Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 16646

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT(CREDIT 1915-GUI)

June 5, 1997

Transport Unit 2Central-Western Africa DepartmentAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = Guinean Franc (GNF)US$1 - GNF513 (at appraisal)US$1 = GNF1028 (at closing)

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development BankAGETIP Agence d'Execution de Travaux d'Intret Public/ Executing

AgencyBADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in AfricaCFD Caisse Fran,caise de DiveloppementIFrench bilateral aid

fundDGTP Direction Geneirale des Travaux Publics/General

Directorate for Public WorksEC European CommunityERR Economic Rate of ReturnIDA International Development AssociationICR Implementation Completion ReportMTPE Ministry of Public Works and EnvironmentMTTP Ministere des Transports et des Travaux Publics/Ministry of

Transport and Public WorksOECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan)SAR Staff Appraisal ReportSDR Special Drawing RightsUSAID United States Agency for International Development

Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib, AFRCountry Director: Mamadou DiaTechnical Manager: Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard, AFTT2Task Team Leader: Abdelghani, Inal

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT

(CREDIT 1915-GUI)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE.

EVALUATION SUMMARY.."i

PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT..1

BACKGROUND.

A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES.1

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES. 3

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 4

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY. 5

E. BANK PERFORMANCE. 5

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE. 6

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME. 6

H. FUTURE OPERATION. 6

I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED ..................... 6................................................................................................6

PART II - STATISTICAL ANNEXES

Table 1: Summary of AssessmentsTable 2: Related Bank Loans/CreditsTable 3: Project TimetableTable 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and ActualTable 5: Key Indicators for Project ImplementationTable 6: Studies Included in ProjectTable 7A: Project CostsTable 7B: Project FinancingTable 8: Economic Costs and BenefitsTable 9: Status of Legal CovenantsTable 10: Compliance with Operational Manual StatementsTable 11: Bank Resources: Staff InputsTable 12: Bank Resources: Missions

APPENDIXES

A. Mission's Aide-MemoireB. Borrower contribution to the ICRC. Map IBRD 21019 R

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

:

ii

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT

(CREDIT 1915-GUI)

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Fourth Highway Project in theRepublic of Guinea, for which Credit 1915-GUI in the amount of SDR39.7 million (US$55.0 millionequivalent) was approved on June 7, 1988, and made effective on June 26, 1989.

The Credit, which was amended and extended three times, was closed on December 31,1996, after a delay of three years. The last disbursement took place on May 14, 1997. Parallelfinancing for the project was provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the CaisseFran,aise de Developpement (CFD), the United States Agency for International Development(USAID), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan (OECF), the Arab Bank for EconomicDevelopment in Africa (BADEA), and the European Community (EC).

The ICR was prepared by Mr. Abdelghani Inal (Sr. Highway Engineer) and Ms. FaridaKhan (Operations Analyst) of the Transport Unit 2, Central-Western Africa Department, AfricaRegion, and reviewed by Ms. Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard (Technical Manager, AFTT2) andMr. Mamadou Dia (Country Director, CD16). It is based on material in the project file and on anICR mission carried out from April 26 to May 2, 1997. The Borrower contributed to the preparationof the ICR by preparing its owIn evaluation of the project's implementation (Appendix B) and bycommenting on the draft ICR. Comments were requested of the Guinea Country Team and the TaskManagers, who had appraised or supervised the project, and these were incorporated in this ICR.

I

'Il

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT

(CREDIT 1915-GUI)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The International Development Association (IDA) has been among the principal sources ofexternal financing for transport sector development in Guinea. Since 1975 IDA has provided sixcredits for road, port, and other transport sector projects in the country. The Fourth Highway Projectcontinued IDA assistance for the development of Guinea's road network, its rehabilitation andextension, and for strengthening local capacity to manage the sector. It complemented an earlierIDA-assisted Transport Sector Project, under which most sectoral reforms had been carried out andwhich had laid the basis for substantial long-term external financing for the rehabilitation ofGuinea's road network and the preparation of a new road sector strategy.

Project Objectives

2. The major project objectives were to: (a) gradually increase the National Road Network andenhance its level of service; and (b) further strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Transport andPublic Works' (MTTP's) for managing the National Road Network.

3. The objectives were to be achieved by implementing five components: (a) construction andimprovement of two major sections of the National Road Network (Dubreka-Kolaboui--196.5 kmand Mamou-Kankan--401 km) to paved road standard; (b) spot improvements over a total length of1,500 km, including repair of drainage systems, rehabilitation of bridges, and regravelling;(c) development of routine maintenance by contract; (d) economic and technical studies to preparethe next phase of the road development program, including feasibility studies for about 600 km andfinal design for about 200 km; and (e) technical assistance and training and fellowships for theGeneral Directorate for Public Works (DGTP) staff in charge of road planning, supervision, andmanagement of civil works and maintenance operations.

4. The project objectives were clear and consistent with the Government's sector strategy. Theroad network has been neglected and needed improvement and extension. As the performance ofcontractors was generally satisfactory, and contracting out routine road maintenance to the privatesector was improving, it was considered opportune to expand it. The objective of strengtheninglocal capacity by training and technical assistance seemed realistic. The main risk mentioned in theStaff Appraisal Report (SAR) was whether DGTP could implement the project on time because of itslack of experience. To mitigate this risk, long-term technical assistance was provided to the DGTP;nevertheless, there were long delays in project implementation and a lack of local staff participationin project preparation and management. Other problems, not foreseen during appraisal, whichhindered project implementation, were: (a) insufficient availability of counterpart funding for road

iv

maintenance; (b) insufficient results from technical assistance and training for developing the localcapacity; (c) lack of reliable accounting system and internal control and long delays in carrying outprocurement and other procedures; (d) chaniges in customs and tax regulations, with retroactiveeffect, which delayed contracts execution; and (e) absence of support for road management and forprivate local contractors development.

Implementation Experience and Results

5. The project's physical objectives were achieved, although implementation was slower thanexpected. The two major sections of the national road network were constructed and improved topaved road standard, except for the last section (94 km of the Mamou-Kankan road, financed by theEC, which is to be finished by the end of 1999). Service was enhanced on about 1,378 km of earthroads as planned. Tools for routine maintenance were procured, and labor-based road maintenance(cantonnage), started under the pilot program, was so successful that it was expanded. Economicand technical studies for the next phase of the road development program were carried out.Technical assistance lasted about a year longer than had been planned.

6. The achievement of jinancial objectives was negligible. The road fund is being replenishedfrom the national budget with insufficient and non-secured amounts, even though the taxes andduties collected from road users would be sufficient to fund maintenance and extension of thetransport infrastructure network. The project's institutional development impact was substantial.The MTTP was restructured into two ministries. The new Ministry of Public Works, which becamethe Ministry of Public Works and Environment (MTPE) in 1995, set up three techlnical Directorates,one each for road maintenance, road investment. and strategy and development, and tried tostrengthen the regional directorates. In addition, to improve the sector's efficiency, the MTPEprepared a new road sector strategy (without the aid of any technical assistance), which it is planningto implement through a major program of reorganization and decentralization. The capacity-building objective was partially achieved. Local capacity was created in planning, programming,and management of road investment and maintenance, but it needs to be strengthened further. Theprivate sector development objective was partially achieved. Although 100% of road maintenance isbeing contracted out to local private contractors, the sector still needs further strength.

7. Economic Evaluation. The 1996 average daily traffic was as follows: (a) on the Dubreka-Kolaboui (Boke) road, 400% of the traffic forecast at appraisal, in spite of the poor services of theFatala River ferries; (b) on the Mamou-Kankan road, 300% of the forecast traffic, even though thelast section is not yet built; furthermore, the mining traffic of Siguiri area is expected to start soonand reach 80,000 tons a year fairly quickly; (c) on the roads improved by the program of spotimprovements, 200% of the traffic forecast. When assuming a 3% traffic increase a year from 1996onwards (which is rather low, at least for Mamou-Kankan road), the Economic Rates of Return(ERR), based only on the net Vehicule Opetating Cost benefits, would be: (a) more than 20% for theDubreka-Kolaboui road (13% estimated at appraisal); (b) more than 40% for the Mamou-Kankanroad (11% estimated at appraisal); and for road improvement, the ERR would also be higher thanthat estimated at appraisal.

8. Costs and delays. The latest project cost estimate was US$207 million, compared with theSAR estimate of US$200 million. This moderate increase was due mainly to exchange ratevariations, delays in implementation, use of higher construction standards than planned at appraisal,reconstruction of two bridges, and technical assistance which lasted longer than planned. IDAdisbursed a total of SDR39.4 million for the project, or US$56.1 million compared to

v

US$55.0 million estimated at appraisal; the Government provided about US$8 million(GNF7 billion) of its estimated contribution of US$19.2 million (GNF9.8 billion), while parallelfinancing amounted to US$143 million.

9. The delay in the startup of the project was mainly due to the painful and slow restructuringof the MTTP implementation in addition to the poor quality of subproject technical studies availableat appraisal. The lack of resources for counterpart funding and for maintenance was the major factorin causing further implementation delays. Other contributing factors were the delay in parallelfinancing, and the long delays in the award of tenders following the receipt of bids because ofcumbersome Governnient review procedures. The failure to release funds promptly, or providecustoms clearance for equipment and goods (mainly petroleum products) imported by contractors,and change in taxes, customs, and clearance regulations, were other factors of implementation delay.

