Public Office GOCCs, De Jure De Facto Officers.pdf

8/10/2019 Public Office GOCCs, De Jure De Facto Officers.pdf

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G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]

FELICITO S. MACALINO, peti t ioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,espondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition for certiorarii[1] assailing theurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan toake cognizance of two criminal casesii[2] against petitionernd his wife Liwayway S. Tan, contending that he is not aublic officer within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan.iii[3]

On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office ofhe Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed

with the Sandiganbayan two informations against petitionernd Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa throughalsification of official documents (Criminal Case No. 18022)nd frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantileocuments (Criminal Case No. 19268), as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18022

That on or about the 15th day of March, 1989 and forometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of

Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction ofhis Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO

S. MACALINO, being then the Assistant Manager of theTreasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration& Insurance Section of the Philippine National ConstructionCorporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporationwith offices at EDSA corner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, andence, a public officer, while in the performance of his officialunctions, taking advantage of his position, committing theffense in relation to his office and conspiring andonfederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, beinghen the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by means of deceitefraud the Philippine National Construction Corporation inhe following manner: in preparing the application with the

Philippine National Bank, Buendia Branch for the issuance of demand draft in the amount of NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY

THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO &1/100 PESOS (P983,682.11), Philippine Currency, in favorf Bankers Trust Company, accused FELICITO S.

MACALINO superimposed the name Wacker Marketing asayee to make it appear that the demand draft was payableo it, when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well

new, it was the Bankers Trust Company which was the realayee as indicated in Check Voucher No. 3-800-89 and PNB

Check No. B236746 supporting said application for demandraft; subsequently accused FELICITO S. MACALINOkewise inserted into the letter of PNCC to PNB Buendia

Branch the words payable to Wacker Marketing to make itppear that the demand drafts to be picked up by theesignated messenger were payable to Wacker Marketing

when in truth and in fact the real payee was Bankers TrustCompany; and as a result of such acts of falsification, PNBBuendia issued 19 demand drafts for P50,000.00 each andnother demand draft for P33,682.11, all, payable to Wacker

Marketing, which were subsequently delivered to accused

Felicitor S. Macalino and which accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN

thereafter exchanged with PNB Balanga Branch fochecks at P50,000.00 each and another for P33,682.11all of which she later deposited into Account No. 0042-06 of Wacker Marketing at Philtrust Cubao, thereby caupecuniary damage and prejudice to Philippine NatConstruction Corporation in the amount of P983,682.11.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, Philippines, August 24, 1992.iv[4]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19268

That on or about the 4th day of April, 1990, subsequently thereafter, in the Municipality of MandaluyMetro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorCourt, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALbeing then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Divand the Head of the Loans Administration and InsuraSection of the Philippine National Construction Corporaa government-controlled corporation with offices at Ecorner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and hea public officer, while in the performance of his offunctions, taking advantage of his position, committingoffense in relation to his office, and conspiring confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, bthen the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and twillfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by means of dedefraud the Philippine National Construction Corporatiothe following manner: after receiving Check Voucher No422-90 covering the partial payment by PNCC of the sinfund to International Corporate Bank (Interbank) as weCheck No. 552312 for TWO MILLION TWO HUNDFIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P2,250,000.00), PhilipCurrency, payable to Interbank for the purpose, accuFELICITO S. MACALINO falsified PNB Check No. 552by altering the payee indicated therein to make it appear

the aforesaid check was payable to Wacker Markeinstead of Interbank and further falsified the schedulcheck disbursements sent to PNB Buendia by makinappear therein that the payee of Check No. 552312 Wacker Marketing when in truth and in fact and asaccused very well knew, it was Interbank which was thepayee; accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter deposCheck No. 552312 into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of WaMarketing at Philtrust Cubao and Wacker Markesubsequently issued Philtrust Check No. 148039 P100,000.00 in favor of accused FELICITO S. MACALwhich acts of falsification performed by the accused whave defrauded the Philippine National Constru

Corporation of P2,250,000.00 had not PNB Buendia ordthe dishonor of Check No. 552312 after noting alteration/erasures thereon, thereby failing to producefelony by reason of causes independent of the will ofaccused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, Philippines, May 28, 1993.v[5]

Upon arraignment on November 9, 1992, petitioner pleanot guilty to the charges. Hence, trial proceeded.vi[6]


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However, during the initial presentation of evidence for theefense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion toismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no

urisdiction over him since he is not a public officer becausehe Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC),ormerly the Construction and Development Corporation ofhe Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned orontrolled corporation with original charter.vii[7] The Peoplef the Philippines opposed the motion.viii [8]

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a

esolution denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack ofmerit.ix[9]

Hence, this petition.x[10]

The Issue

The sole issue raised is whether petitioner, an employee ofhe PNCC, is a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No.019, as amended.

The CourtsRuling

Petitioner contends that an employee of the PNCC is not aublic officer as defined under Republic Act No. 3019, asollows:

Sec. 2. (a) xxx xxx xxx.

(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officialsnd employees, permanent or temporary, whether in thenclassified or classified or exempted service receivingompensation, even nominal, from the government asefined in the preceding paragraph.

We agree.

To resolve the issue, we resort to the 1987 Constitution.Article XI, on the Accountability of Public Officers, provides:

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, asrotectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaintsled in any form or manner against public officials ormployees of the Government, or any subdivision, agencyr instrumentality thereof, including government-owned orontrolled corporations x x x.

