Rapid Decisive Operations Pub218

8/7/2019 Rapid Decisive Operations Pub218

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RAPI D DECISI VE OPERATI ONS:

AN ASSUM PTI ONS-BASED CRITI QUE

Antu l i o J. Echevarr ia I I

November 2001


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ISBN 1-58487-073-7

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FOREWORD

Most expert s agree that no genuine mil it ary tr ansformation or

revolu t ion wi l l occur wi thout a corresponding change in operati onal

concepts. Merely replacing old equipment wi th new i s not enough.

Militaries must also develop new waysto link tactical actions to

strategic ends. For thi s reason Rapid Decisive Operat ions (RDO), an

emerging concept cur rent ly under development by the Join t Fut ures

Lab (J9) of Joint Forces Command, is par ti cularl y import ant for the

transformation of U.S. military forces today. An innovative and

viable concept will not only stimulate the development of new

technologies; it will also help balance the advantages and

disadvantages that the introduction of such technologies always

entails. On the other hand, a flawed concept will only lead to

frustrat ion in t raining and disappointment in combat as resul ts fail

to match expectations.

In support of the Joint communitys efforts to develop a viable

operat ional concept, L ieutenant Colonel Ant ul io J. Echevarr ia I I has

wr i t ten an assumpti ons-based cr it ique of RDO. He argues that the

concept s developers deserve high pr aise for at tempt ing to link two

relat ive propert iesspeed and decisivenessbut that the defini t ion

of RDO is at pr esent incoherent and based on several deeply fl awed

assumptions. He concludes that RDO creates dubious expectationsand will likely fail to balance the strengths and weaknesses

introduced by new technologies. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria

further recommends a method for identifying and addressing an

operational concepts critical assumptions. This method, which

offers a way t o adjust operat ional concepts before they have claimed

too much in t he way of resour ces, ought to become a standard part of

concept development.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Str ategic Studies Instit ute

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BI OGRAPHI CAL SKETCH OF TH E AUTHOR

ANTULI O J. ECHEVARRIA I I , a lieutenant colonel in theU.S. Army, is cur rent ly assigned as the Di rector of Str ategicResearch at the St rategic Studies Inst i tut e. He graduatedfrom t he U.S. Mil i tary Academy in 1981, was commi ssionedas an armor offi cer , and has held a variety of command andstaff assignments in Germany and Continental UnitedStates; he has also served as an assistant professor ofEur opean history at t he U.S. Mil it ary Academy; Squadron

S3 of 3/16 Cavalr y; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctr ine at theU.S. Army Ar mor Center at Fort Knox; as an act ion offi cerat t he Army Aft er Next project at H Q TRADOC, Ft . Monroe,VA; and as a speechwr iter for t he U.S. Army Chief of Staff.He is a graduate of t he U.S. Armys Command and GeneralStaff Col lege, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in H istoryfrom Princeton University. He has published articles in anumber of scholarl y and professional journals to include theJournal of M il it ary Hi story, War in History, War & Society,Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review, andAirpower Journal. His book, After Clausewitz: GermanMilitary Thinkers before the Great War, was published bythe Universit y Press of Kansas in t he spring of 2001.

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SUMMARY

Technological innovation plays a paradoxical role inmilitary transformation. With each problem it solves,technological innovat ion tends to int roduce new chal lengesor compl icat ions. Operational concepts can part ly reconcilethese tensions by finding the optimal balance betweentechnological strengths and weaknesses. In so doing, theyperform two vital functions (integrating and stimulating)for mil it ary tr ansformation.

The concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) alsoatt empts to perform each of these functions. However, i tsdefinitional incoherence and faulty assumptions havecaused the concepts stimulating function to exceed itsintegrat ing one. This monograph examines the coherence ofthe defini t ion of RDO, identi fies and analyzes several of it scr i t ical assumpt ions, recommends a method for ident i fyingother assumptions, and then proposes a reasonablealternati ve to RDO.

The Concept Defi ned.

RDO is incoherent, containing no rationale for rapidoperati ons and only an impart ial defini t ion of decisive ones.While the White Paper identif ies the requirementsnecessary to make RDO rapid and decisive, it is not clearwhether RDO can occur if some of the requirements areabsent. It is also difficult to understand why the UnitedStates should invest more defense dollars to develop RDOwhen it has very l imi ted applicati on across the spectrum ofoperations (i.e., the concept is most appl icable in high-end,smaller scale contingencies such as Grenada, Haiti,

Panama, and Desert Shield) and since i t merely per fects anapproach to war in which the United States is alreadysuperior.

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Cri t i cal Assum pt ions.

While definitional contradictions and inconsistenciescan be easily corrected, the same is not true of criticalassumpt ions. RDOs fi rst and most egregious assumpt ion isthat t he Nat ional Command Author it ies (NCA) wi ll desir emi l i tary forces that are rapid and decisive in all scenarios.Political leaders might well prefer a gradual approach inmost cases.

The second faulty assumption is that U.S. forces willpossess perfect or near-perfect knowledge of the enemy.Information technologies have not yet l ived up to

expectati ons in this regard.

The thi rd flawed assumpt ion underpinni ng RDO is thatan adversary is a system of systemsthat can be paral yzed bya few well-placed strikes against his critical nodes.Although a worthy goal, history shows that such paralysisrarely occurs.

