Przeworski Democratic Socialism in Poland

7/31/2019 Przeworski Democratic Socialism in Poland

1/25

Adam Przeworski

Democratic Socialismin Poland?

The coming months will be decisive in forging the course of history ofPoland. The system established in Poland during the late nineteen forties, a

system which retained its central features each time as it recovered from

workers' revolts in 1956, 1970, and 1976, now appears irreparable. Agricul-

tural production is drastically inefficient; the industry operates in ways

which are chaotic, wasteful, and unpredictable; stores are empty and the

lines are long. Only a few die-hards believe that the country can survive

without fundamental economic reforms.

But even if the economic situation is disastrous, the call for reformswould not be sufficient to differentiate the current situation from the many

crises that the country experienced during the past thirty years. Economic

reforms - whether of agricultural policies, management systems, incentive

systems, accounting conventions, local administration, taxation, or central

planning - have been as frequent in Poland as projects to combat unem-

ployment in the United States. Their consequences are also the same:

nothing ever changes. What is new this time is not the depth of the

economic crisis but the political situation. The lingering workers' resistance

which exploded in 1970 and 1976 and accelerated during recent years was

caused by economic conditions. Perhaps this resistance would have

subsided if conditions of work and of daily life had improved in the

aftermath of the events of June 1976. But now no economic improvement

will suffice. The movement is oriented toward economic demands, but its

causes are political. And during two months of this summer the workers'

Studies in Political Economy, No.5, Spring 1981 29


2/25

Studies in Political Economy

movement destroyed the relations of political forces under which Poland

has lived since 1948. Emerging as an autonomous political force in a

country where for thirty years power was concentrated in one center, where

politics was reduced to administration, where every conflict was treated asa threat to the system, where the society was atomized, where individuals

were reduced to the status of uninformed and unwilling executors of

decisions, the Gdansk workers have broken the dam. Their victory gave

impetus to a sudden, massive rebirth of civil society.

The Polish Summer

The opening was made by workers. On July 1, 1980, the government

announced a set of measures concerning the pricing and the distribution of

meat. The price of meat sold in ordinary stores was to be increased by 2 0 0 7 0

and that of meat in the so-called "commercial" establishments - normally

50 to 100% higher than the general distribution - by 14.2%. Moreover,

several varieties of meat, including staple products such as smoked lard and

ham hocks, were to be distributed exclusively through the higher price

network. Sale of meats through factories was to be abolished and

restaurant prices were to be aligned with the commercial network.

Meat is politically important in Poland. The increase of the prices of

meat in December 1970 led to a series of riots, most notably in the Balticport of Gdansk, and resulted in the toppling of the then First Secretary of

the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka.

When Edward Gierek became the First Secretary in 1970, he promised that

prices of basic staples, including meat, would not be increased for five

years. Since in the meantime nominal wages were increasing rapidly (58.6%

between 1970 and 1975) and meat production increased only slightly, meat

became increasingly scarce and lines longer. Moreover, in order to

persuade peasants (80% of land is privately owned in Poland) to produce

for the market, the government in 1972 abolished compulsory deliveries of

meat and other agricultural products, increased the prices at which the state

bought these products from the peasants, lowered the rate of taxation on

land, and increased the import of feeds. The result was that meat was being

sold to consumers at increasingly subsidized prices. To correct this situa-

tion, another attempt to increase meat prices was made in June of 1976,

followed by an instantaneous popular explosion. As in 1970, workers in

several cities went to the streets. This time the government quickly

withdrew, and since 1976 it has been pursuing a more flexible policy of

gradual and often hidden price increases, for example, by introducing the

two-class system of ordinary and commercial stores. Not until July 1 of thisyear were meat prices raised again by an administrative decree.

This time the increase did not evoke massive outbursts. Although infor-

mation is incomplete, it seems that local strikes, varying in duration, scope,

30


3/25

Adam Przeworski/POLAND

and demands, kept erupting all over the country throughout July. The

most notable event was a four day strike of municipal transport and

railroad workers in Lublin, a city in southeastern Poland. This strike was

important because, by its very nature, it was highly visible and becauseworkers there made the first demands concerning unions: they called for a

new, secret, and free election to the union local.

From what we know, Iit seems that the goverment consistently yielded

to the demands of strikers, whatever they happened to be. In Lublin, the

Vice-Prime Minister, Mr. Jagielski, made his first appearance as a

negotiator; all the demands were granted, including the free union election.

Elsewhere strikers saw their demands satisfied. In Ursus workers were

offered a 100/0 compensatory wage increase and a return to factory distri-

bution of meat; in Swidnik the wage increase was 15%; the garbage

collectors in Warsaw received a wage increase of 700 zlotys per month. At

the same time, the benefits were limited only to those workers who struck.

In a synthetic textiles factory at Bierun Stary, the 170 workers who

participated in a strike received wage increases of 20%; the remaining 1,830

workers who did not strike did not obtain the increase. Similarly, in a glass

factory at Walbrzych, the strikers got a 10% wage increase; the non-

strikers received nothing. Among the Warsaw transport workers, the

strikers received an increase of 1.50 zloty per hour, the non-strikers an

increase of 1.10 zloty. Only in Gdansk and Gdynia did some workersdiscover to their surprise that their wages were increased in their next

paycheck.

The strikes seem to have intensified by the beginning of August. The

demands of strikers continued to be predominantly narrowly economic:

wage increases and a return to the prices of July 1. Only one demand which

became widespread had political overtones: the alignment of family

allowances and pensions to those received by the army and the police,

generally thought to be 6 to 10 times higher.

On August 14th a strike began in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, a place

even more important for political than for economic reasons. It was in

Gdansk that workers marched against the local party committee in

December 1970; it was there that police opened fire, killing between 42 and

75 persons. Most importantly, it was in Gdansk that the then newly elected

First Secretary, Gierek, received from workers the credit of legitimacy

when, having presented his program, having promised not to increase

prices, and having sworn that he would never order police to shoot at

workers, he obtained from thousands of workers a unison pledge of

pomozemy, "we will help." It is from this pomozemy and from his

personal popularity in his old power base, Silesia, where he was the

Regional Party Secretary until 1970, that Gierek drew considerable popular

support.

31


4/25


Although rumors about work stoppages in different parts of the

immense Lenin shipyard circulated earlier, the immediate impetus for the

strike of August 14th was the firing of Mrs. Anna Walentynowicz, a 60

year old crane operator, a member of the strike committees in 1970 and1976, and a leader of the fledgling independent trade union movement.

Supporting this strike were 16,000 shipyard workers. During the next two

weeks the attention of the entire country and much of the world focused on

Gdansk. The strikers demanded the rehiring of Mrs. Walentynowicz and

two other workers fired for union activities, among them a Mr. Lech

Walesa; a wage increase of 2,000 zl. per month; and the return of meat

prices to those of July 1. They demanded a monument on the site dedicated

to the memory of the martyrs of 1970. As one worker put it, "if we have

three statues of Lenin, we could have one monument to our fallen

brothers". Most importantly, the Gdansk workers were the first to raise

what would become the key political issue: dissolution of the official union

local to be replaced by a free local union and the publication of all demands

by the national media.

