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© Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014 Questions the Marikana Commission of inquiry raises about the senior leadership of the South African Police Service Gareth Newham 5 th ISS Annual Conference on National & International Perspectives on Crime Reduction and Criminal Justice

Questions the Marikana Commission of inquiry raises about ... · © Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014 10 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION Contradiction:

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Page 1: Questions the Marikana Commission of inquiry raises about ... · © Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014 10 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION Contradiction:

© Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014

Questions the Marikana Commission of inquiry raises about the senior leadership of the South

African Police Service

Gareth Newham

5th ISS Annual Conference on National & International Perspectives on Crime Reduction and Criminal Justice

Page 2: Questions the Marikana Commission of inquiry raises about ... · © Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014 10 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION Contradiction:

© Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014 2

They are educated. They are trained.

Why did the police have to kill my husband over wages?

Widow of the Marikana massacre

13 August 2014 Marikana Commission of Inquiry

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© Copyright – Institute for Security Studies – 4 September 2014 3

This presentation will reflect on the evidence before the Marikana Commission of Inquiry to explore this

question.

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I commit myself to creating a safe and secure environment for all people in

South Africa … …

In carrying out this commitment, I shall at all times – uphold the Constitution and the law;

… I undertake to –

act with integrity in rendering an effective service of a high standard which is accessible to everybody

… uphold and protect the fundamental rights of every person;

act in a manner that is impartial, courteous, honest, respectful, transparent and accountable;

exercise the powers conferred upon me in a responsible

and controlled manner; …

SAPS’ CODE OF CONDUCT

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THE MARIKANA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

2014/09/04 5

On 16 August 2014 at 15h53 in the afternoon, members of the South African Police Service shot 112 striking mineworkers at near the Lonmin

Platinum mine at Marikana, Rustenburg.

A total of 34 were killed and 78 injured. Largest number of police killing in a single event since the apartheid

police massacre at Sharpville in 1960

SAPS National Commissioner General Riah Phiyega states that police had to utilize “maximum force to defend themselves.”..”

President Jacob Zuma institutes a judicial commission of inquiry on 23 August 2012 chaired by retired Judge Ian Farlam with Adv. Bantubonke

SC & Adv Pringla Hemraj SC.

Four days after the killings General Phiyga states that what happened at Marikana “represents the best of responsible policing.”

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BACKGROUND

2014/09/04 6

21 June: Lonmin

negotiate with Rock Drill Operators outside of

established bargaining structures

10 August: Rock Drill Operators

strike peacefully &

Lonmin refuses to engage in contravention of their own

policy

11 August: NUM shoot & injure striking mineworkers

Striking mineworkers start to arm themselves

12 August: 2 Lonmin

security guards are killed.

2 mineworkers are killed

13 August Incident

resulting in the death of 3 miners & 2

police officers 14th

mineworker killed

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THE VERSION OF THE POLICE

Police decision

making

Kilings Scene 1

Killings Scene 2

•  Previous violence resulted in police build-up at Marikana on 16 August •  Received information that the strikers on the koppie would not disarm •  At 13h30 the JOC took a decision based on operational

considerations to disperse the protesters, disarm them and where necessary effect arrests

•  Operation is scheduled for 15h30

•  At 15h40 police deploy barbed wire parallel to the koppie •  Miners start leaving the koppie and repeatedly attempt to breach barbed

wire •  Armed miners succeed on 3rd attempt & attack the TRT police back-up

line •  Police defend themselves using lethal force •  17 miners are killed – no police officers are injured •  Miners turn and run a few hundred metres to a hill •  Police surround hill to disarm & arrest miners •  Police are attacked & forced to use lethal force to defend themselves •  17 miners are killed at this second scene – no police officers are injured

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

Political pressure on the police to act against the

miners

12 August: Non-Executive Board Cyril Ramaphosa speaks to Police Minister & urges increased police presence at Marikana. 13 August: Frans Baleni, the General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers releases a public statement calling for the deployment of the Special Task Force to Marikana. He later speaks directly to the Minister of Police by phone. 14 August: SAPS Provincial Commissioner Zukiswa Mbombo “But when I was speaking to Minister Mthethwa he mentioned a name to me that is also calling him, that is pressuring him, unfortunately it is a political high…(Cyril Ramaphosa)” Mbombo said to Lonmin that there should be no suggestion that they were undermining NUM or supporting AMCU. Mbombo also says the situation should be dealt with before Malema took advantage. 15 August: Ramaphosa lobbies Minister of Minerals & Energy not to characterise the events at Marikana as a labour dispute but as criminal activity

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

Contradiction:

Police decision to engage the

miners.

