The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility�

Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken

July 31, 2010

�Toute Constitution est un régicide.�(l�abbé Rauzan, quoted in deWaresquieland Yvert 2002: 61)

1 Introduction

The topic of this paper are the origins of government responsibility to parlia-ments, the shift of the power to appoint governments from the crown to electedassemblies. While one can adduce several reasons to study the history of par-liamentary responsibility, the motivation here is most trivial, namely, that ithas not been done or at least done well.1 But, as luck would have it, historiesof constitutional monarchies turn out to be mischievously subversive: countriesin which the principle of parliamentary responsibility was written into consti-tutions did not practice it, while some practiced it long before it was constitu-tionalized. Thus questions abound: Why write a constitutions that would notbe observed? Why constitutionalize a status quo that is already an equilibriumwithout being written down? And the elephant in the room: What, if any, isthe e¤ect of constitutions on the actual political practices?

The text is organized as follows. Parliamentary responsibility is de�ned andconstitutions of monarchies are described �rst. The structure of con�icts engen-dered by these constitutions is then analyzed and the feasible historical pathsof constitutional monarchies are distinguished. Finally, the actual histories aresummarized. For lazy readers, sketches of histories of particular countries arerelegated to the Appendix, but the devil is in the detail, so they should beconsulted.

�Revised paper presented at the Conference on Constitutional Design, University ofChicago Law School, October 16-17, 2009. We appreciate the assistance of Gonzalo Rivero,Didac Queralt, and Kong-Joo Shin in collecting the data. This work was supported by a grantfrom the National Science Foundation.

1There are surprisingly few comparative studies of the subject. In spite of its subtitlethat promises to cover the period from 1789 to 1999, von Beyme�s (2000) book devotes onlyone chapter to historical evolution, summarizing it in rather cursory tables. Lavaux (1998)is perhaps the most informative but he, as well as Van Caenegem (1995), focus on selectedcases. Herb (2004) compares some Western European cases to the Middle Eastern monarchies.Some papers by economists (Congleton 2007, Huang 2008) o¤er promising titles but are tooabstract to be useful here.

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2 Parliamentary Responsibility

The origins of parliamentary responsibility is a slippery topic for two reasons:the ambiguity between legal and political responsibility of governments and thefact that the practice did not always correspond to the law. Already Hegel, inthe essay on �The Reform Bill,� observed that, in spite of the constitutionalrights of the crown, formation of the ministry was the center of contestation inthe monarchical systems (Lavaux 1998: 53). This contestation makes it di¢ cultto date the rise of parliamentary government. In England, for example, it canbe dated to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the explicit recognition of theprinciple of parliamentary responsibility in a speech in the House of Lords in1711 (Lavaux 1998: 188), the �rst collective resignation of the cabinet of LordNorth in 1782, the formation of the �rst explicitly partisan government by Pittin 1803, or the reinstatement of the Melbourne government after the election of1834. Such ambiguities arise in several countries.

To de�ne parliamentary responsibility, that is, collective political responsi-bility of governments to the parliament, it is necessary to distinguish it fromother mechanisms of responsibility. In turn, to date its origins, one must beable to discern which of the episodes in which governments changed partisancolors were just contingent outcomes of interplay of forces and which constitutedan application of principles, informal conventions, or legal norms. Clearly, theuncertainty is resolved if and when norms are enshrined in laws and the lawsare complied with but, as we see shall see below, several countries experiencedperiods in which parliamentary responsibility was practiced without being legal-ized while in some other countries it was constitutionalized but not practiced.Note that the practice of parliamentary responsibility is observable only if anopposition to the forces supported by the monarch becomes majoritarian in theparliament: if the opposition does not win, we cannot observe whether it wouldhave been allowed to assume o¢ ce had it won.

In all monarchical constitutions the monarch was the chief executive. Heor she was not responsible to the parliament or the courts. De Lolme�s (2002:59) argument �the �King himself cannot be arraigned before Judges; because,if there were any that could pass sentence upon him, it would be they, andnot he, who must �nally possess the executive power� �was standard. Themonarch governed assisted by his ministers, councillors, or advisers, whom hecould choose. But while the person of the King was inviolable, ministers were�responsible.� The French Constitutions of 1814 and 1830 were prototypical:�The person of the King is inviolable and sacred. To the King belongs theexecutive power. His ministers are responsible.�(Articles 13 and 14 in 1814; 12and 13 in 1830)

What that meant is far from clear and often it was not clear to the con-stitution writers themselves (Wasquerel and Yvert 2002). It is necessary todistinguish (1) the actions for which ministers were responsible, (2) the proce-dures according to which they could be held responsible, (3) the sanctions towhich the ministers were subject, and (4) whether their responsibility was indi-

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vidual or collective. To anticipate, parliamentary responsibility is a mechanismin which (1) the actions for which the government is responsible are not speci�edex ante (the sanctioning body, which is the legislature, does not have to specifyany reasons for invoking responsibility), (2) the procedure is some version ofvote of no con�dence (the requirement to remain in o¢ ce is that the govern-ment cannot be formally rejected by a majority of the legislature), (3) the onlysanction is that ministers must leave o¢ ce (but may return), and (4) the re-sponsibility is collective. Thus de�ned parliamentary responsibility may coexistwith other mechanisms, but it is distinct from them. Importantly, the actionsfor which ministers are help responsible may be political while the procedurefor exacting responsibility may still be legal, as in the 1815 model of BenjaminConstant.

As with many distinctions, these are easier to make than to apply. Typically,in the European monarchical constitutions:

(1) Although the actions for which ministers could be held responsible mayhave been de�ned broadly and loosely, the ministers had to be accused of hav-ing committed (or omitted) previously speci�ed acts. In England, accordingto De Lolme (2002: 59), ministers could be prosecuted for spending money ina manner contrary to the declared intention of the Parliament, �any abuse ofpower..., or, in general, any thing done contrary to the public weal....� TheSwedish Constitution of 1720 (article 14) also de�ned responsibility in terms sogeneral that it comprised political acts. The Jordanian Constitution of 1952(article 51) speci�es that the government is responsible "in respect of the publicpolicy of the State." In contrast, the French Charte of 1814 (article 56) spec-i�ed that ministers �can be accused only for the fact of treason or corruption(concussion)." The Prussian Constitution of 1850 speci�ed that �To be valid,all the acts of the King�s government need to be signed by a minister, who inthis way assumes responsibility for them,�but this �responsibility�was to bede�ned by ordinary legislation which never came (Schmitt 1993: 478). Thusthe sanctionable actions may have been purely criminal (treason, corruption)or may have been also political (�any thing done contrary to the public weal�).But responsibility applied only to previously speci�ed actions.

(2) The procedure was everywhere one of �impeachment�or �censure,�thatis, legal. Both the 1814 and the 1830 French constitutions gave the Chambredes députés the right to accuse ministers to the Chambre des pairs which wouldjudge them. According to the Norwegian 1814 constitution, the lower houseserved as the accuser and a specially formed court adjudicated.

(3) Almost everywhere, the sanctions were only political, that is removalfrom o¢ ce. The Norwegian Constitution of 1814, is unique according to Elster(2007a) in that �In theory, an accused politician could be sentenced to prison.That has never happened, but �nes and removal from o¢ ce have been imposedin several cases. The most frequent charge has been the government�s neglectto provide parliament with the information it needs to enact laws.�

(4) The responsibility was individual. For example, in France in 1815, whenan eminent prisoner condemned to death easily escaped from prison, the Cham-

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bre initiated an investigation again the Minister of Police, Decazes. The typicalreference was to the �Ministry,�which was a collection of individual ministers,not necessarily hierarchical or disciplined. In the German Constitution of 1871(article 17), only the Chancellor was �responsible.� In Sweden, two ministersof equal status were. In contrast, collective responsibility means that mem-bers of the government must publicly support its collective decisions and, inconsequence, are jointly responsible for all decisions. The di¤erence betweenindividual and collective responsibility is illustrated by the contrast betweenArticle 13 of the French Constitution of 1852, which says �Each minister is re-sponsible only for those acts of the government which concerns him; there isno solidarity among them� and Article 6 of the (republican) Constitution of1875, according to which �The ministers are solidaristically responsible ... forthe general policy of the Government and individually for their personal acts.�

To get an intuition of the ambiguities such systems generated, examine theSwedish Constitution of 1809. It stated that �The King alone shall govern therealm,� that the King can dismiss ministers, who are his advisers, and has aquali�ed right to dismiss the Parliament. The parliament could not call theKing to account for his conduct (Article 3). Yet all executive acts were to becountersigned by a Minister and Ministers were obliged to object against King�sunconstitutional actions. The Parliament could impeach a Minister in case of�manifest violation of the fundamental laws or failure to refuse countersigna-ture.� Article 9 stated that �Should at any time the unexpected event occurthat the King�s decision would be plainly contrary to the fundamental or gen-eral laws of the realm, it shall be the duty of the members of the Council ofState to make a vigorous protest against such decision. Any member who doesnot separately enter his opinion in the minutes shall be held for the decisionas if he had advised the King to make it.�Article 38 speci�ed that �Should aMinister presenting a matter think that any order of the King is in con�ict withthe Constitution, he shall remonstrate against in the Council of State: if theKing should still insist upon issuing the order it shall be the Minister�s rightand duty to refuse the countersignature thereto and, as a consequence, to resignfrom his o¢ ce which he shall not resume until Parliament has examined and ap-proved his conduct.�Parliament controlled the Council of Ministers through itsConstitution Committee, which examined the minutes of the Council of State(or King-in-Council). If the Committee discovered that there had been a man-ifest violation of the fundamental laws or failure to refuse countersignature, asindicated in Article 38, it was to instruct Parliament�s O¢ ce of Justice to im-peach the Minister before the Court of Impeachment (Article 106). Where therewas a less serious misdemeanor, such as "the failure of the Minister or even thewhole Council of State to pay due regard to the welfare of the State," the Con-stitutional Committee was to bring the matter before Parliament, which couldrequest the King in writing to remove from the Council of State and from o¢ cethe person or persons criticized (Article 107). The latter was known as the�political responsibility� in contrast to the �juridical responsibility�of Article106.