Summary of Findings, Future Operations and Key Lessons Learned

10. Overall, the project met most of its objectives and has had a large and positive economicimpact. Its sustainability would belikely if the Government makes available adequate funds for roadmaintenance from user taxes and duties (or from another source) through the Road Fund. Otherwisethe sustainability of the project's achievements is uncertain.

11. The Bank's performance in project preparation and supervision was satisfactory, althoughduring appraisal, Bank staff failed to identify some important risks. The Borrower's performance,however, was deficient despite its satisfactory own assessment. The Borrower was slow in followingthrough on procurement procedures and the release of funds, and its management capacity Wasinsufficient during project preparation and implementation.

12. A proposed road sector management project was appraised in July 1992, but was droppedbecause the conditions of negotiations on transport public enterprises privatization were not met.However, at the most recent Public Expenditure Review Meeting in 1997, three sectors, includingthe road sector, were identified as needing immediate attention. A new Road Sector Strategy, with aview to increasing sector's efficiency, has been prepared by the MTPE. This could lead to a followup investment in integrated rural infrastructure, poverty alleviation, and capacity-building project,provided that outcomes of this Highway IV Project are sustained.

13. The lessons for future projects in the transport sector are:

a) adequate funds for routine road maintenance should be secured from user payments andallocated to the project counterpart funds; Public Expenditure Reviews should play amajor role in ensuring that the Government adresses this important issue in the future;

b) project counterpart funds required for contracts should be totally paid up front, ascontract advance payment before the start of the works;

c) Other generic issues (such as procurement, custom duties, taxes, and procedures forpayment of local funds) should be addressed globally through institutional developmentassistance. For greater efficiency and lower project costs, project management shouldbe delegated to private entities like AGETIP or a private road authority;

vi

d) technical assistance should be made available for the short term, with clear objectivesand monitorable performance indicators to be assessed frequently and included inconsultants' contracts;

e) local staff should be motivated and made responsible for project preparation,implementation and sector management; and

f) the development of routine maiintenance executed by private local contractors should bewith project support to MTPE road management unit and to these local contractors.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT

(CREDIT 1915-GUI)

PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

BACKGROUND

I . After 25 years of neglect, at the time of Project appraisal in 1987, Guinea's transport sectorwas among the least efficient in the region and a major obstacle to achieving economic growth.Most of the transport infrastructure was barely operable. The Government accorded the higlhestpriority to the creation of a sound policy framework and the re-establishment of essential transportservices. In support of this strategy, the Government's investment program focused on theelimination of four major bottlenecks: (i) the heavily deteriorated road system; (ii) the seriouscongestion in the port of Conakry; (iii) the unreliable and unsafe air transport system; and (iv) thedifficulties of transforming a transport industry historically dominated by inefficient parastatals intoan efficient private service industry.

2. IDA and a number of other multilateral and bilateral donors have been supporting theGovernment's strategy througlh a series of projects financing priority investments and supportingreform measures in the transport sector. The Transport Sector Project (Cr. 1915-GUI), signed inMay 1987 and completed in December 1993, was designed to ensure the establishment of anappropriate sector policy framework and to meet the essential needs of the ports and aviation sub-sectors. It was envisaged at the time that important additional investments were required in the roadsub-sector.

3. The Highway IV Project, the sixth IDA-financed project in the transport sector in Guineaapproved in 1988; was aimed to further develop Guinea's road network, build capacity, providefinancing for routine road maintenance and assist in its privatization, and, although not included inthe original project design, start a dialogue on road sector policy. The project was the first phase ofa long-term program to improve the country's economic performance.

A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES

4. The major project objectives were to: (a) increase gradually the National Road Network andenhance its level of service; and (b) strengthen further the MTTP's capability for managing theNational Road Network.

5. The project included financing for civil works, equipment, and consultant services to carryout the following five project components:

a) construction and improvement to paved road standard of two sections of the NationalRoad Network: Dubreka-Kolaboui (196.5 km) and Mamou-Kankan (401 km);

2

b) spot improvements over a length of about 1,500 km of the primary National RoadNetwork to ensure year-round accessibility, including repair of drainage systems,rehabilitation of bridges, and regravelling;

c) development of a routine maintenance policy for all rehabilitated portions of theNational Road Network;

d) studies by consultants of the feasibility of improving about 600 km of the NationalRoad Network, followed by detailed engineering design for 200 km, andmiscellaneous economic and technical studies related to the transport sector; and

e) provision of fellowships for training MTTP's staff in charge of road planning,supervision, and management of civil works and maintenance operations, andprovision of technical assistance.

6. Project objectives were clear and consistent with the Government's strategy. The roadnetwork had been neglected and needed to be improved and extended. The performance ofcontractors in road maintenance had been generally satisfactory and contracting out routinemaintenance to the private sector was to be expanded under the project. This was an appropriateobjective. The objective of strengthening local capacity by training aind technical assistanceappeared to be realistic. The main risk identified at appraisal was the inability of the GeneralDirectorate for Public Works (DGTP) to implement the project in a timely manner in view of its lackof experience. To mitigate this risk, DGTP was to be provided with long-tern technical assistanceas well as short-term technical assistance for studies, supervision of works, and training.

7. The following problems, however, were not identified at appraisal but later proved to bereal:

(a) insufficient availability of local funds for counterpart funding and for routine roadmaintenance; a large gap existed between the amounts planned in the Government'sannual budgets and the actual funds made available, which resulted in long delays inpayment to contractors and inadequate routine maintenance;

(b) although some capacity in planning, programming, and management of roadinvestment and maintenance was created within the MTP, the results of technicalassistance (which was good and provided at levels higher than planned) and trainingin developing local capacity were less than expected; this was mainly due to the lackof motivation and inexperience of local staff; in addition, local staff had not beenmade responsible for implementation, and the technical assistance that was providedlacked clear objectives, benchmark indicators, and frequent assessment;

(c) lack of reliable accounting system and internal control, cumbersome procurementand other procedures which added to the reason for late payments to contractors andother delays;

(d) changes in customs and tax regulations implemented in 1995, witlh retroactive effect,whichi had an impact on customs clearance procedures and contract costs andresulted in interruption of works by contractors for several weeks and other delaysin project implementation; and

(e) absence of support for road management and private local contractors development.

3

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

8. Macroeconomic Policies. Not applicable.

9. Sector Policies. The project objectives were substantially achieved: (a) the National RoadNetwork was improved and expanded; (b) 100% of road maintenance was contracted to the private*sector; (c) the road sector strategy was reviewed to obtain more involvement of the private sectorand the regions; and (d) a long-term, rolling priority investment program was prepared.

10. Financial Objectives. The road fund is replenished from the national budget withinsufficient and uncertain amounts, although the taxes and duties collected from the transport sectorare sufficient to fund adequately the maintenance, extension, and renewal of the road network. Theresources allocated for road routine maintenance amounted to GNF2.8 billion in 1991, and decreasedto GNFI .2 billion in 1994, when the required amount was estimated at GNF4.7 billion. However, inthe last three years, the Government has allocated more resources for road maintenance:GNF4.3 billion in 1995, GNF2.9 billion in 1996, and has planned for GNF7.0 billion in 1997.Private contractors' lack of confidence in the capacity and willingness of the Government to paythem resulted in slow implementation of work contracts. The IDA Credit had to be amended in 1995to make up for the Government's payment arrears (SDR 850,000), and to update a GovernmentAction Plan on counterpart and maintenance funding .

11. Institutional Development Objectives. The project institutional development impact wassubstantial: (a) early after effectiveness, MTTP was restructured into two ministries, the Ministry ofTransport and the MTP; and (b) to improve efficiency in the road sector, the MTPE prepared a newroad sector strategy (without the help of technical assistance) and is planning to implement it througha major program of reorganization and decentralization. Capacity has been created at the MTPE inplanning, programming, and management of road investment and maintenance, although somefurther strengthening of this capacity is required. Road maintenance Decentralization to the MTPERegional Directorates and capacity building at the regional levels were onlypartially achieved; thesupervision of works was always carried out by the M FPE central staff through technical assistance.Under the new road strategy, the Regional Directorates are to be responsible for road maintenance.A new accounting system was set up at the MTPE and its staff trained.

12. Environmental Objectives. The construction and rehabilitation of roads did not cause anysignificant ecological problems. The new paved road surfaces eliminated unpleasant conditions forthe population living near the roads and improved traffic flow and safety, while increasingaccessibility in large areas of the country.

13. Physical Objectives. Most of the project's physical objectives were achieved: (a) twosections of the National Road Network--Dubreka-Kolaboui (196.5 km) and Mamou-Kankan (401km) were paved to a high-level standard, with the exception of the last section (94 km) financed byEC, which is still under construction; (b) spot improvements were made on some 1,378 km of theprimary National Road Network to ensure year-round accessibility; (c) labor-based roadmaintenance (cantonnage) started under a pilot program was so successful that it was expanded tothe whole country; and (d) technical studies on the feasibility of improving 1,000 km of the NationalRoad Network, in addition to detailed design engineering studies for the Road Network sectionsabove, were completed.

4

14. Economic Evaluation. The 1996 average daily traffic was as follows: (a) on the Dubreka-Kolaboui (Boke) road, 400% of the traffic forecast at appraisal, in spite of the poor services of theFatala River ferries; (b) on the Mamou-Kankan road, 300% of the traffic forecast, although the lastsection is not yet built; furthermore, the mining traffic of Siguiri area is expected to start soon andreach 80,000 tons a year fairly quickly; (c) on the roads improved by the program of spotimprovements, 200% of the traffic forecast. When assuming a 3% traffic increase a year from 1996onwards (which is rather low, at least for Mamou-Kankan road), the Economic Rates of Return(ERR), based only on the net Vehicule Opetating Cost benefits, would be: (a) more than 20% for theDubreka-Kolaboui road (13% estimated at appraisal); (b) more than 40% for the Mamou-Kankanroad (11% estimated at appraisal); and for road improvement, the ERR would also be higher thanthat estimated at appraisal. These EERs reflect the rich potential and resources of the country whichhave yet to be fully exploited.

