Document of

The World Bank

Report No: ICR2800

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(TF-095120)

ON A

MULTI DONOR TRUST FUND - SOUTH SUDAN (MDTF-SS)

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$10.0 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

FOR A

GENDER SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

June 12, 2013

Post Conflict & Social Development Practice Group (AFTCS)Sudan Country DepartmentAfrica Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective February 2013)

Currency Unit = South Sudanese Pound1.00 SSP = US$0.29

US$1.00 = 3.50 SSP

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAFOD Catholic Agency for Overseas DevelopmentCBO Community-based organizationCGA Comprehensive Gender AssessmentCPA Comprehensive Peace AgreementDG Director GeneralESAF Environmental and Social Management FrameworkESIA Environmental and Social Impact AssessmentESMP Environmental and Social Management PlanFA&P Finance, Administration and PlanningFM Financial ManagementFMS Financial Management SystemFP Focal PersonsFPP Final Project PaperGA Grant AgreementGLA Grant Letter AgreementGoSS Government of South SudanGSDP Gender Support and Development ProjectIA Implementing AgencyICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportIFR Interim Financial StatementISN Interim Strategy NoteISR Implementation Status and Results ReportJAM Joint Assessment MissionM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMA Monitoring AgentMDTF-SS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern SudanMGCSW Ministry of Gender, Child and Social WelfareMOA Memorandum of AgreementMTR Mid-Term ReviewNGOs Non-Governmental OrganizationsPCU Project Coordination UnitPDO Project Development ObjectivesPFM Public Financial Management

PFMU Project Financial Management UnitRF Results FrameworkSDG Sudanese PoundSPSC Sub-project Selection CommitteeSPLM Sudan People's Liberation MovementTA Technical AssistanceTF Trust Fund(s)UN United NationsUSD United States DollarsVfM Value for MoneyWA Withdrawal ApplicationsWB The World BankWFP World Food Program

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Bella Bird

Sector Manager: Ian Bannon

Project Team Leader: Yasmin Tayyab

ICR Team Leader: Yasmin Tayyab

COUNTRYSouth Sudan Gender Support & Development Project

CONTENTS

Data SheetA. Basic InformationB. Key DatesC. Ratings SummaryD. Sector and Theme CodesE. Bank StaffF. Results Framework AnalysisG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRsH. RestructuringI. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design...................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................ ..... 53. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................... 114. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome. .................... ..... 165. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................ ........ 166. Lessons Learned ..................................... ......... 197. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors ........... 20Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ................................. 22Annex 2. Outputs by Component ............................... ..... 23Annex 3. Efficiency Related Analyses ................................. 28Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes....... 29Annex 5. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results. .......... ............. 30Annex 6. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................... 31

MAP

A. Basic Information

Gender SupportCountry: South Sudan Project Name: Development Project

(GSDP)

Project ID: P115717 L/C/TF Numbers: TF095120

ICR Date: 06/12/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Government of SouthLending Instrument: Grantee: Sudan oSo

Sudan (GoSS)Original Total USD 10.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 9.02MCommitment:

Revised Amount: USD 9.02M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies:Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare

Co-financiers and Other External Partners: BORR, MDSS

B. Key DatesRevised / Actual

Process Date Process Original Date es)Date(s)

Concept 01/15/2009 Effectiveness: 11/16//2009Review:

06/29/2011Appraisal: 02/13/2009 Restructuring(s): 06/28/201206/28/2012

Approval: 08/26/2009 Mid-term 05/18/2011Review:

Closing: 06/29/2011 12/31/2012

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICROutcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Grantee Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Moderately ModeratelyQuality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory

Quality of Moderately Implementing ModeratelySupervision: Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory

Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately

Performance: : Satis factor ]Perf orman ce: Unsatis factoryy

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Indicators QAG Assessments RatingPerformance (if any)

Potential Problem Qlty at EntryProject at any time No (QEA): None(Yes/No):

Problem Project at any No Quality oftime (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA):

DO rating before ModeratelyClosing/Inactive status: Satisfactory Qaiy o riiafAta

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 70Micro- and SME finance 30

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Gender 100

E. Bank StaffPositions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli K. Ezekwesili

Country Director: Bella Deborah Mary Bird Kenichi Ohashi

Sector Manager: Jan Bannon Jan Bannon

Project Team Leader: Yasmin Tayyab Yasmin Tayyab

ICR Team Leader: Yasmin Tayyab Yasmin Tayyab

ICR Primary Author: Cliff Burkley

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)Achieve immediate peace dividends for targeted women in Southern Sudan through theprovision of: (a) improvements in access to existing economic opportunities, and (b)support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approvingauthority)No Change.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual ValueValues (from Achieved atIndicator Baseline Value appro Revised Target cmpletapproval Values Completion or

documents) Target Years

% of target women who perceive an increase in income as a result of projectinterventions

Valuequantitative or N/A 20% 1,527 40% or 2,854Qualitative)Date achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012

Based on beneficiary survey, interviews with focal persons, chairpersons of CBOs andComents monitoring visits by project staff. Final number of women benefitting from the project(incl. % is 7,134 based on field visits, interviews with CBOs, focal persons and chairpersons ofachievement) women's organizations and monitoring reports.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)Original Target Formally Actual Value

Values (from Achieved atIndicator Baseline Value appro Revised Target cmpletapproval Values Completion or

documents) Target Years

Indicator 1: % of target women receiving training in non-farm income generating activitiesValue(quantitative N/A 20% 1,527 18% or 1,267or Qualitative)Date achieved 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012Comments(incl. %achievement)Indicator 2: 30% of target women receiving training in agricultural production activitiesValue(quantitative N/A 30% 2,290 29% or 2,037or Qualitative)IDate achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012Comments(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 3: % of target women utilizing at least one new agricultural production technology orpractice due to project interventions

Value(quantitative N/A 30% 2,290 29% or 2,037or Qualitative)Date achieved 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012Comments(incl. % 2,037 women out of 7,134 or 29%achievement)

Indicator 4: % of target women who perceive an increase in crop yields or harvests due to project

interventions

Value(quantitative N/A 20% 1,527 33% or 2,366or Qualitative)Date achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments(incl. % 2,366 women out of 7,134 or 33%achievement)

Indicator 5: % of sub-projects that will continue post project closure activities

Value(quantitative N/A 10% 11 40% or 44or Qualitative)[Date achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments(incl. % Total number of sub-projects is 108achievement)

Indicator 6: % of women joining associations

Value(quantitative N/A 10% 713 28% or 2,000or Qualitative)Date achieved 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 7: 1% of collective action among women in project sites

Value(quantitative N/A 10% 10 500% 520or Qualitative)Date achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments(incl. % Assumes no collective action prior to project for lack of dataachievement)

Indicator 8: Interim prefabricated buildings, furniture and equipment installed

Value(quantitative 0 Yes N/A Yesor Qualitative)Date achieved I March 2009Comments(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 9: Construction of new Ministry building completed

Value(quantitative 0 Yes N/A Noor Qualitative)Date achieved 06/29/2011 12/31/2012

Comments(incl. % At the project closing the construction of the building is 31%achievement)

Indicator 10: Country gender assessment completed

Value(quantitative 0 Yes N/A Yesor Qualitative)

Date achieved 06/29/2011 05/2011

Comments(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 11: Completion of capacity building training program

Value(quantitative 0 Yes N/A Yesor Qualitative)Date achieved 1 06/29/2011

Comments(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 12: [Number of GoSS and state ministry staff receiving training

Value(quantitative 0 52 N/A 41or Qualitative)Date achieved 06/29/2011Comments(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 13: Number of CBO participants in project training

Value(quantitative N/A N/A N/A 3,395or Qualitative)Date achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012Comments 3,304 participants in agriculture and non-farm sub-project training and 91 participants(incl. % in project-conducted trainingachievement)

Indicator 14: [Number of monitoring reports submitted by approved sub-projects

Value 10 statesValu N/AN/A 0 sttes 8 states submitted(quantitative N/A N/A submittedor Qualitative) quarterly reports quarterly reports

IDate achieved 1 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012Comments Quarterly reports from CBOs were replaced by monitoring reports from focal persons(incl. % because of reporting challenges.achievement)

Indicator 15: [Number of supervision visits to approved project sitesValue 83 of the 108 sub-(quantitative N/A N/A N/A p s

or Qulitaive)projects visitedor Qualitative) _____________________

Date achieved 06/29/2011 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments Outbreak of violence in some states prevented supervision visits.(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 16: Number of project staff onboard within 6 months of effectiveness