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3 Kings against Parliaments

Constitutional monarchs were chief executives, not responsible to anyone in anymanner, who governed with the advice and consent of their ministers. Parlia-ments could at most impeach or censure individual ministers for having com-mitted previously speci�ed acts. Yet there were many instances in which parlia-mentary majorities forced monarchs to dismiss or accept governments againsttheir will. As Schmitt (1993: 475) observed, the di¤erence between the practiceof parliamentary responsibility in Belgium as opposed to France or Prussia �wasnot due to legal dispositions, but to its use in the public life of the nation. Itis a practical rule which resides in the spirit of the constitution; the latter saysnothing of it.�

The power of the parliaments stemmed from their control over legislation,particularly budgets. Monarchs needed money to govern. Control over thebudget by the parliament was a central feature of the �English constitution�: thevery existence of the Commons, De Lolme (2002: 54) argued in 1771, dependedon its exercise of this prerogative. Moreover, �If any other person, besides theRepresentatives of the People, had a right to make an o¤er of the produce oflabour of the people, the executive power would soon have forgot, that it onlyexists for the advantage of the public.�Already in 1626 the Commons refusedto approve the budget unless the unpopular Buckingham was dismissed by theKing (von Beyme 2004: 23). So did the Belgian second chamber in 1841, theSwedish Rikstag in 1868, German Reichstag in 1887, 1892, and 1907, and manyothers.

Hence, parliaments had a powerful instrument to impose their wills on themonarchs. They could use it not only to control expenditures but to pressure theking to choose ministers to their liking. And since parliaments used or threatento use this power, kings at times considered their wishes. Historians tell us thatin Sweden �after 1840, the King had to pay attention in choosing Ministers�(Verney 1957), in Belgium �The principle was soon established that a cabinethad to have the support of a majority not only in the House of Representatives,the predominant chamber, but also in the Senate....� (Lorwin 1966: 119), inGreat Britain �The executive, which used to be in the hands of the King andhis secretaries, passed to the cabinet of ministers, who were politicians....�(VanCaenegen 1995: 120). Yet when the Prussian parliament refused to approve thebudget in 1862 and in 1866, the government continued to manage without thebudget, presenting the situation as abnormal but not unconstitutional (Schmitt1993: 478). The same happened in Denmark, where in 1877 and between 1885and 1894 the Conservative leader, Elstrup, prorogued Parliament and on hisown responsibility issued a provisional budget (Jergensen 2004: 67).

In turn, except in Norway, kings could dismiss parliaments. Since incumbentgovernments managed elections and could use the apparatus and the resourcesof the state to secure a desired outcome, monarchs often used this prerogativeto bring the composition of the parliament closer to their wishes. Most of thetime they succeeded: elections were administered by the Ministry of Interior and

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validated by the newly elected legislature (Lehoucq 2003), so winning them wasnot very di¢ cult. In several countries, control over the elections was so perfectthat a regular alternation between parties was orchestrated from above. The�avor of these arrangements is best captured by Garrigo (1998: 218), writingabout Spain, �The electorate did not elect Parliament, and it did not elect thegovernment. The system worked from �top to bottom�: the King named hishead of government, who convoked elections, which had, of necessity, to bestowa large majority on his party.�

Hence seeds of con�ict were built into this system: the king appointed theministers but did not control the budget; parliaments held the purse but couldnot choose the ministers; the king could dissolve the parliament.

It is useful to analyze this structure of con�icts somewhat schematically.First, looking at the situation from the point of view of monarchs, it is obviousthat ideally they would want to appoint whatever governments were to theirliking and to have their budgets approved by parliaments. Having to tolerategovernments chosen by parliaments against their will was not only unpleasantbut was often seen as an a¤ront against royal majesty. Nevertheless, facing ahostile government was preferable to not having a budget, particularly a budgetfor military expenditures. Finally, the worst possible outcome would have beenfor the monarch to be deposed or the monarchy abolished.

Now, as long as the pro-royalist forces won elections, the issue of parliamen-tary responsibility was not on the table. The issue appeared on the politicalagenda only when pro-royalist governments were not able to pass importantlegislation. Thus, for example, in France in 1827, �For the �rst time since 1814,the royal power found itself in face of majoritarian opposition. The questionthat was latent since the origins of the regime between royal and parliamentarypreponderance is directly posed� (de Waresquiel and Yvert 2002: 396). Thechoices available to monarchs in such situations included (1) dissolving the par-liament and calling for a new election, (2) suppressing the parliament, eitherby dissolving it sine diem, or changing electoral rules by decree and holding anew election under the changed rules (as did Tsar Nicolai II in 1907 and KingHussain of Jordan in 1993), or taking power directly into their own hands, or(3) yielding to the parliament in choosing the government.

These actions were not without political consequences. Dissolutions borethe risk that the royalist force would do even worse in the subsequent election.Changing electoral rules by executive decree reduced this risk but generateda new one, namely, that the repression would engender opposition by thosecharged with exercising it and that the military might take power into theirown hands or that it would intensify popular opposition, bringing the populationto the streets. Monarchs ran some risk of being deposed even when the wonelections but repression intensi�ed this risk, as witnessed by the fate of CharlesX, Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, King Gyanendra of Nepal and several otherswho entered on this path. Hence, when choosing the course of action followingan electoral defeat, monarchs had to look at political consequences beyond theimmediate moment.

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Assume now that monarchs did what they thought was best for them,whether dissolve, suppress, or yield. Histories of constitutional monarchies mayhave followed any of several diverse sequences of such actions, where in the endmonarchs would either yield, that is, adopt the practice of parliamentary re-sponsibility, or be overthrown. But as varied as these sequences may have been,it is apparent that the feasible historical paths of constitutional monarchies fallinto three patterns:

(1) The principle of parliamentary responsibility is not tested because theKing never loses elections or wins every election after a dissolution. Note thatmonarchs who always wins elections can be still overthrown.(2) The King loses some elections, mixes dissolutions and suppressions when

he loses, and is overthrown.(3) The King loses some elections, mixes dissolutions and suppressions, sur-

vives, and at one time yields.

Of these paths, only the last one leads to parliamentary monarchies. In the�rst path, the principle is never tested and, as seen below, monarchy was abol-ished or stripped of executive power in all countries that followed this pattern.The second path leads to republican revolutions. Monarchs end up reigning butnot governing only along the third path.

4 Constitutions and Practices

Constitutional monarchies are systems in which the head of state bears a titleof monarch and which have a constitution providing for an at least partiallyelected legislature with a power to approve the budget. Only those countrieswhich were independent as constitutional monarchies are included below, whichexplains the absence of Tunisia, which passed an abortive constitution in 1861.

The paths to parliamentary monarchy turned out to be narrow: of the thirty-two countries that at one time established a constitutional monarchy eighteeenare now republics. It was traversed only in Belgium, Denmark, Japan (where theEmperor lost even the nominal executive power in 1947), Lesotho (where themonarch lost executive power in 1993), Netherlands, Norway, Sweden (wherethe monarch lost executive power in 1974), Thailand, and the United Kingdom.Monarchy was reestablished in Spain in 1978 but the monarch has no executivepower. Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Swaziland continue as monarchies inwhich the monarchs in fact appoint and dismiss governments at their discretion.

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Table 1 presents a summary of the histories of particular monarchies.

Table 1: Summary of Constitutions and Practices

LawnPractice Yes No Not testedYes ??? Thailand 1932- Iran 1907-1979 Albania 1928-1946Yes Nepal 1990-2008 Jordan 1952- Iraq 1925-1958Yes Serbia 1903-1918 Morocco 1962-1970Yes Morocco 1996-Yes Nepal 1959-1962Yes Egypt 1923-1952Yes Serbia 1869-1903Yes Lesotho 1966-1993

No Belgium 1847-1892 Austria 1867-1918 Bulgaria 1887-1918No Denmark 1901-1953 Brazil 1824-1891 France 1830-1848No Netherlands 1868- Bulgaria 1878-1886 France 1852-1870No Norway 1884- Bulgaria 1918-1947 Germany 1871-1918No Sweden 1917-1974 France 1815-1830 Japan 1887-1947No UK 1834- Hungary 1867-1918 Portugal 1822-1910No Greece 1875-1910 Nepal 1962-1990 SpainNo Italy 1861-1925 Ottoman 1876-1920No Romania 1866-1947No Russia 1906-1917No Yugoslavia 1921-1945No Kuwait 1962-No Swaziland 1968-

Notes: "Law" indicates whether the principle of parliamentary responsibility waspresent in a constitution, where the test of the principle is whether a constitutionprovides for a procedure of non-con�dence. "Practice" is classi�ed as "No" unlessthere were periods in which governments not supported by monarchs were allowed togovern and the parliament served a full term. The cases in which constitutionalizationfollowed practice are not listed. Cases in bold are those in which either a particu-lar dynasty was deposed or the monarchy was abolished. Cases in italics indicatethat governments changed partisan composition by royal decisions or an agreementbetween parties. The unit of observation is the continuous constitutional status ofparliamentary responsibility or a dynasty.

The constitutions (or other organic laws) of Serbia in 1869, Iran in 1907,Egypt in 1923, Iraq in 1925, Albania in 1928, Thailand in 1932, Jordan in 1952,Morocco in 1962 and 1996, Nepal in 1959 and 1980, and Lesotho in 1966 pro-vided for the principle of parliamentary responsibility, with explicit proceduresof non-con�dence. Periods in which oppositions to the monarch were allowed togovern occurred, however, only in Serbia between 1903 and 1918 and in Nepal

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between 1991 and 2008, albeit with a royal coup d�état in 2005. The history ofThailand is convoluted because of the active role of the military, who alternatedwith civilians in claiming royal support. In the remaining countries and periodsthis constitutional norm was observed only if the parliamentary majority wasroyalist, which was always true in Albania as well as Iraq and most of the time inthe other countries. When the royalist parties did not enjoy su¢ cient support inthe parliament, monarch dissolved parliaments and either won the subsequentelections or ruled without legislatures. In Iran, the parliament was dismissedwhenever monarchs were displeased with their actions and monarchs assumeddictatorial powers in 1907, 1911-14, 1949-51, and 1961-3. In Jordan, King Hus-sain allowed the National Socialist opposition to form a government in 1956, butsacked the government and declared martial law as soon as he was reassured ofthe support of the army one year later. The parliament was restored only in1983 and political parties were legalized only in 1992, but the King changed theelectoral laws before the multi-party elections of 1993 and pro-royalist forceswon all subsequent elections. In Morocco, when the opposition UNFP won theelection in 1965, King Hassan II suspended the parliament and served as his ownprime minister during two years. The opposition won the plurality election in1998 and formed the government, but this event is generally considered to havebeen engineered by the King. In Nepal, the opposition Nepal Congress partywon a majority in 1959 and formed the government but in the following yearthe King suspended the parliament, appointed his own Cabinet, and ruled di-rectly. Political parties were legalized in 1990 and governments were supportedby shifting parliamentary majorities until 2005, when King Gyanendra took of-�ce in a royal coup d�état. Although power was restored to the parliament oneyear later, the monarchy was abolished in 2008. In Lesotho, the constitution wassuspended as soon as an opposition party seemed to be winning the �rst electionafter independence in 1970. In the end, all the constitutions that provided forparliamentary responsibility were violated, in several countries repeatedly. Whywrite down rules that would not be obeyed?

