QPS CMC

Review of Taser Policy, Training, and Monitoring and Review Practices

July 2009

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CONTENTSEXECUTIVESUMMARY ........................................................................................ 1

RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................................................... 2

TERMSOFREFERENCE......................................................................................... 5

Overview........................................................................................................... 5

TermsofReference ........................................................................................... 5

OutputsandReporting...................................................................................... 5

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 6

Background....................................................................................................... 6

ImmediateContext ........................................................................................... 6

ReviewDescription ........................................................................................... 7

ReviewLimitations............................................................................................ 7

ANAUDITOFDATADOWNLOADSJanuarytoJune2009 .................................. 9

POLICYANDPROCEDURESONTASERUSE..........................................................11

Currentframework ......................................................................................... 11

MultipleandExtendedDeployments .............................................................. 12

OtherTaserDeploymentissues....................................................................... 16

TRAININGONTASERUSE ...................................................................................20

MONITORING,REVIEWANDEVALUATION.........................................................23

ATTACHMENT1DRAFTTASERPOLICY.............................................................26

ATTACHMENT2LEGISLATIONANDQPSPOLICY...............................................43

ATTACHMENT3READINGLIST ........................................................................47

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

On15June2009,theMinisterforPolice,CorrectiveServicesandEmergencyServicesand the Commissioner of Police announced that a review of Taser training andoperational policy was to be conducted jointly by the Crime and MisconductCommission(CMC)andtheQueenslandPoliceService(QPS).The review was announced in direct response to a death proximal to a TaserdeploymentinBrandon,NorthQueenslandon12June2009(theBrandonIncident).TheQueenslandPoliceServiceEthicalStandardsCommandiscurrentlyinvestigatingthisincidentonbehalfoftheDeputyStateCoronerwithoversightbytheCMC.Thisreview ran alongside these investigations, which are ongoing. Some of thecircumstancessurroundingtheBrandonIncidentarenowamatterofpublicrecord.Inparticular, thatduring theBrandon Incident theTaserused recorded28 cycles.This informationraisedasakeypolicy issuethemaximumuseofaTaserbypoliceduringanyoneincident.Overall thereview found that thecurrentpolicyand, inparticular,current trainingaddressedmost of the risks identified during this review. The review report putsforward a range of recommendations designed to improve Taser policy andprocedures,trainingandmonitoringprocesses. Inparticular,thereviewalso foundthatQPS Taser Policy should be amended to provide a clearer statement on thegeneralthresholdtesttobeappliedfortheuseofaTaser.Thereviewrecommendedthatthethresholdtestfordeploymentshouldberiskofserious injurytoaperson.The reviewalso recommended that the linkbetweenConductedEnergyWeapons(CEW)useandsomedeathsshouldbehighlightedintheQPSTaserPolicy.ThefurtherrolloutofTasersacrosstheStatewassuspendedtoallowforthereviewto take place and to allow for the implementation of any revisions to policy andtraining recommended by the review. Those review recommendations capable ofimmediate implementation or implementationwithin a short time frame will beincorporated intoTaserpolicyand trainingprior to the resumptionof the rollout.However,someofthereviewrecommendationswillrequirefurtheranalysis,costingorresearch;forexample,proposalsrelatingtopossibledesignchangeoftheTaser,includingvideocamandtriggerpullrecordingenhancements,arenotwhollywithinQPScontrol.Otherrecommendations,suchasthosedirectedatcontinuedresearchonTaseruseand the collectionanduseofdata to informongoing assessmentofmatterssuchasmissioncreep,willrequirelongertermimplementation.AttheoutsetofthereviewprocesstheCommissionerofPoliceandtheChairpersonoftheCMCagreedthatanyrecommendationsmadebythereviewteamwouldbetreated as interim recommendations. As a result any changes made to policy,training ormonitoring and audit practiceswill be put in place for a period of 12monthsandsubjecttocontinuousmonitoringbytheQPSandtheCMC.Thisreporthighlights the paramount importance of ongoing collaboration between the CMCandQPS inmonitoringboth the implementationof the reports recommendationsandemergingresearchontheeffectiveandsafeuseofCEWs.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the QPS Taser Policy state that a single deployment of a Taser ischaracterisedbyasinglefivesecondcycleineitherprobeordrivestunmode(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

2. ThattheQPSTaserPolicypreventofficersfromusingtheTaseronpersonsby

application ofmore than a single five second cycle, unless the officer issatisfiedafterreassessingthesituation,thatexceptionalcircumstancesexist(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

3. That theQPSTaserPolicyplace increasedemphasison the risksassociated

with the use of the Taser, particularly the risks arising from multiple orprolongeduse(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

4. ThattheQPSTaserPolicyhighlightthatwhileeachandeveryuseoftheTaser

willbecarefullyscrutinised,officersshouldbeawarethatmultipleorprolongeddeploymentswillbesubjectedtoincreasedscrutiny(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

5. That theQPS Taser Policy state that officersmust not usemore than oneTaserononepersonatthesametime(Refer14.23.4UseofMorethanOneTaser).

6. ThattheQPSTaserPolicyspecificallyrestatethe importanceofthegeneralpolicy regarding theuseof force,namely thatofficers shouldonlyuse theminimum amount of force necessary to resolve an incident (Refer 14.23.3UseofTasers).

7. ThattheQPSTaserPolicyprohibitofficersfromusingTasersunlessitcanbe

establishedthatthereisariskofseriousinjurytoaperson(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

8. That the QPS Taser Policy require officers to continually reassess the

circumstancesof the incident,particularlybefore they redeployaTaserordecidetodeployadifferentuseofforceoption(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

9. That,inadditiontothecircumstancesidentifiedintheQPSTaserPolicyabout

whenaTasershouldnotbeused,thefollowingsituationsarealso included:(i) that theTaser shouldnotbeusedagainstpersonswhoarehandcuffed,unlessexceptionalcircumstancesexist;(ii)thattheTasershouldnotbeusedagainst persons of particularly small body mass, except in extremecircumstances;and(iii)thatthesecondaryinjuriesidentifiedinthepolicyasapotential consequence of a person falling after being Tasered, include theexampleofconcussivebraininjury(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

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10. That theQPS Taser Policy include a specific statement about Tasers beingassociatedwithorlinkedtodeaths(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

11. That theQPSTaserPolicy include additional requirements forofficerswho

deployaTaseronapersonwho is suspected tobementally ill,namely toensurethattheassistanceoftheQueenslandAmbulanceServiceisobtainedandwherepossible,discussoptionswithmentalhealthprofessionals (Refernewsection14.23.5UsingtheTaseronpeoplewhoaresuspectedmentallyill).

12. ThattheQPSTaserPolicyprohibitofficersfromaimingaTasertopurposely

strike the head or neck of a subject unless this is unavoidable (Refer newsection14.23.6SpecialPrecautionstoavoideyeandheadinjuries).

13. ThattheQPSTaserPolicyprohibittheintentionaldirectionofaTaserslaser

sight target function at a subjectseyes (Refernew section14.23.6 SpecialPrecautionstoavoideyeandheadinjuries).

14. QPSTasertrainingshouldbeupdatedwherevernecessarytoincorporatethe

changestoTaserpolicyrecommendedbythisreview.

15. QPSTasertrainingshouldbeincreasedfromthecurrenttrainingof10hourstoaminimumof14hoursovertwofulldays.

16. QPS Taser training should be enhanced by incorporating more practical

scenariobased training that emphasises decision making, the need forcontinual assessment of a situation and selection of proportionate tacticaluseofforceoptions.

17. QPS should review its current use of open book testing for officer

accreditationrelatingtoTasersaswellasOperationalSkills.

18. ThattheQPSRiskManagementCommitteeshouldundertakeadetailedriskanalysis of the circumstances under which voluntary exposure in Tasertrainingcurrentlyoccurs.

19. That data from the Taser following every drive stun or probe mode

deploymentofaTaserisdownloadedwithin72hours.

20. That a Chief Superintendent assess every drive stun or probe modedeploymentofaTaserwithin72hours,includingdatadownload.

21. ThattheQPSdevelopacontrolselfassessmentguide(orchecklist)thatcan

be used by Officers in Charge and the Significant Event Review Panels toreviewTaserdeployments.

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22. ThattheQPScontinuetoexaminethedesignoftheTaserandanyotherCEWdevicestoensurethatthebestandmostaccountabletechnology isused.Inparticular, the ability to record trigger pulls, a limit on the period ofdeployment and a restriction on the number of times that a CEW can bedeployed during an individual incident should be the subject of continuedexamination.

23. That theQPSaudit theuseofTasersbypoliceandalsoexamine testingor

auditingoftheelectricaloutputofTasers.

24. That the QPS trial the effectiveness of Tasercam or video recording in adiscretelocation.

25. ThatoncetheoutcomesofthereviewoftheNationalGuidelinesontheUse

ofForcearemadeknown,QPSgiveconsideration to theSituationalUseofForceModel and the review reports recommendations in the context ofthesefindingsandidentifyanyaspectsforimprovementorchange.

26. That theCMC andQPS continuewith their collaborative efforts to review,

research and evaluate Taser use inQueensland. Specifically, theQPS andCMCshoulddevelopa researchplanandprotocols tomanage thisprocess,withaparticularfocuson:a. ThecollectionanduseofdatatoinformassessmentoftheTaserand

theidentificationoftrends,suchasmissioncreep.b. ContinualreassessmentofbestpracticeintermsofTaserpolicyand

procedures, training and monitoring, as informed by the latestavailabletechnologicalandmedicalevidence.

27. That the QPS adopt the draft policy recommended in this report (Refer

Attachment1).

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TERMSOFREFERENCE

OverviewThe terms of reference for the reviewwere developed by theQueensland PoliceService (QPS)and theCrimeandMisconductCommission (CMC)andapprovedbyGovernment. The terms of reference were framed on the basis of the knowncircumstancesexistingatthetimeoftheBrandonIncident.The review team comprised officers from the QPS and the CMC. The officersparticipating in the review had extensive experience inQPS policy on the use offorce,operational skillsand tactics, riskmanagement,auditand reviewprocesses,andeducationandtraining.

TermsofReferenceThereviewfocusedonfourkeyareas:

1. ApolicyreviewonmaximumuseofaTaserbypoliceandanauditofcurrentpolicyonoperationaluseofTasers,havingregardtocontemporaryresearchfromtheCMC,nationallyandinternationally;

2. A reviewof current training andwhether there is aneed for changes as aresultofthepolicyreview;

3. Areviewofcurrentmonitoringandreviewprocessestoprovideeffectiveandreasonable safeguards and accountability, as well as the opportunity forcontinuousimprovement;and

4. TheTaserReviewwillbe inclusive. Any issue that is identifiedasamatterthatwarrantsconsiderationbeyondthosealreadyidentifiedasaresultoftheBrandonIncidentwillbereportedon.

