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Language Planning and Politics in Pakistan Tariq Rahman Research Report Series # 9 1995

R9-Language Planning and Politics in Pakistan

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Page 1: R9-Language Planning and Politics in Pakistan

Language Planning and Politics in Pakistan

Tariq Rahman

Research Report Series # 9 1995

Page 2: R9-Language Planning and Politics in Pakistan

All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission of the publisher. A publication of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI). The opinions expressed in the papers are solely those of the authors, and publishing them does not in any way constitute an endorsement of the opinion by the SDPI. Sustainable Development Policy Institute is an independent, non-profit research institute on sustainable development.

RR- 009- 002- 120- 1995- 069 © 1995 by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute Mailing Address: PO Box 2342, Islamabad, Pakistan. Telephone ++ (92-51) 2278134, 2278136, 2277146, 2270674-76 Fax ++(92-51) 2278135, URL:www.sdpi.org

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Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 1

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1

Section 1(The Theory of Language Planning).................................................................... 1

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 15

Section 2 (Language Planning in Pakistan) ..................................................................... 15

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 32

References........................................................................................................................... 33

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The Sustainable Development Policy Institute is an independent, non-profit, non-government policy research institute, meant to provide expert advice to the government (at all levels), public interest and political organizations, and the mass media. It is administered by an independent Board of Governors. Board of Governors: Mr V. A. Jafarey Chairman of the Board

Syed Babar Ali Advisor, Packages Ltd.

Dr Tariq Banuri Executive Director, SDPI

Mr Hameed Haroon Pakistan Herald Publications (Pvt) Ltd.

Mr Javed Jabbar President Baanhn Beli

Ms Asma Jahnagir Chairperson Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Aban Marker Kabraji Country Representative, IUCN-Pakistan

Dr G. M. Khattak Co-ordinator, Sarhad Provincial Conservation Strategy

Abdul Rahim Mahsud Regional Representative for West Asia, Nippon Gieken Associates

Dr Amir Mohammad President ASIANICS

Imtiaz Ahmed Sahibzada Secretary, Environment and Urban Affairs Division

Dr Arshad Zaman Former Chief Economist to the Government of Pakistan In the Research Report Series, the SDPI publishes finished research papers written either by the regular staff of the Institute or affiliated researchers. These papers present research findings directly or indirectly related to sustainable and just development. These findings are meant to provide insights into economic, political, social and other issues in the context of sustainable development.

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Language Planning and Politics in Pakistan Tariq Rahman

Abstract This study aims at studying language planning (LP) in Urdu, Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Baluchi and Siraiki, with a view to understanding how it is related to political policies, aims and motivations. The study is divided into two sections. Section one provides a theoretical framework for interpreting the processes involved in, and the explicit and implicit goals of, LP; section two studies LP in Pakistan with reference to the aforementioned languages. Introduction Language Planning (LP) is the systematic manipulation of language in pursuance of certain state, or society-driven goals. Since these goals are also political -- connected with the distribution of power in a society -- LP is related to politics and governance. Pakistan has many official LP organizations: The National Language Authority (for Urdu); The Sindhi Language Authority; The Pashto Academy; The Baluchi Academy; The Brohi Academy and The Punjabi Adabi Board for promoting these languages. Besides these, many unofficial bodies and individuals, too, are engaged in LP activities. The policies pursued by the official and unofficial LP organizations (and individual planners) are also politically motivated in the widest sense of that term.

Section 1 The Theory of Language Planning Language Planning Uriel Weinreich's term, 'language planning', was popularised by the linguist Einar Haugen who defined it as follows:

The activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community (1959: 8).

This definition omits the political dimension completely since it suggests that some purely pedagogical body, presumably apolitical, carries out linguistic activities in order to facilitate the public in general in matters of grammar, spelling and usage. Among the other terms used for LP -- language engineering (Miller 1950), language development (Noss 1967), language management (Jernudd and Neustupny 1986), language treatment (Neustupny 1970) -- one finds the same kind of emphasis on what is done (i.e. engineering, management, development, etc.) as one finds in LP. However, the terms 'language policy' (Cooper 1989: 29; Paulston 1983: 55) and 'glottopolitics' (Hall 1951) do refer to the reasons for the planning -- they suggest that these reasons might have something to do with policy or with politics in general. In other words, the focus appears to shift from what is done in LP (merely planning) to why it is done (out of political interests). The following definition of LP, which will be used in this study, does not mention political policy explicitly, but the reference to 'influence' implies it.

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Language planning refers to deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes (Cooper 1989:95).

Here 'influence' means direct or indirect exercise of power -- persuasion, too, can put other people's will under one's control -- and hence to power-differentials. Those who are powerful can impose their language over others, a process which is called 'linguistic imperialism' by Phillipson who describes it as follows:

Linguistic imperialism is also central to social imperialism, which relates to the transmission of the norm and behaviour of a model social structure, and these are embedded in language (Phillipson 53-54).

This transmission of social structure and values from the centre to the periphery -- whether the centre is the industrialised West in relation to pre-industrialised cultures, or the Westernised urban areas of a country in relation to the underdeveloped rural hinterland -- is a form of cultural imperialism in Galtung's sense of that term (1980: 128). This process privileges the collectivity whose language is dominant. That is why LP can be a bone of contention between competing collectivities. Before turning to this political aspect of LP, let us examine what activities come under it. The Activities of LP By activities one means what Kloss calls LP foci (1969) and Cooper subsumes under 'what' (1989: 31), i.e. what do language planners do? These activities are (1) status planning, (2) acquisition planning, and (3) corpus planning. Status Planning The term was used by Kloss (1969) for the importance given to a language by the state. An alternative term is language allocation, i.e. 'authoritative decisions to maintain, extend, or restrict the range of uses (functional range) of a language in particular settings' (Gorman 1973: 73). As these are policy decisions, taken by governments and reinforced with the support of the apparatus of the state rather than linguists, they are obviously related to politics. Thus the decision as to which language will be the national or official language is a case of status planning by the state. Acquisition Planning This used to be related to the teaching and use of language (Cooper 1989: 31). Lately, however, 'language shift' (LS) -- the shifting of speakers from the use of one language to another', generally from a language of less power to one of more power (Fishman 1991) -- has been included in it. This means that all attempts, whether through teaching or unstructured exposure through interaction and the media, to 'increase the number of speakers of a language at the expense of another language (or languages)' (Nahir 1984: 365) are now included in it. It is, therefore, considered 'a separate analytic category' of LP (Cooper 33). However, the decision to use a language in the domain of education, in the media or in informal domains can be subsumed under status planning as well. It does, after all, extend or restrict the range of the uses of a language. That is why attempts by proto-elites (which will be defined in Section 1.3) to reverse language shift (RLS) -- i.e. start using their own language again in certain domains -- has been

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called a 'sub-category' of status planning by Fishman (1991: 381). In this study, then, acquisition planning will be considered a sub-category of status planning. Corpus Planning Corpus planning 'encompasses efforts to alter and improve the language per se whose status is the object of policy decisions and implementation attempts' (Fishman 1977a: 36). Matters like creating a new script (graphisation), reforming an existing one (regraphisation), determining the spellings of words, coining new terms to express modern concepts come under this activity. The determination of a fixed script and spellings are known as standardisation while the creation of new terms is called modernisation. In fact, both activities may be related to attempts to modernise a society, as we shall see later. Corpus planning can be, and in some cases is, done by linguists, but only after the major policy decisions about language allocation have been taken. Once the decision-makers have decided which language is to be used for administration, judicial processes and education, linguists or other people can be commissioned to spread its use (status planning). While doing so, they will standardise the script and the spellings for ease of communication, and prepare dictionaries to facilitate the translation of modern knowledge created in other cultures. This modernisation of vocabulary will then help to create new knowledge and disseminate existing knowledge. State- and Society-sponsored LP The definitions given above focus on state-initiated language planning. Indeed, many scholars do consider state-sponsored LP as the norm (Jernudd and Das Gupta 1971: 211; Rubin & Jernudd 1971: XVI; Weinstein 1980: 55). However, the achievements of individual language planners cannot be ignored. Among these are Samuel Johnson for English (Bate 1975: 240-260; Sledd & Kolb 1955); Ben Yehuda for Hebrew (Fellman 1974); Noah Webster for American English (Weinstein 1982); and St Stefan of Perm for Komi (Ferguson 1968a). Most of these planners engaged in corpus planning -- preparing dictionaries, determining spellings, and fixing other linguistic norms -- which did influence the spread of certain languages, but the decisions about using the language in one domain or another was not in their hands. Because of this distinction between LP by governmental planners and private ones, the activities of the latter are sometimes called 'language treatment' by some scholars (Jernudd 1977; Paulston 1983: 58). Such a distinction is of doubtful utility unless a conceptual distinction is made between state- and society-sponsored LP on the one hand and elite versus non-elite sponsored LP on the other. Whereas the dominant elites may be over-represented in the state apparatus, and may use it in their own interest, the abstraction called the state is distinct from these elites. It is an interlinked bureaucratic system, in the all-encompassing Weberian sense of the term (Weber 1922), which is autonomous and projects itself as an arbiter between antagonistic interest groups. A state-sponsored language policy (or act) is one which is supported, and even imposed, by the apparatus of the state. The ruling elite, or at least the members of it who administer state institutions, do, of course, appear to identify with it. However, another language policy, not actively or openly supported or imposed with the help of the apparatus of the state, might be in the interests of the ruling elite itself. Thus state-sponsored and elite-supported (or elite-approved) LP may be distinct.

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Because of the use of the apparatus of the state, state-sponsored LP helps to maintain what Gramsci called the hegemony of the dominant class over a society's subaltern classes or, in the case of multi-ethnic states, sub-nationalities. But this hegemony is not necessarily a 'question of language attaining a single cultural climate' as Gramsci argued (Gramsci 1971: 349). It is a question of subaltern classes and collectivities acquiescing in a certain factitious 'national' culture and language. The dominant class can keep using its own language -- say English or French in the ex-colonies of Europe and the King's English (Oxbridge) in England -- while keeping up the illusion that the 'nation' shares in the same culture. But when the dominated groups or classes do not accept state-sponsored LP -- and the resistance is more when the apparatus of the state is visibly used -- their LP efforts are counter-hegemonic. In this sense the Bengali language movement in former East Pakistan (1948-1954) was a counter-hegemonic movement (Alam 1991). That is why this kind of LP -- hegemonic as it is -- is generally resisted more strongly than merely elite-approved one. Society-sponsored LP includes not only the LP acts of individuals, such as the ones mentioned above, but also those undertaken by corporate unofficial bodies, ethno-nationalist proto-elitist intellectuals and resistance leaders. Even resistance to newly coined words or linguistically expressed social conventions (such as a new way of greeting or addressing people) are society-sponsored acts of LP. In this case, their very spontaneity prevents them from being classified as acts of planning, but they do affect linguistic usage. The Political Aims of Status Planning within a Country If government is seen as the domination of powerful elites over a society (Mills 1956), then politics is the process by which these elites maintain their domination. The members of the governing power elite may change either through violent means (as through coups or dynastic struggles), or peaceful ones (through elections). In this case, the opposition belongs to the same elitist groups, and the term counter-elite may be useful to describe it. If, however, the governing elite is challenged by powerless (or less powerful) groups who 'are (or feel) excluded from the power and influence they covet and ... [who] ... possess the personal gifts or material resources to move symbols and masses toward desired sociopolitical regrouping' (Fishman 1972: 15), these groups may be called proto-elites. One of the symbols mobilised by the ruling elites as well as the proto-elite is language. Let us now take both the cases of state and non-state motivated LP one by one. The Aims of the Ruling Elite The ruling elites give their own dialect the status of the national and official language. This helps them in creating nationalism -- in imagining a community where none existed. This process is summarised by Anderson as follows:

In France, for instance, the dialect of the elite of Paris was imposed as 'standard' French (the French language) whereas the other varieties of French were undervalued. The Academie Francaise then standardised the language (Cooper 1989: 3-11) and the other French dialects -- some of which were entirely different languages -- were neither taught in schools nor used in literature or in the media (Jacob & Gordon 1985).

