Rational, Human, Political, And Symbolic Text in Harvard Business School

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10.1177/1052562903252511 ARTICLEJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION / August 2003

Swiercz, Ross / HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL CASES

RATIONAL, HUMAN, POLITICAL,

AND SYMBOLIC TEXT IN HARVARD

BUSINESS SCHOOL CASES: A STUDY

OF STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

Paul Michael SwierczGeorge Washington University

Kathleen T. RossArbitron, Inc.

Critics of the case method have argued that cases too frequently overempha-

size the formal and rational aspects of organizational functioning. Responding

to these concerns, Harvard Business School (HBS) announced a commitment

to broaden case content. In this study, narrative analysis is used to investigate

the content of the 36 most popular HBS cases of 1996. It reveals that these

cases continue to reflect the rational domain bias that engendered the original

criticism. The authors provide guidance to both case users and writers through

the identification of four perceptual hazards (metathemes) that characterize

the rationality bias.

Keywords: case studies; qualitative research; narrative analysis; cast teach-

ing; case writing

Since in actual human behavior, motive and emotion are major influences onthe course of cognitive behavior, a general theory of thinking and problemsolving must incorporate such influences.

—H. Simon (1977, p. xiv)

407

Please address correspondence to Paul Michael Swiercz, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Man-

agement Science, George Washington University, 2115 G. St. NW, Monroe 302E; phone: 202-

994-0399; e-mail: [email protected].

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION, Vol. 27 No. 4, August 2003 407-430

DOI: 10.1177/1052562903252511

© 2003 Organizational Behavior Teaching Society



The case method holds a unique distinction in the world of business edu-

cation (Hammond, 1980). It is simultaneously one of the most popular and

most controversial teaching methods used by the 405 schools of business

accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business.

Accurate statistics on the true extent of its use are not available, but we do

know that Harvard Business School (HBS) Press alone publishes and sells

7,500 self-produced cases. Within the realm of business pedagogy, the case

method is recognized as having several advantages over the traditional lec-

ture approach: (a) It is highly integrative, challenging the student to deal with

a complex situation requiring the use of numerous theories and strategies for

analysis and diagnosis; (b) it relies on student participation to a greater extent

than the lecture method; and (c) it allows for collective solutions and insight

(Ratliff, 1990).

Teaching cases endeavor to describe actual business situations, detailing

what are supposed to be some of the most critical aspects of organizational

life. Proponents claim that “dealing with the case is very much like dealing

with the problems that managers encounter daily” (Corey, 1976, p. 1). Stu-

dents are required to analyze the data presented, identify key issues and prob-

lems and propose solutions that make sense in a real-world context.

Despite its popularity and its stated goal of objectively presenting real-

world business dilemmas, the case method is often criticized for overempha-

sizing the rational and failing to include the turbulent, nonrational aspects of

contemporary organizations (Bludent, 1993; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1987;

Linder, 1990; McHenry, 1986). Based on these or related concerns regarding

the relevancy of graduate business education curricula, the HBS in 1986

announced a significant restructuring of its MBA program. A major element

of the revision included a commitment to broaden the content of teaching

cases (Nussbaum & Beam, 1986).

Critics of the curriculum argued that course content was overly quantita-

tive and mechanical in its orientation. Quantitative research concerns were

paramount. Courses attempting to deal with the problems of managing peo-

ple, communication, interpersonal relationships, ethics, and self-awareness

were relegated to second-class status (Behrman & Levin, 1984), despite the

fact that a growing body of research had identified a significant gap between

what aspiring managers were being taught and what practicing managers

needed to know (Keys & Wolfe, 1988; Mintzberg, 1976).

This study investigates the degree to which best-selling teaching cases

prepared by the HBS have succeeded in resolving the problems of

overquantification and overrationalization. To this end, we analyzed the con-

tent of the 36 most popular HBS cases a decade after the highly publicized

curriculum revision was launched (the appendix provides a detailed listing).

408 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION / August 2003



To guide the analysis, we used an adaptation of Bolman and Deal’s (1984)

model for framing organizations. It consists of four organizational arenas

including rational, human, political, and symbolic. Using the model, we

coded the cases, teaching notes, and attachments into one or a combination of

the four arenas specified. A pilot study was employed to establish that the

four arenas provided the appropriate breadth and flexibility for analyzing

teaching cases. This study, to our knowledge, is the first systematic explora-

tion of the structure and content of HBS teaching cases employing the

advanced tools of contemporary qualitative research (Hertz & Imber, 1995;

Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In addition to the research data, it provides recom-

mendations for management educators and case writers.

BACKGROUND

Important stakeholders of American business schools have long

expressed concern with the narrow focus of business school curricula

(Behrman & Levin, 1984). Rapidly changing technologies, global competi-

tion, and the economic restructuring of major markets require business man-

agers and executives to be more creative, adaptive, and action oriented than

ever (Drucker, 1992, 2001). In addition, an increasingly diverse and highly

specialized workforce demands that managers be able to demonstrate sophis-

ticated interpersonal skills (Dass, 1999).

A continuing challenge to business education is the need to teach creative

thinking, innovation, and risk taking—all increasingly important character-

istics for building more entrepreneurial enterprises. Business schools are

accused of perpetuating models that focus primarily on risk avoidance and

maintenance of the status quo (Bartz & Calabrese, 1991). To foster creativity,

innovation, and critical thinking, critics argue that business curricula must

recognize that there are multiple solutions and many different and useful ana-

lytical models. Indeed, complex problems are best solved when explored

from multiple perspectives. Also, because organizational problem solving is

increasingly a collective effort, it is most appropriately taught as a collective

process rather than an individual task (Ellis & Fisher, 1994).

