Public Participation Mechanisms in Environmental Disasters

Public Participation Mechanisms in EnvironmentalDisasters

CONSTANTINA SKANAVIS*

Department of Environmental StudiesUniversity of the AegeanUniversity Hill, Mytilene 81100, Greece

GEORGE A. KOUMOURIS

VASSILIKI PETRENITI

Department of Environmental StudiesEnvironmental Education and Communication LaboratoryUniversity of the AegeanMytilene 81100, Greece

This paper examines the role of public participation mech-anisms in certain major environmental disasters. It examinessituations in which people's lifestyles or their lives have beendirectly threatened, and thus elicited citizen participation.Threatening issues often seem morally, physically, socially,economically, religiously, and otherwise unacceptable to a

group. As will be presented in this paper, citizens voluntarilyparticipate in a community activity when they see that theirway of life has been threatened. An introductory historicalperspective, the legal framework upon which it is based, andbackground information on the participatory mechanisms, allemphasizing the importance and need for empowering citi-zens with participatory skills so as to bring changes in theexisting educational, legal, and social systems are pre-sented. The major environmental accidents/disasters ofMinamata, Japan; Bhopal, India; Seveso, Italy; Chernobyl,Ukraine; and Exxon-Valdez, Alaska are discussed, mainly toindicate the reaction, and the participatory mechanismsused by the affected communities in each of the suddendisasters that occurred. If citizens worldwide had been ac-tive participants in the environmental issues, it is quite pos-sible that we would have experienced fewer environmentalaccidents.

The Historical Perspective

Although the past decade has been dominated byefforts to promote a more participatory approach, theconcept of participation is not entirely new. Throughthe ages, citizens have found several ways to be heard.The Swedish legal system already contained provisionsrelating to public participation in the 18th century.One can even find examples further back in history inthe Middle Ages or even further to 1000 A.D. The livesof people residing in the Netherlands, Germany, andDenmark continually faced eternal struggle against thethreats of the sea (Halvorsen 2003). For that reason,people had been preoccupied by land reclamation,dike construction, and water level control out of sheernecessity. Dike building required management andregulation. The oldest regulations we know to date arethe Stringer Rules of Law (1100 A.D.), which directlyinvolved the people living in these areas. In the Neth-

erlands this system and this structure of direct publicinvolvement still exists (Beierle 1999).

By the late 1940s, the early initiatives of economicassistance and of planned interventions in underde-veloped countries to promote development andchange had commenced. However, it was in the 1950sand particularly in the 1960s that these initiatives, viathe actions of processes of community development,sought to involve local people in efforts to improvetheir communities. Community development in the1960s built the infrastructure of rural and urbancommunities; it also developed local skills and abilitiesand encouraged local people to play a part in and takesome responsibility for supporting and implementing arange of infrastructure works. Community develop-ment at this stage also sought to build community-based organizations to serve as vehicles through whichlocal people could get actively involved (Smith 2003).The 1950s and 1960s saw the community developmentmovement flourish and, particularly in Africa and Asia,national programs sought to build community infra-structure and to break down communities’ exclusionfrom development activities.

In the late 1960s, the environmental movement ar-ose and made the public increasingly aware of theseriousness of air, water, and soil pollution and thedangers of chemical agriculture and food production.

KEY WORDS: Participatory mechanisms; Environmental decision-making; Environmental justice; Environmental infor-mation

Published online May 27, 2005

*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; email:

[email protected]

Environmental Management Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 821–837 ª 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

DOI: 10.1007/s00267-004-0120-z

Table 1. Major environmental disasters and participation mechanisms

Environmental disasters Participation mechanisms

Minamata

disease incident

Citizen advisory committees:� Citizen action groups were established to provide a permanent capacity for studying, managing

and memorializing the disaster.Surveys:� Non-deliberative mechanism for obtaining information from the public: The Minamata Research

Group provided Kumamoto University survey results of high academic quality.Public education campaigns:� Creation of ��Seirinsha,’’ documentary films on the Minamata disease and the supporters’ movements.

They were shown in many places and this contributed greatly to spreading knowledge of the disease.� Media or community groups played important roles in identifying information to a wider public

Seveso incident Non-deliberative mechanism for obtaining information from the public:� One-way flows of information from the public to the government: Reaction of affected residents

marked by physical attacks on people and property due to the chemical accident.Non-deliberative mechanism for providing information to the public:� The provision of the Right-to-know information: The Seveso I and II Directives had established

a framework that delineated the responsibility of both government and industry to communicatehazardous information to the public� Media played an important role examining the implementation of the actively supplied rather

than passively made available public information requirements of the directives, to local people.� Public education campaigns

Citizen advisory committees:� Citizen advisory committees were formed to bring in international know-how and expertise to

develop suitable approaches and strategies for a long-term chemical disaster management program.Chernobyl

nuclear disaster

Citizen advisory committees:� Groups established without government involvement: Activist groups and the reaction of many

citizens in affected communities had as a result the formation of citizen-actiongroups such as the ��Children of Chernobyl,’’ due to the increasing mistrust for central authorities.Non deliberative mechanism for providing information to the public:� The provision of the right to public participation in decision-making and to get true information

about the state of the environment was established through the Law on the Protection of the NaturalEnvironment.� Citizen organizations: NGOs and victim action-groups played important roles in identifying

information to a wider public.� Public education campaigns took place in European Union countries to show and inform the

public the magnitude of the crisis.Public hearings:� Citizens got the right to know how proposed industrial projects would impact the environment and

the health of the population.Nondeliberative mechanism for obtaining information from the public:� At first there was one-way flow of information from the public to the government due to the

continuous denial of the magnitude of the crisis by the government.Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms:� Regulatory negotiations for preventive measures on nuclear incidents due to the growing public

distrust in the frequent concealment of information and cover-ups by governments about nuclearaccidents.

Bhopal

toxic-gas disaster

Non-deliberative mechanism for obtaining information from the public:� One-way flows of information from the public to the government due to the involvement of the

victims in legally confronting corporate crime and by direct action campaigns, to bring corporatecriminals to justice.Non deliberative mechanism for providing information to the public:� Public education campaigns were organized due to the involvement of various action groups

worldwide, with national and international input.� Media and community group involvement and interest that started reporting even small

chemical leakages and accidents.� Citizen and expert advisory committees were formed due to public pressure on governments, and

this pressure was transmitted on the chemical industries from the government, public and employeesto improve their safety systems, procedures, and practices.

822 C. Skanavis and others

The quality of everyday life appeared to be at stake. Inmany countries, politicians were very slow in respond-ing to this increased awareness. Nevertheless, from the1970s onward, environmental management and pres-ervation became important issues for most politicalparties in Western countries. In this climate, known as��The Political Opportunity and Structure,’’ all kinds ofgroups and organizations were established (McComas2001). Most of the groups were active on the local level,e.g., waste/water pollution and soil pollution withinthe boundaries of their own community.