A fourth faulty assumption is that one can identify,att ack, and destroy whatever an adversary values most, andin so doing break his will to fight. Ideology and politicalreali t ies make this a faci le solut ion for some situat ions and

completely unr eali st ic for others.The fi fth fault y assumpt ion under lyi ng RDO is that all

elements of national power can be brought together in asingle operation that is both rapid and decisive. Forexample, some of the most potent tools of economicpowerblockades and sanct ionsgeneral ly r equire a greatdeal of time to work and often entail a signif icant amount ofcollateral damage.

I dent i f y i ng and Analyzin g Assum pt ions.

Concept development would benefi t fr om a process thatrequired the identif ication and analysis of crit icalassumptions. With minor effort one could modify theAssumption-Based Planning tool developed by the RAND

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Corporation for such uses. Assumption-Based Planning

involves five steps: 1) identifying the explicit and implicitassumpt ions expected to remain t rue over a reasonable t imehorizon; 2) identifying assumption vulnerabilities; 3)defining signposts that will indicate when one or moreassumpt ions has become vulnerable; 4) def in ingappropriate shaping actions that avoid assumptionvulnerabilities; and 5) defining hedging actions thatminimize the impact of an assumption failure. However,even Assumpt ion-Based Planning is not a sil ver bul let.

An Alt er nati ve Concept .

Whereas RDO focuses on at tacking an opponent s cent erof gravit y or t hreatening what he values most, a concepttha t concen t ra tes on in te rdependen tor fu l l yJointmaneuver would permit policymakers to determinefor themselves what the military instrument shouldaccompl ish. The Joint Staff s exper imenters should analyzethe kinds of pol it ical object ives that U .S. mil i tary forces wi llmost likely have to accomplish over the next 15-20 years,and then develop ways to get at them. Attacking what theenemy values most is not always the best route to theobjective.

In sum, RDO fails in its integrative function. It is anincoherent concept tha t res ts on severa l fau l tyassumpt ions. To prevent such concepts from creating falseexpectati ons and leading to potent iall y disastrous resul ts,the U.S. military will need a process for identifying andanalyzing assumpt ions in concept development .

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RAPI D DECISIVE OPERATI ONS:

AN ASSUM PTI ONS-BASED CRI TI QUE

Antu l i o J. Echevarr ia I I

Whether one bel ieves that the cur rent t ransformat ion ofthe U.S. military is part of a comprehensive Revolution inMil i tary Affai rs (RMA) or merely a reasonable response toevolving operational and strategic demands, change is

clearly underway. Yet, technological innovationa majordriver of such changeplays a paradoxical r ole in mi l i tarytransformation. Today, a growing number of weapons canstrike with greater accuracy over extended distances;however, t hose same or simi lar weapons in t he hands of anadversary will mean significant anti-access challenges forfr iendly forces. Innovat ions in fuel and propulsion systemsmay help to reduce the cumbersome logistical tail ofmaneuver forces, but the longer distances that such forcesmust t raverse wi ll , in turn, put addit ional str ains on thosesystems. Information and communication systems can

enhance operational control and facilitate decentralizedoperations, yet they also require larger staffs and moreski l led junior leaders t rained to operate independent ly. In afinal example, advances in biogenetic engineering havealready revealed several ways to increase (as well asexploit) the physical capacities of individual soldiers;however, they have also raised complex moral and ethicalquestions about doing so. In short, with each problem theysolve, technological innovations tend to introduce newchal lenges or compl icat ions.

Fortunately, operational concepts can partly reconcile

such tensions. They can find the optimal balance betweentechnological strengths and weaknesses. If technologicalinnovations do not permit the reduction of logistical tails,for example, operational concepts could aim at achieving

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the best possible results within existing logistical

constraints. Concepts also provide a mark on the wall fortechnological development, stimulating the research anddevelopment communities to move beyond currentcapabilities toward those described in vision documentssuch as Joint Vision 2020(JV2020). In short, operationalconcepts occupy t he intel lectual space between doctr ine andvision and help convert desired capabilities (vision) intosomething practicable (doctrine). Hence, operationalconcepts perform two vital functions (integrating andst imulat ing) in the course of a mi li tarys t ransformati on.

The concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)

attempts to serve both purposes.1 Its developers clearlyintended to use it to put a very high mark on the wall inorder to st imulate research and development . For that , theydeserve high praise. They also deserve high praise forhaving made numerous improvements in the concept,especiall y over the last 6 months or so.

However, whi lestretchingoperat ional concepts can helppulltechnological development, hi story shows that conceptscan sometimes get too far ahead of emerging capabilities.When they do, such concepts tend to fail in t heir in tegrat ivefunction and create expectations that can lead todisappointing, if not disastrous, results. RDOs developershave, in fact, emphasized their concepts stimulatingfunction at the cost of its integrating one and haveconsequent ly generated a number of dubious expectat ions.

An object ive analysis of t he concept reveals that not onlyis the defini t ion of RDO incoherent , it rests on a number offaul ty assumpt ions. If left uncorrected, these faul ts wi l l notonly undermine the concepts overall effectiveness, theycould well result in adverse consequences for the militaryforces of the United States. This monograph examines the

coherence of the definition of RDO, identifies and analyzesseveral of its critical assumptions, recommends a methodfor identifying other assumptions, and then proposes areasonable alt ernative to RDO.

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The Concept Defi ned.

