LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS

LANCE M. APOLONIO LEGAL ETHICS

Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000. 322 SCRA 529

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant Vs.ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent

Misrepresentation and Non-payment of Bar Membership Dues FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption, is the payment of membership dues.

CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

CANON 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen.HELD: Guilty. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues. In addition, by indicating in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility that provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. A.M. No. AC 4762 dated June 28, 2004

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,vs.ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.

FACTS:

Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complaint with the Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo for "having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00" against Atty Pepito C. Presquito (respondent). Mr. Espino and the respondent entered into an agreement for a purchase of land by the latter from the former. The price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments. Respondent issues post dated checks as payment. Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. The land waseventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.The 8 post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainants numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.Respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless.Respondents claim that he and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr Espino will not encash the checks until the right of way problem has been resolved. In addition, respondent claims that the balance would be offset with the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espinos son in a criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent failed to act with candor and fairness towards the complainant.

HELD:Complainants testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement between respondent and complainants late husband for the sale of the latters land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-rightof- way.The responded failed to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the 8 dishonored checks, respondents indifference to complainants entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late husband, first by allowing the 8 checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics.

A.C. No. 4585 November 12, 2004

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainantVs.ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent

Petition for Disbarment for having been Convicted in a Crime involving Moral Turpitude

FACTS:

This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City. Respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8, 000. He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.

RULES:

Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.Sec. 12, Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."

HELD:

Atty. Francisco P. Martinez, respondent, is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney."A.C. No. 716 January 30, 1969

EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainantVs.PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent

Confusion and Prolongation of the Cadastral Suit

FACTS:

A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an Affidavit ofAdjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter of fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he introduced the same in evidence. Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, having caused confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence containing a false statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the family litigations between his client and complainant, which are rooted in succession rights and that respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Carranza violated his oath for prolongation of the cadastral suit.

HELD:

Pedro B. Carranza, respondent, is reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with.Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice.Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned.Even if there be no intent to deceive, a lawyer whose conduct betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not willful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitionerVs.CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, Commission on Appointment and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has the 10 years of practice of law requirement for him to assume such office.

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of Law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

(In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency) Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION, petitioner

Reinstatement of a Disbarred Member of the Bar

FACTS:

Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, the vote being unanimous with the late. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.

RULE:

Effect of non-payment of dues: Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Marcial A. Edillon shall be disbar and strick out his name in theRoll of Attorneys due to his stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues.Whether or not refusal to pay his IBP member dues invade his constitutional rights.

HELD:

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon. On the petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for reinstatement to the Roll of Attorneys, appearing that he had fully paid his delinquent membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and submitted to the IBP Board of Governors a verified application for reinstatement together with an undertaking to abide by all By-laws and resolutions by said Board in the event of reinstatement, the Court Resolved to grant the petition of Mr. Marcial A. Edillon to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar. He was allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after payment of the required fees.

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983 ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainantVs.ELMO S. ABAD, respondent

FACTS:

Mr. Elmo S. Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. Respondent Abads circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law. He should fulfill the two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.

Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.

HELD:

Mr. Elmo S. Abad is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to the Court within ten (10) days from notice, failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment. The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALEROVs.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY

Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

ISSUE:Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer'sCertificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to endwith the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbeforereproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is asunprecedented as it is unprofessional.

HELD:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen was suspended from the practice of law until further orders; the suspension was to take effect immediately. The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity which cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it was viewed that the suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefore left the court no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, the court are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to the Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

FACTS:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.The Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.Petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/ letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not is Argosino allowed to take the Lawyers Oath?Whether or not is Argosino morally fit to practice the legal profession?

HELD:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was allowed to take the lawyer's oath on a date set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession. In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. The various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. They are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainantvs.ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondentAdministrative Complaint for DisbarmentFACTS:On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.

RULES:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Dominador M. Narag violated the Canon of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers.

HELD:Dominador M. Narag is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. The Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitionersVs.HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and MAC-ARTHUR INTERNATIONAL MINERALS CO., respondentsFACTS:Original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Honorable Gaudencio Cloribel, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from continuing with the hearing of Civil Case No. 67400 of said Court, and from enforcing a restraining order issued therein on November 16, 1966, as well as to annul an order of respondent Judge, in the same case, dated December 9, 1966.From the records of said Case No. 67400, that the Company had no cause of action against petitioners and that, accordingly, respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its restraining order of November 16, 1966, and its order of December 9, 1966, refusing, in effect, to set aside said order of November 16, 1966.