Legal Framework

Public awareness on environmental issues is onlyone side of the picture. The other side was the partic-ipation of citizens in thinking and talking about solu-tions. Governments needed the support of the publicfor effective implementation of its measures. This iswhy they could not evade the obligation of takingpublic opinion seriously. Broad international recogni-tion of public involvement including provisions fortransparency, participation, and justice dates back 55years. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in1948 provided the kernels for generalized access toinformation (Article 19) and justice (Articles 8 and 10)as well as the right to associate (Article 20) (Hill 2003).In the West, widespread public awareness of negativechanges in the quality of human life and the environ-ment emerged in the1960s, with the publication of��Silent Spring’’ (Carson 1962), ��The PopulationBomb’’ (Ehrlich 1968), and ��Small is Beautiful’’(Schumacher 1973). The immediacy of television cov-erage of disasters such as the Torrey Canyon and acidrain made an even greater impact.

In the United States as in much of the West, the1960s and 1970s were marked by a participationmovement (Schneider and Opperman 1998), whichled to legislative changes. The Freedom of InformationAct 1966 gave access to data and information held by

governmental agencies. The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act (NEPA) of 1969, among its measures, re-quired public review of Environmental Impact State-ments (EIS). Previously, the Administrative ProceduresAct of 1946 directed governmental agencies to com-mence rule-making procedures and to keep registers.This Act also allowed for the right of appeal to Federalcourts (Ortolano 1997). Together, these three piecesof legislation provided the foundation for the involve-ment of the public in environmental protection in theUnited States. NEPA was the example upon whichenvironmental impact assessment worldwide had beenbased.

The issue of environmental concern was interna-tionalized at the Stockholm Conference, 1972 (UnitedNations National Conference on the Human Environ-ment), drawing together both developed and devel-oping nations, but in the absence of the Soviet Unionand most of its allies. For the first time, environmentalnongovernment organizations (ENGOs) played animportant part in the deliberations. Stockholm was theevent that turned the environment into a major issue atthe international level, declaring the right of people tolive ��in an environment of a quality that permits a lifeof dignity and well being’’ (GEO-3 UNEP 2002).

During 1971–1975, 31 major national environmen-tal laws were passed in OECD countries, compared with32 in the previous 15 years. The number of countrieswith Environment Ministries rose from 10 in 1972 to100 in 1982. The link between environment anddevelopment was made in Stockholm; it was the 1983World Commission on Environment and Development(WCED), also known as the Bruntland Commission,that first developed the idea of Sustainable Develop-ment, in its broadest sense. The WCED report in 1987resulted from consultations at all levels of the globalsociety, and attempted to balance the needs of futuregenerations with those of our own. In essence, it triedto promote both inter- and intragenerational equity(Beierle 1998). However, in its concluding statement,

The Exxon-Valdezoil spill

Non deliberative mechanism for providing information to the public:� The enactment of the federal Oil-Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Since its enactment there has

been no spill of anywhere near the size of the Exxon-Valdez accident in U.S. waters.� Public education campaigns took place because the media or other environmental or other

action groups, and published scientific studies played important roles in identifying information tothe wider public.Regional Citizens Advisory Council (RCAC):

� A mechanism mandated by OPA 90. Local governments and interest groups from the regiondirectly affected by the Exxon-Valdez spill appointed the members of the council.

� A group of scientists conducted research on an issue under the direction of a group includingrepresentatives from the oil-industry, the RCAC, and the Coast Guard.

Public Participation Mechanisms in Environmental Disasters 823

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the commission stated that the ��existing decision-making structures could not cope with the demands ofsustainable development’’ (WCED 1987). The UNConference on Environment and Development (UN-CED or ��The Earth Summit’’) held in Rio De Janeiro,Brazil, saw 176 governments, 100 Heads of State,10,000 delegates, 1400 NGOs and 9,000 journalists,gathered in what was still the largest event of its kindever. The summit was preceded by global consultationswith hundreds of thousands of groups and individuals(Hill 2003). Among its many achievements, the twomost relevant here are Agenda 21 and Principle 10 ofthe ��Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-ment’’. Agenda 21, in its 40 chapters, lays a solidfoundation for the promotion of sustainable develop-ment.

Specifically, Principle 10 States:

Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned

citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have

appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by

public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activ-

ities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-

making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and

participation by making information widely available. Effective access to

judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall

be provided.

The most important initiative evolving from Principle10 was the 1998 UNECE Convention on Access toInformation, Public Participation in Decision-Makingand Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. TheECE (Economic Commission for Europe) was a re-gional body of the United Nations that included 55countries. The European Community plus 39 othernations had signed the convention (also known as theAarhus Convention), which ratified in 2001. The Aar-hus Convention was based on access to information;public participation in decision-making; and access tojustice; the ��three pillars,’’ ensconced in Principle 10and elaborated in Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992).

In September 2002, in Johannesburg, South Africa,the World Summit on Sustainable Development(WSSD) took place. Its goal was to hold a 10-year reviewof the 1992 UN Conference on Environment andDevelopment and to reinvigorate global commitmentto sustainable development.Main outcomes included the following:

� The Summit reaffirmed sustainable development asa central element of the international agenda andgave new impetus to global action to fight povertyand protect the environment;

� The understanding of sustainable development wasbroadened and the links among poverty, the envi-ronment, and the use of natural resources werestrengthened;

� Governments agreed to a range of commitments toachieve a more effective implementation of sustain-able development objectives;

� Energy and sanitation issues were critical elements ofthe negotiations to a greater extent than in previousconferences on sustainable development worldwide;

� Support for the establishment of a world solidarityfund for the eradication of poverty was a positive stepforward;

� The international community identified Africa forspecial attention, focus, and support.

However, there was also great failure. Not once wasthe issue of environmental education (EE) ap-proached. The need for implementation and supportof the greatest tool, which could lead to action, forexample, the need for specific knowledge, was neverstated. Moreover, issues of knowledge, access to infor-mation, critical thinking, evaluation, assessment, evendispute and doubt, being components that made citi-zens actively participate in the environmental decisionprocess, were not addressed. Chiefs in Johannesburgmanaged to decide upon the need for reaction, with-out mentioning Environmental Education (EE), thenecessary prerequisite. Twenty-one thousand peoplediscussed sustainability targets, but neglected to con-sider how they would be reached. One might think thatEE was not discussed, because it had already beensuccessfully implemented; maybe the worldviews werethat citizens did actively participate in the environ-mental decision-making, or maybe we could still be sonaive as to simply forget what we were talking about(Skanavis and Sarri 2004).