Value(quantitative N/A 7 N/A 7or Qualitative)Date achieved June 2010 June 2010

Comments All project staff onboard within 6 months of effectiveness. M & E Officer replaced in(incl.% Feb 2011.achievement)

Indicator 17: [Number of sub-projects receiving full disbursement of grants

Value(quantitative N/A N/A 94 94or Qualitative)Date achieved I June 2010 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments Grants for 14 CBOs were cancelled due to non-performance(incl. %achievement)

Indicator 18: [Number of sub-projects complete by 2012Value(quantitative N/A N/A 94 94or Qualitative)[Date achieved I I June 2010 05/2011 12/31/2012

Comments(incl. %achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

ActualDate ISR Ata

No. Ate DO IP Disbursements(USD millions)

1 03/27/2011 Moderately Satisfactoryl Satisfactory 5.332 10/14/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.203 10/16/2012 Moderately SatisfactoryModerately Satisfactory 8.664 02/04/2013 Moderately SatisfactoryModerately Satisfactory 8.78

H. Restructuring

ISR Ratings Amount

Restructuring Board at Disbursed at Reason for RestructuringDate(s) Approved Restructurin Restructurin & Key Changes Made

PDO Change g g in USDDO IP millions

06/29/2011 N IClosing date extensionAmendment of GA

06/28/2012 (additional financing) andextension of closing date

I. Disbursement Profile

Original ---- Formally Revised -- Actualio -

6 ------------------------------------------------- ----

4-

0/2-i

- N m -a rY Y o o o Y Y Y Y Y Y N N a Y

oCI - - - - - -o oooooo

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1. The Gender Support and Development Project (GSDP) aimed to provideimmediate peace dividends to women's community based organizations in South Sudanfollowing the decades-long war. This was to be achieved by improving women's accessto economic opportunities and supporting the Ministry of Gender, Child and SocialWelfare (MGCSW) to develop gender policies and strategies. A US$10.0 million grantwas provided by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) for theproject.

1.1 Context at Appraisal

2. The end of the twenty-year war ushered a period of challenging transformationand rebuilding for South Sudan. The civil war between the Government of Sudan and theSudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended in January 2005 with the signing ofthe Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Following the adoption of the CPA, theGovernment of South Sudan (GoSS) was established. Coming out of civil war, the newlyestablished GoSS faced tremendous development challenges from the outset, including,inter-alia, a virtual lack of government structures and institutions, a severe lack of basicinfrastructure and services, limited human and institutional capacity, and a weakeconomic base. In March 2005, the United Nations, the World Bank, the Government ofSudan, and the SPLM conducted a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and prepared areport presenting the reconstruction and development requirements for the consolidationof peace, and for attaining broad-based growth, poverty reduction, and sustained humandevelopment aligned towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The JAMlaid the groundwork in developing the priorities after the CPA.

3. The civil war had a devastating effect on development in the South. The JAMdescribed the country as follows: "Key education and health indicators, such as child andmaternal mortality and primary enrolment, are among the worst in the world.Infrastructure is virtually non-existent, with no paved roads outside the main urbancenters ... " Poverty is widespread, estimated at 50%. Internal displacement wasestimated to be close to half of the approximately 8 million population of the country.Isolation, underdevelopment and absence of basic services characterize most of thecountry. Women and children are among the most severely affected by the war. The ratioof adult women to adult men is 2:1; only 1 in 10 women is literate; on average, womenare poorer than men due to inequities in access to productive assets. Household, familycare and income generation responsibilities fell to women left behind in war-torn areas.

4. Given this harsh environment, women in South Sudan find themselves trapped atthe center of a vicious cycle of extreme poverty and household vulnerability. Theirtraditional role makes them responsible for providing food for their households, with nocontrol over, nor access to the resources needed. Yet they are expected to provide food,water and health care for the family members. While women are the principal producersin the field, they rarely control the output; and due to their time, poverty and other

1

mobility constraints, they also find it difficult to access the few existing local marketopportunities or make decisions on how the money is spent.

5. Agriculture comprises 67% of the economy, a mainstay of livelihood in thecountry. Agriculture is subsistence in nature with low outputs. Production potential isgenerally high, given the soil and climatic conditions. However, disruption brought aboutby the war and lack of access to needed inputs, technology and tools, constrainsproduction, especially by women who depend mostly on agriculture and are responsiblefor household food security. In this context, women, the major contributors of agricultureproduction, are left deprived of the much needed technology and resources required toimprove cultivation practices and thus improve the well-being of the family.

6. The CPA created high expectations for quick peace dividends among the peopleof South Sudan to reverse the impact of the war. People displaced by the war and theones who chose to return added pressure for quick gains. With the urgent need for basicservices however, are enormous challenges of institutional capacity constraints ingovernment. The establishment of a new government, practically from scratch magnifiedthis challenge, potentially crowding out the equally important priorities for basic servicedelivery. Among the newly created Ministries is the Ministry of Gender, Child and SocialWelfare (MGCSW); a representation of the commitment of GoSS to the continuedinvolvement of women in the task of rebuilding and a manifestation of the results of theJAM that culminated in the Oslo Conference of 2005. MGCSW was essentially setupwith a skeletal, top heavy staff with no technical skills or experience to provideleadership to its mandate and institutional structure, with no physical space and a limitedbudget to function as a ministry.

7. Progress at the national policy level in responding to the stark, gender-basedrealities outlined above was modest, and mostly donor led. Gender specific developmentresponses and strategic interventions were diffused, fragmented and uncoordinated, withlittle or no direct planning, monitoring or sector oversight by MGCSW. This reality wascompounded by the absence of a national gender policy and strategy, and a completeabsence of capacity for planning and implementation at the state and county levels thatcould facilitate gender-sensitive planning and the roll out of gender programs in asystematic and coordinated way.

8. Since the CPA, GoSS, donor partners, UN agencies and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) have funded women's activities. GoSS has allocatedapproximately US$0.4 million every year, from 2006 to 2008, to the 10 States forwomen's activities and projects. Another US$120,000 was allocated yearly for dedicatedactivities for women and children, such as women's month celebration and conferences.In 2009, approximately US$600,000 was budgeted to support women's economicempowerment activities. Donor and NGO support was made available for gendermainstreaming activities and other stand-alone activities for women.

9. These were however mostly in the form of one-off, stand-alone operations withlimited impact. In 2009, the MDTF-SS and World Bank agreed to support GoSS to

2

develop a project to ensure the participation of women in the development of SouthSudan through GSDP. The project provides support to the Government in response to therequest for immediate peace dividends for women. The capacity needs of MGCSW werealso addressed through support to the development of gender policies, training programand financing of the construction of office space for the newly established Ministry. Thepreparation team, knowing full well, the unavailability of contractors in Juba, the lack ofexpertise within MGCSW to supervise the civil works, the short time frame for projectcompletion and the rising cost of materials due to inflation, was hesitant to include a civilworks component in the project. The construction of the Ministry building wasreluctantly included in the project under pressure from the Minister of MGCSW anddonors.

10. The project was prepared under OP/BP 8.00 directives using an EmergencyRecovery Grant instrument due to the post-conflict status of South Sudan and in keepingwith the need for speed, flexibility and simplicity.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

11. The PDO is to achieve immediate peace dividends for targeted women in SouthSudan, through the provision of: (a) improvements in access to the existing economicopportunities and (b) support to the Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies andstrategies. The key performance indicator is stated as: "% of target women who perceiveincrease in income as a result of project interventions."

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, andreasons/justification

12. The PDO was not changed throughout the duration of the project.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

13. The project was expected to benefit women, women's groups and community-based organizations (CBOs), originally in 5 States, but at the request of the Minister thecoverage was expanded to include all 10 States to follow GoSS' policy on equity despitethe severe implementation constraints at the States' level. Investments in capacitybuilding, training and research addressed needs of MWCSW, its staff and staff of theSocial Development (SD) Ministries in all 10 States.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

14. The project had three components: (i) Economic Empowerment of Women (US$4million); (ii) Construction of a Building for the MGCSW (US$3.1 million); and (iii)Institutional Development of MGCSW (US$2.9 million).

15. Component 1: Economic Empowerment of Women (US$4 million), providedassistance in empowering vulnerable women and improving their economic opportunitiesthrough the implementation of income-generating sub-projects in the 10 States. Proposals

3

from women's groups from the 10 States were funded based on a transparent procedureand criteria developed and agreed at a stakeholder workshop during Appraisal andreflected in the Operations Manual.