In England there was no language academy, but the East Midlands dialect spoken in London was elevated to the status of standard English (Parker 1983: 346-347). Through the writing of dictionaries in it and through use in all privileged domains -- administration, education, the legal system, research, literature, the media -- it became powerful enough to cause a language shift in England, Scotland and Wales. In

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Wales, this shift was not complete before it was reversed in the twentieth century, but the other languages of Britain died and Scottish Gaelic survives only in remote pockets of Scotland (Grillo 1989: 84-96). By promoting either their own dialect or the one which they are fluent in, the elite facilitates its own access to the decision-making levels of the apparatus of the state in which that language is officially used. Since most of the population speaks different dialects of this language, or different languages altogether, they remain underprivileged, as access to these domains is more difficult for them. Moreover, by giving their chosen language the status of the national language, the ruling elite extends its power base as it claims to lead a nation with several minorities. A rationalisation of this aim of the elites, especially the modern ones, is what Laitin calls 'state rationalisation' (1988). This refers to Weber's concept of 'formal rationality', that is, the use of a standard procedure making administration efficient and orderly (Weber 1968: 809-838). This apparently benevolent aim, however, conceals the fact that this orderliness and efficiency is more in the interests of the ruling elite than the proto-elites which claim that translations would also contribute to efficiency while not devaluing their culture and language. Thus language serves as an integrative symbol and performs power-preserving functions for the ruling elite. The Aim of the Proto-Elites For the proto-elites, on the other hand, the state-sponsored national language may seem an imposition. If such proto-elites mobilise on the basis of ethnicity, language is one of the most common symbols chosen to express this ethnicity (Ross 1979: 9-10). Before we determine the meaning of the verb chosen as used in this study, let us look a little more closely at the concept of ethnicity. The politics of ethnicity is a problematic issue because of the conflicting views on its real nature (Fishman 1989). The primordialists argue that ethnicity is felt as shared paternity, bio-kinship, and such concepts as blood-relationship and descent are invoked (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963; Connor 1993). The instrumentalists, however, suggest that it is a modern phenomenon which helps social groups to gain greater share in power and wealth (Yinger 1981). Thus ethnicity is a construct, a method of creating a pressure group in order to increase bargaining power (Williams 1984; Deutsch 1953; Hechter 1971; Glazer & Moynihan 1975: 1-26; Young 1970). One possible way of reconciling the primordialist-instrumentalist debate is the view that the salience of certain symbols such as language, religion or the myth of paternity, etc., makes it possible to mobilise communities by appealing to them (Brass 1979: 40). People are limited by the range of concepts available to them and, as Skinner argues, these concepts are contingent upon the world-view of the society in question (Skinner 1974: 277-303). In other words, the elites too 'understand and pursue their interests within the framework of ideas they possess for understanding the world' (Robinson 1979: 81). The instrumentalist position emphasises rational goal-seeking, such as the maximisation of power and wealth, which are easier to identify than extra-rational sentiment. Hence, the frequent appeal to it in order to explain ethnicity as in the case of the Welsh and the Basque movements among others by Williams (1984). However, the role of primordialist attachments cannot be denied, however difficult it may be to quantify. Perhaps both the elites and the masses are conscious of both factors, though the leaders might be more conscious of the rational ones in some cases of mobilisation. However, although pre-modern people take factors like language for granted and elites do make them into identity-markers, the situation is different once a language movement is underway. Then the actors feel emotionally involved. They feel that they are striving for their culture and identity and not only for jobs, economic resources and political power.

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So when a language expresses ethnicity, it may be seen as a means of self-identification, a defence against becoming a cypher in modern society. It may also be a means of securing power and wealth through education and participation in the modern state. Thus a language thrusts itself as a necessary symbol upon the consciousness of the mobilising group and its leaders and may not be chosen by the leaders through purely conscious and rational calculation. This is the meaning in which the verb chosen is used in this study. In this way, Irish Gaelic was chosen by the ethno-nationalist movement of Ireland in order to strengthen a sense of identity which contributed in turn to the establishment of the Irish Free State (Macnamara 1971: 68). The French Canadians have maintained their separate identity and obtained material benefits through their efforts to increase the use of their language (Esman 1985: 55-59; Mc Connell et al 1979: 89-90). In Wales, as mentioned earlier, the Welsh language serves similar identity-maintenance functions (Williams 1984: 189-198; Grillo 1989: 83-106). In Belgium, the Flemish movement, led by underprivileged proto-elite s (Hartig 1985: 73-74), has reversed the language-shift to French which had been going on since 1930 when the French-speaking elite had made their language the sole official language of the country. Moreover, it has also gained an increased share in power and goods and services in the country (Geerts 1979: 66). In Spain, the Catalonian and Basque language movements, which had been repressed savagely (Medhurst 1977; Clark 1979), got a reprieve as part of the autonomy process in contemporary Spain (Rial 1985: 102-104). In Catalonia, for instance, the use of Catalan has increased tremendously since 1978 (Woolard & Gahng 1990). In the former Soviet Union, although in theory Stalin advocated the doctrine of languages (and cultures) being 'national in forms, socialist in content', in practice it was Russian which was privileged (Kreindler 1985b: 353-354). Thus the nationalist movements of the Soviet Union emphasised language but their attempts at LP were suppressed. The attempts generally consisted in introducing indigenous terms for Russian ones for the languages of Uzbeks (Fierman 1985: 218-219), Mordvinians (Kreindler 1985 c: 249) and Belorussians (Kreindler 1985 b: 353). Now that the former Soviet nationalities are independent nations, they make symbolic gestures in favour of their languages though Russian remains the language of common use. In the rest of the world, too, the proto-elites opposing governmental LP policies, assert their own counter-policies instead. In India, for instance, the proto-elites of South India protested against the ruling elite's policy of making Hindi the official language of the country in 1965 (Tambiah 1967: 231). Apart from attachment to the Dravidian cultural tradition, of which language was a part, students from South India also felt that they would not be able to compete for employment with students from the North whose mother tongue was Hindi (Tambiah 1967: 231). The compromise solution was the 3 + 1 language formula, according to which English and Hindi share the status of the federal languages; the state language must be learnt in the school, while people from minorities may also have to learn their own language in addition to all the others (Laitin 1989). In this case, Nehru compromised, enhancing the legitimacy of his government and promoting the image of the state as a fair arbiter of conflicting interests. In cases of compromise, the LP policies of the state are neutralised by sections of the society. When compromise does not come about, there may be communal tension. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the Sinhalese ruling elite made Sinhala the dominant language in 1956 (Gair 1983), and tried to use the coercive power of the state to create linguistic uniformity. This was opposed by the Tamil minority which asserted its own language policy, that of giving Tamil the status of a national language too, in opposition to the ruling elite's decision. This is a contributing factor in the acute social tension between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in the country (Dharmadasa 1977; Kearney 1978; Abeysekera & Gunasinghe 1987: 243-249).

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Examples may be multiplied but these are enough to make the point that policies about which language(s) will be used in what domains are connected inter alia with the distribution of power. The ruling elite makes policies to extend its power base by integrating all groups within the boundaries of the nation and, at least in its own eyes, make the nation a viable, modern member of the world community of states. As the nation-state is not a fixed entity, especially as far as the ex-colonial states are concerned, these policies are identified with the state and legitimised in its name. Thus the challenge of the proto-elites, or society in general, to these hegemonic claims both in the name of cultural diversity and deprivation are seen as acts of treason against the state rather than merely opposition to the government. The Political Aim of Status Planning Between Countries We have seen how a country's ruling elites and proto-elites may oppose each other's status planning policies for political reasons. Now we shall see how in a colonial, anti-colonial and neo-colonial situation similar policies may be used for acquiring or retaining power. The Colonial Situation Although the pre-modern imperialists -- such as the Romans and the Arabs -- also used their languages in the privileged domains of governance and learning, we shall only be concerned with the modern ones in this study. As most modern imperialists are from the West, the focus is on the language policies of Western powers -- for the sake of brevity only on British, French and Spanish ones. When the English and Spanish-speaking people settled down permanently in other parts of the world -- the English in Australia, New Zealand and parts of South Africa (the other settlers being Dutch-speakers); the Spanish and Portuguese in Latin America and parts of North America -- they simply ignored the indigenous languages. If linguistic rights were recognised, as they were in North America, they were the rights of Europeans (Heath 1981: 13). In Australia (Ozolini 1985; Ingram 1988) and New Zealand upto the 1970s, the dominant language was English. Recently, however, New Zealand's indigenous Maori language has been given some importance (Peddie 1991). In Latin America, Spanish (or Portuguese in the case of Brazil) 'is both the vehicle of acculturation and the easily identifiable trait for maintaining prestige' (Hornberger 1988: 15). In South Africa, too, only English and Afrikaans (a variant of Dutch) are the languages of power and privilege. This language policy keeps power firmly in the hands of the European settlers. Where the Europeans did not settle down permanently, they made language policies in their imperialist interests in order to rule foreign civilizations (Calvet 1974; Phillipson 1992). The French imposed their language on Algeria, Tunisia and the Black African countries they ruled (Alexandre 1972: 77). By doing so they created a native elite 'to satisfy the needs the colonies had for low-level functionaries and in some cases to satisfy European consciences about the "mission" to Africa' (Wardaugh 1987: 158). The Belgians were less hostile to the indigenous languages, but they, too, used French in the Congo from 1877 onwards because the area had over 200 languages (Palome 1968: 296). The British were apparently more tolerant of the indigenous languages, but spread them out of policy nevertheless (Phillipson 1992: 102). That this tolerance, too, could be the result of certain political policies is illustrated by a study of the Orientalist language policy between 1780-1835 in India. They taught Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic to Indians as well as the British civil servants who were supposed to rule them. In 1835, English was given the status of the language of higher administration, judiciary and education. This was the new Anglicist policy. However, both policies were meant to consolidate imperial rule. The Orientalist view was that privileging the Indian classical languages would help in

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conciliating the native elites. The Anglicist one was that English, being a vehicle of Western ideas, would Anglicise the newly emerging Indian elite which would be loyal to the British. Both the Anglicists and the Orientalist policies were meant to support imperialism though they appear apparently opposed (Rahman 1992). Another important function a single language could serve was to create the very idea of the colonial state. Like the devices of the census, the map and the museum, which gave the idea of a community spread out in space and time but somehow definable as a collectivity (Anderson 1983: 163-185), language too could create the idea of a unity, a single entity -- British India. The English-speaking elite, speaking the only common language, became a symbol of integration. Thus, in the name of integration (the preservation of the state itself), the elite legitimised its privileged position. It became, so to speak, coterminous with the state while the polyglot masses remained underprivileged till they learned the colonial language and became part of the colonial bureaucracy. The Anti-Colonial Situation The indigenous proto-elites who struggled against colonial domination sometimes used language as a symbol of nationalist unity. In Europe, for instance, the Poles took a fierce pride in the Polish language during the occupation of Poland by Russia, Prussia and Austria. Although the Russians (Rudnyckyj 1976: 15) and the Germans (Niedzielski 1979: 137) tried to suppress the language, it was privately developed and taught to children (ibid. 137-140), and an anti-language, based upon it, was later developed to resist communist rule of the country (Wierzbicka 1990). In Ireland, despite the acceptance of English by most Irishmen, Irish Gaelic was used as a symbol of pride in Irish nationalism and resistance to British rule (Macnamara 1971: 68). Here again are cases of resistance to state-sponsored LP despite the fact that, at least in Ireland, the language imposed by the state (English) was and is being used in all formal domains. In Asia and Africa, such anti-colonial struggle was meaningful only when the proto-elite, too, used at least some Western categories of thought. One idea which was mostly explicitly, and always implicitly, accepted was that of an imagined community, i.e. nationality and nation. A written (and printed) language or a religion was a useful symbol of commonality. Other symbols, generally social or cultural, were also useful, but some idea of sameness was a desideratum. In Vietnam, which was ruled by the French, language was a weapon though 'hardly the most important one, in the anticolonical struggle' (De Francis 1977: 258). Likewise, in Indonesia, too, the role of language was not significant during the Dutch occupation, though the oath of the Indonesian Youth called for 'one father land, one nation, and one language' (Alisjahbana 1971: 180-181). In India, too, despite Gandhi's efforts to make Indians proud of their own languages, the sentiment against English remained ambivalent, and was not an important part of the anti-colonial movement (Tambiah 1967: 225). One reason for this, as far as India was concerned, was that Hindu-Muslim rivalry dominated the political scene, especially after the Khilafat Movement of the early 1920s, and this was expressed in the Hindi-Urdu controversy rather than a joint anti-English movement (Brass 1974: 119-181; Robinson 1974: 69-145). In Africa, too, according to Pierce Alexandre, linguistic problems as such played a very minor part in the political struggle for independence, especially in comparison with historical European precedents (1968: 172). One explanation for this lack of emphasis on language in anti-colonial struggles is that they were generally led by Westernised proto-elites. English education had given them the very notions of nationalism, anti-imperialism and democracy which were crucial to the struggle. Moreover, it was English which had given them elite status and they would ensure that it would not pass away to the