Public Participation Mechanisms

Nondeliberative Mechanisms for ObtainingInformation from the Public

Nondeliberative mechanisms include statutory pro-cedures for soliciting public input through commentson proposed rules or environmental impact state-ments. They also include nonstatutory mechanisms,such as survey focus groups, which help public man-agers incorporate information about the public intodecision-making (Beierle 1998). Focus groups are aquick means of gauging what is likely to be the publicreaction to a proposal. Involving a group of 15–25 in-vited participants, properly facilitated, this method can


give a detailed understanding of people’s perspectives,values, and concerns. If well planned and facilitated,focus groups are relatively inexpensive to organize(Lando 2003). As a group, these mechanisms provideone-way flows of information from the public to thegovernment. Little to no deliberation among differentstakeholders takes place, and input is rarely binding ondecision makers. The source of public input differs,however, among mechanisms. Although surveys collectthe views of individual citizens, focus groups use ��rep-resentative’’ citizens as a proxy for public opinion.Comments on permits and proposed rules are stillmore distant from the average citizen because theyhave come to be dominated by those with a profes-sional stake in the outcome.

The primary goals against which surveys, focusgroups, and public comments should be judged in-clude the degree to which they facilitate the incorpo-ration of public values into decision-making and fosterthe generation of policy alternatives. An interestingresearch question is how the achievement of thesegoals changes as the consulted public changes frommany citizens (surveys) to representative citizens (focusgroups) to citizen representatives (public comments)(Fiorino 1990).

Nondeliberative Mechanisms for ProvidingInformation to the Public

At the other end of the information spectrum areone-way flows of information from the government tothe public in forms such as public education cam-paigns, the provision of right-to-know information, andpublic notices. The accessibility of chemical emissionsand transfer data through the Toxics Release Inventory(TRI) may be the best-known example. Although thesemechanisms are relatively passive, the intent is often toinspire more active participation. For example, Ad-vanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, which alertthe public through a Federal Register notice of upcomingopportunities to comment on rules, are intended toencourage public input into the rule-making process.Proposed federal legislation requiring electricity pro-viders to supply information on emissions and fuel typeto customers on their monthly bill may encouragecustomers to select power suppliers based on environ-mental performance (NAPA 1997). For some of thesemechanisms—such as the dissemination of TRIdata—intermediaries, the media, or community groupsplay important roles in identifying and disseminatinginformation to a wider public.

These mechanisms should be expected to create abetter-informed and educated public and to increasetrust by making government and the regulated com-

munity more accountable and transparent to its citi-zens. Whether information provision informs a largenumber of people or educates a small number willdepend on the mechanism and how it is used. Forexample, on-line access to Superfund databases has thepotential to reach a large (although perhaps not rep-resentative) number of people with summary data onlisted sites, whereas public education campaigns mayreach a targeted (and more representative) audiencewith in-depth information (NEJAC 1996). In contrast,few, if any, members of the public can be expected tomonitor the Federal Register for public notices exceptthose who are paid to do so. Similarly, the type andquality of government information provided to citizenswill determine its impact on trust (Beierle 1998).

Public Hearings

Public hearings remain the most common form offace-to-face public involvement in spite of nearly uni-versal criticism of their ability to provide meaningfulparticipation. The Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) convenes hundreds of hearings per year(Fiorino 1990). Most are used to defend agency deci-sions rather than to involve the public in the decision-making process itself (Beierle 1999). Agencies oftenhold hearings late in the decision-making process,presenting technical information beyond the under-standing of the lay public, and seek to do little morethan fulfill administrative requirements (Fiorino1990). Although two-way information flows in a publichearing, it is generally not deliberative. The two-wayflow of information would suggest that public hearingsought to be able to achieve goals such as increasingpublic knowledge; providing decision-makers withpublic values, assumptions, and preferences; providingsubstantive information to improve decisions; and, tothe extent that hearings increase transparency, in-crease trust in institutions. However, the lack of realdeliberation might lead one to predict a priori thatmost public hearings will do a poor job of achievingmentioned goals. Hearings might best be thought of asactive forms of notice and comment procedures, withthe government contributing summary informationand the public responding with comments for the re-cord.

The outlook for trust formation is particularly bleak.Public hearings include all of the active and concernedpublic who choose to attend, but the nonbinding nat-ure of public input militates against trust formation.Moreover, a number of studies have determined thatthe majority of those who choose to attend hearingsactually represent organized interests with significanteconomic stakes in the outcome (Fiorino 1990). Be-


cause they offer an opportunity for government andthe active public to interact, public hearings ought tobe expected to reduce conflict. However, the process isnot deliberative; it may encourage participants to takemore extreme positions, and the opportunities forconflict reduction are likely to be limited (Beierle1999). The advantages of public hearings greatly out-weigh the potential disadvantages. To capture the fulladvantages, it is necessary to clarify to all of the stake-holders the purpose and expected results of the publichearings. It is also necessary to set time limits for thepublic hearings and strictly follow them (Lando 2003).The public hearing can become an ineffective methodof involving the citizen in local government if no realinformation exchange occurs and if those speakingtend to be polarized by the process. The public hearingactually creates more cynicism about government ra-ther than producing any positive results (Beierle 1998).

Citizen Advisory Committees

Citizen advisory committees (CACs) encompass awide variety of groups that represent ��a relatively smallgroup of citizens who are called together to representideas and attitudes of various groups and/or commu-nities’’ (Sewell and Philips 1997). They are distin-guished from expert advisory committees, whichagencies use extensively to bring outside scientific,economic, and other technical information into gov-ernment decision-making processes. The Fort OrdRAB provides an example of a citizen advisory com-mittee, but the form and function of CACs vary widely.Federally endorsed committees established under theFederal Advisory Committee Act follow strict require-ments regarding representation, transparency, andgovernment involvement. CACs may also be quiteinformal, including groups that were established with-out government involvement but that have come torepresent public views in policy-making. For example,community leaders and residents representing thecommunity’s interests in the Anaconda, Montana Su-perfund Site Clean-up Process formed the Anaconda-Deer Lodge Advisory Committee. CACs are used toadvise numerous aspects of environmental policyincluding rule-making, standard setting, permit issu-ing, and planning (NAPA 1997).

Advisory committee members are intended to serveas the voice of the larger public, although in practicethis has been interpreted to include elected officialsand other elite as well as ��typical’’ members of thecommunity. Even in the latter case, a number of stud-ies have shown that participants are often not repre-sentative of the wider community in terms of incomeand education (Abelson and others 2003). CACs often

present members with the opportunity to engage indiscussions with a number of other interests, eitherinternally in committees with ��balanced representa-tion’’ or externally with other organized interestgroups. They typically only play an advisory role, butideally their input is explicitly incorporated into thedecision-making process. Where committees are bal-anced, the CAC can act like a voluntary negotiatingbody whereby each participant represents broad con-stituent interests (Harless 2002). The deliberative andrepresentative nature of advisory committees suggeststhat they ought to achieve the following four goals:increasing public knowledge; providing decision-mak-ers with public values, assumptions, and preferences;providing substantive information to improve deci-sions; and increasing trust in institutions.

Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The two primary alternative dispute resolutionmechanisms in environmental decision-making areregulatory negotiations and stakeholder mediations.Regulatory negotiations provide a formal process forstakeholders to negotiate the content of federal regu-lations. Stakeholder mediations describe a far morediverse and often nongovernmental set of approachesfor bringing together opposing interests to settle divi-sive issues. Some of the most successful mediationshave been over resource issues in the western UnitedStates. For example, a grass roots effort to seek con-sensus on water management issues in Montana’s ClarkFork River Basin brought miners, ranchers, municipalofficials, and environmentalists together after decadesof acrimonious conflict to successfully resolve disputesover water use (NAPA 1997).

Regulatory negotiations and stakeholder mediationsoffer substantial opportunity for two-way deliberationsamong a variety of opposing interests. Their explicitpurpose is to reduce conflict and reach consensus, of-ten in cases where other forms of agreement or disputesettlement have failed. If parties reach a decision, theyare generally bound by it. In fact, this may be a criticalaspect of successful negotiations or mediations. Par-ticipants, particularly those representing the publicinterest, are often professional representatives ratherthan members of the lay public. One of the principalcriticisms of regulatory negotiations, in particular, isthat they only involve the ��usual suspects,’’ i.e., lobby-ists, NGOs, and government officials (Beierle 1999).

Citizen Deliberations

Mechanisms for citizen deliberation include citizenjuries (or the related ��citizen panels’’) and consensusconferences. Citizen juries are essentially an informal


inquiry, involving 15–20 ordinary members of thepublic selected to represent a cross section of thecommunity. They are brought together to consider aparticular issue and receive evidence from expert wit-nesses, whom they can cross-examine. At the end of theprocess, they produce a report setting out the views ofthe jury, including differences of opinion (Renn andothers 1991). Many of the examples of these mecha-nisms in the United States have been nongovernmentalexperiments in participatory policy analysis on com-plex issues such as education policy, energy planning,and public spending priorities. Some states have usedthese mechanisms to inform the public about decisionsbased upon risk prioritization, water quality planning,and sludge disposal (Lalo 2000). Although the formatvaries across different mechanisms, their purpose is tohelp nonexpert citizens, acting as ��value consultants,’’analyze technically complex subjects. Organizers pro-vide a group of selected citizens with access to expertinformation and sufficient time to engage in delibera-tive analysis with experts and among themselves. Theyare expected to combine the technical facts with publicvalues, thus forming a set of conclusions and recom-mendations.

These mechanisms are explicitly designed to allowtwo-way communication between experts and thepublic, and sometimes government. However, expertsand the government are mainly information resources,and most of the actual deliberation takes place amongthe citizen members of the group. A random selectionprocess is preferable to a stratified sample of relevantsocial groups. Randomly selected citizens are non-committed to a position, and thus can take advantageof new information and adjust their preferencesaccordingly. Moreover, other affected citizens canidentify with randomly selected participants because ofthe equal chance to be drawn into the sample. Thisadds to the legitimacy of the panels. Random selectionis inspired by the goal of equal representation of allvalues and preferences. Even if many citizens elect notto participate, attempting to acquire a representativesample of the pertinent population is a democratic andlegitimate procedure (Fiorino 1990). Personal ambi-tions to dominate the process are not tolerated by thegroup members; everyone is free to express him orherself freely (Beierle 1998).

In contrast to voting by elected bodies, members ofcitizen panels work on only one issue and do not needsupport from voters or interest groups. They representtheir own preferences and do not link their work onthe panel with political career ambitions. The limitedparticipation period prevents the citizens frombecoming alienated from their usual social roles: they

only change their perspectives for a brief period. All ofthese factors would suggest that deliberative schemesought to be particularly good at educating participants,providing decision-makers with public values, assump-tions and preferences, and generating substantiveinformation to improve decisions. In the past, many ofthese mechanisms have had public or media outreachprograms, which extended educational opportunitiesbeyond those who actually participated (Sewell andPhilips 1997).

The mechanisms involve a limited number ofopportunities for interaction between interest groups(other than the extent to which participants identifythemselves with various groups in their daily lives).Therefore, opportunities to reduce conflict are mini-mal. A fair procedure, however, does not ensure thatcitizens will select the best technical solution or theoption favored by the risk management agency. Citi-zens may understand the technical dimensions, butchoose another option more consistent with their val-ues (Kelly 1997). Experts are needed to provide tech-nical data and point out relations between options andimpacts. Citizens live with the consequences, and aretherefore the best judges to evaluate the options. Citi-zen panels are intended to bring these perspectivestogether in a productive fashion (Wakeford 2003). Theexperience with citizen panels shows that the structureof the process is capable of providing an arena foraddressing conflicts at the factual, managerial, andvalue levels of the debate. Through participation,rationality is enhanced, and through rationality, par-ticipation is facilitated (Renn and others 1991).

Environmental Disasters/Accidents

Major environmental disasters had a great impacton the development of public participation mecha-nisms, e.g., Minamata in Japan in 1956, Seveso in Italyin 1976, Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986, Bhopal in Indiain 1984, and the Exxon-Valdez in Alaska in 1993(Tables 1 and 2).

The ��Minamata Disease’’ Incident

The ��Minamata disease’’ is the name given to mer-cury toxicosis (poisoning) that developed in peoplewho ate contaminated seafood taken from MinamataBay in the period after World War II. During this time,methyl mercury was dumped into the sea as an un-wanted byproduct of acetaldehyde processing by theChisso Company Ltd. industrial plant in Minamata(Ross 1995). In 1953, at Minamata Bay and Niigata,Japan, people reported chronic headaches, malaise,and diarrhea. Their fingertips started to tingle and


tremor, their muscles weakened, and their steps be-came uncoordinated. Many found it painful to swallow.Some became blind and deaf. A few slipped into acoma and died (Montgomery 2003). The mercury re-leased into the water was infiltrated into the fish, whichwas a prominent part of the residents’ diet, thus beingreleased into the food chain. By the time the emissionsof mercury had stopped, the death toll was 55, andthere were 3128 cases of mercury poisoning, many withirreversible symptoms. The devastating ecological costswere not recorded and could only be speculated(Gwam 2002).