16. Component 2: Construction of a Building for MGCSW (US$3.1 million),financed the construction of a building and the establishment of temporary prefabricatedfacilities to house some MGCSW staff and project consultants.

17. Component 3: Institutional Development of MGCSW (US$2.9 million),supported the strengthening of human and institutional capacity of MGCSW and of theparticipating staff from the SD State Ministries to monitor and provide technicalassistance to sub-projects and develop a gender policy and strategy, with the followingthree subcomponents:

* Subcomponent 3 (a). Studies. A Country Gender Assessment (CGA) was financed tocompile, review and analyze existing and on-going work by various agencies on theeconomic, social, legal and traditional environment of women for policyrecommendations.

* Subcomponent 3 (b). Institutional Development of MGCSW and SD State Ministries.A capacity assessment and training program was supported to address MGCSW's andStates' needs to prepare them to monitor CBO's sub-projects and to mainstreamgender activities and implement direct interventions for gender equality and women'sempowerment in the future. This subcomponent also included setting up of the ProjectCoordination Unit in MGCSW, led by the Director General Finance Administration &Planning (DG FA&P) as project coordinator and staffed with three internationalexperts: Financial Management Specialist (FMS), Procurement Specialist (PS), andMonitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Specialist to support the management of projectimplementation.

* Subcomponent 3 (c). Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting. The establishment of anM&E system within MGCSW and the preparation of regular evaluation reports weresupported under this subcomponent.

1.6 Revised Components

18. No changes were made to the project Components throughout its duration.

1.7 Other significant changes

19. A one year no-cost extension of the project Closing Date from June 29, 2011 toJune 29, 2012 was approved in June 2011 to: (i) complete transfers of funds to CBOs andallow them sufficient time to undertake sub-project activities; and (ii) complete theprocurement of materials and equipment and construction of the building for the Ministry.

4

20. A second restructuring was carried out in June 2012 to extend the project ClosingDate and provide additional financing of US$546,795 for completion of the ongoingactivities under Component 2 (Construction of the Building). The need for restructuringfor additional financing and extension of Closing Date was in response to the escalatingcosts of construction material due to inflation, miscalculation of funds required forsupervision consultants, and procurement delays. The six-month extension, from June 29,2012 to December 31, 2012, brought the cumulative extension to 18 months and the totalproject cost to US$10,546,795. The change in Component costs is presented in Annex 1.

21. The results framework (RF) was revised during the project Mid-term Review totake into account new knowledge of development problems and local conditions. Abeneficiary survey, complemented by information received from project monitoring staffand MDTF Monitoring Agents generated significant data to revise the data and indicatorsin the RF, presented in Annex 2.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

22. Project Preparation. The Peace Accord raised expectations among the people ofSouth Sudan for immediate dividends. The limited economic opportunities, low capacityand lack of infrastructure and services posed challenges in breaking the cycle of povertyand inequity.

23. Absence of capacity of a nascent Ministry. MGCSW is among the agenciescreated following the CPA. At the time of preparation, it was still in the process ofrecruiting staff and organizing itself. It had minimal or no expertise nor experience inmanaging projects or developing policies and strategies. At the time of appraisal, it didnot have a physical space of its own; staff had a few offices within the Ministry ofHealth.

24. Given the absence of capacity, a smaller and limited coverage - not including theconstruction Component - would have been a prudent decision. The ambitious coverageof all 10 States and the inclusion of the building were however a result of strongrepresentation by Government, citing equity to allow all 10 States to benefit; and thepressure from the Minister to provide office space to the Ministry staff. Although theproject aimed to involve State officials in implementation support and monitoring, andincluded training of State officials in gender mainstreaming and project administration,State involvement was limited to State focal points who were provided with monetaryincentives to undertake project-related activities. Local governments remained extremelyweak despite the capacity being built at the center and State levels. The extensivecoverage and the construction of the building stretched the already limited capacity ofMGCSW, including that of the Housing Ministry that was to have played a key role inthe building construction.

5

25. Absence of a national gender policy and capacity for implementation. TheJAM and the resulting Oslo Conference cited the need to improve the plight of women,especially those affected by the war. The Government had submitted a draft NationalGender Policy for adoption by Parliament to address these aspirations in the JAM.However, the policy was not adopted for lack of evidence-based strategies andrecommendations. Lack of coherence resulted in a number of stand-alone initiatives forwomen, dispersed with ineffectual strategy and outcomes. Taking this into account, thedesign included a Component to support the preparation of a comprehensive genderassessment and to build the capacity of the Ministry in implementing gender programs.

26. Limited opportunities and diversification of women's sources of householdincomes. Although data is lacking, anecdotal evidence suggests that women bore theburden of providing for their families during the conflict (Section 1.1), relying mostly onsubsistence agriculture. Lack of capital, skills and mobility hampered their ability todiversify sources of livelihood. The Government was keen to develop the economicempowerment Component to address these gaps. A stakeholder workshop duringpreparation confirmed the need and endorsed the Component. While initially focusing onfinancing the expansion of ongoing agriculture activities, the workshop opened theeligible activities to non-agricultural income generating projects and advised the projectteam to allow for flexibility in the selection of sub-projects. In hindsight, it would havebeen appropriate to only focus on ongoing agriculture activities where chances of successare greater given the country context. An analysis of sub-projects indicates that non-traditional and new activities tended to experience more difficulties in accessingmaterials and in operating new technologies.

27. Assurances from the Housing Ministry. Apprehensions regarding the lack ofcapacity and experience with respect to the construction Component were allayed byassurances from the Ministry of Housing that it would take an active role in theconstruction and that designs were available for the building. Due to the Ministry ofHousing's high volume of construction and re-building projects in the country, theparticipation of the Ministry was limited to design approval. Even this was delayed. Theproject did not provide for an engineer to oversee this Component and had to rely on theprocurement specialist and the engineering consultants for oversight.

28. Building on Recent Programs. Past donor and GoSS funded programs in thecountry informed the design of Component 1. GoSS has been providing resources,although small, for the economic empowerment of women to the 10 States from 2006 to2008 (approximately $40,000 to each State) for livelihood projects. Various donors alsoprovided support targeting women and children.

29. Risks and Mitigation. The risk assessment indicated that the project would face anumber of risks and classified the overall project risk as High. Risks identified included:fiduciary risks, stability of the peace and insecurity, a nascent Ministry as implementerwith no expertise, newly established state governments with no experience furtherexacerbated by increased demand for their time and skills by other projects, the lack ofexperienced NGOs and CBOs, and poor access to markets and inaccessibility of markets

6

due to lack of transport and roads. Fiduciary risks were addressed by putting in place aframework for mitigation, including monitoring actual expenditures by a MDTFMonitoring Agent (MA) and management of the accounting system by the ProjectFinancial Management Unit (PFMU) at the Finance Ministry. Capacity risks were to beaddressed through the institutional development Component of the project, hiring ofinternational specialists to assist the Ministry to manage the project, participation andsupport of other more capable Ministries (e.g., Ministry of Housing) for the constructionComponent, and the competitive selection of NGOs as sub-project grantees.

2.2 Implementation

30. The project became effective on November 14, 2009. Despite capacity constraintsand delays, Components 1 and 3 commenced in a satisfactory manner. Component 2 onthe building construction, however, started slowly. As the operations progressed, anumber of factors affected project implementation: security concerns, inaccessibility ofsub-project sites and grantees, absence of banks to transfer funds, inability of CBOs toproduce documents and reports, and slow pace of monitoring and financial managementby the PCU despite the full time presence of international consultants. Meanwhile, theparticipation of other donors and NGOs in the preparation of the CGA was a positivecontributing factor.

31. The project faced challenges specific to a fragile and post-conflict State. Securityissues caused delays or failure in a number of sub-projects (23 out of 108) underComponent 1, and lack of security forced the relocation of a number of sub-projectactivities. Pilfering of sub-project inputs (seedlings, tools and fencing materials) was alsoa problem. These constraints also affected the ability of the Project Coordination Unit(PCU) to undertake monitoring and technical assistance visits. The lack of bankinginfrastructure delayed fund transfers to grantees for sub-project activities. Most banksoperated from Kenya and this delayed the remittance of funds. The remoteness and lackof access to some sub-project sites hindered monitoring and reporting. Experience andgood leadership among implementing CBOs, on the other hand, contributed to goodperformance. Interviews and surveys by the PCU confirmed that CBOs with dedicatedleaders and prior grant experience or those assisted by NGOs with experience working onsimilar projects tended to perform better.

