1200:5, assuming a fire induced secondary open circuit will cause a secondary fire.Include a description and justification of the method and associated probability applied inthe quantification. VFDR-BR1 B-008 appears to be an example of this; however, it wasevaluated qualitatively.

Response:

While the PIRT panel results were unable to conclude that secondary fires are not risksignificant (i.e., could not conclude that such events were "incredible"), neither did theyfind that such events are likely. The PIRT panel judged that the likelihood of secondaryfires from higher ratio CTs to be very low, and recommended that additional testing beperformed to confirm this judgment. In fact, the conclusion appears to be that while thePRA panel has indicated they cannot determine a conditional probability for this event,such an occurrence would be considered "unlikely." This conclusion, that this is neitherincredible nor likely, but no number has been determined by the experts, makes theconduct of a credible sensitivity study impossible at this time, for the following reasons:

" Using a conditional probability of 1.0, while bounding, would be conservative byat least two orders of magnitude, and likely by more. This is clearly true becauseif the conditional probability were on the order of 0.1+-, the evidence would beclear enough for the PRA panel to assign such a value, and it would beconsidered "likely," not "unlikely." Therefore, such a sensitivity study would be soconservative as to provide no useful information.

" The RAI states that one option is to "Include a description and justification of themethod and associated probability applied in the quantification." Given that theexperts on the panel, after thorough consideration of the evidence, were not ableto determine and justify a probability it is not reasonable to expect that Ginna orits contractors could provide such a value and justification that could stand up to

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90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Inforimation for NFPA 805

scrutiny. To attempt to do so would clearly result in an "unreviewed analysismethod" (UAM) being applied to the model. NRC, in a generic RAI for NFPA 805plants, proscribes the use of UAMs. The text of this RAI states

"Identify and describe all UAMs or deviations from NUREG/CR-6850, itssupplements, and approved FAQs, and clarify whether guidance from theJune 21, 2012, memo from NRC to NEI, "Recent Fire PRA Methods reviewPanel Decisions and EPRI 1022993, 'Evaluation of Peak Heat Release Ratesin Electrical Cabinets Fires"' was used in applying related methods. Foridentified deviations from NUREG/CR-6850 that fall outside this guidancememo, provide a sensitivity study that estimates the impact of their removalon the LAR Table W-4 CDF, LERF, delta-CDF, and delta-LERF."

Therefore, the performance of a sensitivity analysis that injects a UAM is not areasonable solution to addressing this phenomenon.

Given this situation, it is not possible to provide a credible and acceptable sensitivityanalysis at this time. Ginna proposes to continue to monitor the developments in theunderstanding of this phenomenon in the future update of Volume 2 of NUREG/CR-7150and to incorporate in future updates of the FPRA new findings and information as itbecomes available. Once sufficient information is available in Volume 2 upon which tobase an interim probability, the appropriate way to define an acceptable approach tomodeling this phenomenon in a FPRA would be through the FPRA FAQ process or amethodology development under the EPRI/NRC-RES MOU.

b) FQ-F1-02. The disposition of the finding should be updated to be consistent withRegulatory Guide 1.200, Rev. 2 which defines a significant sequence slightly differentthat that noted in the disposition, i.e., 95% versus 90%.

Response:

A significant cutset or accident sequence is defined as the top 95% of the CDF/LERFper Regulatory guide 1.200, Rev. 2. In future versions of our quantification notebook, wewill consider as significant, accident sequences and cutsets that are within and includingthe top 95% of CDF and/or LERF.

c) FSS-C1-01. Please provide a description of the resolution of this finding (the disposition

cites a reference for the resolution).

Response:

Section 6.1.3.8 of G1-FSS-F001, the detailed fire modeling notebook, describes thedisposition of finding FSS-C1-01. The HRR (heat release rate) model implemented inthe Ginna Fire PRA is based on the guidance available in Appendix E and Appendix F ofNUREG/CR-6850. The first point used is that associated with the severity factor. It isthe minimum HRR needed to damage a PRA target or ignite an intervening combustible.Specifically:

Calculatinq the First Point

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The first point is the critical heat release rate to trigger the scenario progression. Thevalue represents the lowest heat release rate required to propagate the fire from theignition source to intervening combustibles or in scenarios with no interveningcombustible, the lowest heat release rate required to generate target damage.

