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Public Policy in Private Markets. Monopolization (section 2, Sherman Act). Announcements. Case presentations: 6 groups = 3 cases Groups: Please check class website and make sure your group is listed accurately (see Case Assignments section) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Public Policy in Private Markets
Monopolization (section 2, Sherman Act)
Announcements
Case presentations: 6 groups = 3 cases Groups: Please check class website and make
sure your group is listed accurately (see Case Assignments section)
Tentative dates: Early March, Early April, Late April. Material will be posted 1 month in advance for each group.
Clickers: 1 student has been using clicker but it is not
registered. 11 students have not registered a clicker
Overview of Antitrust Laws
Sherman Act, Section 2
Monopolization
Market definition
Intent (next class) Brief history Predatory Pricing
Sherman Act, section 2
Burden of Proof:
1. Substantial market power (structural criteria)
A. Define relevant marketB. Show market power
2. Intent to monopolize (conduct criteria)
Sherman Act, section 2
Burden of Proof:
1. Substantial market power (structural criteria)
A. Define relevant marketB. Show market power
2. Intent to monopolize (conduct criteria)
Showing Substantial Market Power
A. Define Relevant Market Both product and geographic This is VERY important under Section 2 (and
elsewhere) Example: Du Pont – limit pricing (1956) Government definition: relevant market was cellophane.
Mkt share = 75% Du Pont’s definition: flexible wrapping materials (wax
paper, foil, etc.). Mkt share = 20% Du Pont persuades Court with their definition. Case
stops (intent stage is not reached)
Defining Relevant Product Market
Are convenience stores (e.g. 7-11, Dairy Mart) in the same relevant product market as supermarkets? (e.g. Stop & Shop, Big Y)?
Would the cross-price elasticity be positive or negative?
A. PositiveB. Negative
Cross price Elast = % Change in Quantity Demanded at Supermarkets% Change in Price at Convenience Stores
Defining Relevant Product Market
Are convenience stores (e.g. 7-11, Dairy Mart) in the same relevant product market as supermarkets? (e.g. Stop & Shop, Big Y)?
What would the value of the cross-price elasticity need to be to say YES?
A. -1B. -0.5C. 0D. 0.2E. 0.8
Cross price Elast = % Change in Quantity Demanded at Supermarkets% Change in Price at Convenience Stores
Defining Relevant Product Market Are convenience stores (e.g. 7-11, Dairy Mart) in the
same relevant product market as supermarkets? (e.g. Stop & Shop, Big Y)?
As an estimate, what value would the cross-price elasticity take?
A. -0.9B. -0.2 C. 0.05D. 0.3 E. 1.1
Showing Substantial Market Power
A. Define Relevant Marketi. Product (service) Market:
Physical characteristics (e.g. Du Pont case) Firm: the broader the better
Distinct customers or end users (e.g. commercial vs. retail)
Cross price elasticity: E.g.: bread and cookies, same market? Strong substitutes: high and positive cross-price
elasticity No clear cut-offs
Showing Substantial Market Power
A. Define Relevant Marketi. Product (service) Market:
Absolute price differences: if large may signal different markets (e.g. luxury cars vs. economy cars)
Unique production facilities: are both goods produced in same type of facility?
Industry recognition of each other: e.g. do they belong to the same trade association?