32. A major concern during implementation was the delay in disbursing funds and thesubmission of accountability documents by CBO grantees, which was a trigger forrelease of second and third tranches of funds. The profile of a sample of CBOs who didnot submit timely accountability reports indicated that contrary to the sub-projectselection criteria of a functional and registered CBO, some of these were recently formed,did not have full-time leadership and activities selected were new types of activities andnot expansion of ongoing ones. Lack of security and ability in preparing reports andbookkeeping were also cited in interviews as among the likely causes of non-submissionof reports. To ease the difficulty of reporting back to the CBOs, the Bank recommendedto the PCU to equip the focal persons in the SD Ministries with motor bikes, laptops andmobile phones, but it failed on many occasions to implement that recommendation. Thelack of security and difficulty of access to many of the sub-projects due to remoteness,

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and the reluctance of the FM consultant to travel for supervision resulted in the limitedmonitoring of the sub-projects and delays in release of funds.

33. At the MTR in May 2011, concerns were raised on the slow progress in thesubmission of financial accountability reports by grantees and delays experienced in threemajor activities, namely the preparation of the CGA, the construction of the MGCSWbuilding and the supervision of construction. Delays in procurement of the three packageswere caused by capacity constraints in managing procurement activities and in thepreparation and approval of bidding documents. The approval of bidding documentsprepared by the authorities that oversee construction of public offices in South Sudantook six weeks.

34. The preparation of the CGA was under the responsibility of the DG, Gender ofMGCSW. However, she was disengaged and unable to provide guidance to this activity,causing the delay in its commencement. The Bank had requested that the DG play a moreactive role or that the CGA preparation be placed under another Ministry official. As aresult, the activity was transferred to the DG FA&P, which speeded up the preparation ofthe CGA.

35. To address the delays in the construction Component, a revised timetable wasagreed on the procurement activities and the project was extended. The Ministry in themeantime was provided an international engineering consultant funded by the JointDonor Team to provide technical advice to the Ministry on construction matters. Theengineer observed that the existing scope of works for the building was for two floors(ground and first) and shell for the third level. According to the Government, the actualcost of current scope of works was US$5.7 million instead of the bid price of US$2.9million. This bid price was based on an underestimated bill of quantities.

36. Revisiting the Results Framework (RF). An effort to reach out to beneficiariesand to create an information database was undertaken by the PCU prior to the MTR.This sought to address the absence of baseline data during project preparation. Theinformation gathered as well as the results of monitoring provided relevant information torevisit and revise the RF. This is presented in Annex 2.

2.3 M&E Design, Implementation and Utilization

37. M&E Design. The design for the M&E system and the self-reporting baselinequestionnaires had a very slow start due to poor performance of the M&E specialist whowas eventually removed. Her replacement took time and the M&E system, based on theRF, was finally established in the second year for the project. Implementing CBOs wererequired to include detailed benchmarks and provide information on baselines, againstwhich project progress would be measured. The M&E Specialist led monitoring ofComponent I while those of the other two Components were under the responsibility ofthe DG FA&P and concurrently the Project Coordinator.

38. M&E Implementation. From its inception, the M&E system of the project wasinadequate, the international consultant hired by the PCU was not up to the task, she was

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eventually removed and replaced by a relatively competent consultant. Information onsub-project grantees for a baseline was not available until the MTR. The self-reportingsurvey questionnaire of beneficiaries to gather data and assess the performance of theproject was designed just before the MTR. Information was collected using self-assessment forms, cross-checked by interviews and site visits. State Focal Persons (FPs),who were provided with logistical and financial support, were tapped to undertakemonitoring and reporting. Data generated was used to revise the RF.

39. Data verification for Component I was extremely challenging. Data collectedfrom different sources suffered from discrepancies making it difficult to determine theactual impact of the sub-projects. These discrepancies were likely due to lack ofinformation by some of the survey respondents. To compensate for the lack of data,verification of information was done using in-depth interviews with FPs, chairpersonsand beneficiaries. Site verification visits supplemented these interviews. Data collectedremains incomplete and actual figures for each of the indicators for Component I cannotbe determined. Financial monitoring of CBOs was especially problematic due to theirlack of skill in preparing reports, sub-project site inaccessibility and the laissez-faireattitude of the FMS in the PCU. However, the information collected, as verified appearsto be a good representation of the project's outputs and outcomes.

40. M&E Utilization. The M&E system became the basis of the project performancereport, allowing the PCU to review sub-project status and take corrective or follow-through action. The reports generated also became the basis for providing additionalsupport to performing CBOs. The M&E system is still being utilized by the Ministry butin a limited way after project completion. The data gathering and performancemonitoring have largely been left to the DG FA&P and one Ministry staff who aresaddled with other tasks. With the project's closing, support to FPs also ceased, makingthem less likely to do any monitoring work.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

41. Environmental and Social Safeguards. The project is classified as Category Bunder the Bank's OP4.01 Environmental Assessment. Sub-projects have been very smalland did not trigger any safeguards policies. The project had a negative menu, which didnot permit sub-projects with negative environmental impacts to be implemented.

42. The project triggered no social safeguards policies. Project grantees were alreadyengaged in productive activities and any expansion covered donated government lands.For the building construction, unoccupied land was procured by MGCSW and legalrequirements and consultations were undertaken prior to design.

43. Procurement. Overall procurement risk was rated High. An international PS washired to assist the PCU build the capacity of the Ministry by pairing up with itsprocurement staff. The PS, with the two other international specialists in the PCU, wasresponsible for the procurement of works, goods and services. There were significantdelays in the procurement process of goods and services, especially in undertaking the

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CGA and in the implementation of Component 2. The slow progress of construction andthe quality of supervision raised concerns during the donor Oversight Committeemeetings. At project closing, the construction of the building was only 31% completewith a shortage of funds of US$4.2 million to complete the building due to poor analysisof the scope of works by the supervision consultants and inability of the PS to providethem with timely and appropriate guidance.

44. Financial Management. FM and institutional systems were assessed as weak.Overall FM risk is rated as high but moderate in reality because of the mitigatingmeasures that were put in place, which included: (i) monitoring the actual expendituresby a Monitoring Agent; (ii) assigning the responsibility over accounting systems to theProject Financial Management Unit (PFMU) established for the MDTF-SS, under theMoFEP; and (iii) selecting an External Audit Agent (EAA) to provide independentassessment of financial statements. All Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) and the auditreport for the Financial Years 2010 and 2011 were prepared and submitted on time.Mitigating measures were implemented and contributed to the moderately satisfactoryrating of the FM aspect of the project.

45. A FMS was engaged by the PCU with the responsibility to carry out basicaccounting and financial monitoring of the three Components. The FMS's most importanttask was the monitoring of the accounts of 108 CBO grantees. This was most challenginggiven his reluctance to travel to the States until the very end. Of the 108 sub-projects,four were found to have misused the first tranche release. As a result, all subsequenttranches were reallocated to better-performing sub-projects and the four grantees wererequired to account for the funds.

46. The project's FM is Moderately Satisfactory. Overall, the FM system in placeis adequate. Out of the allocated amount of US$10,546,795, total disbursement stood at$8,999,899 (85%) at closing. There are still concerns regarding accountability of thegrants to CBOs. The first tranche for 95 of the 108 beneficiaries and the second tranchefor 47 have been accounted for. Out of the total of US$3,860,408 for sub-grants releasedto beneficiaries, US$579,966 (15%) remains to be accounted for. The Bank issued amemo in April 2013 to MGCSW requesting documentation for the missing funds.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

47. The project is not expected to continue into a next phase. However, it hascontributed immensely in: (i) creating and training a pool of women CBOs that have thepotential of becoming partners or conduits of future development assistance; (ii)developing experienced State-level actors at the Ministry of Social Development andstaff at the National level to continuously play a role in providing technical assistance andsupport to CBOs; and (iii) an improved policy environment to advance the status ofwomen.

48. Several development partners and commercial banks are expressing interest incontinuing to support well-performing CBOs. These include a planned project from the

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Government of the Netherlands for continued support to agriculture-based livelihoodprojects in Jonglei State, among others, as well as the provision of credit by a number ofbanks to women CBOs. A sizeable number of CBOs (44) are also continuing theiroperations and expanding them with revenues generated from the grants.