The selection of the first point as the lowest heat release rate to trigger a sequence ofevents ensures that the contribution from fire intensities larger than the critical values(i.e., including the full range of the probability distribution to the right of the critical heatrelease rate value) is accounted for in the risk quantification process. That in partsuffices the supporting requirement FSS-C1 of selecting a fire intensity model thatencompass low likelihood, but potentially risk contributing, fire events in the context ofboth fire intensity and duration given the nature of the fire ignition sources present.

When suppression is not credited in a fire scenario, a decision has been made that therisk contribution of such scenario is not high enough to merit further detailed analysis(the scenario is not among the top risk contributors). In this case, the FSS-C1 is notapplicable.

Determining the Second PointThe second point of the heat release rate model is based fire suppression creditassigned to the fire scenario.

Scenarios Crediting Manual Suppression Only:For scenarios receiving manual suppression credit only, the second point heat releaserate value is the 98th percentile of the distribution characterizing the heat release rate forthe ignition source. The use of the 98th percentile as the second point ensures thefollowing:

1. Meets the SR FSS-C1 requirement of including in the analysis low likelihood, highconsequence conditions since this percentile is the maximum value postulated in theFire PRA as the NUREG/CR-6850 guidance suggests that higher values can be

screened from the analysis as risk contributors.

2. As the highest value used in the analysis, the use of the 98th percentile shouldgenerally result in the shortest time to target damage and the largest zone ofinfluence, even in scenarios where the timing is governed by the characteristics ofintervening combustibles. Consequently, shorter damage times will result in thehighest non suppression probabilities when calculated following the guidance inChapter 14 of Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850. Recall that the non suppressionprobability is calculated as Pns = EXP(-At) where t is the time available forsuppression. The shorter the time, the closer to 1.0 the P, value is expected to be.

The two points selected for the analysis ensures that the scenario, as reflected in theanalysis bounds its corresponding risk contribution. At the same time, the parameters

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are based on detailed fire modeling calculations for determining the critical heat releaserate and the time to damage associated with the fire scenario.

Crediting Automatic Suppression Only:Although manual suppression is always available, there are scenarios where automaticsuppression is only credited. For scenarios receiving automatic suppression credit only,the second point heat release rate value is the lowest heat release rate that wouldactivate the system. In some cases, this heat release rate value is the same as thecritical heat release rate used for calculating severity factors. This heat release rateselection is based on the expectation that the lowest fire intensity will generate thelongest response times for the system. Consequently, the number of targets affectedbefore automatic suppression can be credited is maximized.

The above described strategy presents the following characteristics:

1. Meets the SR FSS-C1 requirement of including in the analysis low likelihood, highconsequence conditions since this percentile is the maximum value postulated in theFire PRA as the NUREG/CR-6850 guidance suggests that higher values can bescreened from the analysis as risk contributors.

2. It should be recognized that when crediting automatic suppression, some of thetargets within the 98th percentile zone of influence are protected by the automaticsuppression. In many scenarios, the time to fire propagation to the first fewintervening combustibles and/or targets in the zone of influence is used as anindication for activation of the automatic suppression system. Consequently, theevaluation of fire conditions using two or more points from the heat release rateprobability distribution may not offer any new insights as the activation time isprimarily governed by the fire propagation through intervening combustibles.

* A good example includes sprinklers located within cable trays. Damage orignition assumed in a cable tray immediately below the sprinkler is used as thetime to sprinkler activation and protection for trays above the sprinkler. Noticethat in this approach, the tray under the sprinkler is not receiving automaticsuppression credit.