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have theollowing powers, functions and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,ny act or omission of any public official or employee, officer agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,njust, improper and inefficient. x x x

2. Direct, upon complaint or at its instance, any publicfficial or employee of the government, or any subdivision,gency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of anyovernment-owned or controlled corporations with originalharters, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by

law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropin the performance of duties. (underscoring supplied)

Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constituprovides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisinstrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, inclugovernment-owned and controlled corporations with oricharters. (underscoring supplied)

Republic Act No. 6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties -The Office oOmbudsman shall have the following powers, functionsduties:

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complainany person, any act or omission of any public officeemployee, office or agency, when such act or omisappears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x

2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any of

or employee of the Government, or of any subdivisagency or instrumentality thereof, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations with oricharters, to perform and expedite any act or duty requirelaw, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropin the performance of duties.

Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it incorporated under the general law on corporationfollows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer wthe coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus,Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction ov

private individual is when the complaint charges him eas a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public ofwho has been charged with a crime within the jurisdictioSandiganbayan.xi[11]

The casesxii[12] cited by respondent People of Philippines are inapplicable because they were decunder the provisions of the 1973 Constitution which incluas public officers, officials and employees of corporatowned and controlled by the government though organand existing under the general corporation law. The Constitution excluded such corporations.

The crimes charged against petitioner were committe1989 and 1990.xiii[13] The criminal actions were institute1992. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court to criminal case is determined by the law in force atinstitution of the action.xiv[14]

The Fallo

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court GRANTS the petition. Court SETS ASIDE the order dated July 29, 1999 ofSandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18022 and 19and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the two (2) cases agapetitioner and his wife.


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G.R. Nos. 147706-07 February 16, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,s.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)nd EFREN L. ALAS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents,irectors or trustees, or managers of government-owned orontrolled corporations organized and incorporated underhe Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act? The petitioner, represented by the Office ofhe Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative positionn this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt. Respondent Efren L. Alas contends otherwise,ogether with the respondent court.

Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the

Office of the Ombudsman, two separate informations

1

foriolation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with theSandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L.Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalousdvertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as

President and Chief Operating Officer of the PhilippinePostal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay PublishingCompany which purportedly caused damage and prejudiceo the government.

On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash thenformations for lack of jurisdiction, which motion wasehemently opposed by the prosecution. After consideringhe arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruledhat PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers,articularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under

Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. According to theSandiganbayan:

After a careful consideration of the arguments of theccused-movant as well as of that of the prosecution, we aref the considered opinion that the instant motion of theccused is well taken. Indeed, it is the basic thrust of

Republic Act as well as (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1606s amended by President Decree No. 1486 and Republic

Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249 that theSandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officersnless private persons are charged with them in theommission of the offenses.

The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal SavingsBank is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporationwhich is a government owned corporation, the same is notreated by a special law. It was organized and incorporatednder the Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg.8. It was registered with the Securities and Exchange

Commission under SEC No. AS094-005593 on June 22,994 with a lifetime of fifty (50) years. Under its Articles ofncorporation the purpose for which said entity is formed wasrimarily for business, xxx

Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposethe corporation points to the conclusion that it existsbusiness.l^vvphi1.net Obviously, it is not involved inperformance of a particular function in the exercisgovernment power. Thus, its officers and employees arecovered by the GSIS and are under the SSS law, actions for reinstatement and backwages are not within

jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but byNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

The Supreme Court, in the case of Trade Unions of

Philippines and Allied Services vs. National Housing C173 SCRA 33, held that the Civil Service now covers government owned or controlled corporations with originlegislative charters, those created by an act of Congresby special law, and not those incorporated under pursuant to a general legislation. The Highest Ccategorically ruled that the Civil Service does not incgovernment-owned or controlled corporation which organized as subsidiaries of government-ownedcontrolled corporation under the general corporation law

In Philippine National Oil Company Energy DevelopmCorporation vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26, the Supreme C

emphasized that:

The test in determining whether a government-ownecontrolled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Lathe manner of its creation such that government corporacreated by special charter are subject to its provision wthose incorporated under the general corporation law arewithin its coverage.

Likewise in Davao City Water District vs. Civil SerCommission, 201 SCRA 601 it was held that government-owned or controlled corporation with origcharter we mean government-owned or contr

corporation created by a special law and not underCorporation Code of the Philippines" while in LlenesDicdican, et al., 260 SCRA 207, a public officer has bruled, as a person whose duties involve the exercisdiscretion in the performance of the function of governme

Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements oSupreme Court, the accused herein cannot be considerpublic officer. Thus, this Court may not exercise jurisdicover his act.

2

Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the SpProsecutor (OSP), filed this petition

3 arguing, in esse

that the PPSB was a government-owned or controcorporation as the term was defined under Section 2(13the Administrative Code of 1987.

4 Likewise, in fu

defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249not make a distinction as to the manner of creation ofgovernment-owned or controlled corporations for officers to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being Presiand Chief Operating Officer of the PPSB at the timcommission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas cunder the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1awphi1.nt

Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dFebruary 15, 2001, respondent Alas, on the other h

practically reiterated the pronouncements made by
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espondent court in support of his conclusion that the PPSBwas not created by special law, hence, its officers did not fallwithin the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

5

We find merit in the petition.

Section 2(13) of EO 2926 defines government-owned or

ontrolled corporations as follows:

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined Unless the specific wordsf the text or the context as a whole or a particular statute,hall require a different meaning:

xx xxx xxx

13) government owned or controlled corporations refer tony agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporationested with functions relating to public needs whetherovernmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by theovernment directly or indirectly or through its

nstrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in thease of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of itsapital stock: provided, that government owned or controlled

orporations maybe further categorized by the department ofhe budget, the civil service commission and the commissionn audit for the purpose of the exercise and discharge ofheir respective powers, functions and responsibilities withespect to such corporations.