Table 1. Project inputs and functional sub-projectsItem No. ofprojects Quantity functional Percentage

Beehives 5 345 275 80%Fishponds 2 2 0 0%Goats 2 210 195 93%Grinding machines 8 19 12 63%Hand-dug wells 5 11 10 91%Ovens 2 8 8 100%Sewing machines 8 104 79 76%Water pumps 25 41 32 78%

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

49. Project objectives, design and implementation remain highly relevant to thedevelopment priorities of GoSS, and priorities under the Interim Strategy Note (ISN) ofthe Bank. Addressing gender imbalances is among the priorities of the ISN. The design ofthe project provided support in the analysis of gender issues in the country and helped theGovernment develop and implement policies and programs through sub-projects andanalytical work. Despite perceived improvements in the economic situation of womenand increased capacity for policy formulation and implementation by MGCSW, muchstill needs to be done to address gender inequalities. Recent data released by the NationalBureau of Statistics (2009) show that more than half of the country continues to livebelow the poverty line. There are significantly more women than men who are poor. Theliteracy rate for women is 28%, compared to 55% for men. MGCSW is a newgovernment institution with limited capacity to effectively discharge its responsibilities; itwill require continued support to deliver on its mandate.

50. The design of the project remains relevant, given the need to continuously providesupport to sub-projects and strengthen institutions. The project sought to provideimmediate peace dividends to vulnerable women and pursued longer-term impacts bybuilding the capacity of the Ministry, thereby allowing it to deliver on its mandate. Thedual objectives of the project were achieved using the most reasonable means of doing so,in spite of the weak institutional capacity and challenges of a post-conflict environment.Four factors influenced the project design: (i) the project built on the experience ofMGCSW in providing similar economic empowerment programs; although limited andsmall in comparison to the project, the former economic empowerment project was theonly program that provided similar services to conflict-affected women; (ii) the projectutilized MGCSW's ties, i.e., its proximity to women's networks, as channels fordelivering grants and training and ensuring sub-project implementation; (iii) the project

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sought to build the capacity of the Ministry that will most likely support other similarfuture activities; and (iv) the project used existing mechanisms and structures at theMinistry and State level (focal persons) instead of establishing parallel delivery systems.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

51. The project development objective "to achieve immediate peace dividends fortargeted women in South Sudan " was surpassed. The target was set at "20 % of targetwomen perceiving an increase in income." As of the closing of the project, 40% of targetperceived an increase in income. The choice of perception to measure achievement overother indicators was due to the absence of data and the difficulty of collecting them. Allintermediate outcome indicators were either met or surpassed (Annex 2). Indicators weremeasured based on beneficiary surveys, supplemented and verified by site visits andinterviews with focal persons, chairpersons and project staff.

52. Improved access to economic opportunities. The infusion of resources andtraining expanded economic activities for women beneficiaries. Under Component 1, 108sub-projects from the 10 States were financed, benefiting some 7,134 women. Half of thesub-projects (54) funded agricultural activities of clearing fields and planting produce forconsumption by members and/or sale to the markets, and 2,366 women reported increasein yields or harvests. Another 54 sub-projects engaged in non-agricultural activities suchas tailoring, livestock-raising and business start-up, expanding the skills and opportunitiesof beneficiaries to non-traditional income-generating activities. All sub-projects involvedsome kind of training in agricultural technology or non-farm skills. More than 3,000women participated in agricultural and non-farm sub-project training, providing themwith the skills to engage in expansion or future projects. Table 2 presents a breakdown ofsub-projects.

Table 2. Projects, by type of primary activitySector Activities Number of projects

Agriculture Purchase of tools, seeds, water pumps and 54provision of training

Tailoring Extensive training and member assistance in 9establishing markets

Livestock Goat rearing, poultry raising and fish farming 9Business start-up Start- up of small-scale businesses 7Trading Retail activities, including clothes boutiques and 6

grocery storeGrinding machine Provision of portable machines or large machines 6

at a central locationBricks Brick making, typically mud stacked and burned 4

using firewood.Hotel Establishing a hotel 4Variety Projects with more than one primary activity 4Beekeeping Installation of honey bee hives to collect honey 3Processing Processing lulu nuts bought from the community to 2

make oil and soap especially

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Total 108

53. Supporting the development of gender policy. MGCSW was supported indeveloping a National Gender Policy and strategies. Under Component 3, the projectfinalized the CGA. The CGA was critical in enhancing the gender framework initiallypresented by MGCSW to the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly in 2008.Final approval of the 2008 Gender Policy was delayed due to lack of evidence-basedrecommendations, but the findings and recommendations of the CGA provided the basisfor updating the existing Gender Policy Framework draft into a National Gender Policyfor approval by the Legislature.

54. The project's contribution to the improvement of the policy environment andinstitutional capacity of MGCSW has been well received. The capacity building trainingwas completed for 45 officials. MGCSW has adopted the three modules of trainingmanuals as its standard training material for all future training on gender mainstreaming.

The training program also provided a strong foundation for follow up trainings that wereprovided to the Ministry staff at the National and States levels. The training manuals arecurrently being used by the States to conduct training for other staff on variousadministrative and gender mainstreaming themes.

55. Under Component 2, interim office spaces and furniture were provided. Thisallowed the Ministry to function during the project while the building is underconstruction. Interim office spaces remain usable and still serve as temporary offices ofthe Ministry.

56. The Ministry building remains incomplete upon project closing due to delays inprocurement. The work progressed very slowly, although an international civil engineerwas appointed to monitor work progress on September 27, 2012. The response of thecontractors to suggestions made has been slow. MGCSW observed that the performanceof the Supervising Engineer had been unsatisfactory for a number of reasons: (i)inaccurate bill of quantities, (ii) incomplete design - absence of mechanical drawings;and (iii) lack of information to the client on quantities of materials based on actualmeasurement.

3.3 Efficiency

57. Given the emergency nature of the operation and the absence of data andinformation, no detailed economic analysis was conducted during preparation. However,the MDTF-SS Monitoring Agent carried out a value for money assessment in October2012 on a number of activities to determine whether they meet the three measures ofeconomy, efficiency and effectiveness.

58. Value for Money (VfM) Assessment. Activities assessed were the constructionof the Ministry building and the purchase of motorcycles for the 10 State Focal Persons.The assessment concluded that the overall VfM performance for the construction ispartially achieved but fully achieved for the purchase of motorcycles. The VfM assessed

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both financial management and procurement arrangements as good. However, the studyraised issues about the failure of the Ministry to provide adequate counterpart staff to betrained in FM and procurement to ensure transfer of skills. The conclusions of the VfMstudy are presented in Annex 3.

59. The contribution in improving livelihoods, increasing incomes and strengtheningcapacities of women CBOs has served to catalyze support from other donors and theprivate sector. Commercial banks (Equity Bank and the Kenya Commercial Bank) arelooking into providing credit to women CBOs; bilateral and multilateral donors and theMinistry of Agriculture are targeting the provision of agricultural inputs to three CBOs inJonglei State. Building on the gains from the project, ensuring better linkages andsystematizing learning and feedback with other agencies can further maximize impacts.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome RatingRating: Moderately Unsatisfactory.

60. The project was successful in achieving its PDO the way it was stated "...

provision of: (a) improvements in the existing economic opportunities and (b) support tothe Ministry of Gender to develop gender policies and strategies." However, the secondComponent, which was not reflected in the PDO, was not completed and hence theoverall rating as MU. The contributions in terms of livelihoods, perceived increase inincomes and improved capacities of women CBOs and the Ministry, have served tocatalyze support from other donors and the private sector. Other activities underComponent 2 such as the provision of interim office space and equipment were achievedin a satisfactory manner. The VfM has assessed the project as partially efficient forreasons already stated above.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

61. The project provided support to 7,134 poor women in 108 CBOs, training them inincome generating skills and further enhancing the likelihood of improving their incomes.Sub-projects generated revenues, which were either reinvested or distributed to members.Interviews with beneficiaries indicated that the project increased household food security,contributed to time savings in fetching water, and increased household incomes toimprove school participation, improved shelter and household health.

62. Gender Aspects. The project focused on the provision of assistance to women'sorganizations and CBOs. The project also contributed to the development of a nationalgender policy that will be translated into an action plan to reduce gender inequalities andimprove opportunities for women.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

63. The project contributed significantly to the policy environment and building ofthe capacity of MGCSW and women CBOs. Forty-five officials from the National andState level Ministries were trained in gender mainstreaming and project management.

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Three modules of training manuals were developed, providing materials for futurefollow-on training. The CGA and various institutional capacity building activities havebecome anchors of the Ministry's reorganization effort, strategy and programdevelopment. Policy support has also contributed to the growing number of analyticalwork to support gender policies and programs in the country.