In turn, the principle of parliamentary responsibility was absent from allEuropean monarchical constitutions. The principle was perhaps for the �rsttime tacitly recognized in the United Kingdom in 1834. With time, it wasexplicitly accepted and regularly practiced in several European countries: thebest dates seem to be 1847 in Belgium (where the constitution dated to 1831),1861 in Italy (1861), 1868 in the Netherlands (1815), 1875 in Greece (1844),1884 in Norway (1814), 1901 in Denmark (1849, 1866), and 1917 in Sweden(1809). Hence, the practice developed without constitutional changes. Indeed,the principle of submitting governments to the will of parliamentary majoritieswas either constitutionalized only decades after it was well entrenched or itcontinues until today without being constitutionalized: in Belgium in 1892 (?,see below), Denmark in 1953, Norway either in 1928 or not until now (see below),Sweden in 1974, and not until now in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.Why write down as a formal rule something that has been practiced and wouldcontinue to be practiced without it? If constitutions only describe equilibria,

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why write down the rules that political actors follow anyway?

The dating of when parliamentary responsibility became a norm, convention,or principle which everyone expected to be obeyed is obviously problematic. Iso-lated instances in which monarchs consented to governments that were againsttheir liking do not su¢ ce to treat parliamentary responsibility as a principle reg-ulating the existence of governments. After all, Charles X yielded in 1828 buttwo years later had to be reminded that, in the words of the French Chambre of1830, �The permanent harmony of the political views of your Government withthe wishes of your people is the indispensable condition for the conduct of publica¤airs. Sire, our loyalty, our devotion oblige us to tell you that this harmonydoes not exist� (cited in Bury 1962: 39). Kings Hussain of Jordan, Hassan ofMorocco, Mahendra of Nepal, Fuad of Egypt, and several others at one timeallowed the opposition to form the government only to clamp down soon after.Hence, sporadic instances in which monarchs yielded to parliamentary majori-ties do not necessarily indicate that they were ready to do so in the future.The problem is to distinguish periods in which the outcomes of con�icts werepurely contingent on the relations of political forces from periods during whichthese outcomes were regulated by unwritten constitutional norms or in Elster�s(2007a) terms, �constitutional conventions.�As he observes, such norms do notemerge through the sheer passage of time. Something more is needed. This�something� is that: (1) �Unwritten norms cannot have causal e¢ cacy unlessone believes that other relevant actors believe in them and will act on them.�(2) �For their existence, CC [constitutional conventions] require that individu-als hold true beliefs (or at least do not hold false beliefs) about how others willreact to a violation.� (3) �If violating a norm causes no reaction, ... , it neverexisted in the �rst place.�(Elster 2007a, various pages). The �rst two criteriaadd up to saying that constitutional conventions support equilibria: everyoneknows that everyone knows what others will do in and out of equilibrium. Thethird criterion, in turn, implies that if we were to observe an out-of-equilibriumaction, that is, a violation of the convention, we should also observe a reaction.An example is provided by Denmark, where parliamentary responsibility wasaccepted as a principle in 1901 but was not codi�ed until 1953, and where in1920 Christian X decided on his own initiative to dismiss the government andappoint another without backing by the Parliament, only to be defeated in theface of popular unrest (Jespersen 2004: 79). It may thus appear that this crite-rion provides an observational principle for determining whether a conventionwas in place. Yet it fails to do so, since it does not imply its converse: an actionto a unilateral imposition by a king need not constitute a reaction against viola-tion of a norm. Charles X was overthrown in 1830 when he attempted to imposehis will but he may not have been and his successor dissolved the parliamentfour times, won the subsequent elections, and did not provoke a reaction. In theend, we have no way of knowing whether no convention was in place or it wasin place but was violated. Hence, the dates used here of necessity somewhatarbitrary: these seem to be the best dates because many people thought at thetime that a principle was at stake and because historians think in retrospect

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that it was. Moreover, except for Greece, all governments subsequent to thesedates enjoyed parliamentary support regardless of the outcomes of elections.

In sum, except for short periods in Serbia and Nepal, when constitutionsprovided for parliamentary responsibility, it was not practiced while in othercountries the practice took hold without having been constitutionalized. Thepower of constitutions thus appears paltry. What, then, is the role of consti-tutions in regulating political life? Neither Elster�s (1984, but 2007b) view ofconstitutions as commitments nor Hardin�s (1989, also Kornhauser 1999) ar-gument that constitutions pick one coordination equilibrium among several aresupported by the experience of monarchical constitutions. At most, constitu-tions construct a game �grant institutional status to players and attribute toeach a set of actions �within which di¤erent outcomes may ensue, depending onexogenous conditions, their hunger for power, and perhaps also luck. Certainly,the future of a monarchies could not be predicted by reading their constitutions.What was inexorable was that the monarchs would lose power but whether theywould also lose the crown was not foretold.

Why did some monarchies succeed is losing power but preserving the crownwhile others lost both? In the end, l�abbé Rauzan was right: Once they con-stitutionalized their rule, monarchs could not keep power and survive. Themonarchs who were too good at using the state apparatus to manage elections,and many were, saw their monarchies abolished. Those who clung to powerwhen they happened to have lost also ended being overthrown. To keep thecrown on their heads they had no know when to give up. They did not likeit. King Wilhelm of Netherlands abdicated rather than accept a parliamentarygovernment, as did King Prajadhikop of Thailand, while Queen Victoria wasinsulted by having to accept it. So only a handful had the wisdom of embarkingon the road to oblivion.

While con�icts over government responsibility were sharp, often violent, inretrospect they appear strangely inconsequential. Parliamentary republics arethese days indistinguishable from parliamentary monarchies: whether the cere-monial head of state is elected by the parliament or inherits her mantle seemsto have no practical consequences. Anti-monarchical sentiments are at timesfed by royal families intruding into the news but juicy stories about the livesof the royals are just a folklore of parliamentary monarchies. The sharpest linedistinguishing political regimes in the nineteenth century �monarchies versusrepublics �has been completely e¤aced.

Again ironically, the structure of con�icts that permeated constitutionalmonarchies is endemic in presidential systems: the president chooses the cabinet,the legislature controls the budget, the president needs the budget to govern,the legislature has preferences about the cabinet. Hence, the strategies and thecon�icts that ensue are similar to those of monarchies. In Chile in 1881, forexample, "a group of deputies attempted to cut o¤ funds for the war e¤ort, asa means of pressuring [President] Pinto to reshu­ e his cabinet." (Collier andSater 1996: 145). In 1890 the Congress rejected a budget proposal of PresidentBalmaceda, who then announced that he would govern with previous year�s

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budget, which was not enabled by the Constitution. In response, the Senatethreatened to impeach the President, for which it did not have constitutionalauthority either. A civil war ensued, in which about 3,000 people were killed,and Balmaceda was deposed. Simon Bolívar had it right when he remarked"We elect monarchs whom we call presidents." True, presidents are elected butit is not obvious that this fact changes the strategic situation. In turn, withminor exceptions presidents do not have dissolution power, which means that ifthey are stuck with a hostile legislature they have to wait until the next sched-uled election. But, contrary to Linz (1994), this structure induces presidents tobe more conciliatory than were monarchs, building government coalitions andmaking policy concessions (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004). Perhapsthis explains why no presidential system in history evolved into a parliamentaryone.

5 Appendix: Historical Paths

5.1 Principle not tested, dynasty deposed or monarchyabolished

5.1.1 Never lost

In these cases the principle was never tested because either anti-royalist forcesnever won an election or each time they had won the parliament was dissolvedand pro-royalists won the ensuing elections.

Albania: The 1928 constitution replaced the republic established in 1925by monarchy. According to this constitution, executive power was vested in theKing, to be exercised through the government, which had to maintain the con�-dence of the parliament (Article 113: �A Cabinet which does not obtain a voteof con�dence from Parliament is obliged to hand in its resignation to the King.�)In practice, King Zog (who reigned from 1928 to 1939) changed his ministersat will and because political competition was not permitted, �parliament wasan assembly of handpicked individuals . . . entirely dependent upon the King"(Skendi 1957: 95). The pro-Zog parties won elections in 1928, 1932, and 1937.In 1935, the King made a conciliatory move and allowed the formation of anew �relatively liberal� government. However, when a vote of no con�dence,probably inspired by King Zog, brought the new cabinet to an end, Zog gavethe o¢ ce back to the original holder and elections in 1937 produced unanimoussupport for the government (Fischer 1984: 244-7). Monarchy was abolished in1946.

France 1830-1848. The 1830 Constitution did not provide for parliamen-tary responsibility. Several governments fell, however, when they lost an im-portant, budget or foreign policy, vote in the Chambre. Still, they were alwaysreplaced by cabinets appointed by the King. At four moments (in 1831, 1834,1837, and 1839), Louis Philippe resorted to dissolving the parliament, hopingto solidify his parliamentary support, but all elections that followed dissolutions

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resulted in reproducing the balance of forces, that is, a small margin in favor ofthe incumbent government. The monarchy was abolished in 1848, to be followedby a short-lived republic.

France 1852-70. The 1852 Constitution did not provide for parliamentaryresponsibility. The government won all elections during the Second Empire.Napoleon III introduced parliamentary responsibility on 21 May 1870, but toolate to prevent his overthrow and with him of the monarchy.