In the ensuing negotiation, two of the three workers were hired, an

increase of 1,200 zl. was offered and the monument was conceded. Yet the

director of the shipyard, assisted by the Secretary of the Regional Party

Committee, Mr. Fiszbach, declared himself incompetent to negotiate the

other demands. As a result, when Mr. Walesa entered the shipyard andurged the workers to continue the strike, they proclaimed him the strike

leader and chairman of the newly founded Strike Committee. The workers

rejected the offer of 1,200 zl. and demanded the dissolution of the Central

Confederation of Trade Unions, the abolition of "commercial" stores,

and an interview with the Prime Minister. The strike continued and in the

meantime other enterprises, in and around Gdansk, joined in a solidarity

strike.

On August 15th, the local press for the first time informed the publicabout "work stoppages." The Prime Minister Mr. Babiuch went on

national television promising economic reforms, previously announced in

February, and urging workers to return to work. Mr. Gierek cancelled his

vacation and returned to Warsaw. The Plenary Meetings of the Central

Committee of the Party took place in Warsaw - one suspects to determine

the strategy with regard to Gdansk and the strikes in general.

On August 17th, the government responded to the strikers, again in a

conciliatory manner. The wage offer was increased to 1,500 zl., a new free

election to the existing union local was to take place immediately with strike

leaders as admissible candidates, and a guarantee of immunity was given to

the strikers and their leaders. When the offer was announced, workers

received it as a victory, singing the traditional "Hundred Years" to

Walesa. The strike seemed to be over. At this moment, however, a repre-

32


5/25


sentative of one of the factories which joined in a solidarity strike pointed

out that the agreement was limited to the Lenin Shipyard and that other

enterprises would obtain nothing once the strike ended. Walesa agreed and

urged that a new strike be proclaimed, now in solidarity with the other

striking workers. Hence, a new strike began on the 17th.

That same afternoon an Inter-Enterprise Committee (MKS) was

formed. By the next morning 49 enterprises, with 100,000 workers, had

joined the MKS, which began to formulate a list of demands. These ranged

from the narrowly economic to the broadly political, from the vague to the

very specific, from the cautiously moderate to the programmatic. In the

ensuing discussion, a member of the KOR (Committee for Social Self-

Defense, established after the events of 1976) urged that the demand for

free elections be dropped and that the list include more specific economic

demands, such as extension of maternity leaves or the advancement of

retirement age. Walesa himself took a moderate position, emphasizing that

the demands must not preclude a way out for the government. The final

list, which bears the imprint of having been produced during a night of

spontaneous debates, included the right to strike, the right to form free

unions, relaxation of censorship, liberation of all political prisoners (of

whom there eventually turned out to be three), broadcast of a Sunday mass

by the media, and a number of specific economic demands.

When the Central Committee met again in Warsaw, it seems to havearrived at a coherent strategy. Gierek appeared on television, admitted a

need for change, recognized that the labor unrest had objective grounds,

distinguished between strikers who are "honest workers" (those who raise

economic demands) and "anti-socialist elements" (who raise political

demands), strongly rejected any possibility of political concessions, and

urged a return to work. He did not, however, threaten to use force. A

television campaign was organized to convince people that Gierek's speech

had the effect of persuading responsible workers that nothing is to be

gained by striking and to provoke a middle class backlash against thestrikes. The campaign against "anti-socialist elements" was intensified and

some 30 dissidents belonging to different groups were detained in Warsaw.

The head of the official unions, Mr. Szydlak, came out with a hard,

uncompromising speech.

At the same time Gdansk was cut off from the rest of the country.

Telephone communication was interrupted, road blocks were introduced,

selected people travelling by train were stopped and sent back to Warsaw.

The strategy with regard to the strikers consisted of sending a Vice-Prime

Minister, Mr. Pyka, along with a huge government delegation, to negotiateseparately with each of the enterprise strike committees, not recognizing

the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS) as a legitimate representative

of workers, since such a step would de facto recognize it as an independent

union.

33


6/25


Neither the television campaign nor Pyka's mission was successful. Only

17 of the then 280 member committees of the MKS would talk to Mr. Pyka,

and whenever an agreement seemed to be within reach, they would return

to consult "at the base," thus destroying the results of negotiations. Theshipyard workers said that they would not be had twice by Mr. Gierek.

At this moment the situation turned into a full-fledged crisis, since the

only option of the government was either to recognize the MKS or to use

force. What happened cannot be reconstructed exactly, since there are

many versions and several appear to be credible. The fact is that Mr. Pyka

was recalled from Gdansk, to be replaced by a new delegation, headed by

Mr. Jagielski. At the same time, yet another Vice-Prime Minister, Mr.

Barcikowski, was sent to Szczecin, where another shipyard had gone on

strike on the 19th. Mr. Barcikowski immediately began to negotiate with

the Szczecin MKS, and on the evening of the 21st Mr. Jagielski, after tough

preliminary negotiations, made the first contact with three delegates of the

Gdansk MKS.

The Church now appeared as an actor for the first time. The bishop of

Gdansk, Msgr. Kaczmarek, met Cardinal Wysznski, and the communique

from their meeting contained an appeal to the workers for calm and moder-

ation and at least implicitly for a return to work.

On Friday the 22nd, the Central Committee met again in Warsaw, with

the participation of Messrs. Jagielski and Barcikowski. This seems to have

been the turning point. The introduction of a state of siege, conscription of

the striking workers, and the use of force were supposedly discussed, with a

narrow majority of those present opposed. The fact is that the meeting

opted once again for a policy of compromise. Four members of the

Political Bureau, known to be hardliners, were expelled and replaced by

two moderates. The Prime Minister, who lost his position in the Political

Bureau, also departed from his government post along with severalministers. The head of the official unions was fired. In the aftermath

Gierek appeared on television for the second time in six days, but with a

much more moderate tone, clearly shaken by the course of events. And

immediately after the meeting, Jagielski returned to Gdansk, obviously

with instructions to enter into negotiations with the MKS, although

apparently holding to a strategy of yielding on all demands save the free

unions. On Saturday, August 23rd, Jagielski and his team entered the

shipyard for the first time and negotiations began, point by point,

broadcast through loudspeakers all over the shipyard.

On Sunday, for the first time in the history of People's Poland, the

Cardinal appeared on television with a 75-minute speech. He urged

workers to terminate the strikes. In the meantime, the television campaign

continued. The three prisoners whose liberation was demanded by workers

34


7/25


were portrayed as common criminals. Cooked-up interviews with house-

wives "inconvenienced" by the strikes were intermixed with statements by

old workers calling for responsibility and hard work. Tension continued to

mount.