According to its White Paper (dated August 9, 2001),RDO was intended to function as an integrating conceptor ient ed on high-end, small -scale cont ingencies in t he 2015time frame.2

RDO:

will integrate knowledge, command and control, and

effects-based operat ions to achieve the desiredpolitical/military effect. In preparing for and conducting an

RDO, the mil it ary acts in concert w it h and leverages the other

inst ruments of nat ional power t o understand and reduce the

regional adversarys critical capabilities and coherence. TheUnited States and its allies asymmetrically assault the

adversary from direct ions and i n dimensions against which hehas no counter, dictat ing the terms and tempo of the operati on.

The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherenceand unable

to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that areagainst U.S. int erests or has his capabil it ies defeated.3

Unfortunately, the definit ion is incoherent. Forexample, it contains no menti on of any rati onale for maki ngRDO rapid. Everything in the definition would applyequally well to an operation conducted in a gradual or

del iberate manner. Moreover, it impl ies that being decisivemeans the adversary chooses t o cease act ivi t ies that areagainst U.S. interests. However, a better definition ofdecisive would include not only forcing the enemy to ceasecerta in act iv i t iessuch as ethnic c leansingbutcompell ing him to commence others, such as the wit hdrawalof hi s armed forces.

The definition also states that, in RDO, the UnitedStates and its all ies would assault the adversaryasymmetr icall y fr om direct ions and in dimensions againstwhich he has no count er . This sentence impl ies that RDOcan occur only via asymmetric ways and will never takeplace against an adversary that possesses an asymmetriccount er , however l imi ted. Also, the emphasis on at tackingan opponent scoherence(not defined unt i l some pages later)

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suggests that an enemy fighting incoherently is not a

concern. With the proliferation of Chemical, Biological,Radiological, Nuclear, High-explosive/High-yield (CBRNE)weapons that is expected to occur by 2015-20, even anadversary suffering from loss of coherence can poseserious security challenges to the United States and itsall ies. I t is also dif fi cul t to see how an incoherent adversarycan make his forces comply with desired peace terms.

The defini t ions inconsistencies notwi thstanding, RDOsdevelopers deserve high praise for combining (or attempt ingto combine) two sometimes conflicting propertiesspeedand decisivenessinto a single operational concept. This is

a bold endeavor. Speeddefined as accomplishing theobjectives of the campaign as rapidly as possibleanddecisivenessdefined as imposing our will on the enemyby breaki ng his coherence and defeat ing his wil l and abi l it yto resistare relative properties.4 Each depends on anadversarys capabilities and will to resist. Historically, thedesire to arr ive faster has competed wi th t he need to havethe force necessary upon arrival to compel an adversary tosubmit . Neit her property should be str essed at t he expenseof the other. Yet, while some advances in both maneuverand firepower technologies will likely occur by 2015, the

probabil it y remains high that some tension wil l st il l existbetween speed and decisiveness. Concept developers willhave to address that tension to ensure the synergy thatoccurs when speed and decisiveness are combined is notlost.

The White Paper also identifies the requirementsnecessary to make RDO rapid and decisive. However, thelarge number of requirements begs the question as towhether RDO can occur if some of the requirements areabsent. If not, one has to wonder why the United Statesshould invest in a concept that is so bri t t le. For example, to

achieve speed, RDO must have:

Knowledge: Detailed understanding of enemy andourselves;

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Earl y start to planning, t imely decisions;

Forward presence and rapid movement;

Tai lored forces and sustainment;

Intense high tempo of operati ons;

Respons iv e C2 Syst ems, es tab l i shed j oi n theadquarters element, and compressed decision process.5

Simi lar ly, to achieve decisiveness, RDO must have:

Knowledge: Ident ify and affect what is most valuableto enemy;

Effects-based operat ions employing ful l range ofnati onal capabil it ies;

Info super iori ty, dominant maneuver , and precisionengagement to apply synchronized precision effects togenerate overwhelming shock;

Responsive C2 Systems and shortened response cycle;

Relent lessness.6

Indeed, one could well make the argument that suchcapabilities would enable just about any operational

concept t o work. I t is, therefore, diffi cul t to understand whythe United States should invest more defense dollars todevelop a conceptsuch as RDOthat applies only to alimited portion of the spectrum of operations, namely,high-end, smaller-scale contingencies such as Grenada,Haiti, and Panama.7 Furthermore, RDO merely seeks toperfect an approach to war in which the United States isalready superior. Instead, the U.S. military should investmore resources in developing concepts for those scenariosthat occupy the middle to lower end of the spectrum. Mostproject ions of t he future secur i ty envi ronment assign a high

probability of occurrence to such operations for the next10-15 years; and such scenar ios have t radit ional ly posed thegreatest challenges for U.S. forces.8

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Cri t i cal Assum pt ions.

While definitional contradictions and inconsistenciescan be easily corrected, the same is not true of criticalassumptions. Correcting faulty assumptions may requirereworki ng the fundamental concept ent irely. RDO is basedon a number of faul ty assumpt ions, but this monograph wi l lanalyze only t he most cr i t ical here.

The first and most egregious assumption that RDOmakes is that the National Command Authorities (NCA)

wi l l understand t he need for, or even desire, operati ons thatare rapid and decisive in all scenarios. The White Papercontinually stresses speed in the application of force.However, the NCA may consider a graduat ed response moreappropr iate for any number of reasons, such as the desire toavoid escalation to nuclear weapons or to keep allies orcoali t ion partners in t he fight . Thus, whil e RDO purports tooffer the NCA additional options, it actually diminishesthem, compelling decisionmakers to embark upon a majorcommitment of forces even in a small-scale contingency.This inflexible, one-sided approach to military strategy

plunged Western Europe into a devastati ng confl ict in 1914when all -or -nothing war pl ans deprived poli t ical leaders ofthe flexibility of pursuing limited aims. Therefore, whilecalling for an integrated application of all nationalcapabil i t ies for the accompl ishment of pol it ical object ives,RDO actually treats military operations in a vacuum,disassociat ing them from poli t ical aims.