•  14 August: Mbombo “Tomorrow when we go there for the second time now, that we were there today and they did not surrender, then it is blood.”

•  “When tomorrow we have to move in, if today we do not find cooperation in these people we need to move in such that we kill it.”

•  15 August: That evening a extraordinary session of a SAPS senior National Management Forum meeting is held. The decision that miners will be dispersed the following day is minuted. Mbombo phones 3 Major-Generals (Annendale, Naidoo & Mpembe)

•  16 August: The next morning at 6am hand written notes (withheld from commission for 18 months) of a police meeting states that today is “D-Day.” 9 am press conference Mbombo states “This thing will end today.”

•  Early that morning four mortuary vans and 4000 rounds of automatic rifle ammunition are ordered.

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

Contradiction:

When did senior commanders

know about the deaths?

•  15 August, Foreseeability: The Deputy Provincial Commissioner William Mpembe warned that if the police engaged the striking miners on the koppie there would be “bloodshed.”

•  16 August: 15h53: 17 people are shot by the police, Police trained in

medical aid & legally obliged to assistance provide no help. 15 people died at the scene, 2 die en route to hospital.

•  16h03: Brigadier Pretorius, Head of Communications in the JOC sent an SMS to the Acting Provincial Head of IPID Molatedi Molatedi, in the North West Province. The SMS read as follows: “Having operation at Wonderkop. Bad. Bodies. Please prepare your members as going to be bad.”

•  eTV are broadcasting live when the shooting starts

•  16h20: All SAPS senior commanders in charge of the operation in the JOC testify that they are made aware for the first time that people have been shot and killed.

•  Field Operational Commander Brig Calitz testifies under oath that he

first become aware of shootings at scene one 16h47 (an hour later)

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

Contradiction:

The original Police Plan vs

the one created for the

Commission

•  Police plan initially presented as Disperse, disarm & arrest (DDA) a large group of people (2 - 3000 people) using a horse shoe formation within Public Order Police backed up by the Tactical Response Teams (TRT).

•  SAPS Colonel Duncan Scott came under substantial pressure from

the evidence leaders of the Marikana Commission to eventually produce his computer hard drive.

•  Documents withheld from the Commission for 18 months suggest that

the DDA plan was created by the police in a 9 day meeting in Potshefstroom subsequent to the events at Marikana

•  From documents on Scotts hard drive it appears that the original

police plan was to encircle the Koppie during darkness of late night or early morning (called the encirclement plan to tackle 50 people.)

•  Arguably, the police were forced to abandon & adapt their

encirclement plan due to political pressure to act immediately

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The role of the SAPS National Commissioner

Key areas of concern

•  SAPS National Commissioner submits different affidavits, subsequent versions do not implicate the Minister of Police.

•  In the official public statement Phiyega conflates scene 1 and scene 2 creating

the impression that all killings were the result of one situation of self-defence. •  When challenged suggested that it was acceptable to give different versions to

the public & the president. •  Refers to NMF meeting on 15th but omits to mention the decision to go tactical

the next day.

•  Provincial Commissioner Mbombo leaves the JOC just before the shooting

starts and spends half an hour outside sitting under a tree

•  None of the senior TRT commanders standing in the front line at scene1 used their weapons.

•  To date no credible evidence has been presented before the inquiry demonstrating that the police needed to use lethal force that resulted in the deaths of 16 people at scene two.

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EVIDENCE OF A COVER UP

Statement released by the

Marikana Commission on 13 September

2013

1.  Commission obtained documents which the SAPS previously said were not in existence.

2.  Commission obtained documents which in our opinion ought to have

been previously disclosed by the SAPS, but were not so disclosed. 3.  Commission obtained documents which give the impression that they

are contemporaneous documents, but which appear in fact to have been constructed after the events to which they refer.

Commission publicly raises concerns that some of the information provided to them by SAPS “… is in material respects not the truth.”

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KEY QUESTIONS

The evidence before the Marikana Commission of Inquiry raises the following questions: •  Why are there stark contradictions in the versions given by senior SAPS

commanders & the objective evidence? •  Why did the police withhold crucial evidence for 18 months? •  To what extent do politically connected people and groups get preferential

treatment from SAPS leadership? •  Why has no action been taken against various police officers where evidence

has emerged of wrong doing? •  Will action be taken against senior officers if they are found to have been

dishonest before the commission?

There appears to be substantial shortcomings in relation to integrity and accountability at the highest levels of the SAPS.

This needs to be addressed if the SAPS is to become a professional and

trusted organisation

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