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT

Factors not generally subject to Government Control

15. The non-availability of parallel financing in a timely manner forced the Borrower to slowdown the implementation of part of the project, especially on the last section of Mamou-Kankanroad.

Factors generally subject to Government Control

16. The reorganization of MTTP into two ministries led to some initial disorganization anddelays in project implementation. The Borrower's cumbersome procurement and other procedures(mainly changes in customs and tax regulations in 1995, with retroactive effect; and delays incustoms clearance, principally affecting petroleum products, cement, and equipment) led tosuspension of works by contractors and extensive delays in works to be completed. Other factorswhich affected the project were the failure to promptly release funds to contractors and the non-availability of counterpart funds. Eventually this led to a Government Action Plan to allocateadequate funds for maintenance and counterpart, and to an amerndment to the IDA Credit Agreementin April 1995 to finance arrears in counterpart funds. As a result, an improvement in routinemaintenance financing was noticeable over the course of the last three years.

Factors generally subject to Implementing Agency Control

17. Management. Lack of motivation and experience on the part of the implementing agencystaff contributed to significant delays in procurement, payment to contractors, capacity building(through technical assistance and training), and in routine maintenance by contractors. Lack ofinternal controls and a weak accounting system also delayed timely payment to contractors.

18. Cost and financing. The latest project cost estimate was US$207 million, compared with theSAR estimate of US$200 million. This moderate increase was mainly attributable to exchange ratevariations, implementation delays, use of higher construction standards than planned (stabilizationwith cement of about 500 km of base course not planned at appraisal, asphalt concrete in lieu ofdouble surface treatment on 310 km), reconstruction of two bridges, and technical assistance whichlasted longer than planned. IDA disbursed (SDR39.4 million) US$56.1 million, compared withUS$55.0 million estimated at appraisal; the Government provided about US$8 million

5

(GNF7 billion) of its estimated contribution of US$19.2 million (GNF9.8 billion), while the parallelfinancing amounted to US$143 million. OECF and IDA had to make up the deficit in Governmentcounterpart financing.

19. Implementation Delays. Late project startup due to delay in conditions of effectivenessfulfilment, poor technical studies available at appraisal, delays in parallel financing, slow andcumbersome procurement procedures and other processes (changes in tax and custom regulationsand clearance), and long delays in payments to contractors because of insufficient counterpart fundsresulted in a three-year delay in project completion. The last section of Mamou-Kankan road to bebuilt with EC financing is expected to take another three years.

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

20. The achievements of the project are likely to be sustainable if the Government makesavailable adequate funds for road maintenance from road user taxes and custom-duty payments (orsome other source) and channels them to the Road Fund. Project results, such as its substantialeconomic impact, ministry reorganization, contracting out 100% of routine maintenance to theprivate sector, capacity built at the MTPE with Directorates able to manage the road sector andeffectively carry out new road projects, without full-time technical assistance, augur well for projectsustainability. Delays in future project implementation could be avoided by delegating projectimplementation to a private entity like AGETIP or a Poad Authority; otherwise, projectsustainability is uncertain.

E. BANK PERFORMANCE

21. In project identification, the Bank's performance is rated satisfactory. The project wasconsistent with the Bank's strategy of promoting maintenance by private contractors, rehabilitatingthe road network and enhancing its level of service, and building local capacity.

22. In project preparation and appraisal, the Bank's performance is rated satisfactory overall.The Bank assisted the Borrower in preparing the technical, institutional, and physical aspects of theproject with the assistance of a team that included economists, a financial analyst, a transportspecialist, a construction specialist, and a highway engineer. The Bank's assessments of the roadnetwork and of the necessary measures to bring about improvements in its physical conditions wererealistic. However, the Bank was optimistic in its judgment about the Borrower's ability to increaseits management capacity rapidly and implement the project in a timely manner. The Bank did notanticipate the delays that would result from poor technical studies, cumbersome procurementprocedures and other processes or from the lack of counterpart financing and funds for routinemaintenance.

23. The Bank's performance in supervision is rated satisfactory. The frequency of supervisionmissions (every four to six months) was adequate. The Bank's relationship with the Government,although somewhat conflicted in the areas of generic country issues such as procurement andcounterpart funding, was constructive and collaborative on the whole. The Bank strongly urged theGovernment to comply with the counterpart funding requirements, in accordance with theDevelopment Credit Agreement. The successive extensions of the closing date were used to pressthe Borrower to take action. The extensions of the closing date in 1993 and in 1994 were madesubject to the implementation of a comprehensive action plan that was agreed upon with the

6

Government. This action plan was aimed at resolving the counterpart funding issues and roadmaintenance financing. In accordance with this plan, all arrears were paid by the Borrower (exceptfor some of the interest fee for late payment). To further help the Borrower, at the time of the thirdextension in 1995, the Bank agreed to finance arrears in counterpart funds owed to privatecontractors as of October 31, 1994 (SDR 850,000), and had the.Borrower commit itself to financingall road maintenance in 1995 (GNF4.5 billion) and to provide further counterpart funds in a timelymanner. The Resident Mission should had been more active mainly on disbursements matters.

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE

24. The Borrower's performance is rated deficient despite its satisfactory owIn assessment andthe successful contracting out to private sector of 100% of road maintenance. The Government didnot allocate adequate funds for road maintenance in a timely manner. Project's implementationlagged because of the accumulated arrears in payment of the Government's share of the project costsand lack of resources for road maintenance. These arrears caused financial difficulties for privatecontractors. The Borrower's cumbersome review procedures caused long delays in the award oftenders following the receipt of bids.

25. The shortfall in parallel-financing exacerbated the situation, as the Borrower had to look forfunding elsewhere. It would have greatly facilitated a timely execution , if the Bank and theBorrower had insured the availability of parallel financing by the time that the IDA credit wassigned.

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME

26. The project's outcome is considered satisfactory as its objectives were achieved. Theproject is expected to continue to yield significant development benefits. The road network wasextended and its level of service enhanced; routine maintenance is now totally contracted out toprivate contractors; local staff were trained and they are nlow satisfactory managing the road sector;and a new road strategy was prepared with a view to increasing the sector's efficiency.

H. FUTURE OPERATION

27. A proposed road sector management project was appraised in July 1992 but was droppedbecause conditions of public transport enterprises privatization were not met. However, at the mostrecent Public Expenditure Review in 1997, three sectors, including the road sector, were identifiedas needing immediate attention. A Road Seetor Strategy was prepared by the Borrower in 1997which could lead to a follow-up investment in integrated rural infrastructure, poverty alleviation, andcapacity-building project, provided that outcomes of this Highway IV Project are sustained.

I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED

28. The key lessons learned from project implementation are as follows:

a) Adequate funds for routine maintenance should be secured from user payments andallocated to the project as counterpart funds; Public Expenditure Reviews should play amajor role in ensuring that the Government adresses this important issue in the future.

7

b) Project counterpart funds required for contracts should be totally paid up front as anadvance payment, before the start of works.

c) Other generic issues (such as procurement, custom duties, taxes, and procedures forpayment of local funds) should be addressed globally through institutional developmentassistance. For greater efficiency and lower project costs, project management shouldbe delegated to private entities like AGETIP or a private road authority.

d) Technical assistance should be made available for the short term, with clear andmonitorable objectives and performance indicators that can be assessed frequently andincluded in the consultants' contracts.

e) Local staff should be motivated and made responsible for project implementation andsector management.

f) The development of routine maintenance executed by private local contractors should bewith support to the MTPE road management unit and to these local contractors.

8

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

A. Achievement of obiectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable(x) (x} (lx (x)

Macro policies O 0 0 L

Sector policies I l 0 0

Financial objectives I 0 L

Institutional development Ii aA l

Physical objectives i 0I aoPoverty reduction i i zl

Gender issues L 0 0 L

Other social objectives a L Cl L

Environmental objectives i i L X

Public sector management 0i L Li

Private sector development L Li Li

Other (specify) L L L L

B. Proiect sustainabilitv Li.kel Unlikely Uncertain(x) (x) (x)

HijhlyC. Bank performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

lx) (x} lx)

Identification L Li

Preparation assistance L L i

Appraisal L Li

Supervision Li Li

HighlyD. Borrower Derformance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

(x) (x) (x)

Preparation L L 3

Implementation L Li [I

Covenant compliance Li L 3l

Operation (if applicabtel L LiHighly Highly

E. Assessment of outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory(x) (x} (x) (x)

Li Ei Li Li

9

Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits

Year ofLoan/credit title Purpose approval Status

Preceding operationsl

Highway Project To rehabilitate and ensure continued maintenance Dec-1975 Completed(Cr. 596-GN) of Guinea's priority road network. Jun-1980

Second Highway Project To continue the road rehabilitation and Sep-1979 Completed(Cr. 953-GN) maintenance program begun under the first Dec-1984

Highway Project.