* Another example includes automatic Spray or Halon systems that are activatedby smoke detection signals. These systems may operate sooner than the time ittakes a fire to propagate through the intervening combustibles and/or targetswithin the zone of influence.

The two points selected for the analysis ensures that the scenario, as reflected in theanalysis will bound its corresponding risk contribution. At the same time, the parametersare based on detailed fire modeling calculations for determining the critical heat releaserate and the time to damage associated with the fire scenario.

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Crediting Both Automatic and Manual Suppression:Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850 provides guidance on how to credit automatic andmanual suppression in calculating non suppression probabilities. The guidance is basedon an event tree model that is solved at specific points in time characterizing thesequence of events in a fire scenario. For scenarios receiving automatic and manualsuppression credit, the second point heat release rate value should be determined byevaluating the results of the detection suppression event tree model described inAppendix P of NUREG/CR-6850.

1. Given activation of the automatic suppression, shorter times available for manualsuppression would generally result in higher non suppression probabilities.

2. Similarly, for scenario sequences where the automatic detection or suppression hasnot activated, shorter times available for manual suppression would generally resultin higher non suppression probabilities.

d) FSS-D1-01. Please provide a description of the resolution of this finding (the disposition

cites a reference for the resolution).

Response:

Finding FSS-D1-01 addresses that the Fire PRA software requires a verification andvalidation process to make sure the outputs are accurate. The Ginna Fire ModelingDatabase was subjected to an independent verification and validation process. GinnaFire PRA notebook G1-FSS-F005, Verification and Validation (V&V) of the Ginna FireModeling Database, documents the V&V in detail. The scope of the V&V includes thequantification of fire ignition frequencies and the data manipulation associated with thepreparation of the input tables for quantification. The independent V&V results concludedthat the Ginna Fire Modeling Database is processing the data and information forscenario input correctly.

e) FSS-D7-01. SR FSS-D7 is related to detection and suppression systems unavailability,including consideration of system outlier unavailability. Provide a discussion on howcapability category II was addressed and the conclusion with respect to meetingcapability category I1.

Response:

Total system failure probabilities for credited systems are documented in Table 1 of G1-FSS-FOO1 Rev 1, Detailed Fire Modeling Notebook. To address plant specific systemunavailability, Ginna Key Input 76 identifies unavailability factors for selected firesystems using control room log data from January 1st, 2007 to December 3 1st, 2011.The unavailability time for each system was summed and divided by the total time periodfor specific factors. These factors are added to the generic estimates of total systemunavailability and applied in the Ginna Fire Modeling Database. For example, systemS18, an automatic sprinkler system, has an unavailability factor of 3.2E-03. The generic

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estimate for an automatic sprinkler system to fail on demand is 0.02 (2E-02), thereforethe total failure likelihood (failure on demand plus unavailability) used in the PRA is2.32E-02 (2.32E-02 = 2E-02 + 3.2E-03). The credited systems are installed andmaintained under the Ginna Fire Protection Program, EPM-FPPR. Based on the reviewin Key Input 76, there is no outlier behavior of the credited systems. The availabilityfactors for the specific credited systems are added to the generic estimates to accountfor systems unavailability during plant operations. This approach meets capabilitycategory II for FSS-D7.

f) FSS-F1-01. During the audit it was noted that the finding was related to potential fires inthe hydrogen storage room and the turbine lube oil storage room with respect to a multi-compartment impact on the diesel generator room. Given this clarification of the finding,please clarity the disposition of this F&O.

Response:

Areas where the fire sources are considered to be high-hazard and capable of structuraldamage to multiple areas were analyzed for the hydrogen storage room, the turbine lubeoil storage room, and the two diesel generator rooms. Due to the hazard in these areas,scenarios were analyzed given a fire that may extend through the adjacent compartmentto additional compartments. The results of this analysis are included in Appendix B andAppendix C of G1-FSS-F003, Multi-Compartment Analysis. The tables below identify thecompartment combinations considered as well as the combination barriers between theareas.