By the middle of the next week the Gdansk talks seemed to come to a

stalemate. Although agreement apparently was reached on most points -

the government simply yielding - Jagielski refused even to talk about the

unions. Once again, the crisis seemed insoluble. On the 28th a strike began

in a coal mine in Silesia, and the day after a similar local Inter-Enterprise

Strike Committee grouping first 9 and eventually 11 mines, was formed.

Strikes also spread to a steel mill in Nowa Huta and several other places.

On the 29th all points were agreed to in Gdansk with the exception of theunions. Finally, on Sunday, August 31st, after a last minute stand-off

concerning the liberation of KOR activitists who remained under deten-

tion, an agreement was reached in Gdansk.

The most important point of the agreement concerned the right to

organize. The document signed in Gdansk specifies that workers now have

the right to organize unions that are independent of the party and of

employers, in conformity with conventions number 87 and 97 of the Inter-

national Labor Organization, of which Poland is a signatory. At the same

time, in creating the new unions the MKS declared that it would respect the

principles of the Polish Constitution; that the unions would not play the

role of a political party, that they would be based on the principle of social

ownership of the means of production, the base of the socialist system in

Poland; that they recognized the directing role of the Polish United

Workers Party in the state and that they did not oppose the existing system

of international alliances. The government in turn promised to create the

legal conditions necessary for the existence of the new unions, including the

legislation enabling their registration and a new labor code. The unions

gained a real opportunity to influence decisions concerning life conditionsof workers and the partitioning of the national product into consumption

and investment, the distribution of social expenditures, the principles of

remuneration (in particular the indexing of salaries on the cost of living),

the long-term economic plan, investment and price policy. The unions are

to form an independent research institute which will study problems related

to material conditions of workers and will publish their results. In addition,

the new unions will have their own publications. Finally, the right to strike

will be guaranteed in the new labor code.

Other points of the agreement included the relaxation of censorship,

which is to be limited to state secrets, matters concerning the security of the

state and its international interests, and moral offenses. Decisions of the

censorship office are to be subject to appeal through the newly created

Supreme Administrative Court. Political prisoners, three of whom were

3S


8/25


mentioned by name, were to have their convictions re-examined. The entire

communique was to be published by the national media. An economic

reform was to be introduced after an extensive public discussion.

Finally, the agreement contained as many as 13 specific economic

demands, with regard to which the government agreed in general to study

the possibility of their satisfaction within some specific time, but without

making a specific commitment on most points.

The Gdansk agreements constitute the culmination of a process that

started in the aftermath of the riots of 1976, a process of gradual

organization of civil society. Since at least 1977 the party leadership has

reacted in the same way to the growing movements for reform: it has

continued to yield under immediate pressures at each time, trying to limit

the concessions to those immediately required. The strategy of the

leadership was highly flexible and its reactions swift and pragmatic, but

they were always designed to arrest the changes, to consolidate the existing

state of affairs. Once the pragmatic wing, under Gierek's leadership, had

succeeded in repressing the urge for a hard line strategy when in 1977 it

released the workers arrested for participation in the 1976 events, no voices

for taking the initiative were heard within the party until the party congress

which took place in February of this year. The dynamic of the summer

events constituted simply an acceleration of this process. Again, the partyhad taken a conciliatory position toward the July strikers, in fact rewarding

those workers who struck. And even in Gdansk, the leadership had first

conceded the limited demands, then agreed to consider far-reaching

economic demands, while rejecting the right to strike, then accepted all

political demands with the exception of the right to organize, and, finally,

yielded on the last bastion.

Why this posture of enlightened conservatism? Why would the party

neither take a hard line, moving toward general repression, nor grasp into

its own hands the initiative toward broad reforms? As always under such

circumstances, possible explanations abound. What seems clear is that the

party, or at least its current leadership, did not, and could not, envision

that spontaneous social processes could mount to overwhelm the entire

society. Having themselves operated for thirty years in a system in which

everything was directed, orchestrated, authorized, reported and approved,

they did not believe in the mobilizing potential of the burgeoning

movements. They were convinced - against the warnings of hard-liners -

that the handful of noisy Warsaw intellectuals could be isolated and worn

out by mild harrassment and that workers could always be silenced by

minor economic concessions. They simply did not believe in the staying

power of spontaneity.? Even now they feel at a loss when faced with so

many events that were neither planned, nor ordered, nor approved. A party

official asked me in a trembling voice, "but who will be responsible for the

36


9/25


new unions?; who will direct them?"

Secondly, the leaders lived well. The details of abuse of political posi-

tion, appropriation of public funds, and outright theft are slow to emerge,

but it is clear that the people around Gierek and even the lower level party

and government apparatus which emulated the example of the top, treated

the national product, the allocation of which they controlled, almost as

their private property. Their pragmatism went along with their bougeoisifi-

cation. Defense of private interests required social peace and social peace

required concessions. Repression would have disturbed the idyllic life of

private pursuits. It would have required an intensification of the ideological

climate within the party and increased the power of the security apparatus

which might have turned against corruption as well. Political reforms, on

the other hand were in no one's interest. Increased democracy, particularlywithin the party, would have meant accountability, and accountability

might have signified the end to privilege.

Hence, the pragmatic, conservative yet flexible posture dominated, as

intellectuals kept organizing and workers were being driven to the limits of

their patience. And there are several indications that the party has still not

learned from the summer events. The initiative continues to rest completely

with civil society.

The Rebirth of the Civil Society

What was not clear about the Gdansk agreement is the geographic scope

of the point concerning unionization. Although the document seems to

have general validity, at one point it specified explicitly that the new union

was to be formed at the coast, which would limit such activity to Gdansk,

Gdynia, Elblag, and Szczecin. This ambiguity led workers in other parts of

the country to strike for the extension of the agreement. The Silesian strike,

which began on the 28th, was quickly settled on September 2nd. The

Gdansk agreement was extended and a list of the specific demands of

miners added. The same scenario was repeated all over the country. By this

time various party officials, Mr. Jagielski among them, declared that the

agreement held for the entire country and that workers could form new

unions wherever they wish. But in practice, the efforts to unionize were

meeting with resistance on the part of managers and were successful only

where workers struck. In Warsaw, one of the newspapers published a

report that workers in one of the enterprises did not want to join the new

union. The enterprise went on strike immediately and the union was

formed.

At the same time, various professional associations met and declared

themselves to be independent and self-governing. The Polish Sociological

Association was among the first, along with those of architects, writers,

37


10/25


artists, doctors, and teachers. A number of professional groups formed an

umbrella organization; some joined the Gdansk union, which assumed the

name of "Solidarity." University students, who were still on vacation,

began to meet and announced the formation of independent and self-governing student organization. As if to anticipate the inevitable, the

Government announced that it would introduce a law on academic self-

government, giving full autonomy, including the right to elect all officers,

to the institutions of higher learning. A movement to elect a new Rector of

the University of Warsaw was immediately launched in the University

Senate.