Germany: The Constitution of 1871 recognized only the Reich Chancelloras a minister, giving him the responsibility for co-signing laws. The Reichstagwas dissolved in 1887 when it refused to approve military appropriations. In theensuing election, the government won. The same occurred in 1892 and in 1907.In the sequel to the 1907 election, Bülow created a parliamentary block andchanged the cabinet to get its support. According to Carr (1969: 206), �[T]hiswas the �rst �rm association between a government and the majority partiesand, as such, a step on the road to parliamentary government. When the blocthreatened to fall apart in December 1907, Bülow summoned party leaders andthreatened resignation unless they continued to support him; in other words,a chancellor made his continuation in o¢ ce dependent, not on the emperor�spleasure, but on the willingness of majority parties to cooperate with him.�In1909 a �nance bill was defeated and Bülow resigned. Quoting Carr (1969: 208)again, �the manner of his departure was important, for, unwittingly perhaps,he had established some kind of causal relationship between resignation andthe defeat of a government bill.�But his successor was still appointed by theEmperor. The phrase �The Chancellor of the Reich requires the con�dence ofthe Reichstag to exercise his functions�was �rst introduced as an amendmentto the 1871 Constitution on 18 October 1918 and then incorporated (as article54) into the Weimar Constitution, after the monarchy had been abolished.

Iraq: The original Iraqui constitution was drafted by the British in 1921 andthe �nal version was adopted by an elected Constituent Assembly in 1925. Ac-cording to Brown (2002: 43), it provided for parliamentary responsibility, withexplicit procedures of non-con�dence. Yet no government, not even a single min-ister, was dismissed because of a parliamentary vote of non-con�dence. Whilethe military entered into politics in the late 1930s, the constitution remained inforce until 1958, when the monarchy was abolished.

5.1.2 Rotation

In several countries, during sometimes long periods, control over governmentsrotated between parties or factions either according to a pre-established agree-ment or as a consequence of monarchs seeking to maintain a balance betweenthem. In such systems the monarch appointed governments of parties di¤erentfrom the incumbents either just before a scheduled elections or before dissolvingthe parliament. The new government would then administer the election andinvariably win.

One can think di¤erently about such systems. On the one hand, the monarch

13

exercised total control over the choice of governments. On the other hand, themonarch felt obliged to change their partisan composition. If one thinks thatthe monarch was just accurately reading the mood of the political elite, hewas anticipating the results that would have ensued in competitive elections,which nay be seen as anticipatory parliamentary responsibility: governmentsrotated and always enjoyed parliamentary support. Yet only government thatwere palatable to the monarch participated in the rotation, so even if they boredi¤erent labels, they were all pro-royalist.

Note that not all cases of rotation are included in this section. If rotationwas followed by suppression, they are included in the "Suppression" section(Austria, Romania).

Brazil: The 1824 Constitution (Article 101, paragraph VI) granted the Em-peror unlimited freedom to appoint and dismiss governments. The parliamentwas dissolved in 1842. A major reform occurred in 1847, when the Decree 523created the position of the President of the Council of Ministers, to be appointedby the Emperor, but with the prerogative of forming the rest of the government.Historians do not agree whether the government was to be formally responsibleto the parliament in addition to the Emperor (da Silva Soares no date, MotaBarbosa 2007). According to da Silva Soares, when a government did not enjoythe support of a majority of Deputies, it was the role of the Emperor to resolvethe situation. He could, and at times did, change the prime minister but appointanother one from the same party or dissolve the parliament and call for a newelection, which occurred in 1868, 1884, 1885, and 1889. Because parties in o¢ cealways won elections, the Emperor could maintain political balance by changingprime ministers before elections. Fausto (1999: 99) summarizes this period asfollows: �A parliamentary government was only to begin, and even at that inan unusual and restricted form in 1847. In that year, by decree, the positionof president of the council of ministers was created. He would be appointed bythe emperor. This political agent would appoint the ministry, which togetherformed the council of ministers or the cabinet. They controlled executive power.For the system to work, it was presumed that the cabinet would need the con�-dence of the Chamber of deputies as well as that of the emperor to stay in power.There were times when the chamber forced the council of ministers to changeits composition. But the emperor held on to a considerable power through thisability to moderate, and this is what made the imperial system less than totallyparliamentary, even between 1850 and 1889. The emperor exercised his moder-ating prerogatives when the Chamber did not support the cabinet he preferred.On those occasions, after hearing form the council of state, he would use hispower to dissolve the Chamber and call for new elections.�The monarchy wasoverthrown in 1891.

Bulgaria 1887-1918: Ferdinand (1887-1918), who succeed Prince Alexan-der following his abdication in 1886, appointed governments, if need be dissolvedthe parliaments (in 1889, 1901, 1902, and 1913), and then held elections to con-�rm his choice. Partisan alternations engineered by agreements followed byelections in 1894, 1899, 1902, 1908, 1911, 1913. In 1913 the newly appointed

14

government did not secure a majority and needed a second election in 1914.According to Crampton (2005: 121), �Elections by the turn of the century weremore often carried out simply to provide a newly appointed cabinet with adependable majority in the assembly. And by 1900 it was the prince who deter-mined when the composition of a government should be changed and an electionheld.�According to Kostadinova (1995: 27), �By appointing governments theMonarch indirectly dictated the results of the elections, providing the executiveauthority the opportunity to �elect�the legislature.�

Japan: The constitution of 1889 did not provide for parliamentary responsi-bility. According to Scalapino (1968), between 1892 and 1937 �a party in powernever lost an election during the entire period. . . power did alternate by meansof elections, but only when �neutral,� non-party governments presided oversuch elections.... alternation in power between parties took place as a result ofthe genro system, with the senior Japanese statesmen selecting prime ministerswhen, in their opinion, conditions necessitated a change. These prime ministersthen proceeded to use elections to ratify their power.�Ramseyer and Rosenbluth(1998: 43-33) maintain that while at various moments the ruling oligarchs foundit di¢ cult to maintain control over parliaments, every recalcitrant parliamentwas either bribed or dissolved. When anti-government majority threatened torevise the budget in 1890 and again in 1898, several members were bribed tovote with the government. An anti-government party was coopted into a gov-ernment coalition in 1895. The parliament was dissolved in 1892, 1893, 1894,1898, 1903, 1916, 1930, 1936, and 1937. In the early stages of parliamentaryrule, non-partisan prime ministers were common: between 1890 and 1906, theonly partisan PM held o¢ ce brie�y in 1898 (Sims 1991: 87-88). In 1906, asecond partisan PM took o¢ ce. Elections in 1908, 1912, 1914-5, 1920, 1930,and 1931-2 rati�ed partisan changes that preceded them (Sims 1991). In 1917elections were held under a non-party PM but the government-supported partywon largest share of seats; in 1924 elections resulted in a change from a neu-tral to a partisan PM, and in 1928 elections produced a draw. Non-partisangovernments held o¢ ce under military tutelage from 1932-1946 and the 1947Constitution did not grant the executive power to the Emperor.

Portugal: The �rst constitution was adopted in 1822 (in force 1822-1826),followed by new ones in 1826 (in force 1826-1828 and 1842-1911), and 1838 (inforce until 1842). After 1851, a system of alternation between two parties hasdeveloped. But this alternation was orchestrated from above. �Elections usuallyoccurred after a change of government, not before, and were then won by theincoming administration which manipulated the patronage of the party bossesamong the provincial electors.� (Birmingham 1993: 132) In 1907 King Carloshad bypassed parliament to appoint his own prime minister. He was assassinatedin 1908 and monarchy was abolished in 1910.

Spain: The constitutional history of Spain is convoluted, with six monarchi-cal constitutions following the �rst one, adopted in Cádiz in 1812, and severalperiods of non-constitutional rule. None of these constitutions restricted thefreedom of the monarch to appoint and dismiss ministers. Between 1844 and

15

1868, �the Crown became the decisive factor of political changes, above theParliament. . . . What mattered was the con�dence of the Palace. Electoral fal-si�cation generated the rest. Crises and con�icts were resolved by naming a newgovernment, independently whether or not it enjoyed parliamentary majority.The new chief of government called elections and tried to fabricate the Cortes ofhis convenience" (Bahamonde and Martinez 1998: 285). Dissolutions occurredin 1839, 1843, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1863, and 1865. In 1868, �a parliamentarymonarchy of a democratic nature� (Darde and Estrada 1998: 148) was estab-lished, under the reign of Amadee of Savoy, but in fact this constitution (Article68) still granted the King the power to choose governments at his discretion.This monarchy lasted only two years due to the lack of consensus between themonarchist political parties. The Cortes were dissolved again in 1869, 1871, and1872. After a short-lived Republic, a new monarchy was established in 1874.Between 1874 and 1923 two parties, Conservative and Liberal, alternated ino¢ ce but this alternation was a result of an explicit agreement between them(Jacobson and Luzón 2000). No dissolution occurred during this period. In1923 King Alfonso XIII supported the coup which established the dictatorshipof Primo de Rivera. Monarchy was abolished in 1931. It was restored in 1978but the King was not granted executive power in the 1978 Constitution.