High Hazard Fire Combinations identified for analysis

Exposing Cmpt Cmpt Description Exposed Cmpt 1-Cmpt 2 Exposed Cmpt 2

TB External Gen HydrogenK1-H2 Bottle Store House K1-TO-K-EDG1A K-EDG1A

KI-TO TB External Oil Storage Room K-EDG1A-K-EDG1B K-EDG1B

K-EDG1A Diesel Generator Room A K1-TO K1-H2

K-EDG1B Diesel Generator Room B K-EDG1A K1-TO

High Hazard Fire Combination Barriers

Exposing Cmpt 1 Cmpt 2

Cmpt Barrier Type Barrier Type Barrier Failure Pr 1 Barrier Failure Pr 2

K1-H2 Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03

K1-TO Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03

K-EDG1A Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03

K-EDG1B Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03

Note: Column "Barrier Failure Pr 1" is the probability of the failure of the first barrierbetween the exposing compartment and the adjacent compartment. Column "BarrierFailure Pr 2" is the barrier between the first exposed compartment and the secondexposed compartment.

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Applying the screening methods in NUREG/CR-6850 for multi-compartment scenarios,the combined barrier failure probabilities, including the propagating of the fire failing twobarriers are shown below.

MultiComplD Comment Frequency

K1-H2-TO-K1-TO-TO-K-EDG1A Frequency below 1E-8 2.16E-09

K1-TO-TO-K-EDG1A-TO-K-EDG1B Frequency below 1E-8 8.02E-10

K-EDG1A-TO-K1-TO-TO-K1-H2 Frequency below 1E-8 2.88E-09

K-EDG1B-TO-K-EDG1A-TO-K1-TO Frequency below 1E-8 2.88E-09

The room layout is shown within the Plant Partitioning Notebook (G1-PP-FOO1, Rev.2Page C-16, pdf page 48-of-54). The four compartments are all in a row on the north sideof the turbine building. K1-H2 is the furthest room to the west followed by Ki-TO then byK-EDG1A. Compartments K1-H2 and K1-TO contain no PRA equipment and have noassociated PRA operator action travel paths. Compartments K1-H2, K1-TO, and K-EDG1A are all conservatively assumed to fail a low significance turbine buildingelectrical panel TB-02 due to a lack of coordination. As such, fires involving K-EDG1Aalready include a bounding impact as no new impacts are introduced. Therefore,considering multi-compartment combinations beyond two compartments adds no newimpacts. Therefore these combinations are screened from final quantification.

g) IGN-B2-01. Please indicate the guidance used in addressing the ignition frequency bins

noted in the finding.

Response:

Section 4 of G1-IGN-F001, the ignition frequency notebook, was updated to reflect theignition frequency basis for those ignition frequencies not directly obtained fromNUREG/CR 6850 Supplement 1.

* For bins 5, 11, and 31 (Cable Fires Caused by Welding and Cutting), and bins 6and 24 (Transient fires caused by welding and cutting), the data comes from theSeptember 27, 2011, NEI submitted letter on "Recent Fire PRA Methods ReviewPanel Decision: Clarification for Transient Fires and Alignment Factor for PumpOil Fires." This letter coupled with the endorsement contained in RECENT FIREPRA METHODS REVIEW PANEL DECISIONS AND EPRI 1022993,"EVALUATION OF PEAK HEAT RELEASE RATES IN ELECTRICAL CABINETFIRES" (ML12171A583) provides the basis for these frequencies.

* The data for Bin 19 (Misc. Hydrogen Fires) was taken from NUREG 6850Supplement 1 Section 10.2.1. However, per the guidance of Appendix N (sectionN.2.4) of NUREG/CR-6850, only 10% of miscellaneous hydrogen fires (Bin 19)lead to a damaging fire outside of the ignition source. Therefore, a reductionfactor of 0.1 was applied to the generic ignition frequency to account for

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miscellaneous hydrogen fire explosions damaging additional targets separatefrom the ignition source.

h) QNS-C1-01. The disposition notes the criteria for screening CDF and LERF, but doesnot indicate the results of the screening with respect to the clarification in RegulatoryGuide 1.200, Revision 2 for QNS-C1-01. Please discuss the results also. Pleaseprovide a description of the resolution of this finding (the disposition cites a reference forthe resolution).