Conakry Port Project To increase the autonomy, efficiency and Jun-1983 Completed(Cr. 1382-GN) productivity of the Port Authority of Conakry by Dec-1988

improving its financial and managerial functionsand by training its personnel; and to reducecargo losses caused by pilferage and poorhandling and thereby reduce ocean freight costfor Guinea's imports and exports

Third Highway Project To assist Government with (a) rehabilitation and Apr-1987 Completed(Cr. 1457-GN) maintenance of the priority road network; (b) Sep-1991

institution building for road maintenance andrehabilitation; (c) staff training; and (d) definitionof medium-term priorities for the transport sector.

Transport Sector Project To improve and increase the supply and May-1987 Completed(Cr. 1815-GUI) efficiency of transport services in order to meet Dec-1993

the growing demand and eliminate existingtransport-related bottlenecks to the developmentof the productive sectors of the Borrower'seconomy.

Follow-up operationsRoad Sector To improve the management and efficiency of Appraised

Management Project inter-urban and intra-urban road transport following Jul-92approaches that ensure greater participation of then droppedprivate road transport operators and localcontractors; build capacity for sector manage-ment, optimize the impact of civil works onemployment, and mobilize adequate resourcesfor sustainable road maintenance.

10

Table 3: Project Timetable

Date actual/Steps in project cycle Date Planned latest estimate

Identification (Executive Project Summary) May-87Preparation Jul-87Pre-appraisal 06-Jan-88Appraisal Sep-87 Feb-88Negotiations May-88 Apr-88Board presentation May-88 7-Jun-88Signing 29-Jun-88Effectiveness 27-Sep-88 26-Jun-89Action Plan on Counterpart Funding Not foreseen 30-Dec-94Program completion 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-99Credit closing 31-Dec-93 31-Dec-96

11

Table 4: Cumulative Credit Disbursements: Estimated and Actual

(US$ million)

FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97

Appraisal Estimate 7.20 16.50 32.50 42.50 51.20 55.00 -- -- --

Actual 0.00 0.33 3.75 9.90 29.56 28.77 44.72 52.94 56.15

Actual as % of Estimate 0.0% 2.0% 11.5% 23.3% 57.7% 52.3% 81.3% 96.3% 102.1%

Date of Final Disbursement 14-May-97

Cumulative Estimates versus Actual Disbursements

6050

4 40 - + Appraisal

320- - Actual1001

00 ON N O_ es 0N O ON>4 >4 >. >~ >F >Y >a >

Fiscal Years

12

Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

L Key implementation indicators in 11

SAR/President's Report Estimated Actual

Construction of Dubreka-Kolaboui Road 200 km 200 kmConstruction of Mamou-Kankan Road 400 km 400 km

Spot Improvement (Cumulative)1989 500 km1990 800 km1991 1,200 km1992 1,500 km1996 -- 1,378 km

Feasibility Study of the National 600 km Done 1,000 kmPrimary Road Network, for future project

Final Design Studies:for future project 200 km 0 kmfor Fourth Highway -- Done 500 km

Table 6: Studies Included in Project

Pu'lrpose as definedStudy at appraisal/redefined Status Impact of study

I Study for the eliminationi of Technical specifications for works, Completed

critical points drainage structires, culvert inverts,

erosion control, and small bridges.2 Study of Fatala Bridge Whether to include bridge in the Completed No; there was no economic

priority progranti. justificationi.3 Geotechnical study for Boffa- Completed Implementation|

Kolabouyi Road4 Faranah-Gueckedou road Completed

study

5 Study of quarry on Boffa- Completed Implementation

Kolabouyi Road

6 Study of Kakaa Bridge Completed

7IFeasibility sttidy for Lot I Completed Impleientation

8 Feasibility study for Lot 2 Completed Implementation

9 Study for the promotion of PME Completed Satisfactory

(Small and Medium Enterprises)10 Study for Routine Maintenlance Completed Implementation

I Study of Mamou-Farannah Road Completed

12 Assessment of the MlTE staff Compleled Reorganization programand training needs.

13 Study for crossing Niger- conversion of tile old railway bridge on Coinpleied Implemenitationi -- new bridgeMamou-Kankan Niger near Kouroussa for combined

road-railway use.14 Study of Lot 4 of Mamou-Kankain Completed Implemenitationi

14

Table 7 A: Project Costs

IDA Contribution Iotal Project CostProject Components SAR Estimate Actual SAR Estimate Actual

_________________________________ _______________ - (U S$ M illion)A. Road Construction

(i) Dubreka-Kolabouyi 11.5 16.1 77.3 81.8Lot 1: Works (97.5 km) -- -- 37.9 42.2

Supervision -- -- 1.2 2.6

Lot 2: Works (99 km) 10.3 13.7 37.0 34.6Supervision 1.2 2.4 1.2 2.4

(ii) Mamou-Kankan 12.5 12.4 88.4 96.0Lots 1 & 2: Works (146 km) -- -- 33.2 37.6

Supervision -- -- 2.0 3.0Lot 3: Works (73 km) 12.5 12.4 13.9 13.2

Supervision -- -- 0.9 1.0Lot 4: Works (88 km) | 17.0 17.5

Supervision - 1.0 1.0Lot 5: Works (94 km) - 19.3 21.7

Supervision -- -- 1.1 1.0

Total Component A 24.0 28.5 165.7 177.8B. Spot Improvement

Works (1,378 km) 21.0 17.6 23.4 19.6Supervision 3.5 1.3 3.5 1.3

Total Component B 24.5 18.9 26.9 20.9C. Routine Maintenance

Tools 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.8Works -- -- 0.9Consultants 1.4 1.4

Total Component C 1.5 0.8 2.4 0.8D. T.A. Fellowships

Fellowships 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2Technical Assistance 4.6 7.6 4.6 7.6

Total Component D 5.0 7.8 5.0 7.8

Grand Total 55.0 56.1 200.0 [ 207.3

Table 7 B: Project Financing

Source SAR Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate(US$ M) Currency (US$ M)

IDA 55.0 39.7 m SDR 56.1Government 19.2 7 b GNF 8.1CFD 35.3 277 m FF 44.8AfDB 34.8 6.3 m US$ 6.3USAID 23.0 23 m US$ 23.0Italy 17.4 --

Other 15.3 -- --

OECF -- 3,853 m Y 34.5BADEA 11.8 US$ 11.8EEC -- 20 m ECU 22.7

TOTAL 200.0 207.3

15

Table 8: Economic Costs and Benefits

Road Appraisal Estimates 1988 Actual Estimate 1997________________ Traffic ADT ERR % Traffic ADT | ERR 0/0

Dubreka-Boffa-Kolaboui 13 >20Dubreka-Boffa 171 782Boffa-Kolaboui 118 502

Mamou Kankan 11 >40

Mamou-Dabola 75 221Dabola-Kankan 108

Spot Improvement 15 cars/day 12 to 32 >30 cars/day >12

16

Table 9: Status of Legal Covenants

Agreement FulfillmentText Covenant Date Description of Covenant Comment

Reference Class Status Original RevisedSection 2.02 (b) I C Continuous Borrower to open and maintain in In compliance

dollars a Special Account andoperate it in accordance withSchedule 4 of the Credit Agreement

Section 3.03 (a) 9 CD Continuous For the purposes of Parts A, B & C Compliedof the Project, the Borrower shall: with Delaysnot later than 10/31 of each year,submit to IDA for its review, programfor road construction, spot improve-ments and road maintenance to becarried out during the following year

Section 3.03 (b) 4 C Continuous Establish and maintain a road fund on In complianceterms and conditions satisfactory toIDA and replenish said fund on the1 st day of each quarter during whichthe Project is executed.

Section 3.04 (a) 10 C Continuous For the purposes of Part B the In fullBorrower shall submit to IDA for complianceapproval, model technical andstandard bidding documents for spotimprovement works

Section 3.04 (b) 10 CD Continuous Circulate, after consultation with IDA, Compliedguidelines for the identification, with Delaysselection and execution of spotimprovement works.

Section 3.05 10 CD Continuous For the purposes of Part C. I of the CompliedProject, the Borrower shall submit a with Delaysprogram to IDA for review for theperiodic maintenance of the nationalroad network by qualified andexperienced contractors.

17

Table 10: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements

[ Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance

1 OD 10.60Accounting, Financial Reporting, The audit reports were submitted with minorand Auditing delays.

2 OD 12.20 Received with minor delays.Special Accounts

3 OP 12.30 Received with minor delays.Statement of Expenditure

18

Table 11: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

Stage of Planned Revised Actualproject cycle Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$

Through Appraisal 42.3 $101Appraisal -- Board 20.5 $80Board -- effectiveness 24.2 . $27

Supervision ] 30.0 $69 28.0 $65 99.8 $277Completion 16.0 $31 8.0 $14 8.8 $7

TOTAL 46.0 $100 36.0 $80 195.6 $492

Planned and Revised. SWs are starting from FY95, whereas Actual represent the total.Actual US$ amount reflects the consultant fee, staff and consultant travel.