A few days later, still at the beginning of September, some official

unions which were members of the Trade Union Confederation,

announced that they would leave the Confederation. Some stated their

intention to become independent and self-governing and sought to register

under the new legislation. The Socialist Union of Students, one of the

youth arms of the party, met to emphasize the need for its own autonomy

and welcomed the creation of independent student organizations. The

resolution called for far-reaching political changes, including free elections.

At the same time a movement for reforms erupted within the party

itself. Various groups within the party called for internal democracy, for an

end to corruption and bureaucracy, for free and secret elections to all partyposts, for full information about party activities, and for an increased

ideological orientation of the party. Several editorials in party newspapers

argued that democracy within the party is a necessary condition for any

reforms within the society.

The media suddenly became pluralistic. Public discussions erupted in

newspapers which began to publish editorial articles explicitly stating their

positions with regard to the developing reform movement. Economists

were interviewed about the details of the economic crisis and the paths toreform. Television itself became pluralistic: it seems as if each program

independently chose its direction. One day, for example, the news began

with a long story in which the First Secretary of the Party and the President

of Poland awarded medals to peasants for their outstanding achievements,

a routine ceremony of the past thirty years. (Perhaps one third of all news

material in newspapers used to consist of the numerous titles of officials

participating in numerous ceremonies.) The news program was then

followed by an hour-long film showing how a factory hastily fabricates its

"outstanding achievements" in anticipation of an "unexpected" visit by

an official. Several films made between 1976 and 1980 and relegated "to

the drawer" were shown at the September Gdansk film festival and

reviewed by the press.

The Church bared itself as an openly political force. Capitalizing on the

38


11/25


moderating influence it played during the strikes, the Church sought to

cash in on the credits it earned by demanding increased parliamentary par-

ticipation of Catholic deputies, reintroduction of religious instruction in

schools, insertion of moral clauses into the new law on censorship, and acommitment by the state to the morally repressive policies the Polish

Church has always advocated. At the same time, the Church continued to

try to ingratiate itself with the new unions, denying that the Cardinal

betrayed workers in his speech of August 24th (of which six minutes,

critical of the government, were in fact cut) and surrounding Wales a with

advisers close to the Church hierarchy.

On the 5th of September, the Sejm (Parliament) met in Warsaw to

approve the governmental changes which had occurred 10 days earlier. The

debate was highly critical of the government. The same day in the evening

the Central Committee met again, and the wave of changes reached the

top: Gierek was replaced as First Secretary by Stanislaw Kania. Other

changes of top leadership followed. Kania in his first speech promised that

the government would adhere to the Gdansk agreements, suggested wide

reaching economic reforms, and emphasized the need for democracy,

which, he said, "is not a gesture of the state to the people, but a need of

socialist society."

Nevertheless, the situation remained unclear and contradictory.Managers of enterprises have been dragging their feet in recognizing new

unions. Party press and television news continued to give conflicting signals

about the true intentions of the party leadership, censoring, for example,

some of the parliamentary speeches. New appointments within the party

apparatus were interpreted by many people as indicating the ascendancy of

hard liners, the generation of 1968. The press and television continued a

very restricted coverage of the new unions and began in turn a campaign

against "anti-socialist elements," which lumped together left-wing and

nationalistic, right-wing opposition groups. The leader of an openly anti-

Soviet group, Mr. Moczulski, was arrested and charged with insulting the

authority of the state - a strange accusation reminiscent of the worst days

- in an interview given to Der Spiegel. (The interview was inflammatory,

but he could have been charged with threatening the security of the state -

an accusation that would have been consistent with the spirit of the Gdansk

agreements.)

Although Kania and others attempted to calm the situation, their

messages were received as ambiguous. Neither the party and government

apparatus nor the society at large knew how to interpret such words. Afterthirty years of double talk nothing could ever be taken at face value. Even

those managers who wanted to follow party policy were not certain what

this policy truly was. The Council of State had moved swiftly, issuing a

decree enabling the Warsaw Regional Court to register new unions, but the

procedure takes some time and the unions were impatient.

39


12/25


The new unions were still amorphous creatures of two weeks of organiz-

ing. Since at the beginning it was not clear whether unions other than

Solidarity would be allowed to register, various groups from all over the

country have joined it. As a result, Solidarity combines the Gdanskshipyard workers with, perhaps, teachers from Krakow, machinists from

Swidnik, and actors from Wroclaw. Eventually, other union federations

appeared, most importantly in Warsaw and Silesia. These unions met and

decided not to confederate at the national level at this moment but to

remain in communication with each other. The result was rather chaotic.

The first internal conflicts also have begun to emerge. There are rumors

that within the Lenin Shipyard workers dissatisfied with Walesa's

compromise on economic issues have already organized - now wildcat -

strikes against the new unions. As if to reaffirm their existence and to

reassure the membership, the new unions organized a highly disciplined

one-hour strike on October 10.

Since the situation is in flux, any account of events risks being out of

date by the time it is read. When the Central Committee met again on

October II it announced, (without specifying the date), the convocation of

an extra-ordinary Congress of the Party. This announcement guarantees

that the dynamic of the movement for reforms will not be arrested and that

it will soon overwhelm the entire party. At least until that Congress the

situation will remain volatile and the limits of the possible will be tested

repeatedly.

The current period is still one of organization of the particular social

forces. New unions are still forming and their mutual relations are being

forged. The new wave is also sweeping the previously existing

organizations. Since the consolidation of the present regime Poland has

had innumerable organizations, covering all areas of social life. Two

political parties have existed in addition to the Polish United Workers'

Party (PZPR); the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and a Democratic Party(SO). There are also youth organizations, women organizations, profes-

sional associations, cooperatives, sport clubs, cultural groups, hobby

circles, and religious groups. Most of them have been given a monopoly of

their area of activity, and they have been centralized, bureaucratized, and

subjugated to party control. Now they are breaking away from the mold,

all declaring themselves independent and self-governing and cleaning their

houses by announcing free and secret elections. One should not be

surprised if in a few days the Polish Philatelist Association or the Bird

Watchers' Union declare themselves to be independent and self-governing.

At the same time, they all announced that they will pursue a vigorous

defense of self-interests.