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traditional, indigenously educated proto-elite which was their rival for power. This aspect of the issue will be dealt with in more detail in the next sub-section. Sometimes English was used to avoid the disintegrative effect of promoting only one out of several indigenous languages. Thus the exiled South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which led Namibia's struggle for independence from South Africa used English. In fact, the language of both the freedom movement and independent Namibia is English. As Namibia has many ethnic languages, this choice has 'the merit of being extra-ethnic' (Kennedy 1989: 76 & 79). The Post-Colonial Situation In the post-colonial situation, the Westernised ruling elite, the successors of the colonial ruling elite, want to retain English or French as the case may be, as the privileged language. The proto-elites which oppose them want this privileged status for an indigenous language or languages. In Kenya, for instance, the elite uses English as a status symbol and in order to preserve its privileges (Harries 1983: 123-124). Such explanations have also been advanced for the retention of English in Ghana (Apronti 1974: 1), Nigeria (Emenyonu 1989: 88), the Phillipines (Tollefson 1986: 177-189) and other ex-colonies. It appears, however, that the situation is far more complex than that and, of course, varies from country to country in ways that generalisations must be treated with caution. For instance, the ruling elites' desire to stress authenticity and national identity, for which an indigenous language would seem necessary. However, this comes in conflict with the desire for modernisation, efficiency and retaining privileged status, for which the ex-colonial language is more important. Thus the ex-French Arab countries -- Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in the Maghrib -- are torn between Arabic and French (Gallagher 1968). In Lebanon, too, the ruling elite manifests contradictory aspirations (Wardaugh 1987: 186-190; Gordon 1985: 148). In some other countries, favouring any one indigenous language would privilege an ethnic group and lead to intensification or rise of ethnicity (Wardaugh 1987: 164; Harrison 1960; Greenberg 1965). In Nigeria, for instance, the major languages -- Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba -- are associated with ethnic groups, and preferring one would create divisiveness in the country (Paden 1968: 199-213). In Ethiopia, Haile Sellasie's policy of privileging Amharic led to resistance from Ormo, Tigrinya and Somali language groups (Bender 1985: 277). In the Cameroon, there are about 100 languages for more than five million people (Alexandre 1968: 120-121). In such a case, privileging any one language could not only be divisive but, in fact, it would be practically impossible to standardise all the languages after making them the languages of governance and education (Todd 1983: 167-168). That is why it is only in very few countries that the indigenous language has actually been privileged. One noteworthy case is that of the promotion of Swahili, mother tongue of only ten per cent of the population of Tanzania, as the national language. It was acceptable to all the tribes because it expressed anti-British sentiment and was not the language of any tribe. It was, therefore, used as the 'language of national unity' by the ruling elite after independence in 1961 (Whiteley 1968: 331). Sometimes, when the ex-colonial language is reduced in status, it is done in the interests of a powerful pressure group in society. In Malaysia, for instance, where Malay (Bhasa Malaysia) was made the national language and the language of education after independence in 1957, it was the Chinese not the

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Malay community which was more proficient in English. Thus the privileging of Malay was a way of facilitating social mobility for the Malays (Mauzy 1985: 172; Watson 1983: 135). However, the ex-colonial languages are languages of wider communication (LWC). English, for instance, is an international language used in research, commerce, aviation, the media and diplomacy (Platt et al 1984: 1-29). Thus, in the interests of modernisation, efficiency and international communication, it cannot be ignored by the ruling elites in most countries (Armstrong 1968; Gallagher 1964; Le Page 1964; Whiteley 1968). This brings us to the continuing domination of the West over the Third World, especially over the ex-colonies, a situation which is often described as neo-colonialism (Phillipson 1992). One aspect of this situation is that the indigenous language creates a ghettoising effect. Since the language is not used in elitist domains -- higher administrative, judicial, military, diplomatic and commercial employment -- it restricts ones possibilities of social mobility. In some such situations, even the speakers of that language might oppose proposals to increase its use in such less-powered domains as primary education. To a lesser extent, such a situation exists in most of the Third World countries, especially those with strong links with English- or French-speaking countries. Most people are drawn towards the privileged ex-colonial language because it is an upper-class status marker and facilitates, or at least gives hope of, moving into the national elite. Even where the national language is supported at the emotional and rhetorical levels, the possibility of moving into the cosmopolitan elite is attractive. In the Phillipines, for instance, the ordinary Filipino is drawn towards English because he wants his children to share in 'the good life', which 'is accessible, at present, through English' (Sibayan 1983: 94; also see Miller 1981). In South Africa, the 'mother tongue principle', and all LP efforts to enforce it, have been opposed by the Blacks, because these mother tongues render the learner less capable of competing with white people who learn Afrikaans and English (Bunting 1964 & 1966; Hirson 1981; Troup 1976). In Peru, the indigenous language, Quechua, is 'the easily identifiable trait of lower status' (Hornberger 1988: 15). In such conditions, a dominated group opposes its own language to avoid ghettoisation. Thus the Hawaiians and the Chamorrs (of Guam) prefer English to their native languages, resulting in the attrition of the latter (Day 1985). Thus the oppressed language, in a curious reversal, becomes the oppressor (Albo 1977: 52 in Hornberger 1988: 15). This may even take the extreme form of a complete language shift (LS) to another language (Fishman 1991), which is also called linguistic death (Dressler 1972), linguistic suicide (Denison 1977), or linguistic genocide (Day 1981) (for the 'death' of some minority languages of Europe, see Stephens 1976). This is how the speakers of oppressed languages themselves help to preserve the privileged status of dominant languages. When they do so, they continue to read literature published in it, look up to the West for social and cultural norms, and imitate Western lifestyles. In other words, they help to perpetuate the cultural, social, linguistic and economic dominance of the West (Galtung 1980: 128; Phillipson 1992). Western powers perpetuate this state of neo-colonial dependence upon them by making language policies to increase the use of their languages. Thus Phillipson demonstrates how the concept and methodology of English Language Teaching (ELT) were actively promoted by the USA and Britain in the world (Phillipson 1992: 136-222). The French, too, have a similar policy of promoting their language called 'Francophonie' (Weinstein 1980). As these languages are seen as the vehicles of modernisation, they may be opposed by the pre-modern traditionalists and all those who oppose the onslaught of modernity. However, post-modernist

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intellectuals in the ex-colonies of the West, while emphasising alternative epistemological models (Banuri 1990: 99), have not paid enough attention to the use of non-Western languages for this purpose. The Non-Linguistic Aims of Corpus Planning Traditionally, the tasks of corpus planners have been defined as graphisation, standardisation and modernisation as I mentioned in section 1.3. To this, Cooper adds renovation, which he defines as efforts 'to change an already developed code, whether in the name of efficiency, aesthetics, or national or political ideology' (1989:154). All purification movements, purges of foreign words, and re-graphisation are classified as linguistic renovation. Apparently, these are all purely linguistic tasks involving the creation of alphabets (graphisation), choosing one dialect to be the 'standard language' (standardisation), and creating words to express scientific and technological concepts (modernisation). Even renovation involves linguistic tasks -- changing an existing script, changing the vocabulary, etc. -- and it is only by paying close attention to the aims of corpus planners that we can determine in what way they are connected with political and other aims. The Ideology of Standardisation and Modernisation LP, in common with all planning, is based on the ideology of development, modernisation and Westernisation in varying degrees. In Section 1.4, it has been pointed out how Western languages are used in certain domains in the interests of development. Apart from that, indigenous languages, too, are developed for that purpose. Such development falls, for the most part, in corpus planning. Language planners assume the instrumentalist view of language -- that it is a means for achieving efficient communication -- and not an intangible group, or individual possession, or part of the personality. The instrumentalist view has been advanced most forcefully by Ray (1963) and Tauli (1968). According to them, languages can be evaluated and certain languages are superior to others. The ultimate criterion used for this evaluation is use in modern, industrialised, technologically sophisticated cultures (Ray 1963; Tauli 1974: 287; Haugen 1972: 159-190). Descriptive linguists have, however, always argued that it is not linguistic structure which is - or can be - evaluated,1 but the functional value of language as a code of communication in certain domains alone. This evaluation, it is argued, is based upon social values rather than 'inherent linguistic characteristics' as such (Rubin 1971 :307). If the modernising imperative is accepted, the pre-modern language will be considered inadequate and will either have to be modernised or substituted by another one. Charles Ferguson gives evaluative criteria from this functional point of view. According to him, standardisation can be evaluated along a scale (0, 1, 2), under which zero means having different, mutually intelligible dialects, but without one of them being an accepted standard form. The number one represents having two standards, while two means only one uniform standard. His other scale is about writing. This is (0, 1, 2, 3), where zero means that the language is unwritten; one, that it is written for pre-modern purposes; two, that it is used for producing modern scientific knowledge; and three, that it has the capability of translating all scientific forms of knowledge in other languages. Thus English was St. 2 and W.3 -- a fully modernised, standard language (Ferguson 1968 b: 28). Once decision-makers (an elite or a proto-elite) agree that they want to modernise their society and that they want to use a pre-modern language for it (which is a status planning decision), it can be standardised and modernised. 1 Tauli, however, makes out a case that even language structure can be evaluated in so far as morphophonemic

complexity may make a language more difficult to learn (1974: 55-56).

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Political Aims of Corpus Planning Corpus planning legitimises one norm, prescribing that others are not to be used. This eliminates, or at least underprivileges, other norms (Milroy and Milroy 1985). Thus when a dialect is made the standard, other dialects are stigmatised as uneducated, rustic or unsophisticated forms of speech. As we have seen earlier in the context of the standardisation of French, the language of the elite simply appears to be natural, correct and sophisticated to the intelligentsia, which accepts it as the standard. But this does privilege the elite whose language it is rather than those whose language it is not (Meillet 1928 in Haughen 1972: 176). It also helps the elite to legitimise its rule through the symbol of the 'standard national' language because the legitimacy of the state itself gets transferred to that language. Corpus planning activities also relate to identity formation and preservation. Proto-elites may disown the 'standard' language, claiming that it undermines their distinctive identity (Cooper 1989: 133). They may also use other corpus planning activities to achieve their aims. Graphisation is often related to identity. During the nineteenth century, many Englishmen proposed using the Roman script for writing Indian languages either for convenience or for alienating the Hindus and Muslims from the ancient sources of their values. One letter expressing the latter political aim says:

All the existing Muhammadan and Hindu literature will gradually sink into disuse, with the exception of such portion of it as are worthy of being turned into the new letters. Nothing keeps India in a state of moral and intellectual debasement so much as the false religion, false morals, and false science contained in the sacred and learned books of the Muhammadans and Hindus (circular letter by W. Yates, W. H. Pearce, C. E. Trevelyan and J. Thomas, 1834, in Williams 1859: 164).

Their opponents were conscious of the indigenous scripts being a part of the identity of the people of India and this was one reason, out of many others, which they advanced in their opposition to such proposals (J. Prinsep 1854 in Williams 1859: 33-35; Tytler ibid. 53). Another example of politically motivated graphisation is the invention of the Vai syllabry of Liberia in 1883. It was meant to privilege the Vai at the expense of the black settlers from America (Dalby 1967; Cooper 1989: 130). The possession of an indigenous script gives power while retaining identity (Kotei 1972). This explains the insistence of the Hindi supporters of nineteenth century India who wanted the Devanagri script to be used for writing Hindi (Malaviya 1898 BM). In fact, in order to stress Hindu identity, it was even proposed that all Indian languages be written in the Devanagari script (Gandhi 1929). Modernisation is generally carried out by inventing terms to express the concepts of modern knowledge and technology. Their choice of morphemes (parts out of which words are made) reflect conscious political decisions. If ethnic identity is emphasised, the morphemes are from the indigenous ethnic language. If religious identity is emphasised, the morphemes are from sacred languages. In Israel, for instance, all modern concepts are made by the Hebrew Academy which uses morphemes of Hebrew, or at least of Semitic origin, to create new terms for them. Thus the Israeli Jewish identity is reinforced through modernisation (Fellman & Fishman 1977; Gold 1989). In India, the state LP bodies create neologisms from Sanskrit, the sacred language of the Hindus and hence part of Hindu identity, even when they hamper effective communication (Khubchandani 1983: 110). Renovation, too, reflects political, generally identity-related, concerns. One of its concerns, creating a new script or re-graphisation, is intimately connected with a certain desiderated cultural identity. Thus Mustafa