The second faulty assumption in RDO relates toknowledge (defined above). RDO asserts that U.S. forceswi l l possess perfect or near-per fect knowledge of the enemythr ough an Operational N et Assessment (ONA)defined as

a continuously updated, system-of-systems analysis of theadversarys total war-making capabil i t ies matched againstlikely courses of action.9 Yet, it is unclear how suchcontinuous ONA updates will occur rapidly (if at all)

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without greater resources, such as larger staffs, at each

level of command. Artificial intelligence and similarsystems have so far not lived up to expectations in thisregard. Furthermore, while information systems haveshown themselves capable of amassing vast amounts ofdata, data itself is not necessarily information andinformati on i s not necessari ly knowledge.

As a corollary, RDO assumes that such knowledgeenables the key links and nodes within an adversaryssystems to be ident i fi ed and at tacked. RDO also presumesthat attacking those nodes will produce predictablefirst,second, and even third-order effects that can collapse an

adversarys wil l and/or destroy his capabil i ty to resist .10TheWhite Paper defines such Effects-Based Operations as aprocess for obtain ing a desired strategic out come or effect on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative, andcumulative application of the full range of military andother national capabilities at the tactical, operational, andstrategic levels. An effect is defined as the physical,functional, or psychological out come, event , or consequencethat results from specific mil itary and non-militaryactions.11

Efforts to explore effects-based operations are, first ofall, to be applauded for moving away from the oldforce-on-force Lanchester war-gaming models, whichreduced warfare to a simple calculus of attrition.12 Thisapproach also has the benefit, as retired Marine GeneralAnthony Zinni remarked, of forcing political and militaryleaders to focus on the specific effects they want military(and nonmi li tary) act ion t o achieve.13

However, the White Paper treats the effects as ends inthemselves, rather than connecting them to political andstrategic objectives. Once again, this assumption

presupposes that an opponent is nothing more than amappablesystem. Worse sti l l , thi s system is assumed to bereactive rather than proactive, and static rather thandynamic. When asked to describe effects-based operations,

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fo r examp le , a sen io r o f f i c ia l i nvo lved in the

experimentation process said that they amounted to anapproach that dissolves the glue that holds a tabletogether, rather than striking at its individual legs.14

Unfortunately, this metaphor reflects a tendency to viewadversaries as inert objectsas tableswaiting to be hit,rather than as thinking beings capable of acting first, orindeed of preempting ones attack. In other words, RDOpresupposes an enemy that does not attempt to anticipateor preempt hosti le actions or seek to change hisdecisionmaking apparatus before we can map it.

The thi rd flawed assumpt ion underpinni ng RDO is that

an adversary is a system of systems. This phrase, whichderives from a combination of RMA-speak and languageconcerning compl ex adaptive systems employed bycomplexity theorists, is merely a trendy and ultimatelyineffective way to describe the total sum of an adversaryspo l i t i ca l , s t ra teg ic , opera t iona l , and tac t i ca ldecisionmaking activities.15 The phrase first originatedamong those RMA proponents who sought to t iesensor-shooter-assessor linkages together into a single,holistic, information-sharing system that could perform allcritical combat functions.16 While the term compl ex

adaptive systemmay well convey the sense that opponentscan adapt t o their envi ronment in complex (and successful)ways, it does not impart suff icient proactiveagency to them.In other words, it assumes that they are primarilyreactiveinnovating within the constraints of theirenvi ronmentrather than att empt ing to step beyond thoseboundaries. Hence, the RDO White Paper s use of t he termtends to limi t the choices that an adversary might select .

Furthermore, the assumption presupposes that anadversary can be paralyzed by a few well-placed strikesagainst its critical nodes. Al though a wort hy goal, hi story

shows that such paralysis rarely occurs. Adversaries tend torecover rather quickly from an initial shock. Often, thesevered pieces of an opponents armed forces tend to fighton, carrying out the last orders they received (e.g., the Red

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Army in 1941-42) or taking actions independent of orders

(e.g., the U.S. Army in the Battle of the Bulge, 1944). Aspreviously mentioned, in an age of proliferating CBRNEweapons, the actions of such severed elements cannot beconsidered irrelevant. An adversarys military forces,carrying out the last orders they received, can still launchdevastating CBRNE attacksovertly and covertlyagainst the United States, or one of its strategic partners.Thus, the advantage of attacking the enemys coherencemay belost . Moreover, whi le RDO wi l l presumably cont inueto evolve as a conceptreflecting the results of furtherexperimentation, exploration, and critical analysisthe

ster il it y of war-gaming envir onments wil l make it diff icult ,if not impossible, to discover what factors, if any, wouldactually lead to an opponents psychological collapse.