Once this period is concluded, some kind of an institutional modus

vivendi will have to develop. Poland has functioned since 1948 under a

40


13/25


system in which patterns of actual interaction among state institutions have

had little, if any, relation to the constitutional principles. In particular, the

factual role of the party in the state was not a reflection of the law. Even

the treatment of the First Secretary as the Head of State was a courtesy

granted by other heads of state. This situation has been sufficiently

awkward that the party attempted several times to define its legal role vis-a-

vis other state institutions and finally a new constitution was recently

adopted which recognizes "the leading role of the party in the state." Yet

as long as the relation of political forces remained what it was - the party

had an effective monopoly within the state - all the relevant actors could

form some stable expectations about the dynamic of the system within

which they operated. Now, however, that this monopoly has been broken,

neither the established practices nor the existing legal principles will suffice

to provide a framework within which the newly independent organizations,the Church, and the Party can coexist and resolve conflicts with some

degree of responsibility and predictability. For example, although the

existing law specifies that university rectors are to be nominated by the

Minister of Higher Education, a new Rector was in fact elected by the

University Senate in Warsaw and continues to operate without the

nomination: by the mandate of popular will reflecting the relations of

political forces, but against the law. The process must enter into an

institutionalizing phase as soon as the current wave of organizing ends and

most likely before.

Prospects

The agreement signed in Gdansk has already been dubbed in Poland a

new "social contract." The terms of this contract are that all parties:

(I) accept the social ownership of the means of production as the base of

the Polish socialist society; (2) recognize the leading role of the Polish

United Workers' Party in the state (although this formula is used in

somewhat different wording and its scope is far from clear and will be the

object of further conflicts); and (3) accept the current structure of Polish

alliances, meaning the relation with the Soviet Union. For some groups

these points, particularly the second and third, constitute a concession, but

thus far any group that rejects any of these three principles would put itself

outside the national consensus. These principles define, therefore, the

limits of the possible and the criteria by which the legitimacy of any new

institutional arrangement and any program for reforms is to be judged.

What is the maximal scope of reforms compatible with these principles?

I believe it is broad and includes:

(I) A sovereign, superior role for Parliament within the state, including

its own investigatory body (which already exists), legislative initiatives,

motions of non-confidence, etc.

41


14/25


(2) An electoral system that would guarantee the majority in the

Parliament to the Polish United Workers' Party, thus allowing it to form

governments, but would leave the remaining 49 per cent of seats (or

whatever is the safe margin) to open competition, including campaigning,competitive publications, access to mass media, etc.

(3) The right to organize and associate on condition that the organiza-

tion does not advocate any goals that would be contrary to the three basic

terms of the social contract described above, and only on this condition.

(4) Widespread institutional autonomy for all voluntary associations,

cooperatives, institutions of high learning, etc.

(5) Limitation of censorship to state secrets, matters of national security

(including anything dealing with the Soviet Union), and, if the Church has

its way, offenses to morality.

(6) The right to strike.

(7) The right and material capabilities for the unions to participate in

economic decision-making at all levels.

(8) High reaching decentralization and autonomy for local govern-ments, increased role of village councils, and their election without any

constraints other than those applicable to (3) above.

(9) An internal democratization of the party, including fixed terms for

all elective offices, free and secret elections, full information for all party

members about internal conflicts within the party.

(10) Economic reforms that might reduce the role of the state as the

organizer of production and increase of its role in mitigating social effectsof the market.

What could divert the march of Polish society toward democratic

socialism? For the Western media, in particular, the threat comes from the

Soviet Union. The Soviets, the argument runs, cannot stand and watch idly

as Polish workers organize and strike, as Polish society democratizes.

Accordingly, American and German newspapers headline troop move-

ments on the Polish-Soviet border, and their accounts of Polish internal

events are submerged under alarmist stories of reactions in Moscow. This

analysis is based on the traditional premises of anti-communism:

"communism" is somehow incompatible with "democracy," hence the

Soviets must intervene because democracy is a threat to them.

This position seems unfounded. Polish events do not threaten the

42


15/25


strategic interests of the Soviet Union. The process of democratization,

even if it goes as far as I think it might, neither changes the position of

Poland in the international structure of alliances nor permits an organiza-

tion within Poland of forces that might be hostile to the Soviet Union. Tothe contrary, the success of reforms would consolidate the national

consensus that includes the principle of good relations with the Soviet

Union. Already, many circles that used to participate in anti-Soviet

demonstrations before Gdansk now see such acts as irresponsible and

injurious to reform. The Soviets may be concerned about the effects of the

Polish events upon their own and other Eastern European societies, but

there is no reason why they should attempt to solve internal problems of

the Soviet Union or East Germany in Poland. The main danger I see is that

Soviet leaders will be persuaded by the New York Times or Der Spiegel that

the Polish events are a threat to them, that in the Western view they have

good reasons to intervene, and that the West would interpret their non-

interventionist posture as an indication of weakness.

More credible threats to the path of reforms exist within Poland. One is

internal to the party, in so far as it is possible that out of the current crisis

will emerge a group of party leaders who will continue to resist or perhaps

who will even seek to repress the new movement. There are numerous

indications that the party and government bureaucrats entrenched during

the Gierek period will defend their positions and privileges by all means.Moreover, any group within the the party that seeks to contest leadership

will have to make some compromise with the conservative and corrupt

party apparatus, even if only to guarantee immunity for acts of corruption

committed earlier. Perhaps more importantly, the party apparatus has no

imagination, no initiative and still no understanding that the situation is

qualitatively different. They still have not passed the threshold of

understanding that democracy means that some conflicts will be resolved

against their interests and their views, that they will have to cope with

uncertainty, that outcomes of the democratic process may be contrary towhat they consider rational in a particular case. Neither do they have any

tolerance for the procedural costs and obstacles inherent in a democratic

system: they still see conflict as chaos, they are impatient with the fact that

democratic organization extends the time necessary for conflicts to be

resolved and that it introduces procedural considerations independent of

the merit of a particular choice. I think the will to introduce democratic

reforms is there. Certainly, there is a strong pressure for democratization

within the party. It is the habit that is missing: they accept the need for free

elections, but they still expect that such elections must bring desired results;

they accept independent unions, but they still think that workers should

work rather than discuss.

The burden placed on the party by the new conditions is immense.

During the years of unchallenged power, the party grew numerically,

43


16/25


became bureaucratized, and lost its ideological combativeness. In the new

situation, in which multiple social forces will compete - even if not for

power certainly for moral authority and ideological allegiance - the party

will have to reassert itself as an ideological authority within the society, as aforce hegemonic in Gramsci's sense of moral leader of the nation.

If my assessment of the current situation within the party is accurate,

there exists a great danger that the party leadership will continue to under-

estimate the depth of transformations of recent months and the mobilizing

power of the new union movement. This movement is young, still angry,

still unsure of itself, and this means both powerful and volatile under

pressure. It will neither conveniently exhaust itself under internal conflicts

nor will it be easily fragmented or co-opted. If the party decides that the

changes can be limited to the letter of the Gdansk agreement, it will

continue to be forced to yield under pressure, without any initiative or

direction of its own. And an urge to repress would be, under current

circumstances, fatal for the entire society.