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Kamal's change of the Turkish script from Arabic graphemes to Roman ones reflects his desire to create a modern and European identity for the Turks in place of the pre-modern Ottoman oriental one (Heyd 1954; Gallagher 1971; Lewis 1981). Such is the symbolic significance of linguistic devices that the Arabic pluralisation rule instead of the Turkish one (the use of the morpheme - ler) is considered obsolescent and 'suggests to some the shadow of Islamic reaction' (Gallagher 1971: 169). The Soviet government first substituted the Latin script for the Arabic one in the Muslim Central Asian republics in the 1920s, and then changed it to Cyrillic in 1938. This helped to cut these people off from their Muslim identity and brought them closer to Russia (Shorish 1984). The Turkic identity of most of these republics was also de-emphasised by creating different orthographic representations of the same sounds in different Turkic languages (ibid. 42). The controversy over the use of Arabic or Devanagari script for writing the Sindhi language among Sindhis in India is part of their emotional need for maintaining the community's identity versus the pragmatic need for communicating with North Indian elites (Khubchandani 1991: 91). Another major renovation activity is purging a language of words of foreign origin. When such words are commonly understood, the desire is not to increase communicative ability, but to emphasise identity. Thus modern Urdu was created by Muslim poets between 1702 to 1755 by purging words of Indian Hindi origin in their language and replacing them with words of Arabic and Persian origin (Rai 1984: 247-262). This put a distinctively Muslim upper-class stamp on the Urdu of Lucknow and Delhi. Modern Hindi was created after the 1800s by purging words of Perso-Arabic origin in order to stress Hindi identity (Khubchandani 1991: 91; Bhatt 1992: 50-60). Such Sanskritised Hindi may not serve communicative ends as it is not intelligible to ordinary people (Khubchandani 1983: 110), but it is meaningful as a symbol of Hindu identity. In Turkish, too, Perso-Arabic words were eliminated by Zia Pasha and Namik Kemal for the most part from the 1860s onwards, in order to emphasise the new Turkish rather than the Ottoman identity (Gallagher 1971: 162). Other changes in the language, such as spellings, may also perform an identity-marking function. Thus the Dutch settlers of South Africa took pride in the deviation of their variety of Dutch from the Dutch of Holland so as to make it an identity-marker and not a stigma which it would have been had it been perceived as a corrupted form of the latter (Cooper 1989: 142). Noah Webster, the American lexicologist, changed the spellings of certain English words in order to make American English symbolic of a different national identity (Weinstein 1982). Change in usage, though rare, is also part of renovation. A recent case in point is the feminist campaign against sexist bias in language. Thus androcentric generics -- the use of the masculine form as the norm -- is disapproved of and changes in usage are taking place. The end here is socio-political -- to make women visible and remove discrimination against them -- and the advocated change in usage is a means to that end (Cooper 1989: 14-21). The Plain Language Movement is another relevant example. It aims at changing bureaucratic, legal and professional jargon so that common people can understand documents written in them. According to Alfred Kahn, once an advisor of President Carter, this jargon is 'to put people down, to conceal, to substitute for clarity' (Adams 1978 in Nahir 1984: 310). Thus those who want to increase the public's power seek to abolish this obfuscating jargon (Battison 1980; Alatis & Tucker 1979). The Consumption of LP and Post-Modernism

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Language policies and their products -- linguistic norms, discourses, new coinages -- whether state- or society-sponsored, are meant to be consumed. Whether they are actually consumed -- i.e. used in different domains -- depends on the demand for them. The demand for most state-driven LP is by the state itself. It is symbolic, political and pragmatic. For instance, a national language serves to unite diverse ethnic and linguistic groups under one hegemonic state. But, in the ex-colonies of the West, apart from the necessity of supporting the fiction of unity or to 'imagine a collectivity' in Anderson's sense (1983), English or French may also be required in the interests of modernisation and efficiency. Moreover, English may also be in demand as a means of getting access to positions of power. In such cases, there is greater demand for English than the ghettoising national language. Both English and a state-imposed national language may be resisted by pressure groups, especially in the name of ethnic identity and preservation of culture. The demand for the ethnic language may also reflect the desire to gain access to state patronage through it rather than an alien, and hence less familiar, language. However, unless positions of power are not really accessible through the ethnic languages, they may be seen as ghettoising and there may be less demand for them, as has been brought out in the case of South Africa. Both production and consumption of LP are contingent, to a great degree, on the acceptance of modernisation. The state supports LP to create uniformity of linguistic usage without which neither modern bureaucracy, nor education and industry can function. The proto-elites may object to the imposition of a certain language, but they, too, support the modernising imperative by standardising and modernising their languages. They, too, make efforts to use their languages in the domains of power -- in short, to make them the uniform, highly abstract and jargon-laden languages of modernity. In general, society appears to accept the imperative of modernisation, though there may be ideological resistance by traditional religious societies to the Westernisation and secularisation implicit in it. However, there is also spontaneous and unorganised resistance to the impending impersonality and uniformity of modernism. This may be the reason for the non-acceptance of the coinages of language academies and individual language planners. Thus, as we have seen, the general public is indifferent towards the coinages of the Hebrew Academy in Israel, and Hindi LP bodies in India. Even the feminist campaign for replacing sexist androcentric generics by non-sexist terms ('he and she' for 'he'; 'man and woman' for 'man', etc.) has not been popularly accepted, though it has gained wide currency in fashionable, left-leaning circles, and journalistic and academic discourse (Cooper 1989: 19). This apparent reluctance to change is not entirely explained by linguistic conservatism, mere force of habit or lethargy. After all, fashionable slangy words, coinages like 'fantabulous' and 'hopefully' (in place of 'I hope') do become popular despite purist resistance to them. There is, perhaps, a need for these words, but why this need is not fulfilled by the coinages of language planners -- the coinages which are prescriptively presented -- could have something to do with society's unwillingness to accept imposed uniformity. This may be connected with a certain resistance to the specialist -- in this case the linguist. And, finally, it may also be due to a fear of losing the colourful authenticity and fun of living. That is, perhaps, why obscenities and swear words could never be purged from any culture even if they were tabooed in polite society. The relationship of these inchoate and amorphic resistances seem to be connected to pre- and post-modernist resistance to the uniformity and impersonality of modernism, but this relationship is yet to be explored fully.

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Conclusion We have seen that the real goals of LP are social, economic and political. The linguistic goals are only the apparent or short-term goals. In Cooper's words:

Language planning is typically motivated by efforts to secure or maintain interests, material or nonmaterial, or both. There is nothing peculiar to language planning in this. In the struggle to promote interests one uses whatever ammunition is at hand (1989: 183).

These goals, it must be pointed out, are not only rational but also extra-rational. Thus, not only instrumentalist, but also primordialist reasons contribute towards determining the goals of LP. Section 2, which follows, will determine to what extent and how LP in Pakistan is related to political goals. Section 2 Language Planning in Pakistan The Language Situation of Pakistan According to census reports, the figures for the speakers of different languages in Pakistan (i.e. what was called West Pakistan upto 1971), expressed in percentages, are as follows:2

Urdu Punjabi Siraiki Hindko Sindhi Pashto Baluchi Brahvi 1951 7.05 67.08 - - 12.85 8.16 3.04 0.70 1961 7.57 66.39 - - 12.59 8.47 2.49 0.93 1981 7.60 48.17 9.54 2.43 11.77 13.15 3.02 1.21

The census of 1991 is not available, but the latest approximate figure for the population is 126,406,000 (Britannica Year Book 1992). Thus, in terms of actual numbers, even relatively small linguistic groups are fairly large as compared to such groups in less populous countries. Before discussing LP, let us look at the nature of the post-colonial Pakistani state. The colonial state, according to Hamza Alavi, was 'equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and form of government which enabled them through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes' (1972: 59). The Pakistani state inherits this powerful, or over-developed, bureaucratic-military establishment. Sections of the ruling elite have command over English through having been educated in English medium schools. Moreover, they are also exposed to it in the process of training (as in the Civil Service Academy, armed forces academies, etc.) and while exercising power (meetings, press 2 The figures for Pakistan as a whole before 1971 include Bengali speakers who constituted 56.40 per cent of the

population in 1951 and 55.48 per cent in 1961. The number of speakers of Punjabi is less in the 1981 census because Hindko and Siraiki, which were included in

Punjabi in the census of 1951 and 1961, are considered separate languages here. The number of Pashto speakers has increased because Dir, Swat and Chitral, which were considered princely states

upto 1969, became districts of Pakistan by a Presidential declaration of that year. The census of 1951 and 1961 contained questions on mother tongue while the 1971 census had no such question.

The census of 1981 did have a question on 'language commonly spoken in the household'.

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conferences, foreign visits, etc.). Thus, the whole vast network of the affluent and the powerful who occupy positions of power in the state bureaucracy, are much more exposed to English than the general public and those in less powerful positions. English is not only the language of the upper levels of the Pakistani state but also provides access to lucrative employment in the non-governmental sector (NGOs, private universities, elitist schools, etc.) and the international bureaucracy (World Bank, UNO, etc.). Thus it is easier for members of the elite to obtain access to these positions. It is clearly also in their interests to provide this opportunity for their children. Thus the ruling elite should support language policies which aim at promoting English. But the state's overtly articulated policy is not consistently pro-English. It appears to be pro-Urdu -- at least at the rhetorical level. This apparently paradoxical situation is understandable in the light of the use of Urdu as a symbol of integration in the face of ethno-nationalist struggle for autonomy or separation. Thus other languages of the country are given even less official recognition than Urdu. The state, however, supports LP activities in Urdu and, to a lesser extent, in the other languages (mainly Sindhi). The supporters of these languages also carry out LP activities. This section examines all these efforts in the light of the theory given earlier. LP in Urdu Urdu had become the symbol of Muslim separatism during the Hindi-Urdu controversy (1865-1947) (in Brass 1974: 119-181; Robinson 1974: 135; Dittmer 1972). As the ruling elite of Pakistan was from the Muslim League, which had used this symbol, as well as that of Islam, as a mobilising factor (Brass 1991: 100), its emotive value continued to be felt both by the elite and the masses at least in West Pakistan. Apart from these sentimental and ideological reasons, the elite also seems to have realised that Urdu could serve as an integrative symbol in a multi-ethnic country like Pakistan. Status Planning in Urdu The official desire, or at least aspiration, to make Urdu the medium of instruction was expressed early. Although in the very first meeting of the Advisory Board of Education (7-9 June 1948), it was agreed that 'the mother tongue should be the medium of instruction at the primary stage' (ABE 1948:4), yet in the Punjab, the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, the federal area of Karachi and parts of northern Pakistan, Urdu continued to be the medium of instruction as it had since British days. But, whereas Urdu was clearly favoured over regional languages, it did not replace English, the language of the elite. Time and again the English medium institutions were justified through appeals to the higher quality of education they imparted. It was also stated unabashedly that the state would invest more in the public schools so as to produce the ruling elite of the future (military officers and civilian bureaucrats, etc.) (ABE 1958: 58; Khan 1967: 43; RCSP 1966: 18). In time, the supporters of Urdu (henceforth the Urdu proto-elite) came to be associated with traditionalism and religious fundamentalism in a process described by Brass (1991: 30) and Rahman (1993a: 81-85). Most of the leaders of the pro-Urdu movement came from the middle-class, Urdu-educated intelligentsia of the Punjab, the mahajirs and, to a lesser extent, the Urdu-educated intelligentsia of urban NWFP and Baluchistan. They were opposed by the supporters of the provincial languages on the grounds that Urdu dominated their languages, threatened their culture, and made their entry into jobs difficult. The first, and most successful, opposition to the state-sponsored imposition of Urdu came from East Bengal in the form