A fourth faulty assumption underpinning RDO is thatthe United States or its coalition partners can identify,att ack, and destroy whatever an adversary val ues most, andin so doing break his will to fight.17 This assumptionpresupposes that U.S. adversaries would conform to thesame rational-actor model that characterizes its ownbehavior. However, models that describe the behaviors ofideologues can differ markedly fr om our own. For example,

during the missile crisis of 1962, Fidel Castro and CheGuevara considered i t per fect ly reasonable to sacr i fi ce Cubain a nuclear exchange with the United States in order tofur ther the cause of social ism. Fort unately, the Soviets didnot agree, believing that the United States would alsolaunch missiles at the USSR.18 Even in the simplestscenar ioswhere what an adversary values most is powerrather than ideologydomestic or coalition concerns maynot permit the United States to employ the capabilitiesnecessary t o get at the basic sour ce of an opponent s power,whatever that may be. Thus, asserting that RDO will

deprive an enemy of what he values most is too facile asolut ion for some situations and completely unr eali st ic forothers.

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The fi fth fault y assumpt ion under lyi ng RDO is that all

elements of national power can be brought together in asingle operati on t hat is both r apid and decisive.19 Yet, thepaper includes no discussion of just how RDOand mil it arypower in generalwould actually operate in combinationwith the other elements of national power, aside from thebenefi t the Joint Task Force commander would der ive fromadditional information (if indeed this is a benefit). Forexample, some of the most potent tools of economicpowerblockades and sanct ionsgeneral ly r equire a greatdeal of time to work and often entail a signif icant amount ofcol lateral damage. I t is not clear, t herefore, that RDO and

economic sanct ionsor other toolscould work together toproduce resul ts that are both r apid and decisive, at least notwithout substantial modification. Such integration, ifpossible at al l, could produce a powerful synergy. The Whi tePaper must, however, do more than assert that suchintegration should occur: it must discuss how RDOintegrates each element of national power and theadvantages and disadvantages involved in doing so.

I dent i f y i ng and Analyzin g Assum pt ions.

With good reason, U.S. defense planners explicitly

ident i fy assumpt ions made in t he development of war plans.While the process for explicitly identifying planningassumptions is neither scientific nor foolproof, it isextremely valuable because it makes war planners anddecisionmakers more cognizant of at least some of t he plansinherent risks. Such an awareness would also provetremendously valuable for concept developers who couldthen address a concepts inherent risks. However, to date,no process for identifying and analyzing assumptions isincluded in the development of operational concepts. Thenumerous faulty assumptions underpinning RDO only

underscore the need for such a process.

One possible tool for examining assumptions is theAssumption-Based Planning tool, an instrument for

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long-range planning, developed by the RAND Corporation,

that has ga ined cur rency in recent years .20

Assumption-Based Planning involves five steps: 1)identifying the explicit and implicit assumptions expectedto remain t rue over a reasonable time hor izon; 2) ident i fyingassumpt ion vulnerabil it ies; 3) defining signpoststhat wil lindicate when an assumption has become vulnerable; 4)defining appropr iateshapingact ions that avoid assumpt ionvulnerabilities; and 5) defining hedging actions thatminimize the impact of an assumpt ion failure. Alt hough itdoes not claim to be a panacea, Assumpt ion-Based Planningdoes offer a much improved alternative to trends-based

forms of planning which posit only a single (usual ly eithermost likely or worst case) future.21 Most important,Assumption-Based Planning helps expose organizationalassumptions that might prove invalid, and thereforedangerous, to a long-range plan in a given per iod of t ime. I tssuccess depends on the ability of decisionmakers to linktheir implicit and explicit assumptions to events in thephysical world. With some adjustment, the methodologypresented in Assumpt ion-Based Planni ng could apply t o thecraft ing of visiondocument s as well as to the development offuture operational concepts. In other words, with littleadjustment, Assumption-Based Planning could become anAssumpt ion-Based Concept Development tool.

Assumption-Based Concept Development would thushelp ident ify t he cr it ical assumpt ions underpinning RDO.For example, wit h r egards to RDOs fi rst assumpt ionthatit is an appropriate, indeed necessary, response in anys i tua t ion invo lv ing a h igh -end , sma l le r sca lecontingencyAssumption-Based Concept Developmentwould guide concept developers first to identify theassumptions vulnerabilities. An example of such avulnerability is that history shows that U.S. political

leaders have tended to hedge their bets in crises by optingfor a graduated response so as to avoid escalation orover-commitment. Thus, RDO might have little appeal tothem. Second, Assumption-Based Concept Development

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would guide concept developers to define signposts for

indicating just how vulnerable this assumption is, andvalidate those vulnerabil it ies through r igorous war games.Third, once assumption vulnerabilities are validated,concept developers would then seek shaping adjustment s tothe concept that might make RDO more flexible, and thusmore pract icable and appealing to the poli t ical leadership.Finally, Assumption-Based Concept Development wouldguide concept developers to incorporate hedgingadjustments into the concept, admi t t ing, for example, thatit has very limited applicability except at specific pointsalong the spectrum of operations.

However, us ing Assumpt ion-Based ConceptDevelopment would also require a basic understanding ofthe tools limitations. The first of these involves thesensitivity of human perceptions. Assumption-BasedConcept Development would require the identification ofgenuine and unambiguous signposts.22 Yet, in f luidenvironments, signposts are myriad, conflicting, and attimes almost invisible. For example, strategic bombingtheory was inspired by events dur ing World War I , such asthe bombing of L ondon by German zeppel ins whi ch caused atemporary wave of panic among the Br i t ish populati on. The

assumption derived from this and similar events was thatmassive air bombardments could win wars by themselves.However, as World War II showed, such bombardmentstended to strengthen rather than collapse an adversaryswill to fight.23 In other words, nogenuine and unambiguoussignpost appeared to indicate that the fundamentalassumpt ion of str ategic bombing theory was flawed.