Not surprisingly the newly emerging social forces are no better prepared

for democratic coexistence. The new unions combine a know-nothing

attitude toward existing institutions with an idealized, naive vision of

democracy. Much has been written about the responsibility of the Polish

workers and all of it is true. But the entire orientation of the new unions is

still entirely negative. Their basic conception of their role is one of a

narrowly economic, particularistic force that would militantly, through

strikes, defend the material interests of their members. Workers believe

that the party is responsible for the material deprivations they experience;

they point out that the party had 30 years in which it ruled unchecked; they

programmatically reject any responsibility for the disastrous economic

situation and any participation in the existing institutions which, they

believe, would inevitably lead to the co-optation and neutralization of the

movement. They repeatedly rejected all offers of democratizing existingunions. They equally emphatically rejected the party's offer to resuscitate

the Worker's Councils that appeared after 1956 and were eventually

reduced to yet another cog in the bureaucratic machine. As Walesa told

Jagielski in Gdansk, workers want to improve nothing: they want an inde-

pendent union of their own. They will not be had again. Moreover,

workers reject all the arguments about the difficulty of the economic

situation, about the need for moderating economic demands, and even

about general interests of workers, since they know - again from

experience - that the acceptance of such exhortations must lead to

compromises in which workers will bear the brunt. Workers are not willing

to share the cost of getting out of the economic crisis unless and until they

will have a political guarantee that their sacrifice will not be again futile and

the only guarantee they see is an independent, militant union. The

movement is simply too young to afford moderation. Its main task at the

44


17/25


moment is mobilization, and to mobilize the leadership has to be

intransigent. Moreover, according to sociological investigations as well as

popular perceptions, economic inequalities have greatly increased during

the last 10 years and workers in Poland, as elsewhere, see redistribution of

income as an immediate solution to their material deprivation.

In analyzing the posture of the new unions one is reminded of a speech,

made long ago, by Jules Guesde: "The Revolution which is incumbent

upon you is possible only to the extent that you will remain yourselves,

class contra class, not knowing and not wanting to know the divisions that

may exist in the capitalist world."3 The Polish summer should be viewed as

a classical struggle for the right to organize. The narrowly economic

intransigence combined with pressure for a general democratization, the

rejection of the existing institutions, the incipient tendencies towardinternal differentiation between leaders and followers are all reminiscent of

numerous Western experiences. And I firmly believe that the key to the

understanding of the prospects lies in this analogy.

Trade unions emerged in Western Europe only after decades of struggle,

often more bloody and more protracted than in Poland. They provided an

impetus for the democratization of entire societies, they evolved from

intransigence to moderation, and both the employers and the state learned

to live and cope with them. They continue to struggle for the right toorganize against perpetual attempts to divide, co-opt, and repress them.

The right to strike, however, has become a carefully and strategically used

weapon, restricted by numerous legal technicalities and by economic

possibilities that unions learned to calculate and anticipate. The unions

themselves have become sufficiently monopolistic, bureaucratized, and

entrenched that their appeal is no longer based on militancy. Economic

militancy is no longer reactive; it has become strategic.

This historical analogy encourages optimism. But nations do not

experience their crises as repetitions. Neither the Polish workers nor

intellectuals see beyond their own immediate experience. They perceive the

situation as unique. At the same time, after so many years during which the

promise of improving material conditions remained unfulfilled, Poles have

come to see in democratization of political life the panacea for all social

ills, including economic ones. Hence, any indications that democracy may

be a far from perfect system of political organization are experienced as the

proof of the futility of any reforms. The clause requiring a two week

warning before a strike, included in the first draft of yet unpublished new

labor legislation - was already received by the new unions as unfaithful tothe very principle of the right to strike. Indeed, my Polish interlocutors

were incredulous when I recited a list of some restrictions on the unions in

the United States. Even the notion of a three year long contract seemed

unacceptable - Gdansk workers talked about a new list of demands every

45


18/25


two months, to be followed by strikes each time they are not met.

Yet this lack of experience, this purist position which sees in every

limitation and every imperfection a harbinger of the ultimate defeat andwhich is the source of skepticism widespread in Poland, obviously cannot

constitute a sufficient condition for the defeat of the Polish experiment.

Otherwise democracy would not have been possible anywhere. Societies

learn quickly under crisis conditions. I believe that the party has the will to

change itself and to learn to live in a situation where its authority would

have to be ideological and moral, not simply bureaucratic. I also believe

that the unions will soon learn the realities of power relations and the

intellectuals will re-read their Michels.

This account would be incomplete if something were not said about the

economic crisis." The economy is in a disastrous state. The staggering size

of the foreign debt - now about 21.5 billion dollars - would not be in

itself a sign of a crisis if it were not for indications that a great part of this

money has been squandered or stolen. Market disequilibrium is even more

striking and, short of additional borrowing, there is no quick way to

moderate it. The entire economy is notoriously inefficient. The inefficiency

of agriculture, public and private, is well known, but equally telling is the

fact that with steel production and energy consumption per capita equal to

that of Italy and Austria, Polish industry manages to supply only one half

of final demand goods produced in those countries. The causes of this

situation are structural. The central planning system has not worked in

Poland in spite of its frequent reforms. In fact the Polish economy is not

centrally planned. Plans are made, but individual enterprises, with the

support of local party committees and local governments, act as

decentralized and particularistic actors and predictably succeed through

political pressure in generating an allocation of resources, particularly of

investments, that break all the assumptions of the plan. Since construction

of new plants is beneficial to the particular enterprises and localcommunities regardless of the economic efficiency of the new plant, the

pressure to over-invest is irresistible and the efficiency of investment

meager. Moreover, in the absence of formal market arrangements, the

result of these pressures is the absence of any reliable coordination among

firms connected through input-output linkages. Central planners are thus

condemned to chasing and trying to correct imbalances generated by this

spontaneously operating system. Typically, they only succeed in destroying

whatever informal arrangements have developed among firms. As someone

has quipped, in Poland only mistakes are centrally planned.

Both agricultural policy and the management of publicly owned

industries must be profoundly altered if the economic situation is ever to

improve. But, as recent issues of Polityka - the consistently reform-

minded party weekly - continue to insist, no economic reform will be

46


19/25


effective without political reforms, since the cause of the chaos is the

stalemate between central planning and the pressures exerted by the

network of managers and party officials.

Whatever the direction of economic reforms, it is certain that the

market situation will not improve to any discernible extent for a long time,

to be measured in years. Hence, the process of democratization will have to

continue under conditions of prolonged economic crisis. Yet the effect of

this crisis on the dynamic of political events cannot be assessed

unambivalently. Clearly, the party will try to use the crisis to scare the

unions into moderating their wage militancy, something the new unions

simply cannot afford to do if they are to maintain the support of the rank-

and-file. One effect of the union pressures will be to push reforms toward

the problem of market disequilibrium - something which is long overdue.