OutputsandReportingThe review teamwas taskedwith providing advice and recommendations to theChairoftheCMCandtheCommissionerofPolice.Suchadviceandrecommendationsweretoreflectwhatthecommunitywouldreasonablyexpectafterbeing informedby advice on the law, operational circumstances, national and international bestpracticeandtechnology.TheChairoftheCMCandtheCommissionerofPolicewereresponsibleforprovidingtheseoutcomestotheMinisterofPolice,whointurn,reportedtoCabinet.

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INTRODUCTION

BackgroundThe QPS trial of Tasers (a brand or type of Conducted EnergyWeapon CEW)commencedon1July2007for12monthstoexaminetheuseoftheTaserX26asaless than lethal forceoption inageneralpolicingenvironment.At the inquest intothedeathsofSeniorSergeantsPerryJames IrwinandDamienLawrenceCoatestheStateCoroner(p17,2005)observed:

The community expects police officers to undertake dangerous tasks in thepursuitofpublicsafety.Officersareentitledtoexpectthattheywillbegivenallreasonableequipmenttheyneedtodothatworkassafelyaspossible.

Inthisvein,theintroductionofConductedEnergyWeapons(CEWs)wasintendedtoprovideanotheroptionwithintheServicesUseofForcemodel.TheQPSrecognisedtheimperativethatappropriateandsufficientuseofforceoptionsbemadeavailableto operational police to enable them to effectively deal with the range ofincreasinglyvolatilesituationstowhichtheyarerequiredtorespond.Failuretodosowouldriskunnecessaryinjuryordeathtoofficersandallotherpartiesinvolved.FurtherobservationsmadebytheStateCoronerin2008reinforcedthismessage.Atthe inquest into the deaths (by police shooting) of Thomas Dion Waite, MiengHuynh,JamesHenryJacobsandJamesMichaelGearinMarch2008(p.157158)theStateCoronerfoundthattheuseofCEWsbypolicemayhaveassistedinpreventingtheirdeaths.TheStateCoroneralsoadvocated theneed forevaluationof theuseandeffectivenessofCEWs.The currentQPSpolicyon theuseof Taserswas informedby theReviewofQPSTaser Trial (the Trial Review),whichwas also undertaken collaborativelywith theCMC. A literature review undertaken by the CMC in 2008 informed this body ofwork.TheTrialReviewwaspubliclyreleasedon2July2009.ThistrialindicatedthatTaserscouldprovideanimportant,alternativeuseofforceoptionforpolice.From 1 January 2009 the rollout of Tasers to operational police across the Statecommenced.

ImmediateContextFollowingtheBrandon Incidenton12June2009theMinisterforPolice,CorrectiveServicesandEmergencyServicesannouncedthata furtherreviewofTasertrainingandoperationalpolicywouldbeundertakenbytheCMCandtheQPS.TheBrandonIncidentiscurrentlythesubjectofaninvestigationbytheDeputyStateCoronerandthisreviewisnotintendedtopresumetheoutcomeof,orinfluenceinany way, that ongoing investigation. The investigation into the incident is beingconductedby theQPS,withoversightby theCMC, for theDeputy StateCoroner.

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Rather, this review has been conducted to ensure that QPS policy, training andproceduresreflectbestpractice.TheneedforfurtherchangestoQPSpolicy,trainingand procedures arising from any findings from the coronial investigationswill beconsidered,whenthefindingsbecomeavailable.TheStatewiderolloutof,andtrainingfor,Taserdeviceswasputonhold,pendingtheoutcomeofthisreview.

ReviewDescriptionThereviewteamexaminedadditionalresearch intoCEWs,withparticularattentionpaid to current work emanating from North America and Canada (refer toAttachment3forareadinglistofmaterialonCEWs).AnauditofdatadownloadedfromTasersdeployedfromJanuarytoJune2009wasalso conducted to inform an analysis of police self reporting of Taser use and, inparticular,ofincidentsinvolvingmultipleorprolongeduse.Arangeofspecificissuesorriskswerethenidentifiedfromtheauditeddataandtheresearch.CurrentQPSTaserpolicy,proceduresandtraining,includingthecurriculumandmaterialsusedbytheQPSduringtraining,werethenassessedtodeterminetheextent towhich theyadequatelyaddressed the issuesand riskshighlightedduringthe review. Good practice or areas for improvement were identified andrecommendationsforchangemade.

ReviewLimitationsTheBrandonIncidentraisedquestionsabouttheuseofTasersbypoliceandexistingsafeguards.Followingthatincident,thepublicreleaseofthereportonthe12monthTaser trial provided an important opportunity to inform public debate. In theinterestsofpublicconfidence itwasconsiderednecessaryforthisfurtherreviewtobeundertakenasquicklyaspossible.Thistimeconstrainthasnecessarily impacteduponthescopeofthisreview.Whilenomemberofthereviewteampossessesmedical,scientificortechnologicalqualifications,theyrelieduponinformationderivedfromexpertresearchalreadyinthepublicdomaintocomplementtheirexistingknowledgebasespecificallyrelevanttoCEWs, accountability and thepolicing context.Thiswasused to assessexistingQPSpolicy,procedures,andtrainingandmonitoringprocesses.Secondly, the review builds upon the review teams collective knowledge aboutCEWsandparticularlyworkalreadyundertakenandpublishedbybothagencies inrelation toCEWsand theirapplicationwithin thepolicingenvironment.Asaresultthis reviewdoesnotattempt to reanalyse informationalreadypresented.Rather,whereappropriatenewinformationthatwasnotpreviouslyavailableispresentedtosupplementtheexistingbodyofwork.In this regard the review team found thework of the Braidwood Commission, aCommission of Inquiry on conducted energy weapon use established in British

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Columbia,Canada,considerablyhelpfulparticularlyfor informingtheprioritypolicyissuesaswellasotherrelevantissuesconcerningtheeffectiveandsafeuseofCEWswithinpolicingcontexts.ThereviewteamalsohadtheopportunitytoconsidertheCommissionsfinalreportofJune2009,RestoringPublicConfidence:RestrictingtheUseofConductedEnergyWeaponsinBritishColumbia.Inaddition,acontemporarystudyfortheNationalInstituteofJustice,USA,AMultimethodEvaluationofPoliceUseofForceOutcomes(2009)(the2009MultiMethodEvaluation),wasalsoparticularlyinformativebothatastrategiclevelandinrespectof the specific areas of policy interest. This study was based on a strongmethodological foundation conducted by experienced and respected researchersfromseveraldifferentinstitutionsintheUnitedStatesandwillformpartofalargerstudyfundedbytheNationalInstituteofJusticedueforpublicationin2010.The review team remains cognisant that research and technology, alongwith thebodyofmedicalknowledge,ontheuseofCEWscanchangerapidly.Finally,inviewofthefactthatinvestigationsintotheBrandonIncidentareongoing,the review team acted only upon information from the investigation that waspublicly available. The Deputy State Coroner will ultimately arrive at findings inrelationtothatincident,whichwillbeconsideredbytheQPSandCMCatthattime.

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ANAUDITOFDATADOWNLOADSJanuarytoJune2009

AnauditofthedataobtainedfromTaserweaponsused in64deploymentsfrom1January2009 to16 June2009,excluding theBrandon Incident,was completedbythe QPS and compared to information contained in the Taser Usage FormscompletedbypoliceofficerseachtimetheyuseaTaser.TheTaserusesafivesecondcycle.Forthepurposeoftheauditmultiplecycleswasdefined as more than one cycle, and prolonged cycling was defined as thecontinuouscyclingoftheTaserlongerthananormalfivesecondperiod.ThisoccurswhenthetriggeroftheTaser isheldon for longerthan fiveseconds.Themomentthefingerisoffthetrigger,thecyclestops.ThecyclecanbemadeshorterthanfivesecondsiftheoperatormanuallyturnstheTaseroffduringthecycle.Theauditfoundthe64incidentsinvolvedthetotaluseof95Tasercycles.Elevenofthesecycleslastedlongerthanfiveseconds.These11cycleswereusedin10ofthe64incidentsasoneincidentinvolvedtwoprolongedTasercycles.ItisnotpossibletodeterminefromthedatadownloadsalonewhethertheindividualTasercycle(s)attributabletoagivenincidentresultedincontactwithasubject.Table1depictsthenumberofcyclesinanincident.Cycle N=IncidentsOne 44Two 12Three 6Four 1Five 1>Five 0Total 64Forallincidentsthisrepresentsatotalof95cycles.Cyclesgreaterthanfivesecondswererecordedon11ofthe95cycles.Table2depictsthenumberofandlengthofcyclesgreaterthanfiveseconds.Seconds NofoccasionsSix 3Seven 3Eight 2Nine 0Ten 3Total 11

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In20 incidentstherewasmorethanonecycle(predominatelyrangingfromtwotothreecycles).Afurtherincidentinvolvingfourcyclesoccurredwherethefirstprobecyclewasbelieved tohavemissedandoneof five cycleswhere twoof the cycleswerearcdemonstrationsasawarning(Table1refers).Ofthe64occasions,54wereprobemode,eightweredrivestunandtwooccasionswereprobeanddrivestuncombination.Ofthese64uses,theCMCortheQPShavereceivedfourcomplaintsabouttheuseoftheTaser.Twoofthesecomplaints involvedthreecycles inthedrivestunmode(oneofthreeonesecondcycles;oneconsistingofacombinationofa10,athreeanda foursecondcycle).Theother twocomplaintsrelate touseof theTaser inprobemodeforasinglecycle.Allofthesemattersarecurrentlybeing investigatedbytheQPSwithCMCoversight.Any further analysis of the 64 incidents audited, beyond the raw data presentedabove,wouldhavenecessitatedasubjectiveassessmentofeachindividualincident.Thiswasbeyondthescopeofthisreview.

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POLICYANDPROCEDURESONTASERUSE

CurrentframeworkThis introductory section outlines the existing policy and procedural frameworkgoverningtheuseofTasersbypoliceinQueensland.The use of force by Queensland police is governed by both statute and policeoperationalprocedures.Therelevantlegislationiscontainedinsections615and616ofthePolicePowersandResponsibilitiesAct2000(PPRA).Generally,policeofficers inQueenslandcanuse reasonablynecessaryforce intheexerciseofanypowersunderthePPRAoranyotherAct(s.615(1)).Officersmayalsousereasonablynecessaryforce(butnotforcelikelytocausegrievousbodilyharmordeath)against individuals toprevent them fromescaping fromcustody (s.615(2)).In criticalsituations,thepowerofpoliceextendstotherighttouseforce likelytocausegrievousbodilyharmordeath(s.616).Operationalising the PPRA, section 14.3 of the Operational Procedures Manual(OPM) istheprincipalsourceofpolicepoliciesandproceduresontheuseof forceandadoptstheSituationalUseofForceModeltoguidepoliceintheirchoiceofuseofforceoptions.TheSituationalUseofForceModelallowsofficerstoselectjustifieduseof forceoptions (e.g.presence,openhand tactics, tacticalwithdrawal,baton,situational containment, firearm) to escalate or deescalate force to resolve anincident safely, most effectively and with minimum use of force. For example,officersmay choose to use tactical communication, then escalate use of force topresentationofOleoresinCapsicum (OC) spray if sufficiently threatened,and thenchoose not to deploy OC spray if a threat diminishes. This part of the OPMemphasises that any use of force must be authorised, justified, reasonable,proportionate,appropriate, legallydefensible,andtacticallysoundandeffective. Inparticular,theOPMreinforcestheimportanceofpoliceusingtheminimum levelofforcenecessarytoresolveanincident.Tasersarecurrentlydescribed insection14.23oftheOPMasa lessthan lethaluseofforceoptionthatmayassistofficersresolveincidentsinvolvingviolentsubjects.Taserscanbeused in twoways.Theprobemodeuseswiresandadart todeliverelectricalpulses into thebodywith the aimof rendering the subject incapableofmovinguntil thedevice isdeactivated.Unlikeotherpoliceaccoutrementssuchasthe baton, OC spray, and handcuffs, the probe does not rely on pain alone.Furthermore, itcanbeeffective regardlessof the subjects size, strengthandpainthreshold.Thedrivestunmodereliesondirectcontactoftheweaponontothebodyandcausesextremelocaliseddiscomfort.Itdoesnotimmobilisethesubjectandmaynotbeeffectiveonsubjectswhoaredrugoralcoholaffected.TheOPMpermitsofficerstousetheTaserineitherprobemodeordrivestunmodeto assist officers in resolving incidents involving violent or physically aggressive

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personswhoattemptorthreatentoapplyphysicalforceorwhophysicallyassaultoractively resist an officer in amanner thatmay result in injuries to the officer orothers.Before deploying a Taser, the OPM requires officers to consider the Taserscapabilities ineithermodeby reference to the circumstancesexisting at the timeand theSituationalUseofForceModel. Inotherwords,officersmust considerallavailable use of force options and the circumstances of an incident whendeterminingthemostappropriateuseofforceoptiontobeused.Wherepracticable,theOPM also requires officers towarn subjects before deploying a Taser and toconsider the area in which the subject may fall. The OPM also sets out thecircumstancesinwhichaTasershouldnotbeused.In addition, the OPM dealswith training, probe removal and disposal, aftercare,reporting of Taser use, carriage of a Taser, storage, inspection andmaintenance,downloadingdatafromtheTaser,recordingofTaserequipmentandreviewofTaserincidents. Some of these areaswill be considered in subsequent sections of thisreport. The relevant section of the OPM relating to Tasers is used by police inconjunctionwith the ConductedEnergyDeviceTaserGoodPracticeGuide.TheGoodPracticeGuideprovidesfurtherdetailedinstruction,explanationandexamplesonuseofTasers,coveringmatters suchas technicaldetails, safetyconsiderations,carriage, station procedures, deployment, drive stun backup, removal of probes,aftercare,reportingprocedures,cleaning,maintenanceandstorage.Therelevantextractsofthe legislationandpolicydocumentsreferredtoaboveareincludedasAttachment2tothisreport.

MultipleandExtendedDeploymentsFollowing information thatmultiple deployments of the Taser were used in theBrandon Incident,keypolicy issues forconsiderationby the review teamwere theissuesofmaximumuseormultipledeploymentsandextendeduse.TheauditofdatadownloadsconductedforthisreviewshowedthatmultipledeploymentsoccurredinapproximatelyoneinthreeincidentsinwhichaTaserwasdeployed.Asaresult,thefindingsandrecommendationsmadebythereviewteaminrelationtothesepolicyissues have been elevated to the priority matters considered in this report. Inaddition, asper theoriginal TermsofReference, the review team considered theoperational viability of establishing amaximum limit on the number of times orlengthoftimeaTasershouldbeusedduringanyoneincident.The CMC (2008) review of Taser research (available from itswebsite) highlightedthat despite limited research about the effects of prolonged CEW applications,scientistssuggestthatmultipleCEWapplicationsincreasethechanceofanelectricaldischarge affecting a persons heart during a vulnerable period of the heartrhythm, increasingapersonsriskofserious injuryand/ordeath(Schlosberg2005).Repeatedapplicationsmayalsoleadtoimportantphysiologicalchangesintheheart,increasingthe likelihoodofventricularfibrillationanddeath(Schlosberg2005). It isthought that prolonged CEW discharges may similarly affect an individuals

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respiratory and cardiac functioning (HECOE 2005), offering a plausible theory tohypothesiseaboutapossibleconnectionbetweendeaths, the repeatedapplicationofCEWs,andrepeatedapplicationsonpeopleexperiencingexciteddelirium (CPRC2005).In itsreportontheuseofCEWsbytheNSWPoliceForce,theNSWOmbudsmansOffice(2008)identifiedthatthemoreseriousrisksassociatedwithCEWuse,suchasdeath and serious injury, appear to occurmore frequently during circumstanceswhereapersonhasbeenexposedtoaprolongedcharge,ormultiplecharges(p.22).ThisresearchcitesAmnestyInternationals2006reportwhichincludesanumberofdeathsproximaltoseparateand/orprolongedCEWuseincluding:

amanwhowas subjected to two CEW applications,with one applicationlasting57seconds;

a man who was subjected to six CEW applications, with one applicationlastingtwominutesand49seconds;

amanwhowas subjected to up to 19 CEW applications by two separateweapons;and

amanwho died after hewas subjected to simultaneous charges by threeseparateCEWs,foraperiodtotalling75seconds.

The Ombudsman recommended that the NSW Police Force amend its standardoperatingproceduresgoverningCEWusetoprovideguidancetoofficersaboutwhenit is (and is not) appropriate to subject a person tomultiple or prolonged CEWapplications. Italso recommended thatNSWPoliceForceemphasise thatmultipleand/orprolongedCEWusagemay increase the riskof injuryordeath toaperson.Similarly,theNationalInstituteofJustice(NIJ)publicationStudyofDeathsFollowingElectroMuscularDisruption:InterimReportofJune2008(theNIJ2008Report)foundthatwhile studiesexamining theeffectsofextendedexposure inhumans toCEDareverylimited...[a]preliminaryreviewofdeathsfollowingCEDexposureindicatesthatmanyareassociatedwithcontinuousorrepeateddischargeoftheCED(p.4).

As adirect result, theNIJ recommended that law enforcementofficers shouldbemadeawareof thepotential risksofmultipleorprolongedexposureandexercisecautionwhenusingaCEWinthisway.TaserInternationalitselfhasrecognisedariskassociatedwithprolongedormultipleuse in itsTrainingBulletin(12.004ofJune282005),observingthatrepeated,prolonged,and/orcontinuousexposure(s)totheTASER electrical dischargemay cause strongmuscle contractions thatmay impairbreathingandrespiration,particularlywhentheprobesareplacedacrossthechestordiaphragm.

The2009MultiMethodevaluationnotedthatreporteddeathsinvolvingCEWsofteninvolve the use ofmore than oneweapon at a time ormultiple CEW cycles. Inparticular,thestudynotedtheexistenceofmedicaltrialsdemonstratingthatusingaCEWforcontinuousperiodsof15secondsissafefornormalhealthyadults.OnthisbasisthestudyrecommendedthatCEWuseshouldbelimitedtonomorethanthree

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standardfivesecondcyclesagainstanindividualandthatofficersshouldberequiredtoreassessthesituationaftereachstandardcycle.Alluseof forceoptionscarrya riskof injuryordeath;however, it isoperationallyimpracticabletoartificiallyspecifylimitsonthenumberofpunches,batonstrikesorshotsthatapoliceofficermightneedtouseinanygivensituation.Toattempttodoso fails to acknowledge the operational idiosyncrasies associated with eachindividualincident.Insteadapreferredpositionistoorganisationallysupportofficersbyprovidingoperationallyrelevanttoolstoassistthemincompetently,carefullyandcontinually assessing the circumstances contributing to the situation which willinformtheirselectionofauseofforceoption,andtoreassessthesecircumstancesfollowing initial deployment and prior to the application of any use of forceaccoutrement.Whileavoidingtheartificialcreationofamaximumuse,theQPSdoescontextualise all use of force options within a paradigm of using the minimumamountforcenecessarytoresolveanincident.Tasers, representing one use of force optionwithin the Situational Use of ForceModel,arealsoviewedwithinthiscontextofminimumuseofforce.Thereviewalsoconsidered that setting an upper limitmay potentially result in an unintentionalconsequenceofcondoningmoreforcethanreasonablynecessaryandcertainlyfailstoacknowledge the individualcircumstancesassociatedand/orcontributing to theparticularsituation.Thisconcernbeingparticularlyrelevantwhenavolatilesituationinwhich theartificiallyestablishedupper limit fora specificuseof forceoption isreached,andanofficerisfacedwithnoalternativebuttoescalatetheirresponsetothesituation.Officersmustalsobeequipped toassessa situationandmake informeddecisionswithinanoperationalcontextwhichenablethemtorespondappropriatelytoeachcase characterised by unique circumstances. An officermay decide following aninformed process that repeated applications of a Taser, while acknowledgingincreased risks,are justified in lightof thecircumstancesand inpreference to theuseoflethalforce.Insummary,onthebasisoftheexaminationconducted,thereviewteamfound:

No conclusivemedical evidence existswithin current research indicating ahighriskofserious injuryordeathtoanormalhealthyadultfromthedirecteffects of CEW exposure of up to 15 seconds. However, ambiguitysurroundingtheactualrateor levelofriskassociatedwiththeuseofCEWswithin the scientific and medical communities remains, particularly as asignificant proportion of individuals in contact with police under suchcircumstances may also have a poor health status including people withchronicdisease,mentalillnessorwhoaresubstanceaffected.

MultipleorprolongeduseofCEWsonone subject can increase the riskofinjurytothatsubject.

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Bestpracticeindicatesthatfollowinganapplicationofauseofforceoption,officersshouldreassessasituationpriortoanysecondaryapplicationoruseofanalternateuseofforceoption.

Exceptionalcircumstancesmayexistwithinanoperationalcontext inwhichmultiple(repeated)exposureisrequiredandjustified.Intermsofprolongedexposure, the CMC is of the view that prolonged or continuous exposureshould not be able to occur by design, without the safeguard of officershavingtopullthetriggeraftereachexposure,andwitheachtriggerpullbeingrecorded.TheQPSisoftheviewthattherewillbeexceptionalcircumstanceswhereofficerswillberequiredtoprolongexposure(e.g.fromfivesecondstoeight or nine seconds) to safely deal with a situation. In such a scenarioofficers shouldbeawareof theassociated riskswithmultipleorprolongeduse.Fromanorganisationalperspective,officers shouldalsobeaware thatrepeatedand/orprolongedTaseruseduringtheone incidentwillresult inahigherdegreeofscrutinybymanagement.

Bestpractice indicates thatofficers shouldnotuse twoormoreTasersononepersonatthesametime.

Aswillbediscussed later in this report theCMCs firmview is that theTaserX26shouldberedesignedormodifiedsothatasingledeploymentorapplicationoftheTasercanlastnolongerthanfivesecondsatatime.AdvicefromTaserInternationalis that thesemodifications to theX26 arenotpossible at this time.TheCMChasasked that the QPS examine this issue further, including considering possiblealternativestotheTaserX26 inthe interestsofsafeusage.TheQPShasagreedtoconsideralloptionsandopportunitiesinlightoftheCMCsconcerns.ThereviewteamsspecificrecommendationsforamendmenttotheQPSTaserPolicyaresetoutinthetextboxbelow.Referencestotherelevantupdatedsectionsoftherecommended QPS Taser Policy are included in brackets alongside the relevantrecommendation.RecommendationsThattheQPSTaserPolicystatethatasingledeploymentofaTaser ischaracterisedbyasinglefivesecondcycleineitherprobeordrivestunmode(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).That the QPS Taser Policy prevent officers from using the Taser on persons byapplicationofmorethanasinglefivesecondcycle,unlesstheofficerissatisfiedafterreassessingthesituation,thatexceptionalcircumstancesexist(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).ThattheQPSTaserPolicyplaceincreasedemphasisontherisksassociatedwiththeuseoftheTaser,particularlytherisksarisingfrommultipleorprolongeduse(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).

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ThattheQPSTaserPolicyhighlightthatwhileeachandeveryuseoftheTaserwillbecarefully scrutinised, officers should be aware that multiple or prolongeddeploymentswillbesubjectedtoincreasedscrutiny(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).ThattheQPSTaserPolicystatethatofficersmustnotusemorethanoneTaserononepersonatthesametime(Refer14.23.4UseofMorethanOneTaser).

OtherTaserDeploymentissuesAny deployment of a Taser, as with all use of force options, must be judgedaccording to the circumstances characterising the incidentat the specific time.ToensureQPSTaserPolicyeffectivelyassistsofficers intheproportionatedeploymentof Tasers, a range of issues must be addressed within the articulated policyframework.These include,butarenot limited to, the seriousnessof the situation;theknownriskfactors, includingsubjectcharacteristics;contemporarymedicalandscientificevidence;available informationaboutoptimalpractice;andthenatureofthe Taser as a weapon, including safety considerations, vis a vis other optionsavailable to police. The NationalMinimum Guidelines for IncidentManagement,ConflictResolutionandUseofForcedevelopedby theAustralianCentre forPoliceResearch(reportseries132.1)providesausefulstartingpointforsuchspecificpolicyconsiderations.TheNationalGuidelines establish thephilosophyof applying theminimumuseofforcenecessarytoresolveasituation.Inotherwords,thisGuidelinepromotesnonphysical resolution in the formof effective communication and conflict resolutiontacticsaspreferredforallsituationswhenpossible.Thereviewteamdidnotuncoverany new material during its examination of research to contradict this policyparadigm.Inaddition,representingandintegratingtheTaserasoneofanumberofuseofforceoptionsavailabletopolicewithintheSituationalUseofForceModel,isconsistentwith best practice in other jurisdictions. As a result, the review teamagreedthattheTasershouldremainasoneuseofforceoptionintermsofthepolicystatementsgoverningitsuse.Followingon from this,safetyaspectsspecificto theTaserrelative tootheruseofforce options are also a key policy consideration. The findings of the 2009MultiMethod Evaluation demonstrated a significant reduction in the risk of injury tosuspects when CEW or OC spray is used. This conclusion emanated from anexaminationof24,000useofforcecasesacross12differentpoliceagencieswithintheUSinwhichtheoddsofasubjectbeinginjureddecreasedbyalmost60percentwhereaCEWwasused(referp.83).However, as discussed in the preceding section onmultiple deployments, deathshaveoccurredproximaltoCEWuse.CertainexpertswhoprovidedevidencetotheBraidwoodCommissionconcludedthatwhiletheriskofcardiacdeathfollowingCEWuse is very low it cannot be ruled out. In particular, the existence of secondaryfactors such asunderlyinghealth conditions,personswithhigh adrenalineor in astateofexciteddelirium, and thepositioningof theCEWdarts in the chestwerethoughttocontributetotheincreasedrisk.

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Similarly,the2009MultiMethodEvaluationnotedthatCEWs,aswithOCspray,areneither painless or riskfree. Citing the earlier 2008 NIJ report, this evaluationreaffirmsthatwhilepeoplehavediedproximaltoCEWuse,noclearevidenceexiststo suggest that theweapons themselves have caused death. The 2008NIJ reportindicated thatwhile nomedical evidence exists to confirm that exposure toCEWproduces abnormal cardiac rhythms in normal healthy adults, the effects of CEWexposureinatriskpopulationsisnotclearlyunderstoodandrequiresmorefocusedstudy.Accordingly,the2008NIJreportrecommendedthattheuseofaCEDagainstthesepopulations(whenrecognised)shouldbeavoidedbutmaybenecessaryifthesituationexcludesotherreasonableoptions(p.4).TheheightenedriskofharmarisingduetotheplacementofCEWdartswasreportedintheCanadianMedicalAssociationJournalofMarch2009.Thisarticlereferredtoacaseofgeneralisedtonicclonicdisclosureafteranofficerwasmistakenlyshotbytwo barbed darts to his upper back and occiput (back of the head). The reportconcluded that a CEW deployed in the head may result in a brainspecificcomplication such as the one experienced by this officer. In this case the officerexperiencednolongtermilleffects.In linewith findings in relation tocomparative risksandbenefitsof theCEW, it isimportant toestablishanappropriate threshold test toguide thedeploymentofaCEW.The2009MultiMethodEvaluationclassifiedCEWsaslessthanlethalweaponswithdeathorharmassociatedwiththeirusebeingextremelyrare.However,giventhe possibility for CEW overuse, evidenced by the weapons ease of use andpopularity amongst officers interviewed for the study, the evaluation consideredthatthesubjectresistancethresholdforCEWsshouldbedefensive(muscletensing,struggling to escape physical control, fleeing on foot) or higher levels of suspectresistanceasopposed to inappropriately low levelsof suspect resistancewithoutphysicalforceorthreat.TheBraidwoodCommission recommended a slightlyhigher thresholdof actualorthreatened bodily harm to the subject or officer. The NSW Ombudsmanrecommended CEW application only be authorised where a person is violentlyconfrontingor resistingpoliceand thatTaserusebyanofficerother than in suchcircumstancesbesubjecttomanagementaction(2008,p.68).Other significant issues highlighted by thematerial accessed by the review teamincluded attaching importance to the continual reassessment of use of forcesituations by police officers and medical aftercare for persons who have beensubjecttoaCEW.Insummary,thereviewteamfound:

ATaser,aswithallotheruseofforceoptionsavailabletopolice,carrieswithit an inherent risk of injury or death. Accordingly, in linewithQPS policy,

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officersshouldonlyusetheminimumamountof forcenecessarytoresolveanincidentandalwaysexerciseduecarewhenusinganyuseofforceoptions.

Despiteambiguity in the research the riskofaCEWcausing thedeathofanormalhealthyadult is small,particularly relative to theuseof firearms. Itmust also be acknowledged thatmany critics argue that the capacity of aCEWtocauseorcontributetothedeathofahealthysubject isapossibilitythatcannotberuledout.

Researchsuggeststhattheriskof injuryfollowingthedeploymentofaCEWmayincreaseifthesubjectismentallyill,substanceaffected,haspreexistinghealth problems, has been struggling violently for a long period, has beensubjectedtootheruseof forceoptionsorrestraints,oranycombinationofthesefactorsexists.

Taser incidents reviewed by the QPS have shown that in a number ofsituations,hadtheTasernotbeendeployed,thedeploymentofotheruseofforceoptionsmayhaveresultedinmoreseriousorlethaloutcomes.

EvidencesupportsthattheappropriateuseofCEWscanconsiderablyreducetherateofinjurytosuspectsandtoofficers.

ThereviewteamconsideredthatwhiletheexistingQPSTaserPolicyaddressedmanyof the general risk issues highlighted in the research, improvements were stillpossible.Inparticular,thereviewreportsrecommendationsarticulatetheneedforaclearstatementastothegeneralthresholdofriskofseriousinjurytoapersonthatmustbemetbeforeaTasercanbedeployed.ThereviewteamsspecificrecommendationsforamendmenttotheQPSTaserPolicyabout general Taser deployment are provided below. References to the relevantupdated sections of the QPS Taser Policy are included with the relevantrecommendation.RecommendationsThat QPS Taser Policy specifically restate the importance of the general policyregarding the use of force, namely that officers should only use the minimumamountofforcenecessarytoresolveanincident(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).ThatQPSTaserPolicyprohibitofficersfromusingTasersunlessitcanbeestablishedthatthereisariskofseriousinjurytoaperson(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).ThattheQPSTaserPolicyrequireofficerstocontinuallyreassessthecircumstancesof the incident, particularly before they redeploy a Taser or decide to deploy adifferentuseofforceoption(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).That,inadditiontothecircumstancesidentifiedintheQPSTaserPolicyaboutwhenaTaser shouldnotbeused, the following situationsarealso included: (i) that theTaser shouldnotbeusedagainstpersonswhoarehandcuffed,unlessexceptional

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circumstances exist; (ii) that the Taser should not be used against persons ofparticularly small bodymass, except in extreme circumstances; and (iii) that thesecondary injuries identified in thepolicy as apotential consequenceof apersonfalling after being Tasered, include the example of concussive brain injury (Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).ThattheQPSTaserPolicyincludeaspecificstatementaboutTasersbeingassociatedwithorlinkedtodeaths(Refer14.23.3UseofTasers).ThattheQPSTaserPolicyincludeadditionalrequirementsforofficerswhodeployaTaseron apersonwho is suspected tobementally ill,namely toensure that theassistance of theQueenslandAmbulance Service is obtained andwhere possible,discussoptionswithmentalhealthprofessionals (Refernew section14.23.5UsingtheTaseronpeoplewhoaresuspectedmentallyill).That theQPSTaserPolicyprohibitofficers fromaimingaTaser topurposelystriketheheadorneckofasubjectunlessthis isunavoidable(Refernewsection14.23.6SpecialPrecautionstoavoideyeandheadinjuries).That theQPSTaserPolicyprohibit the intentionaldirectionofaTasers laser sighttargetfunctionatasubjectseyes(Refernewsection14.23.6SpecialPrecautionstoavoideyeandheadinjuries).

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TRAININGONTASERUSE

The QPS Taser Policy prohibits officers from using a Taser unless they havecompleted the Taser training course as part of broader qualification in theOperationalSkillsTraining(OST)curriculum.OfficersarerequiredtorequalifyinOSTonanannualbasis.TheOSTcurriculumisconsistentacrosstheStateandisrevisedeveryyeartoensuretrainingiscurrentandmeetstheidentifiedneedsofQPSmembers.Thecurriculumisinfluencedby operational needs, changes to national guidelines.QPS policies andprocedures, riskmanagement and litigation issues and judicial recommendationsincludingcoronialfindings.All operational skills and techniques are researched and validated before beingincluded inthecurriculum.Qualification iscompetencybased.Participantswhofailtodemonstratetherequiredcompetencystandardofaskillortacticwillbeprovidedwithremedialtrainingandthenreassessed.Competencystandardsreflectwhattheindividual is required toachieve inorder toperform theoperational skillor tacticsafely,efficientlyandeffectively.The current OST curriculum is divided into three blocks of training. Block Onetraining provides six hours of training over one day and has been designed toincorporatetherevisionandenhancementofthecoreoperationalskillsandtacticsincluding firearms that are essential for general operational policing. Block Twotraining provides six hours of training over one day and has been designed toincorporatebothcoreandkeyskills,includingfirearms,soastoexpandtheofficersskillbase.BlockThreetrainingfocusesoncoreandkeyskillsinrelationtothetheoryandoperationof theTaser.ThecurrentTaseruser trainingconsistsof10hoursoftraining,eighthoursofwhichisfacetofacetraining.Thisincludespassinganopenbookexaminationcovering thecorecomponentsof the trainingdelivered.Officersmustcompleteeachtrainingblockinconsecutiveorderbeforetheycanmoveontothe next training block. Requalification for Taser user trainingwill become BlockThree.OfficersmustcompleteallthreeblocksofOSTonanannualbasisinordertoqualifyforoperationalserviceinthenextcalendaryear. Priorto1January2009TasertrainingduringthetrialperiodconsistedofsixhoursoftrainingandwasdeliveredbytheSpecialEmergencyResponseTeamoveratwodayperiod.It is essential that training on Taser use ensure that all officers are capable ofefficientlyandeffectivelydeployingaTaserwithintheapprovedpolicy framework.Encouraginglythereviewteamfoundthatcurrenttraininghadalreadybeenupdatedto reflect the learnings from the12month trialof Tasers.Consequently, inmanyrespects this trainingalreadyaddresses the issuesand riskshighlightedduring thisreviewasrequiringtreatmentintheQPSpolicyonTaseruse.

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For example, the review team identified that QPS policy could be enhanced byrequiringofficerstocontinuallyreassessthecircumstancesofanincidentbeforeredeployingaTaser.Inthisregardcurrenttrainingmaterialsalreadyadviseofficerstoavoid extended or repeated applications where practicable and apply only thenumberof cycles reasonablynecessary to allow them to safely restrain a subject.Further,officersareinstructedtoconsidereachcycleasawindowofopportunityto attempt to establish control over a situation, butwhere circumstances requireextended duration or repeated discharges, officers are instructed to take care toobservethesubjectandprovidebreaksintheTaserstimulationwhenpracticable.Agapanalysisofcurrent trainingand thepolicy findingsand recommendationsofthis review indicated that current trainingwas adequate although some changeswould be required in order to reflect the policy changes recommended by thisreview.Overallthereviewteamfound:

That comprehensive Taser training and regular retraining are essential toensuresafeandeffectiveuseofTasersinoperationalpolicing.

That Taser training should continue to adequately address all known riskissues relating to Taser use and continually emphasise the overridingprinciple that officers should use only the minimum amount of forcenecessarytoresolveanincidentaswellastheriskofseriousinjuryordeathinherentinsomeuseofforceoptions.

Thattherewasalackofspecificscenariobasedtrainingtoincorporatetheoryanddecisionmakingintopracticalsessions.Forexample,relatingtopersonswithmentalhealthissues,drugaffectedpersons,teampolicingsituation.

That therewas a lack of specific training addressing vulnerable or atriskpersons and potential risks associated with those members of thecommunity.

Fromapracticalperspective,inordertoaccommodatetheadditionalscenariobasedtraining and training on vulnerable persons the review team recognised that thecurrenttrainingdeliveredunderBlockThreeofOSTwouldneedtobeincreasedtoaminimum of 14 hours to be delivered over two full days. The review team alsoconsidered that the use of Tasers should be incorporated into the dynamicinteractive trainingscenariosalreadydeliveredduringBlockTwo toensureofficersaretrainedinafullyintegrateduseofforceapproachtorespondingtoincidents.

1Morebroadlytheissueofopenbooktesting forOSThasbeenraisedbytheCMCasa matter requiring review. While it was beyond the capacity of this review toundertake an examination of the most effective methods for general adulteducation,thisissomethingthattheQPShasagreedtoinvestigatefurther.

1 Currently, officers undertaking the final written examination relating to the use of the CEW may refer to QPS policies and other written material in answering questions that are required in order to complete Taser training.

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ThereviewteamnotesthattheabilityforofficerstoundertakevoluntaryexposuretoaTaserisalsopartofcurrenttraining.Suchexposureislimitedtoonefivesecondcycle and officers are required to sign an appropriate waiver. After preliminaryexaminationofthiselement,thereviewteamdeterminedthatthiswasnotamatterthat couldbeadequately investigatedaspartof the current reviewgiven its timeconstraints. The issue is a complex onewhichwill require a detailed risk analysiswithin the broader context of all other police training for operational skills andindeed operational policing activities generally. Accordingly, the recommendationmadebelowisforfurtherconsiderationtobegiventothisissue.ThereviewteamsspecificrecommendationsforamendmenttoQPSTasertrainingaresetoutintheboxbelow.RecommendationsQPSTasertrainingshouldbeupdatedwherevernecessarytoincorporatethechangestoTaserpolicyrecommendedbythisreview(refertoPolicyandProceduresonTaserUseabove).QPSTasertrainingshouldbeincreasedfromthecurrenttrainingof10hourstoaminimumof14hoursovertwofulldays.QPSTasertrainingshouldbeenhancedbyincorporatingmorepracticalscenariobasedtrainingthatemphasisesdecisionmaking,theneedforcontinualassessmentofasituationandselectionofproportionatetacticaluseofforceoptions.QPSshouldreviewitscurrentuseofopenbooktestingforofficeraccreditationrelatingtoTasersaswellasOperationalSkills.ThattheQPSRiskManagementCommitteeshouldundertakeadetailedriskanalysisofthecircumstancesunderwhichvoluntaryexposureinTasertrainingcurrentlyoccurs.

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MONITORING,REVIEWANDEVALUATION

Robust and ongoingmonitoring, review and evaluation processes are consideredessentialtoensuringaccountabilityatbothoperationalandstrategiclevels,withthelatterfacilitatingtheearlydetectionofemergingtrendsinTaseruse.Commitmenttosuchprocessesalsoensuresthatthepolicy,proceduresandtraininggoverningTaseruseinQueenslandwillcontinuetoreflectbestpracticeandsafeguardagainstknownrisk factors in line with developments in associated research, including medicalevidence.Accountabilityalso incorporatesa focusontheappropriatemaintenanceandroutine inspectionofTasersrelieduponwithintheoperationalenvironmenttoensure their continued functionality and relevance to operational policingrequirements.Ensuringexistingpolicies,proceduresandtrainingadequatelyaddresstheriskinusingtheCEWisanimportantpartofbroaderaccountabilitymechanismsassociatedwithuseoftheweapon.Effective monitoring and improvement relies on appropriate and accurateinformation,andthemajorityofavailable literaturerecommendsenhancementstoagency data tomore effectively evaluate CEW usage and consider organisationalimplications.ComparingtheserecommendationsagainstQueenslandsexistingdatacollection mechanisms, however, identified that adequate information is beingcollected to meet both operational and strategic imperatives. Through thecombination of information collected using the QPS Taser Usage Form anddownloadeddata from theTaser itself, theQPSand theCMCareable toevaluateuse, identify any emerging issues requiring consideration, and inform policy andpractice.While recording trigger pulls provides for more accurate assessment of policedecisionmaking,thecurrentTaserX26modeldoesnothavean inbuiltcapacitytorecord trigger pulls. Rather, the downloadable data measures cycles. However,current QPS training requires officers to depress the trigger once, remove theirfinger,reconsiderthesituation in linewiththeSituationalUseofForceModelandselectthemostappropriateuseofforceoption.Thetrainingfurther identifiesthatwhereapoliceofficerdecidestodeployanadditionalcycleoftheTaseronaperson,thetriggermustbedepressedasecondtime.Considerable research evidence also demonstrates a preference formanagementreviewofbehaviourand/orpracticeassoonaspossible followingdeploymentofaCEW in an operational setting. Currently, panels of senior officers in each policeregionorcommand, referred toasSignificantEventReviewPanels,evaluateTaseruse within their respective areas according to agreed processes, including timeframes. Initiation of the Significant Event Review Panels also includes the priornotification of senior operational managers within the area in which the Taserdeployment occurred. Such a localised approach with oversight, or directinvolvementwherenecessary,bythecentralEthicalStandardsCommandconformswith available national and international literature which consistently supports

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ongoingevaluationofsituations involvingtheuseofforce, includingacommitmenttoorganisationallearningthroughmonitoringofincidentsatanaggregatelevel.TestingtheelectricaloutputofCEWs(numberofpulsespersecond,durationofeachpulse,andmaximumcurrentduringeachpulse)hasreceivedconsiderableattentionwithin the literature,most notably in Canada.While no specific international orAustralianstandardonsafetyparametersforConductedEnergyWeaponscurrentlyexists, it appears that scope exists for such parameters to be established andindependently tested. A valid testing or audit regimewould enhance confidencelevelsinthesafetyofCEWsasuseofforceoptionsforpolice.Tasersareintegratedintotheexistingpolicyframeworksurroundingprotocolstobeadoptedwhere serious injury or death occurs involving police. Ethical StandardsCommandoverseesall investigations intosuch incidentsand inany investigationofthatnature,evidencewillbeseizedandexamined.Forexample,anypolicefirearmthathasbeenusedwillbe seizedandballisticexaminationswillbeundertakenaspart of the investigative process. Training of operationalmanagers reinforces thisproceduralobligation.Also evident in informed discourse about CEWs and more specifically theirapplication and accountability within policing environments is the issue of videorecordingthroughtheuseofanattachedcamera,referredtoasTasercam.NSWandNewZealand integratedTasercamaspartoftheirTaserequipmentacquisition.Thereview team specifically examined Tasercam and as part of this process becameaware of other suitable technologies delivering a similar if not superior recordingcapacity.Thereviewteamalsoconsideredtheappropriatenessofisolatingonlyoneuse of force option for video recordingwithout extending this position to otheroptions,orpoliceincidentsmorebroadly.Thefollowingfindingsweremade:

While it isacknowledged thatexisting levelsofaccountability forTaserusewould increase if a capability to record every trigger existed, themanufacturerhasadvisedthatthisiscurrentlynotfeasiblefortheTaserX26.

TheCMCspreference isthatan inbuilt limiterbeusedrestrictingtheTaseruse toa specifiedmaximumnumberof times itcanbedeployedduringanindividual incident. However, advice from themanufacturer indicates thatsuchmodificationstotheTaserX26arecurrentlynotpossible.TheQPSwillexamine this issue further in the interests of safe usage, includingconsiderationofpossiblealternativestotheX26.TheCMCisoftheviewthatsuch a capability is already available in another type of CEW. The QPSexamines operational accoutrements to provide police themost effective,safestoptionsandtoensurebestuseofresources.

Thatongoingand independentevaluationofTasers isessential toensuringandmaintainingpublicconfidenceinpoliceallocationanduseoftheweaponundertheSituationalUseofForceModel.

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These findings lead the review team to articulate a number of specificrecommendationsasdetailed intheboxbelow.AnyassociatedupdatedsectionsoftheQPSTaserPolicyarealsoidentifiedwiththerelevantrecommendation. RecommendationsThatdatafromtheTaserfollowingeverydrivestunorprobemodedeploymentofaTaserisdownloadedwithin72hoursandprovidedtotheSignificantEventReviewPanel(Refernewsection14.23.18DownloadingdatafromaTaser).ThataChiefSuperintendentassesseverydrivestunorprobemodedeploymentofaTaserwithin72hours,includingdatadownload,withafollowupreviewbytheSignificantEventReviewPanelrequired(Refernewsection14.23.20ReviewofTaserincidents).ThattheQPSdevelopacontrolselfassessmentguide(orchecklist)thatcanbeusedbyOfficersinChargeandtheSignificantEventReviewPanelstoreviewTaserdeployments.ThattheQPScontinuetoexaminethedesignoftheTaserandanyotherCEWdevicestoensurethatthebestandmostaccountabletechnologyisused.Inparticular,theabilitytorecordtriggerpulls,alimitontheperiodofdeploymentandarestrictiononthenumberoftimesthataCEWcanbedeployedduringanindividualincidentshouldbethesubjectofcontinuedexamination.ThattheQPSaudittheuseofTasersbypoliceandalsoexaminetestingorauditingoftheelectricaloutputofTasers.TheQPStrialtheeffectivenessofTasercamorvideorecordinginadiscretelocation.ThatoncetheoutcomesofthereviewoftheNationalGuidelinesontheUseofForcearemadeknown,QPSgiveconsiderationtotheSituationalUseofForceModelandthereviewreportsrecommendationsinthecontextofthesefindingsandidentifyanyaspectsforimprovementorchange.ThattheCMCandQPScontinuewiththeircollaborativeeffortstoreview,researchandevaluateTaseruseinQueensland.Specifically,theQPSandCMCshoulddeveloparesearchplanandprotocolstomanagethisprocess,withaparticularfocuson:

ThecollectionanduseofdatatoinformassessmentoftheTaserandtheidentificationoftrends,suchasmissioncreep.

ContinualreassessmentofbestpracticeintermsofTaserpolicyandprocedures,trainingandmonitoring,asinformedbythelatestavailabletechnologicalandmedicalevidence.

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ATTACHMENT1DRAFTTASERPOLICY

14.23ConductedEnergyWeapon(Taser)

Taser isabrandnameofoneofanumberofweapons in thegeneral categoryofConducted EnergyWeapons (CEW). It is a hand held neuromuscular disruptiondevicecapableoftemporarily incapacitatingapersonandcausingpainthroughtheapplicationofanelectricalcurrent.TheTaserhastwomaincapabilities,probemodeanddrivestunmode.IntheprobemodeaTaserusespropelledwires/darts,todelivershortdurationhighvoltageelectricalpulsesintothebodywhichaffectthesensoryandmotorfunctionsof the nervous system. The electrical charge transmitted by a Taser causes thesubject person to experience involuntary muscular contractions, rendering thepersontemporarily incapacitatedorunabletoperformcoordinatedactionuntilthedeviceisdeactivated.UnlikebatonsorOCspray,probemodedoesnotrelyonpaincompliancealoneand iseffectiveregardlessofthesize,strength,mentalconditionorpainthresholdofthesubjectperson.Thedrive stunmodeusesdirectcontactof theTaser to thebodyorclothingofapersonandcausessignificantdiscomfortintheareawheretheTaserisapplied.Thedrivestunmodedoesnothaveasignificanteffectonthecentralnervoussystemanddoesnot immobiliseaperson.As such itmaynotbeeffectiveonpeoplewhoarehighlymotivated,mentallydisorderedordrug/alcoholaffected.Thedrivestunmodecanalsobeusedincombinationwiththeprobemodetocompleteanincapacitationcircuit.Tasers are 'Category R'weapons, as defined in s. 8(f) of theWeapons CategoriesRegulation1997.

14.23.1IssueofTasers

Taserswillbeissuedtopolicestationsandestablishmentsforusebyofficersaspartof the performance of their duty. The logistical distribution of Taserswithin eachregion or command is at the discretion of the officer in charge of that region orcommand.

14.23.2Tasertraining

POLICYOfficersarenottouseorcarryaTaserunlessthey:(i) havesuccessfullycompletedtherelevantTasertrainingcourse;

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http://phoenix.qldpol/phoenix/legislation/weapons_categories/008.htm

(ii) are currently qualified in Operational Skills and Tactics (OST) training (see s.14.3.1:'OperationalSkillsandTactics(OST)training'ofthischapter).

OfficerswhosuccessfullycompletetheTasertrainingcoursewillneedtorequalifyintheuseofaTaseronanannualbasis.ThisannualrequalificationwillbeundertakenaspartofBlock3OSTtraining(sees.14.3.1ofthischapter).The ChiefOST Instructor is responsible for ensuring the necessary systems are inplacetoprovideTasertrainingtonominatedofficers.

14.23.3UseofTasers

TheuseofaTaser'scapabilities,ineithertheprobemodeordrivestunmode,shouldbe determined by the circumstances existing at the time, bearing in mind the'SituationalUse of ForceModel' (see s. 14.3.2: 'SituationalUse of ForceModel 2009'ofthischapter).OfficersareremindedtheService'sphilosophyof'ConsiderallOptionsandPractiseSafety'(COPS)shouldbeembracedwhendealingwithincidentswhichmayrequiretheuseofforce.POLICYOfficers should only use theminimum amount of force necessary to resolve anincident.Theremustbe a riskof serious injury to apersonbefore anofficer candeploy aTaser.ThedecisiontoapplyforceoruseaTaserisanindividualoneforwhicheveryofficerwillbeheldaccountable.Everydecisiontouseforceshouldbethesubjectofacontinuousassessmentpriortotheapplicationofanotheruseofforce.Officersshouldconsiderall the 'useof force'optionsavailable to themandall thecircumstancesofan incidentwhendeterminingthemostappropriate 'useofforce'option(s)tobeused.PriortousingaTaserineithermode,officersshould:(i) verballywarnthesubjectperson(s)wherepracticable;and(ii) bemindfulof thearea inwhich the subjectmay fall. Inprobemode theTaser

causes temporary incapacitation which may cause the subject to fall down.Injuriesmaybesustainedbythesubjectwherethisoccurs.

ATasershouldnotbeusedineithermode:(i) againstpersonsofferingpassive resistance (e.g. refusing tomoveoroffering

littleornophysicalresistanceandrefusingtocomplywithpoliceinstructions.A

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http://phoenix.qldpol/phoenix/operational_procedures/operational_skills/opskills14.3.htm#14_03_01http://phoenix.qldpol/phoenix/operational_procedures/operational_skills/opskills14.3.htm#14_03_01http://phoenix.qldpol/phoenix/operational_procedures/operational_skills/opskills14.3.htm#14_03_01http://phoenix.qldpol/phoenix/operational_procedures/operational_skills/opskills14.3.htm#14_03_02

personactingasadeadweightorrequiringanofficertolift,pull,dragorpushtheminordertomaintaincontrol);

(ii) againstpersonsthatarehandcuffedunlessexceptionalcircumstancesexist;(iii) as a crowd controlmeasure (e.g. for crowd dispersal at a demonstration or

industrialdispute);

(iv) againsttheoccupantsofavehicleortheoperatorofmachinerywherethereisa danger of the vehicle ormachinery going out of control and injuring theoccupantsorotherpeople;

(v) againstjuvenilesorpersonsofparticularlysmallbodymass,exceptinextremecircumstances where there is no other reasonable option to avoid theimminentriskofseriousinjury;

(vi) againstfemalessuspectedonreasonablegroundsofbeingpregnant,exceptinextremecircumstanceswherethereisnootherreasonableoptiontoavoidtheimminentriskofseriousinjury;

(vii) nearexplosivematerials, flammable liquidsorgasesdue to thepossibilityofignition;

(viii) punitivelyforpurposesofcoercionorasaprodtomakeapersonmove;(ix) torouseunconscious,impairedorintoxicatedpersons;(x) on persons where there is a likelihood of significant secondary injuries

(particularly concussivebrain injury) froma fall (e.g. standingona ladderorotherelevatedposition);or

(xi) onelderlypersons,except inextremecircumstanceswhere there isnootherreasonableoptiontoavoidtheimminentriskofseriousinjury.

DeploymentofaTaser

A singledeploymentofaTaser is characterisedbyone five second cycle ineitherprobeordrivestunmode.AnydeploymentofaTaseronan individualbeyondthissinglecycleisconsideredamultipleorprolongeddeployment.OfficersaretousetheTaseronpersonsbyapplicationofonefivesecondcycle.Officersshouldbeaware that theremaybe technicalorphysiologicalreasonswhythedevice isnotworking as expectedon aparticular individual. Therefore, if theinitial application of the Taser in either the probe or drive stun modes is noteffective,officersshould reassess thesituationandconsiderotheravailableuseofforceoptions.OfficersarenottousetheTaserinaprolongedfashionbyholdingthetriggerdownforaperiodgreaterthanfivesecondsunlessexceptionalcircumstancesexist.Additional cycles (one trigger pull five seconds)may be applied in exceptionalcircumstancesaftertheofficerhasreassessedthesituationpriortoeachadditionalcycle.

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Officers are reminded that a subsequent use of the Taser or any prolonged use(greaterthanfiveseconds)willbescrutinisedandwillneedtobejustified.Whilealluseofforceisscrutinised,officersshouldbeawarethatthegreatertheuse(multipleorprolonged)ofaTaser,thegreaterthelevelofscrutinythatwillbeapplied.OfficersshouldbeawarethatmultipleorprolongedusesofaTaserhavebeenlinkedtodeaths,particularlywhere:(i) use of the Taser was accompanied by the use of restraints or chemical

incapacitantsprays(e.g.OCspray);

(ii) subjects had underlying health problems such as heart conditions ormentalillness;

(iii) subjectswereundertheinfluenceofdrugsand/oralcohol;(iv) subjectswerestrugglingviolentlyforasustainedperiod;or(v) acombinationofthesefactorsexisted.TherearecaseswheresuchpersonsexposedtotheeffectsofTaserhavediedsometime afterbeingexposed. It ishowever, recognised that there are circumstanceswheretheonlyalternativemaybetheuseofapotentially lethal firearmorwheretheactivationoftheTaser irrespectiveoftheadditionalrisk isabsolutelynecessarytoprotectlife.

14.23.4UseofmorethanoneTaser

POLICYOfficersmustnotusetwoormoreTasersontheonepersonatthesametime.

14.23.5UsingtheTaseronpeoplewhoaresuspectedmentallyill

POLICYOccasions will arise where it is necessary to use the Taser on a person who isexhibiting violent behaviour and who is also suspected suffering from a mentaldisorder or illness. When responding to amental health incident officers are toensure theassistanceof theQAS is requestedandwherepossible,discussoptionswithmentalhealthprofessionals(refertosection6.6,MentalHealthInterventionoftheOPM).

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14.23.6Specialprecautionstoavoideyeandheadinjuries

There is a specific risk of injury to the eye through penetration of a barb. Barbpenetrationintheneckorheadmayalsoincreasethelevelofinjury.POLICYTasersshouldnotbeaimedsoastostriketheheadorneckofasubjectunlessthisisunavoidable.Thelasersightshouldnotintentionallybeaimedattheeyesofthesubject.

14.23.7VoluntaryexposurestoTaser

POLICYVoluntary exposures are only to be undertaken as part of Taser training by aqualifiedTaserinstructor.Exposure is to be limited to one five second cycle and is not to occur unless theofficerbeingexposedhasreadaQPSapproved facts/informationsheetandsignedthe appropriate waiver prior to the exposure. Members of the QPS are not toundertakevoluntaryexposuresformembersofthepublic.MembersoftheQPSarenot toundertake voluntaryexposuresatpolice stations/establishmentsunless theexposureispartofTasertrainingbyaqualifiedTaserinstructor.

14.23.8Proberemovalanddisposal

POLICYProbe removalanddisposal is tobeconducted inaccordancewith theproceduresoutlinedintheConductedEnergyWeaponTaserGoodPracticeGuide.Whereprobesare imbedded insensitivetissueareas(e.g.neck/throat,face,breastorgroin)medicalaidshouldbesoughttoremovetheprobes.Officers in charge of stations or establishments should ensure suitable proberemoval and disposal equipment (i.e. protective gloves, sharps container, alcoholwipes/swabs and band aids) is available in all operational vehicles under theircontrol.

14.23.9Aftercare

ApersonwhohasbeenTasered:

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(i) should recoverquickly.The incapacitatingeffectof theTaserendswhen thetriggerisreleasedandtheunitisdeactivated;

(ii) mayfeeldazedforseveralseconds;(iii) mayexperiencetinglingsensationsforashortperiodafterwards;and(iv) mayexhibitminor skin irritation, temporaryblistersor rednessat the siteof

application.The application of a Taser should not affect or damage a pacemaker, or causepermanentdamageor longtermeffectstothesubjectperson'smuscles,nervesorotherbodyfunctions.However,itshouldberecognisedthatthesubjectpersonmayhave preexisting injuries or medical conditions and/or secondary injuries fromfallingdownwhenincapacitatedbytheTaser.POLICYIfrequired,theofficerwhodeployedtheTaser istoensurefirstaidand/ormedicalattentionisprovidedtothesubjectperson,asnecessary.See s. 16.13.1: 'Assessment of prisoners' and Appendix 16.1: 'The assessment ofprisonersandpersonsincustody'ofthisManual.PROCEDUREWhenmedicalattentionortreatmentisrequired,thedeployingofficershouldnotifytheDutyOfficer,PoliceCommunicationsCentre(PCC)Brisbane,or inareasoutsideofthosecoveredbyPCCBrisbane,thecommunicationscoordinatoroftherelevantPCC, and request the attendance of the Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS).Where it is impractical to obtain the attendance of the QAS, the officer shouldarrange tohave the subjectperson taken to thenearest facilityprovidingmedicalattention.

14.23.10ReportingtheuseofaTaser

Forthepurposeofthissection,theterm'use'includes:

(i) deployingorfiringtheprobesagainstapersonoranimal,orinthedirectionofapersonoranimal;

(ii) pointing a Taser in thedirectionof apersonwithoutdeployingor firing theprobes;

(iii) usingthedrivestunmodeagainstapersonoranimal;or(iv) holding/pressingaTaseragainstapersonwithoutactivatingit.POLICYAfteranincidentinvolvingtheuseofaTaser,theofficerwhousedtheTasershould:(i) notifyassoonaspracticable:

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(a) theDutyOfficer,PoliceCommunicationsCentre (PCC)Brisbane toensuretheincidentisrecordedontheCADsystem;or

(b) in areas outside those covered by PCC Brisbane, the communicationscoordinatoroftherelevantPCCtonoteontheCADsystemortheirRunningLogasthecasemaybe;or

(c) in areas where no police communications centre exists, the officer incharge for the timebeingof the station responsible forpolicing theareawheretheincidenthasoccurred;and

(ii) priortotheendoftheshift:

(a) complete and submit a 'Taser Usage Report', which is available on theOperations Support Command, 'Taser Implementation' webpage on theQPSIntranet(BulletinBoard);and

(b)ensureasignificanteventmessageissubmittedoutliningthecircumstancesof thedeployment (see s.1.6.10: 'SignificantEventMessagingSystem'ofthisManual). When completing the significant eventmessage, the dropdown menu in the subject field must be used and 'Taser Deployment'selectedasthesubject.Withinthesignificanteventmessageasummaryoftheincidentshouldbeprovidedincluding:

thesubject'sbehaviourandactions; theweapon(s)usedoravailabletothesubject; whetherthesubjectwasaffectedbyalcoholand/ordrugs; theperceiveddegreeofthreattopoliceand/orothers; otherpersonsinvolved; theofficer'sactions; whethertheprobesweredeployed,drivestunused,orwastheTaser

pointedtowardsorheldagainstthesubjectwithoutactivation;

whetheraverbalwarningwasgivenandifnot,whynot?;and whether any injuries were sustained and/or medical treatment

required/providedbyanyperson.The DutyOfficer, communications coordinator or officer in charge notified of anincidentinvolvingaTaseristoadvisetheappropriateregionaldutyofficer(RDO)ordistrictdutyofficer(DDO).TheofficerinchargewherethepoliceofficerusingaTaserisstationed,isto:(i) ensure that a 'Taser Usage Report' and significant eventmessage has been

submittedinrelationtotheincident;and

(ii) overview the incident to determine whether the use of the Taser was inaccordancewithServicepolicyandprocedures.

Wherepracticable,theoverviewshouldincludeafacetofacemeetingbetweentheofficerincharge(orsupervisor)andtheofficerwhodeployedtheTaser.

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If an officer deploys a Conducted EnergyWeapon accidentally, or other than inaccordancewithOPM14.23.8Safetyissues,thedeployingofficeristo:(i) submitaTaserUsageReportoutliningthecircumstancesoftheincident;(ii) notifytheShiftSupervisorandOICoftheincident(and/orDistrictDutyOfficer

/RegionalDutyOfficerperlocalSOPs);

(iii) in the case where any person was the subject of an unintentional Taserdeployment in either probe or drive stun mode, or significant damage topropertywascausedby thedeployment,asignificanteventmessage is tobegenerated. Data from this devicewill be downloadedwithin 72 hours persection14.23.18oftheOPM;

(iv) theShiftSupervisor(orOIC,DistrictDutyOfficerorRegionalDutyOfficer)willthenmake inquirieswithaviewtoestablishingthecauseofthe incident(e.g.memorylapse,lackofproficiencyofTaseruser,mechanicalfailure,operationalissues, deliberate disregard of established policies or protocols, deliberatemisuseofCEW);

(v) theShiftSupervisor(orOIC,DistrictDutyOfficerorRegionalDutyOfficer)willmakearecommendationonhowthematterwillbedealtwith(e.g.officernotpermitted to use a Taser until further training undertaken, managerialguidance,sentforformalinvestigationre:misuse).

If theuseof theTaserwas inappropriateornot inaccordancewithServicepolicy,see s. 7.2: 'Duty concerning misconduct or breaches of discipline' of the PoliceServiceAdministrationAct 1990 and Chapter 18: 'ComplaintManagement' of theHumanResourceManagementManual.

14.23.11CarriageofaTaser

POLICYQualifiedofficersperformingoperationaldutiesshould,whereappropriate,carryaTaser,ifoneisavailable.When removing a Taser from a gun safe or other approved safe provided by theServiceattheirrespectivestationorestablishment,membersaretoinspectandloadthe weapon in compliance with the procedures outlined in Chapter 6: 'Stationprocedures'oftheConductedEnergyWeaponTaserGoodPracticeGuide.TheTaser shouldbe loadedwith an air cartridge, ready foruse, and carriedon autility belt in the holster provided for that purpose. A spare cartridge should becarriedinthebottomofthe'extendeddigitalpowermagazine'(XDPM).Taserholstersshouldbecarriedsecurelyfittedonautilitybelt,onthesideoppositethedominanthand,andworn ina 'crossdraw'manner (i.e.with thehandleof thedevicefacingforward).

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Members arenot to leave a Service Taserunattended in a vehicleorotherplacewithoutgoodandsufficientreason.Thismayinclude:(i) membershavingtoattendasituationwherethecarriageofaTaserposesarisk

to security or safety, e.g. riot, serious street disturbance or authorisedassembly;

(ii) wheretheTaserrestrictsoperationalactivity,e.g.membersbeinginvolvedinarescueoperation;or

(iii) where it isnecessary for specialoperational situationsor circumstances,e.g.hostageorsuicidenegotiations.

CarriageofTaserbyplainclothesofficersPOLICYQualified officers performing plain clothes duties may carry a Taser, if it isappropriatetothedutiestheyareperforming.Tasersshouldonlybecarriedbyplainclothesofficers:

(i) intheServiceissuedholsterprovidedforthatpurpose;and(ii) securelyfittedonadressbelt(orutilitybelt ifavailable),onthesideopposite

thedominanthand,andworn ina'crossdraw'manner(i.e.withthehandleofthe device facing forward). Plain clothes officers are not to carry Tasers inServiceissuedbumbags,orinotherlocationsorpositions.

IfcarryingaServiceTaserexposedtoview,plainclothesofficersshouldcarrytheiridentificationbadgeinsuchapositionthatitisalsovisibletomembersofthepublic.CarriageofTasersonaircraftandatairportsPOLICYOfficerswhointendtocarryconductedenergyweapons(Tasers):(i) on commercialpassengerairlines/prescribed aircraft, are to complywith the

relevant provisions of s. 14.11.1: 'Weapons and prohibited items onCommercialPassengerAirlines/Prescribedaircraft'ofthischapter;

(ii) atairports,aretocomplywiths.14.11.4:'Carriageofweaponsandprohibiteditemsatairports'ofthischapter;or

(iii) onPoliceAirWingaircraft,aretoconsultwiththerelevantAirWingOperationsCoordinator for advice and direction regarding the carriage or storagerequirements.

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CarriageofTasersincourtPOLICYOfficers should notwear or carry a Service Taser, other than an exhibit, in courtunless:(i) authorised by the presiding magistrate or judge. This includes an officer

performingdutyasacourtorderly;or

(ii) theyarerespondingtoanincidentwithinthosepremises.CarriageofTasersinwatchhousesPOLICYOfficersmaycarryTasersinwatchhouses.Aswithbatons,oleoresincapsicumsprayandhandcuffs, there isno requirement foranofficer to removeandstoreaTaserpriortoenteringawatchhouse.CarriageofTasersincorrectionalcentresanddetentioncentresORDERUnless authorised or approved by the Chief Executive, Queensland CorrectiveServices,totakeweaponsintoacorrectionalcentreordetentioncentre,officersaretohandallTaserstothecorrectionalofficerondutyattheentrancetoacorrectionalcentreordetentioncentreforsafekeeping(sees.128:'Takingprohibitedthingintocorrective services facilityor givingprohibited thing toprisoner'of theCorrectiveServicesAct2006).Officersare to inspectallTasers returnedprior to leavinga correctional centreordetentioncentretoensuretheyareundamaged.

s.14.14.1Seealso :'Carriageoffirearmsandammunitionincorrectionalcentresanddetentioncentres'ofthischapter.CarriageofTasersinhospitalsPOLICYOfficers should exercise their discretion in regard to the carriage of conductedenergyweapons (Tasers)within the confinesof an authorisedmental health highsecurityunit,ormediumsecurityunit(sees.14.13:'Carriageoffirearmsinhospitals'of this chapter). Officers should also consider the policy outlined in s. 14.6.2:'Securityofweapons'ofthischapter.

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14.23.12Safetyissues

POLICYMembersareto:(i) treateveryTaserasifitisarmedandreadytodeploy;(ii) keep hands away from the front of the Taser at all times particularlywhen

loadingorunloadinganaircartridge;

(iii) ensurethesafetyswitchisactivatedandtheTaserisinsafemode:(a)beforehandingittosomeoneelse;

(b)uponreceivingitfromsomeoneelse;

(c)beforeloadingorremovinganaircartridgefromaTaser;

(d)whenreplacingtheextendeddigitalpowermagazineintheTaser;and

(e)whenevertheTaserisnotintendedforimmediateuse;

(iv) perform a static electricity earthing drill before handling live Taser aircartridges.

Abuildupofnaturallyoccurringstaticelectricityinaperson'sbodymay,inextremecases,causetheaircartridgetomalfunctionwhenhandled.Accordingly,membersshould:(i) groundthemselvesbeforehandling,loadingorunloadingTaseraircartridges;(ii) where practicable, load and unload Taser air cartridges in a designated safe

weapon clearingarea (see s.14.2Definitionsand references to legislation inthischapter);

(iii) neveraimtheTaserattheeyesorfaceofaperson;(iv) neverthrowaTasertosomeoneelseorattempttocatchaTaser;(v) neverpointaTaseratanyperson,orinanydirectionwhereapersonislikelyto

be,unlessitisactuallyintendedtousetheTaseragainstthatperson;

(vi) observe security precautions consistent with the Weapons Act 1990 andServicepolicies;and:

(vii) notuse,deployordischargeaTaserunless intheperformanceofoperationaldutiesorServiceapprovedtraining.

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14.23.13Storage

POLICYPriortoceasingduty,orwhereaServiceTaserisnotrequiredforduty,membersareto:(i) unloadanyServiceTaserintheirpossessionincompliancewiththeprocedures

outlinedinChapter6:'Stationprocedures'oftheConductedEnergyWeaponTaserGoodPracticeGuide;

(ii) place the Taser in a gun safe or other approved safe provided at theirrespectivestationorestablishmentforthepurpose(seeChapter20:'MinimumStorageStandardsForWeaponsHeld inPoliceFacilities'oftheAdministrationManual);

(iii) storetheTaserwiththeextendeddigitalpowermagazine(XDPM) insertedatalltimes.TheXDPMmustnotberemovedfromtheTaserwhenstored.IftheXDPM requires replacement it shouldbe carriedoutprior to storage (see s.14.23.12: 'Replacing the Extended Digital Power Magazine (XDPM) of thischapter);and

(iv) storeanyaircartridges,attheirrespectivestationorestablishment, inacool,dryandsecurelocation,elsewheretotheTaser,withtheblastdoorsoftheaircartridgesfacingdown.

EachmemberaccessingasafeprovidedbytheServiceforthestorageofTasersistoensurethesafeissecurelylockedimmediatelyafteruse.Officers taking out or returning Taser equipment to its storage facilities are tocompletetheregistersprovidedbythestationorestablishmentforthatpurpose.

14.23.14Inspectionandmaintenance

POLICYWhenobtainingaTaser,aircartridgesandholsteratthecommencementofashift,officersshould:(i) inspectallequipmentforvisiblesignsofdamage;(ii) checktheenergyorbatteryleveloftheextendeddigitalpowermagazine.Ifthe

energy level is less than20%,sees.14.23.12: 'Replacing theExtendedDigitalPowerMagazine(XDPM)'ofthischapter;

(iii) conductasparktestforonesecondvisuallyensuringthere isanarcbetweentheelectrodes;

(iv) check theexpirationdateof theaircartridges. Ifanaircartridgehasexpiredsees.14.23.11:'Used,damagedorexpiredaircartridges'ofthischapter;and

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(v) before loadinganaircartridge in theTaser,ensure the safety is 'on', inspectandifnecessarywipeouttheaircartridgefiringbaywithadrycloth.

Officersare to immediatelyreport to theirofficer inchargeanydamage,defectorunsatisfactory condition relating to,or the lossof a Taser, air cartridge,XDPMorholster.A Taser should not be exposed to significantmoisture orwater. If the Taser unitbecomeswet,officers are to complywith theproceduresoutlined inChapter 13:'Cleaningandmaintenance'oftheConductedEnergyWeaponTaserGoodPracticeGuide.Officersinchargeofstationsandestablishmentsareto:(i) ensure an inspection of Tasers, air cartridges and other ancillary equipment

under their control, is carried out on amonthly basis. Particulars of theseinspections are to be recorded in a register kept for this purpose. (see s.14.23.15:'RecordingofTaserequipment'ofthischapter).Officersinchargeofregionsandcommandsmayauthorisethat inspectionsofTasersandancillaryequipmentareundertakenatotherspecifiedtimeintervalsinconjunctionwithlocalriskmanagementpractices;and

(ii) immediately report to the district officer or other supervising commissionedofficer the lossof, any damageordefect to,or anyunsatisfactory conditionrelating to Service Taser equipment and complywith the provisions of theFinancialManagement PracticeManual in relation to any losses and,whereappropriate, the recovery of debts resulting from the loss or destruction ordamagetopropertywhileinthecareofmembers.

Seealsos.14.23.13:'Taserrepairsandreplacement'ofthischapter.

14.23.15Used,damagedorexpiredaircartridges

POLICYUsed or expended air cartridgesmay be disposed of as general refuse.However,priortodisposingofausedaircartridge,theserialnumber label istoberemovedfromthecartridge.Air cartridges are to be forwarded to the Regional (or Command) Education andTrainingCoordinator,fortrainingpurposesif:(i) theyhavepassedtheirexpirationdate;or(ii) theaircartridgehasnotbeendeployedbuttheblastdoorshavefallenoffthe

cartridge. In such circumstances, although the cartridgemay still fire, itmaynotdosoreliably.

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14.23.16ReplacingtheExtendedDigitalPowerMagazine(XDPM)

POLICYWhen theXDPMenergy level is less than20%,a replacement shouldbeobtainedandinsertedintotheTaser.The expended XDPM should then be forwarded to the Regional (or Command)EducationandTrainingCoordinator,fortrainingpurposes.WhentheXDPMenergylevelreads1%,itistobedisposedof.Continuedusebeyondthis energy level may cause potential data corruption in the Taser recordingmicroprocessor.ToreplacetheXDPMinaTaser,officersaretocomplywiththerelevantproceduresoutlinedintheConductedEnergyWeaponTaserGoodPracticeGuide.

14.23.17Taserrepairsandreplacement

POLICYTasers which are damaged, defective or otherwise require servicing are to beforwardedtotheArmourySection,LogisticsBranch.PROCEDUREOfficers in charge of stations or establishments that require the repair orreplacementofadamagedordefectiveTaserareto:(i) contact the Armoury Section, Logistics Branch for advice concerning the

necessaryarrangements;and

(ii) where a replacement Taser is required, complete a QP413: 'Requisition forWeapons/RestrictedItem'formandforwardtotheArmourySection,LogisticsBranch.

POLICYIf possible, the information recorded on a Taser is to be downloaded prior toforwarding the device to the Armoury Section, Logistics Branch (see s. 14.23.14:'DownloadingdatafromaTaser'ofthischapter).When a Taser is forwarded to the Armoury Section, Logistics Branch, any costsinvolvedintheinspection,testing,repairorreplacementoftheequipmentaretobemetbytherequestingregionorcommand.IfaTaserisreplacedordisposedof,theManager,WestEndSupplyCentreistosendareportoutliningthedescriptionandserialnumberofthe itemandadvisingof its

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destructiontotheOfficer inCharge,WeaponsLicensingBranch,who isresponsibleformaintainingtheQPSWeaponsSystem.

14.23.18DownloadingdatafromaTaser

TheTaserhasan inbuiltsystemwhichcanrecord the time,date,duration,batterystatusandtheinternaloperatingtemperatureatthetimetheTaserwasusedforitslast1500activations.POLICYWhereaTaser isdeployed ineitherdrivestunorprobemode,therelevantDistrictOfficerorManageristoensurethatassoonaspracticablebutwithin72hours,thedata from theTaserused isdownloadedbyapersonqualified todo so.ThedatadownloadedistobeprovidedtotheRegionalorCommandSignificantEventReviewPanelasapriority.Firearms Training Officers or Taser Training Officerswill generally be the personqualifiedtodownloadthisdata.Where the Ethical Standards Command (ESC) or the Crime and MisconductCommission assumes responsibility for investigationof amatter involving aTaser,the data download is not to be conducted without the approval of theSuperintendent,InternalInvestigationsBranch,ESC.PROCEDUREIf required for courtorotherpurposes,orwhereaTaser isbeing returned to theArmoury Section, Logistics Branch for repair or replacement, officers in charge ofstations or establishments should contact the Officer in Charge, OperationalResearchandAdvisoryUnit,andmakearrangements for the information recordedontheTasertobeextracted.POLICYTheOfficer in Charge,Operational Research and AdvisoryUnitmay arrange on aperiodicbasisthedownloadingofdatafromTaserswithintheService.

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14.23.19RecordingofTaserequipment

POLICYTheManager,WestEndSupplyCentre,isresponsibleforensuringthatthefollowinginformationisrecordedontheWeaponsAssetControlSystem:(i) thedistrict,orotherorganisationalunitwithintheService,eachTaserandair

cartridgeisissuedto;

(ii) theserialnumberofeachTaserandaircartridge;and(iii) thedateofissue.DistrictofficersorotherorganisationalunitsaretomaintainalocalregisterofTaserequipmentwithintheirareaofresponsibility.Particularstoberecordedinclude:(i) thedateofreceiptofeachitem;(ii) thestationorestablishmenteachTaserandaircartridg