In addition to the very real problem of signpostdetection, Assumption-Based Concept Developmentimplies that the identification of explicit and implicitassumpt ions is easy. An organizat ions abil i ty to ident i fy i ts

assumptions depends upon its willingness to performrigorous self-crit ical analyses. In other words, theident if icat ion of expli cit and impl icit assumpt ions might notproceed much beyond a superfi cial analysis.

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Third, shaping and hedging actions will compete for

finite resources, possibly leading to a situation in whichpreparing for one precludes achieving success in another.For example, shaping act ions in all armies at t he turn of thecentury propelled improvements in firepower technologies,especiall y cannon, muni t ions, and powder, so that by 1914,art il lery had increased dramati cally in number and calibre.However, resources demanded by this and other shapingact ions far exceeded those invested in appropr iate hedgingactions such as the development of armored fightingvehicles. In a world of limited budgets, therefore, militaryestabl ishments must balance resources among shaping and

hedging actions, an activity that might complicateif notcompromi sethe development of operat ional concepts overthe long term. If the processes for achieving technologicalintegration are not flexible and responsive, therefore, theaccurate ident i fi cati on of signposts and assumpt ions mightnot matter.

Four th, in a dynamic global envi ronment such as todaysin which technological change could well occur withininstitutional decision or adjustment cycles, hedgingac t ionswhi le appear ing to remedy vu lne rab leassumpt ionsmight only fur ther reduce the overall pace of

technological integration. Assumption-Based ConceptDevelopment will not eliminate the risks that decisionmakers face as they attempt to determine the rightpace ofmodernization for the U.S. mi li tary. Changing too quickl ycould result in acquiring immature or inappropriatecapabilities or might even undermine the doctrinalorganization or cohesion essential to a military force.Modernizing too slowly, on t he other hand, runs the r isk offielding a force with outclassed and, therefore, restrictedcapabilities.

The point of airing these concerns is to emphasize that

Assumpt ion-Based Concept Development is merely a tool. I tis only one of many ways to examine the assumptions thatunderpin operational concepts. Other weaknesses in theprocessespecially in an environment in which change is

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rapid, pervasive, and nonlinearcould well compromise

the overall effort . The value of a t ool l ik e Assumpt ion-BasedConcept Development depends upon how well i tcompensates for human limitations within a particularenvironment. It certainly offers no silver bullets. In anycase, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) would do well tom a in ta i n a push-pul l approach for incorporat ingtechnological innovations into operational concepts.Operational concepts drive technology toward desiredend-stat es, whi le technology offers new capabil i t iesactualand potentialthat might enlarge, cancel, or otherwisealter operational concepts.

An Alt er nati ve Concept .

Concept developers should bui ld enough elast ici ty int o aconcept so that it can accommodate shaping and hedgingact ions. As we have seen, as an operat ional concept , RDO istoo r igid and several of i ts cr i t ical assumpt ions are flawed.Rather than revising RDO, concept developers might dobet ter to scrap it ent irely in favor of a concept that focuses onmaki ng movement and fi re interdependent for the purposeof accompl ishing a broad range of poli t ical object ives, fr omthe poli t ical defeat of an adversary to the mere destruct ion

of his offensive capabilities. Whereas RDO focuses onattacking an opponents center of gravity or threateningwhat he values most, a concept that concentrates oninterdependencecall i t interdependent maneuver or anyname that conveys mutual dependencewould permitpoli cymakers more flexibil it y in determining just what themilitary instrument should accomplish in any particularsituation.24

As we have seen, RDO tends to t ie the hands of t he NCAby permi t t ing only one ki nd of response to any number of

smaller scale contingencies. Enough historical data existsto enable the Joint Staffs experimenters to identify andanalyze the poli t ical object ives that U .S. mil i tary forces wi l lmost likely have to accomplish over the next 15-20 years.

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Our focus then, as military professionals, should be on

developing a force and attendant concepts to accomplishthose var ious object ives more effect ively and effi cient ly. Toooft en, however, mi l i tary exper imentati on t ends to focus ondefeating an opponent in a largely convent ional scenar io onthe assumpt ion that i t i s the most di ffi cul t t ask and that , if itcan be accomplished, so too can most other tasks.

Simply put, interdependent maneuver would meanapplying the principl es of fi re and movement to the tact ical,operational, and strategic levels of war simultaneously. Itwould amount to elevating a tactical concept to anoperational and strategic one. Yet, the advance, or expected

advance, of information, maneuver, and firepowertechnologies over t he next 15-20 years (the focus of JV 2020)makes such an approach feasible. Interdependentmaneuver would also exploit the fact that the tactical,operational, and strategic levels of war can be seen as asingle continuum of military activity.25

The levels of war have actually never been more thanarbitrary categories used to help military planners assignobjectives, resources, and responsibilities to subordinatecommands in an att empt to manage confl ict. I n 21st centurywarfare, therefore, it might pr ove more useful to see warfareas an open (rather than closed) system of militaryactionswhether hand-to-hand combat or strategicbombinglinked together i n t ime and space by a growingvari ety of informati on systems. I t might also prove useful tosee those actions as divided into two parts: a) firetheabil it y to infl ict lethali ty, whether by the tip of a bayonet ora computer virus; and b) movementthe physicalrelocati on necessary t o del iver that lethali ty, whether by asoldier crawling across the battlefield or pressing acomputer key.