Reaction had been initiated with serious disagree-ments about the allocation of blame and aboutappropriate restitution and countermeasures. Anxietyand mistrust had taken root in private lives and publicdiscourse (Ross 1995). The Minamata Research Group,which was formed at the time of the first civil courtstruggle, was able to provide reports and survey resultsof high academic quality, a nondeliberative mecha-nism. Public education campaigns, also a nondeliber-ative mechanism for providing information to thepublic, were expected to create a better-informed andeducated public and to increase trust by making gov-ernment more accountable and transparent to citizens.In this regard, the contribution of Seirinsha should benoted. Seirinsha led Japan in the production of docu-mentary films on the Minamata disease and the sup-porters’ movements. These films acted as publiceducation campaigns and were shown in many places,spreading knowledge of the disease. The reaction ofthe affected people expanded through the decision-making process, being marked by protests, riots, andprotracted legal disputes as well as by attempts atmediation and reconciliation. Citizen action groups, aparticipatory mechanism that falls into the CAC cate-gory, were intended to serve as the voice of the largerpublic, although in some cases these included electedofficials and other elites as well as ��typical’’members ofthe community. In the process, Minamata’s identityhad become inextricably bound with the disease, bothin the minds of its own residents and in the eyes of theoutside world (Montgomery 2003).

As a result of this, Japan was one of the first coun-tries to introduce hazardous waste controls in the1960s. Japanese courts liberalized the standard of prooffor negligence in a pollution case and placed on thedefendants the task of using the best technologyavailable without consideration of economic feasibility(Goodman 2001). Not only were substantial damagesawarded to the plaintiffs, but also the court establisheda doctrine that required polluters to cease pollutionwhen there existed doubt about the safety of their

discharges. As a consequence of the new standards ofproof and the newly established rules concerning theresponsibility of polluters, it became substantially eas-ier for victims of pollution to file suits and recoverconsiderable damages. The Japanese government,however, saw the availability of a judicial remedy as athreat to its control over both pollution policy and itsability to set the pace, at which such policy should bepursued (Ross 1995). However, by the early 1980s, adecade after the antipollution movement and theimplementation of most of these measures, socialpeace returned to Japanese society, at least in theenvironmental area (Maruyama 1995). The JapanesePrime Minister was the first ever to offer a publicapology to victims of Minamata disease in a final reliefplan. This ended a four-decade-long battle between thestate and some 25,000 victims of a disease officiallyrecognized in 1956 as afflicting people consuming fishand other marine products taken from Minamata Bayin Kumamoto prefecture. The companies in question,Chisso and Showa Denko, paid over 5 billion yen to fivepatients’ groups, to cover litigation and other costs(Clark 1998).

Within the context of this crisis, the Minamata dis-ease victims themselves, their supporters, and citizens’movements worked to arouse public opinion, and toencourage the struggle of all disease victims. Minamata-disease-related citizens’ movements acted as a reactionin order to ��wake up’’ the appropriate authorities andutilised nonviolent direct action and implementation ofnondeliberative participatory mechanisms for obtain-ing and providing information to the public. Also, theconcept of CACs, an important participatory mecha-nism tool, was discussed.

The Seveso Incident

In Seveso, Italy, a dioxin contamination disastertook place in 1976. An explosion at a trichlorophenolplant near Seveso resulted in the highest TCDDexposure known in human residential populations. Anumber of in-depth studies (Eskenazi and others 2004)provide evidence on the serious protracted health ef-fects on those communities. It remained possible at thetime that the effects of TCDD on birth outcomes wereyet to be observed, because the most heavily exposedwomen in Seveso were the youngest and the least likelyto have had a pregnancy (Eskenazi and Mocarelli2003). TCDD is highly lyophilized, extremely stable inthe environment, and bioaccumulates in the foodchain. It has been classified as a known human car-cinogen and has been shown to disrupt multipleendocrine pathways (Eskenazi and others 2004).


The affected community reacted, causing tensionsbetween industry–government and the local popula-tion (Schneider 1998). The name Seveso ended upbeing associated with dramatic changes in European-wide public policy. The so-called Seveso Directive was abreaking measure that sought to reduce industrialaccident risks by publicizing information about haz-ardous facilities and communicating it to groups ofpeople on a ��Right-to-Know’’ basis (Halvorsen 2003).The provision of ��Right-to-Know’’ information is a one-way flow of information from the government to thepublic, incorporated into the nondeliberative partici-patory mechanism for providing information to thepublic. It was expected to create a better-informed andeducated public and to increase trust between gov-ernment and the affected community. Public infor-mation, in tandem with strict environmental laws, canexert a positive influence on corporate decision-makers and provide government officials with a list ofcarcinogens and other dangerous chemicals (Hearne1996). The Seveso Directive established a frameworkthat delineated the responsibility of both industry andgovernment to communicate hazardous information tothe public. Although information was seen as animportant resource in both the United States andEuropean community countries, European legislationand policies interpreted public access to hazardousinformation based on a policy of ��a need to know’’basis rather than the ��right to know’’ (Walker andothers 1999). Instead of having a policy of an open-ended access to all information, the Seveso Directiveprovided only access for specific information that wasneeded for a specific purpose (Button 1995). Researchundertaken across Europe examining the implemen-tation of the public information requirements of thedirective raised various concerns about the extent ofimplementation, the quality and amount of informa-tion provided, information dissemination on a regularbasis, and the extent to which the public was taking onboard the communicated information (Marchi 2000).The media made available public informationrequirements of the directives to local people, thusaffecting the participatory mechanism.

The second amendment to the Seveso Directive,made in 1988, strengthened the original public infor-mation provision, a participatory mechanism for pro-viding information to the public, by requiring thatinformation should always be actively supplied to localpeople and being available to anyone who requested it(Walker and others 1999). There were a number ofadditions, the most important being the following:

� The public should be able to ��give its opinion’’ on

land use planning decisions about new establishments,

modifications to these, and development in their

vicinity.

� Information on the notified inventory of substancesheld at top tier Seveso II sites should be ��madeavailable’’ to the public (Walker and others 1999).

The Bhopal Toxic Gas-Leak Crisis

In Bhopal, India, in 1984, 45 tons of methyl isocy-anate gas escaped from two underground storage tanksat a pesticide plant owned by the Union Carbide Cor-poration. The result was that 2000 people died and300,000 were injured. Another 1500 people died in thefollowing months. At least 7000 animals perished, butdamage to the natural environment remained largelyuncalculated. The death toll currently has risen tomore than 20,000 and is still rising, with more than 30survivors dying every month. Currently, more than120,000 survivors are still in desperate need of medicalattention for chronic diseases, including shortness ofbreath, persistent cough, early-age cataracts, loss ofappetite, menstrual irregularities, recurrent fever,backaches, weakness, anxiety, depression, and so on(Savangi 2002). Thousands of families were on thebrink of starvation because the breadwinners died orwere too sick to work. The company, Union Carbide,simply abandoned the factory. At present, more than20,000 people in the surrounding area rely on drinkingwater that has been contaminated with chemicals thathave seeped into the groundwater from the plant,causing cancer and other diseases. Union Carbide’sown report on the contamination indicated that morethan one third of the factory premises was hazardouslycontaminated (Wakeford 2003). A recent report of theFact-Finding Mission of Bhopal, in 1999 (Montgomery2003), showed that the chemicals found in the groundwater were also present in high concentrations in thebreast milk of women in the surrounding communities.