From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-wned or controlled corporation, and organized and

ncorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary ofhe Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than9% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to theovernment while the rest is nominally held by its

ncorporators who are/were themselves officers ofPHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctionedy Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal

Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, "toncourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit ofavings among the general public, especially the youth andhe marginalized sector in the countryside xxx" and toacilitate postal service by "receiving collections and makingayments, including postal money orders."

7

t is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdictionver presidents, directors or trustees, or managers ofovernment-owned or controlled corporations with originalharters whenever charges of graft and corruption arenvolved. However, a question arises whether theSandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers inovernment-owned or controlled corporations organized and

ncorporated under the Corporation Code in view of theelimitation provided for in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the987 Constitution which states that:

SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches,ubdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of theovernment, including government-owned or controlledorporations with original charters.

t should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from the Civil

Service Commission. The same is governed by ArticleSection 4 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayancontinue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as nohereafter may be provided by law."This provision, in efretained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defunder Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution wmandated its creation, thus:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a spcourt, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall h

jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graftcorrupt practices and such other offense committed by pofficers and employees, including those in governmowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their offic

may be determined by law. (Italics ours)

On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authvested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA 7maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan presidents, directors or trustees, or managersgovernment-owned or controlled corporations without distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5, 1Congress enacted RA 8249

9 which preserved the su

provision:

Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exe

exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amenotherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesRepublic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, TitleBook II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or morthe accused are officials occupying the following positiothe government, whether in a permanent, acting or intcapacity, at the time of the commission of the offense,

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positof regional director, and higher, otherwise classified as g"27" and higher, of the Compensation and PosClassification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6specifically including:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managersgovernment-owned or controlled corporations, suniversities or educational institutions or foundations. (Itours)

The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of "presidedirectors or trustees, or managers of government-ownecontrolled corporations" within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from makingdistinction with respect to the manner of their creation.

The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly revealsintention of the legislature to include the presidents, direcor trustees, or managers of bothtypes of corporations wthe jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever theyinvolved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwiscould have simply made the necessary distinction. But i

not.
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t is a basic principle of statutory construction that when theaw does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Ubi lexon distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Corollarily,

Article XI Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, on theurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the governmentsrosecutory arm against persons charged with graft andorruption), includes officers and employees of government-wned or controlled corporations, likewise without anyistinction.1awphi1.nt

n Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,10

this Court, already mindful of

he pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled thathe concerned officers of government-owned or controlledorporations, whether created by special law or formednder the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction ofhe Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Otherwise, as wemphasized therein, a major policy of Government, which iso eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the graft andorruption that has permeated the fabric of the public serviceke a malignant social cancer, would be seriouslyndermined. In fact, Section 1 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act embodies this policy of the government, that is,o repress certain acts not only of public officers but also of

rivate persons constituting graft or corrupt practices orwhich may lead thereto.

The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived itssefulness. On the contrary, it has become even moreelevant today due to the rampant cases of graft andorruption that erode the peoples faith in government. Forndeed, a government-owned or controlled corporation canonceivably create as many subsidiary corporations underhe Corporation Code as it might wish, use public funds,isclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities andesponsibilities provided by law. By including the concernedfficers of government-owned or controlled corporations

rganized and incorporated under the Corporation Codewithin the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislaturevidently seeks to avoid just that.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition isereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution dated

February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
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G.R. No. 158187 February 11, 2005

MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYNFARAHMAND,petitioners,s.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, espondents.

CORONA, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regionalirector/manager of government-owned or controlledorporations organized and incorporated under the

Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graftnd Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspanssumes a negative view in the instant petition for certiorarinder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Office of the

Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared byhe respondent court.

n the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for awrit of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a temporaryestraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set asidehe resolutions

1dated January 31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of

he respondent Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division. Theseesolutions denied her motion to quash and motion foreconsideration, respectively.

On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal CaseNo. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, asmended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspannd Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Healthnsurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional

Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors ofTiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. Thenformation read:

That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and forometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City, province of

Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction ofhis Honorable Court, above-named accused MARILYN C.

GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the RegionalManager/Director, of the Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in suchapacity and committing the offense in relation to office,onniving, confederating and mutually helping with DR.

EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private individual andChairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi MedicalCenter, Tiong Bi, Inc., Mandalangan, Bacolod City, witheliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest

artiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andeloniously release the claims for payments of patientsonfined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Healthnsurance Corp., prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to

NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOURnd 64/100 (P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi

Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in theDeed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999,nvolving the sale of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi,nc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the possession,peration and management of the said hospital will beurned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc.ffective January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts

eceivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to

West Negros College, Inc., thus accused MARILYNGEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her offfunctions, had given unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein represented by accusedEVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, to the damage and injuWest Negros College, Inc.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan ha

jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accGeduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Regioa position classified under salary grade 26.

In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent cdenied the motion to quash. The motion for reconsiderawas likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the RegiManager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine He

Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, appointment paper and notice of salary adjustment2 s

that she was appointed as Department Manager A ofPhilippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) salary grade 26. Philhealth is a government owned controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherknown as the National Health Insurance Act of 1995.

