VILLARICO V. COURT OF APPEALS (305 SCRA 193)

Facts:Spouses Teofilo Villarico and Maxima Villarico filed an application for confirmation of title over a parcel of land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which they bought from Teofilos father, Segundo Villarico and which they themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for more than 30 years. The application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the land in question is part of the public domain hence, not available for private appropriation. The trial court dismissed the case reckoning that the property in question forms part of the public domain, thus possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property.The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue:Whether or not the property still forms part of the public domain.

Held:Yes, the property still forms part of the public domain. The Supreme Court held that both the trial court and the appellate court correctly adjudged the area to be within the unclassified forest zone incapable of private appropriation. In the case at bar, there has been no showing that declassification has been made declaring the land in question as disposable or alienable. Thus, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons, possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

Municipality of OAS v. ROA (7 Phil 20)

Facts:The Municipality of Oas brought the action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was part of the public square of said town. The defendant, Roa, alleged that he was the owner of the property since he bought it from Jose Castillo and was able to procure a possessory of information from the justice of the peace of Oas and record it in the Registry of Property in 1894. Roa has constructed upon the property a substantial building without opposition from the Municipality. As early as 1852, however, the subject land had been used by the municipality, constructed thereon buildings for the storage of property of the State. It therefore had ceased to be property used by the public and had become a part of the patrimonial property of the Municipality. And this fact was not unknown from the defendant. In fact, there are admissions by him that the land was owned by the pueblo and his grantor Castillo was not the owner of the land.

Issue:Whether or not the land is part of the public square of the town of Oas and the municipality owned it.

Held:Yes, the land was owned by the Municipality of Oas. The defendant was not a purchaser in good faith. The plaintiff, having permitted the erection of a building by the defendant without objection acted in bad faith. The rights of the parties must be determined as if they both had acted in good faith. To the case are applicable those provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the construction by one of a building upon land belonging to another. Article 364 (now Art.453) of the Civil Code is as follows: When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on anothers land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. The Supreme Court declared that the Municipality is the owner of the land and that it has the option of buying the building thereon, which is the property of the defendant, or of selling to him the land on which it stands.

Velayo v. RepublicGR No. L-7915, July 30, 1955

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines filed a proof of debt in the proceedings for the involuntary insolvency of the Commercial Airlines Inc., for its unpaid charges for the use of Government airports and air navigation facilities. The claim has been approved and declared preferred by the insolvency court. It is however contended that the debts owing from the insolvent corporation was due not to the National Government but to the National Airports Corporation. Thus, the National Government claim cannot enjoy preference under the Insolvency Law.

Issue:

Whether or not the debt was due to the National Government.

Held:

Yes. The establishment, operation, and maintenance of airfields are air navigation facilities undertaken by the government as a governmental function entrusted to agencies. There appears to be no question that the airports and air navigation facilities in question belong to the National Government. Such being the case, compensation for the use thereof, that is, their civil fruits, must also belong to the said government and not to the agencies that had been set up to administer or manage them. The debt involved in the present case pertains to the Government in its function as such government.

Lucero Jr. v. City Government of PasigGR No. 132834, November 24, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners were granted a lease contracts to occupy and operate stalls in the public market of Pasig by virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983. In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56, prescribing rules and regulations in using and occupying market stalls. All stall occupants were advised to submit the necessary application form which contains the terms and conditions for the operation of the stalls, and if approved such would serve as the lease contract. Petitioners refused to apply. The City Government of Pasig filed an ejectment complaint against petitioners alleging that the petitioners failed to pay the required P10,000.00 performance bond and their rental fees since January 1994 as required by the municipal ordinance. Petitioners claimed that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as set forth in their 1983 lease contracts and it was the City Government which refused their payments because of their failure to submit new applications to lease. They also not pay the performance bond because as previous stall occupants they were not required to do so.

The MTC finds the ejectment suit without merit. Dissatisfied with the lower courts decision the city government appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC decision. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can claim a vested right to the market stalls they were occupying by virtue of their lease contracts under Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1993.

Held:

No, they cannot claim a vested right upon their occupied stall by virtue of an ordinance which has already been superseded.

A right is vested when the rights to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. It is unalterable, absolute, complete and unconditional. This right is perfect in itself; it is not dependent upon a contingency. The concept of vested right expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. It includes not only legal and equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.

The petitioners 1983 lease contracts did not grant them irrefutable rights to the market stalls. They were mere grantees of a privilege to occupy and operate such booths.

What petitioners had was a license to occupy and operate particular stalls over a period of time. Their possession and use of these facilities could not be characterized as fixed and absolute. Indeed, petitioners did not have any vested right to the stalls.