5.2 Suppress, dynasty deposed or monarchy abolished

The instances of suppression are italicized below.Austria: The newly elected parliament was dissolved in 1849 and no elec-

tions were held until 1861, when a new constitution of the Austria-Hungarianempire created a joint parliament. In 1867, a separate constitution was adoptedfor the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy (May 1968). According to thisconstitution, the ministry was responsible to the Emperor, who also had thepower to promulgate decrees when the parliament was not in session and to dis-solve it. Although until 1900 ministries relied on parliamentary support, primeministers were chosen by the Emperor and partisan alternations occurred be-fore elections. The �rst Prime Minister (Auersperg, a German Liberal) of theparliament elected in 1867 enjoyed support from the German majority in parlia-ment. However, according to Taylor (1948: 139), the constitutional laws of 1867and the appointment of Auersperg did not signify true parliamentary govern-ment: �This was not a true responsible ministry, where the leader of the partyis appointed Prime Minister and then chooses his colleagues. The ministerswere chosen by Francis Joseph on the advice of Beust [prime minister precedingAuersperg].�Thereafter, Francis Joseph appointed prime ministers from alter-nating factions of German Liberals in 1868, 1871, 1873, when the faction alreadyin power since 1871 won elections, and in 1879, when the newly appointed fac-tion won. There were elections again in 1885 and 1891, but another partisanchange did not occur until 1893, when Prime Minister Taa¤e, in o¢ ce from 1879to 1893, was dismissed. Taa¤e had proposed universal su¤rage and oppositionagainst the bill had grown in parliament. According to Taylor (1948: 164-68),Francis Joseph feared that if the opposition �maintained itself, it would impose

16

on him a �parliamentary�ministry. The sole reason for Taa¤e�s existence was toprevent a parliamentary ministry; he was failing to do so, and Francis Josephhad to employ other means. . . ." In 1895, a PM appointed by Francis Josephfailed to obtain support in parliament. The Emperor then appointed a new PM,who won the subsequent election. There were a few other shifts until 1900 whenFrancis Joseph chose Koerber, the parliament was dissolved, and new electionswere held in 1901. The Koerber ministry (1900-1904), unable to command amajority, ruled by emergency decrees. In 1904, Koerber was replaced, followedby more changes in 1906 and an important franchise reform in 1907. Electionsheld in 1907 altered the composition of parliament. After the entry of a new PMin 1908, emergency decrees were used to pass essential legislation and in 1911parliament was dissolved again and new elections were held. After the elections,the PM resigned because he was unable to command a majority. Parliamentwas dissolved yet again in 1914 and monarchy was abolished in 1918.

Bulgaria 1878-1886: Bulgaria became self-governing in 1878 and adoptedthe �rst constitution in 1879. According to Black (1943: 308), Article 152provided that ministers are appointed or discharged by the prince but Article 153stated that ministers are responsible to the prince and to the National Assemblycollectively for whatever measures they take in common, and individually for theadministration of the department entrusted to them. It is not clear, however,whether the constitution provided for a procedure of non-con�dence, that is,whether the "responsibility" of Article 153 was political or only criminal.2 Inany case, when the Liberals won the �rst elections in September 1879 and formeda cabinet, Alexander dissolved the assembly. New elections in 1880 were wonagain by the Liberals, who formed a Ministry. In 1881 Alexander suspended theconstitution (reinstated in 1883). In 1886, he was forced to abdicate.

Bulgaria 1918-1946. During King Boris�rule (1918-1943), the AgrarianParty had come to power after the elections in 1919. The parliament was dis-solved in 1920 and a military coup, presumably with Boris�support, ousted thePrime Minister Stambolinski in 1923. The oppositional People�s Bloc had wonthe elections in 1931. A military coup in 1934 was followed in 1935 by a counter-coup which established royal dictatorship (Crampton 2005: 159). Until 1938,there was no legislature and the constitution was suspended; elections were heldin 1938 and 1939 with appointments of non-party Prime Ministers. Monarchywas abolished in 1946.

Egypt: The �rst constitution adopted was in 1882. The provisions con-cerning parliamentary responsibility stipulated that the parliament (Council ofDelegates) was to be automatically dissolved if it could not resolve a con�ictwith the government but if the newly elected Council maintained the same po-sition its will was binding. A precedent was immediately set when the khediveTaw�q dismissed a prime minister under the pressure of the parliament. Yet theconstitution went into oblivion when Great Britain occupied Egypt the sameyear (Based on Brown 2002: 27-28). Egypt became a constitutional monar-

2Wikipedia provides for a link to the Bulgarian text of the 1879 Tarnovo Constitution butthis link is broken and we could not �nd the text in any language.

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chy again in 1923, under King Fuad. According to Bentwich (1924: 49), theConstitution of 1923 granted the King the right to nominate and dismiss min-isters but governments, as well as individual ministers, were subject to vote ofnon-con�dence of the lower chamber. Botman (1998), however, emphasizes theKing�s prerogative in appointing and dismissing governments without mention-ing the role of the parliament. In any case, throughout the entire period kingsappointed governments without considering results of elections. In the electionof 1924 a party opposed to the King, Wafd, won the election and formed the gov-ernment under Sa�ad Zaglul but was forced to resign under British pressure thesame year, the parliament was dissolved, and the King appointed a provisionalgovernment headed by Ahmad Ziwar Pasha (Federal Party). New elections wereheld in 1925 and 1926. Both were won by Wafd. After the �rst election, theKing locked the deputies out of parliament, dissolved the lower chamber again,and called for new elections. After the 1926 election, the British opposed Sa�adZaglul taking o¢ ce, and the monarch agreed. Wafd was forced to coalesce withthe Liberal Constitutional Party (LCP), but Sa�ad Zaglul was vetoed as primeminister and Adli Yakan Pasha (Liberal Party) took his place. In 1931 Isma�ilSidqi, a monarch loyalist, who had been prime minister since June 1930, dis-solved Parliament, and drafted a new Constitution strengthening the monarchy.Wafd boycotted the election of 1931. Sidqi won and remained in o¢ ce until1933, when the King forced him to resign. Parliament was dissolved again in1934. Until 1936 elections, di¤erent governments, all appointed by the King,succeeded one another. In December 1935, the British allowed the restorationof 1923 Constitution, and new elections were called for May 1936. Wafd wonand Al-Nahhas was elected Prime Minister. One and a half years later, in De-cember 1937, the new monarch, King Faruq (his father had passed away beforeMay 1936 elections) removed al-Nahhas, dissolved the parliament, and called fornew elections, boycotted by Wafd (which still won 12 seats). The Liberal Partyformed the government under Mohamed Mahmud. One year later, Mahmudwas deposed by the King in favor of Ali Mahir (independent), who formed a na-tionalist government. The British forced the King to replace him in June 1940.The parliament was dissolved again in 1944 and the monarchy was abolishedafter the military coup of 1952.

France 1815-1830: The 1814 Constitution did not provide for parliamen-tary responsibility. In 1815, after an electoral success of ultra-royalists, thegovernment of Talleryand resigned and Louis XVIII accepted the resignation:�J�ai reçu mes ministres, qui m�ont apporté leurs démission. Ils me l�ont donnéeà l�anglaise, je l�acceptée de même.� (cited in de Waresquiel and Yvert 2002:160). Yet this change of government did not emanate from the parliament,but was a unilateral tactical move by the King. Dissolutions in 1816 and 1824resulted in victories of the government. After de Villèle failed to pass an impor-tant law and his majority progressively diminished, the Chambre was dissolvedagain in 1827. Elections in November 1827 were catastrophic for the ministry.The opposition was about to win an absolute majority. Popular unrest eruptedand it was brutally repressed. Charles X resisted abandoning de Villèle. A new

18

ministry was formed, but it was continuist. This incident did not change CharlesX�s views. He is reported to have said: �It [parliamentary responsibility] wouldbe an absurdity and an injustice in France. In England, ..., the ministers governand should be responsible. In France, the King governs and the ministers cannotbe punished for obeying him. It is their duty.�(de Waresquiel and Yvert 2002:411) Montignac, the Prime Minister, speaking in the Chambre, emphasized thatministers govern only in the name of the King. He governs, they execute. �Weare accused of going from concession to concession. Certainly, if to concede isto give, grant, award (donner, octroyer, accorder), in virtue of his right and hispower, the Kings of France did not cease going from concession to concession.But if one would want to understand by this word the abandonment of a prerog-ative useful to the Crown, we would like to declare, the throne will never makesuch concessions.�(de Waresquiel and Yvert 2002: 414). Montignac fell in May1829, having lost a vote on local administration. The King used this occasionto get rid of him. Complex and secret negotiations ensued. The King decidedto impose himself. The Chambre passed a resolution demanding a change ofgovernment. Charles refused and suspended the parliament. On May 16 theChambre was dissolved. The Minister of Interior expected the government towin a majority in the ensuing elections. Polignac, the new Prime Minister de-clared that in case of victory of the opposition the King would be obliged torule by decrees. �It is thus up to the voters to make it so that the majorityof the new Chambre would not be such that the King would be obliged .... totake strong measures...� In the election, the opposition won 274 seats against145 for the ministry. The King, on July 7, decided to rule by ordinances3 anda revolution ensued.

Greece: According to the Constitution of 1844 (article 24), �The Kingappoints and removes his Ministers,� a phrase that was repeated verbatimthe Constitution of 1864. Nevertheless, in 1875 �the King accepted the prin-ciple that he would invariably call upon the party leader enjoying the sup-port of a majority of deputies in parliament to form a government." In hisCrown Speech, King George I expressly declared, "I demand as a prerequi-site, of all that I call beside me to assist me in governing the country, to pos-sess the manifest con�dence and trust of the majority of the Nation�s repre-sentatives. Furthermore, I accept this approval to stem from the Parliament,as without it the harmonious functioning of the polity would be impossible.�(http://www.parliament.gr/english/politeuma/default.asp). It was not until1881, however, that Kharilaos Trikoupis was able to secure parliamentary sup-port for his New Party. For much of the remaining two decades of the centurya two-party system operated, with Trikoupis alternating with his arch-rival,

3Charles X invoked article 14 of the Constitution as granting him the right to rule bydecree. But this article does not seem to give this power. Here is the text:

Article 14. - Le roi est le chef suprême de l�Etat, il commande les forces deterre et de mer, déclare la guerre, fait les traités de paix, d�alliance et de com-merce, nomme à tous les emplois d�administration publique, et fait les règlementset ordonnances nécessaires pour l�exécution des lois et la sûreté de l�Etat.

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Deliyannis (Clogg 1992: 67). Yet in 1910, the King dissolved the parliamenteven though the parliament voted con�dence in Venizelos. The new election waswon by Venizelos. Another dissolution occurred in 1915, two parallel govern-ments were formed, a civil war ensued, and Konstantin abdicated in favor ofhis younger son. Monarchy was abolished in 1924, reestablished in 1935, to beabolished again in 1974.

Note that this is the only case in which parliamentary responsibility waspracticed for an extended period of time yet subsequently the monarch at-tempted to override the parliament.

