Prolegomeno para una teoria de las instituciones Parsons.pdf

Prolegomena to a Theory of Social InstitutionsAuthor(s): Talcott ParsonsSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jun., 1990), pp. 319-333Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095758 .

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PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 319

Policy and Institutionalism: Selected Essays. Clifton, New Jersey: Kelley.

. 1932. "Institution." Pp. 84-9 in Encyclo- pedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 8, edited by Edwin R. A. Seligman. New York: Macmillan.

Hankins, Frank Hamilton. 1928. An Introduction to the Study of Society. New York: Macmillan.

Hobhouse, L. T. [1906] 1915. Morals in Evolution, 3rd edition. New York: Holt.

. [1924] 1966. Social Development. Lon- don: Allen and Unwin.

MacIver, R. M. [1917] 1928. Community: A Socio- logical Study, 3rd edition. London: Macmillan.

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Parsons, Talcott. 1934. "Some Reflections on 'The Nature of Significance of Economics."' Quarterly Journal of Economics 48:511-45.

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_ . 1914. The Instinct of Workmanship. New York: Macmillan.

PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS*

TALCOTT PARSONS

T he theory of social institutions as revealed by current literature both in sociology and

in the related social sciences is in a highly unsatisfactory state. There is no such thing as a standard work to which the inquirer may be referred with confidence. Limitations of space forbid my entering at present into a critical discussion of what literature is available. What I shall present in this outline is a sketch of the main concepts prerequisite to a theory of institutions as they have developed in the course of my own work over the past few years. While it is true that the explicit literature of the subject is distinctly unsatisfactory and much reconstruc- tion is necessary, the present attempt is not to be regarded as manufactured ad hoc out of

* "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions" is published here by-permission of the Harvard Uni- versity Archives. The text is published intact, except for light editing to correct obvious errors of omission, spelling, and punctuation, and to modernize Parsons's citation style. Amendments to Parsons's text and/or explanatory notes written by the editor are enclosed in brackets. ED.

whole cloth. It has rather been developed by interpretation and further construction on the basis of some of the most important trends of recent sociological thought, as well as from treatment of the concrete material. Implicitly at least, a theory of institutions is one of the principal results toward which the work of the group sometimes called the sociologistic school has been heading up. But to refer in detail to the sources of my own conceptions in the work of other theorists would unduly lengthen an essay already of considerable scope. The most important names to me have been those of Pareto, Durkheim, Max Weber, Simmel, and Thnnies.

There are, I think, two main valid approaches to the theoretical treatment of institutions, both of which must be considered here - I call them the "objective" and the "subjective," respectively. The former is their study from the point of view of a sociological observer, the latter from the point of view of the individual acting in relation to institutions. Unless one is to be a radical behaviorist, the inclusion of the latter point of view is essential to all the sciences



320 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

dealing with human conduct, and the relation of the two points of view to each other is a matter of the first importance.

Another difficulty must be met at the outset. In discussing institutions, like many other objects of scientific theory, it is seldom made clear whether the reference is to an analytical category or to a class of concrete phenomena. For reasons which it is impossible to enter into fully here, it seems highly desirable to use the term institution in the former sense even though it runs counter to a great deal of general usage. Thus, I conceive the theory of institutions to be one of the principal branches of general sociological theory, hence the theory of all social life in one aspect, not the theory of one particular concretely separable department of social life. The latter alternative would make it, in Professor Sorokin's terminology', a special sociology like Rural or Urban Sociology, not a branch of general sociology.

In the literature of the subject we find, in discussions of institutions, frequent reference to uniform or established patterns of behavior. Also there is frequent reference to established forms of relationship between individuals. Fi- nally, connected with this is the idea of sanction - that these are modes of behavior and forms of relationship which [do] not merely exist, but are held by the individuals concerned as those which ought to exist - there is a normative element involved. This normative element is empirically conspicuous in the fact that radical departure from such established modes of behavior or forms of relationship calls forth reactions from the rest of the community of almost endless variation in detail, but having in common that they are unpleasant to the offend- ing individual.

