Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitionervs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., respondentPonente: Puno

Facts:

MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the next day.

After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA question the denial and appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St. then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed action.

On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no authority to order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.

Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune St. to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdividion roads to public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of MMDA? (4)Was Bel-Air denied of due process despite the several meetings held between MMDA and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with unclean hands?

MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality.

**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and administrative region in 1995. And the administration of metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which includes, transport and traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are limited to the acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies and installation of a system and administration. MMDA was not granted with legislative power.

Ruling:(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune St.

(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.

Petition Denied.

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of AppealsRodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued severalsuspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.ISSUE:Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.HELD:Yes.Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.Humberto Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation197 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal ProtectionClauseMunicipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in ImperioIn1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was createdbyPresidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shallregulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existingfranchiseor permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:Section 1.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates theequal protectionclause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.Basco et alargued that PD 1869violates theequal protectionclause becauseit legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities likeManila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as thefranchiseholder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.ISSUE:1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates theequal protectionclause.2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.HELD:1. No.Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of theequal protectionis not clearly explained in Bascospetition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protectionof the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protectionclause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such guidelines andlimitationas the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines andlimitationas Congress may provide.Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.

Ismael Mathay, Jr. vs Court of AppealsIn November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created a Civil Service Unit (CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City mayor Brigido Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was passed providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be automatically absorbed into the QC Department ofPublic Orderand Safety (QC-DPOS). During the term of the next mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined that PD 51 never became a law because it was never published. Mathay then did not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel, at the same time, they were not reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU personnel before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually, the CSC Commissioner ruled that based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel to QC-DPOS.ISSUE:Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.HELD:No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption of the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayorthe power to chooseas to who should fill said office. Just like in the national government, the local sanggunian can only create an office, it cannot choose the personnel who should fill such office that is a power vested in the local chief executive (mayor). This is also clearly provided for in the Local Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive.The power of the city council orsanggunian, on the other hand, is limited tocreating,consolidatingandreorganizingcity officers and positions supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the mayors right to choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never came into existence for it has no legal basis to speak of. It created no right hence the QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.