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of the Bengali Language Movement (1948-1955). Bengali became a counter-hegemonic symbol in the hands of the vernacular-educated proto-elite, and contributed towards creating that consciousness of indigenous identity which led to the emergence of Bangladesh (Alam 1991; Umar 1970). The supporters of Urdu were also opposed by the English-educated elite ostensibly in the name of efficiency and modernisation (Rahman 1993 a: 84-89). During General Zia-ul-Haq's regime (1977-1988), anti-democratic forces were legitimised in the name of Islam and Pakistani nationalism. Urdu had always been a part of Pakistani nationalism and so it was promoted by Zia-ul-Haq. Among other things, he passed an order in 1979 that the medium of instruction from class one would be Urdu so that the matriculation examination in 1989 would not be in English (PT 4 Feb 1979; D 24 Nov 1980). This would have been a radical departure from established policy, but it was changed by the military rulers (possibly after pressure from the elite) in 1987, when the English medium schools were allowed to continue as before (PT 12 Nov 1987; editorials of D 18 Dec, N & M 13 Nov 1987). Thus, like all other rulers, General Zia, too, protected the dominance of English while appearing to give an enhanced status to Urdu. This policy continues till date, and maintains the English-using elite's privileged position in Pakistani society (for the role of English and its teaching in Pakistan, see Abbas 1993). Corpus Planning in Urdu Corpus planning in Urdu was promoted by the British themselves after their 1837 decision to use the indigenous languages of India in the lower judicial, administrative and educational domains. The first glossary, on naval terms, written by Thomas Roebuck is, however, of 1811 (Roebuck 1811). In the 1840s the Delhi College, which taught most subjects in Urdu, coined terms for those scientific concepts which they imported from the West (Durrani 1993: 14). The Scientific Society of Aligarh, the Darul Tarjuma bureau of translation of the Usmania University of Hyderabad, and the Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu (the Society for the Development of Urdu) were the main organisations for modernising Urdu as they were meant to disseminate modern Western knowledge in that language (Khan 1993). The Usmania University, which taught all subjects except English in Urdu, coined new words or used English words in Urdu texts according to ways described by Ross Masood before the Blatter Commission on October 4, 1924 (in Siddiqui 1987: 6-9). The terms used by the Usmania University have now been made available by the Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban (National Language Authority) in two volumes, one of which has been published (Jalibi 1991). The Anjuman's glossaries on various subjects have been appearing since 1925, and a list was given in ABE (1955: 45-85 & 81-142; another list is attached in Durrani 1993: 24-66). Thus, there are now - and indeed there were even at the time of Pakistan's birth - enough modern terms to translate scientific and technological works into Urdu. Later, the West Pakistan Academy, the Urdu Science Board, the University of Karachi's Bureau of Composition, Compilation and Translation, The Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu, the GHQ, Rawalpindi, and the Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban published glossaries and word lists of many scientific and technical subjects, including physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, medicine and the social sciences. In all, there are about 250,000 terms in Urdu for expressing modern concepts. Perhaps the most useful glossary in Urdu is Farhang-e-Istalahat in three volumes (Urdu Science Board 1984). The Muqtadra's several glossaries

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are also ambitious attempts at providing equivalents for most of the terms available in conventional textbooks of science used in Pakistan (for an up to date list, see Durrani 1993: 24-67; for a list of institutions for the promotion of Urdu, see Sabir 1985). The principles of neologism, the creation of new terms, have been greatly influenced by ideological considerations. The British language planners borrowed English words or used indigenous translation of both Perso-Arabic and Sanskritic origins. Sohan Lal, a lexicographer of the nineteenth century, preferred indigenous words in common use which Imaduddin Hussain Bilgrami dismissed as 'rustic' (Durrani 1993: 14). It was Bilgrami, too, who emphasised the use of Muslim -- which meant Perso-Arabic -- morphemes. In Pakistan, the Perso-Arabic roots are used in order to stress the Muslim aspect of the Pakistani identity and, in keeping with the two-nation theory, differentiate Pakistani Urdu from Indian Hindi which is becoming more and more Sanskritised (see Syed Abdullah's justification of this tradition in Minhajuddin 1965: 1). Shaukat Sabzwari, Shabbir Bukhari and Farman Fatahpuri, among others, have been the upholders of this Islamicising tradition while it has been opposed by those who want to use international terms, terms from other Pakistani languages and even Sanskritic terms (for details see Durrani 1993: 17). Here are some examples of Perso-Arabic neologisms, made under the Islamic imperative, for some commonly used English words in Pakistan. Word commonly used Urdu Coinage Bulb Barqi qumquma Generator Muvallid-e-burq or burqi janak Thermometer Tapish paema X-ray Lashuai manzar The white papers issued by the government are called qartas abeez (qartas means paper and abeez white in Arabic), though the ordinary Urdu words would have been sufaid (white) and kaghaz (paper), had intelligibility been the guiding principle of corpus planning. This tendency to sacrifice intelligibility to ideology (in this case the creation, re-enforcement and maintenance of a Pakistani identity based upon religion and nationalism rather than ethno-nationalism) is, of course, common to language planners all over the world. The parallel cases of the Hebrew and Hindi coinages have already been referred to. It should further be added that none of these official coinages are accepted by the general public without quiet resistance. Proposals for improving the nastaliq script of Urdu, too, have been dominated by ideological considerations. All proposals for replacing the Arabic-based Urdu script by either Devanagari or Roman have been seen by Muslims as attempts to undermine their cultural identity (Barelvi 1989). The last occasion when the Roman script was tentatively suggested was in the report on education popularly known as the Sharif Commission Report (CNE 1959). However, Ayub Khan, who probably felt that this would promote regional integration, yielded to the emotional outcry in both East and West Pakistan in favour of the Bengali and Urdu scripts, respectively (Abdullah 1976: 57; Barelvi 1989; also see other articles in Majeed 1989). Proposals for creating diacritical marks to express vowels have, however, met with no active resistance (Siddiqui 1989; Jain 1989; Barker 1989). Even so, there have not been any serious attempts to change the

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script. In fact, with the improvement in computer technology, it is easy to print works in the traditional Urdu nastaliq so that the naskh script, which was used for some years in Pakistan, has been phased out. LP in Sindhi LP in Sindhi is intimately connected with British rule, which lasted in Sindh from 1843 till 1947. Graphisation -- or rather re-graphisation -- was carried out by the British, who gave Sindhi the status of the language of lower levels of education, administration and the judiciary. Therefore, let us begin by looking briefly at the relationship of British LP efforts with imperialism before going on to see how LP in Pakistan is connected with Sindhi nationalism as well as Mahajir-Sindhi tensions in Sindh. Sindhi LP in the British Period In 1847, R. K. Pringle, the Commissioner of Sindh, suggested to the Governor of Bombay that 'the vernacular language of the people' may be used in the province (Pringle 1847: 58-SA). British officers also confirmed that Sindhi was in general use and the Hindu Khudawadi script was not favoured even by most of the Hindus (Pringle 1848-SA). So, after a brief controversy between Captain Burton and Stack, with the former favouring the Arabic naskh and the latter Khudawadi (letter from Frere to C.J. Erskine, DPI, 24 Dec 1855 in Baloch 1971: 2-SA; Khuro 1978: 246-250), the naskh was agreed upon. Then, B. H. Ellis, the Deputy Commissioner of Sind, headed a committee including five Muslims and four Hindus, which agreed on 52 Arabic-based characters and 'a sheet containing the revised alphabet was published in July 1853' (Ellis 1854 in Baloch 1971: 15-SA). The British felt that the 'revenue and judicial officers' could not work effectively with a foreign language (Clerk 1854 - I O L). Thus they did not want to introduce English. Persian, which had been used by the Talpurs, was reminiscent of their rule and was also a foreign language. Thus they agreed on the vernacular Sindhi. The Arabic script was chosen to conciliate the articulate sections of the Muslim majority in Sindh (Ellis 1854 in Baloch 1971: 17). However, as the British also wanted to avoid alienating the Hindus, some of the senior decision-makers suggested that they should be instructed in the Hindu-Sindhi character if they so desired (Ellis 16). Sir Bartle Frere, the Commissioner, also advocated the use of a Hindu script (RBPC 1884: 25 - IOL) in order to conciliate the Hindus, and got it prepared by a committee in 1868 (ibid 39). This script was initially popular, but despite the efforts of Narayan Jagganath Mehta, the Deputy Educational Advisor in Sind in 1868, it did not prove successful (Dunsterville 1857-SA; MS letter from the Educational Advisor to the Commissioner, 29 April 1870, SA; Dow 1976: 55). Mehta supported it in order to play up the distinct identity of Sindhi Hindus, but social mobility was only possible in the more popularly used Muslim script. Hence, with Hindu support, it was withdrawn in government institutions (Dow 55). The effort to use the Hindu script, and the turn-of-the century attempt to purge the Arabic one of superfluous letters, led to resentment among the Muslims. They suspected that the letters and words which were being purged were of 'foreign (Muslim) origin' (Dow 56) and these LP attempts were dubbed conspiracies (Barelvi 1987: 39 & 59 - PC). Thus, before the Partition, LP was dominated by British as well as Hindu/Muslim nationalist politics. The British LP decisions were ultimately meant to consolidate the empire, whereas the Hindus and the

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Muslims expressed their antagonism (which was itself part of the two communities' consciousness of separate identities and aspirations) through LP proposals or opposition to them. Sindhi LP in Pakistan After the creation of Pakistan, the major LP activity of both official and unofficial bodies has been status planning. The cities of Sind, especially Karachi and Hyderabad, received a large number of Urdu-speaking migrants (mahajirs) from India between 1947 to 1951 (Census 1951: Table 19-A). This altered the demographic composition of Sindh so that in 1951 it was as follows:3 Proportion of Mahajirs in the Cities of Sind in 1951 Unit Population Mahajirs Percentage of Mahajirs Pakistan 73,880,000 7,226,000 9.8 Karachi (Corporation) 1,064,557 612,680 57.55 Hyderabad 241,801 159,805 66.08 Sukkur 77,026 41,791 54.25 Mirpurkhas 40,412 27,649 68.42 Nawabshah 34,201 18,742 54.79 Larkana 33,247 11,767 35.39 Source: Census 1951: Table 2, Section 2 and 3 This fairly large minority, concentrated in the urban areas, was not assimilationist for many reasons (Ahmed 1992a: 142). One being that it was inordinately proud of its language and culture, and one of the reasons for the growth of Muslim separatism in UP had been the desire to save them from the domination of Hindi (Robinson 1974: 13-14 and 347). Moreover, as the government of Pakistan had given Urdu the status of a national language, it was clearly in a superior position vis-a-vis Sindhi in the context of the whole country. In other words, it placed the mahajirs in an advantageous position as far as inter-provincial mobility and the procurement of employment was concerned. Thus, for both primordialist and instrumentalist reasons, the mahajirs supported Urdu. For the same reasons the Sindhis started supporting Sindhi. As Sindhis got educated, 'the classic problem of the developing or modernising society' occurred (Brass 1991: 33), i. e. in Hamza Alavi's words, the emergent Sindhi 'salariat' also started competing for jobs which it did not qualify for earlier (1991: 165). The development of this discontent is briefly outlined below. Urdu became the dominant language of Karachi soon after Partition, but it was in 1957 that the syndicate of the University of Karachi forbade students from answering examination questions in Sindhi. The response to this came from Hyder Baksh Jatoi, President of the Sind Hari Committee, who declared that the University had told Sindhis to 'go to Sind' if they wanted to 'retain Sindhi' (Jatoi 1957: 13). Since then, a number of unofficial bodies have been working to increase the number of domains in which Sindhi is used. Among them are: the Sindhi Adabi Sangat (Sangat n.d); the Sindhi Boi Sath (Sath 1990: 2); the Sindh Sujan Subha; and the Sind Graduates Association. As any increase in the use of Sindhi implies a corresponding decrease in the use of Urdu, the Sindhi-Urdu controversy actually reflects the struggle for power between the Sindhi and the mahajir communities. This controversy has led to riots twice.

3 Although the census of 1981 shows Sindhis as 65 per cent and non-Sindhis as 35 per cent of the population of

Sindh, Sindhis fear that they may be turned into a minority in their own homeland.

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In 1970, the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education and the Syndicate of Sind University attempted to increase the use of Sindhi. The Board's resolution (BISE 21 Dec 1970)4 attempted to teach Sindhi to mahajir students on a reciprocal basis, while the University decided to use it within its offices (SU 21 Aug 1970)5. The mahajir protest led to riots in urban Sind in January-February 1970 (details in D, PT, HP of relevant dates). In 1972, the provincial PPP government again tried to make Sindhi the official language of the province (Sind Gazette 1972).6 Once again, the mahajirs protested and there were riots in Karachi and other cities of Sind in July, in which there was much destruction (NAD 28 Aug 1972: 504-508. Also see Ahmed 1992a). During the peace talks that took place after these riots, it was clear from the demands of the mahajirs and the Sindhis that both the communities wanted power in the province (see the demands in the Urdu magazine Zindagi 23 July 1972). This situation led to the rise of the MQM (Mahajir Qaumi Movement) which claims an ethnic Urdu-based mahajir rather than a Pakistani non-ethnic identity (Alavi 1991: 166-168). This clash between the mahajirs and Sindhis (and also between other groups) has led to Sindh being a violence-prone area in the last few years (Kennedy 1991). Corpus Planning in Sindhi The Sindhi Adabi Board was established in 1951, and one of its aims was to publish a standard dictionary of the language (Sabir 1985: 141-143); the Institute of Sindhology of Sindh University was established in 1963, and one of its purposes was to encourage the dissemination of scientific knowledge in Sindhi (Sabir 1985: 159); and the Sindhi Language Authority (SLA) was established in 1991 in order to, among other things, publish dictionaries and 'arrange translation and publication of technical terms in science subjects and humanities' (SLA 1991: 5). A number of new terms have been devised. The official bodies have generally taken Arabic or Persian morphemes and have pluralised them according to rules of Sindhi phonology (lists are given in Haider 1980: 502-507). The use of Perso-Arabic diction was carried to extremes in the works of the Jamiat-Shoara-e-Sind ('Party of Sindhi Poets'), which emphasised it as part of their Islamic identity and ongoing resistance to the Progressives who were liberal or leftist in views. Some Arabic-based coinages are given below: English Sindhi Phoneme Soteo (from saut, Arabic for sound) Judgement Fatwa (from fatwa, Arabic for decision)

4 The resolution is as follows: Resolved that Sindhi be adopted as official Language of the Board. Resolved further that the subject of salis

[easy] Sindhi be introduced as a compulsory subject for the students whose mother-tongue is Urdu from the year 1971-72 and who are appearing at the Secondary School Certificate Part-1 Annual Examination to be held in the year 1972. It was also suggested by the Director of Education that the Government be requested to introduce it at appropriate level in High Schools (Resolution No. 21, 21 Dec 1970, BISE).