The judicial story of Bhopal illustrated in full detailthe worldwide inadequacy of codes and structures tohold corporations and their senior officials account-able, as well as the utter lack of international forum forredressing corporate crimes. Under this approach,holding corporations accountable for their crimeswould involve the solidarity of victimized communitiesand their supporters worldwide (Kumar 1996). In theUnited States and around the world, ��CommunityRight-to-Know’’ was under fierce attack or nonexistent.The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, also known as Title III of the SuperfundAmendments and Reauthorisation Act (SARA), was theact that stemmed from the 1984 tragedy in Bhopal,


India. SARA Title III was enacted to provide citizenswith the right to know and access to information aboutchemicals used, stored, and released in their commu-nity. This act also had requirements for communities todevelop emergency response plans to deal with po-tential chemical releases in their community. SARATitle III established requirements for Federal, State,and local governments, Indian Tribes, and industryregarding emergency planning and ��CommunityRight-to-Know’’ reporting on hazardous and toxicchemicals. The Community Right-to-Know provisionshelped increase the public’s knowledge and access toinformation on chemicals at individual facilities, theiruses, and releases into the environment (Skanavis1999). SARA Title III had four major components:emergency planning, emergency release notification,hazardous chemical inventory, and toxic chemical re-lease inventory. The chemicals covered by each of thesections were different, as were the quantities thattriggered reporting (Skanavis 1999).

In Bhopal, corporate secrecy had prolonged thesuffering of victims. Before the disaster, there was onlyone minor scientific paper published on the healthconsequences of methyl isocyanate among a few ex-posed firemen. Today, most of the medical informa-tion on the chemical disaster remains with the UnionCarbide Corporation, which continues to withhold itsunpublished data, a ��trade secret.’’ This suppression ofinformation was impeding the medical care of thesurvivors. Lack of treatment protocols, in the absenceof information, was leading to indiscriminate pre-scription of potentially harmful drugs that com-pounded exposure-induced injuries (Clark 1998).

The merger of Union Carbide with the DowChemical Corporation united the victims of Bhopalwith the victims of dioxin-related illnesses, death, anddeformity worldwide. The gas-exposed people of Bho-pal had not remained passive victims of Union Car-bide’s crimes. Immediately after the disaster, theaffected people became organized, demanded justice,and ran legal and direct action campaigns to bring thecorporate criminals to justice, initiating their reaction(Mitchell 1996). Three organizations of survivors,whose members were overwhelmingly women, contin-ued to hold weekly meetings and demonstrations aspart of the longest legal battle of its kind. They hadreceived support from communities victimized by cor-porations around the world, as well as from trade un-ions, environmental and human rights organizations,and others (Sarangi and Dinham 2002). The Sam-bhavna Trust Clinic based in Bhopal was the onlyorganization supporting the struggle of the survivors.More than ever, ensuring justice in Bhopal was vital to

protect the lives and health of the people consideredexpendable by the institutions of globalization (Kumar1996). Ultimately, the pressure was transmitted to thechemical industry from the governments, public, andemployees to improve their safety systems, procedures,and practices and to develop plans for responding toemergencies (Gupta 2001).

For more than 15 years, extensive work was done atthe governmental, institutional, and industrial levels,by way of enactment and amendment of legislations,strengthening enforcement in developing programsfor increasing awareness, training of different targetgroups, and implementation of projects with nationaland international inputs (Hill 2003). The focus onpreparedness had been at the local level with a backupfrom the state and national levels (Halvorsen 2003).Lack of professional expertise and experience wasacutely felt. The government, industry, and profes-sionals were caught by surprise and realized that therewas a need to bring in international ��know-how’’ andexpertise to develop suitable approaches and strategiesin this area (Hearne 1996).

The Chernobyl Disaster

In April 1986, the Chernobyl disaster began, in acivilian nuclear power station of Kiev Oblast-Province,in the Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic). Achemical explosion at the station’s fourth reactor andan uncontrolled graphite fire that followed led to therelease of more than 450 radionuclides, comprisingabout 3.5% of the fuel stored in the reactor core. TheUkrainian government estimated the number ofdeaths as 7000–8000 (Mitroff 2002). The Russian oblastof Bryansk was the most severely affected area in theformer USSR. Both people and environment were af-fected, with significant ecological and health damageresulting from the radioactive fallout. In Russia, thisgave rise to the public movement no less spectacularthan in Ukraine and Byelorussia.

The discovery of high radiation zones by individualinvestigators provided an incentive to activists to ex-press their reaction to the central government that ithad concealed the real effects of Chernobyl (Harper2001). Regarding the fact that Ukraine had experi-enced a significant deterioration in press freedom overrecent years, international media organizations haddescribed government restrictions on freedom of thepress in Ukraine as some of the most severe (Clark1998). Because of rapidly building public reaction, theUkrainian and Belarusian governments gave high pri-ority to the elimination of Chernobyl’s consequences.There was also a plethora of other bodies as ��Children


of Chernobyl’’ organizations to help citizens (Harper2001).

The Parliament and Ministry of EnvironmentalProtection of Ukraine (established in 1991) developedthe National Environmental Legislation. The Parlia-ment adopted a Law on the Protection of the NaturalEnvironment (1991), a Land Code (1992), Forest Code(1994), Water Code (1995), Code of Entrails (1994),Law on the Protection of Atmospheric Air (1992), Lawon Environmental Examination (1995), and so on(Harper 2001). For the first time, the Law on Protec-tion of the Natural Environment confirmed the rightof citizens to a safe and healthy environment, andcompensation for damages inflicted on them and/ortheir property by environmental transgressions(Kravchenko 1994). This right was guaranteed bypublic participation in decision-making and by citizens’right to get true information about the state of theenvironment. Citizens had the right to know howproposed industrial projects would impact the envi-ronment and the health of the population. They alsohad the right to participate in environmental impactassessments, state environmental examinations, and toorganize independent public environmental investiga-tions (DETR 2000). The appearance of victim actiongroups in the USSR was a much slower process than itwould have been in the West, because there was noestablished tradition of citizen organizations unrelatedto either the government or the Communist Party.Such an organization was the ��Green World EcologicalAssociation’’ founded by Chernobyl activists. Indeed,the founders of the organization were the most elo-quent in drawing attention to the secrecy surroundingthe event. Long discussions on Chernobyl in Parlia-ment occurred in sessions; laws were enacted; demon-strations outside the Parliament showed the reaction ofthe people; the opposition deputies were very vocal(Beamish 2002). Regulatory negotiations (an alterna-tive dispute resolution participatory mechanism) wereput into effect to implement preventive measures onnuclear incidents. The reason for this was growingpublic distrust in the frequent concealment of infor-mation and cover-ups of nuclear accidents by govern-ments.