19

Table 12: Bank Resources: Missions

Performance ratingNumber Specialized Implemen- Develop-

Stage of Month/ of Days in staff skills tation ment Types ofProject Cycle Year Persons Field Represented a/ status objectives problems

Through Appraisal Jan-87 2 3 LO, SECMar-87 3 2 SEC,FA,HEJul-87 3 5 SEC,HE,CISOct-87 2 4 SHE,PTEC

Appraisal through Jan-88 3 14 SHE,PTEC,SPOBoard approval Mar-88 1 4 PEBoard approval Jun-88 - - - 2 1 PMP,AFthrough effectiveness Nov-88 1 5 FA 2 1 PMP

Jun-89 1 7 PE 2 1 AF, PMPSupervision I Jul-89 2 7 FA, SCIS 2 1 PMP,AF,SPSupervision 2 Oct-89 1 3 FA 2 1 PMP,AF,PPSupervision 3 Jan-90 1 4 FA 2 1 PMP,AF,PPSupervision 4 May-90 2 7 FA,HE 2 1 PMP,AF,PPSupervision 5 Sep-90 2 4 FA,HE 2 1 PMP,AF,PPSupervision 6 Jan-91 2 4 HE,TEC 2 1 PMP,AF,PPSupervision 7 May-91 3 7 HE,TEC,FA 2 1 PMP,AF,PPAN UPDATE Aug-91 - - - 3 3 CLC,PMP,AF,PPSupervision 8 Sep-91 4 5 HE,TEC,2 FA 2 2 CLC,PMP,AF,PPSupervision 9 Feb-92 4 19 HE,TEC,2 FA 2 2 CLC,PMP,AF,PPSupervision 10 Nov-92 3 4 HE,FA,PS 2 2 CLC,PMP,AF,PPSupervision 11 Aug-93 1 4 HE 3 3 CLC,PMP,AF,PPSupervision 12 Oct-93 2 6 HE,FA 2 3 CLC,PMP,PP,SPSupervision 13 Mar-94 2 15 HE,FA 3 2 CLC,PMP,AF,PP,TP,TAP,SPSupervision 14 Jul-94 2 3 HE,FA U S CLC,PMP,AF,PP,TP,TAP,SP,FPSupervision 15 Nov-94 3 5 SHE,HE,FA - Limited SupervisionSupervision 16 Jan-95 1 7 SHE - Limited SupervisionSupervision 17 May-95 1 4 SHE S S CLC,PMP,AF,PP,TP,TAP,SP,FPSupervision 18 Oct-95 1 9 SHE S S CLC,PMP,AF,PP,TP,TAP,SP,FPAN UPDATE Jun-96 - 2 SCS S S CLC,PMP,AF,PP,TP,TAP,SP,FPSupervision 19 Nov-96 I 1 7 SHE S S CLC,PMP,AF,PP,TP,TAP,SP,FPCompletion Apr-97 1 6 SHE S S

a/ Key to SpecializationLO = Loan Officer SEC = Senior Economist FA = Financial AnalystHE = Highway Engineer SHE = Senior Highway Engineer CIS = Construction Industry SpecialistPTEC = Principal Trans. Economist SPO = Senior Project Officer PE = Prinicpal EngineerPS = Port Specialist EC = Economist TE = Transport EconomistSCIS = Senior Construction Industry Specialist

b/ Key to StatusI = Problem Free 3 = Major Problems S = Satisfactory2 = Moderate problems U = Unsatisfatory

c/ Key to ProblemsPMP = Project Management Performance AF = Availability of Funds SP = Studies ProgressPP = Procurement Progress CLC = Compliance with Legal Covenants TP = Training ProgressTAP = Technical Asst. Progress FP = Financial Performance

20

APPENDIX A

REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE

Quatrieme Projet Routier (cr. 1915)

Preparation du Rapport d'Achevement du Projet

Mission de l'IDA du 26 avril au 2 mai 1997

Aide-Mimoire de la mission

1. Une mission de 1'IDA a ete effectuee en Guinee du 26 avril au 2 mai 1997 par M.Abdelghani Inal, Charge du Projet, pour preparer le rapport d'achevement du projet etdiscuter avec l'Administration en charge du secteur routier de l'atteinte des objectifs duprojet et des conclusions a en tirer. La mission a eu des entretiens avec S.E. Monsieur ElH. M. Cellou Diallo, Ministre des Travaux Publics et de l'Environnement (MTPE), MM.le Secretaire general du MTPE, le Chef du Bureau de Suivi et Developpement (BSD), leDirecteur National des Investissements Routiers (DNIR), et le Directeur National del'Entretien Routier (DNER). La mission exprime tous ses remerciements aux personnesrencontrkes pour leur totale disponibilite et leur entiere cooperation.

2. Le pr6sent aide-memoire r6sume les principales conclusions de la mission, enattendant l'envoi au Gouvernement du rapport d'achevement du proj et prepare par l'IDA:

(a) rappel des objectifs du projet et leur evaluation, et description du projet;(b) atteinte des differents objectifs du projet;(c) cofits du projet et evaluation economique;(d) facteurs ayant affecte la mise en oeuvre du proj et;(e) durabilite des investissements du projet; et(f) principales lecons tirees du projet.

A. Objectifs et description du projet.

3. Les principaux objectifs du projet etaient: (a) 1'extension progressive du reseauroutier national et 1'amelioration de son niveau de service; et (b) le renforcement descapacites du Ministere des transports et des travaux publics a gerer le r6seau routier. Pouratteindre ces objectifs, le projet comportait cinq composantes: (i) construction en routerevetue de deux principales liaisons du reeseau routier (Dubreka-Kolaboui et Marnou-Kankan, avec un total de 600km); (ii) elimination de points critiques sur une longueur de1500km, incluant reparation des systemes de drainage, rdhabilitation de ponts etrechargement; (iii) developpement de l'execution de l'entretien courant a 1'entreprise; (iv)6tudes techniques et economiques pour preparer la phase suivante de developpement dureseau routier, y inclus les etudes de factibilite de 600km de routes et les etudes

Aide-Memoire de la mission sur le rapport d'achevement du Quatrieme Projet Routier (26 avril-2 mai 1997)

21

d'execution de 2OOkm; et (v) assistance technique, formation et bourses pour le personnelde la Direction g6nerale des travaux publics (DGTP) en charge du reseau routier.

4. Les objectifs du projet etaient clairs et conformes aux objectifs du Gouvernement.Le reseau routier a e longtemps neglige et necessitait rehabilitation, amelioration etextension pour desservir correctement de vastes et riches regions du pays. L'execution del'entretien routier par de petites entreprises locales repondait a un souci d'efficacite. Lerenforcement des capacites locales par des actions de formation et par un apportd'assistance technique etait un objectif realiste. L'appui d'une assistance technique pourla mise en oeuvre du projet etait aussi normal du fait de l'experience insuffisante dupersonnel local.

B. Atteinte des objectifs du projet

5. Les objectifs physiques du projet ont ete pratiquement tous atteints, malgre ledemarrage tardif du projet. Les deux principales liaisons routieres ont ete construites enroutes revetues (A l'exception du demier lot de 94 km de la route Mamou-Kankan,finance par la Communaute Europeenne, dont l'achevement est prevu fin 1999) et leniveau de service a e ameliore sur 1378km de routes en terre en les rendant praticablespar tous temps en traitant les points critiques (assainissement, drainage, ponceaux, ponts,"bourbiers"). L'ex6cution de l'entretien routier par cantonnage et par des petitesentreprises s'est developpee, et les etudes techniques et economiques pour une secondephase de developpement du reseau routier ont e entreprises.

6. L'atteinte des objectifs financiers a e negligeable, le fonds routier ayant ealiment6 par le Budget national, de maniere irreguliere et aleatoire, avec des montantsinsuffisants pour assurer un entretien correct du reseau routier, bien que les fondsprovenant des usagers de la route par le biais des taxes et droits qu'ils paient sontlargement suffisants pour couvrir non seulement les depenses d'entretien routier, maisaussi celles d'extension et de renouvellement du r6seau routier et de paiement de la dettedfie aux emprunts des investissements routiers.

7. Les objectifs de developpement institutionnel ont ete atteints par la reorganisationde l'ancien Ministere des Transports et des Travaux Publics et la creation du Ministeredes Travaux Publics avec trois directions techniques, celle des investissements routiers,celle de l'entretien routier, et celle de la programmation et du suivi. Le MTP a aussiessaye de renforcer les directions regionales des travaux publics. Par ailleurs, voulantaugmenter l'efficacite du secteur, il a prepare une nouvelle strategie routiere qu'il sepropose de mettre en oeuvre avec un programme de reorganisation et de decentralisation,avec l'appui des partenaires au d6veloppement.

8. Des capacite's locales ont et6 developpees en matiere de gestion du reseauroutier, programmation et suivi des inxvestissements et de l'entretien routier, au contact del'assistance exterieure et par des actions de formation. Par ailleurs, l'objectif de

Aide-Memoire de la mission sur le rapport d'achevement du Quatrieme Projet Routier (26 avril-2 mai 1997)

22

-developpement des entreprises locales privies a ete atteint par l'execution de l'entretiencourant A 100% A l'entreprise.

C. Cofits et evaluation economique du projet

9. Les estimations initiales du projet ont ete depassees sur la section Dubreka-Boffa(financement CCCE) pour des problmes techniques. Les lots I et 2 (OECF) de la routeMamou-Kankan ont connu un depassement des previsions initiales duies A l'addition de lareconstruction de deux ponts, le traitement non prevu de la laterite au ciment en couchede base, et le revetement de la route en beton bitumineux au lieu d'un enduit superficielbi-couche. Le lot 3 (IDA) est reste dans les limites des estimations initiales bien que lacouche de base a aussi ete traitee au ciment. Le lot 4 (BADEA) a subi les consequencesde l'augmentation du taux de change du DM (monnaie de paiement du marche detravaux), en plus des ameliorations citees ci-avant, apportees egalement a ce lot. Lasection 5 connait des changements importants dans la conception du projet, notammentpar la construction d'un pont non initialement prevu sur le fleuve Niger, et couitera bienplus chere que prevue A l'evaluation du proj et. L'elimination des points critiques a cofutmoins que prevu A l'evaluation du projet. En conclusion, sans le pont sur le Niger (lot 5)et sans les ponts des lots 1 et 2, le depassement des previsions initiales exprimees enDollars americains est de l'ordre de 3.5%, compar6 a une baisse du taux de changemoyen du dollar par rapport au FF (monnaie de paiement des principaux marches detravaux et de consultants) sur la periode 1988-1996 de 12% environ (1$=6,18 FF en1988, et 1$=4,95FF en 1995).