Hungary: The Constitution of 1867 did not provide for parliamentary re-sponsibility. The Liberals had originally come to power through elections ofAugust 1875, which gave them a majority and represented a change away fromConservatives. While this event may have indicated the acceptance of par-liamentary responsibility, subsequent events showed the Emperor�s dominanceover the parliament. After the budget could not be passed in 1903, the elec-tion of January 1905 brought the �rst defeat of the Liberals. They won only159 mandates, while the National Coalition (opposition) elected 235 deputies.The Emperor was willing to appoint Coalition government but not to acceptits platform. In June, Francis Joseph appointed a non-parliamentary caretakergovernment, headed by the former minister of defense, General Fejervary. Thelower house, in which the Coalition had a majority, protested by calling for na-tionwide passive resistance including non-payment of taxes and refusal to sendrecruits to the army. In February 1906, the army occupied the Parliament and aroyal commissioner read a declaration dissolving the legislature without settingthe date for new elections. Only after a tacit agreement that they would notpursue their original course, Francis Joseph agreed to let the Coalition form agovernment, which subsequently won an absolute majority in the May election(Macartney 1962: 99-100, Jeszenszky 1990). The Emperor continued to chooseprime ministers until monarchy was abolished in 1918.

Iran: The �rst constitution was adopted in 1906-7. According to the Article67 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907, "If the NationalConsultative Assembly or the Senate shall, by an absolute majority, declare itselfdissatis�ed with the Cabinet, or with one particular Minister, that Cabinet orMinister shall resign their or his ministerial functions." In 1907, however, thereigning Shah bombed the Majlis building and dissolved the parliament. He wasdeposed one year later and the parliament was reinstated.

From 1911 to 1914 the legislature was closed again and the constitutionwas suspended. In 1914, the legislature was reconvened, to be closed again in1915. In 1921, the parliament was reconvened and met under a governmentthat commanded its con�dence. Ahmad Shah (who ruled from 1914 to 1923) ofthe Qajar dynasty established the practice of never appointing a premier unlessthe parliament had indicated its preference by vote. According to Farmanfarma(1954: 244), the last time �this constitutional custom" was exercised underthe Qajar dynasty was in 1923 with the Musto� cabinet. Between this cabinetand the accession of Reza Pahlavi in 1925, there was one other cabinet. A

20

formal vote of preference was not obtained, �presumably because only a fewdays were left of the 4th session and the person appointed was particularlyfavored.�(Farmanfarma 1954: 244). Ahmad Shah was overthrown in 1924.

From the accession of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925 to his deposition in 1941,there was no formal vote of con�dence in the parliament and Pahlavi appointedand dismissed ministers as he pleased. During this period, parties were not al-lowed to operate, although elections continued to be held regularly. In 1941 RezaKhan resigned in favor of son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. From 1941 to 1949,no prime minister took o¢ ce without vote of preference, unless the parliamentwas not in session. In 1949, the young Shah made a �rst attempt to consolidatehis power, by declaring martial law and convening a Constitutional Assemblythat introduced a Senate and gave the Shah the right to dissolve Parliament. Fortwo years, the practice of asking parliamentary approval for appointment of theprime minister was not followed, but it was re-established in 1951 when Mosad-degh came to power as prime minister against the will of the Shah. Mosaddeghpersuaded the Iranian parliament to grant him extraordinary powers and de-manded that the Shah act as a constitutional monarch. He organized a plebiscitefor the dissolution of the Majlis, claimed a massive vote in favor of the proposal,and dissolved the legislature. In August 1953, Mosaddegh was overthrown andShah�s power was restored. Elections were held, but parties were banned. In1957, the Shah allowed for the creation of two government-sponsored parties,which competed in elections in 1960. The �rst election, in which the governmentparty won a majority was annulled in the face of accusations that it was unfair.The government again won a majority in the election that followed in 1961. Inresponse to protests, the Shah dissolved the parliament and gave the premierthe right to rule by decree. After 1963 elections were held and the parliamentwas open, but opposition parties never gained even close to a majority of seats.The monarchy was overthrown in 1979.

Lesotho (Basutaland): The �rst constitution was adopted in 1959, andthe second in 1966, when the country became independent. When the royalistBasutaland National Party seemed to be heading toward electoral defeat in the�rst post-independence elections in 1970, the incumbent prime minister nulli�edthe election, proclaimed emergency, dissolved the parliament, and suspended theconstitution. In 1986 a military coup transformed all the executive and legisla-tive power to the king who, however, was supposed to act on the advice of theMilitary Council. King Moshoeshoe was exiled by the military in 1990 but acountercoup in 1991 brought him back. In 1993 a new constitution took allexecutive power from the king. In 1994, King Letsie III staged a countercoupbut constitutional government was restored within a month.

Nepal: In 1959, the King granted a constitution that provided for a cab-inet responsible to the lower house. Elections were held in 1959 in which theNepal Congress party won a majority. A cabinet led by B.P. Koirala, who ledthe Congress, was formed. In 1960, the King dismissed the government andsuspended parliament, appointed his own Cabinet, and ruled directly. The 1962Constitution contained a stronger and more explicit statement of royal author-

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ity than did previous constitutions. The King was the sole source of authorityand had the power not only to amend the constitution but also to suspend it byroyal proclamation during emergencies. The Council of Ministers during thisperiod were appointed by King at his own discretion (Rose 1963: 117). Theconstitution abolished all political parties. In 1977, King Birendra Bir BikramShah Deva broke a seventeen-year tradition when he appointed Kirti Nidhi Bistaas prime minister on the recommendation of the National Assembly. Politicalparties were banned since 1960, however, so it is di¢ cult to tell whether thisappointee was a member of the �opposition.� Still, it was the �rst time since1960 that a Nepalese King waived his authority to appoint the leader of the gov-ernment. A 1980 amendment to the constitution formally re-instated cabinetresponsibility to the parliament but partisan elections occurred only in 1990,when the ban on parties was o¢ cially lifted. King Birendra dissolved Nepal�snational assembly, accepted the resignation of his Prime Minister Lokendra Ba-hadur Chand, and appointed a leading opposition �gure of the Nepali CongressParty to lead Nepal�s �rst government in thirty years not set up by the monarch.In the subsequent elections the NCP won a majority and continued in o¢ ce un-til the elections of 1994, which it lost. Between 1994 and 2002, with anotherelections intervening in 1999, several governments were removed by votes ofnon-con�dence. In 2002, King Gyanendra unilaterally changed the governmentand in 2005 he staged a royal coup and, although he agreed to reconvene theparliament one year later, the monarchy was abolished in 2008.

Ottoman Empire: The Article 7 of the Basic Law of 1876 provided thatthe Sultan makes and cancels appointments of ministers. When some deputieselected in 1877 and, after the dissolution of the �rst parliament, in 1878 criticizedthe government and sought to impeach some ministers, the Sultan dissolved theparliament sine diem. The 1876 Constitution was restored as a consequence ofa military revolt in 1908 and elections for parliament were held for the �rst timein thirty years. In 1909, the Sultan Abdul Hamid II attempted a coup againstthe parliamentary regime and was deposed by the army in favor of his brother.The constitutional revision of 1909 stated in Article 30 that "Ministers shall beresponsible to the Chamber of Deputies collectively for the general policy of theGovernment and personally for the a¤airs of their respective departments," butdid not provide for a procedure of non-con�dence. In 1912, the ruling party,CUP, dissolved the parliament. Elections that year produced a CUP majority�the majority was secured through violence and as a result only �a handful�ofopposition party members were elected. Although the Chamber gave the CUPprime minister a vote of con�dence, he resigned and was replaced by an anti-CUP cabinet which dissolved parliament again. In 1913, the old CUP primeminister returned as a result of a military coup; upon his assassination, a newCUP prime minister was appointed. Because the opposition did not participate,the CUP dominated elections held in 1914. Parliament was dissolved in 1918.Elections were held in 1919 but the chamber did not meet until January 1920and prorogued itself in April of the same year. (Based on Zurcher 1997.)

Romania: Constitutional monarchy was established in 1866. Articles 92

22

and 93 gave the king the right to choose and revoke his ministers. It wascustomary for the monarch to appoint governments, dissolve the parliament,and hold elections in which the new government would produce a majority inthe legislature. Partisan alternations followed this pattern in 1876, 1888 (whenthe parliament was dissolved), 1895, 1899, 1901, 1905, 1907, 1911, and 1914.Hitchins (1994: 94) summarizes this period as follows: �The King played a keyrole in determining the outcome of elections through his constitutional authorityto appoint the incoming Prime Minister. By the �nal decades of the centurythe procedure for changing governments had been perfected. The process beganwith the resignation of the sitting government, consultations between the Kingand leading politicians, and the selection of one among the latter to form a newgovernment. The �rst task of the newly designated Prime Minister after he hadchosen his cabinet was to organize elections for a new Chamber and Senate.That was the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior. . . to make certainthat the opposition would be overwhelmed in the coming elections. Between1881 and 1914. . . no government designated by the King was ever disappointedat the polls. The �rotation�of parties also became the rule during this period. Itbecame customary for the King to alternate the two major parties in o¢ ce. . . .�

A Liberal government, headed by Ionel Br¼atianu, was installed at the endof November 1918. In the elections in November 1919 Liberals received only 22per cent of the vote and 103 deputies out of 568. This was the �rst time thatthe government�s administrative apparatus had failed to deliver an absolutemajority to the party running the elections (Hitchins 1994). Eventually theopposition from the King generated a paralysis and the parliament was dissolvedin March 1920. The King gave the mandate to Averescu (People�s Party) whosecured a majority in the elections that followed in May. Thereafter the previoustradition of alternation followed by election was reestablished, as evidenced in1922, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1931, 1932, and 1933. Under the new Constitution of1923 (Articles 87, 88) the King could choose his ministers even from outsideparliament and he could dismiss them as he thought best.

In 1937, elections did not produce a majority for the incumbent LiberalParty. The PM resigned and King Carol appointed the head of the NationalChristian Party (only the fourth largest party in parliament) to form a govern-ment, intending �to show that the elections . . . had not really changed the waythings were done and that it was, after all, his will that counted" (Hitchins 1994:420). A new constitution was adopted in 1938 and non-parliamentary rule wasimposed in 1940. Monarchy was abolished in 1947.

Russia: The organic laws of 1906 established a parliament, the Duma,leaving the prerogative no appoint and dismiss governments to the Tsar. The�rst Duma was elected in 1906 and dissolved after two months. The secondDuma was elected in 1907 and also dissolved. Electoral laws were then changedby Nicolas II to assure that no more electoral defeats would ensue. Moreover,contrary to the Manifesto of October 1907, after June 1907 the Tsar could anddid issue edicts, bypassing the Duma when it was not in session. Monarchy wasabolished in 1917.