Belarus Popular Front members had been activein the charitable fund for the ��Children of Cher-nobyl.’’ The Fund was the most effective among thevarious nongovernment organizations (NGO). It hadcooperated closely with German organizations (Kra-vchenko 1994). In the case of Chernobyl, it has onlybeen within the past few years that the State gov-ernments of Belarus and Ukraine have issued legaldocuments about compensation for residents of the

contaminated communities. The Soviet governmentnever accepted full responsibility for the conse-quences of Chernobyl—especially the internationalaspects, which included a radioactive cloud thatcrossed Europe and caused extensive harm to com-munities in northern Scandinavia, southern Ger-many, and the highlands of Britain (Clark 1998). Anumber of regulations were issued, both under theEuratom and the EEC treaties, concerning maxi-mum permitted levels of radioactive contaminationin foodstuffs and animal feeds after a nuclear acci-dent or radiological emergency, and also concerningimports of agricultural products originating fromcountries outside the European Union. Also, adecision was passed to increase the circulation ofinformation among member states and the Com-mission in the event of a radiological emergencycaused by an accident or by the detection ofabnormal levels of radioactivity either within oroutside the territory of a Member State. Here, theearly diffusion of information was judged necessaryin order to provide the effective application ofagreed standards for protection of the populationthroughout the Community. The issue of publicinformation on radiological emergencies was firstaddressed in Community legislation, through an adhoc directive of 1989. It was devoted to publicinformation about health protection measures andactions in the event of a radiological emergency(O’Connor and Vande Hove 2001). Enhancement ofpublic confidence could, in this view, contribute tothe assurance of a high level of consensus on theacceptability of nuclear technology as a whole, de-spite Chernobyl and other misadventures (Baver-stock 1996). The design of consultative proceduresfor information sharing and appraisal of costs, risks,and benefits by potentially dissenting or untrustingstakeholders, is a real challenge in a domain thathas, historically, been rather secretive (DETR 2000).The enhanced role of public and stakeholder par-ticipation can be seen in some political and legis-lative developments at both the European and theMember State levels:

� Increased attention has recently been given to thepublic communication and human resources aspectsof emergency response capacity in the case of asevere accident.

� The 1999 resolution of the EU committee of theregions concerning the siting of nuclear facilities aswell as nuclear waste management and disposal sitesrequired that the decision process should involvelocal and all other citizens concerned (O’Connor


and Vande Hove 2001).

Meanwhile, the goal of the Euratom nuclear energyresearch program in 1999 was to help exploit the fullpotential of nuclear energy (both fusion and fission),in a sustainable manner, by making current technolo-gies safer and more economical, and by exploringpromising new concepts for the fuel cycle, for radio-active waste management, and for risk governance(Daniloff 2004). Efforts with deliberate involvement ofstakeholders could define domains of pragmatic andprincipled compromise, with respect to the sensibilitiesof the different protagonists (O’Connor and VandeHove 2001). This multi-stakeholder decision processwas thus characterized by a change of emphasis. Mov-ing beyond sole expert concern with (technical) qual-ity of inputs for a decision problem and forcommunication to the public, it focused on reciprocalcommunication quality, negotiation, and exchanges ofstakeholder experience within the evaluation anddecision process itself (O’Connor and Vande Hove2001).

The Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill in Alaska

The largest marine oil spill in North America oc-curred when the Exxon Valdez ran aground andleaked oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound in March1989. About one quarter of the cargo, 38,800 tons ofcrude oil, was spilled (Bergman 1999). Some of this oilultimately coated about 1200 miles of coastline, up to470 miles away from the site of the accident. No humanlives were lost, but 20 communities and a rich naturalenvironment were irreversibly affected. The problemswere magnified by organizational confusion ofresponsibility, allocation of authority, and decision-making (Slater 1994). The spill was the largest andmost destructive in North American history. In theend, only 14% percent of the spilled oil was everrecovered (Mitchell 1996).

Public reaction ranged from sorrow to outrage, andtriggered demands for policy change to prevent suchan apparently devastating environmental disaster fromhappening again. The most obvious result of the Ex-xon Valdez spill––or, more precisely, the outcome ofthe public reaction triggered by the incident––was theenactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).The spill thus illustrated how attention-grabbing‘‘focusing events’’ can spur policy change (Birklandand Lawrence 2002). For years Congress was unable toagree on a comprehensive solution to the problem ofoil spills, in large part because attention was divertedfrom oil spills to hazardous wastes’ (Busenberg 2000).OPA 90 provided tough penalties and liability for

spillers of oil, allocated more resources for dealing withspills, and placed more responsibility on the federalexecutive branch to respond to oil spill incidentspromptly (Miraglia 2002). Numerous scientific studies(Slater 1994) had been published and a fuller sense ofshared responsibility had resulted, and all this due topublic pressure and reaction. Public Education Cam-paigns (participatory mechanism) took place. Mostreporters got their information about the oil spill atpress conferences, and their interpretation of theevents from each other. The result was a predictableslew of stories almost uniform in both content andperspective, purposely ignoring the 12-year Reagan-eradecline in oil-shipping safety standards and the CoastGuard funding that made a Valdez-type disaster inevi-table (Clark 1998). In the aftermath of the Valdez spill,it was realized that imagery and symbolism could pre-vail over dispassionate scientific and economic calcu-lations of risk and response, so that large oil spillsshould be considered broad societal issues and prob-lems, not merely technical matters (Rabalais 2003). Inthe search for community involvement and recovery, itwas suggested that small communities had greaterabilities for involvement/recovery than were usuallyrecognized. External involvement by attorneys, socialservices, and even inappropriate research might inhibitrecovery/involvement processes and prolong or shar-pen awareness of the original pain (Miraglia 2002).

Discussion

The major environmental accidents/disasters ofMinamata, Japan; Seveso, Italy; Bhopal, India;Chernobyl, Ukraine; and Exxon-Valdez, Alaska havebeen presented, giving special emphasis on the par-ticipatory mechanisms (Tables 1 and 2) that were theresult of their reaction. In some of the cases, this led tospecial legislation. In others, authorities were forced toinvolve citizens in the decision-making process and toprovide more access to information. However, in allaforementioned disasters, the public became increas-ingly aware of the potential dangers of environmentalpollution, and the effects that these might have had ontheir health.