First Contempt Case.The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International Minerals Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Santiago and Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the MR. The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just intended to be in the MR's rough draft.

Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained language which the Court found disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of town when the decision was written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of graft and corruption in the judiciary. The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that it the motion was already prepared by Santiago when he took the case as was verified by Morton Meads, an employee from MacArthur.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lawyers should be cited in contempt?

HELD:Writ granted. Orders of respondent Judge dated November 16, and December 9, 1966, are annulled and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the present case made permanent, with costs against respondent, Mac-Arthur International Minerals Company. Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985ADRIANO E. DACANAY,complainantvs.BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.,respondentsFACTS:Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo).

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,complainantvs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA,respondentFACTS:In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361.On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmedin totothe decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law.On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.Revised Rules of Court:Sec. 27.Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)Sec. 28.Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorneyfrom practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)Issue:Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.

HELD:The Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.

A.C. No. 5141.September 29, 1999

PRISCILA L. TOLEDO,complainant

vs.

ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS,respondent

FACTS:On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month.To guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit B).After the lapse of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation.Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline.On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo.Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the complaint.According to the Supreme Court, the general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law is warranted.

ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Erlinda Abalos is subject for disciplinary action for not paying her financial obligation under the jurisdiction of Commision on Bar Discipline of IBP.Whether or not Atty. Erlinda Abalos is subject for disciplinary sanction for disregard ofits lawful orders.

HELD: No, the Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint for collection of a sum of money which she borrowed in her private capacity. The complaint lodged against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she committed in the exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As the Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the necessary collection case in court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her. Yes, her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer. It still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one month is warranted.

January 9, 1973IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINESFACTS:On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the saidReportand the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that"this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustiveReportof the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.ISSUE:

Whether or not: (a) the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar; (b) the integrationof the Bar is constitutional; (c) the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time.HELD:The Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

A.C. No. 4758.April 30, 1999VICTOR NUNGA,complainantvs.ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY,respondentFACTS:Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed.It was concurred with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents.Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11, Title IV, Book I, Revised Administrative Code).He tried to impress upon the investigating commissioner that since 1965 to date he has always been commissioned as a notary public.Yet, he was unable to rebut complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question.Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action.For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law.Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes.These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Venencio Viray subject for disciplinary action for notarizing a document when was not commissioned to do so.HELD:The Court adopted the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors.As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of the Resolution.

A.C. No. 4369.November 28, 1997PIKE P. ARRIETA,complainantvs.ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA,respondent

FACTS:Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale.Complainant averred that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 1993 making it appear that some of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and signatories thereto when in truth and in fact, all three were already dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale.Jesus T. Bonilla died on August 22, 1992 while Leonardo P. Toledano died on November 1, 1992.Edelina T. Bonilla allegedly died on or about June 11, 1992.By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private document into a public document.By certifying the Deed, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (2) that they are all personally known to him; (3) that they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (4) that he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.Respondents act of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, they being his former clients, constitutes misconduct.But this being his first administrative offense, such should not warrant the supreme penalty of disbarment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa was in violation of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead?HELD:The Court found respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct.Consequently, he was orderedSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely.

ADM. CASE No. 6973, February 13, 2006ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA and ROMMEL F. MARONILLA (Complainants)Represented by ATTY. RAMON M. MARONILLA vs.QUISUMBING J. CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES, and IDA MAY J. LAO and TINGA, JJ. (Respondents)Represented by ATTYS. EFREN N. JORDA FACTS: On 28 January 2002 at about 4:45 in the afternoon, Ferdinand Ocampo, a student of the UP and a member of one of the fraternities was assaulted by members of the rival fraternity. Ocampo hesitated in the identification of Robert Francis and Rommel Maronilla (Maronilla brothers) for the reason that they are twins, thereby making positive identification difficult. Atty. Jorda thereafter prepared an Extended Manifestation praying that the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the SDT decision be considered as an appeal and the modification of the SDT decision holding that the Maronilla brothers be equally held liable as the rest of respondents in the SDT case. The Extended Manifestation was noted by herein respondent Atty. Ida May J. Lao (Lao), the chief legal officer of the UP Diliman Legal Office.ISSUE:Whether respondents, members of the U.P. Diliman Legal Office, stepped out of bounds when they appealed to the University president to reconsider the exoneration by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal of the sons of the complainant.HELD:The Court approves the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Resolution dated 22 October 2005. Accordingly, Atty. Efren N. Jorda is reprimanded for gross ignorance of the law and for violating Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint against Atty. Ida May J. Lao is dismissed for lack of merit.The Court recognized that Jorda breached a procedural rule no higher than the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Fraternities, Sororities and Other Student Organizations of UP. It must be remembered that Jorda as a functionary of a state university is obliged to adhere to the due process clause of the Constitution, the UP being an instrumentality of the State. He is bound to respect those enactments that afford benefit or relief to those under pain of sanction. As an officer of the law, he is expected to be circumspect in acting within the boundaries of his duties and responsibilities.