23

Serbia: According to (Dragnich 1978), the 1869 Constitution did not makeclear if ministerial responsibility was legal or political. According to Stead (1909:58), however, the �Constitution of 1869 represented the type of constitutionaland parliamentary monarch of the English model. The direct representatives ofthe supreme authority exercising this authority were the Prince and the NationalSkupchtina. The responsible Ministerial Cabinet existed between them as theircommon organ as the expression of their common desire. This was appointedand dismissed by the Prince, but could only continue and act if supported bythe con�dence of the majority in the Skupchtina.�Political responsibility wasrecognized in practice in 1874: Liberals formed governments from 1869 until1873, but when Prince Milan appointed a Conservative PM, Marinovic, andwhen the elections in 1874 did not produce a Conservative majority, Marinovicresigned despite having won two votes of con�dence. In 1875 Liberals returnedto o¢ ce having won the election. But in the early 1880�s, when the RadicalParty won a majority, Prince Milan appointed a technocratic cabinet undera Conservative. Milan eventually appointed a Radical cabinet in 1887 andRadicals won nearly all the seats in the ensuing elections. A new constitutionwas adopted in 1888, providing again for a vote of non-con�dence: according toStead (1909: 64), �The executive power is in the hands of a ministerial cabinet,appointed and dismissed by the king, but which cannot retain its position if itdoes not enjoy the con�dence of the legislature, the assembly possessing all thenecessary constitutional means for controlling the cabinet, and for obliging itto resign as soon as it can no longer command con�dence.�A Radical cabinetwas formed, and elections followed. Radicals governed until 1892 when Pasic(Radical) resigned and a Liberal PM was appointed. Elections in 1893 gavethe Liberals a narrow majority but in the same year Milan, who abdicated inthe meantime, staged a coup and returned in 1894. A number of semi-partyor non-party cabinets ensued until Radicals returned to power in 1903 after acoup which ousted Alexander (Milan�s son) and the Obrenovic dynasty. The1888 constitution was restored, subsequent elections were competitive, and thewinners assumed o¢ ce, but the country was incorporated into Yugoslavia in1918.

Yugoslavia: In the early period, governments served with parliamentarysupport. Radicals (1918) and the Democratic Party (1919) headed cabinets inthe provisional assembly. Elections for a constituent assembly in 1920 did notproduce a majority for any party. A constitution adopted in 1921 did not providefor a vote of non-con�dence. Elections in 1923, 1925, and 1927 gave Radicals aplurality. In 1928, there was a partisan alternation after a crisis where deputieswere killed. King Alexander attempted federalist reforms, but when they failed,on January 6, 1929, he abolished the 1921 Constitution, dissolved the parliamentand introduced a personal dictatorship. The King revived parliament with theConstitution of 1931, according to which ministers were responsible solely tothe Crown. Elections held that year were not competitive, while elections heldin 1935 and 1935 did permit some opposition but cabinets formed in 1935 and

24

1939 were drawn from the o¢ cial government party. Monarchy was abolishedin 1945. (Based on Seton-Watson & La¤an 1966.)

5.3 Yield, survive

Belgium: Lorwin (1966: 119) asserts that �The Belgian state was born parlia-mentary�but the Constitution of 1831 did not di¤er from the standard of thetime, that is, the King was the chief executive, governed through his ministers,who had to co-sign all acts, and were only individually responsible. Accordingto the Article 65, "Le Roi nomme et révoque ses ministres." From 1831 to 1847,King Leopold presided over unionist governments, most of which were mixedcabinets of Catholics and Liberals. In 1840 he made a issue of reinstatement inthe army of an exile colonel a matter of con�dence. Defeated in both Cham-bers, the government resigned. In 1841, the Parliament refused to adopt thebudget (van Beyme 2000: 21). The King appointed a purely Liberal govern-ment, which was defeated in the Senate and resigned but the King refused todissolve the parliament and appointed another unionist government. Liberalsmade electoral progress in 1845 and the prime minister resigned. But the Kingwas not ready to accept the end of unionism and kept the prime minister ino¢ ce while searching for a successor. The King appointed a government headedby a non-partisan civil servant, who in turn resigned in 1846 because of internaldissensions within the Ministry. �On the resignation of M. Van der Weyer, KingLeopold recognized that the day of Unionism was over, and that it would benecessary to employ homogeneous ministries instead of mixed�(Boulger 2005:295). The King was prepared to appoint a Liberal, M. Rogier, but the lat-ter demanded the right to dissolve the Chambers and the King declined. TheKing appointed an exclusively Catholic administration, but the majority of theChamber was Liberal. When Liberals won the election after the parliament hadbeen dissolved in 1847, the King appointed Rogier. In 1852, Catholics madeelectoral progress, Liberals were divided, and the King appointed a governmentof experts. In 1854, Catholics won a clear majority, �rst time ever. The expertgovernment of de Brouckere survived one more year but in 1855 it was replacedby a Catholic ministry. When a school bill advanced by this government passedthe parliament but met with popular demonstrations, the King appointed a Lib-eral government and authorized it to dissolve the Chambers. Liberals won thesubsequent election, in 1857. (Based on Boulger 2005). Subsequent dissolutionsoccurred in 1864, 1870, and 1892.The current version of the Constitution (Article 96) has an explicit article

about parliamentary responsibility. It repeats the phrase "Le Roi nomme etrévoque ses ministres" but then goes on "The Federal Government o¤ers itsresignation to the King if the Chamber of Representatives, by an absolute ma-jority of its members, adopts a motion of disapproval, proposing to the Kingthe nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister, or proposes to the Kingthe nomination of a successor to the Prime Minister within three days of therejection of a motion of con�dence. The King names the proposed successor asPrime Minister, who takes o¢ ce the moment the new Federal Government is

25

sworn in.�We cannot trace the date of this article but we guess it must havebeen in 1892.

Hence, parliamentary responsibility was not included in the constitution of1831, it was practised as of 1847, and consitutionalized in 1892 (?).

Denmark: In 1848, the King yielded to mass pressure, led by Liberals, todismiss his cabinet but he appointed another Conservative government. Thisincident occurred, however, before Denmark had a constitution, which wasadopted in 1849 and followed by another one in 1866. In 1872, the oppositionparty, Venstre, won an absolute majority in the Folketing (the lower house),but the government continued to be Conservative. The right-wing party, Højre,continued to govern in spite of Left majorities until 1901, when it won only eightout of 114 seats in the Folketing. Fearing that Venstre would be driven into thearms of radical Socialist Workers who were winning ever-more seats since 1884,on 24 July 1901 Christian IX appointed �rst Venstre government. �From thatpoint on, parliamentarism was adopted as political practice in Denmark�(Jer-gensen 2004: 69) In 1920, Christian X attempted to impose his government butfailed. The principle was codi�ed in 1953.

Hence, parliamentary responsibility was not in the constitutions of 1849 or1866, it was practised as of 1901, and consitutionalized in 1953.

Netherlands: Parliamentary responsibility was not provided for in the Con-stitution of 1815. In 1840, when the government introduced some constitutionalamendments, the First Chamber declined to consider the budget so long as thegovernment had not brought in a bill for amending the constitutions by minis-terial responsibility. �Reluctantly the government consented. The budget waspassed as well as government�s other constitutional amendments. But the Kingdid not plan to continue his reign under this constitution...� He abdicated afew months later.(Blok 1970: 443). In 1848, there was a comprehensive con-stitutional revision. Count Schimmelpennick asked the King to appoint him as�cabinet former� for the formation of a de�nitive �homogeneous and respon-sible�ministry. The King consented to preparing a constitution �in the mainlike the British.... The ministerial responsibility fully introduced had bound theexecution of authority to the cooperation of the ministers...�(Blok 1970: 461-2;note however the plural of �ministers.�) The ministry of De Kamenaer collec-tively resigned in 1849. �A Thorbecke (Liberal leader) ministry was desiredby the majority [of the Second Chamber]. All attempts to escape it failed oneafter another. At the end of October the King yielded to the pressure.... Thusthe path of parliamentary government was �nally entered upon.� (Blok 1970:465). But the Thorbecke government fell in 1853, �not by a parliamentary de-feat but apparently by the King�s will.�The parliament was dissolved and theelections was won by Conservatives. In 1856 Conservatives became a minor-ity but continued to form governments, facing parliamentary defeats. In 1866,a motion of disapproval of the government was passed by the Chamber, theministry proposed to the King the dissolution of the Second Chamber. �Beforethe elections set for October 31st the government induced the King to issue aproclamation urging the voters to choose representatives, who would agree with

26

the administration and put an end to the �constant change of responsible coun-sellors.�The proclamation was sent with the ballots to the voters. The purposewas evident to use the attachment to the house of Orange against the liberalparty.�(Block 1970: 482) The result was a slight defeat of Liberals. In 1867, theparliament refused foreign a¤airs budget, the ministry resigned, and the SecondChamber was dissolved again. The government was defeated in the elections of1868. At the Liberal instigation, the Chamber passed a motion declaring that�no national interest had required the dissolution.�The government was againdefeated over foreign a¤airs budget. In the 1869 elections Conservatives weredefeated again. �An antiliberal government was not possible against the liberalmajority�and Thorbecke took o¢ ce again in 1871. Alternation as a result ofelection occurred in 1877. There was a dissolution in 1886 over religious issues,in which the government was defeated. A dissolution in 1887 was required forthe constitutional reform to become valid.

Parliamentary responsibility was not in the constitution of 1815. Everyonetakes 1868 to be the turning point and it is true that since 1871 governmentsalternated according to parliamentary majorities, but 1840 and 1848 are alsopossible dates. It seems that the principle was never explicitly constitution-alized: the Constitution of 1983 still says (article 42, paragraph 1) that "TheGovernment shall comprise the King and the Ministers" and (article 43) thatthe ministers are appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree, without mentioningany role of the parliament.