64. Component 1 resulted in 3,300 women receiving training in agriculture and non-farm skills and technologies. Hands-on experience in managing small projects alsocreated a pool of women CBOs where future support can be channeled.

65. The project fielded specialists in FM, procurement and M&E to support projectimplementation and provide a learning opportunity for MGCSW staff. To make thishappen, a twinning arrangement where Ministry staff would be paired with the specialistswas agreed to but not realized. Only one M&E staff remains active in the project.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

66. A number of sub-projects have gone beyond intended outcomes: vegetablesproduced from farms in Unity State are being transported to the markets of Warrap;revenues from renting out stalls are being used as social assistance grants by a CBOengaged in assisting vision-impaired women; the same CBO was able to set up a healthclinic for its members from proceeds of the grant; a tailoring project secured a supplycontract from local schools. The Ministry has developed a Social Protection Policy as anoutcome of the CGA. These outcomes point to the establishment of a pool of womenCBOs that are more self-reliant and capable of handling future projects.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

67. During Appraisal (March 10-11, 2009), MGCSW, in collaboration with UNIFEM,organized a multi-stakeholder workshop in Juba to finalize the design of the EconomicEmpowerment for Women Component of GSDP. The objective was to identify keycriteria to guide the development and design of sub-projects to be financed under thisComponent. Key topics included clarification of the criteria for sub-project activities,targeted localities, and intended beneficiaries; criteria for potential implementingpartners; mechanisms for soliciting proposals; composition and responsibilities of theselection committee, and the responsibilities of State and National level Ministries.Working groups and associated subtopics were divided into the following three groups:

* Group 1 - Implementing agency criteria and capacity needs* Group 2 - Identification of target localities and the role of the Ministry of Gender* Group 3 - Sub-project criteria and sub-project selection processes.

Final results presented by each working group signify a collective body ofrecommendations and informed the final design of Component 1 and the development ofGSDP Operations Manual.

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4. Assessment of Risk to Development OutcomeRating: Substantial

68. Continuing security risks, lack of skilled personnel and the recent austeritymeasures threaten the sustainability of development outcomes. The country level risk isexpected to remain high as the security situation worsened, due to rising criminality,conflict in the border areas among ethnic groups. This affects the ability of CBOs tocontinue sub-project operations and of MGCSW to monitor and provide technical support.The recent austerity measures adopted by GoSS caused significant budget cuts for allagencies. MGCSW operates on a budget that can support only personnel and mandatoryexpenditures for maintenance. Without program or project funds, the Ministry will relyon other government agencies and donors as potential sources of funds. Capacity andpersonnel constraints continue to be a risk for sustaining gains. While the foundations ofa stronger agency have been set in place, much needs to be done to translate interventionsinto a robust policy environment for women's empowerment.

69. Strong ownership of the outcome of the project by MGCSW and the existence ofbetter equipped and experienced women CBOs and network are expected to temper therisks. The CGA contains a substantial body of information on key development issues ongender. There is reasonable expectation that the leadership of the Ministry will move thiswork forward, given the ongoing revision of the national framework and continuedengagement of National and State Agencies in gender mainstreaming initiatives.Successful and mature CBOs have increased demand for similar government programs tosupport women in economic empowerment. The interest of other donors and Governmentagencies in a number of these CBOs is an indication of the improved number of qualifiedwomen's groups, capable of undertaking similar projects.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at EntryRating: Moderately Satisfactory

70. The project design was appropriate given the situation and development prioritiesof GoSS at Appraisal. Response to the women's dire economic situation was amongGoSS' key priorities. The role forced upon women by the conflict, as key providers in ahigh potential but low developed agricultural sector, dictated the provision of economicopportunities to poor women CBOs. The absence of information to address genderconcerns and the overall weak capacity in the country informed the institutional buildingComponent.

71. The design provided arrangements to ensure fiduciary compliance duringimplementation. Assistance provided by international consultants ensured that theproject's financial, procurement and M&E systems were adequate. Assurances from theMinistry of Housing were relied on in moving forward with the construction Component.

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All activities under the project, except for the building construction, were completed. Theproject extensions secured were primarily to complete the construction activity. Theproject, however, took advantage of these extensions to provide additional funds to bestperforming CBOs for expansion of ongoing sub-projects.

72. A shortcoming at project preparation was the short period within which theconstruction Component was to be completed (10 months, shortened to 7 due toprocurement delays). In addition, constraints in constructing any type of physicalstructures in South Sudan (i.e., low public sector capacity, lack of private sectorconstruction capacity, procurement and other fiduciary issues) affected cost escalations.Despite assurances from the Ministry of Housing and internal and external pressure, thesituation on the ground was sufficient basis for removing the construction Component orassigning the same to another agency. The extensive geographic coverage is also ashortcoming and could have been phased in, overstretching the ability of a nascentMinistry with no capacity.

(b) Quality of SupervisionRating: Moderately Satisfactory

73. Regular supervision was done by the Team Leader supported by a country-basedtask team. The team provided hands-on support to the PCU during projectimplementation. It also provided significant support to the project on all Componentswith particular attention to Component 1 and the procurement of studies and contractorsfor the building construction. Aide-memoires from Bank supervision highlighted keyaccomplishments and called the attention of the Ministry and Bank management to keyissues and follow-up actions by both the Client and the Bank. Among these issues werethe challenges in undertaking monitoring and reporting of sub-project grants; delays inthe procurement of CGA studies; and delays in procurement and supervision by thebuilding contractor.

74. The Bank team played a particularly critical role during the MTR by reviewingand revising the RF, together with the Government and putting in place corrective actionsto support the reporting of CBOs. While Component I was progressing well at the timeof the MTR, intensive monitoring and additional site visits were agreed with the PCU toprovide assistance to CBOs in completing key documents and in linking them to otherGovernment agencies for additional support. The linkage with State agencies was toserve as a mechanism for transitioning CBOs to more regular support from differentagencies. Among the agencies tapped for technical support to CBOs were the agricultureand livestock agencies.

75. Other relevant interventions by the Bank team led to the replacement of theGovernment's lead for the CGA and the development of an M&E framework with thenew M&E consultant.

76. The project was extended twice to complete all activities, especially forComponent 2. Additional financing was provided under the second restructuring for theadded costs incurred for the building construction brought about by inflation, inaccurate

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bill of quantities and delays in the work of contractors. The issue of non-completion ofthe Ministry building was brought to the attention of Bank management and MGCSWduring the MTR and in the last ISR, advising the Ministry to seek additional sources offunds to complete the building.

(c) Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

5.2 Borrower Performance(a) Government PerformanceRating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

77. Government's commitment to the project is a reflection of its commitment to theJAM and its priorities, one of which is to address the dismal status of women throughpolicy action and directed programs for economic empowerment. The PCU wasestablished and staffed by a project coordinator, office assistant and three internationalconsultants. While MGCSW was tasked to implement the project, other governmentagencies, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Housing provided support.

78. The Government established a PFMU in the Ministry of Finance to handle thefinancial aspects of the project, including the filing of withdrawal applications,reimbursements and financial reporting. PFMU has, by and large, performed this functionwell. Other line Ministries (Agriculture, Animal Resources) provided technical support toCBOs to maximize their production and income generating potential. States also providedsupport through the Ministries of Social Development, whose staff acted as focal personsfor the project. States' involvement was however limited to the focal persons. TheMinistry of Housing played a key role in the construction Component. Delays in theapproval of the design and bid documents however became the major cause for the non-completion of the building.

(b) Implementing Agency PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

79. MGCSW (through the PCU) implemented the project. It appointed counterpartstaff to the project and named two of its Directors-General (DG FA&P as coordinator,and DG Gender) to lead the implementation and closely collaborate with the Bank in theimplementation of the project. The DG FA&P was actively involved in the day-to-dayoperations of the project and was highly committed. The DG Gender was however lessengaged, resulting in a request in the second supervision mission to name a replacement,given that CGA was a critical aspect of the project. The replacement was effective beforethe MTR.

80. Overdependence on External Consultants. While a number of staff were assignedto work with counterpart specialists in a twinning arrangement, their involvement wasunsatisfactory. The exception to this is the project officer assigned to undertake M&E.The capacity build-up expected from the twinning arrangement between specialists andMGCSW staff did not take place and the transfer of knowledge, particularly on FM,

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procurement and training was negligible. Tasks on monitoring the financial complianceof CBOs and their performance have now been left to the DG FA&P and one projectofficer. Staff assigned to the project have returned to their previous units with no ongoingrole in the project.