Based on increasing concerns and criticisms regarding the efficacy of

business education, many business schools followed Harvard’s lead and

began revamping their MBA programs. The stated objective of these reform

efforts was to broaden student views of management and organizations.

Of particular interest for purposes of this study was Harvard’s goal to

expand the content of its popular case studies to include information con-

sciously intended to represent organizations as more than economic entities.

Swiercz, Ross / HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL CASES 409



RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In keeping with the tenets of the qualitative research methodology used in

this study, the research questions were framed to be general enough to permit

exploration but specific enough to establish boundaries for the inquiry. Effec-

tive teaching cases are supposed to provide a rich, descriptive, and varied

view of real-life situations. Indeed, that is the primary objective and pur-

ported advantage of the case method. To allow us to make an assessment of

their claims to be realistic portrayals of actual business practice, an in-depth

exploration of teaching case content was conducted using the following

research questions:

• What are the major problems/issues presented to the reader? Are these problems/issues representative of the human, political and symbolic—as well as rational—arenas of organizational life?

• What is the nature of the information presented to the reader for use in diagnosisand problem solving? Is there, for example, rich descriptive information con-cerning structures, strategies, events, interactions, relationships, beliefs, atti-tudes, and processes?

• What are the salient themes, patterns and categories across cases, and what dothese patterns suggest for future cases?

RESEARCH METHOD

This study is rooted in the qualitative paradigm and uses analytic induc-

tion as the logic of inquiry. The 36 cases selected for assessment were sub-

jected to intensive narrative analysis and cross-case comparison. Thus, the

study, in addition to providing a theory based analysis of case content, was

also designed to (a) enhance understanding of case structure and content, (b)

identify further research questions, and (c) suggest methods for future studies

(Babbie, 1995).

The specific research technique employed was narrative analysis. Narra-

tive analysis is a form of content analysis, but it is more qualitative in that it

seeks to understand the meaning within the text. In narrative analysis, the

researcher “typically begins with a set of principles and seeks to exhaust the

meaning of the text using specified rules and principles, but maintains a qual-

itative approach” (Berg, 1998, p. 225). Several contemporary social scien-

tists have written of narrative analysis as a method to investigate the assump-

tions and worldviews of authors as expressed in textual representations

(Boje, 1991; Heise, 1992; Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994). Berg (1998)

points out that content or narrative analysis can remain conceptually qualita-




tive even when counts of textual elements are used as a means of identifying,

organizing, indexing, and retrieving data.

In addition to narrative analysis, nonparametric statistics were used to

organize and describe the data. The magnitude of certain observations serve

to describe more fully the overall analysis and interpretations. The use of ana-

lytic induction via narrative analysis allowed for identifying differences and

similarities among cases—but also how and why they were different or simi-

lar by identifying specific content and structure patterns.

Holsti (1968) differentiated between manifest and latent content analysis.

Although only the manifest attributes of text were coded in this study, infer-

ences were made to latent meaning and theory and included in the findings.

As suggested by Berg (1998), detailed excerpts from the text were used to

support investigator interpretations.

Although the research questions in this study could be applied to a variety

of sample frames, the intent of this study was to better understand and assess

teaching cases. It seemed reasonable, therefore, to analyze those cases most

frequently used. Thus, the sample for this study included those cases most

frequently ordered from the HBS in the spring of 1996. Based on information

obtained from a publications manager at Harvard Business School Press, we

obtained the 40 most frequently ordered business cases. According to the

HBS distribution office, this cluster represents a significant concentration of

cases in use—below which, use is highly fragmented. Of those 40, 4 were

actually concept papers and were thus eliminated from the sample. The sam-

ple of cases represents 10 subject categories as indicated in Table 1.

There were three primary phases to the methodological model used in this

study. Phase I called for decontextualizing data from individual cases, that is,

analyzing the language used in the case within the interpretive structure of the

research design rather than solely with the boundaries of the individual case.

In Phase II, the data were recontextualized according to patterns and themes

identified through cross-case analysis. And finally, in Phase III, conclusions

were drawn and future research questions identified.

An essential first step in decontextualization required identification of the

appropriate unit of measure. Because this study sought to identify the pres-

ence of concepts, the paragraph was determined to be the appropriate unit of

measure (versus words and pages of text). Because a paragraph is intended to

present one significant idea or thought, it provided a consistent unit of mea-

sure across the sample of cases.

The initial coding structure was derived from the pilot study of four cases

and relevant literature. However, as new material emerged during the study,

this knowledge was incorporated into the coding scheme. Coding notes docu-

mented any changes that appeared to deviate from the model.




Phase II, the recontextualization process, involved cross-case compari-

sons by date, teaching subject, research method, key issues, and patterns and

themes. As observed by Eisenhardt (1989), cross-case comparisons can yield

significant findings useful for the replication and/or extension of existing the-

ory. By comparing similarities and differences from the vantage points listed

above, findings useful to theories of management education and future case

development were identified.

As mentioned earlier, the coding frame for this study is based on a modi-

fied version the popular Bolman and Deal (1984) model of organizational

analysis. The Bolman and Deal framework has received wide acceptance

over the past two decades and has demonstrated utility in a range of cultural

contexts (Bolman & Granell, 1999). According to this model, theories of

organization can be summarized into four perspectives or frames. The first of

those perspectives, the structural frame, emphasizes rationality, goals, and

efficiency. It posits that effective organizations articulate clear goals, assign

people into specific roles, and coordinate diverse activities through policies,

rules, and chain of command. Structural leaders value analysis and data, keep

their eye on the bottom line, set clear directions, hold people accountable for

results, and attack organizational problems with systems, policies, rules, and

restructuring.