10. L'evaluation economique du projet etait basee sur les productions agricoles desregions situees dans les zones d'influence des deux routes qui ont et construites et sur lesdebits journaliers moyens, pour les sections traitees dans le cadre de l'F1imination despoints critiques. Pour la route Boffa-Kolaboui, les statistiques disponibles pour l'ann6e1995 aussi bien pour les productiorns agricoles que pour le trafic automobile lui-meme,montrent que les previsions faites lors de l'evaluation du projet sont tres largementdepassees; la rentabilite de cette route est certainement bien superieure aux previsionsinitiales. La production agricole de la zone d'influence de la route Mamou-Kankan adepasse egalement les previsions faites, a l'exception de celles liees A la production ducoton. Toutefois, la baisse de trafic dfie au coton serait largement compensee par le traficdu aux activites minieres (region de Siguiri) et qui avoisinerait 80 000 t/an (plus que ledouble des previsions de tonnage de coton en 1996). Le taux de rentabilte de la liaison estcertainement superieur A celui prevu lors de l'evaluation, particulierement pour le lot 3dont les couits n'ont pas depasse les previsions. Pour les sections traitees en eliminationdes points critiques, les donnees actuelles de trafic donnent des valeurs superieures auxprevisions; les cofits previsionnels n'ayant pas ete depasses, la rentabilite est superieure Acelle qui etait prevue. Globalement, la rentabilite du projet pourrait etre appreciee commelargement superieure aux previsions faites lors de l1'valuation du projet.

D. Facteurs ayant affecte la mise en oeuvre du projet

Aide-Memoire de la mission sur le rapport d'achevement du Quatnrime Projet Routier (26 avril-2 mai /997)

23

11. Le demarrage lent du projet etait dfi, au depart, a la reorganisation du Ministerecharge du projet, a la mise en place tres lente de la nouvelle organisation au MTP, et aumanque W'exp6rience du personnel. Les longues procedures de passation des marchesainsi que celles liees a des procedures administratives (dedouanement des equipements etmarchandises importes pour le projet, changement de regime de taxation des entreprises,long delai pour le paiement des contreparties locales, etc) ont entramin (et entrainenttoujours) des retards certains dans l'execution du projet. L'insuffisance de la comptabilitedu projet (engagements et depenses) n'a pas permis de proceder a temps a desengagements de depenses pour les travaux d'elimination des points critiques.

E. Durabilite des investissements du projet

12. La durabilite du projet ne peut etre assuree que si les routes construites ourehabilitees dans le cadre du projet ainsi que le reste du reseau routier sont entretenuscorrectement (entretien courant et entretien periodique). Pour cela, des ressourcesadequates doivent etre affectees au Fonds routier en temps utile pour mener a bien lesoperations d'entretien du reseau. Pour ameliorer l'efficacite de l'allocation des ressourceset de l'entretien du reseau, l'organisation de l'entretien serait a revoir pour mieuximpliquer et responsabiliser les directions regionales, et associer les usagers a la gestiondu reseau routier. Les capacites locales seraient a developper davantage, aussi bien ausein de I'administration que dans le secteur prive. Sans amelioration dans le volume desdotations financieres pour l'entretien routier, leur affectation rationnelle et leur utilisationefficiente accompagnee d'un renforcement qualitatif des structures, la durabilite du projetserait incertaine.

F. Principales Jecons tirees de 1'execution du projet

13. Les principales le,ons a tirer de I 'execution du projet pourraient se resumercomme suit:

(a) la disponibilite de fonds adequats pour l'entretien routier et l'executioncorrecte de l'entretien routier sont les conditions de succes de toutepolitique routiere et devraient etre le prealable a tout investissement;

(b) les capacites locales (administration, secteur prive et usagers) devraientetre impliquees davantage dans la gestion du reseau routier, laprogrammation, et 1'execution des travaux, en creant les conditionsnecessaires a leur ddveloppement, en les responsabilisant, et en lesmotivant;

(c) les procedures administratives devraient etre simplifiees et les tracasseriesdouanieres et fiscales clarifiees avant le demarrage de tout projet, ou alorsdes procedures specifiques claires et rapides devraient etre arretees etmises en oeuvre pour chaque projet; et

Aide-Memoire de la mission sur le rapport d'achevement du Quatrieme Projet Routier (26 avril-2 mai 1997)

24

(d) I'assistance technique exterieure devrait intervenir sur des periodescourtes, avec des objectifs clairs, et des indicateurs de performances aatteindre mesurables et contractualises; le personnel local en formationavec cette assistance technique devrait etre sanctionne positivement ounegativement selon les resultats atteints.

14. La mission reste persuadee que la nouvelle politique du Gouvemement dans lesecteur routier (en cours de finalisation par le MTPE) apportera les changementsnecessaires pour une meilleure gestion du reseau routier, son entretien adequat, et sasauvegarde, seuls garants de son extension pour les besoins de l'economie et dudeveloppement. L'importance A accorder A 1'entretien routier dans la definition despriorites du secteur et du Gouvemement permettra un developpement harmonieux dureseau routier et des couits de transport raisonnables.

15. La mission prend note que le rapport d'achevement du projet prepare par leGouvernement sera envoye A l'IDA avant le 25 mai 1997.

Conakry le 2 mai 1997

Abdelghani InalCharge de projet

Transports Groupe 2R$gion Afrique

Aide-Mdmoire de la mission sur le rapport d'achevement du Quatrieme Projet Routier (26 avril-2 mai 1997)

25

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF THE BORROWER

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

Fourth Highway Project (Cr. 1915)

1. Project Design

Project objectives and components were well designed.

However, the following issues which were not addressed, would have made theproject impact higher and the implementation easier: (i) the spot improvementprogram would have taken into account the consequences of traffic increase onbridges not improved; (ii) the project had no subcomponent to support localcontractors in road maintenance; (iii) guidelines for knowledge transfer were not partof the technical assistance design; and (iv) the tools for an efficient road managementwere not planned in the project.

2. Project Preparation

- Project preparation (studies not available) and participation of regional staff wasinsufficient.

3. Project Implementation

- Overall the project execution was satisfactory and its main objectives were reached.

- The physical objectives were reached with delays which were due to: (i) differentdonor procedures and lack of coordination and harmonization in project conceptionand planning; (ii) the weakness of the technical studies available at project appraisal;(iii) the lack of experience of local staff on Bank procedures: (iv) the lack of localcounterpart funds; and (v) the change in taxation rules without preparation of financestaff in managing this change.

- The relations among local staff and consultants in work supervision were not easy,and the results of technical assistance in knowledge transfer were insufficient.

- Reallocation of funds to allow the government pay the counterpart arrears from theCredit, good technical assistance, commitment and competency of local staff, andgood collaboration between Bank and Administration had a positive impact onproject implementation.

26

4. Borrower Performance

The Borrower performance is satisfactory, in spite of its feeble participation inproject design and preparation that led to the total privatization of execution ofroutine maintenance and concentration of technical assistance into the ministry.

Frequent Ministry organization changes, lack of counterpart funds, weak projectmonitoring since technical assistance departure should be mentioned. However,procurement and payment procedures have improved.

5. Bank Performance

- Overall, the Bank performance was satisfactory, with steady supervision missions,listening to Borrower problems and comprehensive.

- However, Bank impact on project implementation would have been more efficient ifthe following conditions were met: (i) higher participation of the Resident Missionin project implementation, mainly in disbursement procedures and local staff trainingon disbursement procedures; (ii) better participation of Borrower staff in projectdesign, preparation and appraisal.

- The Bank decision to introduce sector projects involving the other transportsubsectors led to an interruption of Bank involvement in the road sector.

6. Lessons Learned

- Involvement of Borrower staff in project design and preparation, sound design oftechnical assistance and training, and designation of a project coordinating unitwould improve future project preparation and implementation.

- In order to preserve Bank continuity in the road sector, even though through othersector project, the Bank conditionalities should not be cross sectors.

- Project preparation and appraisal should be based on actual and serious studies.

- The execution of road maintenance by local contractors would be progressive, basedon technical and financial capacity of contractors which should be supported bytechnical assistance.

27

RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU QUATRIEME PROJET ROUTIER

PARTIE DE L'EMPRUNTEUR

Credit N° 1915 GUI

1. Introduction

Le quatrieme Projet Routier, finance par plusieurs bailleurs de fonds, dont la Banque mondialecomme chef de file, comporte cinq composantes. La description du Projet figure dans la partie Idu rapport d'achevement, dont la redaction est assuree par la Banque Mondiale. Elle estcependant r6sumee en annexe au pr6sent rapport. Les objectifs du projet, concu comme lapremiere etape d'un programme d'investissement et d'entretien A long terme, 6taient:(a) d'6tendre progressivement le reseau routier national et le niveau de service qu'il assure et(b) d'accroitre la capacite du Ministere des Travaux Publics A gerer ce reseau.