81. Monitoring of sub-projects and management of contracts have been challengingfrom the start. Information was generated through interviews, phone calls and monitoringvisits. However, after the closing, with financial reports still pending, and consultanciesalready terminated, collection of information and submission of key reports has sloweddown.

82. CBOs played an important role in implementing Component 1. At least one-halfof CBOs performed well, distributing revenues to their members and providing trainingto women's groups. They have also been channels for capacity building activities formembers and their communities.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

83. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory.The limited role played by the States and the failure to provide oversight to theconstruction Component and meet reporting requirements for the sub-projects diminishedthe good performance by the Ministry of Finance in managing the financial aspect of theproject. The failure of MGCSW to provide competent and responsive staff andcounterpart officials necessitated a replacement at project mid-term. While a goodnumber of CBOs performed adequately, a number of them still have to comply withreporting requirements, especially for the funds received.

6. Lessons Learned

84. In a setting such as South Sudan, with extremely weak institutional capacity,continuing post-conflict insecurity and serious accessibility challenges due to the lackof infrastructure, project teams and Bank management should resist governmentpressures to provide nationwide coverage. This is not easy to do since governments willoften feel it is a nation-building imperative to reach all States, but teams should insist ona smaller scale and more focused set of project activities, which can better draw lessonsfor future expansion of coverage and scope. In some cases, and where there are goodprospects for follow-on projects, teams should argue for a phased approach which canstart small and allow the line Ministry and implementing partners to gain experience,before scaling up in subsequent phases. Where there are uncertain prospects foradditional project phases, an option would be to engage early on in project design withdonors who would be interested in scaling up the project approach once the Bank projectends.

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85. Ensuring the buy-in of state authorities is a challenge when they areconsiderably weaker than central institutions and the project or parallel donoractivities do not include tangible incentives for their participation and leadership.Although the project aimed to involve State officials in implementation support andmonitoring, and included training officials in gender mainstreaming and projectadministration, State involvement was limited to State focal points who were providedwith monetary incentives to undertake project-related activities. In a typical fragile andpost-conflict setting, where there is an urgent need to build the state from scratch, localgovernments will be extremely weak, far more than whatever incipient capacity is beingbuilt at the center. Although aiming for local-level involvement and ownership of aproject is a laudable objective, project design needs to recognize that this may beunrealistic unless administrations at the state level are provided direct incentives to takean active role.

86. In such a low-capacity environment as South Sudan, Bank management shouldnot give in to pressure to meet completely unrealistic physical construction timetables.In the case of this project, despite strong reservations by the Task Team, Managementagreed to pressure from the Government and donors to include construction of theMinistry building over a 10-month period. At the time the project was prepared the Bankand donors should have been well aware of the country constraints in constructing anytype of physical structures (i.e., low public sector capacity, lack of private sectorconstruction capacity, procurement and other fiduciary issues) and the effect theseconstraints had on cost escalations. As it happened, procurement delays further reducedthe already unrealistic construction schedule to 7.5 months. Although it may have beenexpedient in the short-run for the Bank to bend to donor and government pressure toaccept inclusion of the Ministry building Component-in a project which should havebeen focused above all in women's empowerment and livelihoods-and at the same timeaccept an unrealistic construction schedule, the almost inevitable delay which led to anunfinished building by project end, resulted in a heavy longer-term reputational cost forthe Bank.

87. Capacity cannot be built with one three-year project-in any setting, butespecially in a new country such as South Sudan where donors are starting almostfrom scratch and capacity needs to be cross-sectoral and imbedded in a new Ministry.Although availability of MDTF funding constrained the ability of the Bank to design alonger-term effort to build gender capacity in the new country and to continue to supporteffective women's groups, as a minimum the Bank should have sought partnerships withother donors that could have committed to support the project's early capacity buildingefforts over a longer time horizon. To the extent possible, and given that donors (whofunded the MDTF) wanted the Ministry building included, Bank management could havemade agreement to take on this project contingent on a structured partnership with adonor(s) already, or planning to be, active in supporting longer-term gender efforts inSouth Sudan.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors

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(a) Grantee/Implementing agenciesN/A

(b) Cofinanciers/DonorsN/A

(c) Other partners and stakeholders(e.g., NGOs/private sector/civil society)N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Original Cost Revised Cost Difference(USD millions) (USD millions)

Component 1: Economic4.04.00 0.00Empowerment of Women

Component 2: Construction of 310 3.646 0.546Ministry Building

Component 3: Institutional 2.90 2.90 0.00Development

Total Project Costs 10.00 10.546 0.546

(b) FinancingAppraisal Actual/Latest

Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage ofCofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal

millions) millions)Trust Funds 0.00 0.00Multi-donor Trust Fund for South 10.00 0.00 00Sudan

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Project Development Project Baseline Target Actual ICR RemarksObjective Outcome Output

Indicators At Revised at At Appraisal Revised atAppraisal MTR MTR

Achieve immediate peace % of tat N/A 7,634 N / A 20%(1,527) 40% of 7,134 Final number of womendividends for targeted or 2,854 benefitting from the project is

women who7,3women in Southern 7,134Sudan, through the perceive an

mecrease mnprovision of: (a) increas iimprovements in access to ie aaeconomic result ofthe existing economic projectopportunities and (b) iretsupport to the Ministry ofGender to develop genderpolicies and strategies.

23

Component 1: Economic Empowerment of Women

Baseline Target

Intermediate Results Intermediate Results Indicators At Revised At Revised Actual Output ICR RemarksAppraisal at MTR Appraisal at MTR

Perceived improvements 1. 20% of target women N / A 7,634 N / A 1,527 40% of 7,134 or Final number ofin income status of perceive an increase in income as a (2,854) women benefittingtargeted women result of project interventions from the project isImproved access to and 2. 20% of target women N/A 7,364 N/A 1,527 18% of 7,134 7,134 based onknowledge of non-farm receiving training in non-farm (1,267) proposals submitted,activities and income generating activities interviews withtechnologies CBOs, focal personsEnhanced access to and 3. 30% of target women N / A 7,364 N / A 2,290 29% of 7,134 and chairpersons ofknowledge of receiving training in agricultural (2,037) women'sagricultural inputs and production activities organizations andtechnologies 4. 30% of target women utilizing at N / A 7,364 N / A 2,290 29% of 7,134 monitoring visits

least one new agricultural production (2,037)technology or practice due to projectinterventions5. 20% of target women who N/A 7,364 N/A 1,527 33% of 7,134perceive an increase in crop yields or (2,366)harvests due to project interventions

Sub-projects are 6. 10% of sub-projects that will N / A 108 N / A 11 40% of 108 (44) Number of sub-sustainable continue post project closure projects only known

activities after approval by theMGCSW

Increase in collective 7. 10% of women joining N / A 7,364 N / A 713 28% of 7,134action in project areas associations (2,000)

8. 10% of collective action among N / A No data N / A 10 500% or 520 Assumes nowomen in project sites collective action

prior to project forlack of data

Component 2: Construction of Ministry Building

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Intermediate Intermediate Results Baseline Target Actual ICR RemarksResults Indicators At Appraisal Revised at At Appraisal Revised Output

MTR at MTR

Improved facilities 9. Interim prefabricated No No change Yes No change Installationfor Ministry buildings, furniture and completedirectorates equipment installed and

MinistryfullyfunctionalAdditionalofficespacerented tohouse otherdirectorates

10. Construction of new No No change Yes No change 31%Ministry building completed complete

Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity BuildingIntermediate Intermediate Results Baseline Target Actual ICR Remarks

Results Indicators At Appraisal Revised at At Appraisal Revised OutputMTR at MTR

Improved data to 11. Country gender No No change CGA completed No change CGAinform gender assessment completed completedpolicies andstrategiesImproved capacity of 12. Completion of capacity No No change Yes No change TrainingGoSS, State ministry building training program completedstaff and CBOs to 13. Number of GoSS and 52 No change 52 No change 41 staffcarry out their state ministry staff receiving trainedmandate training

14. Number of CBO N / A No change N / A No change 3,304 Sub-project trainingparticipants in project participants are provided by

25

Intermediate Intermediate Results Baseline Target Actual ICR RemarksResults Indicators At Appraisal Revised at At Appraisal Revised Output

MTR at MTR

training in agri and external agenciesnon-farmsub-projecttraining and91participantsin project-conductedtraining

Improved monitoring 15. Number of monitoring N / A No change N / A No change 8 out of 10 Quarterly reportsof sub-project reports submitted by focal from CBOs wereimplementation approved sub-projects person replaced by

reports monitoring reportssubmit from focal personsquarterly because of reportingreports challenges.