Then in looking for the field of empirical facts with which the theory of institutions should be concerned, I should concentrate on those uniform modes of behavior and forms of relationship which are "sanctioned," that is stand in some kind of significant relation to normative rules to a greater or lesser degree approved by the individuals subject to them. It is quite clear that these modes of behavior and forms of relationship are concrete phenomena. As such,

they are subject to influence by all the factors which in any way play a part in the determination of human life and action, the physical environment, biological heredity, psychological traits, as well as specifically social factors. It is in the particular feature of being related to norms that the institutional aspect of these uniformi- ties lies. But I do not hold either that this relation is simple, or that all the norms which have a place in human action are to be styled institutional. The best approach, I think, to a rigorous concept of the institutional element in this concrete situation lies in an analysis of the elements of human action as seen from the "subjective" point of view, that of the actor himself.

To the actor, all his actions appear in terms of some form of the relation of means and ends. This appears to be one of the ultimate facts of human life we cannot get behind or think away. It is so fundamental that it is imbedded in the structure of languages. To "do" anything is to adapt means to some end.

This basic means-end schema has a fundamental normative implication, the principal expression of which is in the central role of the concept of rationality in all analysis of action. Action is always measured in terms of a standard of rationality, that is of the choice of the most "suitable" or most "efficient" means possible for the attainment of a given end. This normative aspect characterizes the concepts of all the sciences dealing with human conduct in so far as they transcend behaviorism.2

Whatever may be the case in other societies or in terms of inherent necessities, the definition of rationality of action in modem Western thought is inseparably bound up with the nature and role of positive science. There are three different ways in which the "scientific" standard can be applied to measure the rationality of action. The first, and most obvious, is in terms of the logical correctness of the reasoning involved in the subjective aspect of action. Beyond this, however, there is the question of the empirical reference of the reasoning. This may affect either the means or the ends, or both.

The simplest and clearest type of rational action involves in the first place what I may call an "empirical" end - that is an end whose reference is to a future empirically observable state of affairs, observable not only to the actor himself but also to an outside observer (after

' See his article "The Scope of Sociology,"Journal of Social Forces, 1928. [This reference cannot be traced. Possibly Parsons meant Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Sociology as a Science," Social Forces, 1931, 10: 21-7.]

2 i.e., they take the form of what Max Weber called "ideal types."




completion of the act, of course). This state of affairs may, however, involve either a state of the external world, external to the state of mind of the actor, or such a state of mind, or both, since, short of behaviorism, I do not believe it can be maintained that other people's states of mind are not observable. At the same time, when we talk about ends as a factor in action, we must be careful to distinguish them from concrete ends. The latter contain what may be called an element of prediction - the elements of the future state of affairs which would come about independently of the agency of the actor. The present discussion is concerned only with the factor ends, that is, the elements in the future state of affairs which are to be brought about by the active agency of the actor.

From this class of "empirical" ends may be distinguished "transcendental" ends, such as eternal salvation, the attainment of Nirvana, etc. That is, in terms of empirical science there is no way for an observer to verify whether the end has been attained or not. All that can be observed is what the actor thinks he has attained and what state of the actor, both subjective and objective, accompanies his contention. That is, if an Indian holy man asserts he has attained Nirvana, we can observe what state he is in, but not Nirvana itself.

To such empirical ends, secondly, there is what may be called the "intrinsic" adaptation of means. That is, the "objects," whether material things, services of others or anything else, which are employed as means are chosen by virtue of their intrinsic properties independently of any merely "arbitrary" or "conventional" relation to the end. The choice rests upon "scientific," or pre-scientific commonsense-knowledge of these properties and of their relation to the conditions necessary to bring about the end. From this intrinsic relation of means to ends may be distinguished the "symbolic" means- end relationship where such an arbitrary element does enter in.3 For instance, the employment of the particular linguistic symbol "ink" to convey the reference to the substance with which I write involves such a relationship, for there is no intrinsic reason why that and no other symbol should convey the particular meaning. The German "Tinte" is just as ade- quate, as would be any other symbol so long as both reader and writer knew and accepted the

3In concrete means-end relationships, a combina- tion of both may of course be present.

convention. The line between these two relationships must be drawn in terms of the scientific standard - an intrinsic relationship between things is one "found" there by the actor, not "put" there.4