This is simply not the time for growth. The most urgent need now is to

change the proportions between the producer and consumer goods

industries and to do this with a minimum of new investment in the

producer goods industry. For 30 years Poland has been a society in which

producers were politically organized and consumers were not, and the

effect of wage militancy would be precisely to correct this situation. The

danger is that if the effects of reforms are too slow in coming the unions

will have nothing to show their members for their militancy and will face

the choice of cooptation or purely expressive, politically provocativestrategies.

One set of concrete achievements which the new unions might be able to

offer their members is a true, effective workers' self-government at the

plant level accompanied by participation in decision making at all levels.

Let me emphasize again that thus far the unions do not seek plant level self-

government and that they perceive their influence over economic decisions

as an adversary relation with the government. Yet I do not believe that they

can persist in this abstentionist posture. In the situation in which anyimprovement of conditions of work and life can only follow structural

transformations, the unions will be forced to assume some responsibility by

actively participating in the national effort to reform the economic system.

On the one hand, influence over decisions affecting conditions of work is

the only concrete thing the unions can offer in the foreseeable future and I

cannot imagine that they would bypass this opportunity, in spite of all their

fears of being absorbed into the administrative structure. On the other

hand, the national debate about economic reforms is already in full swing

and I find it inconceivable that the new unions would be absent from this

debate.

Obviously, this entire analysis is based on so many hypotheses that the

grounds for optimism are indeed shaky. Let me just emphasize that despite

the predictive tone, what I have tried to establish are not probabilities, only

47


20/25


possibilities. And I do believe that democratic socialism is possible in

Poland.

Democratic Socialism in Poland

The events of the Polish summer constitute the culmination of a

classical struggle for the right to organize, a struggle that has been already

fought in many Western countries. Yet, as powerful as this analogy may be

in predicting the course of events, the situation in Poland is historically

without precedent. The Polish workers have not simply conquered rights

already enjoyed by workers elsewhere. They have conquered these rights in

a society where the means of production are publicly owned. Workers in

Poland reached for political power, the basis for which lies in the public

ownership of the means of industrial production, a power which eluded

them during thirty years, monopolized by an autonomous, bureaucratic

apparatus of the party. The chance which stands ahead of the Polish

working class, of the party, and the society is unique, for it is a chance for a

democratic socialist society.

This is not to say that the Polish society is on its way toward the

realization of some pre-existing blueprint. We do not know whether

democratic socialism would be a system in which resources would be

rationally allocated to satisfy human needs. I will go as far as to say that we

do not know whether any form of social organization can rationally

allocate resources to satisfy needs. Certainly, we do not have a blueprint

for one. We do not even know whether a society in which all institutions-

including the economic ones - were democratic would be necessarily a

society free of inequalities, privileges, and prejudices. Moreover,

democracy within the workplace, the community, and the representative

institutions can still coexist with a private consumption-oriented,

instrumental, and, if the Church has its way, highly repressive value

system.

What will develop in Poland is some new arrangement of relations

among firms, workers' councils, unions, the party, other organizations, the

government, the central planning office, and the consumers. The challenge

that Poland faces is to develop relations that would combine widespread

democracy - and by democracy I do not simply mean participation in

decision making but a place for conflicts of interest as well as opinions -

with economic rationality. The main choices concern the role of the market

in the relation among consumers, firms, and the central planners and the

structure of relations among the parliament, the government, and the

party. Ultimately, the economic question is by what mechanisms (market

or not) will people be able to reveal their preferences as consumers and by

what mechanisms (market or not) will people be persuaded to orient

production toward satisfaction of revealed preferences. The political

48


21/25


question is by what mechanisms will people be able to seek to persuade

each other about the desired directions of national development, about

superiority of some values over others, and about the legitimacy of their

particular interests.

These constitutional questions are at stake in Poland and will continue

to be for some time to come. I hesitate to make any predictions about the

direction of these developments and I would be surprised if they were

unequivocal, consistent, or unilinear. Trial and error, and the blunders

they involve, are inevitable as are changes and reversals. Yet the fact that

the Polish society is on the threshold of this kind of exploration marks the

moment as a historical turning point.

The ideological and political consequences of the events in Poland are

incalculable. No society can ever serve as a blueprint for other societies

because historical conditions are never the same. But thus far "actually

existing socialism" has served most effectively as the prototype of

something to be avoided. Italian Communists have been as eager to avoid

any association with the Eastern European example as Nicaraguan

revolutionaries have been to shy away from the path of Cuba. The effect of

the "actually existing socialism" - the very phrase is an admission of

defeat - was to push socialism off the agenda of movements for liberation

throughout the world. The success of the Polish experiment would bring it

back.

October 1980

Postscript:

Since these notes were written, Poland has come several times to the

brink of an explosion. Yet the process continues.

The first days of December constituted the end of the first phase: theperiod of organization of the civil society. Several independent unions were

officially registered. Professional associations asserted their autonomy.

Universities became practically, although not legally, self-governing. Even

my facetious predictions about the Bird Watchers Union have materialized:

the Association of Owners of Workers' Gardens claimed its independence.

As one would expect, this general upheaval led to the mobilization of

political forces which are best described as the lunatic fringe. On November

11, the day which used to be celebrated in pre-war Poland as theIndependence Day, always with strong anti-Soviet overtones, mass

demonstrations were held in several cities, including Lublin, Krakow, and

Gdansk. Thousands listened to a mixture of anti-Soviet, anti-socialist, and

religious invocations, including appeals to "liberate our oppressed brothers

in Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania" and statements of outright

49


22/25


hostility to socialism in any form. The ceremonies were enclosed in a

religious format, although the Catholic hierarchy did not participate.

At the same time, the Party underwent a profound internal crisis.Dissatisfied with food dragging of the leadership in instituting reforms and

in purging the organization of corrupt officials of the Gierek era, several

local party organizations decided to take matters into their own hands.

They issued ultimata to the leadership and threatened not to recognize the

authority of the Central Committee unless these were met. The leadership

itself, divided between a reform tendency and a repressive group, which

seems to be headed by Mr. Olszowski, continued to fumble in an indecisive

manner, provoking unnecessary confrontations and yielding at the last

moment.

These developments alarmed the Soviets, who mobilized their troops

along the Polish border and initiated a propaganda campaign that looked

like a preparation for the invasion. This in turn provided a splendid oppor-

tunity for the American right wing forces and eventually for the United

States government who could use the Polish situation to push public

opinion toward intensified militarization of American society. They

succeeded, for the first time since the Berlin Wall episode, if I remember

correctly, to put Western European governments in a common line against

the Soviet threat.