Interdependent maneuver would t hus bring the synergyof fi re and movement t o what t radit ionall y have been knownas the operational and strategic levels of war . For example,once the decision is made to employ military force in

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response to a crisis, interdependent maneuver means that

integrat ed ground, naval , and aerospace forces would beginmoving int o the theater whi le at the same t ime laying downsuppressive fir es throughout. Such fi res would engage whattraditionally would have been considered the adversarystactical forces, as well as his operational and strategicreserves, and other cri t ical strategic assets. The fi res wouldof course be a combination of aerospace, land, and navalsystems employing lethal as well as nonlethal weapons tofacilitate the insertion of ground units. These units wouldinitially consist primarily of special forces equipped withreach-back suppor t and nonli ne-of-sight fi res. They would

deploy in and around key terrain to provide humanintelligence, report battle damage assessment, augmentother special operations forces already in theater, andinterdict enemy movements wi th r each-back fi res.

The suppressive effects of f ires executed throughout thetheater would in turn enable additional aerospace, naval,and perhaps heavier ground forces to arr ive in theater and,situation permitting, deploy directly into combat. Theseforces would exploit the known seamseither already inexistence or created by interdiction firesin the enemysdefensive zones and maneuver to obtain a position of

advantage. In the meantime, suppressive fires wouldcontinue throughout, developing the synergy that comesfrom fire and movement. Interdependent maneuver thuspresents an adversary with a constant rain of destructionthr oughout h is ent ire defensive zone, as well as the thr eat ofinevitable capture or destruction by ground maneuverforces via t he close fight .

Interdependent maneuver has an added benefi t in t hatit applies just as well to scenarios that resemble peopleswars more than they do traditional maneuver conflicts. Ifsuch a war is in the first phasebuilding a political

baseinterdependent maneuver would likely entail lesssuppressive fi res and a greater number of ground elementsso as to isolate enemy forces from the indigenouspopulati on, destroy their supply caches, and int erdict t heir

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effort s to reestablish a l ogistics flow. I f t he peoples war is in

the second phaseexpansioninterdependent maneuverwould be employed to preempt further expansion.Suppressive fires and ground elements would operate intandem to reduce known enemy concentrations, effectisolation, and erode indigenous support . The third phase ofa peoples warfull scale counter offensiveresembles aconventi onal confl ict and most l ikely would be dealt wi th asdiscussed above.

Interdependent maneuver is much more than linkingground maneuver with halt-phase doctrine, which claimsthat air power alone can decisively defeat a large-scale

armored att ack. Fir st , int erdependent maneuver call s for afully Jointapproach from the outset, generating synergywith the interaction between fire and movement, ratherthan placing the burden of success on one dimension withthe others absent or only in supporting roles. Second,halt -phase doct r ine applies only t o a very l im ited segment ofthe threat spectrum; it cannot effect ively address a peopleswar, for example. In fact, the type of conflict to whichhal t -phase doctr ine appl ies, namely, armored engagementsin relatively open terrain as in the Middle East or theKorean peninsula, is becoming rarer.26 By contrast,

interdependence is based upon the principle of presentingan adversary wit h a dual threatdestruct ion by fir e or bythe close fight. As lethal and accurate as it is, aerospacepower alone is simply too easy to counter. American jointforces need a truly integrative operational concept thatgives them every possible mi l i tary advantage.

In conclusion, changes wrought by the tr ansformat ion ofthe U.S. military will not necessarily make warfare lessdif ficul t . The means of war fare wi l l cont inue to changeatt imes very rapidly, but at other t imes much more slowly. Tokeep proper pace wi th such changes, U.S. forces wi l l need an

operat ional concept that is both integrat ive andstimulative. Unfortunately, RDO fails in its integrativefunction. It is an incoherent concept that rests on severalfaul ty assumpt ions. To prevent such concepts fr om creating

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false expectations and leading to potentially disastrous

resul ts, the U.S. mil i tary wi ll need a process for i dent i fyingand analyzing assumpt ions in concept development , as wellas a process for developing the necessary shaping andhedging actions to address those assumptions. Suchprocesses might lead to a revolut ion in concept developmentthat JFCOM could lead. This revolut ion would advance theview t hat warfare is an open r ather than a closed systemaphenomenon compr ised of dynamic, in teract ive dimensionsthat do not necessari ly lend t hemselves to systems analysis.A revolut ion in concept development would onlycomplement the Services cur rent t ransformat ion effort s by

creating an adaptive intellectual framework that wouldhelp exploit (or temper) dramatic advances in technology.

ENDNOTES

1. Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) White Paper, United StatesJoint Forces Command (JFCOM), J9 Joint Fut ures Lab, Coordinat ingDraft (Version 2.0), dated August 9, 2001. RDO synthesizes a broadrange of ideas ext racted from work s by RAND, the Insti tute for DefenseAnalyses, Defense Group, Inc., and others. It remains a work in progressand will li kely undergo fur ther r efinement in t he near fut ure, especial lyin the course of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)experimentation efforts Millennium Challenge 2002 and Olympic

Challenge 2004.

2. It builds upon the operational concepts outlined in JV2020: FullSpectrum Dominance, Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement,Focused Logisti cs, and Ful l-dimensional Protect ion.

3. RDO, p. ii . Emphasis added.

4. The White Paper (p. 9) attempts to ascribe absolute andrelative properties to speed, but as Einstein showed in his generaltheory of relativity published in 1905, speed and time are alwaysrelative.