G.R. No. 120654. September 11, 1996MARIA LOURDES PAREDES-GARCIA (petitioner)vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. ESCOLASTICO M. CRUZ, JR. (respondents)FACTS:A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision of 19 June 1995[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.37081 dismissing the petitioners special civil action for certiorari to annul the order of respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., which cited the petitioner for contempt and ordered her to pay a fine of P100.00.ISSUE:Whether the respondent Judge has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged orders.HELD:

The instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 19 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081 and the challenged orders of respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., of 12 April 1995 and 20 April 1995 in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 are SET ASIDE.The Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal are requested to recall the designation of the petitioner to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and to detail her to other courts if these have not been done yet.

Adm. Case No. 6290 July 14, 2004ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA (complainant) DAVIDE, JR., C.J. (complainant)vsPANGANIBAN, SANTIAGO, CARPIO, and AZCUNA, JJ. (respondents)ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIOFACT:In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents illegal activities and transactions.ISSUE:Whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.HELD:For culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 5908. October 25, 2004ANTONIO B. RAMOS and MA. REGINA PAZ R. DE DIOS (complainants)vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO JOSE C. PALLUGNA (respondent) FACTS:The instant disbarment case arose when Antonio B. Ramos and Ma. Regina Paz R. De Dios charged Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna with gross misconduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer relative to Civil Case No. 2002-264[1] in a verified Complaint dated November 26, 2002. The respondent was the counsel of the plaintiff in the said case then pending with the Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24. The main issue raised in the complaint was the ownership and control of Vineyard Piano Bar and Restaurant. Indeed, the respondents actuations render him administratively liable for failing to observe the candor, fairness and honesty required of him as a member of the bar. It was his duty to inform the appellate court, as well as his client, of the factual developments in the case, and otherwise to bring the case to an end if the court thereafter determines that the issues had thereby been rendered moot and academic. The appellate court could then have devoted its efforts to the study and adjudication of meritorious controversies pending decision. The respondents bad faith is evident, as he applied for a restraining order in the Court of Appeals when he very well knew that the orders of the trial court which were sought be enjoined had already been implemented. The respondents insistence that he was merely assisting in the implementation of the Order of the Higher Court deserves scant consideration.

ISSUE:The main issue raised in the complaint was the ownership and control of Vineyard Piano Bar and Restaurant.

HELD:Respondent Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna is found GUILTY of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months. He is sternly warned that future similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severity.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR (petitioner)vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution (respondents)G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR (petitioner)vs.HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution (respondent)FACTS:A Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements. Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.Respondent Gonzalez disclaims intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of itsper curiamDecision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. ISSUE:Whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar.HELD:The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of courtinfacie curiaeand of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.The Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU (complainant)vs.ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA (Respondent)FACTS:Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lotand the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastorof one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in theLupong Tagapamayapaof Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5thDistrict of Manila where the parties reside.Respondent, aspunong barangayof Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants aspunong barangay.CANON:CANON 1.A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law and legal processes.CANON 7.A lawyer at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.HELD:Respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is found guiltyof professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of lawfor a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternlywarnedthat any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (petitioner)vs.The Honorable Court of Appeals and Arturo Alafriz and Associates (respondents)

FACTS:

A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. During the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.

Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee.

Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:

NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."

NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorneys fees.

Ramos vs. ManalacFACTS:

The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on therefore said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes final. The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order.

ISSUES: Whether or not the order of the court dated September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgage.

Whether or not the decision rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939 in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question is valid.

HELD: The second issue raised by the petitioner is not also taken, for the simple reason that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the Court can undertake even after the lapses of five (5) years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of the third persons have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil. 201). This is the correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession.

The Court is of the opinion that the claim of the petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attach to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717)

G.R. No. 73886 January 31, 1989

John C. Quirante and Dante Cruz, petitioners,vs.The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court , Manuel C. Casasola, and Estrellita C.Casasola, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed in case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00; while in case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.

ISSUE: Whether or not Quirante could claim attorneys fees.