Showing Substantial Market Power
A. Define Relevant Marketi. Geographical Market:
Transportation costs: are they high with respect to price? E.g. construction materials, coal
Barriers to trade? (e.g. ban on cross-state shipments)
% Exported, % Imported: LIFO (little in from outside), LOFI (little out from inside); <10%
Sherman Act, section 2
Burden of Proof:
1. Substantial market powerA. Define relevant marketB. Show market power
2. Intent to monopolize
What we are studying
Sherman Act, section 2: Monopolization
1. Substantial market powerA. Define relevant marketB. Show market power
2. Intent to monopolize Brief history Predatory Pricing
Brief History on Intent
Period 1: Early Cases Evidence of abusive, predatory and/or criminal
acts. Examples: Cutting price to run competitors out of business Buying up or sabotaging competitors
Standard Oil of NJ (1911) – oil refining 90% mkt share (mergers), control of pipelines (cutting
supply to competitors), predatory prices Chief Justice White: Rule of reason – only unreasonable
attempts violated section 2 American Tobacco (1911) –
“Plug war” undercut rivals from 50¢ to 13 ¢. In sum: Market power + abuse (intent)
Brief History on Intent
Period 2: Alcoa Era Strict interpretation of Section 2 Intent assumed if market share is large, unless
market power was “unavoidable” Skill, foresight, economies of scale, patent
Alcoa Case (1945): DOJ charges Alcoa for monopolization of aluminum market
90% market share No evidence of aggressive behavior Cost advantages, patents Accusation: excess capacity, prices that are “too low” In DOJ appeal, Alcoa is found guilty Mkt power alone may be enough to violate Section 2
Brief History on Intent
Period 3: reversal of Alcoa, more needed to prove intent ATT (1974):
Largest corporation in the world ($130 bill. assets, 83% of US telephones)
22 local phone co’s + Western Electric, Bell Labs Shutting down of independent equipment manufacturers Obstructing long-distance carriers from interconnecting. Consent decree ‘82: divestiture, ($87 billion operation)
XEROX, brought by FTC in 1973 (settled ’75): Pricing below cost in high-volume copy machines
IBM: DOJ case starts in ’69, dropped in ’82 (not guilty in a separate private suit)
Intent: Predatory Pricing What is predatory pricing? “Abnormally
low prices”
Anticompetitive vs. good healthy competitive behavior?
Two approaches: Average cost approach Recovery approach
Average Cost Approach
Q
P
ATCMC
AVC
TC=Variable Cost + Fixed Cost Cost includes a normal return to capital If P>ATC: cover all costs (including return to capital)
Operate
Average Cost Approach
Q
P ATCMC
AVC
If AVC<P<ATC: operate in short run (exit in long run) Exit losses > stay losses
If P<AVC: shut down immediately (short run) Exit losses < stay losses
Operate in SR, but shut down in LR
Shut down
Average Cost Approach1. AVC Rule: if P<AVC
Must have predatory intent (economically irrational) P>AVC: not challenged
2. ATC Rule: if P<ATC May have predatory intent:
AVC<P<ATC: Are prices the result of natural variation? Special deals, oversupply, perishables
Must have predatory intent: P<AVC: Irrefutable evidence of predatory behavior
Bottom line: AVC rule: lenient (smaller range of illegal pricing). ATC rule: stricter (broader range of illegal pricing)
Average Cost Approach
Current interpretation: Supreme Court: never formally adopted AVC
rule However, some Appeals Court cases (e.g. AA in
DFW) used AVC ruleProblems:
Accounting cost is different from economic cost How to interpret it with multi-product firms?
Average Cost Approach
Q
P
ATCMC
AVC
Example 1: Increasing MC
Average Cost Approach
Q
P
ATCMC=AVC
Example 2: Constant MC=AVC
Recovery Approach
A.K.A.: “recoupment” Low prices may or may not be
“successful” Focus on consumer well-being:
Are consumers hurt? In SR consumers benefit from lower prices In LR consumers will only be hurt if predatory
pricing is successful: Competitors leave Recovery period (high price afterwards) is achieved
Recovery Approach
Worry only if recovery period is achieved
Illegal behavior: only if consumer is hurt Affected firms are not factored in
Generally, approach is not as widely accepted in court as the average cost approach
However, important in cases such as AA
Summary of Approaches
Average cost: AVC (lenient) ATC (stricter)
Recovery: Sacrifice? (How long? How much?), AND Recovery? (How soon? How much?)
Poll: What Concept is the least clear?
A. Nolo PleaB. Rule of reason v. Per se RuleC. Market DefinitionD. AVC v. ATC ruleE. Cross-price elasticity