Geduspan argues that her position as RegDirector/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5), Sectiof RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exeroriginal jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amenotherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesRepublic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, TitleBook of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more ofaccused are officials occupying the following positions ingovernment, whether in a permanent, acting or intcapacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the posit

of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as G"27" and higher, of the Compensation and PosClassification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 67specifically including;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) All other national and local officials classified as G"27" and higher under the Compensation and PosClassification Act of 1989.

The petition lacks merit.
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The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director ofRegion VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the positionf Regional Director but that of Department Manager A,ence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 areot applicable.

t is petitioners appointment paper and the notice of salarydjustment that determine the classification of her position,hat is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.

Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department

Manager A of Philhealth. She, however, contends that theosition of Department Manager A is classified under salaryrade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of respondentourt. She is at present assigned at the Philhealth Regional

Office VI as Regional Director/Manager.

Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of aemporary restraining order on the alleged disregard byespondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon

Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.3

However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. Inhat case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the Regional

Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX,Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of therime in 1992 his position of Regional Director of LTO waslassified as Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Courtuled that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over hiserson.

n contrast, petitioner held the position of DepartmentDirector A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of theffense and that position was among those enumerated inaragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby furthermended to read as follows:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exerciseriginal jurisdiction in all cases involving:

. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,therwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,

Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more ofhe accused are officials occupying the following positions inhe government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim

apacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;

1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positionsf regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade

Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and PositionClassification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),pecifically including:

a) xxx xxx xxx

b) xxx xxx xxx

c) xxx xxx xxx

(d) xxx xxx xxx

(e) xxx xxx xxx

(f) xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managersgovernment-owned and controlled corporations, suniversities or educational institutions or foundatio(Underscoring supplied).

It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is meclassified as salary grade 26. While the first part ofabovequoted provision covers only officials of the execbranch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whpositions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who arexpress provision of law placed under the jurisdiction osaid court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction petitioner together with Farahmand, a private indivicharged together with her.

The position of manager in a government-ownedcontrolled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is wthe jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al.4ruled

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 revthat to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019

amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)Chapter II, SectioTitle VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the lawbribery), (d)Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issin 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offensefelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimesthe offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c)(e) is a public official or employee holding any of positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; andthe offense committed is in relation to the office.

To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, beindepartment manager of Philhealth, a government-owned

controlled corporation. The position of manager is onthose mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249the offense for which she was charged was committerelation to her office as department manager of Philhe

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction overperson as well as the subject matter of the case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lacmerit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 169328 October 27, 2006

ULIAN A. ALZAGA, MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO,nd MANUEL S. SATUITO, petitioners,s.

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (2ndDivision) andPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari assails the April 25, 2005 andAugust 10, 2005 Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case Nos. 25681-25684, which respectivelyeversed the May 27, 2004 Resolution

2 of the court a quo

nd denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.3

On October 7, 1999,4four separate Informations for violation

f Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 were filedgainst petitioners Julian A. Alzaga, Meinrado Enrique A.

Bello and Manuel S. Satuito relative to alleged irregularitieswhich attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan,Batangas, by the Armed Forces of the PhilippinesRetirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).Alzaga was the Head of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBSwhen one of the lots was purchased. Bello was a PoliceSuperintendent and he succeeded Alzaga as Head of theegal Department. It was during his tenure when the otherhree lots were purchased. Both were Vice Presidents of

AFP-RSBS. On the other hand, Satuito was the Chief of theDocumentation and Assistant Vice President of the AFP-RSBS.

5

Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/orDismiss the informations alleging that the Sandiganbayanas no jurisdiction over them and their alleged offensesecause the AFP-RSBS is a private entity created for theenefit of its members and that their positions and salary

rade levels do not fall within the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential DecreeP.D.) No. 1606 (1978),

6 as amended by R.A. No. 8249

1997).7

On May 27, 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted petitionersmotions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

However, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, theSandiganbayan reversed its earlier resolution. It held that theAFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporationhus subject to its jurisdiction. It also found that the positionseld by Alzaga and Bello, who were Vice Presidents, and

Satuito who was an Assistant Vice President, are coverednd embraced by, and in fact higher than the position of

managers mentioned under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, asmended, thus under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration8was denied, hence,

his petition raising the following issues:

I

THE COURTA QUOCOMMITTED GRAVE ABUSEOF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICAJURISPRUDENCE THAT IT HAS JURISDICTOVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONERS

II

THE COURTA QUOCOMMITTED GRAVE ABOF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDINGQUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER

IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDETHAT THE ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT ASEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM (AFP-RSBS

A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLCORPORATION

III

THE COURTA QUOCOMMITTED GRAVE ABOF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDINGQUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDETHAT PETITIONERS ALZAGA AND BELLO[,] WWERE BOTH VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE ARSBS[,] AND PETITIONER SATUITO[,] WHO W

ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ARSBS[,] ARE COVERED AND EMBRACED BY POSITION "MANAGERS" MENTIONED UNSECTION 4 a (1) (g) OF PD NO. 1606,

AMENDED.9

The petition is without merit.

The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No.(1973)

10 in December 1973 to guarantee continu

financial support to the AFP military retirement systemprovided for in R.A. No. 340 (1948).

11 It is similar to

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Social Security System (SSS) since it serves as the systhat manages the retirement and pension funds of thosthe military service.