5 The resolution is as follows: Resolved that Sindhi be adopted as official language and language of internal correspondence (Resolution No.

7, 21 Aug 1970, SU). 6 The 'Sindh Teaching, Promotion and use of Sindhi Language Act, 1972', Sindh Act No. 2 of 1972 states:

1. Sindhi shall be used as the Provincial Language of the province of Sind. 2. i Sindhi and Urdu shall be compulsory subjects for study in classes IV to XII in all institutions in which

such classes are held. ii. The introduction of Sindhi as compulsory subject shall commence at the lowest level namely class

IV and by stages to be prescribed, be introduced in higher classes upto class XII. This was subject to Article 267 of the Interim Constitution which stated that : '... the Sindhi language was compulsory subject of study in educational institutions but this was discontinued by verbal orders of Martial Law Authorities'.

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However, words of indigenous origin have also been used. For instance, phetho, the word for an instrument of measurement, was used for audio cassettes before the arrival of video cassettes (Haider 1993). The non-official language planners, especially the Sindhi nationalists, have tended to fall back upon indigenous (which means Sanskritic) Sindhi words to emphasise their distinct cultural identity. Some of their terms are as follows: English Sindhi obesity thol cycloplasm mas flood bodh The third trend in coining new terms is borrowing or adapting international terms already in use in the world. M. A. Qazi's scholarly journal entitled Science (published by the Mehran University of Science and Technology, Hyderabad) used international terms in addition to newly devised ones. The following terms, coined by the Sindhi Language Authority, are eclectic. In them, Perso-Arabic, English and Sindhi morphemes are used with a view to creating terms intelligible to Pakistanis educated in Urdu. English Sindhi Pick-up tube chhakendar nuli Radiator garmi chhundar alo Electrical energy barqi tiwanai Shock absorber dikcha band Air brake hawai brake (Baloch, K. M. 1993) Abdul Ghafur Memon's Sindhi Encyclopedia preferred indigenous terms, while Memon Abdul Majid Sindhi of the Jamiat-Shoara-e-Sind, used Arabic and Persian ones. After Urdu, Sindhi may be said to be the most developed language in Pakistan for use in domains of power. Since it has also been used in some such domains, albeit at the lower levels, Sindhi nationalists emphasise the importance of their language much more than other ethno-nationalists of Pakistan. Moreover, educated Sindhis take their language far more seriously than their counterparts elsewhere in Pakistan. Language Planning in Punjabi The Muslim intelligentsia of the Punjab was more or less indifferent to the Punjabi language before the creation of Pakistan. Punjabi was, in fact, associated with the Sikhs, who appealed to the Education Commission of 1882 to use it as the medium of instruction in schools (Edn Comm: P 1884: 457-602; 499; 235 I O L). The Punjabi Muslim intelligentsia read Urdu and wrote in Urdu. As a consequence of the Urdu-Hindi controversy, the Punjabis owed their allegiance to Urdu as a symbol of Muslim identity, rather than Punjabi. In Pakistan, too, partly out of inertia and sentimental attachment to Urdu as a symbol of Pakistani identity, and partly because Urdu was an integrative symbol, it was Urdu which was given high status while Punjabi was relegated to an inferior one. Status Planning in Punjabi

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The Punjabi Movement is a small movement of members of the intelligentsia who are committed to using Punjabi for educational, administrative and judicial purposes. The high points of this movement were the Lyallpur Punjabi Conference of 1956 (Punjabi Mar 1956); Air Marshal Nur Khan's proposals about a new education policy (PNEP 1969 and response to them in PT 7 Aug 1969 and Memorandum 1969); the signing of the Charter of the Punjabi-speaking people on Jan 2, 1985, by 139 people (M 3 Jan 1985; Charter - PC); and the World Punjabi Conference in 1986 in Lahore (Qaisar & Pal 1988). The major demands raised at all these forums were that Punjabi should be given official recognition as the language of basic education in the Punjab. It was also suggested that Punjabi should be used in other domains of public service, especially in the judicial and administrative spheres (see the resolution of the World Punjabi Conference 1986 in Qaisar & Pal 1988: 457-484). These demands are still repeated at the gatherings of Punjabi Movement activists and in their publications (see Ravael). However, because of the cultural shame of educated Punjabis about their language (Kammi 1988: 15-44), and the desire for upward social mobility (for the case of students see Mansoor 1992: 113), the status of Punjabi remains unchanged to date. Corpus Planning in Punjabi Status planning aspirations of the supporters of Punjabi, being dependent upon official policy, came to nothing. However, some advances were made as far as corpus planning in Punjabi was concerned. Regraphisation One of the matters under consideration was the change of script. Some Punjabi intellectuals felt that the Urdu script used for writing Punjabi could not adequately represent the sounds and the stress pattern of that language. Others felt that a new script, distinct from Urdu, would be symbolic of a distinctive Punjabi identity. The debate started in the '50s in the journal Punjabi (Khan 1956: 6-13). In 1962, a Punjabi Script Committee was set up in Lahore (PT 4 May 1962). One of its members, Joshua Fazal Din, had been active since the '50s. In 1972, this debate was also happening on the pages of Pakistan Times. A modified form of Roman was suggested by Zafrullah Poshni (PT 10 Sept 1972), Gurmukhi by Malik Zamurad (PT 17 Sept 1972), and a modified form of the Urdu script by Joshua Fazal Din (PT 5 Oct 1972). The Roman and Gurmukhi scripts were associated with leftist or liberal views, whereas the Urdu script was identified with Islam and Pakistani nationalism. In fact, the proposals for not using the Urdu script were more symbolic of the resentment against the official version of the Pakistani identity than anything else. Eventually, the Urdu script remained in use and no consensus emerged over modifications although the matter was raised at the World Punjabi Conference of 1986 in Lahore (Kareem 1986: 185-200). There has been a demand for adequate Punjabi dictionaries (editorial, PT 29 May 1979), but the Punjabi Adabi Board, established in 1975 to promote Punjabi, claimed that it was unable to publish Sardar Mohammad Khan's dictionary -- running into 4,000 pages -- because of lack of funds (letter to the editor, PT 30 May 1979). In 1983, however, Bhai Maya Singh's dictionary was published by Vanguard Publishers (PT 11 Nov 1983), and in 1989 the Urdu Science Board published a fairly good Punjabi dictionary (Bukhari 1989). Now, the Punjabi Science Board is working on a dictionary of classical Punjabi literature (Ravael Dec 1991: 12). Many Punjabis, and not only activists, complain that ordinary spoken Punjabi is too full of Urdu words to be authentic (Agha Babar in Zaidi 1993). This seems to be a threat to Punjabi identity because of which some

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Punjabi activists use words of indigenous origin, even at the cost of intelligibility, in their writings (but to a lesser extent in conversation). Thus an activist complained that the Punjabi of the official radio broadcasts used about 25 per cent Urdu words. Examples of new coinages and words commonly used are: Word commonly used Punjabi coinage Meaning lafz akkhar word sailab harh flood aqvam-e-muttaehda ik muth qauman United Nations salana varhe var yearly khususi achecha special taqreeb ikath gathering bhejna ghalna to send (a letter) (Khalid 1993) The Punjabi daily Sajjan used many such words. A critic of such usage claimed that it became so unintelligible as to alienate readers. Among many examples, he pointed out that the word gabbhan (pregnant) used for Benazir Bhutto could only be appropriately used for female animals. It was also said that some of these words were Sanskritic or Hindi rather than the well-known Persian or Arabic equivalents in use (Iqbal 1991: 12). This stress on indigenisation appears anti-Islamic to its critics because it involves purging the language of its Arabic and Persian roots. The use of the word chinta for 'worry' rather than fikr, is reminiscent of the Hindi-Urdu controversy when the supporters of modern Hindi substituted this word for 'worry', while the supporters of Urdu retained the Persian fikr. The Punjabi Science Board, an organisation meant to promote science in Punjabi as well as individual writers, coins words from indigenous roots as it wishes to emphasize its Punjabi identity. However, there are Punjabi intellectuals who believe that Punjabi should borrow words freely from Urdu and English (Balchin 1991). There are also those who, like Fateh Mohammad Malik, believe that Punjabi identity should complement the Pakistani one, and both should be in a hierarchical relationship (Malik 1988: 35)7. From this point of view, purging the language of commonly intelligible Perso-Arabic diction is a sign of Punjabi chauvinism. In short, in common with other languages, corpus planning in Punjabi, too, expresses ideological biases, i. e. commitment to the Pakistani or Punjabi identity. The LP aspirations of Punjabi activists differ from those of activists of other languages in so far as the Punjabis are considered the dominant section of the ruling elite of Pakistan. However, Punjabi activists do not want a greater share in goods and services, but merely wish to assert their cultural identity, of which other Punjabis are disdainful or ashamed. LP in this language, therefore, serves sentimental and psychological rather than purely instrumental purposes. Language Planning in Siraiki The term Siraiki came to be used for the dialects of Southern Punjab in the 1960s (Rahman, U 1993; Aslam 1987: 91). Activists of the Siraiki movement used Siraiki as a symbol of ethnic identity - which they perceived as being different from both the Punjabi and Sindhi identities - so as to form a pressure group for the articulation of economic, political and cultural deprivation (Shackle 1977; Rahman 1993b:

7 In private conversation with the author, Fateh Mohammad Malik who is a well-known critic of Urdu literature,

said that unintelligible Sanskritic words alienated Punjabi activists from nationalist Pakistanis. Moreover, they made Punjabi difficult and impeded comprehension (Jan 1992).

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46-49). LP activities in Siraiki were meant to promote Siraiki as a linguistic ethnic identity-marker. Hence the major emphasis of the Siraiki language planners, who were private persons in most cases, was on identity. Corpus Planning in Siraiki Siraiki was probably written in variants of the Brahmi script before the Muslim conquest of Multan in the eighth century (Rasoolpuri 1976: 7-8; Shackle 1983: 5 & 55). The Arabic naskh, which came to be used at that time, was replaced by the Persian nastaliq after the 18th century. The first known attempt at creating new orthographic symbols to express the distinct sounds of the language -- generally the implosives it shares with Sindhi -- was that of Qazi Fakhruddin Razi in 1893 (Rasoolpuri 9).8 After that, a number of people (Aziz ur Rehman (Rahman. A 1944: 5), Khurram Bahawalpuri, Zami Bahawalpuri, Dilshad Kalanchvi, Nazeer Ali Shah, Mehr Abdul Haq and Aslam Rasoolpuri) proposed systems of modifying the letters of the alphabet by adding diacritical marks to them (Rasoolpuri 10-13). Two LP committees, one established by the Siraiki Sangat of Karachi and the other by the Siraiki Conference held at Multan in March 1975, also proposed some changes. The Multan Committee proposed putting circles under or over certain letters (Khan 1975: 12) while the Karachi Committee suggested dots instead of circles. Both did, however, agree on using the naskh (Rasoolpuri 23). Nowadays, most Siraiki publications use dots for the implosives and other distinctively Siraiki sounds. Siraiki writers use distinctive words -- especially meant to differentiate the language from Punjabi, of which it is called a dialect (Shahbaz 1977) -- in their writings. The British were the first developers of modern Siraiki (Shackle 1983). A British officer, Lt Andrew A. Munro, who was posted as Assistant Commissioner in Dera Ghazi Khan in 1856, prepared a glossary of 'cutcherry Technicalities' (technical words used in the courts) in which local words were recorded (Munro 1856 BO). This glossary, as well as the glossaries of F. W. R. Fryer (1876), Edward O' Brien (1881), James Wilson and Pandit Hari Kishen Kaul (1899), does not have new terms for modern concepts (Shackle 1983: 14-19). Even Andrew Juke's dictionary of some 10,000 entries does not contain modern technical terms (Jukes 1900). Such terms are presently being coined but there is no agreement on their use nor even a standard glossary of them. The overriding imperative for the Siraiki intellectuals has been identity formation (Khan. U 1975: 19-21). Thus, when they use words for literary or learned writing, they fall back upon that indigenous word stock which is not shared with Punjabi. Some examples are given below: Word commonly used Siraiki coinage Meaning ilm bhum knowledge alim bhum val intellectual, erudite person lisaniyat boli bhum linguistics intikhab chunar election qutab shimali ubheejar North pole qutab shimali lamuchar South pole rasm ul khat likkhat reet script T.V moorat vaja television radio sur vaja radio atom bomb suth gola nuclear bomb

8 Shackle (1983:ix) gives seven distinctive letters expressing the phonemes (units of sound) of Siraiki. These

were used by Andrew Jukes (1849-1929) in his translation of the Gospels in 1898 (in Shackle 1983: 28). However, William Carey (1761-1834) translated the Lord's prayer in the `Lande or Karikki script' in 1819 (Shackle 1983: 5).