Response:

No fire scenarios were removed from consideration using the QNS-C1-01 screeningcriteria. All fire scenarios were maintained in this step. This criteria was initially used inthe model development phase to determine which scenarios required detailed firemodeling. As not doing detailed fire modeling is conservative, this does not impact thefire analysis.

i) SF-Al-01. The finding notes that not all fire areas were walked down. The dispositionindicates that for those not walked down a qualitative assessment was performed. Thismay not necessarily be sufficient such as for fire areas with a potentially significantCCDP or CLERP. Since the focus of supporting requirement SF-Al is on initiatingevents, identifying unique fire ignition source scenarios may be important. For fire areaswhich have not been walked down and are potential risk significant in the Fire PRA,either perform a walkdown or provide in further detail the justification for determining thatunique sources do not exist or are already known for such fire areas.

Response:

Seismic-Fire Notebook (G1-SF-FOO1, Rev 1) Table 1 provides an assessment for eachfire compartment that was not walked down. The assessments include review of theIPEEE walkdowns as well as consideration of the CDF/LERF for the compartment.Overall, 37 fire compartments were not walked down. For 26 of the 37 compartments,there are no fire scenarios developed, only full compartment burn. Any incrementalincrease in ignition frequency that may result from a seismically induced fire is more thanoffset in the risk calculation by assuming a full compartment burn for any fire.

Of the 11 remaining fire compartments, seven are inside containment. The Plant AreaSummary Sheets from the seismic IPEEE walkdowns were reviewed for these fire areas.All ignition sources in the fire areas are accounted for in the Fire PRA. Per the seismicIPEEE, all components in these areas were found to be well-anchored and there wereno concerns with falling hazards. Based on this review, it is concluded that no uniqueseismic-fire sources exist in these areas inside containment and all ignition sources arecaptured in the Fire PRA.

Two of the remaining four fire compartments are low fire risk, with CCDP less than 1.OE-04 and CLERP less than 1.OE-05.

Assessments of the remaining two fire compartments are as follows:

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Control Room. The Control Room (CR) is a unique fire compartment that is analyzedseparately in Task 11 of the Fire PRA. The rigorous examination of ignition sources andestimate of CR fire frequency ensures that all potential ignition sources are captured,even those that might result from a seismic event.

Cable Tunnel. The Cable Tunnel (CT) contains cable trays and conduit. There are nofixed ignition sources in the tunnel. Per the seismic IPEEE, all trays and conduits arerigidly mounted and/or anchored and there are no concerns with falling hazards. Basedon review, it is concluded that no unique seismic-fire sources exist in the tunnel.

j) SF-A2-01. Please provide addition information discussing the reviews and assessments

performed to meet supporting requirement SF-A2.

Response:

Section 2.4 of the Seismic-Fire Notebook (G1-SF-FOO1, Rev 1) provides a detailedassessment of the performance of fire protection features following a seismic event. Theassessment includes review of the following:

* Compliance with NRC Standards and industry codes to ensure that seismically

induced failures do not adversely impact safety-related equipment

* Previous fire protection system walkdowns during the IPEEE seismic evaluation

" Spurious operation of suppressions systems that could impact the response to postearthquake fires

" Potential diversion of gaseous and water-based suppression systems

* Loss of common suppression systems

* Seismic impact on manual hose stations

The assessments determined that there are no deviations from the installation standardswhich might adversely impact safe shutdown. In addition, current fire emergencyprocedures are adequate to respond to spurious operation of alarms and/or suppressionsystems, loss of suppression systems, or diversion of suppressants from areas wherethey might be needed.

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Documents

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Response to Request for ... · Fax: 585-771-3943 Email: [email protected] January 29, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC