Putnam. Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for Concepts

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Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for ConceptsAuthor(s): Hilary PutnamReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 431-447Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107949 .

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Philosophy ndPhenomenologicalesearchVol.LI,No.2,June1992

Truth,Activation Vectors andPossession Conditionsfor Concepts

HILARYPUTNAM

Harvard University

Readingthese threepapersdevotedto my RepresentationandReality, I hada

very strangeexperience:not one of my threedistinguishedcolleagues got me

substantiallywrong! In the past, whenever I have been asked to write com-

ments on papersabout my views, at least fifty percent of my effort has had

to go into correctingmisunderstandings. n this case, thateffort can happily

be saved,andI can devote myself to the muchmorepleasanttask of takingupthe arguments and the challenges of Dick Rorty, Paul Churchland and

ChristopherPeacocke. None of those challenges is directedagainst my criti-

cisms of functionalism,which took up the majorpartof Representationand

Reality, but they are highly importantnonetheless, dealing, as they do, with

the philosophical morals that I drew from the failure of functionalism;and

Rorty's and Churchland'sessays both deal, at least in part, with the central

philosophical-logical issue of truth.

Rorty and "makingtrue"

Rorty wants to know whether I think that objects bear a relation he calls

"makingtrue" to correctstatementsabout them. The question is an uncom-

fortableone for me, because it is phrasedin a special philosophicalvocabu-

lary, that is, Davidson's vocabulary as appropriatedby Rorty. (Nietzsche

says somewhere that if you accept a philosopher's questions, you have ac-

cepted his philosophy; anotherway of putting this is that to accept another

philosopher'svocabulary s always to accept a good many of his philosophi-

cal assumptions.) Perhapsone way to begin untangling this knot is to sayhow I thinkDavidsonintendstheclaim thatno thingmakes a sentencetrue.

To distinguish my reading of that claim from what Rorty seems to in-

tendby it, let me pointout thatin the very last sentence (p. 198) of the essay

Rorty cites,' Davidson speaks of the amiliar objects whose antics make our

DonaldDavidson,"TheVeryIdeaof a ConceptualScheme," nInquiries into Truthand in-terpretation(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1984).

PUTNAMywosIUm 431



sentences and opinions trueorfalse. So Davidson's point isn't thatthere is

no sense in which objects, be they nearor be they distantfrom us in space or

time, makeour sentences true!Rather,Davidson's point is that we must not

think that true sentences correspondone by one to things called "states of

affairs"; for to do that would be to bloat our ontology with whatCollingwood called "a kind of ghostly double of the grammarian's sen-

tence."93 As is well known, Davidson has no objectionto includingevents in

our ontology; but events, Davidson insists, are not sentence-shapedobjects;

rather,we are to thinkof one and the same event as describableby manydif-

ferent sentenceswhich have in no sense the same meaningorreference.)

But it is my views that are the subject, and not Davidson's. My view is

that whether a sentence is trueor not typically depends on whethercertain

things or events4 satisfy the conditions for being described by that sen-tence-conditions which depend upon the ongoing activity of using and re-

forming language. I agree with Davidson that this should not be thoughtof

as thecorrespondence f thesentenceto a uniquesentence-shaped hingin the

world. The distributionof color properties over the books in this room is

such that the sentence "Thereis no purplebook in the room" is true, but I

feel no need to invent somethingcalled "The absence of purplebooks in the

room" (an ontology of Negative Facts?) for that sentence to "correspond

to.,,5

But Rorty's principal question is this: how can I say that sentences are

"made true"by objects if objects aren't "what they are independentof my

2 Not very different frou my speaking of the statement that I had cereal for breakfastthis

morning as being true as a consequenceof what happenedthis morning is it? (Except that

"antics"might suggest that I am a messy eater of cereal.)3 Collingwood's Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939, 1978), p. 34.

Collingwood was speaking of postulating"propositions"as meanings of sentences, but

the same point applies to "states of affairs." Anotherpartof what Davidsonmeans by his

rejectionof the scheme/contentdistinction is that we must not think of our sentences as

made true by a thing-which-is-not-yet-divided-up-into-things, e.g., "Reality" or

"experience," or the notion of such a thing is incoherent.4 However, I do not agree with Rorty that it is verboten to introduce "states of affairs"

into our ontology. If we can, with Davidson, thinkof "events" as individuatedin such a

way thatthey are describable by differentand inequivalentsentences, why should we not

think of "statesof affairs" in a similarway, so that they areno more "ghostlydoubles of

the grammarian'ssentences" than events are? The meaningful question is not whether

states of affairs "really exist" or not, but whether notions like "state of affairs"are con-

ceived of ashavinga single determinatemeaning,or an open and forever extendable amily

of uses-the same questionthat we must ask about "object,""event,' etc.5 If we were to reify the distributionof color propertiesover books in the room, say by

identifying it with the function whose value on each book in the room is the color of that

book, it would be extremely implausibleto say that the sentence "There s no purple book

in the room"'corresponds' o thatobject in the sense of the correspondencemetaphysics of

truth, although that mathematicalobject indeed contains enough informationto deter-

mine the truthof that sentence.

432 HILARYUTNAM



way of talking"?And my reply is, again, thatRorty's very vocabularycon-

tains philosophical assumptions that I cannot "buy." Talk of "independent

existence" is deeply problematic,when what is at stake is neitherordinary

causal or ordinary ogical independence.That the sky is blue is causally inde-

pendentof the way we talk;for, with our languagein place, we can certainlysay that the sky would still be blue even if we did not use color words

(unless, of course, we affected thatcolor in some ordinarycausalway, say by

producingmore smog). And the statementthatthe sky is blue is, in the ordi-

narysense of "logically independent," ogically independentof any descrip-

tion thatone might give of our use of color words. For these reasons, I have

avoided stating the thesis of conceptual relativity as a thesis of the depen-

dence of the way things are on the way we talk (perhapsRorty's use of this

way of speakingbetrays his attraction o linguistic idealism). In any sense of"independent" can understand,whether the sky is blue is independentof

the way we talk.

Thereis, however,a way in which Rortyhimself has put thingselsewhere

thatseems muchhappierto me. Even if we (withourlanguagein place) must

say that the sky is blue, and that that fact is (causally and logically) inde-

pendent of how we talk, we do not have to concede that there would be athing called "the proposition that the sky is blue" even if we did not talkthat way. It is sentences (not abstract entities called "propositions") thatare trueor false, and while it is true thatthe sky would still have been blue

(indeed, bluer!) even if language-users had not evolved, it is not true that

true sentences would still have existed. If language-users had not evolved,

there would still have been a world, but there would not have been any

truths about the world. But recognizing that fact-and it is an important

one-does not requireus to say thatthe sky is not blue independentlyof the

way we speak. Whatit does requireus to do-and hereI agree with Rorty-is give up the pictureof Natureas having its very own language which it is

waiting for us to discover and use; the picture Rorty called "the mirrorof

Nature."In my view, as on Rorty's, there is no one metaphysically privi-

leged description that was always waiting to be written down. There are

many ways of using words, some better and some worse and some equally

good but simply different, but none which is Nature's own way. If I say,"There s a blue chairin frontof me"and my statementhappensto be true,I

have describeda partof the worldjust as truly as if I had said, "Thereis aphysical system with such and such properties"and that statementhad also

happenedto be true. Both descriptionsdescribe what is before me; neither

describes it "in itself," not because the "in itself' is an unreachablelimit,but because the "initself' doesn't make sense.

We make up uses of words-many, many different uses of words-and

none of them is merely copied off from the world itself. Yet for all that,

PUTNAM syMPosiuM433



some of our sentences are true, and-in spite of Rorty's worries about

"truth-makers"--the truth of "I had cereal for breakfast this morning"

does depend on what happened hismorning.

Again, a point of agreement with Rorty coupled with a point of what I

expect is disagreement: have often argued thatit makes no sense to think ofthe world as "dividing itself up" into "objects" (or "entities") indepen-

dently of our use of language. "Entity," "object," "event," "situation,"

"fact,""property,"tc.,have not onefixed use butan ever expandingam-

ily of uses. (The sense in which a quark-or a set-is an "object" s not the

sense in which a table is an "object.")Because "object"(or "entity") and

"exist" are conceptually linked, the same is trueof "exist." For this reason,

to think there is a Totality of all Objects (in a sense of "object" which is

supposed to have been fixed once and for all by Philosophy!) and a totality

of all Statements (in a sense of Statementwhich is also supposed to be fixed

once and for all), and an intelligible question as to how an ArbitraryState-

ment relates to the Totality of all Objects (or Facts, or whatever), is to be

subject to a deep confusion. This is the conclusion Rorty hails at the begin-

ning of his essay. But-and here is the likely disagreement-it does not fol-

low that when a particularuse of "object," "event,"etc. is already in

place, we cannot say how the particular tatementswe can make in thatpar-

ticular vocabulary relate to those particular objects. And the answer need

not always take the formof simple disquotation.But an example is in order.

In chapter 7 of Representation and Reality, I used the following exam-

ple: we count the objects in a room (a lamp, a table, a chair,a ballpoint pen,

and a notebook) and come up with the answer"five."But (taking the same

things to be our individuals,and not consideringthe partsof the lamp or the

pages of the notebook as "objects'), we are told to count again, this time

considering mereological sums of objects to be objects, and we come up thethe answer 25-1=31 (if the "null object"is excluded). Now, suppose we are

asked to explain why the sentence "there are 31 objects in the room" is true,

in the conceptual scheme of mereology, and not to quantifyover mereologi-

cal sums in our answer.

One way to do this is to point out that the language of mereology is so

set up that the number of "objects" is always equal to the number of

nonempty sets of individuals. This explanation does not say what a

"mereological sum" is. But it does provide a "definitionin use" for the ex-

pression "the number of objects is n" as that expression is used in mereol-

ogy. That the definiens is not "synonymous"with the definiendumdoes not

prevent this definition in use from answering the question how one counts

using mereological sums.

The point of this example is that the fact that one can describe the same

room using two differentvocabularies, vocabularieswhich are not in the or-

434 HILARY UTNAM



dinary semantical sense "interdefinable," oes not mean that one cannot talk

about how those vocabulariesrelate to the familiarobjects in the room; one

can do thatin a varietyof ways, dependingon what resources are availablein

the metalanguage, and what the purpose of the explanation is.6 Given a

definite language in place and definite scheme of "things," the relation be-tween "words and things"is not at all indescribable;but it does not have a

single metaphysicallyrivilegeddescription nymore han he thingsdo. In

sum, my answer to Rorty's question is thatwe can think of thingsas making

assertions about them true (when it is clear what sort of "things" we are

talking about and what we take an "assertion"to be); but there is no one

fixed sense of "make true" involved. Accepting the ubiquity of conceptual

relativity does not require us to deny that truthgenuinely depends on the

"antics"of things distantfrom the speaker, but the natureof the dependencechangesas thekindsof language-gameswe inventchanges.

Truth and logic

Suppose one says that truth "is not an explanatoryproperty" this is some-

thingthatRortyhas said in anotherplace7),but simply a device for disquota-

tion. Then one will not interpret he T-sentence:

'I had cereal for breakfast his morning' is trueif and only if I had cereal

for breakfastthis morning

as saying that whether the sentence mentionedpossesses a certain property

depends on whetherI had cereal for breakfast this morning; rather one will

think of the T-sentencevirtuallyas an equation:

Sentence 1=Sentence2

where Sentence 1= "'I had cereal for breakfast this morning' is true" and

Sentence 2= "I had cereal for breakfastthis morning." (Thus contemporary

"disquotationalist"or "protosentential" theories of truth essentially pick

up Ramsey's disappearancetheory of truth,and regardTarski's work as a

mere technical improvementwhich shows how to extend Ramsey's idea to

contexts in which the predicate "true" s combined with quantifiers.8)But,

as I pointed out in a paragraphRorty singles out for critical attention, the

6 I discuss this point at more length in "Truthand Convention," reprinted n my Realism

witha HumanFace (Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversity Press, 1991).7 "Pragmatism,Davidsonand Truth," n E. LePore (ed.), Truthand Interpretation Oxford:

Basil Blackwell, 1986).8 Davidson has emphaticallydistancedhimself from this circle of ideas, by the way. Cf. his

"The Structureand Contentof Truth,"The Journal of Philosophy 87(6), June 1990, pp.

279-328.

PUTNAM YMPOSIUM 435



"disquotationalist" annot say that our reason for accepting the theorems of

logic is that they preserve the propertyof truth (since there is no such prop-

erty, on this account). And Rorty replies, "Can eliminationists of this stripe

explain why we should continue to use classical logic? No, but who can?"

This retort, and the accompanying challenge to supply an alternative tothe usual laws of logic,9 would be a good one if the question were one of jus-

tifying logic. But my criticism of the disquotationalist was not that (s)he

cannot justify the principles of logic, but that (s)he cannot explain from

within our language and our logic what the rationale for those laws and in-

ference procedures s.

To say, as I do, that the rationaleis that those laws and inference proce-

dures preserve truth does not requireus to think of truthas something exter-

nal to logic. Logical inference does not carry truthfrom premises to conclu-

sion in the way a pipe carries water from one place to another. Any believ-

able account of the truth-preserving haracterof logic will have to point out

that the logical laws are connected with the very meanings of the logical

connectives (this is something Peacocke points out). It will also have to

point out that they are connected with our understandingof truth itself; for

what sense does that notion make apart from the notions of implication, va-

lidity, consistency and inconsistency? The procedures of logic provide the

very standards which we use to certify statements as true in many situa-

tions.10

To say, then, that truth s a normative property s to emphasize that call-

ing statements true and false is evaluating them;and evaluationpresupposes

standards,among them the laws of logic. Our standardsof truthare extend-

able and reformable; they are not a collection of algorithms. But for all

that, there are statements that meet them and statements that do not; and

that is what makes truth a "substantial"notion.11Rorty's reply would be that evaluating a statement (or anything else)

does not require that we ascribe or withhold a normative property; it only

requires that we possess interests. "On James's view [as interpretedand en-

dorsedby Rorty12]true'resembles 'good' or 'rational'in being a normative

notion,a compliment aid to sentenceswhichseemto be paying theirway

9 In fact there are alternatives,and they have theiruses in particularcontexts. I referto in-

tuiLionistogic, relevant ogic and quantum-logic,among others.10 That some of the "laws"of classical logic-I am thinking, in particular,of Bivalence-

are idealizations of our actualproceduresrather handescriptionsof them is somethingI

ignore here. On this point, see my "Vagueness and AlternativeLogic," in Realism and

Reason (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1983).1 This term was suggestedto me by David Wiggin's "WhatWould be a SubstantialTheoiy

of Truth" n Z. van Straaten(cd.) (Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 1982).12 The quotationis from Rorty's Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of

MinnesotaPress, 1982), p. xxv.

436 HILARY UTNAM



andwhich it inwithothersentenceswhich eemto bedoingso."[emphasisadded] It is not the idea that "true" s normative that Rorty objects to, but

the idea that the predicatecorrespondsto a property.On Rorty's account,13

"true" is just a word we use to pay "compliments" to sentences, to dis-

quote, to "caution,"etc.But Rorty also recognizes that language has a social character;"true" s

not a word one uses idiosyncratically.

InIrony,ContingencyndSolidarity, s in his earlierPhilosophy nd the

Mirror of Nature, Rorty tries to reconcile these two strains in his

thought-his emotivist cum disquotationalist account of truth and his

recognition of the social character of our standards for truth-by distin-

guishing between using "criterion-governed sentences within language

games" and speakingwhen the language games arebeing contestedor areun-

dergoing change. In the formercase, the truthor falsity of what we assert is

determined by objective standards.1'4"The world can, once we have pro-

grammedourselves with a language,cause us to hold beliefs."'15In the latter

case, calling p "true" s just paying it a compliment.

But this story has only the appearanceof making sense. Justice is done to

the idea that "the world" has something to do with whether a sentence is

true or false by invoking the pseudo-Wittgensteinian16 notion of a

"criterion," nd the image of a language game as a computerprogram('once

we have programmed ourselves with a language"). But the metaphor re-

quires that there be an objective fact as to what someone with the

"program"n questionwould say undergiven circumstances.f you also

deny that counterfactualspossess any kind of objectivity,17 theneven the no-

tion of truth for "criterion-governed entences within language games" col-

lapses. We are left with the pictureof languageuse as producing"marksand

noises" for the sake of obtaining "pleasure"and avoiding "4pain"15-lan-

13 See, in particular,"Pragmatism,Davidsonand Truth."14 "When the notion of 'description of the world' is moved from the level of criterion gov-

erned-sentenceswithinlanguage games to languagegames as wholes, games which we do

not chose between by reference to criteria,the idea that the worlddecides which descrip-

tions are true can no longer be given a clear sense." Contingency, Irony and Solidarity

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989), p. 5.Loc.cit, p. 6.

16 For reasons for doubtingthat the notion of a criterion as an algorithm for deciding the

truth of a sentence could have been what Wittgenstein had in mind, see Stanley Cavell's

TheClaimofReason.17 I have heardRortyhimself say thatappealto what speakers would say is appealto "ghost

observers."But what"criteria," r programs n the brain,are supposed to be, if the notion

of a counterfactual upporting descriptionis not available,I haven't the faintest ideal8 Rortyused this languagein a paperreadto a conferenceon Truthsponsoredby the College

Internationalede Philosophiein Parisat the end of May, 1990. At the same conference he

suggestedthat we simply try to do withoutthe word "true."The same idea is hinted at in

Rorty's praise of Kunderain "Philosophers, Novelists and InterculturalComparisons:

PUTNAMYmPosIUm 437



guage which suggests the methodological solipsism of Carnap'sAufbau, ex-

cept that the positivist concern with predicting experiences has been re-

placed by an epicureanconcern for producingpleasant ones. Like relativism,

which in many ways it resembles, Rorty's story tacitly assumes notions-

counterfactuals,computerprograms,etc.-which are treatedrealistically inorder to explain how the variousperspectives work, and then goes on to say

that those notions too are only partof a perspective. But at thatpoint it be-

comes totally unclear what the pictureis supposedto be. Rorty's alternative

to realism seems to be not so much an alternativeas the permanent llusion

of an alternative-a sortof philosophicalfata morgana.

Churchland's chairs and mousetraps

According to Paul Churchland,." utnam begins by misrepresenting the ba-

sic argument behind eliminative materialism."Contraryto what I wrote,

eliminativists do not require that all the instances of X must have some-

thing scientifically describable in common to escape the stigma of being

"mythological." "Such a draconian principle would render 'mythological'

any and all purely functional kinds (chairs, mousetraps,valvelifters, etc.).

But eliminativists are not ignorant of or hostile to the existence of func-

tional kinds, nor are they so careless as to embrace a principle that would

banish them all at one blow."

I am glad to hear it. I am also deeply puzzled. For the notion of a chair,to

take one of Churchland'sexamples (a similar point can be made with any of

the others) is conceptually linked to the notion of being a portable seat for

one with a back. And the notionof being a seat is the notion of being an arti-

fact which is made for the purposeof being sat upon. Andpurposes, like all

the propositional attitudes, are said to be like (the avowedly nonexistent)

phlogiston, caloric, and the four principles of medieval alchemy. But, one istempted to reply, if purposes do not exist (any more than phlogiston,

caloric, or the four principles of medieval alchemy), then things made for

purposes also do not exist. So seats do not exist. And, a fortiori, chairs do

Heidegger, Kunderaand Dickens" (in Culture and Modernity: East-WestPhilosophical

Perspectives, Eliot Deutsch (ed.) [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991]):

"Kundera [makes]-the term 'the novel' roughly synonymous with 'the democratic

utopia'-with an imaginaryfuture society in which nobody dreams of thinking that God,

or the Truth,or the Nature of Things, is on her or his side. In such a utopianobody would

dream of thinkingthatthereis anythingmore real than pleasure and pain, or that there is a

duty laid upon us which transcends he search for happiness."Note that thereis no reason

at all to believe that the property"conduces, if believed, to maximize pleasure and mini-

mize pain"is preservedby such rulesof logic as conjunction ntroduction "from P and Q

infer P&Q").This is an example of the way in which accounts like Rorty's undermine he

rationale for acceptingstandard ogical rules.

438 HILARY UTNAM



not exist. So the eliminativist owes us not just a "successor concept for the

notion of truth"but also a successor concept for the notion of a chair.

Presumably, Churchlandwould reply that chairs should not be thought

of as being "madeby people with the purposethat they should be sat upon,"

but simply as having the "function"of being sat upon. "Purposes"are outbut "functions"are in. Why?

Are "functions"thought to be all right because we can think of them as

arising from something like naturalselection? However such a story might

go in the case of an artifactwhich fulfills a biological function (providinga

place to sit, or killing mice-which might be classed as "combatinghostile

species") it is not clear how one would account for the "function"of arti-

facts whose purposes (pardon, functions) are connected with and arise

within a linguistically structuredworld, say, pens or computers. Are writ-

ing and computingalso O.K. notions?But not telling someone something or

figuringsomethingout?

Churchlanddoes not review the case for "the explanatoryand predictive

failures of folk psychology" here, but let me say that I find that case ex-

traordinarilyunconvincing. The trick, of course, is to see the conceptual

scheme of propositional attitudes as a "theory," and then to include all

sorts of things as fundamentalcommitmentsof that

theory.Here it is the

idea that our propositionalattitudeare connected by inferences that is seen

as part of the "theory"whose "ontological commitments" should be give

up; in other of Churchland'swritings it is incorrigibleaccess to our propo-

sitional attitudes that is so included. But if I know that you know that the

bus to work stops at the cornerof Bartlett Avenue, and that you know that

that is the neareststop to your house, and that you dislike walking very far

in the cold, I will naturallyexpect that if you decide to take the bus to work

on a cold morning, you will wait for it at the corner of Bartlett Avenue.This does not commit me to the view thatyou rehearsedthe practicalsyllo-

gism in question in your brain (or "said it in your heart," n the ancient id-

iom). Nor does it commit me to the idea that you are incorrigibleaboutwhat

you believe or decide.'9 And the failure to find a series of scientifically de-

19 As Susan Haack writes (in "Recent Obituariesof Epistemology," American Philosophi-

cal Quarterly27(3), July 1990), "...in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind

Churchland.. argued for the appropriatenessof calling the belief-desire model of the ex-

planationof action a "theory"on the groundsthat one's beliefs and desires are not incor-

rigibly open to introspectiveobservation.So the word 'theory' is playing a neat rhetorical

trick; it is a long way from grantingthe fallibility of introspectionto describing the be-

lief-desire model as a 'researchprogram'.No sooner is the belief-desire model elevatedto

the status of a 'research program', however, than it is demoted by the adjective

'degenerating'. This seems to me like calling the postulation of physical objects a

'degeneratingresearchprogram' on the grounds,first, that it has been sustainedfor many

centuries without majormodification,and, second, that it is simple, coarse-grained,and

gerrymandered elativeto the ontology of modem physics" (p. 205).

PUTNAM YMPOSIUM 439



scribable events in the brain ("non-linear transformations of activation

vectors") which correspondpoint by point to the steps in the practical syl-

logism you did not in fact rehearsedoes not show thatany of the statements

I made aboutyou-(1) You know that the bus to work stops at the cornerof

BartlettAvenue; (2) You know that that is the nearest stop to your house;(3) You don't like walking very far in the cold; (4) You decided to take the

bus to work such and such a cold morning;(5) Thatis the reasonyou waited

for the bus at the corner of BartlettAvenue-is false, or involves a com-

mitment to a categorical structurewhich is incompatible with ("orthogonal

to") thatof brain science.

But what of Churchland'sclaim that we don't need this sort of explana-

tion? Can't we, at least "in principle,"predict/explain why you will go to

the corner of Bartlett Avenue from a sufficient knowledge of your neuro-

computationalprocesses? What makes Churchlandthink this is possible is

thathe believes himself to have an accountof representational success and

failure. The intentionalityof sentences is to be replaced by the intentional-

ity (representationality)of neural states. But this gets things exactly back-

wards. Neuronal events do not literally "represent"anything; the brain is,

in Dan Dennett's happyphrase, a "syntacticengine." Its events do not have a

semantics. (Nor does the evolutionary history of the brain determine such a

semantics.20)We persons say things, andthe causal structureof the events in

our brainsenablesus to do so;21 it is no good to throw the notion of (a per-

son's) saying something22out the window, in orderto welcome the notion

of a pattern of neuronal activation's "representing"a "situation" in the

front door.

The gleam in Churchland's eye

InRepresentation and Reality, it was not the "kinematics,dynamics and se-mantics" of brain activity thatI describedas "only a gleam in Churchland's

20 I arguethis in chapter2 of Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge,Massachusetts: Harvard

University Press, forthcoming).21 I owe this way of putting things to John McDowell.22 I emphasize the notion of "saying" things here, because I want to call attention to the

public character oflanguage,

asopposed to

thevery non-public character of the"representation"by subpersonalmechanisms that Churchlandpostulates. Saying some-

thing is an act subjectto appraisalby a communityof interpreters.Moreover it is closely

related to believing: paradigmcases of "believing thatp" are cases in which the contentin

questioncan be said to be present,at least implicitly, in what the subject says (including

what (s)he says "mentally,"in verbalized thoughts). (This claim is weaker than, but in

the same directionas, Davidson's well-known claim thatthinkingpresupposes the exis-

tence of interpreters.)Churchland'smistake lies in looking to findpropositional attitudes

in the brain, instead of looking at the conditions under which it makes sense for an inter-

preterto ascribe them.

440 HILARY UTNAM



eye" (although, in very truth,it isn't much more than that23), ut the provi-

sion of a successor concept to the notionof truth,and a successor to classical

logic24of standardsof evaluation applicable to the publicly inspectable

linguistic products of socially conducted inquiry,rather than to "activation

vectors" that no one can actually describe (and that, on Churchland'sownaccount, are so complex thaton one may ever be able actuallyto describe the

"prototypevector" corresponding to a human cognitive state of any com-

plexity). But even so, it is strange that Churchlandobjects to the phrase,

since he himself employs similar language in the papers to which he refers

us. Thus in "The Ontological Status of Observables,"after saying that "the

concept of truth is suspect on purely metaphysical grounds, anyway," he

writes,

The formulation of such a conception [a "constructive" conception of

cognitive activity in which the notion of truth "plays at best a highly

derivative role"], adequateto all of our epistemic criteria, is the outstanding

task of epistemology. I do not think we will find that conception in van

Fraassen's model-theoreticversion of 'positivistic instrumentalist', nor do

I think we will find it quickly.But the empirical brainbegs unravelling,and

we have plenty of time" [my emphasis] (ibid., p. 46). And in the "recent es-

say" where, Churchland tells us, "we can see this project already

launched,"25Churchlandwrites, "We are in no position yet even to sketch [a

general account of 'theoretical virtue']" (ibid., p. 221). "That will be no

small taskand I cannoteven pretendseriously to undertake t here"(p. 220),

and again, "as I look back over this essay, I am distressed at how fragile is

the account proposed, and how sketchy are the few details provided" (p.

229).

But I do not think it was simple touchiness thatcaused Churchland o ob-

ject to my saying that a successor concept to the notion of truth is only agleam in his eye. From his point of view, it may be true that"It is not even

very difficult."For, as I read over these papers,I see no interestat all in the

problem I just described as that of providing standardsof evaluation appli-

cable to the publicly inspectable linguistic products of socially conducted

23 For a fair descriptionof the presentstate of ourknowledge, see Jacob T. Schwartz,"The

New Connectionism:Developing Relations Between Neuroscience and Artificial Intelli-

gence,"Daedalus, Winter1988, pp. 123-42-(this issue of Daedalus was also reprintedas

TheArtificialIntelligenceDebate (Cambridge,Massachusetts:M.I.T. Press, 1989).

24 In "The Ontological Status of Observable," Churchland writes that "The notion of

'truth',afterall, is but the central element in a clutch of descriptiveand normativetheo-

ries (folk psychology, folk epistemology, folk semantics,classical logic), andwe can ex-

pect conceptual progress here as appropriatelyas anywhere else" (p. 46). [emphasis in

original]25 A NeurocomputationalPerspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science

(Cambridge,Massachusetts:M.I.T.Press, 1989).

PUTNAM YMPOSIUM 441



inquiry."Thecognitivekinematics erebeing exploreddoes not havesen-

tencesorpropositionss its basicelements;he basicelementsareactivation

vectors.Thevariousdimensions f epistemicvirtuewill therefore ave tobe

reconceivednterms hataregroundedn this new conception f whatcogni-

tive activity consists in." Here and elsewhere,Churchlandwrites as if"prototype ectors" n the brainwere publiclyinspectable,and we could

just forgetaboutmeresentencesand proceed o defineappropriatevalua-

torypredicates irectlyoverprototype ectors.Churchlandejects he idea

that"the unitof cognition s the sentenceorproposition nd thecognitive

virtueof suchunits s truth."26nd he referswith barelydisguised cornto

linguisticallyormulatedcientificexplanation s "a gamethat s occasion-

ally playedby the oldermembers f a single speciesof animalon thoseex-

ceptionaloccasionswhenexplanatorynderstandingequated ere withthenearly nstantaneousctivation f an appropriateprototypeector"by the

brain] or somereason ludes hem."27

For prototype ectors, he explications f the notionsof representation

andepistemicsuccess thatChurchlandketchesare indeed "not even that

difficult"o explain.A prototype ector s said to represent situationust

in case that situation obustlycauses the activationof thatprototypevec-

tor.28Andevaluationn termsof truthcan, it is suggested,be replacedby

evaluationn termsof contributiono reproductiveuccess:"Naturalelec-

tiondoes not carewhether brainhasortends owardruebeliefs,so longas

theorganism eliablyexhibitsreproductivelydvantageousehavior.. [The

"sentential inematics mbracedby folk psychologyand orthodoxepiste-

mology"] s partof a commonsenseheorythat threatenso be eithersu-

perficial rfalse....Truth, s currently onceived,mayceaseto be an aimof

science."29

The moment n Churchland'swritingwhen thingslook that simpletohimis onewith which,I confess,I am totallyout of sympathy.Churchland

wasquiteright o be "distressedt how fragile s the accountproposed, nd

howsketchyarethe few detailsprovided."

Possession conditions for concepts

Christophereacocke'sgenerous ssaymakesa number f suggestionson

whichI cannottake a stand,pending urther larification.My comments

26 "TheOntologicalStatusof Unobservables,"p. 45.27 The Structure of Science, p. 227. Note the innocence about the role of the experi-

menter/observer n defining the "situation"which activatesthe prototypevector!28 An activation vector A misrepresentsa situation when "the situationconfronted is not a

member of the class of situations that will reliably activate A from almost any perspec-

tive, even thoughit happened o activateA on this occasion" (ibid.,p. 220).29 "TheOntologicalStatusof Observables,"p. 46.

442 HILARY UTNAM



will be devoted to indicating the respects in which I would like to see such

clarification:

(1) Are the "possession conditions or concepts" of which Peacocke

speakssupposedo be necessaryandsufficient, r only necessary?

Peacocke's language ('so and so is that conceptsuch that...' or 'conceptsFi... n are thatuniqueamily of concepts uchthat...') suggests hathe has

necessary and sufficient, and not merely necessary conditions, in mind. But

on this interpretation, find much of what Peacocke maintainsimplausible.

Thus, even the possession condition given for universal quantificationonly

works if construed as a sufficient condition, but not as a necessary and

sufficient condition. For, not only does the condition not distinguish objec-

tual from substitutional quantification (and these are surely distinct con-

cepts), and the classical from the intuitionist understandings of

quantification ditto), but, in fact, it is satisfied by any concept of the form:

Cx .x. =df (x) (.....x &F(x))

where F(x) is arbitrary, ndthe occurrenceof x may be inessential. What this

failure of Peacocke's condition illustrates is that conceptually necessary and

sufficient conditions for the possession of a concept may not be so easy to

come by. (I give a numberof examples of the difficulty of pinning down

concepts by necessary and sufficient conditions in Representationand Real-ity; see, for example, pp. 12-15, and p. 51.)

On the other hand, it is true thatPeacocke goes on to say a numberof

things which suggest a very generous understanding of the notion of a

"possession condition." But when he comes to say what he takes the upshot

of "the celebratedargumentsof Quine and Duhem"to be, my worries come

back. For Peacocke takes it that those argumentsshow that the possession

conditions for scientific concepts must mention their "role in a theory,"

while I have argued30 hat we do not and should not usually regard changesin the scientific theories in question as changes in the meaning of their terms.

At different times people have held very different conceptions of what an

electron is, but because certain types of continuity hold between the earlier

and later conceptions, we do not say that the term has a different meaning.

(We might say that they have "different concepts" of the electron," but

that is quite a different sense of "concept."To have different concepts of X,

in that sense, speakers must both mean X, or at least refer to the same X, by

their terms.) Meanings are not fixed "roles in theories."

Peacocke might reply that in order to be conceptions or theories of the

electron, the conceptionsmust at least agree on some very minimal proper-

ties of electrons, but which? Thatthey have trajectories?Hardly,afterquan-

30 Cf. my "Explanationand Reference," and "Meaning Holism" as well as pp. 12-15 in

Representationand Reality.

PUTNAMYMPOSIUM43



turnmechanics!That they are charged?Thatis indeed a necessary condition,

by our presentlights, but hardly a necessary and sufficient one. Thatthey are

elementary particles? In what sense of "particle"?To say that we can treat

the concepts "particle"and "electron"simultaneously, in the spirit of the

approach Peacocke suggests (say, by saying that to count as concepts of"elementaryparticle"and "electron"P and E must be so related that all Es

are Ps) would make the "possession condition" so weak that it would

clearly only amountto a necessary condition, and by no means a sufficient

one.

One possibility would be for Peacocke to follow the route Carnaptook

in his last majorpaper on these questions,3'and just insist that changes in the

theoryare changes in the meaning (the view thatI oppose in Representation

and Reality). On such a view, to be an electron(or to be a family of concepts

electron, elementary particle, charge...) is to satisfy a certain theory, or

certain key assumptions of a theory. (Like Peacocke, Carnap proposed to

treat whole families of concepts simultaneously, rather than concepts one

by one.) But that view has the consequencethat not only was Bohr not refer-

ring to same things when he used the word "electron"in 1900 and in the

1930s, but, indeed, there are no electrons in the sense in which he used the

term in 1900. Nor would it help to say that one does not take the whole the-ory to be what fixes the meaning and reference of the theoretical terms (as

Carnapdid), but only a certain "core,"for what is the permanent"core"of a

theory is something we usually cannot say until we alreadyknow what the

successor theory is going to be! (In Newton's time, no one would have re-

gardedthe approximatetruthof the laws when the velocities are small rela-

tive to the speed of light as an appropriatestatementof the "core assump-

tions"of Newtonian mechanics.) If the "core" of a theory is defined by pure

ahistoricalquasi-conceptualanalysis, and not by reference to what successortheories regard as right, then the problem that arose with Carnap's proposal

will arise even on the modified proposal; not only Bohr's 1990 theory

(which assumed that electrons have trajectories),but even his 1930s theory

(which assumed that electrons are the sorts of things that can be counted32)

will have turnedout to have a false "core" (with the consequence that, since

to be an electron, etc., is supposed, on these "role in a theory accounts" of

meaning, to be to satisfy the core assumptionsof the theory, one will have to

31 "The Methodological Characterof Theoretical Concepts," in H. Feigl and M. Scriven

(eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science; vol. 1, The Foundations of

Science and the Concepts of Psychoanalysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press, 1956).32 I assume that"elementaryparticleshave positions and momenta"and "elementaryparti-

cles can be counted" are the sorts of statementsthat one would count as belonging to the

"core" assumptions of these theories, if one were proceeding a priori, without 20/20

hindsight.

444 FULARY UTNAM



say that there are no electrons in the sense of 1930s quantummechanics,

and-no doubt-in a few years one will have to say that there are no elec-

trons in the sense of 1990s quantummechanics either. The disastrousmeta-

induction that "since all the theoretical terms we used in the past have

turned out not to refer, probablyall our theoretical terms will turn out notto refer" stares us in the face.) And since even ordinary anguage terms like

"plant" and "water" have become to a considerable extent conceptually

linked to scientific theories....

As the reader will see, in the foregoing I express considerable uncer-

tainty as to what Peacocke's position actually amounts to; this is what I

meant when I said at the outset that my comments here will largely be de-

voted to indicating the respects in which I would like to see certain

clarifications.(2) WouldPeacockeallowpossessionconditions o specifywhat the terms

in question re supposedodenote?

Peacocke indicates the great latitudewhich he is prepared o allow in the

formulation of "possession conditions for concepts," writing,

[A possession condition] may however-and in many cases must-use the concept F itself in

giving the possession condition...a possession condition may tie mastery of a given concept

to.. .toparticularexemplars,

or to other environmentalfactors or relations.

This suggests that Peacocke might allow the following (extremely unCar-

napian) possession condition for "electron":

electron is thatconcept F such thatF is a naturalkind concept and F de-

notes electrons.

According to this condition,33 t does not matter that two thinkersmay

have very different theories of the electron; as long as they use their termsas naturalkind terms,and both termsdenote electrons (it is not necessary to

add "rigidly,"since that is how naturalkind terms denote), they both have

the concept "electron."

I should like to pose the following dilemma for Peacocke. If he does not

allow conditions of this kind, then (in spite of the appearanceof latitude in

the passage I quoted) is he not assuming (without argument)that theories of

33 I do not urgethat we accept this condition as it stands, by the way. I myself would regardpossession of the stereotype-not the theory-that electrons are charged particles

("little balls" with trajectoriesand unit negative charge) as part of our concept of the

electron.On my view, stereotypes are far more stable than theories, and contribute o the

identityof our naturalkind concepts withoutproviding necessary and sufficient conditions

for theircorrect applications. They cannot do the last because, in cases like this one, they

areknown to be "oversimplified."Stereotypesdo not, however, contributeto the identity

conditions for those (relatively rare) concepts which have analytic definitions (e.g.,

"grandmother"),s Peacocke correctlyobserves.

PUTNAMYMPOSIUM45



directreferenceof theoreticalterms34 re false? On the otherhand,if he does

allow conditionsof this kind, then how does he reformulatesuch a condition

as a "requirement n subpersonalalgorithmsor mechanisms"?

It may be thought that the first part of the above condition (that F is a

naturalkind concept) might be reformulatedas follows:

F has such and such a role in the language.

(Assuming that all naturalkind concepts have some specifiable "role in

the language"in common. I myself think that no only do individualnatural

kind concepts change theirroles in the course of scientific inquiry,but that

the meta-role "naturalkind concept"is also subject to such changes, but to

argue this would be to repeat points made above.) And Peacocke believesthat possession conditions of this kind (conditions which specify concepts

via theirroles in theories)obviously impose constraintson when the thinker

will be willing to "move into or from certain states" to which the content

in question is attributed.But how is the second part of the condition (thatF

denotes electrons) to be formulatedas a "requirementon subpersonal algo-

rithms or mechanisms"? To simply suppose that it can would seem to as-

sume just whatis at issue.

(3) As just remarked,Peacocke believes that possession conditions whichspecify concepts via their roles in theories (as well as simpler conditions

like the ones which give analytic definitions of single concepts), impose con-

straintson when the thinkerwill be willing to "move into or from certain

states" to which the content in question is attributed.But where is the argu-

ment?

An argument s needed, because this is just the point at which the debate

between "connectionists" and "propositionalists" s hottest. Yet instead of

an argument, we only have the assertion that "This seems particularly

clear"!

Suppose I tell a competent speaker of English, "Joan is the mother of

Henry's father," and the subject responds "So Joan is Henry's grand-

mother."If I understandwhat Peacocke is saying, Peacocke would say that

thereare content-bearingstates, call them Sl,S2,S3 (of subpersonal mecha-

nisms in the subject's brain) such that Si bears the content "Joan is the

mother of Henry's father,"S2 bears the content "Joan s the mother of a par-ent of Henry's," and S3 bears the content "Joan is Henry's grandmother,"

and rules which dictate transitions from Si to S2 to S3. But this is precisely

whatthe connectionistaccountdenies.

34 See, e.g., "ExplanationandReference,"in my Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1975).

446 1-IILARYUTNAM



Connectionists do not refuse to attributecontent to the patterns of neu-

ral activation they postulate; ike Churchland, hey speak of patternsof neu-

ral activation as "representing"situations which activate them. But they

would deny that our subjectmust have gone from a state (a "prototypevec-

tor") which representsJoan as the mother of Henry's father to the verbaloutput "So Joanis Henry's grandmother" ia anythingthat looks like an in-

ference from Si to S2 to S3. Instead, they propose a physical model in which

activity spreads dynamicallyacross a network of interconnectedelements in

accordance with differentialequations. They would deny that these differen-

tial equations "draw upon the information stated in the rule" that one is to

go from Si to S2 to S3. PerhapsPeacocke has an argumentthat this concep-

tion is wrongor conceptuallyconfused, but if so, he does not give it here, and

without such an argument we simply have a reaffirmation of a broadly"Chomskian" iew rather han an argument or such a view.

In a sense, Churchland'sand Peacocke's positions aremade for each other.

Both assume that if propositional attitude attribution is to be viable, the

connections between our beliefs that would be attributedby a sensible in-

terpreter must correspond to transitions between "states of subpersonal

mechanisms"; Churchlandbelieves such states of subpersonalmechanisms

do not exist, and so propositional attitude attributionis not viable, while

Peacocke believes that of course propositional attitudeattribution s viable,

so it is clear that such states exist. I urge thatwe reject the common assump-

tion.

PUTNAM YMPOSIUM 447

Documents

Putnam. Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for Concepts