The human resource frame focuses attention on human needs and

assumes that organizations that meet basic human needs and align work with

people will be more effective than those that do not. Human resource leaders

value relationships and feelings and seek to lead through openness, participa-

tion, and empowerment. They tend to define problems in individual or inter-


TABLE 1

Subject Category No. of Cases % of Total

Marketing 10 27.8

General management 7 19.4

Service management 5 13.8

Industry and competitive strategy 4 11.1

Organization behavior 4 11.1

Computers and information systems 2 5.5

Human resource management 1 2.7

Manufacturing and operations 1 2.7

Accounting and control 1 2.7

Finance 1 2.7

NOTE: 31 of the sample cases include teaching notes; 24 cases were written or revised since1986.



personal terms and look for ways to adjust the organization to fit people, or to

adjust the people to fit the organization (e.g., through training and

workshops).

The political frame views organizations as arenas of continuing conflict

and competition for scarce resources among groups with diverse agendas and

interests. Political leaders are advocates and negotiators who value realism

and pragmatism. They spend much of their time networking, creating coali-

tions, building a power base, and negotiating compromises.

The symbolic frame sees a chaotic world in which meaning and predict-

ability are social creations, and facts are interpretative rather than objective.

Organizations develop cultural symbols that shape human behavior unobtru-

sively and provide a shared sense of mission and identity. Symbolic leaders

instill a sense of enthusiasm and commitment through charisma and drama.

They pay diligent attention to myth, ritual, ceremony, stories, and other sym-

bolic forms.

At this point, it is important to note that the Bolman and Deal model is not

meant to imply that organizational domains or management text can be

divided into neat exclusive categories. The model is intended to broaden our

perspective of organizations and the texts that attempt to describe and teach

us about them. The concepts of a rational, human, political, and symbolic

domains are abstractions. In a purely literal sense, there are not rational,

human, political, or symbolic domains within organizations. However, there

are problems, situations, challenges, and data that can be best understood by

exploring them from the different perspectives as represented in the model.

Table 2 provides a summary representation of the model as applied in this

study.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

The 36 cases and supporting documents analyzed in this study clearly put

forward issues and problems in the context of a specific company and indus-

try and challenge students to explore and understand the role, responsibility,

and demands of management. However, the findings also suggest a distinct

domain bias. By far, the teaching cases analyzed in this study emphasize the

rational domain of organizations. Indeed, the rational domain is often so

emphasized and focused on that it led to the virtual exclusion of the other

domains.

As indicated in Table 3, the coding model used for the analysis provides 15

possible coding categories: the four primary Bolman and Deal arenas and

possible combinations thereof. Despite this wide range of possible content




possibilities, two categories alone, rational and rational/human account,

accounted for 85% of all text in this study.

To investigate the impact of changes initiated in response to critics, we

contrasted cases written before and after 1987. Surprisingly, the preponder-


TABLE 2

Components of Bolman and Deal’s Four Organizational Domains

Rational Human Political Symbolic

Structure Employee needs/

expectations

Competition for

resources

Values/beliefs ideals

Chain of control

(lines of authority)

Interpersonal

dynamics

Diversity of interests/

agendas

Myths/stories

Policies/procedures Group dynamics Power and influence Rituals/ceremonies

External environment

(industry issues)

Relationships Organizational con-

flict/cooperation

Metaphor

Strategy/goals Interpersonal conflict Bargaining/

negotiation

Humor/play

Core technologies

(raw materials,

technical activities,

desired end results)

Management/leader-

ship styles

Legal action/reaction Organizational

reputation

Information technol-

ogy (what and how

is information

managed?)

Human emotions Gray area of unstated

authority levels

Ethics

Decision-making

systems

Creativity Threats Drama/theater

Standards Informal organization Tacit knowledge

Financial analysis Rumors Culture/climate

NOTE: The rational domain is concerned with organizational structure, strategy, roles, andtechnology. The commonly accepted mechanism for understanding this domain of organiza-tional life is the measurement and analysis of various factors within the organization, typicallyeconomic factors. The human domain allows us to explore the interdependence between individ-uals and the organization—it focuses on the individual needs, aspirations, and relationships.This domain is concerned with interpersonal and group dynamics, individual needs, skills, andemotions. It focuses on identifying and analyzing the various relationships in organizational life:both formal and informal relationships between the individuals and the company, as well as rela-tionships between individuals. The political domain is the arena in which power and distributionof resources are negotiated. Organizations are composed of individuals and groups, which co-alesce around needs, perspectives, and interests. Conflict is inherent in complex human sys-tems—bargaining and coercion occur as individuals and groups compete for power and re-sources. The symbolic domain recognizes that organizations can be experienced (and thereforediagnosed and understood) as tribes, culture, and theater. This domain is influenced by perspec-tives shared principally by anthropology and the fine arts. Thus, the symbolic domain representsthe various ingredients of an organization’s culture, including rituals, myths, heroes, ceremo-nies, and values.



ance of exclusively rational subject matter actually increased rather than

decreased—from 39% in cases written prior to 1987 to 45% in cases written

from 1987 to 1995 (Table 3).

These descriptive statistics, as informative as they are, nonetheless mask

the richness of the insights yielded by this textual analysis of the case studies.

Specifically, the textual analysis reveals a good deal not only about the abso-

lute content of cases in a mathematical sense but also about the underlying

assumptions and values embedded in the way we teach aspiring leaders to

think about the nature of the world in which they will perform their roles.

As a consequence of our analysis, we identified four metathemes: Ratio-

nalistic, Execucentric, Instrumentalist, and Objectivist. We use the word

metatheme here in the sense that it is used in literary and musical contexts,

that is, as an implicit or recurrent idea—a motif. Our goal in providing them is

to provide both case users and writers with an enhanced ability to recognize

and address the rational bias we discovered.