12

The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff oAFP through a Board of Trustees and Management Groand funded from congressional appropriations compulsory contributions from members of the Adonations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to system; and all earnings of the system which shall nosubject to any tax whatsoever.14

Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A.8249, grants jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan over:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amenotherwise known as the Anti-graft and CoPractices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and ChaII, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised PCode, where one or more of the accused officials occupying the following positions ingovernment whether in a permanent, acting
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interim capacity, at the time of the commission of theoffense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying thepositions of regional director and higher, otherwiseclassified as Grade 27 and higher, of theCompensation and Position Classification Act of1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

x x x x

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers ofgovernment-owned or controlled corporations, stateuniversities or educational institutions orfoundations;

n People v. Sandiganbayan,15

where herein petitionersAlzaga and Satuito were respondents, this Court has ruledhat the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS arembued with public interest thus the same is a governmentntity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. In

Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,16

we held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporationnder R.A. No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special

Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002. These rulings rendernmeritorious petitioners assertion that the AFP-RSBS is arivate entity.

There is likewise no merit in petitioners claim that theSandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them since theirositions as vice presidents and assistant vice president areot covered nor embraced by the term "managers" underection 4 of RA. No. 8249.

We held in Geduspan v. People,17

that while the first part ofection 4 covers only officials of the executive branch withhe salary grade 27 and higher, the second part "specificallyncludes" other executive officials whose positions may note of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisionf law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. In the

atter category, it is the position held and not the salaryrade which determines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan. Thus, presidents, directors or trustees, ormanagers of government owned and controlled corporations,re under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

n the instant case, petitioners Alzaga and Bello were Headf the Legal Department while petitioner Satuito was Chief ofhe Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice

Presidents and Assistant Vice President. These positionsre not specifically enumerated in RA. No. 8249; however,s correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, their ranks as

Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice President are evenigher than that of "managers" mentioned in RA. No. 8249.

n sum, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporationnd that it has jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners

who were Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice Presidentwhen the charges against them were allegedly committed.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is

DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

dated April 25, 2005 that the AFP-RSBS is a governmowned and controlled corporation and that it has jurisdicover the persons of the petitioners and the Resolution d

August 10, 2005 denying petitioners motion reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 152651 August 7, 2006

ANDABAI T. ARIMAO, Petitioner,s.

SAADEA P. TAHER, Respondent.

TINGA, J. :

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision and Orderated 16 October 2001 and 31 January 2002, respectively,f Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial

Region, Cotabato City, in SPL. Civil Case No. 660, entitledSaadea P. Taher v. Gov. Nur Misuari, in his capacity as

ARMM Regional Governor, Andabai T. Arimao and BajunaidKamaludin, Acting Director of TESDA-ARMM," whichnjoined respondents therein, including petitioner Andabai T.

Arimao, from carrying out the effects of the Memorandumated 04 August 2000 issued by then Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor Nur P. Misuari.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:

On 22 March 1995, petitioner was appointed as Director II,

Bureau of Non-formal Education, Department of Education,Culture and Sports (DECS-ARMM). Thereafter, on 17 July995, respondent was appointed Education Supervisor II.

Petitioners appointment, however, was protested by aertain Alibai T. Benito, who claimed that said appointmentid not pass through any evaluation by the personnelelection board.

1 Petitioners appointment was eventually

isapproved by the Civil Service Commission-Field OfficeCSC-FO), Cotabato City, for failure to meet the experienceequired for the position. On 02 May 1996, the CSC, through

Resolution No. 96- 3101, affirmed the findings of the CSC-FO and ordered petitioner to be reverted to her formerosition of Education Supervisor II.

2 Petitioner sought

econsideration of the decision.

n the interim, petitioner applied for and was granted by theDECS-ARMM an academic scholarship with pay effective 30October 1996 in her capacity as Education Supervisor II.The scholarship was limited to a period of one year.

3

Meanwhile, petitioners motion for reconsideration of CSCResolution No. 96-3101 was denied.

4 Subsequently, she

led a petition for review of the two CSC Resolutions beforehe Court of Appeals

5which, however, denied due course to

he petition on 10 June 1998.6 On 17 October 1998, the

Court of Appeals issued an Entry of Judgment declaring theenial of the petition to be final and executory.

7

n the meantime, the position of Education Supervisor IIeing occupied by respondent was devolved from DECS-

ARMM to the Technical Education and Skills DevelopmentAuthority (TESDA)- ARMM.

On 2 December 1998, petitioner informed the CSC RegionalOffice in Cotabato City that she was already allowed by theDirector of TESDA-ARMM to report for duty, only that shend respondent are reporting to the same position.

8On 10

December 1998, the CSC Regional Director enjoinedespondent from reporting to the TESDA-ARMM.

9 It

appears, however, that respondent continued to reporEducation Supervisor II.

On 7 December 1998, respondent, unaware that petitiwas granted a study leave from October 1996 to Oct1997, filed a complaint before the Regional Director, ARrelative to petitioners continued absence. On 24 Decem1998, upon the complaint filed by respondent, the ExecuSecretary of ARMM, by authority of the ARMM RegiGovernor and per his Memorandum of even date, declpetitioner to have been Absent Without Leave (AWOL

reason of her failure to report to her office for at least a after the expiration of her study leave and directed thatbe dropped from the payroll.

10Petitioner appealed the

Memorandum to the Office of the ARMM Regional GoveIn Resolution No. 001-99 dated 17 March 1999, the office denied the appeal, finding that from 30 October 1up to the opening of school year 1997-1998, first semepetitioner failed to report to office despite the fact thatwas not able to enroll immediately upon the approval ostudy leave.