This threat, I believe, was real: as a story in Warsaw had it, the Soviets

were about to manifest their friendship by sending 500,000 bottles of

champagne, each carried by a waiter. But I think the American media

misunderstood or misinterpreted the cause of the Soviet alarm. This alarm

was caused by the threat to the Soviet strategic interests that was created by

mobilization of the anti-Soviet forces within Poland and the divisions

within the Party, not by the existence of independent unions. Clearly, "the

Polish disease" is a problem for the Soviet Union and most other EasternEuropean governments but, as a Mr. Filatov, member of the Soviet Central

Committee, said in an important Paris interview, the Soviet Union can live

with independent trade unions. For there is another story going around

Warsaw: about Ivan who drives a Russian tank across a Warsaw bridge and

asks a passer-by where is the Warsaw Regional Court, which registered

Solidarity. Stupified, the passer-by asks Ivan why he is looking for the

Court. "To register the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics," is the

answer.

The Soviet threat provided the impetus toward a consolidation. The

Party has executed a complicated manoeuvre. First, it pulled itself together

by reaffirming its hold over the middle level apparatus, introducing new

personnel changes at the top (access of General Moczar, a person with a

rather ominous past who now seems to be a leading reformer), expelling the

50


23/25


most vociferous rebels, announcing a firm date for the eagerly awaited

Congress (end of March), and proclaiming that it is drawing a line beyond

which it will not budge. (It will.) Simultaneously, the Party went to seek

help from the Church.

In order to understand the role and the importance of the Catholic

Church in Poland one would have to review the history of the 150 years of

foreign domination during which the organization developed its

profoundly conservative conception of the "Church besieged," according

to which no innovations in doctrine or in practice can be accepted as long

as the Church remains a fortress under attack, and during which religious

and patriotic (anti-Russian, anti-German) symbols became melded into a

national culture. The chant of anti-Russian religious hymns, sang on

November II,appealed to this tradition and, in spite of the weakness of the

anti-Soviet forces, constituted a mortal threat to the Party. The Party

responded by turning to the Church, asking the hierarchy to dissociate the

Church from these forces, to use its powerful influence over the public

opinion (over 90070of Poles are formally Catholic and around 70% practice

regularly) to restrain Solidarity, and offering in exchange a number of

concrete concessions as well as a promise of a long lasting alliance. These

concessions include a virtual control of the Church over all matters that

relate to the family, and that includes birth control, abortion, and divorce

legislation as well as some aspects of welfare and educational policies. They

include a number of institutional guarantees, such as permits to build new

churches. They also comprise a number of gestures which appear symbolic

but which are of fundamental political importance, since they constitute

the recognition of the right of the Church to mobilize political forces.

The manoeuvre was effective: the Soviet threat waned, anti-Soviet

forces were silenced with minimal repression (to the point that their main

organization voluntarily suspended its activities), and Solidarity felt

compelled to proclaim a pause in strikes. The unveiling of the monument to

the memory of workers killed in 1970, on December 16th in Gdansk,

turned into an official celebration of this new alliance. A short speech by

Mr. Walesa was followed by a slightly longer speech by Mr. Fiszbach, the

local party Secretary and a new member of the Political Bureau, a moment

of commemoration of the dead, and a mass that lasted an hour and a half.

The homily, delivered by bishop Kaczmarek, was an intolerant, aggressive

assertion of the ideological and political power of the Church. It was

apparent that the Church played the first fiddle in this orchestra and it was

striking that the part of the Union was limited to the drum roll for their

fallen brothers. If I were to be forced to summarize in one sentence the

final outcome of 1980 in Poland, I would say, obviously with some

exaggeration, that political power lost by the Party was gained by the

Church.

51


24/25


This picture, however, should not obfuscate other changes which are

profound and, I am persuaded, irreversible. The Parliament has become

the central focus of the process of democratization. Its sessions are lively

and informative: people run home to "watch the Parliament" on televi-sion. A new, liberal law on censorship is about to be passed as well as

several important pieces of legislation which strengthen the role of the Par-

liament and provide protection for individual rights. Higher education and

research have been freed from daily administrative control. A limited

reform of the planning and management systems is about to be instituted,

although this reform does not go far enough to resolve any of the notorious

problems of the Polish economy. A major shift of resources toward

agriculture has been announced and that, coupled with a new and more

reasonable fiscal policy, may make some difference.

The unions do exist. Still somewhat ephemeral, already divided and

already somewhat oligarchical, they will be an essential factor in the life of

the Polish society from here on. New confrontations cannot be avoided,

since the union has to periodically reaffirm its existence by militant actions

and the Party still resists the union as a national organization. At the same

time, however, Solidarity has shown a great tactical sense in picking issues

which can be resolved and which are important for the daily life of

workers, specifically, the five day week. Most importantly, there are

already some signs that Solidarity has abandoned its original abstentionist

attitude: they now talk about Workers' Councils and they are willing to

share power and responsibility at the plant level.

The entire description may seem sobering. But one cannot measure the

progress of the Polish process by some abstract yardstick, since the path is

untravelled and constraints are numerous. What is surprising is that the

process continues. As a Nouvel Observateur' commentator observed, no

government in the world would like to, see democratic socialism in Poland,

for the fear it may happen to them. I am persuaded that in Poland manypeople do want it, but neither the Party nor the Union have a historical

project to realize. Yet in spite of all the twists and turns, Polish society

is entering the uncharted territory of democratic socialism.

January 1981

NOTES:

These are highly informal and to a large extent personal notes written after a visit to

Warsaw in September. They constitute my own attempt to place the Polish events in

some framework. Note that the account of events is necessarily impressionistic and

that my analysis is not devoid of a point of view.

I This account of events is pieced together from Le Monde (excellent coverage by

Bernard Guetta), Le Figaro, Le Matin, and Le Nouvel Observateur, ZycieWarszawy, Trybuna Ludu, and Polityka, the New York Times, and a second

52


25/25


hand account of the coverage by Der Spiegel. I have talked to several Polish

actors and observers, from different circles but excluding those close to the

Church. I have stayed away from analyses of personal struggles within the party,

since I could not get a clear picture of the situation and since I believe that under

crisis conditions people should be taken for what they say and do at the time,

rather than for what they have appeared to represent in the past.

2 Nor did I. See A. Przeworski "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to

Democracy", Washington, D.C., 1979.

3 Cited in my "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," New Left

Review, 122, (July-August 1980) 38, where one can find many analogies.

4 This analysis is incomplete in so far as it ignores the complications due to the

presence of the Church. Indeed, one way in which the path to reform can be

blocked is by a coalition between some groups within the Party and the Church

hierarchy, directed against the new unions. Under the terms of such a coalition,

the Church would obtain religious instruction in schools, increased parliamen-

tary representation, and a commitment by the state to repressive policiesconcerning birth control, abortion, divorce, and moral censorship. In turn, the

Church would offer the Party a moderating stance with regard to the unions,

thus isolating workers from the public opinion over which it exercises important

influence. I do not know enough about the Church, however, to make judgments

about the likelihood of this kind of a coalition.

5 Le Nouvel Observateur (December 15-21, 1980).

3

Documents

Przeworski Democratic Socialism in Poland