HELD: NO. An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client.

With the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: Disbarment of Armando PunoFlora Quingwa (complainant)vs.Armando Puno (respondent)

FACTS:

Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD:

YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A.C. No. 4758, April 30, 1999

Victor D. Nunga (complainant)vsAtty. Venencio M. Viray (respondent)

FACTS:

Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed. . After issues were joined, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation. The report showed that respondent Viray notarized a deed of absolute sale when he was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. Respondent alleged that from 1965 to date he was always commissioned as notary public. . According to respondent, there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. He further explained that in the alleged documents, he had PTR for that purpose and therefore, he would not have obtained a commission without the PTR. The Undersigned noted after going over the records of the case that although both parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a], only complainant complied with the order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents act is a valid ground for disbarment.

HELD:

YES. Notarization is invested with public interest because it converts a private document into a public one, making such documents admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. Notarizing without commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws (the Notarial Law) and by making it appear that he is so authorized is a deliberate falsehood which violates the lawyers oath and of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years.

In Re Integration of the Bar of the PhilippinesFACTS:

The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. Arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. The Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar.

ISSUES:Whether or not: (a) the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar; (b) the integrationof the Bar is constitutional; (c) the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time.

HELD:

YES. The Court may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

YES. The Court quotes discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.

YES. In the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. The national poll conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar shows that 96.45% voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 2.51% against it. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)vsAtty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent)

FACTS:

Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to her by her former classmate. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the said affidavit. On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga

Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:Whether or not respondent be disbarred for immoralityWhether or not respondents act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code.

HELD:NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation and on respondents subsequent marriage, by his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage, complainants allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.

NO. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough in the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

Premises considered, this Court finds Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

G.R. No. L- 24114 June 30, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's Homesite and Housing Corporation andUniversity of the Philippines,vs.HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.

FACTS: On October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano asked the Court to exhume the case from the archives. Atty. Soriano's subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114) and the Varsity Hills case (L-30546). Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance and representation of Marcelino Tiburcio that the two cases were pending in the Court. He then agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases.

ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Soriano is guilty of negligence.

HELD:

YES. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. His entry of appearance in the case without the consent of the first lawyer amounts to an improper encroachment upon the professional employment of the original counsel. Atty. Soriano violates Rule 8.02,Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.A.C. No. 5398, December 3, 2003

Atty. Antonio Alcantara, complainantvs.Atty. Mariano Pefianco, respondent

FACTS: This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant. The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant suggested Atty. Salvani to talk with her when respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client. Atty Pefianco was asked to calm down but he did not refrain from his outburst. This caused a commotion in the office wherein respondent tried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, "Youre stupid!" Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He also averred that it was Alcantara who punched him and called him stupid.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. Though he thought that this is righteous, his public behaviorcan only bring down the legal profession in the eyes of the public and erode respect for it. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.

Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.

A.C. No. 7199 dated July 22, 2009

FOODSPHERE, INC., complainant,vs.ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., respondent.

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as Batas Mauricio by Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant under the brand name CDO after a certain Alberto Cordero purportedly bought a can of CDO Liver spread discovering a colony of worms in it. He filed a lawsuit and asked CDO to pay Php150,000 on a conciliation done by BFAD but CDO refused and instead offered to pay the actual medical and incidental expenses of Mr. Cordero. He brought the matter to the media where Atty. Mauricio threatened CDO that he would publish and air in his TV and Radio programs the said issue.After an agreement was made between Atty. Mauricio as witness and the Corderos of a money settlement of Php 50,000 including placing paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program where Atty. Mauricio is working, respondent (Mauricio) still not satisfied with the offer threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns. He then made several libelous write ups and comments about CDO. Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint but Atty. Mauricio did not stop from making write ups and comments about the matter and questioned the integrity of the prosecutors office using coarse languages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Mauricio has violated lawyers oath and has committed a breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes Atty. Melanio Mauricio violated the lawyers oath and has committed a breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as follows:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.He is therefore suspended from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.G.R. Nos. 154297-300, February 15, 2008

PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE, MAXIMO B. USITA, JR. and WILFREDO C. ANDRES,Petitioners,vs.THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SPECIAL DIVISION, Respondent.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 11, 2002 retaining petitioners, Atty. Maximo B. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), as counsels de oficio of then accused President Joseph Estrada and his son, Jose Jinggoy Estrada.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to act as counsels deoficio for the accused who are not indigent persons.

HELD:

The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the subject Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At the time of PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the