Making allowance for limitations of knowledge and power of control, and hence thinking in terms of probability of success, this type of action may be judged in its rationality in purely scientific terms given the ends. The case is not so simple when the end is transcendental. For since, by definition, it lies beyond the bounds of the empirically observable external world, such an intrinsic relation of empirical means to it is not demonstrable. The most that can be done in tracing action in the empirical world to such ends is to show that they either logically imply, or have otherwise become attached to, certain empirical ends, the pursuit of which can then be judged in terms of intrinsic rationality. Thus the whole Mohammedan religious system may be regarded in this connection as such a system of transcendental ends. One implication of it in one interpretation is the obligation of the faithful to convert the heathen, by force if necessary. But forceful conquest (if not con- version) of another people is an empirical end, and the strategy of a Mohammedan general in pursuit of it can be judged in terms of the same sort of rationality as the strategy, say, of Luden- dorff in the World War. It may be said that usually our ultimate empirical ends are more or less closely connected logically with a system of transcendental ends. But the latter cannot be directly the ends of an intrinsic means-end relationship. Nevertheless, people do attempt to pursue transcendental ends directly rather than through the intermediary of an empirical end and an intrinsic relation of means to it. In this case the means-end relationship becomes symbolic. This situation is one principal characteristic of the element of action I should call the religious - the pursuit of a transcendental end directly by symbolic means. For good reasons this very generally takes the form of ritual - since there is no intrinsic connection between the particular means and the particular end, the stability of the relationship is, in intrinsic terms, insecure and must be protected by an agency extraneous to the intrinsic means-end relation-

4The difference is in terms of the general analysis of action. Of course to aparticular individual learning a language the meaning of its symbols is "given." But this does not apply to the general relations between symbols and meanings.




ship as such - the stereotyping of tradition.' Another type of what is, in terms of the in-

trinsic means-end relationship, "irrational" action, is the case where the attempt is made to achieve an empirical end by symbolic means.6 This is magic. The element in common between religious ritual and magic is the employment of a symbolic means-end relationship where there is no intrinsic place for it. The difference lies in the character of the end. From the point of view of the intrinsic means-end relationship, magic is a spurious practical art7- it is a symptom of incomplete rational control in practical matters where strong interests are at stake. Religious ritual, on the other hand, is in these terms always "useless." Naturally the two are very intimately bound up together empirically. In what are concretely called "religious" there are very generally large magical elements.

To approach nearer to a determination of the place of institutions in this "subjective" schema, it is necessary to analyze the intrinsic means- end relationship a little more closely. In the first place, concrete action does not take place in terms of isolated ends with only one set of means, but rather in terms of very long and complex "chains" of means-end relationships, so constituted that the "end' of one sector of the chain is a means to some further end (or more than one). Not only that, but the chains cross each other and are interwoven in the most complex manner. But in spite of all this com- plexity, it is a logical necessity of the situation that the chains should not be "circular," but that followed in either direction they should come to an end. In one direction "upward" from

S Ritual in general involves also another element, that of "sacredness" in Durkheim's sense. To pursue a certain end there is an obligation to employ certain symbolic means. This obligation involves an attitude of respect on the part of the actor toward the means similar to that shown toward a moral duty.

6 In so far as it is not necessary to do so through acting directly upon the states of mind of other human beings since such action takes place predominantly by means of symbols. The issuance of a command is of course the employment of a symbolic means- language. The point is that symbols are in fact the best adapted intrinsic means of acting upon human beings in certain ways - not the particular symbols of course. While the means is symbolic, the means-end relationship here is intrinsic.

I This is of course not to state that magic has no effects, no "functions." They exist, but they are indirect, acting through the states of mind of individuals.

means to end, etc., we come ultimately to elements which serve as ends, but not as means to any further more ultimate ends, which in these terms are ends in themselves.8 Similarly, fol- lowing the chain in the opposite direction - from end to means - will lead ultimately to elements which are means, but not in any relation ends. Analysis will show that these latter belong to either of the two great categories of non-human environment or of "human nature" in so far as it is determined by the mechanisms of biological heredity.9 These are the ultimately0 conditions of action - the elements of the "given" situation in which man finds himself. Naturally these conditions are in turn modified by the direct or indirect effects of human action, but at any given moment there is a given situation in terms of them." I

We must now return to the factor of ultimate ends. So far our treatment has concerned only

I Whether the analysis stops at the ultimate empirical end or is pushed farther to the ultimate transcendental end behind it (if such exists) will depend on the particular case in hand. For the Jain, for instance, to avoid taking animal life is an ultimate empirical end. But this is rationalized in terms of the doctrines of Karma and Transmigration. The ultimate transcendental ends lie in the metaphysics of which these doctrines are the outstanding features.

It should again be noted that the term ends in this discussion does not, when thought of as afactor in action, denote the concrete ends of concrete acts - for these include elements of "natural" and other determinism which are incompatible with the role of ends in the present schema. Biological hunger as an element of food-getting activities is not an end but a "condition" in the terms to be discussed presently. The factor of ends would appear in the "tastes" which made us choose among the various possible modes of satisfying biological hunger.