5. RDO, p. 9.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. i .

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8. See Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future,http:/ / www.cia.gov/ cia/ publi cations/ globaltr ends2015.

9. RDO, pp. 16-17.

10. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy J. Sakulich, USAF, PrecisionEngagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise or Wi shfulThinking? Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, April 2001, usescomplexity theory to refute the notion that precision engagement canproduce desired effects wi th any degree of cer taint y.

11. RDO, pp. 5, A-2.

12. C. J. Anker, Jr ., and A. V. Gafarian, The Vali di ty of Assumpt ionsUnderl ying Cur rent Uses of L anchester Attr it ion Rates,White Sands,

NM: TRADOC, 1988.

13. Christian Lowe, In Exercise, U.S. Mil i tary PracticesUnconventional Warfare, Defense Week, May 21, 2001, p. 2. Theexercise referr ed to is Uni fi ed Vision, conducted fr om M ay 3-24, 2001.

14. Lowe, Unconvent ional War fare, p. 2.

15. This new paradigm assumes that continuous change anddynamic interaction, rather than equil ibr ium, represent the universesnormal state. I t employs an int erdiscipl inary rather t han a segregatedapproach to science, borrowing from discipl ines as disparat e as biology,economics, physics, and chemistr y t o help explain t he dynamic natur e ofphysical phenomena. The fundamental pr incipl es of thi s new paradigmmaintain that: 1) every component within a system, no matter howsmall or seemingly insignificant, plays a part in final outcomedetermination; therefore, we must treat systems holistically ratherthan focusing only on keyplayers; 2) predictable and nonpredictablephenomena coexist and interact in the physical world producingcomplex networks containing too many variables or relationships toconsistently calculate outcomes; 3) a small change in the input to asystem can result in disproportionate effects; 4) systems, whetherindividuals, armies, or bureaucracies, tend to evolve toward greatercomplexi ty; and 5) these complex adapt ive systems (CAS)spontaneously reorganize t hemselves when confr onted wi th cri ses; inthese moments of challenge we generally find the system at its mostinnovati ve and creati ve. The foll owing are helpful for understanding thebasics of complexity theory: James Gleick, Chaos: Making a NewScience, New York: Vi ki ng, 1987; M. Mi tchell Waldrop,Complexity: TheEmerging Science at the Edge of Chaos, New York : Simon and Schuster,1992; John H. Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems, Daedalus, Vol.

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CXXI, Winter 1992, pp. 17-30; Alan D. Beyerchen, Clausewitz,Nonlineari ty, and the Unpredictabil it y of War, International Secur it y,Vol. XVII, Winter 1992-93, pp. 82-90; and Jack Snyder and RobertJervis, eds., Coping with Complexity in the International System,Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

16. For an example, see Admi ral Wi ll iam A. Owens, The EmergingU.S. System of Systems, in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: TheWinning Edge, Mar t in Li bicki and Stuart Johnson, eds., Washington,DC: National Defense University, 1996, p. 3.

17. RDO, p. 9.

18. During the 1962 missile crisis, Guevara wrote of the need towalk by the path of li beration even when it may cost mi ll ions of atomic

victims. Castro was less fanatical, but also refused to retreat from thepossibility of nuclear holocaust.

19. RDO, pp. 9-10, 14-20.

20. James Dewar, Car l Bui lder, Wil li am Hix, and Mor li e Levin,Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very UncertainTimes, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993.

21. Appendix B of Assumption-Based Planning discusses thedifferences between Assumption-Based Planning and other forms oflong-term planning.

22. Assumpt ion-Based Planning, pp. 25-26.

23. Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities and Civilians: AirpowerStrategy in Worl d War I I , Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,1993; and Richard Overy, Why the Al l ies Won, New York : W. W. Nor ton,1995, present conflicting views on the success of strategic bombing.

24. For a more detailed discussion of i nt erdependent maneuver, seeEchevarr ia, I nterdependent Maneuver.

25. On the idea of the merging levels of war, see Douglas A.Macgregor , Fut ure Batt le: The Merging Levels of War, Parameters,Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 33-47.

26. Halt -Phase advocates have made broad claims for t he concept .See Rebecca Grant , Airpower and the Total Force: The Gift of Time,Ar li ngton, VA: I RIS Independent Research, 1998. For an example of aconcept combining hal t-phase and ground act ion i n a support role, seeJames Riggins and David E. Snodgrass, Halt Phase Plus Strategic

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Preclusion: Joint Solut ion for a Joint Problem, Parameters, Vol. 29, No.3, Autumn 1999, pp. 70-85. For cr it iques of halt -phase doctr ine, see EarlH. Tilford, Jr., Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in Old Skins . . . withPowerpoint, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College, 1998; and Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.,Clashes of Visions: Sizing and Shaping Our Forces in a FiscallyConstrained Environment in Future Warfare: An Anthology, CarlisleBarracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,1999, pp. 81-94.

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U.S. ARM Y WAR COL L EGE

Major General Rober t R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGI C STUDI ES I NSTI TUTE

DirectorPr ofessor Douglas C. L ovelace, J r .

Di r ector of Resear ch

Dr . St even M et z

Author

L ieutenant Colonel Ant ul io J. Echevarr ia I I

Dir ector of Publ i cat i onsMs. Mar iann e P. Cowl in g

Publ icati ons Assistant

M s. Rit a A. Rum mel

*****

Composition

Ms. Ki mberl y A. Rockw ell

Documents

Rapid Decisive Operations Pub218