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grammar akhhar mool grammar dastkhat akhhar huth signature (Faridi n.d) All of these newly coined words use indigenous, mostly Sanskritic, morphemes. They have not only not been accepted by the general public, but even Siraiki literary figures do not use most of them in their writings. Status Planning in Siraiki The 1975 Multan Conference passed many resolutions aimed at making Siraiki the language of education and that of the media (Khan 1975: 19-20). The Siraiki Lok Sanjh, an organisation meant for promoting the consciousness of Siraiki identity through cultural activities, emphasises the language as an identity symbol (SLC 1989: 6-7). The Siraiki National Party (SNP), headed by Abdul Majeed Kanju, which was launched in January 1993, believes that Siraiki can be made the language of inter-provincial communication (Kanju 1993). The other major Siraiki party, the Pakistani Siraiki Party (PSP) of Taj Mohammad Langah, demands that it should be one of the national languages of Pakistan and the official language of the new province of Siraikistan, or the Siraiki Suba, which will be formed by separating the Siraiki-speaking districts from the rest of the Punjab (Langah 1992). These political demands do not appear to have caught the public imagination. However, the manipulation of the symbol of Siraiki -- in fact, the use of one common label for what were seen as dialects -- has created the consciousness of there being a Siraiki speech community among the people of the southern Punjab. To imagine it as a collectivity is a step towards insisting upon its being a nation and demanding a geographical unit, albeit under Pakistani control, for it. To conclude, LP activities express and reinforce the Siraiki identity which aims at making the Siraikis a pressure group desiring a greater share in the power and wealth of the country. Language Planning for Baluchi The first few organisations for preserving and developing the Baluchi language were established at Karachi after Partition. Some of these were: the Liari Adabi Board (later renamed the Baluchi Adabi Board), Baluchi Academy and Fazil Academy. At that time (1949), the only Baluchi-speaking broadcasters, too, were located in Karachi. The Baluchi Educational Society, created in 1951-52, started publishing Baluchi's first monthly called Oman. In 1960, the Baluchi Academy of Quetta and the Baluchi Writers' Guild were established. Their aim was to give official patronage to Baluchi. Corpus Planning in Baluchi The major LP tasks for Baluchi are corpus planning activities: graphisation (agreeing to the use of the Roman or the Arabic script), standardisation of spellings and creating new terms. Some Baluchi intellectuals feel that the Academy at Quetta should have completed them (Jahani 1989: 100). Private individuals have, however, contributed to all these activities, and in 1969, Barker and Mengal prepared a 'distinctive Baluchi alphabet consisting of thirty seven letters plus diacritics and special symbols' (Harrison 1981: 180). However, the Baluch ethno-nationalists, who had long advocated the Roman script (Harrison 1981: 1987), did not accept it.

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Thus when the National Awami Party (NAP) won office in Baluchistan (1972-73), the right-wing forces in the country were dismayed as NAP was ethno-nationalistic and left-leaning, and it was expected to promote the Roman script. Mir Gul Khan Nasir, the Minister for Information and Education in Baluchistan, declared that a convention would be held to decide on a script for Baluchi (D 22 Jul 1972). This Convention was held on 2-3 September 1972, 80 delegates participated (D 3 Sept 72), and the Roman script was indeed supported by Gul Khan Nasir, the Baluch Students Organization and a number of leftist intellectuals (Baluchi Dynya Nov 1971: 14; J 1 Oct 72; Jahani 1989: 144-145; 48-61). The supporters of the Arabic script called this a conspiracy of leftists and ethno-nationalists (NW Ed, 8 Sept 72, J 4 Oct 1952). Some people also pointed out that, since the Arabic-based Sindhi script was used for writing Baluchi in Sindh, such a step would also cut the Baluchis off from each other (D 22 Sept 72). The NAP government fell from power in 1973, leaving the matter of the script unresolved but the controversy lingers on (Sorbazi 1973; Jalal May-Jun 1978: 3; Labzank June 1977: 78-79). In fact, the matter remains unresolved to date, though it is a modified form of the Arabic script -- modified by the LP efforts of individuals (Jahani 1989: 153-158) -- which is used for writing the dialects of Baluchi. Neologism and the Baluchi identity As mentioned earlier, Baluchi LP has mostly been carried out by unofficial bodies and gifted individuals. One of the first language planners was Sayyid Hashmi (d. 1978), who compiled a dictionary called Sayyid Ganj (Askani 1984: 40-47; see a list of his neologisms in Jahani 1989: 233). Hashmi coined many new words, especially for modern concepts. Similarly, Azat Jamaldini, Ata Shad, Abdul Hakim, Swat Khan Marri, Amanullah Gichki, and many Baluch students were also interested in creating modern terms. Among the terms devised were:

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Word commonly used Baluchi coinage Meaning kitab wanagi book radio watgus radio din, mazhab nehrah religion khat or kagaz nimdi letter drama kasmank drama adab labzank literature university zantjah university " mazansahdiarjah " (Jahani 1989: 125) As usual, commonly used words were discarded in favour of less known ones in order to stress a distinctive Baluch cultural and linguistic identity. Such emphasis upon identity has been a part of the Baluchi ethno-nationalistic movement (Harrison 1981), and individual language planners have reflected it in their work. Standardisation of Spelling Baluchi has two major dialects, the Eastern and the Western, which have different phonological rules (rules for combination and pronunciation of sounds; Geiger 1889). Elfbein, who has done extensive work on the dialects of Baluchi, gives details about the sound system which establishes that words with the same meaning are pronounced differently in the Western and Eastern dialects (Elfbein 1966). This makes the creation of a standard spelling problematic. A committee did consider this question in 1968 and suggested four new letters. Another committee, a working committee of the Convention of Balochi Orthography working in Quetta in 1972, also suggested common letters but both proposals came to nothing (Jahani 1989: 64). Some Baluchis feel that two orthographic systems, one for Eastern and the other for Western Baluchi, should be set up (Barker & Mengal 1969: 8-9). However, others feel that this would have a divisive effect on the Baluchis. As Jahani puts it:

Aiming for one standard literary language is also often combined with political ambitions, and the establishment of two standard literary dialects could be regarded as a deliberate attempt at splitting the Baloch nation (Jahani 1989: 104-105).

These and other related problems are so intimately related with Baluch ethno-nationalism that it is easy to see why it is so difficult for consensus to emerge. To sum up, the LP aspirations of Baluch ethno-nationalists are part of their emphasis on their ethnic identity. The LP activities of state-sponsored bodies in Pakistan, however, are meant to accommodate as many of these aspirations as may be compatible with the promotion of Pakistani nationalism. In general, Baluch ethno-nationalism is expressed more through directly political, and even violent, means than through LP. LP in Pashto Pashto is the language of 70 per cent of the inhabitants of the NWFP and almost all the inhabitants of the tribal areas adjacent to it (i. e. about 16-17 million people).9 It is an ancient language, the first written text available being Bayazid Ansari's Khairul Bayan (1526-1574; Pashto Academy 1991: 7-8). There are, however, claims that the Pashto poet Amir Karor wrote in the eighth century (Abbasi 1969: 36). Despite

9 According to the figures in the Britannica Year Book (1992), the population of Pakistan was 126,406,000 and the

Pakhtuns are 13.1 per cent of this figure, i. e. 16,432,780.

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this antiquity, Pashto is not used in the domains of power. Efforts to promote such use have, indeed, been regarded with suspicion by successive governments from British times till now for reasons given below. Status Planning in Pashto The British used Urdu as the language of the Punjab, of which the NWFP was a part, soon after its annexation in 1849. According to the letters of British officers, Urdu was chosen so as to make the tribes look towards India rather than Afghanistan where Persian and Pashto were in use. Thus the Commissioner of Peshawar wrote to the Secretary, Punjab Government, in his letter of 17 June 1862 that he changed the court language from Persian to Urdu in 1853 because of 'the political advantage of hastening the amalgamation of our provinces' (in Chaudhry 1977: 43). The Director of Public Instruction also confirms in his letter of 22 July 1862 to the same official that 'political motives' -- weaning the Pakhtuns away from Afghanistan -- 'had a great share in giving the superiority to Urdu over Persian' (ibid. 38). There is reason to believe that the concept of pakhtunwali (a code of conduct emphasizing autonomy, chivalry and courage; see Barth 1969: 119-124) rather than the Pashto language was central to the Pakhtun identity in Afghanistan where the aristocracy used Persian (Ghaffar 1969: 50 ; Barth, 29). The Pashto language was chosen as an identity symbol to promote Pakhtun dominance in the emerging modern nation-state in Afghanistan in the 1920s. At about the same time, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988), the founder of the anti-British and pro-Congress Khudai Khidmatgar Movement in 1929 (Ghaffar 1969: 96) chose Pashto as an identity marker of the Pakhtuns. He set up non-governmental schools which taught Pashto at the primary level (Ghaffar 1969: 57), and started publishing the magazine Pakhtun in 1928 (ibid 88-90). The Pakhtun, as well as a number of other publications (Sabir 1986), made the Pakhtuns more conscious of the significance of their language as a marker of their identity. Contributors suggested that Pashto be used in education (Ghaffar 1929 a & b), in public and private domains, and that LP should be undertaken to develop it (Shah 1945: 21-24). In 1935, the NWFP government agreed to use the mother tongue in the education of class one and two (letter of 4 September in LAD: F 13 Nov 1935: 258-PA), but since this meant that non-Muslim children would have to study Pashto as well, it was condemned as the anti-Hindi-Gurmukhi Circular by the Hindus and Sikhs (LAD:F 28 Sept 1937: 614--PA). However, Dr Khan Sahib's government did make Pashto a subject of instruction at the Primary level in 1938 after heated debates in the Assembly (LAD: F 28 Sept 1937: 602-622). After Pakistan was created, the Khudai Khidmatgars were associated with 'Pakhtunistan' -- the Afghan irredentist claim to parts of the NWFP. As Wali Khan, Khan Ghaffar's son, led the National Awami Party (now ANP) which emphasised Pashto as an identity marker, the language symbolised Pakhtun ethno-nationalism in the minds of the centrist ruling elite. Thus it was not actively promoted in Pakistan. In 1972, when Wali Khan's NAP formed a coalition government with Mufti Mahmood's Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), this government wanted to distance itself from ethno-nationalism and Afghan irredentism. Thus, despite the pressure on it from some of its members, it chose to make Urdu rather than Pashto the official language of the province (N T 4 May 1972; Amin 1988: 125; NW 12 May 1972). General Zia-ul-Haq's government (1977-1988), like all federal governments, was also centrist and manipulated the symbols of Islam and Urdu to gain legitimacy, but Pashto was introduced as the medium of instruction 'in selected areas of NWFP' in 1984 (Edn Dept 1991: 1). Simultaneously, a Pashto Textbooks Translation Project was launched. This was evaluated in 1989 and an important finding of the

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evaluators was that, despite being a success pedagogically, the people feared the ghettoising effect of teaching a language which would not 'acquire a privileged place in the school curriculum' (Edn Dept 1991: 40). Being marginalised, Pashto has never been taught well (LAD: F 17 Nov 1952: 5-6), nor has it been encouraged by teachers (Pukhto Feb 1970: 2-3). In fact, a recent report on the tribal areas suggested that even there, in some primary schools, Urdu was the medium of instruction, and that teachers were not Pashto-speaking (US Aid 1991: 82; 1990: 69 - PR). Thus, Pashto remains almost as neglected in Pakistan in most domains of power as it was in British times. Corpus Planning in Pashto The nastaleeq was used in most of the available manuscripts of Pashto of the 16th and the 17th centuries. However, books were also written in the naskh in this period (Khattak, P 1977). Some version of the present script was probably made by Bayazid Ansari who is also credited with having invented some of the distinctive orthographic symbols of Pashto given later (Pashto Academy 1991: 8). However, there are differences between the Afghan and the Pakistani scripts despite several attempts at standardisation (Taizi 1989). One feature of all attempts at standardisation is the desire to retain the distinctive orthographic symbols --