In this article, each metatheme refers to that which is both explicitly and

implicitly present. This allows the creation of a structure with respect to the

arrangement of discrete observations and statements within the body of the

case. Figure 1 provides a summary description of the four metathemes dis-

covered. The discussion that follows provides detailed examples of how

these themes were expressed and textual samples from selected cases to

showcase the metatheme in action.


TABLE 3

Impact of Changes Before and After 1987

Coding Categories— % of Pre-1987 % of 1987-1995

Bolman and Deal Model Cases in Category Cases in Category

Rational 39 45

Human 2 1

Political 0 0

Symbolic 0 0

Rational/human 47 38

Rational/political 2 2

Rational/symbolic 1 3

Human/political 0 0

Human/symbolic 2 0

Political/symbolic 0 0

Rational/human/political 1 2

Rational/human/symbolic 5 6

Rational/political/symbolic 0 0

Human/political/symbolic 0 0

Rational/human/political/symbolic 0 1



RATIONALISTIC

Teaching cases are most often written in a modified story form, often

beginning with a catchy vignette. Consider this example from Apple

Computer:

John Sculley, Apple Computer’s charismatic CEO, sat in his small, interioroffice in Cupertino, California, reading the year-end results for 1991. The com-puter industry had just experienced its worst year in history. Average return onsales plummeted to under 4% and the return on equity (ROE) was under 11%.For the first time, worldwide PC revenues actually dropped by almost 10%, despiterising unit volume. Although Apple continued to outperform the industry, theintensity of competition was putting acute pressure on Apple’s margins. “Ourchallenge,” noted Sculley, “is not only to stay ahead of our competition, but wehave to find some way to change the rules of the game. If computer manufactur-ers continue to make and sell commodities, everyone in our business will suf-fer.” Changing a $50 billion global industry, however, was no easy task. YetSculley believed that Apple was one of the only companies that could do it. ForApple’s next strategy session, he asked his staff to address two key questions:(1) could Apple change the structure of the industry, and if so how? And (2)what other alternatives are available? (Apple Computer, 1992, 9-792-081, p. 1)


Meta-Themes

Rationalistic

Rational material dominates the presentation. Even when non-

rationalistic information was provided, it is detailed and developed as

part of a specific problem being posed to the reader.

Execucentric

Cases predominantly written from the vantage point of one or several

senior executives.

Instrumentalist

According to these cases management’s primary purpose is to control

people and circumstances to achieve an outcome.

Objectivist

Cases written to assume that there exists an objective reality waiting to

be observed and recorded.

Figure 1: Metathemes



The opening paragraphs are often among the richest in the entire case. The

preceding paragraph describes the change of the personal computer industry

and the need for Apple to develop a responsive strategy (rational), Sculley’s

request that his staff participate in helping him identify an action plan

(human), information concerning Sculley’s charismatic personality, his

desire to “change the rules of the game” and his belief in his company’s abil-

ity to do it (symbolic).

The opening paragraph often depicts a key individual (usually the CEO)

pondering a specific problem or challenging situation. As in the Apple case,

there is often a relatively high degree of personalized description of the set-

ting and mood in which the pondering is taking place. This level of personal-

ization is often in marked contrast to the depersonalized, just-the-facts tone

that typifies the rest of the case. The observation is relevant because this

opening personalization obscures—to the noncritical reader—the dominant

rationalistic content of the total case. More specifically, the Apple case con-

tains no further descriptions of personal space, the upcoming strategy meet-

ing is never again mentioned, the role composition and influence of Sculley’s

staff is never developed, and only brief references to three other senior execu-

tives are offered. Sculley’s belief that Apple could change the industry is dis-

cussed only from financial, manufacturing, and marketing perspectives; no

reference is made to organizational core competencies or the role of employ-

ees. The Apple case is a good example of a pattern whereby the opening para-

graph displays a personalized, reflective, and descriptive tone that is in

marked contrast to the corpus of the case.

In addition to the narrative, teaching cases typically have attachments

intended to assist students in analyzing the case. The most common attach-

ments are financial statements (rational), product and industry diagrams

(rational), and organization charts (rational/human). The Apple case has nine

attachments (financial statements and industry diagrams), all representing

the rational domain.

Notably absent from attachments to cases are selections from personnel

manuals or employee handbooks, internal memos, notes or recordings of

meetings, and career histories—information about individuals and functions

that comprise the management ranks. These types of attachments, although

arguably difficult to acquire, would certainly broaden a student’s perspective

on an organization beyond mere structural or economic indicators.

Although representation of the rational/human category rivals that of the

rational category for cases in this study (39% vs. 47%), the human informa-

tion in the rational/human category is often less descriptive and less devel-

oped than the rational. This is illustrated by the following excerpt from




Caterpillar Tractor Co. (9-385-276, p. 7) where highly depersonalized terms

are used to euphemistically interject the human dimension:

The company’s management engaged in careful strategic analysis and tried totake a long-term view of its business. In more that half a century, Cat had suf-fered only one year of loss; that was in 1932 at the height of the great depres-sion. The strength of the company’s classic strategic posture of high-qualityproducts backed by effective service was well understood throughout the com-pany, and management was committed to its maintenance and defense. Asenior executive said in an interview: “Our competitive position and our man-agement strengths are a hell of a hurdle for competitors to overcome. We notonly have a strong defensible strategic position, we just know our businessbetter than anyone else, and we work harder at it. (italics added)

These examples illustrate the different degree of description provided in

cases for rational information and human information. The majority of cases

in this study leave the reader with a much clearer picture of the structure, sys-

tems, technologies, and industry (rational issues) than of the human, politi-

cal, or symbolic fabric of the organization. This is true even when there are

numerous references to the human domain, which as illustrated above, when

provided tend to be far more superficial and cursory than the references to

rational information.