9 It is to be noted that the "subjective" point of view is that the ego, not of the concrete human being, and that in these terms his own body belongs to the external world - the conditions of action. The strength of our muscles is just as much a "condition" to be taken account of in lifting a stone as is the weight of the stone.

10 That is what forms conditions or means only, in terms of the general analysis of the elements of action. For a concrete individual acting in a social environment, on the other hand, the laws and customs of the society may constitute conditions. The distinction is vital.

" The idea that the means-end chain is "circular" instead of "open" really amounts to erasing the vital distinction of ultimate conditions and ultimate ends and makes the former the sole decisive factor in




the end of a particular means-end chain. But there are cogent reasons for believing that the different ultimate ends of the various means- end chains do not stand in a merely random relation to each other. First, with reference to the individual - the very concept of rational choice, pushed beyond the "technological" application to choice of means for a single end, to the case where there is also a choice of ends involved, has no meaning unless it is thought of in terms of an organized system of ends. The idea of a random plurality of ends of the individual is incompatible with the concept of an independent role of ends in action, and leads logically to a positivistic determinism which really eliminates ends altogether.

With reference to the relations between the systems of ends of different individuals the situation is not so simple. There is no space to go into the argument here,12 but it can be shown negatively that the state of random variation of such individual systems in the same society would be Hobbes' state of nature - that is, chaos;'3 and that in the absence of a pre-established harmony in terms of a metaphysical "Nature" there must be, for a society to exist, a significant degree of integration of ultimate ends in terms of a system common to the bulk of the individuals composing it. In addition, there is much empirical evidence that such common systems of ultimate ends or values do exist, and play a vital part in social life. We will then assume that every concrete society is and must be characterized by such a common system of ultimate values. This does not, however, imply that concrete individuals may or do not pursue ultimate ends at variance with this system- the latter is only one, though a vital element in

the concrete reality, a normative, limiting type. Before entering into the analysis of the vari-

ous possible relations in which this system of common ultimate ends may stand to the rest of the intrinsic means-end chain, it is necessary to enter into a brief discussion of the way in which the "intermediate" sector of it - that part the elements of which serve both as means and as ends in different relations - becomes differ- entiated.

The simplest means-end relationship is what may be called the "technological" - the case where the means to a single given end are chosen, without reference to other ends, on the sole ground of their direct efficiency. This basic relation may exist in connection with the great- est variety of different ends - there is a technique of musical composition as well as of iron smelting. The technological, while it concerns only the relation to a single end, remains a basic element in the most complex systems of action, though combined with other factors.

The first complication is introduced when the adaptation of means is not thought of in relation to one end alone, but when the potential means to the end immediately in view are thought of as also potential means to other ends, so that the means have alternative uses and must be allocated between them. This process of allocation involves an evaluation of the relative urgency of different possible uses of means, hence of the ends for which they are to be used. This evaluation ultimately involves reference to the whole value system of the individual, as only in terms of it can the relative urgency of ends be determined. This element of action which concerns the allocation of resources between alternative uses is the economic. It can be defined in terms of the actions of the isolated individual taken as a coherent system of action, though not, like the technological, in terms of a single isolated act. But like the technological, and in the closest empirical relations with it, it remains a basic element in much more complex situations. Thus we have so far two normative standards of rationality, those of technological and of economic efficiency, in terms of which to judge and understand action.

If we were analyzing the actions of isolated individuals, these would exhaust the intermediate sector of the intrinsic means-end chain. But in society one further complication arises. Through the division of labor (in the broadest sense) individuals make use not only of the external environment and of their own labor as

determining rational action. This is the path followed by all truly "positivistic" social theories which always try to explain human action in terms of adaptation to conditions, ultimately of the external environment.

12 This issue is central to utilitarian theory. It is comprehensively treated in [Elie] Hal6vy, Laforma- tion du radiculismephilosophique, [3 volumes, Paris: Alcan, 1901-1904]. I have outlined the argument for my position very briefly in my article, "[Some] Re- flections on the Nature [of] Significance of Econom- ics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1934, [48:511-45].