Minamata’s experience could be characterized asboth a failure of the government to protect the healthand welfare of citizens who possessed little power to acton their own behalf, and the outcome of a flawedpublic ethic that promoted unfettered economicdevelopment at the expense of citizens’ rights to a safeenvironment. The reaction of the people initiatedparticipatory mechanisms, such as surveys, a nonde-liberative mechanism for obtaining information from


the public who would not or could not become in-volved in other ways. Public education campaigns, anondeliberative participatory mechanism for providinginformation to the public, was expected to create abetter-informed and educated public and to increasetrust by making government and the regulated com-munity more accountable and transparent to citizens.Also, citizen-action groups that emerged could beclassified as a participatory mechanism that falls intothe CACs category. Minamata’s identity became inex-tricably bound up with the disease, both in the mindsof its own residents and in the eyes of the outsideworld. As a result of this, Japan was one of the firstcountries to introduce hazardous waste controls in the1960s. Japanese courts liberalized the standard of prooffor negligence in a pollution case and placed on thedefendants the task to use the best technology availablewithout consideration of economic feasibility (Good-man 2001). Not only were substantial damages awardedto the plaintiffs, but the courts also established a doc-trine that required polluters to cease pollution whenthere existed doubt about the safety of their dis-charges. As a consequence of the new standards ofproof and the newly established rules concerning theresponsibility of polluters, it became substantially eas-ier for victims of pollution to file suit and recoverconsiderable damages. Access to environmental justicewas partly achieved.

In the period after the Seveso incident, the affectedresidents reacted violently and affected the politicalarena. The ��Seveso Directive’’ publicized informationabout hazardous facilities and communicated it togroups of people on a ��Right-to-Know’’ basis. Theprovision of ��Right-to-Know’’ information is a one-wayflow of information from the government to the pub-lic, incorporated into the nondeliberative participatorymechanism. It was expected to result in a better-in-formed and educated public and to increase trust be-tween government and the affected community. Themedia, a valuable participatory mechanism tool, playedan important role. CACs, a promising participatorymechanism, were formed to bring in international��know-how’’ and expertise for developing suitable ap-proaches and strategies for a long-term chemicaldisaster management program.

The Bhopal crisis was the worst-ever industrialdisaster. It opened a new discourse of industrial crises,crisis management, technology–environment relation-ships, and technology–society relationships (Mitchell1996). The exposed people of Bhopal had not re-mained passive victims of Union Carbide’s crimes.Immediately after the disaster, they initiated theirreaction by getting organized to demand justice and

run legal and direct action campaigns to bring thecorporate criminals to justice. Nondeliberative partici-patory mechanisms for providing information to thepublic were put into effect by organizing public edu-cation campaigns, with national and international in-put. Also, citizen and expert advisory committees wereformed because of public reaction and pressure ongovernment. For more than 15 years after the disaster,extensive work had been done at the governmental,institutional, and industry levels, enacting andamending legislation, strengthening awareness pro-grams, training different target groups, and imple-menting safety regulations.

At the Chernobyl disaster, there was an appearanceof victim action groups, although this was a muchslower process than it would have been in the West,because there was no established tradition of ��CitizenOrganizations’’ in the country. An obvious pre-requisite in ensuring that the public had a voice inenvironmental decision-making was the assurance thatmembers of the public could make their voices heardwithout fear of reprisals. The State governmentsestablished Chernobyl State committees and expertadvisory committees. Expert Advisory Committees is aform of active participatory mechanism, which is usedextensively to bring outside scientific, economic, andother technical information into the governmentaldecision-making processes. There was also an array ofother bodies to help citizens, including ��Children ofChernobyl’’ organizations. National Environmentallegislation was enacted and through the activation ofparticipatory mechanisms, information was providedto the public. The concept of ��public hearings’’ wasfully implemented. The citizen organizations, NGOs,and victim action groups played important roles indisseminating information to the general public.Through public hearings, citizens had become in-formed on how proposed industrial projects wouldimpact the environment and the health of the pop-ulation. Regulatory negotiations (an alternative dis-pute resolution participatory mechanism)implementing preventive measures on nuclear inci-dents were put into effect. The reason was growingpublic distrust in the frequent concealment of infor-mation and cover-ups by governments about the nu-clear accidents. The public reaction activated theappropriate participatory mechanisms, which in turnissued a number of regulations, both under the Eur-atom and the EEC treaties, concerning maximumpermitted levels of radioactive contamination infoodstuffs and animal feeds after a nuclear accidentor radiological emergency, in imports of agriculturalproducts originating in other countries.


The Exxon-Valdez disaster and the resultingenactment of OPA 90 were a reflection of our abilityto learn from tanker accidents and to apply thatknowledge to prevent the recurrence of a similardisaster. OPA 90 was seen as the medium to create abetter-informed and educated public and to increasetrust by making government and the regulated com-munity more accountable and transparent to citizens.CACs (participatory mechanism) represented publicviews on policy-making or changing. The RegionalCitizens Advisory Council (RCAC) was a participatorymechanism mandated by OPA 90. Local governmentsand interest groups from the region directly affectedby the Exxon-Valdez oil spill appointed the membersof the council. Also, a group of scientists (ExpertAdvisory Committee) conducted specialized research.New positions, new organizations, and new publica-tions had been funded, at least temporarily. Numer-ous scientific studies (Slater 1994) had beenpublished and a fuller sense of shared responsibilityhad resulted, and all that due to public pressure andreaction. Public education campaigns (participatorymechanism) took place because part of the media orsome other environmental action groups togetherwith published scientific studies played importantroles in disseminating information to the wider pub-lic. The Exxon-Valdez was a worthwhile case studybecause it allowed all parties—citizens, environmen-talists, government officials, and industry—to partici-pate in environmental protection. The people in thespill area reacted because they wanted to activelyparticipate in the decision-making process and not tobe a passive source of information or a mere subjectof research.

In all the above-mentioned disasters, the appropri-ate participatory mechanisms were activated throughthe reaction of the affected people. These participatorymechanisms played a critical role in generating aneffective and quicker reaction of the victims of thedisasters in question. Recovery measures were apparentin most disasters. The participating citizens repre-sented their own interest or they were members of re-lated organizations. The affected people realized thatonly through the appropriate participatory mecha-nisms could they become involved in effective decision-making. They realized that everyone has the right toparticipate and to have a say in the decision-makingprocess, especially when these decisions affect theirfuture and the future of their children. They realizedtheir importance in the formulation and implementa-tion of environmental policies and in drafting generalregulations and laws directly concerning the environ-ment.

As Mitchell (1996) stated, ��citizens will voluntarilyparticipate in community activity when they see someaspect of their way-of-life threatened.’’ We can take it astep further and add that a healthy and harmoniousenvironment is a basic human right. It is a constitu-tional right and duty of everyone to actively participatein the protection of the environment. The participa-tory mechanisms are appropriate tools and peopleshould use them.

In conclusion, it can be stated that if citizens all overthe world had been environmentally educated to ac-tively participate (activating all appropriate participa-tory mechanisms) in the decision-making process, wewouldn’t need to study the environmental disasters.Furthermore, if citizens all over were active participantsin environmental issues, it is quite possible that wewould have experienced fewer environmental acci-dents/disasters.

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Public Participation Mechanisms in Environmental Disasters