There are exceptions to this pattern, most notably in the teaching category

Organizational Behavior (OB). All four of the OB cases in the sample contain

prominent amounts of text representing the perspectives of employees, and

three of the four include direct quotes regarding individuals’ opinions of

organizational changes and specific managers. This is in contrast to an over-

all pattern whereby employees, if mentioned at all, are characterized as

expendable commodities.

Donna Dubinsky and Apple Computer, Inc. (A) (9-486-083, pp. 6-11)

illustrate an example of a CEO (Steve Jobs) discussing Apple’s distribution

process during dinner with his friend Fred Smith of Federal Express. Based

on this event, Jobs reaches a conclusion without input from the responsible

managers at Apple, creating a negative reaction with the leadership group.

For anyone who has spent time in organizations, this scenario has a ring of

truth and is a stark contrast to the mechanical decision making contained in

most of the teaching cases in this study. In addition, these excerpts portray a

manager (Dubinsky) gaining insight into the problems of the company by lis-

tening to the perspectives of other employees. Students are able to see the dis-

tribution channel conflict as part of a much bigger problem because the

detailed description of the human problem solving interactions go well

beyond the rational elements of the issue.




Southwest Airlines offers another dramatic example of the benefits of pro-

viding rich contextual development. The case (in the teaching category of

Service Management) identifies the question of future growth as the key

issue to be analyzed by the reader—specifically, should the airline expand

service to new cities, or increase the number of flights in existing routes? The

reader is presented with a broad range of information as background to this

decision (Southwest Airlines, 9-694-023, pp. 1, 13-14).

Although much of the text in this case deals exclusively with market strat-

egy and expansion costs, Southwest is an example of a company led by exec-

utives who take seriously the issues of employee focus and corporate cul-

ture—the “patina of spirituality” (symbolic)—as they deliberate competing

growth options. Clearly, a company like Southwest, dedicated to a holistic

management approach, makes it easier to write a case that encourages the stu-

dent to consider multiple perspectives when analyzing a business problem.

A writing style error, which contributes to the overly rationalistic nature of

the cases in this study, is the logical fallacy of assigning concrete properties to

an abstract concept. Students of literature know it as reification, or the error

of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1925). In this study, reification, or

misplaced concreteness, most commonly occurred when human attributes—

thoughts, feelings, and actions—are assigned to the abstract concepts of the

company or management. This pattern is dangerous because it obscures and

oversimplifies, as demonstrated in the following examples:

Sony surprised BPS and the rest of the industry. . . . (Barco Projection Systems[A], 9-5591-133, p. 1)

CMI management was quite happy . . . management felt . . . the companyfeared . . . management expected . . . (Cumberland Metal Industries: Engi-neered Products Division, 1980, 580-104, pp. 5-6)

This was like a personal slap from manufacturing. (Hank Kolb, Director, Qual-ity Assurance, 9-681-083, p. 2)

Unilever had long been a sleeping giant. . . . Colgate was trying to elbow its wayin. . . . (Procter & Gamble Europe: Vizir Launch, 9-384-139, p. 4)

In this study, reification was found in quotes from individuals within orga-

nizations as well as in the narrative constructed by the case writer, thus indi-

cating that reification actually exists at two levels in many of the cases where

the concept of “an organization” is itself an abstraction used by both the case

writer and the subjects being interviewed.




Misplaced concreteness obscures important information and insights into

how organizations really work. Human characteristics attributed to a divi-

sion, function, or company conceal the person or groups responsible for the

decisions. Readers are therefore unable to assess the characteristics or attrib-

utes leading to correct or incorrect decisions. In the Barco case, a fatal mis-

judgment regarding a competitor was represented as “Sony surprised

BPS. . . . The company simply misjudged the competition” (Barco Projection

Systems [A], 9-5591-133, p. 1). A company cannot misjudge, only an indi-

vidual or collection of individuals can misjudge, so who exactly is the case

referring to? Perhaps there is no one within Barco who is charged with—or is

capable of assessing the competition—a significant lesson for the company

as well as for students. In any case, the issue is not developed in either the case

or the teaching notes.

The lack of detail relating to the political arena across all the cases in this

study is quite striking. References to tensions between divisions and friendly

rivalry are examples where reification contributes to obfuscating the real dif-

ferences of perspective and experience, which exist between interest, profes-

sional, and departmental groups. Again, a division cannot feel tension, so

who exactly is feeling tension and what are the circumstances or issues con-

tributing to that tension?

EXECUCENTRIC

Given Harvard’s goal and history of educating senior managers, it is not

surprising to find cases written primarily from a senior management perspec-

tive. The term execucentric, however, goes well beyond an executive per-

spective. The term was created in response to the findings of this study, to

describe an orientation that seems unaware of the presence and legitimacy of

organizational perspectives other than that of the executive. The majority of

cases in this study provide personal background on one or several of the

senior executives in the organization, occasional reference to management

staff, and virtually no mention of nonmanagement employees. Consider for

example, the social responsibility of individual executives or the corporate

sector in general. Social responsibility is referenced in only two cases. And in

each case social responsibility is not examined or advocated for its own sake

but for potential commercial gain as vetted through the personal preferences

and values of the lead executive.

In the Reebok case, for example, CEO Joe LaBonte, decides that Reebok

should help underwrite the Human Rights Now! world concert tour “because

he believed in the tour’s cause and because it offered the opportunity to give




something back to the young people who were responsible for the company’s

success” (Reebok International Ltd., 9-589-027, p. 8).