13 That is so long as ends are held to play a part in action at all. A pure positivistic determinism on the basis, for instance, of natural selection would not be bothered by the problem.




means to their ends, but also, directly or indi- rectly, of the services of others. This leaves an element in the relation which is not determined strictly in either technological or economic terms - the terms on which the services (or, of course, the goods) of others are to be acquired. It is to be presumed that all such transactions involve an exchange of services - that A's actions are potential means to B's ends, while B's actions are in turn potential means to A's ends. The question is that of the relative priority to be granted to the ends of A or of B. This may be called the element of power - or the political element. It does not concern merely market relations, but any relations between human beings in so far as they serve in the capacity of means to each other's private ends as distinct from their pursuit of a common end.'4 In such a case there is always a question of relative power to be settled. It is only in so far as the power question has been settled that relations between different individuals can take place on either the economic or the technological level. Economic exchange implies the absence of coercion as a means of acquisition - that is a limitation on the exercise of power.'5

The distinction of these three elements, the technological, the economic and the political, completes the main analysis of the intermediate sector of the intrinsic means-end chain. We may now turn to a discussion of the primary modes in which the system of common ultimate ends is related to the rest of the chain, particularly the intermediate sector. There are essentially two modes. First is the case where an ultimate end (at least an ultimate empirical end) serves as the immediate end of the action in question. This is the case, for instance, in the action of a Jain when he carries a broom to sweep insects off the sidewalk to avoid step- ping on them and thus killing them. Or it is the case with the Mohammedan general engaged in fighting a religious war, in so far as he is a true believer and not, for instance, a merce-

14 In concrete cases of pursuit of a common end involving organization there is always a power question as between the individuals concerned. To a certain degree this is settled by the intrinsic requirements of the task but there is generally a margin left open. We are not, however concerned with a classification of concrete actions, but of elements in action.

5 It seems expedient further to limit the political element to the exercise of power by coercive means. This raises issues too complex to enter into here. We can present only a very rough outline.

nary. This is the type of action which Max Weber called wertrationales Handeln, a term for which there seems to be no suitable English equivalent. It is susceptible of treatment in terms of ordinary intrinsic rationality, in so far as the ultimate empirical end is known.

The other mode is somewhat different. It re- lates to acts in pursuit of an immediate end which is not at the same time an ultimate end, which belongs in the intermediate sector. Then, in order for the system of action as a whole to be "integrated,"'6 there must be some means by which elements of action of this kind may be kept in line with the system of ultimate ends in both the logically possible ways - that is, in limiting action in that sector to immediate ends which are at least in harmony with, or may be regarded as means to, the common system of ultimate ends, and in regulating the choice of means to such immediate ends in such a way that their employment will not tend to defeat the ultimate common ends.

Thus, while in the case of wertrationales Han- deln the ultimate ends (or some of them) form an integral part of the particular action as viewed in terms of the means-end relationship, in this latter case their relation to the particular action elements is, as it were, "external." Thus the ultimate ends, or rather the value attitudes under- lying them of which ends are an expression, are related to the specific actions not in the form of ends, but of regulatory norms defining limits within which the choice both of immediate ends and of means to their attainment is permissible. This system of regulatory norms, of rules governing actions in pursuit of immediate ends in terms of their conformity with the ultimate common value-system of the community,17 is what I call its institutions approached from the subjective point of view. Thus, in the concrete reality of custom and law it is the normative rule itself which constitutes the institutional element, not the total concrete complex of relatively uniform behavior.

If this general conception of the place of institutions is accepted, the question arises as to the general grounds for believing in their importance. For me, this may perhaps best be explained in terms of what I may tentatively call a "voluntaristic" conception of human action which I believe to be upheld by what knowl-

16 See below for an explicit discussion of the concept of integration.

17 That is in terms other than those of efficiency.




edge of the concrete facts of human social life I possess. Its basis is the postulate that the elements of action which we formulate in terms of the rational norms of the relations of means and ends do not constitute the whole of action. Rationality of action, that is conformity with these norms, does not follow automatically from the mere acceptance of the ends as desirable. In the first place, the rational selection of means and the attainment of the rational knowledge of the intrinsic relationships of means and ends on which such selection of means is based, is not an automatic process. The widespread empiricist tendency to think of the scientist's mind as a passive instrument for the registration of sense impressions is largely responsible for this mis- conception. But just as the best methodologists have come to realize that the role of the scientific mind is creative, not passive, we may state more generally that the rational knowledge on which action is based is the result of the effort of the actor and involves the element of will.

But, secondly, even when knowledge of the rational norm has been attained, conformity with it does not follow automatically either. The necessary technical operations to carry out the prescribed course of actions also call for an expenditure of effort, hence again for the factor of will.