11 Further, petitioners act of enrolling in

second semester of school year 1997-1998 in the abseof an approved extension of her study leave is a cviolation of the implementing guidelines of Republic Act

4670, or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, [p]remises considered, the instant letteMrs. Arimao to reconsider the action of the ExecuSecretary in dropping her from the roll is hereby DENand is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. ThusMemorandum Ordered [sic] of the Executive Secretar

Authority of the Regional Governor dated December1998 is hereby affirmed and remained [sic] undisturNonetheless, since the act of dropping one from the ronon[-]disciplinary action on the ground of being guilty ocharge of Absence Without Approved Leave (AWOL)

respondent may be appointed to other position[s] inGovernment service at the discretion of the appoinauthority.

SO ORDERED.12

On 20 July 2000, Datu Guimid P. Matalam, Regional Governor/Acting Regional Governor, ordered petitionereassume her former position as Education Supervisoand revoked the ARMM Executive Secretarys Resoludated 24 December 1998.

13 However, on 1 August 2

the same Acting Regional Governor issued the folloorder:

In the interest of the service and considering the neeobserve fairness and justice in dealing with our personyou are hereby directed to implement the above mentioresolution rendered by the Regional Solicitor GeneraMarch 17, 1999.

As such, you are likewise directed to maintain STAQUO on the part of Ms. SAADEA P. TAHER, EducaSupervisor II with permanent status duly approved byCivil Service Commission.
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This Memorandum Order takes effective [sic] immediatelynd superscede/ revokes all previous order inconsistenterewith.

14

However, on 4 August 2000, ARMM Regional GovernorMisuari issued a Memorandum

15 to the TESDA-ARMM,

rdering petitioners reinstatement, presumably inccordance with CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and CSC-

ARMM directive dated 26 July 2000.

Respondent thus filed a Petition for Prohibition before the

Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, claiming that she haso other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as she standso suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if she isemoved from the office which she has held for more thanve years.

16On 21 August 2000, the trial court issued a writ

f preliminary injunction commanding ARMM RegionalGovernor Misuari and the TESDA-ARMM to desist fromarrying out the said Memorandum.

17

On 16 October 2001, the trial court rendered the assailedDecision,

18 holding that the 04 August 2000 Memorandum

f the ARMM Regional Governor could no longer bemplemented because the CSC resolutions ordering

etitioners reinstatement, relied upon by ARMM RegionalGovernor Misuari, were superseded by the CSC resolutionsnding petitioner on AWOL and dropping her from theayroll. According to the trial court, this controversy has toe resolved by the CSC, which has the exclusive jurisdictionver disciplinary cases and cases involving personnelctions affecting employees in the public service. The trialourt thus ordered:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the respondents are orderedo cease and desist in prosecuting or carrying out the effectsf the August 4, 2000 [M]emorandum and for respondents toease and desist from continuance of any act which will be

n violation of the right of petitioner with respect to theubject matter of the action or proceeding so as not toender the judgment ineffectual.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the motionwas denied on 31 January 2002.

20

On 31 October 2000, petitioner moved for the issuance of awrit of execution of CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 (orderinger reinstatement to her former office). CSC issued

Resolution No. 01-0132,21

dated 15 January 2001, orderinghe concerned officials of the DECS-ARMM to implement

CSC Resolution No. 96-3101.

Meanwhile, on 22 May 2002, the CSC, acting on the letter ofhe Regional Solicitor General of the ARMM regarding themplementation of CSC Resolution No. 96-3101, issuedResolution No. 020743.

22According to the CSC, it issued

Resolution No. 01-0132 because petitioner did not inform theCommission that she had been declared on AWOL andropped from the rolls since 24 December 1998.

23ARMM

Regional Governor Misuaris Memorandum dated 04 August000 ordering petitioners reinstatement is rendered mootnd academic because prior to the said date she waslready separated from the service, the CSC added.24

Petitioner now comes before us, arguing that a wrprohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation ofdirective of the ARMM Governor implementing the CResolution reinstating her to her former position.

25

claims that the trial court gravely erred in taking cognizaof the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, and fato observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, considethat the case, as declared by the trial court itself, invopersonnel actions which are within the CSCs exclu

jurisdiction.26

In addition, petitioner contends that by vof the disapproval of her appointment, responde

appointment to Education Supervisor II was invalidated,thus both of them are automatically restored to the former positions by operation of law. She further claimsthe AWOL Order of the CSC was previously revoked oJuly 2000 by then Acting Regional Governor Matalam,that the same Memorandum revoked the 24 December 1Memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Atty. RandolpParcasio.

27 Finally, petitioner argues that it is not kn

which position she was being declared AWOLwhenwas declared on AWOL, she was ordered to revert toformer position as Education Supervisor II, which poswas already occupied by respondent who refused to the position, and she was also prevented from functioninDirector II.

28

In her Comment,29

respondent claims that since no apwas taken from the AWOL order, it has become final executory and thus cannot be revoked by mere issuanca Memorandum.

30She argues that the doctrine of prim

jurisdiction does not apply to the case a quo becauraises a purely legal question, that is, the proprietpetitioners assumption of her former position despite habeen declared on AWOL and dropped from the rolls. Duthe urgency of the situation and the immediacy ofproblem, recourse through the same officials who issuedassailed memoranda would be futile.

31

The Court is thus tasked to resolve the following issues:

1. Whether a writ of prohibition lies to enjoin the directivthe ARMM Governor to reinstate petitioner to the positioEducation Supervisor II despite petitioners having bdeclared on AWOL and dropped from the roll;

2. Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance opetition for prohibition and whether the filing of the petfor prohibition violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

3. Whether the AWOL order against petitioner valid

respondents occupancy of the position of EducaSupervisor II;

4. Who, as between petitioner and respondent, is entitlethe position of Education Supervisor II.

The petition must be denied.