A central assumption of the execucentric perspective is that all power and

authority are vested in an executive’s position. Contemporary management

literature presents a compelling case for the fact that increasingly, power

comes not from rank but from competence, interpersonal skill, and the ability

to influence, inspire, and mobilize others (Bridges, 1994; Wetlaufer, 1999).

The political domain deals with power, conflict, and negotiation, issues that

are present in even the most rigidly hierarchical organizations. The assump-

tion that power is the result of one’s position in the hierarchy surely contrib-

utes to the observed meagerness of text in the political domain.

As noted earlier, the Apple case is written almost exclusively from CEO

Sculley’s point of view. There is only passing reference to other major play-

ers, including Steve Jobs, and no mention of individuals or of groups of

employees. The teaching note further reinforces this execucentrism by iden-

tifying one of Sculley’s three major mistakes as not taking complete control

of Apple’s strategy and technology sooner than he did (Apple Computer

1992, 5-792-098, p. 11).

Mrs. Field’s Cookies describes the development of an information tech-

nology system that was designed to give “top management a dimension of

personal control over dispersed operations, . . . The technology has ‘lever-

aged’Debbi’s ability to project her influence into more stores than she could

ever reach effectively without it” (Mrs. Field’s Cookies, 9-189-056, p. 1).

And in the General Electric case, we observe an organization with a charis-

matic and dominant leader, Jack Welch, where,

like most strong CEO’s, the changes he wrought reflected his own manage-ment approach and his beliefs about how people worked in organizations.

The new process relied much more on judgments of a few people at the top.(General Electric: Jack Welch’s Second Wave, 9-391-248, pp. 1-4)

A key ingredient in many of the cases in this study, which relates to the

execucentric perspective, is a lack of interaction and an absence of a sense of

interdependency. Writing of the development of general management skills,

Burnett (1992) cited three critical ingredients: organizational experience,

intellectual curiosity, and self-reflection and the desire/ability to learn from

others.

The teaching cases in this study are largely devoid of executive self-reflec-

tion and references to learning from others. Thus, students are denied insight

into this aspect of leadership and managerial decision making and encour-




aged to view management as a fundamentally independent and technical

function. Twenty-two of the 36 cases do not mention the role, competencies,

or interests of nonmanagement staff.

INSTRUMENTALIST

The instrumentalist perspective is closely related to the execucentricity in

that it assumes that employees are just one of many resources to be controlled

by the manager (as opposed to the source of all activity related to the concept

of organization). The majority of the cases in this study endorse the assump-

tion that conception, planning, and execution of goal-oriented behavior are

the essence of the management role. Embedded in this perspective are the

assumptions that the environment (including employees) is controllable, and

the manager is, or should be, “in control.” Thus, management becomes

largely a technical rather than a social process. The instrumental/technical

foundation is evidenced by marked absence of social interaction in the cases.

Only one case in this study fully acknowledges the challenges of gathering or

disseminating information in support of decision making. In the vast major-

ity of cases, the manager focuses on the process of implementing functions or

policies and his or her own meanings and interests take precedence over all

others.

Over 60% of the cases in this study do not mention employees. Among

those that do, many seem to assume that without executive direction, others in

the organization would be unable or unwilling to take reasonable action. In

the Xerox case, for example, CEO Kearns and his senior managers

instituted a strong quality movement in the belief that quality would drive costsdown and that getting it right the first time would eliminate costly repairs andreplacements and would prevent the unnecessary breakdowns that drive cus-tomers away. Kearns and top management strove to drive the quest for qualitythroughout the organization. . . . The senior management team issued to theoperating units a set of requirements and guidelines to ensure that customer sat-isfaction became their first priority. . . . All employees were made to feelaccountable for customer satisfaction and made to act accordingly. (XeroxCorporation: The Customer Satisfaction Program, 9-591-055, pp. 4, 8,10, ital-ics added)

The word drive has a range of meanings, but in the first sense, it means to

urge or send in some direction by blows, threats, violence, and so on (Oxford

American Dictionary, 1980), suggesting that, without coercion, employees

would not support quality. The excerpt goes on to say that senior managers

issued requirements and guidelines, whereby employees are made to feel and




made to act a certain way. This passage suggests that employees need man-

agement to discover, articulate, and then enforce values, as well as tell

employees how they should feel and act.

In contrast, the Ford case describes a quality program and reflects a differ-

ent approach to the respective roles of managers and employees:

Let the workers run it. Don’t impose the old hierarchy on them if you want themto behave differently; . . . if you involve the hourly worker, he’ll [sic] willinglycontribute far more than management could imagine. . . . Feeling that organiza-tional barriers were stifling the energy and initiative flowing from EI . . . Pageknew that he could achieve only a limited degree of reform before runningheadlong into the barrier of Ford’s corporate wide controls. His solution wasto create a management task force. (Transformation at Ford, 9-390-083,pp. 32, 6, 8)

The Ford case recognizes workers as creative, responsible partners in the

quality effort. In addition, Page realizes that retraining managers to think dif-

ferently about their roles—indeed to move out of the control mind set—is

critical to the success of Ford’s transformation. But Ford is the exception. In

Proctor & Gamble, we again see the more typical case:

Though our greatest asset is our people, it is the consistency of principle andpolicy which gives us direction. . . . The general manager’s role will be compro-mised if our means to control these are dissipated in team discussions. . . .Another concern was that team meetings would be an effective decision mak-ing forum. . . . It was felt that participants would go in with parochial views thatthey would not be willing to compromise. Some managers claimed that,because the teams’ roles and responsibilities were not clear, it would becomeanother time consuming block to decision making rather than a means toachieve progress. (Proctor & Gamble Europe: Vizir Launch, 9-384-139, pp. 2,12, italics added)

Although a spokesperson for Proctor & Gamble stated that “our greatest

asset is our people,” the real emphasis of the case is on management control.