Le cout previsionnel du Projet au moment de son evaluation etait estime A 200 millions dedollars US en 1988, dont 55 millions de dollars US de financement IDA. L'estimation du cofitdu Projet a son achevement ressort A 207,3 millions de dollars US, pour un financement del'IDA de 56,1 millions de dollars US. L'intervention des differents bailleurs de fonds du Projetest donnee ci - apres:

IDA 56,1 millions de $ US

CFD 44,8 millions de $ US

USAID 23 millions de $ US

OECF 34,5 millions de $ US

BADEA 11,8 millions de $ US

BAD 6,3 millions de $ US

FED 22,7 millions de $ US

Gouvernement 8,1 millions de $ US

Total 207,3 millions de $ US

Le present rapport concerne essentiellement la partie financee par l'IDA. Le projet a connu unsucces. Globalement les principaux objectifs ont e atteints meme si un certain nombre deproblbmes ont ete rencontre aux differents stades du projet.

2 Conception du Projet

Le Projet a et en general bien concu. Le quatrieme Projet Routier a et initie dans la continuitedu Projet Sectoriel Transport (PST) qui, bien qu'ayant permis d'identifier de nombreux besoins enmatiere d'investissement et d'entretien du reseau routier, n'avait repondu qu'aux besoins eninvestissement des sous-secteurs portuaire et aeroportuaire.

28

Les differentes composantes du Projet, telles que definies en annexe au present rapportrepondaient done aux contraintes du sous secteur routier guineen, A savoir l'insuffisance dureseau routier bitumd, le manque d'entretien dont souffrait le rdseau routier, et la faible capacitedes cadres nationaux A gerer l'execution de travaux A 1'entreprise. En effet, deux aspectsfondamentaux du quatrieme Projet Routier refletent les solutions apport6es d'une part auxcontraintes du sous-secteur routier et d'autre part aux le,ons tirees de 1'execution du PST:

- un accent particulier dans le cadre de ce Projet a ete mis sur la construction etI'amelioration du reseau routier bitume pour environ 600 km;

- une attention particuliere a egalemenit ete apportee A I'amelioration de la capacitedirecte de I'administration A preparer et suivre des projets routiers, tant par laformation de ses cadres, que par l'appui d'une assistance technique.

Cependant, I'impact du projet aurait ete plus important et son execution plus facile, si laconception du Projet avait integre les elements suivants:

- dans la definition du programme d'elimination des points critiques, I'etat dedegradation des routes et pistes en terre a ete sous estimee. En effet, une foisrehabilites, les points critiques consideres de premiere urgence, le trafic induitconduisait tres rapidement A des ruptures d'ouvrages consid6res de 2eme urgence, ouA I'impraticabilite de tron,ons se comportant comme des canaux d'ecoulement d'eau.Aussi, le 2eme programme d'elimination des points critiques a retenu comme niveaud'amenagement des itineraires, la reparation ou reconstruction de tous les ouvragesdefectueux et le reprofilage lourd sur toute la longueur des itineraires programmes.

- la privatisation totale de 1'execution de l'entretien routier n'a pas suffisamment prisen compte la situation objective des PME du secteur des TP en Guinee. Aucuneetude sur les capacites du secteur prive tant du point de vue technique, que financiern'a ete realisee. Ainsi, les mesures d'accompagnement A cette privatisation de1'execution de 1'entretien routier (mise en place d'un environnement reglementaireincitatif; prise en compte de la progressivite dans le passage de la regie aux travauxexecutes par des PME), n'ont-elles pas et integrees au projet.

- le mecanisme de transfert effectif de competence a manque dans la conception deI'assistance technique. Par ailleurs, on aurait pu prevoir une assistance a la DGTPpour la mise en place des outils de gestion efficace du personnel.

- les moyens materiels pour assurer une gestion efficace du reseau n'ont pas etprevus.

3. Preparation du Projet

La preparation du Projet a e marquee par l'insuffisance des dtudes disponibles. En effet, lesetudes de faisabilite technique et economique pour les constructions de routes, realisees par des

29

cabinets exterieurs, etaient obsoletes au moment de la preparation du Projet. Aussi, la faisabiliteeconomique a 6t6 appreciee par les experts de la Banque Mondiale au moment de l'evaluation duprojet. Avant le demarrage des travaux sur certains tron9ons, les etudes techniques d'executionont e reprises par des bureaux prives exterieurs, sur financement des bailleurs de fonds. Cettesituation a conduit A un retard dans le d6marrage des travaux.La preparation du Projet a egalement ete marque par une faible participation des cadres nationauxdu fait notamment d'une centralisation excessive au niveau des Directeurs.

4. Execution du projet

Dans l'ensemble, le quatrieme Projet Routier a ete ex6cute de fa,on satisfaisante. Les objectifsprincipaux du projet ont e atteints mais A des degres divers en fonction des composantes.

- au plan des realisations physiques: Le programme de construction et de rehabilitationde routes revetues a e execute. Les itineraires prevus ont ete realises. Cependant, lerythme d'execution du Projet a varie d'un troncon A un autre en fonction du bailleurde fonds. Ainsi, I'execution de certains tron,ons a souffert d'un important retard,imputable aux procedures des bailleurs de fonds concernes et a un manqued'harmonisation du point de vue des differents bailleurs de fonds sur l'evolution del'ensemble du Projet. Ces retards ont occasionne un depassement financier sur lesprestations du contr6le des travaux. Concernant, I'entretien routier. le programmed'elimination des points critiques (EPC) qui prevoyait un traitement de 1500 km deroutes, a permis de traiter 1373 km. Au niveau des ouvrages 6 ouvrages metalliquesont ete realises.

- au plan des etudes techniques et de faisabilite: 1400 km de routes et 15 ouvrages defranchissement sur le reseau national ont fait l'objet d'etude de faisabilite, contre 600km de routes pr6vus dans le cadre du Projet. Cependant, aucune etude techniqued'execution n'a et realisee, compte tenu des faibles rentabilites obtenues sur lestron,ons concernes et de la decision de la Banque de conditionner lesdites etudes al'avancement de la preparation du Projet Sectoriel Routier (PSR), alors que le projetprevoyait l'execution d'etude technique sur 200 km de routes, dont la rentabiliteaurait ete etablie au cours des etudes de faisabilite.

- au plan financier: L'enveloppe du financement IDA a permis la realisation descomposantes prevues dans l'accord de credit, malgre la prise en compte d'une partiedes arrier6s de contreparties national es sur le financement IDA.

- au plan de l'organisation de la DGTP : La separation des investissements, del'entretien dans l'organisation a ete realisee avec la creation de la Direction Nationaledes Investissements Routiers (DNIR) et de la Direction Nationale de l'EntretienRoutier (DNER). Cependant, depuis le depart de I'assistance technique, qui assuraitla coordination de 1'execution du Projet, la production des rapports d'avancement etdes tableaux de bord de suivi physique et financier du Projet est devenue irreguliere.

30

au plan de la formation :des bourses de formation ont ete accordbes aux agents de laDNIR et de la DNER, et des voyages d'etudes ont ete organisees aupres de plusieursorganismes techniques, notamment dans la sous region. La formation sur le tas a eteassur6e par la participation des agents de la DNER et de la DNIR a la preparation desDossiers d'Appel d'Offres et au suivi des chantiers. Cependant force est de constaterque les taches des agents detaches sur les missions de contr6le apparaissent quelquepeu difficiles. Les relations avec les bureaux de contr6le n'ont pas ete faciles.

au plan de I'assistance technique: L'assistance technique mise en place a fait preuvede grande competence. Elle a ete logee au niveau des deux directions nationales(DNIR et DNER). Les objectifs directs assignes A l'assistance technique ont 6t6atteints quant A la gestion du quatrieme projet routier. Cependant, le transfert deconnaissance aux cadres nationaux n'a pas ete au niveau des esp6rances de ceux-ci.II est indeniable toutefois, que les capacites de gestion de l'infrastructure routiere desagents de l'administration des TP ont connu une nette amelioration.

au plan du developpement des PME: le projet a permis la naissance de quelquesPME d'execution de travaux d'entretien routier et de tacherons prives. Cependant larealisation des travaux d'entretien routier par les PME nationales a connu deserieuses difficultes (important retard dans l'execution des travaux, manque demat6riels adequats, manque de surface suffisante financiere et d'experience en lamatiere). Ainsi, ces PME n'ont pu etre associe au programme d'e1imination despoints critiques. Par ailleurs, aucune expertise nationale privee en matiere d'etude etde contr6le n'a emerge.

Les facteurs ayant affecte negativement le projet au cours de son ex6cution sont les suivants:

la faiblesse de la qualite des etudes au moment de l'evaluation du projet par laBanque, qu'il s'agisse d'etude technique ou d'etude de faisabilite. Cette situation aconduit A un depassement des quantites sur la composante Dubreka-Boffa financ6epar la CFD. Tirant les le,ons de cette situation, la Banque a fait executer une etudetechnique sur le troncon Boffa-Kolabouyi avant le demarrage des travaux. Cetteetude, a partir de laquelle le quantitatif du marche a ete reajuste, a permis d'eviter desdepassements sur ce troncon;

l'absence de coordination efficace entre les bailleurs de fonds;

le manque de familiarite des cadres nationaux avec les procedures de decaissementde la Banque, notamment celles relatives A la gestion du compte special et au suivi dumontant disponible par composante du projet;

- le manque de disponibilite r6guli6re de fonds de contreparties nationales;

- le changement en 1994 de la fiscalite applicable aux marches publics de travaux, quis'est traduit par la fin des exonerations fiscales et douanieres sans que les proceduresde regularisation au niveau du Ministere des Finances n'aient ete maitris6es.