Petitioner cannot be reinstated by mere

directive of the ARMM Regional Governor
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The assailed Memorandum issued by ARMM RegionalGovernor is reproduced in full, thus:

TO : TESDAARMM

Cotabato City

SUBJECT : Implementation of CSC Resolution No. 96-3101,nd CSC-ARMM Directive Order Dated July 26, 2000

DATE : August 4, 2000

n the highest interest of public service and consistent withhe legal and constitutional precept of promoting socialustice, the above-captioned resolutions are herebymplemented.

As such, you are hereby directed to re-instate ANDABAI T.ARIMAO to her former position as Education Supervisor IIursuant to the foregoing resolution and the provisions of

Sec. 13, Rule VI, Book V of E.O. No, 292 which are furtheruttressed by the series of communication of CSC Regional

Office No. XII dated September 10, 1998, October 20, 1998,

November 03, 1998 and December 10, 1998 and directiverder of CSC-ARMM dated July 26, 2000 respectively.

This [M]emorandum shall take effect immediately and shallake precedence over all memoranda, orders and otherssuances [sic] inconsistent herewith.

Signed)

PROF. NUR P. MISUARI

Regional Governor32

Even a cursory look at the Memorandum shows that therder of petitioners reinstatement was made in reliance on,r in implementation of, CSC Resolution No. 96-3101 and

CSC-ARMM Directive Order dated 26 July 2000, both ofwhich ordained her reinstatement. However, these directiveselied upon by ARMM Regional Governor Misuari wereendered functus officioby no less than the CSC itself per its

Resolution No. 020743, which, as previously noted, ruledhat the TESDA-ARMM is not under legal obligation toeinstate petitioner because she was already dropped fromhe rolls effective 24 December 1998. CSC Resolution No.1-0132, ordering the implementation of CSC Resolution No.6-3101, was issued because petitioner purposely

oncealed and withheld from the CSC the information thathe had been declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls.

33

With Resolution No. 020743, CSC Resolution No. 01-0132was effectively revoked.

ikewise, with the finality of the AWOL order and her havingeen dropped from the rolls, petitioner legally lost her right tohe position of Education Supervisor II. In any case, she haslready received from the DECS-ARMM her salaries as

Education Supervisor II for the period October 1996 to 1997,r the period corresponding to the time the position was still

with the said department.34

Petitioner argues that the 24 December 1998 Memoranfinding her to be on AWOL was revoked and rendered mby subsequent issuances. We are not persuaded. Whiletrue that then Acting Regional Governor Matalam revothe 24 December 1998 order of the ARMM ExecSecretary, he recalled the revocation via his Memorandated 01 August 2006. Thus, the AWOL order datedDecember 1998 was in full force and effect when ARRegional Governor Misuari issued the assailed 04 Au2000 Memorandum.

Propriety of the Petition for Prohibition

The trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the petfor prohibition.

The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prean encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumptio

jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judtribunal. It is granted when it is necessary for the ordadministration of justice, or to prevent the use of the starm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, oput a stop to multiplicity of actions. Thus, for a party toentitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish

following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribucorporation, board or person exercising functions, judiciministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or personacted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with gabuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any oplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary coof law.

35

Under Republic Act No. 6734,36

executive power inARMM is vested in the Regional Governor, who has coof all the regional executive commissions, boards, bureand offices, and exercises general supervision over the government units within the Autonomous Region.

37

assailed Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Miswas presumably issued in the exercise of his powecontrol and supervision. However, by ordering reinstatement of petitioner to her former position based uan outdated CSC Resolution, despite the AWOL orderher being dropped from the rolls, ARMM Regional GoveMisuari acted with grave abuse of discretion, amountinexcess of jurisdiction.

Neither is the petition for prohibition before the trial cviolative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Said docprecludes a court from arrogating unto itself the authoriresolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is ini

lodged with an administrative body of special competencAn exception to this rule is when the issue raised is a pulegal question, well within the competence and

jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative

agency.39

In the instant case, the legal question of whea memorandum of the ARMM Governor, ordering reinstatement of an employee declared AWOL and dropfrom the rolls, was issued in excess of jurisdiction is a lquestion which should be resolved by the courts. Forsame reason that the issues to be resolved in this casepurely legal in nature, respondent need not abide bydoctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Besides, to allow the matter to remain with the Office of
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14/49

All the same, however, respondent cannot continue hernauthorized occupancy, notwithstanding the fact that theosition of Education Supervisor II has been vacant since999. Absent any showing that she has been reappointed tohe position after petitioner was declared AWOL andropped from the rolls, respondent cannot lay a valid claimhereto.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision andOrder dated 16 October 2001 and 31 January 2002,espectively, of the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 14

re AFFIRMED.

Respondent is ordered to VACATE the position of EducationSupervisor II, TESDA-ARMM, and turn over to petitioner themoluments she received for the position from 17 October998 to 17 March 1999.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


15/49

G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991

LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D.MENZON, petitioner,s.

LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR, LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA inhis capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leytend Head of SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and

Leyte Provincial Treasurer FLORENCIO LUNA,espondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of theCourt dated August 28, 1990 which initially denied theetition for certiorari and mandamus filed by then Acting

Vice-Governor of Leyte, Aurelio D. Menzon. In the August 28esolution, the Court stated that Mr. Menzon cannotuccessfully assert the right to be recognized as Acting Vice-

Governor and, therefore, his designation was invalid. In thismotion, the primary issue is the right to emoluments whilectually discharging the duties of the office.