-- of the script. These symbols represent the following sounds in the two major dialects of Pashto given below: Symbol Hard Dialect Soft Dialect

Adapted from Hallberg (1992 : 11) When Maulana Abdul Qadir proposed that these letters as well as naskh should be abandoned in favour of Urdu orthographic symbols and the nastaleeq (Qadir 1942: 20-25), there was a protest and the proposal was rejected by almost all other participants in the debate (for a summary of these views, see Shaido 1942 & 1943). The Pashto Academy was formed in 1955 for LP and it did agree to retain both these distinctive features -- the letters and naskh -- in its conference on standardisation of script and spelling in 1957 (Pashto Academy 1957b; Tair n.d). As Afghan LP experts had participated in this conference, it was expected that the differences between the Afghan and Pakistani scripts would be eliminated. However, some of the decisions were ignored in Pakistan. Similarly, the recommendations of the Pashto Tolana's meeting in Kabul in 1961 (Ulfat 1961) and those reached at the Pashto Conference at Bara Gali in 1990 were also ignored (Pashto Academy 1991; Khattak, R 1991). Thus, the Pashto script and spellings remain to be

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fully standardised though it remains distinctive from Urdu, and thus expressive of the Pakhtun identity in the eyes of identity-conscious Pakhtuns. Identity is also expressed and maintained through the desire for 'Soocha Pashto', i. e. Pashto expurgated of Persian and Arabic words. This movement was promoted in Kabul by language planners out of whom one, Siddiq Ullah Rishtin, now lives in Pakistan (Khattak, R 1993). There are, however, Pakistani Pakhtun nationalists -- some said to be associated with the ANP and the Pakhtunkhwa Qaumi Party -- who support this movement in Pakistan as well (Khattak, R 1993). Among the words used by them are: Word commonly used Pashto coinage Meaning sumrin doob mako submarine vai jaz alvata aeroplane universtai pohinto university propesar / ustad pohand professor aspatal roghtun hospital daskhat las leek signature Those who favour giving primacy to the Islamic, rather than the ethnic, identity argue that Arabic and Persian morphemes should be retained and used for coining new terms (Akbar 1957; Naseeruddin 1984). They also point out that most of the new words are so unfamiliar that they are not accepted by the people. For instance, says Khyal Bukhari, the word ranrak is never used for an electric bulb in Pakistan which is simply called a bulb (Bukhari, K 1965: 140). However, some magazines and writers do use such words in order to emphasise their distinct identity (Achakzai 1957), and there seems to be a desire, at least on the part of identity-conscious people, to use them in the media (Khattak, N 1993)10. The Pashto Academy, being a government-funded organisation, does not use such indigenous words. It freely borrows from other languages and even retains words in common use for its glossary of modern terms which Raj Wali Khattak is preparing (Khattak, R 1993). However, some words of Pashto origin, such as Palwasha (ray), may be combined with the English 'laser' to make the equivalent of 'laser rays'. In short, Pashto LP reflects the desire of identity-conscious Pukhtuns and ethno-nationalists to promote the use of Pashto in the domains of power just as they themselves use it in the private domain (Hallberg 1992: 44). Through LP, such Pukhtuns also express their desire to preserve the distinctiveness of their script and vocabulary from other languages because these aspects of the language, like the language itself, are seen as symbols of identity. Supply and Demand of LP policies and products in Pakistan

10 Nasir Khattak, a lecturer at Peshawar University, told the author (2 November, 1993) that he was instructed to

use indigenous words of Pashto in his broadcasts on Radio Pakistan, Peshawar, by an identity-conscious director. This, however, is not the official policy of the radio. The references are divided in two parts: (a) manuscripts and official reports; and (b) published works and theses. Sources in part (a) are located in archives and libraries which have been abbreviated below. Some of them may also be located elsewhere. When the location is not indicated, the work is commonly available. Sources in part (b) are books, articles, theses and writings by corporate authors other than reports.

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The state, as we have seen, imposes Urdu and spreads its use through its institutions (the media, courts, bureaucracy, schools, etc.). It also coins new terms based upon Perso-Arabic roots in keeping with its use of Islam as a symbol of national integration. From the point of view of demand, the situation is complicated. At the popular level, at least in the urban areas, Urdu is much in demand as a link-language, a sort of Pakistani lingua franca. Thus it is learned by immigrants from the rural areas to the cities, and even by Afghan and Iranian immigrants. But this Urdu is far removed from the highly Persianised Urdu used by the agencies of the state. It is heavily influenced by the phonological and other rules of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. Thus there are Punjabi, Pakhtun, Sindhi and Baluchi Urdus, just as there are Englishes influenced by these languages in Pakistan (Rahman 1991). Urdu is also in demand for employment in the lower positions of the bureaucracy, in state schools and middle class business ventures. Thus it is learned by Pakistanis, especially the less affluent ones, who would otherwise remain illiterate and ineligible for even lower middle class employment. However, for all lucrative and high-powered positions, it is English which is required as it was in the days of the British Raj. In that context, Urdu is ghettoising. Hence, whereas highly-placed state functionaries support Urdu in their official roles, they privately use English and educate their children in it. In fact, even middle class people who support Urdu for ideological reasons adopt the pragmatic policy of learning English and teaching it to their children. That is why, as we have seen, despite the state's apparent support of Urdu, English-medium elitist schools continue to multiply. As we have seen, society-driven initiatives of LP mostly come from ethno-nationalist LP organisations and individuals in Pakistan. Their opposition to Urdu, and the substitution of standardised and modernised varieties of their own languages in its place, are supported for symbolic reasons by their ethnic groups but not actually used. Although Sindhi and Baluchi ethno-nationalist sentiment is strong enough to provide effective resistance to Urdu, only Sindhi is used at various levels in Sindh. In Baluchistan, if only to avoid ghettoisation, Urdu is in demand. And, for that matter, English is in demand among the Sindhi elite just as it is elsewhere in the country. As for Punjabi, Siraiki and Pashto, they are not much in demand in the masses for fear of ghettoisation. However, emotional support for LP in Siraiki and Pashto, at least among the intelligentsia, is in evidence. There is much less demand for Punjabi except as a medium of popular entertainment. In this case, the demand comes from the desire to preserve the group's cultural identity. These are all cases of LP with implicit acceptance of the imperative of modernisation. The state may, or may appear to, desire the use of Urdu while the proto-elites desire the use of their ethnic languages. In fact, however, modernisation is in progress in English in a neo-imperialistic manner which is very much in the interests of the Anglicised elite because it is Western in form rather than indigenous. Conclusion LP can be seen in relation to the politics of Pakistan with reference to: (1) hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles; (2) identity and nationality formation; (3) modernism and post-modernism. The dominant bureaucratic-military cum feudal elite, which is mostly Punjabi, maintains its hegemony by using several symbols of integration, one of which is Urdu. The idea of a single national language helps to imagine a nation (à la Anderson) and neutralise the autonomist or secessionist tendencies of ethno-nationalists.

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All major Pakistani languages, including Urdu, also have counter-hegemonic roles. Urdu was used as an identity symbol to counter the imminent Hindu hegemony in pre-Partition India. Now, it is being used to counter the hegemony of Western culture and Anglicisation. And it is also used by the mahajirs of Sindh to counter what they perceive as the threat of Sindhi hegemony in the Urdu-speaking cities of Sindh. The other language-based ethno-nationalist movements -- such as the Sindhi movement -- are counter-hegemonic in that they resist centralised rule, and the marginalisation in power-sharing this implies, by resisting Urdu. The formation of a Pakistani national identity and the sub-national identities are also linked to the manipulation of the symbol of language. This process has involved the choice of a language as a major or subsidiary symbol of collective identity by the elites. This choice is at least partly determined by primordialist attachments. The manipulation of the symbol creates an awareness of common identity which matures into the perception of being a distinct nation. This nation then functions as a pressure group for gaining political power. The Siraiki and mahajir identities are two instances of this process at work in Pakistan. In the latter case, Urdu is not emphasised as it is part of the state's construction of the Pakistani identity, but it is emphasised in contrast to Sindhi in the context of Sindh. This process of nationality formation has been explained in instrumentalist, rational, goal-seeking terms. This, however, is how it appears to one who looks at the outcome of language movements or takes into account only the rational, calculable economic and political aims of the elites. From the intersubjective point of view of the actors in a language movement the language in question appears as part of an ancient cultural heritage, a necessary primordialist attachment and not a constructed identity symbol. It is necessary to emphasise this to understand that instrumentalist analyses, though very insightful from the political and economic point of view, can falsify the subjective reality of those who experience, and participate in, ethno-linguistic movements. All LP activities assume the desirability of modernisation. It is only a modern state, not a pre-modern inchoate polity, which needs a state-language. Even the ethno-nationalists who resist this state-language do not reject modernity altogether. They also, like the state, modernise and standardise their languages precisely to use them in the modern domains of power. In other words they do want to share power in the modern state but on their own terms, through their own language. But, while insisting on the use of their own language, the ethno-nationalists do resist that uniformity, that impersonality which, according to Tariq Banuri, is the distinguishing feature of modernity (1990: 83). It is interesting to note here that spontaneous, society-sponsored neologisms (such as lota for a politician who changes his loyalties, and chamcha for a sycophant) are readily accepted in all languages of Pakistan, but neologisms of LP experts in all Pakistani languages are ignored or resisted. One reason for this is that Pakistani languages are not used in the domains of power where these new coinages would be most useful. But even otherwise, society-sponsored terms are used whereas the ones made by experts are not. Perhaps the public feels no need for them having established terms for the concepts; perhaps the terms are far too learned, abstruse and factitious. Or perhaps the resistance is to imposition, to the ever-increasing intrusion of uniformity in people's private lives. If this is so, it is resistance to the onslaught of modernity. It is post-modernist in that the pre-modern state was simply not organised or centralised enough to influence peoples' lives as much as the post-colonial Pakistani state is. Nor, indeed, did such a large section of the population have to look for employment contingent upon the public use of language. Thus, although ethnic proto-elites and the general public use the idiom of pre-

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modernism, their resistance to the uniformity and impersonality entailed in language policies is post-modernist. There is also conscious and informed questioning of the assumptions of modernism in Pakistan. In the field of development, the theory of alternative approaches to development and decenteralisation have been seriously argued (Banuri 1990: 95-99). In the field of politico-linguistics it may be pointed out that, besides perpetuating the dominance of the Westernised elite pointed to earlier, English also facilitates the process of modernisation. It is not being argued that the use of other languages -- which, too, would be standardised and modernised -- would not do it. But the way English acts is by distancing people from most indigenous cultural norms. Even the vocabulary of politeness -- the use of honorifics for older people and not their first names as in some sections of English-speaking societies -- may change in the direction of impersonal non-differentiation (creating the illusion of egalitarianism and democracy; Rahman 1993). The use of indigenous languages may help to bring about modernisation -- it can hardly be resisted -- without also bringing in Westernisation. Moreover, it may help to tackle the issue of ethnicity. Given that ethnicity in Pakistan is a response to domination by an elite with the help of the apparatus of the state, the use of Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Baluchi and Siraiki in the domains of power would empower the regional proto-elites and bring about the 'legal decentralisation' which 'can facilitate direct participation in economic decision-making by people involved in the production process' (Banuri 1990: 98). Whether this happens or not, such a change will radically alter the power relation between the centrist ruling elites and the vernacular, peripheral proto-elites. This may reduce the ethno-nationalist threat of the disintegration of the state though at the cost of reducing the power and privileges of the ruling elite. These are very serious political matters and, as we have seen, LP is at their centre. Indeed, LP cannot be ignored in any serious effort at understanding the politics of Pakistan. The abbreviations for locations of sources in part (a) are as follows: BISE - Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education Office, Hyderabad, Sindh. BM - British Museum (The British Library). BO - The Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. IOL - India Office Library and Records, London. SA - Sindh Archives, Karachi. SU - Sindh University offices, Jamshoro, Sindh. PA - NWFP Archives - Peshawar. PC - Private Collection. Abbreviations of newspapers are as follows (the language of the publication is English unless specified in parentheses): D - Dawn FP - Frontier Post HP - Hilal-e-Pakistan (Sindhi) J - Jang (Urdu) M - Muslim MN - Morning News N - Nation NT - New Times NW - Nawa-i-Waqt (Urdu) PT - Pakistan Times

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