16. Number of supervision N / A No change N / A No change PCU Outbreak ofvisits to approved project visited 83 violence in somesites of the 108 states prevented

sub- supervision visits.projects,some ofthem morethan once.

Effective oversight 17. Number of project staff 0 No change 7 No change 100% onof overall project onboard within 6 months of boardimplementation effectiveness within 6

monthsNumber of sub-projects N / A No change N / A 94 94 Grants for 14 of thereceiving full disbursement 108 CBO wereof grants cancelled due to

non-performance.

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Intermediate Intermediate Results Baseline Target Actual ICR RemarksResults Indicators At Appraisal Revised at At Appraisal Revised Output

MTR at MTR

Number of sub-projects N / A No change N / A 94 94 Based on interviewscomplete by 2012 with PCU staff

27

Annex 3. Efficiency Related AnalysesVfM performance of the two sampled project activities is presented in Table 2.21.

Activity VfM Assessment finding VfMassessment performanceparameter rating

Construction of Economy The contract is negligibly beyond the tothe Ministry approved budgeted amount and paymentsHQs Building made were consistent with contract

provisions. Procurement process wastransparent and competitive.

Efficiency Activity budgeted for, included in the 2.0procurement plan but there was delayedimplementation of the activity to achieveexpected outputs

Effectiveness Activity still on-going and had not 3.ocontributed to achievement of projectobjectives and impact to beneficiaries.Overall VfM performance 2.0

Senke Bike Economy The contract is within the approved budgeted 1.o150cc 4" Stroke amount, and payments consistent withMotor contract provisions. Procurement process was

transparent and competitive.Efficiency Activity budgeted for, included in the 2.0

procurement plan, actual outputs matchedexpected outputs. However, there were delaysin the distribution of the motorcycles to statefocal persons.

Effectiveness Activity contributed to achievement of project .oobjective; activity outputs used for intendedpurpose; and impact of the project activity isimproved communication and mobility formonitoring the activities project beneficiariesat the state level.Overall VfM performance 1.3

1= full achievement, 2= partial achievement, 3=non-achievement

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Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Unit Responsibility/Specialty

[Lending/Grant Preparation

Supervision/ICRYasmin Tayyab Sr. Social Development Specialist AFTCS Team Leader

Evarist F. Baimu Senior Counsel LEGAM Legal

Museme Munira Issa Gender Specialist AFTP2 Gender

Akwii Anne Kennox Team Assistant AFMJB Admin Support

Prosper Nindorera Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Procurement

Verena Phipps-Ebeler Social Development Specialist AFTCS Social Development

Frederick Yankey Sr. Financial Management Spec AFTMW FMS

Helen Mbao Chilupe Sr. Operations Officer AFMJB Operations

Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Sr. Financial Management Spec AFTME FMSAnjani Kumar Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPE Procurement

Joseph Ellong Sr. Program Assistant AFTCS ICR review

(b) Staff Time and CostStaff Time and Cost (MDTF-SS Only)

Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (includingNo. o a etravel and consultant costs)

Lending ______________________

Total: 32.83 106,518.00

Supervision/ICR

Total: 106.29 370,687.00

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Annex 5. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. A stakeholder workshop was conducted in March 2009 in Juba to solicit inputsfor the design of the Economic Empowerment for Women Component of GSDP. Theworkshop agenda included: (i) criteria for sub-project selection; (ii) target localities andbeneficiaries; (iii) mechanism for soliciting proposals; and (iv) role of State and GoSS-level Ministries. GoSS National and State level Ministry representatives (Ministries ofGender Children and Social Welfare, Animal Resources and Fisheries, Water Resources,Agriculture and Forestry, Cooperative and Rural Development and Finance) attended theworkshop. The results of the workshop were incorporated in the final Operations Manualof the project.

2. Criteria for Beneficiary Selection. Participants suggested several criteria forselection of grantees, including: registration with local or State authorities; functioninggovernance structure and sufficient number of staff; absence of potential conflict ofinterest; experience working in post-conflict environments; physical presence in theselected localities; existence and maintenance of a bank account. The suggested criteriawere however relaxed and made flexible owing to the low capacity of CBOs in thecountry, allowing applicants to form associations that collectively may maintain thegovernance and institutional capacity required to implement sub-projects.

3. Sub-project Selection. Key activities for funding included existing or on-goingproduction activities (e.g., cultivation of crops such as ground nuts, sorghum and assortedvegetables). Considerations for selection included market accessibility, road accessibility,market demand, availability of resources (such as livestock), technology andinfrastructure, availability of arable land and the ability of community groups andimplementing partners to manage risks at county, Payam and Boma levels.

4. Target Areas. Workshop participants recommended that projects be implementedat the Payam level, with final selection of localities to be determined through consultativeprocesses involving Payam and Boma representatives, to ensure that stakeholders andbeneficiaries are involved in decision-making and planning at all levels of the program.

5. Role of MGCSW. The Ministry shall be responsible for policy guidance and willhave oversight responsibilities for sub-project implementation. States shall be free to runtheir own affairs. The Ministry needs to hire a number of new staff, including a GoSS-level project officer to be responsible for overall supervision of sub-projectimplementation, inspection officers, and state-level project officers was alsorecommended.

6. Application and Selection Process. Calls for proposals will be issued byMGCSW and disseminated through multiple channels including: electronic and printmedia at the local and national levels, NGOs and CBOs and associated networks, andwomen's groups and associations. A selection committee tasked to accept, reject orshortlist proposals, shall comprise state-level representatives, GoSS-level representativesor a combination of the two.

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Annex 6. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

The Government of South Sudan, through the Ministry of Gender, Children and Welfareassessed the overall outcome of the project as successful. Despite the non-completion ofthe Ministry building, the project generated positive impacts that were deemed tocontribute to the longer-term agenda of women's empowerment.

Component 1, Economic Empowerment of Women, has successfully improved theeconomic status of a considerable number of targeted women. It provided beneficiarieswith increased income, training, opportunities to use new agriculture technologies in theirday-to-day livelihood activities, and increased crop yield. These gains have, in turn,provided financial cushion that resulted in improved household resilience to externalshocks, increased food security, improved health and education.

Component 2, Construction of the Ministry Building, suffered major setbacks and wasnot completed. The Government attributed the failure to the unrealistic work plan, failureto conduct rigorous and regular supervision by the construction supervision contractorand delays in addressing issues timely and adequately by the contractors.

Component 3, Institutional Capacity Development, was assessed as largely successful.The Comprehensive Country Gender Assessment (CGA) presented a formidable body ofstatistics and data on key development issues that affect gender equality in South Sudan.It provided focused strategies to the Ministry of Gender for gender mainstreaming. It alsoshowcased several comparative best practices for coping with these issues.

While policies and strategies for women still remain incomplete, pending a review by thelegislature, the CGA represents a successful first step towards creating focused strategiesfor successful gender mainstreaming in South Sudan. The training provided under theproject improved the capacity of the ministry in delivering services to its constituenciesand leading in the mainstreaming of gender concerns in other agencies of government.

The ministry has coordinated project management effectively, and staff have beenassigned to manage the day-to-day activities under the project.

Key Lessons Learned and Implementation Challenges

The government has identified a number of learning from the implementation of theproject that can improve its management of similar projects in the future:

1. Smaller scale and focused coverage. A smaller scale start, scaling up to all the 10States, upon proof of success, would be a better pacing, given the limited capacity toimplement and monitor 108 sub-projects throughout the entire project cycle.

2. Simpler and more limited sub-projects, or those where target groups already havesome experience, such as agriculture activities could have resulted in better returns, by

31

not straining the capacity of the intended beneficiaries and markets for raw materials andproduce.

3. A longer project completion period is needed for a low capacity environment, to allowfor a slower build-up of capacity. For the economic empowerment component, longerduration can allow for learning from previous sub-projects to feed into succeeding ones.The compression of the construction period dramatically reduced the probability that theheadquarters would be completed.

4. Stronger provisions in MOU with beneficiaries can help ensure compliance. TheMOU does not clearly specify the obligations of beneficiaries and sanctions for non-compliance. Strengthening this can increase the accountability for sub-project funds.

5. Simplifying the Operations Manual for Component I can increase understanding ofbeneficiaries and empower them more.

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