The facts of the case are as follows: On February 16, 1988,y virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed inhe province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Governmentuis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E.

Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte.

On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, aenior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was alsoesignated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-

Governor for the province of Leyte.

The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator AlbertoRomulo on March 29, 1988.

On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U.Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of theDepartment of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., aso the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act ashe Vice-Governor of Leyte.

n his reply letter dated June 22, 1989, Undersecretaryacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337 has norovision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-

Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointmentf the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is notecessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily

erforming the functions of the Governor, could concurrentlyssume the functions of both offices.

As a result of the foregoing communications between TenteU. Quintero and Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the SangguniangPanlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989,ssued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid theppointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor ofeyte. The pertinent portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREAS, the circumstances obtaining atpresent in the Office of the Vice-Governor isthat there is no permanent (sic) nor a

vacancy in said office. The Honorable

Leopoldo E. Petilla assumed the Officthe Vice-Governor after he took his oaoffice to said position.

WHEREAS, it is the duty of the membethe Board not only to take cognizance oaforesaid official communication of Undersecretary, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr.also to uphold the law.

WHEREAS, on motion of the Honor

Macario R. Esmas, Jr., duly secondedthe Honorable Rogelio L. Granados andHonorable Renato M. Rances.

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved nrecognize Honorable Aurelio D. Menzo

Acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. (Rollo, p

The petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting Regional Counsel, Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarificafrom Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. regardingJune 22, 1989 opinion.

On July 12, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar reand explained his opinion. The pertinent portion of the lreads:

This has reference to your letter dated 10, 1989, requesting for clarification ofletter to Provincial Administrator TenteQuintero dated June 22, 1989, which stin substance, that "there is no succesprovided for in case of temporary vacanthe office of the vice-governor and thadesignation of a temporary vice-governnot necessary.

We hold the view that the designaextended by the Secretary of LGovernment in favor of one of Sangguniang Panlalawigan MembersLeyte to temporarily discharge the powand duties of the vice-governor duringpendency of the electoral controversy inOffice of the Governor, does not contrathe stand we have on the matter. The that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan memwas temporarily designated to performfunctions of the vice-governor could noconsidered that the Sangguniang memsucceeds to the office of the latter, forbasic that designation is merely imposition of additional duties to performed by the designee in addition toofficial functions attached to his ofFurthermore, the necessity of designatinofficial to temporarily perform the funcof a particular public office, would depenthe discretion of the appointing authoritythe prevailing circumstances in a given and by taking into consideration the interest of public service.


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On the basis of the foregoing andconsidering that the law is silent in case oftemporary vacancy, in the Office of the Vice-Governor, it is our view that the peculiarsituation in the Province of Leyte, where theelectoral controversy in the Office of theGovernor has not yet been settled, calls forthe designation of the Sangguniang Memberto act as vice-governor temporarily. (Rollo,

p. 31)

n view, of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar,he Regional Director of the Department of Local

Government, Region 8, Resurreccion Salvatierra, on July 17,989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor ofeyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting the latter that

Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan bemodified accordingly. The letter states:

In view thereof, please correct previousactions made by your office and those of theSangguniang Panlalawigan which may havetended to discredit the validity of Atty.

Aurelio Menzon's designation as acting vice-

governor, including the payment of hissalary as Acting Vice-Governor, if he wasdeprived of such. (Rollo, p. 32)

On August 3, 1989, the Regional Director wrote anotheretter to Acting-Governor Petilla, reiterating his earlierequest.

Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governornd the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct

Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitionerhe emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.

Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner filed before thisCourt a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petitionought the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for theayment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-

Governor of Leyte.

n the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship ofeyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimedhe Governor of the province of Leyte.

During the pendency of the petition, more particularly onMay 16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florenciouna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary ascting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00,or the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting

Vice-Governor.

On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filedy Aurelio D. Menzon.

On September 6, 1990, respondent Leopoldo Petilla, byirtue of the above resolution requested Governorarrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the provincef Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which heeceived while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motionreconsideration of our resolution. The motion prayed thaCourt uphold the petitioner's right to receive the salaryemoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Govewhile he was acting as such.

The petitioner interposes the following reason for allowance of the motion for reconsideration:

THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLEDTHE EMOLUMENTS FOR HIS SERVI

RENDERED AS DESIGNATED ACTVICE-GOVERNOR UNDER PRINCIPLES OF GOOD FAITH. SIMJUSTICE AND EQUITY.

The controversy basically revolves around two issuesWhether or not there was a vacancy?; and 2) Whether othe Secretary of Local Government has the authoritmake temporary appointments?

The respondents argue that there exists no vacancy inOffice of the Vice-Governor which requires the appointmof the petitioner. They further allege that if indeed there a need to appoint an acting Vice-Governor, the poweappoint is net vested in the Secretary of Local Governm

Absent any provision in the Local Government Code onmode of succession in case of a temporary vacancy inOffice of the Vice-Governor, they claim that this constitan internal problem of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was thus for it solely to resolve.

The arguments are of doubtful validity.

The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There ivacancy whenever the office is occupied by a lequalified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacwhen there is no person lawfully authorized to assumeexercise at present the duties of the office. (seeStockinState, 7 Ind. 326, cited in Mechem. A Treatise on the LawPublic Offices and Officers, at p. 61)

Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it canreadily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor wasvacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor LeopPetilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes oflaw, the office to which he was elected was left barren legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the officthe Vice-Governor.

There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Penotwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Govecontinued to simultaneously exercise the

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