Although the case references the use of teams, management is concerned that

without careful control, teams might undermine the controlling managers’

“objective” view of the problems at hand.

An overly instrumentalist view of leadership assumes that the superior’s

task is to manipulate and control subordinates. This approach to leadership

undermines the moral and creative aspects of leadership and dehumanizes

both the leader and his or her colleagues. With the notable exception of the

Ford case, teaching cases in this study adopt an instrumental orientation. And

as a consequence, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of complex interde-




pendencies within organizations—or the challenge leaders face to recognize

and nurture creative and productive interdependencies.

OBJECTIVIST

The teaching cases in this study bring with them an implicit assumption

and writing style that projects an image of accuracy and objectivity devoid of

conditions or reservations. It’s true that every case carries with it a footnote

stating that the case is “the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate

either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.” But

one must ask, “Is this a statement about liability or objectivity?” Implicit in

each of the cases is the assumption that the author is objectively reporting the

facts of case; cases are not supposed to be works of fiction, the literary license

invoked by creative writers and film makers is not an option open to case

writers.

At the core of every HBS teaching case is the assumption that there is an

objective reality “out there” that case writers are sent to capture and then

“write it up.” The instructions to case writers developed by the HBS focus on

preparation, interviewing, writing, and closure (getting the company to sign

off on the case). All three areas are discussed from a logistics rather than a

substantive point of view. For example, part of preparation is to identify a ten-

tative theme(s) for the case. However, there is no suggestion that theme selec-

tion is inherently influenced by one’s perspective and thus, as possible

themes emerge, the case writer should self-critically surface and evaluate

personal predispositions that might influence theme selection and reporting.

(In qualitative research this is called bracketing; see Maxwell, 1996;

Moustakas, 1994).

Furthermore, because many of the issues discussed in cases have propri-

etary and other legal implications, the case writing researcher must work

within the constraints of a set of ground rules. The ethics of classic research

require that the investigator reveal the whole and unvarnished truth. In con-

trast, the ethics of the case writer require that the author reveal the “whole

truth within the constraints agreed to by the participating firm.” Teaching

cases do not come with a reader advisory stating, “The authors of this case

have attempted to provide the reader with an objective and fully informed

summary of events and issues presented. However, the reader must know that

all quotes, data, and interpretations in the case have been reviewed and

approved by the subject firm and its legal counsel prior to publication.”

It is also important to recognize that the primary research tool of the case

writer is the interview. Thus, the data reported are virtually always filtered




through the perceptual and interpretive lenses of the interviewee as well as

those of the interviewer. Rarely does the case writer reveal insights gained

from direct observation. However, there were two exceptions to this general

rule in the our sample. The author of the Fred Henderson case, John Kotter,

spent three days with his subject Fred Henderson. Thus, the case includes

more detail about Henderson than an interview would have allowed: How

Henderson dressed, what time he arrived and left the office, as well as

detailed interactions (including informal conversations) are included in the

case (Fred Henderson, 480043, p. 3). These direct observation details pro-

vide the reader with rich insight into Henderson’s typical work day and his

personal management style.

Another example of direct observation case writing is Club Med. This is

the only case in this study that directly references the role of the case writer. In

an afternoon session by the swimming pool, the case writer revealed his per-

sonal engagement with the case. When speaking of guests who indicated that

their desires for escape and relaxation were so successful that they had for-

gotten what companies they worked for, the case writer admitted that he was

having trouble remembering why he came to Club Med, stating, “I guess I

won’t need my calculator” (Club Med [A], 9-687-046, p. 5).

The presence of a case writer is invisible in most cases. This obfuscates the

influence the case writer has on crafting the story; indeed, it seems to assume

that the case writer is a passive instrument in the process of developing a case.

The objectivist perspective is rooted in the notion that the case writer is sim-

ply gathering and reporting “reality based data.” Yet case writers do not write

up everything they see or hear. They select what they think is relevant and

interesting, thus constructing the reality of the case. The central role of the

writer in the development of a case is unavoidable. Thus, it is critical to

acknowledge, explore, and educate case writers to their roles and to the possi-

bility that unexamined assumptions and biases can diminish the true potential

of a teaching case.

When the case is written, it is in an impersonal and objective style, a quasi-

scientific format, purportedly to “let the facts speak for themselves,” except

that the facts speak (almost exclusively) from a senior executive through a

case writer. This combination significantly influences the structure and con-

tent of the case. In fact, a specific, and rather narrow, message of management

as rational thinking in action is being conveyed through the presentation of a

concrete set of events. A key objective of management education must be, as

Behrman and Levin (1984) suggested, to help students develop a holistic

view of organizations as well as the self-insight that effective leadership

demands.




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Certainly, a basic role of management education is to contribute to the

development of effective managers. This, too, is an objective of the case

method. Harvard, for example, states that “the school’s goal is to be the pre-

mier source of men and women with the talent and training to become excel-

lent general managers in any and all fields of business” (Kelly & Kelly, 1986).

An equally important objective of management education is challenging

students to think critically about the role, influence, and philosophical foun-

dations of management. An analysis of the role of management has broad

social significance as organizations (particularly business organizations) and

the concept of professional careers increasingly dominate our collective psy-

che. Although the MBA is patterned after the medical and legal models of

professional education, management education has yet to develop an undis-

puted body of core knowledge and a distinguishing set of professional ethics

in the tradition of medicine and law. The lack of agreement regarding a com-

mon body of knowledge makes self-scrutiny even more important. The body

of knowledge regarding management is exceptionally dynamic, constantly

emerging from the daily interplay between theory and practice. Thus, man-

agement education has the potential—some would argue a recurring ten-

dency—to reproduce a vast and often confusing array of management per-

spectives. (For interesting discussions of management fads, see Eccles &

Nohria, 1992; Hilmer & Donaldson, 1996; Lee & Skarke, 1996.)