Norway: The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 does not provide for par-liamentary responsibility. In 1836 a prime minister kept his position despitehaving been impeached and convicted by the Storting (Storing 1963: 52). In1869, however, Charles XV (Swedish King) had to accept the Storting�s requestfor a change of Ministry (Verney 1957: 132). Everyone agrees that the datewhen parliamentary responsibility was accepted as a principle was 1884, whenthe parliament successfully brought charges against the government of Selmer(Elster 2006, Storing 1963: 30). In 1882 the Liberal party won sweeping victo-ries at the pools. When Selmer was impeached, Oscar II did accept the verdictas well as the resignation of the Selmer government but attempted to rule withan opposition ministry without conceding the principle. This tactic failed andthe King was forced to accept a Liberal ministry. Hence, while the procedureutilized was penal, the consequences were political. Lavaux (1998: 200) com-ments that �The con�rmation of the principle of governmental responsibilitywas very rapid. From 1888, the right, which had been in favor of maintainingthe separation of powers, used the motion of censure and in 1891, while it wasin power, the motion of con�dence.� However, in 1893 Oscar II appointed agovernment against an expressed lack of con�dence in the Storting. Accordingto Storing (1963), this was the only use of the vote of non-con�dence. Thisgovernment lasted two years.

According to Elster (personal communication), �After an impeachment casein 1926-27 showed deep ambiguities in the idea of the responsibility of the gov-ernment to the parliament, a parliamentary committee was appointed in 1927

27

to clarify the matter. In its report (1929) it stated explicitly that a vote of nocon�dence was legally binding for the government. In the meantime (1928), theHornsrud government (Labor) has stepped down after receiving a vote of nocon�dence, the �rst unambiguous case in recent times. Although the committeereport did not lead to legislation, it was generally accepted among politiciansand jurists that the principle of parliamentarism has now acquired constitu-tional status so that its violation could trigger impeachment.�Note, however,that the current version of the constitution says nothing about parliamentaryresponsibility. According to Article 3, "Executive power is vested in the King,or the Queen ...," while Article 12 still maintains that "The King himself chooseshis Council...."

Sweden: Neither the Instrument of the Government of 1719, which ush-ered in the �rst period of constitutional monarchy (Roberts 2002), nor the oneof 1809, provided for parliamentary responsibility. In 1868 Storting refused forthe �rst time to grant the defense budget. Some ministers wanted to resign butCharles XV did not accept it, declaring that such a resignation would implyparliamentary control over the Ministry and, therefore, that there must be nosuggestion of resignation. An opposition party, Farmers, �rst won in 1880 andOscar II called upon Count Posse, the leader of the party, to head the govern-ment. He was not fully supported, however, by his party and ended up forminga government which had the highest proportion of nobles of any during thisperiod (Verney 1957: 103). His defence bill was defeated and Posse resigned.First collective resignation of the government occurred in 1905. In 1906 �rstgovernment, Liberal under Staa¤, came into o¢ ce because it had the pluralityin the lower chamber. In 1907, opposition leader referred to a �hypothetical voteof no con�dence�but still no such vote could be taken. When Staa¤ resigned, aConservative government came into o¢ ce but due to their majority in the upperchamber they could muster as much support as Liberals. When Liberals wonthe election of 1911, they were returned to o¢ ce again. In 1914 a stalemateensued: Social Democrats won a one vote plurality over the Conservatives andLiberals were badly defeated. Moreover, Social Democrats were not ready toenter a government, and a Conservative government was formed. In 1917, SocialDemocrats won the plurality, followed by Liberals, and a coalition of these twoparties took o¢ ce.

According to everyone, �It is the 1917 Government which is regarded asthe �breakthrough of parliamentary government�.� (Verney 1957: 232). In theconstitution of 1974, the King no longer had the executive power and the gov-ernment was made explicitly responsible to the parliament.

Thailand: After a series of coups and counter-coups, a constitution wasadopted in 1932. This constitution stipulated that the Cabinet would be re-sponsible to the legislature. King Prajadikhop left for Europe on the pre-text of seeking medical treatment, refused to sign legislation, and abdicatedin 1935. For the next sixteen years, Thailand had no resident monarch (Bakerand Phongpaichit 2005: 116-123). Subsequent history of Thailand witnessed re-peated con�icts between civilian and military factions, always claiming support

28

of the monarch: between 1932 and 2000 there were nine instances in which theparliament was dissolved and nine coups, yet none directed against the King.An appointed upper house was introduced in 1968 and votes of con�dence hadto be passed by both houses. Between 1976 and 1977 the legislature was fullyappointed. But the principle of cabinet responsibility was never reversed in thesense that the King never appointed a cabinet that did not enjoy the supportof the majority of the legislature.

United Kingdom: The �rst instance may have been 1695, when the cabi-net for the �rst time fully corresponded to the parliamentary majority or 1701when the Tories, previously in opposition, won a majority and the King incor-porated them into the cabinet (Schmitt: 1989: 468). Lavaux (1998: 190) takes1729, Walpole�s cabinet, as the �rst incidence of a government that enjoyed thecon�dence of the parliament. Hume, writing in 1742, noted that the approvalof the cabinet by the King was �but a formality.�Yet in 1741 Walpole refusedto resign when he was demanded to do so by the Commons. The governmentof Lord North was the �rst to resign collectively in 1782. In 1834, the Whiggovernment of Lord Melbourne was dismissed by William IV and it was replacedby a government headed by Peel, who was the Tory leader in the Commons.The Parliament was dissolved, and when Peel lost the election, the King recalledMelbourne. In 1858, however, Queen Victoria replaced Liberal Palmerston witha minority Tory government under Derby; the Tories lost the elections in 1859,the Queen reappointed Derby, and only when he could not pass legislation, sheaccepted Palmerston and subsequently Gladstone.

5.4 Yield, overthrown

Italy: The government was responsible only to the King in the Statuto Al-bertino of Sardinia, adopted in 1848, which became the constitution of Italyafter uni�cation in 1861. Nevertheless, the practice of parliamentary responsi-bility was recognized from the onset. There was a period when parties agreed togovern together, so the issue was moot. Although never recognized legally, thepractice was so entrenched that in 1925 Mussolini had to pass a law explicitlystating that the government is not responsible to the parliaments. Monarchywas abolished in 1946.

Parliamentary responsibility was never constitutionalized but always prac-ticed. But monarchy was abolished nevertheless.

5.5 Suppress, survive

Jordan: The Constitution of 1952 provided for the principle of parliamentaryresponsibility (article 51) and the procedure of non-con�dence (article 53). Afterthe election of 1954, King Hussain removed the prime minister, with eight gov-ernments appointed by him following until the elections of 1956. In early 1956,a previous dissolution was declared illegal and the previous government was re-stored. The parliament was dissolved in June 1956 and the ensuing elections

29

resulted in a victory of the opposition parties. A few days after the election,King Hussein asked Suleiman Nabulsi, the leader of the National Socialist Partywhich gained eleven seats in the elections, to form the government. After anattempted coup against the monarchy in 1957, however, the King, reassured ofthe army�s backing, forced prime minister Nabulsi to resign and appointed agovernment of his own choice. While the elections in 1961 were rigged, those in1962 were relatively free although parties were banned (Robins 2004: 109). Theincumbent government received the con�dence of the new assembly but withsome dissenting votes. Soon after, however, King Hussain replaced Prime Min-ister Tall with Samir al-Rifai, who for the �rst time in the history of Jordan wasbrought down by a vote of non-con�dence. In response, the King appointed aninterim prime minister, and the lower house elected in 1963 proved to be moremalleable. The parliament was dissolved sine diem in 1974, to be restored onlyin 1983. First elections after 1967, with parties still banned, were held in 1989and parties were legalized in 1992. In November 1991, Prime Minister Tahiral-Masri lost his support in parliament and resigned in anticipation of losing acon�dence vote. In 1992 parliament brought down a government, though not bydirectly using its power to withdraw con�dence (Brown 2002: 118). Before theelections of 1993, however, the King dissolved the parliament and changed theelectoral rules. Royalist forces won all the subsequent elections, some of whichwere boycotted by the opposition.

Kuwait: The �rst constitutional experiment occurred in 1938 and wasshort-lived. When the assembly attempted to exercise its �scal prerogatives,the amir dissolved it and called for a new election. When the assembly failedto modify the constitution in the amir�s favor, the constitution was abandoned.(Brown 2002: 30-31). A new constitution was adopted in 1962 after the coun-try became independent in 1961. While the parliament could censure individualministers, it could not withdraw con�dence from the prime minister, who wasalways the crown prince (Brown 2002: 57). In 1964 the amir conceded to theobjections of some parliamentarians to the composition of the government. Yetin 1976 the amir disbanded the parliament and transferred its legislative author-ity to the government, which "required suspending parts of the constitutionwithout the consent of the parliament, something speci�cally forbidden by theconstitution" (Brown 2002: 57-58). The parliament was reconvened in 1981 butin 1986 the constitution was again suspended. After the Iraqui invasion of 1990,the parliament was reopened again in 1992. The parliament was dissolved in1999 but this time constitutional provisions were observed.

Morocco: Morocco became a constitutional monarchy in 1962 and held �rstelections one year later. According to the Constitution of 1962 (Article 24), theKing appoints and dismissed the ministers but (Articles 80 and 81) the House ofRepresentatives can dismiss the government by a vote of non-con�dence. Whenthe opposition UNFP won the election, in 1965 the King suspended the parlia-ment and served as his own prime minister during two years. The constitutionwas slightly revised in 1970 and again in 1972 increasing the power of the Kingto appoint and dismiss governments. Two more constitutions were adopted in

30

1980 and 1992, while another dissolution occurred in 1983. Yet another con-stitution was adopted in 1996, providing again for parliamentary responsibilityand a procedure of con�dence. The opposition won the plurality election in1998 and formed the government, but this event is generally considered to havebeen engineered by the King. In 2002, Mohammed VI reverted to the practiceof naming the prime minister regardless of election results (Ottaway and Riley2006).

Swaziland: The �rst constitution was adopted in 1968, when the countrybecame independent. It did not provide for parliamentary responsibility. Whenan opposition party won 20 percent of the vote and three out of twenty-four seatsin 1972, King Sobhuza II dissolved the parliament, repealed the constitution, andassumed all powers. A new parliament was partly elected and partly appointedby the King in 1979. A new constitution was adopted in 2005, providing forgovernments responsible to the king.

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