31

Les e16ments ayant affecte positivement l'ex6cution du projet sont les suivants:

- les composantes du projet ont et modifiees pour prendre en compte sur lefinancement IDA, le paiement d'une partie des arrieres de contreparties dugouvernement guineen;

- la bonne selection et la competence de I'assistance technique;

- la competence et la disponibilite des cadres nationaux;

- la bonne collaboration entre la Banque et I'adrninistration.

5. Performance de l'Emprunteur

D'une maniere generale, la performance de l'Emprunteur peut etre jugee satisfaisante, bien quefaible pendant les phases de conception et de preparation du projet.

En effet, I'implication des competences nationales au stade de la conception et de la preparationdu projet a e insuffisante. Ceci s'est notamment traduit d'une part par la privatisation totale etsans transition de 1'entretien routier et d'autre part par une repartition desequilibree deI'assistance technique et des opportunit6s de formation, qui ont 6t6 concentre exclusivement auniveau des directions nationales (DNIR et DNER).

Par ailleurs, il y a lieu de noter les insuffisances suivantes:

- modifications frequentes de l'organigramme du Ministere;

- non paiement des contreparties nationales;

- baisse de la capacite de suivi du projet depuis le depart de l'assistance technique, dufait notamment de la non designation d'une structure dfiment mandate pour assurer lacoordination du Projet.

Neanmoins, des efforts ont ete accomplis par l'administration au niveau des points suivants:

- diminution des delais en ce qui concerne le circuit et les procedures de passation desmarches et de paiement des ddcomptes. Le nombre de visas e reduit. Par ailleurs,I'approbation des marches d'entretien de montant superieur ou egal a 200 millions deGNF, sur financement du Budget National, est du ressort du Ministre des TravauxPublics;

- amelioration de la coordination interministerielle au cours de 1'execution du Projet,notamment avec les Ministeres charges du Plan et des Finances.

32

6. Performance de la Banque

La performance de la Banque a ete satisfaisante dans 1'ensemble. En effet:

- les missions de supervision de la Banque ont e regulieres, ce qui a permis un suiviad6quat et la resolution continue des difficultes au cours du deroulement du projet;

- tout au long de l'execution du Projet, la Banque a prete une oreille attentive auxpreoccupations des autorites guineennes, en faisant preuve de comprehension. Aubesoin, des ajustements ont e apportes pour rendre plus efficace le deroulement duProjet ( prise en compte d'une partie des arrieres de contreparties nationales sur lefinancement de la Banque, equipement des BRER).

Cependant, l'intervention de la Banque aurait eu un impact plus efficace sur le deroulement duProjet, si:

- la mission residente de la Banque, compte tenu de sa proximite avec les agencesnationales d'execution, etait plus impliquee dans la gestion du Projet notamment ence qui concerne les procedures de decaissement;

- des precautions etaient prises au niveau de la Banque, pour assurer une coherence deson intervention a I'occasion des changements de charges de projets;

- il avait 6te procede au debut du Projet, a une explication des methodes et proceduresde la Banque aux differents responsables de l'administration, notamment ceux encharge du suivi des decaissements;

- lors de la conception, de la preparation et de l'evaluation du Projet, les cadresguineens avaient ete mieux associes.

Au niveau du sous-secteur routier, la continuit6 de l'intervention de la Banque s'est trouv6einterrompue, du fait de la volonte de la Banque de mettre en place des projets sectoriels,impliquant les autres sous-secteurs du secteur des transports.

7. Lecons a tirer

Pour la preparation des futurs projets avec la Banque, une attention particuliere devrait etreaccordee aux preoccupations suivantes:

- une implication des cadres nationaux dans la conception, et la preparation des projetspourrait permettre d'eviter certaines difficultes lors de 1'execution;

- une identification judicieuse des besoins en assistance technique et en formation, unedefinition precise du transfert de competence attendu de I'assistance technique versles cadres nationaux constituent un facteur determinant pour la reussite des projets;

- la preparation des futurs projets doit prendre en compte la necessite d'eviter unerupture au niveau de l'intervention de la Banque dans le sous-secteur routier. Aussi,

33

il serait judicieux, a defaut de pouvoir monter une op6ration uniquement routiere,d'6viter des conditionalites croisees entre sous-secteurs;

la preparation et 1'evaluation des projets doivent etre basees sur des etudes fiables etrecentes tant au niveau technique qu&au niveau economique;

la structure chargee de la gestion et du suivi des projets doit etre designee de manierea permettre l'elaboration reguliere des tableaux de bord physique et financier, ainsique les rapports d'avancement des projets. Ceci permettra a I'administrationd'apporter les mesures correctives appropriees et de facon diligente, pendantl'execution des projets;

la realisation des travaux d'entretien routier par les PME nationales devrait etregraduelle et tenir compte de la capacite technique et financiere des entreprisesciblees, pour laquelle une assistance pourrait etre con,ue.

34

ANNEXE

La pr6sente annexe a pour objet de decrire de maniere succinte les differentes composantes duquatrieme Projet Routier.

1. Reconstruction, amelioration et revetement

Le Projet a prdvu de reconstruire et d'ameliorer. notamment au moyen d'un enduitbitume, deux principaux axes du r6seau routier national - la route c6tiere Dubreka -Kolaboui (200 km) et un troncon de la route principale reliant Mamou a Kankan, versl'Est (400 km), en conservant dans 1'ensemble leur trace actuel mais en ameliorant leursprofils en long et en travers. Ces deux tron9ons comprendront une chaussee a deux voiesde circulation, de 7 m pour la route Dubreka-Kolaboui et de 6 m pour la route Mamou-Kankan.

2. Elimination des points critiques

Le Projet a prevu de financer les etudes techniques, la supervision et la realisation destravaux d'elimination des points critiques portant sur environ 1.500 km de routes nonrevetues appartenant au reseau routier national. Ces travaux devront porterprincipalement sur la construction de systemes de drainage, la remise en etat desouvrages d'art, ainsi que la reparation et le rechargement des troncons impraticables,avec travaux de terrassement selon les besoins pour eliminer les points critiques.

3. Entretien routier

Entretien periodique: Du fait des travaux de remise en etat du reseau actuel de routesrevetues et des composantes revetement et amenagement localise proposees, 1'entretienp,riodique n'aura besoin de commencer qu'environ cinq ans apres le lancement duprojet. Le Projet prevoit une politique de sous-traitance de l'entretien periodique, derenforcement institutionnel sur la formation d'un nombre limite d'ingenieurs de1'entretien qui seront amenes a diriger les travaux d'entretien periodique effectues a1'entreprise.

Entretien courant :L'entretien courant du reseau routier national 6tait du ressort des 36subdivisions de la DGTP, mais celles-ci n'ont pas fonctionne du fait d'un manqued'organisation, de moyens techniques et de ressources financieres. Dans le cadre duTroisieme Projet Routier, la DGTP a mis au point une methode de cantonnage; cettemethode, testee dans le cadre d'un projet pilote inclus dans le Projet du Secteur desTransports, consiste a faire effectuer les travaux de d6broussaillage et d'entretien dessystemes de drainage par les villageois eux-memes. Aussi, le Projet a prevu lefinancement par la DGTP du coOt de cette main-d'oeuvre, qui sera chargee de l'entretiencourant de trongons determines, longs de 4 km en moyenne. En outre , un groupe depetits entrepreneurs sera forme aux techniques de realisation de ces travaux danscertaines regions.

35

4. Etudes de faisabilite et projet d'execution

Le projet a pr6vu des fonds pour la rdalisation d'une serie d'etudes de faisabilite portantsur 600 km de routes environ et de projets d'ex6cution portant 200 km. Les itinerairesdont les taux de rentabilite economique seront superieurs A 10 %, feront l'objet d'etudesd'execution, pour autant que le ddbut de leur r6alisation soit programme dans les troisannees suivant la realisation des desdites etudes.

5. Octroi de bourses de formation au personnel de la DGTP et assistance technique

Le projet a prevu des bourses pour permettre aux fonctionnaires de recevoir uneformation dans des pays voisins, et notamment A l'Ecole Nationale Superieure desTravaux Publics en C6te d'Ivoire. Ces bourses devront &re octroyees sur la base d'unprogramme de formation des candidats A soumettre A l'IDA.Le projet a prevu en outre des fonds pour poursuivre l' assistance technique deja fournie Ala DGTP dans le cadre du Projet du Secteur des Transports, afin de permettre A la DGTPde planifier, superviser et gerer les travaux routiers.

I T o D a k cr S G I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I~~~~~~ M A L ~~~~~~~~~~~ IBRD 2101

J I~~~~~~ P

M)A~~ ALE NIGECHAD

EEEi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ I' "' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ J , o ooo12t

~~AN ZAIRE ~~~~~~~$ f .... ribaor '0' ~~~~~~~~~CoaKoubia

T. Bola= Bok

Koloboui ~ ~ ~ ar -eou

l<&f IDA/USAID Fyja~~~~~~~lumaID

GCYA

ss rma~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eres uo

NATIONAL RDADUSAID EMSF

~~~ovedRUd~~~~~~~~~~~~~~y{ig~~~~~~~~~Eyeo ~~~~~~~~~~~9Ee~~~~~~~ct~~aR~~ad4bb, Qf~4~Jr~dm Long ~~rm ~rogkour

4 r~~~~~~~~~~~

n4 - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .- !oroto

7,,,4 $ l 1* /to 9.I6e ofyj o on n'-

........... bb,*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"oOnoiBeyla ~ ~ ~~JU, 10

IMAGING

Report No.: 1864gType: ICR