Critical analysis of teaching cases is particularly important, both because

they are a mainstay in business education and because they are presumed to

represent the “reality” of actual business practice and organizational func-

tioning. Yet this study reveals a pervasive assumption of rationality in organi-

zations, markets, and industries.

Although a significant proportion of management literature reflects this

change in thought, this study reveals that our future CEOs and senior execu-

tives continue to be steeped in the same rational/hierarchical models of exec-

utive leadership that characterized the preparation of their predecessors. This

isn’t surprising, because the rational/hierarchical model has been and contin-

ues to be a seductively powerful worldview. Against the backdrop of global

competition, changing technologies, and demanding shareholders, it offers a

sense of order and certainty that will not be set aside with ease.

In a widely read article published in Harvard Business Review, Henry

Mintzberg (1996) made observations about current misconceptions regard-

ing contemporary organizations and the nature of management. Two of

Mintzberg’s comments are particularly relevant to the findings of this study:




Consider how we train strategists in the MBA classrooms. We take young peo-ple with little business experience—hardly selected for their creativity, letalone their generosity—and drill them in case after case in which they play thegreat strategists sitting atop institutions they know nothing about. . . . Is it anywonder that we end up with case studies in the executive suites—disguised asstrategic thinking? (p. 63)

Let’s begin by recognizing today’s MBA for what it is: technical trainingfor specialized jobs, such as marketing research and financial analysis. (Andthese are not good management.) Then maybe we can recognize good manage-ment for what it is: not some technical profession, certainly not a science(although sometimes the application of science) but a practice, a craft. We havesome good things to teach in management schools; let’s teach them to peoplewho know what’s going on. (p. 63)

FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study raises two important future research questions. First, given the

lack of research regarding teaching cases and the useful revelations emerging

from the Bolman and Deal model, “Are there other investigative frames

which might be used to explore the content and structure of teaching cases?”

The Bolman and Deal model offered a unique opportunity to investigate the

question of “rationality bias”; alternative models could offer important addi-

tional insights into the assumptions and values embedded in our teaching

tools.

The second question concerns how cases are written and reported. A criti-

cal exploration of the dynamics and process of case preparation could pro-

vide a valuable resource for future investigations of case pedagogy. The ques-

tion “How real are the real-world case studies?” deserves an answer. The

“science” of management research has made significant strides over the past

three decades. Recent qualitative research developments and innovations

have created powerful tools for investigating the “truth” of case narratives.

Given the centrality of the case study in business education, research aimed at

investigating the case process has a great deal to offer to the advancement of

business education and the organizational processes that flow from it.




APPENDIXCases Analyzed

Revision Subject Research Case Teaching

Case Title Date Date Category Method Number Notes

Apple Computer 1992 92 94 Ind & Comp Strategy F 9792081 Y

Barco Projection

Systems (A) 91 91 Mktg F 9591133 Y

Benihana of Tokyo 72 94 Serv Mgt F 9673057 Y

Butler Lumber Company 91 94 Fin F 9292013 Y

Calynx and Corolla 91 95 Mktg F 9592035 Y

Caterpillar Tractor

Company 85 — Gen Mgt L 9385276 Y

Club Med (A) 86 — Serv Mgt F 9687046 Y

Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi 91 94 Ind & Comp Strategy L 9391179 Y

Cumberland Metal 80 — Mktg F 580104 Y

Destin Brass 89 93 Acct/Control G 9190089 Y

Donna Dubinsky/Apple

Computer 86 93 OB F 9486083 Y

Fred Henderson 79 — OB F 480043 N

General Electric/

Jock Welch (A) 91 93 Gen Mgt L 9391248 N

Hank Kolb 81 93 Mfg & Ops Mgt G 9681083 Y

Hurricane Island OB 87 92 Mktg F 9588019 Y

Johnson & Johnson (A) 83 — Gen Mgt F 384053 Y

Komatsu Ltd. 85 — Gen Mgt L 9385277 Y

Lincoln Electric 75 — Gen Mgt F 376028 N

Lotus Development

Corporation 86 94 Mktg F 9587078 Y

Microsoft 87 91 Mktg F 9588028 Y

Mrs. Field’s Cookies 89 93 Comp/Info Sys F 9189056 Y

People Express (A) 83 95 HRM F 9483103 Y

Peter Browning/

Continental 86 — OB F 9486090 Y

Proctor & Gamble/Europe 83 — Gen Mgt F 9384139 Y

Reebok International Ltd. 88 — Mktg F 9589027 Y

Renn Zopheropoulous 80 93 OB F 9480044 N

Rohn and Haas 86 93 Mktg F 9587055 Y

Sealed Air Corporation 82 — Mktg F 582103 Y

Shouldice Hospital Ltd. 83 — Serv Mgt F 9683068 Y

Singapore TradeNet 90 95 Comp/Info Sys F 9191009 Y

Skil Corporation 88 — Ind & Comp Strategy F 9389005 Y

Southwest Airlines 93 93 Serv Mgt F 9694023 N

Taco Bell Corporation 91 94 Serv Mgt F 9692058 Y

Transformation at Ford 89 91 Gen Mgt F 939083 Y

Wal-Mart Stores




Discount Operations 86 — Ind & Comp Strategy L 9387018 Y

Xerox: Customer

Satisfaction 91 93 Mktg F 9591055 Y

NOTE: F = Field; G = General Experience; L = Library.

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Rational, Human, Political, And Symbolic Text in Harvard Business School