But these very conceptions of effort and will imply resistant factors which in so far as the present general conception of action is sound, must be thought of as inherent to some significant degree (though not necessarily unchang- ing in specific form or in formidability) in human life. These factors, the investigation of which is in my opinion the business mainly of psychology and which cannot be attempted here, may be classified in the two great groups of those which inhibit action - factors of inertia, and those which "drive" to action diverging from the rational norms, which, to use an old term of Hobbes', might be called the "passions."

Given this general conception of human action, the further undoubted fact should be noted that the immediate ends of a very great proportion of the concrete actions of everyday life are either remote from ultimate values in general, or though close to some values in a common system, are remote from others in the same system. Then the need for, and very great importance in practical life of, the kind of normative control I have called institutional becomes evident. For the factors of inertia will impose resistance to creative action in the pursuit of

any ends and tend to leave the individual the creature of a system of "conflicting psychological pulls," while the passions will subject the efforts in the pursuit of ends to a continual "bombardment of interests," which with cen- trifugal effect will tend to break down the con- centration of what effort there is on the realization of a particular and integrated system of ends.18

One final circumstance may be noted as indi- cating the importance of institutional control. The elements in the subjective aspect of action which we have made the basis of our analysis have been the "rational" elements. The factor of ultimate ends partakes of this rational character equally with the rest. This implies, of course, the susceptibility of rational formulation in terms of linguistic or other symbols subject to all the rules of logic. Thus, we may speak of an end properly only in so far as there exists a logically formulable anticipation of a future state of affairs, empirical or transcendental, to be realized through action. But this also is a norm - our concrete "ends" or "tendencies of action" are, especially the more ultimate they become, at best imperfectly formulated in these rational terms. This more fundamental "something" of which a true end is a rational formulation, I should like to call an "ultimate value attitude." Now, there is at least the possibility, apart even from change in these ultimate value attitudes themselves, that there should be alternative modes of rational formulation possible, which when they take the role of ends may lead to highly divergent courses of action. Thus, the "otherworldliness" of the Christian Gospels, which may be called such an attitude, led in different interpretations to the policy of "take no thought for the morrow" in the Gospels themselves, to the radical asceti- cism of the Egyptian monks, and to the relatively conservative sanction of worldly things, at least for the laity, of Medieval Catholicism, to mention only three of the possibilities.

Given the importance for social stability of a significant degree of conformity in ultimate values which has already been pointed out, it becomes apparent that institutional control of the formulation which these ultimate value attitudes receive, thus of the ends to which they

18 Thus the "function" of institutions is not only to keep the means and ends of the intermediate chain in conformity with ultimate values, but also to endow the individual with the energy to live up to institutional norms, to overcome these resistant factors.




give rise, is a matter of the first importance. For a failure of such control may lead to divergent formulations which, hardening into dogmas, become the basis of irreconcilable divisions in the social body. The religious wars of the post- Reformation period constitute a sufficiently vivid case in point.

The whole "subjective" analysis of the place of institutions in action is above all concerned with the relation of the individual to the institutions of his society. Like every definition, this is more than a mere arbitrary definition - it is at least the prolegomena of a theory. The central thesis of the theory is that institutions are intimately related to, and, in part at least, derived from ultimate value attitudes common to the members of a community. They are thus, in a strict sense, moral phenomena. This implies further that the primary motive for obedience to an institutional norm lies in the moral authority it exercises over the individual. That is, his attitude to it is one of disinterestedness - he obeys it because be holds it, or the principle embodied in it, good for its own sake,19 not merely as means to some further end in the intrinsic means-end chain. This attitude will prevail in so far as he shares in the system of ultimate common value-attitudes of which the institutional system is a manifestation, and in so far as the former effectively governs his conduct.

But at best this is true to only a limited, through highly important degree. In so far, however, as, though not diverging from the common value-system in the sense of holding different values, its control over his conduct is weak, his attitude to institutional norms may cease to be entirely disinterested in that sense and becomes in part one of "calculation of advantage." That is, he regards them in terms of the effect of conformity and non-conformity respectively considered as means to his own ends apart from the common value-system. His attitude is "interested." In so far, however, as he is actuated by values other than those of the common value-system there are two possibilities. If the value embodied in the particular individual norm is indifferent to, that is, not incompatible with, that motivating his conduct, his attitude will again be that of calculation of advantage. On the other hand, if it is so incom-

19 That is, seen in terms of intrinsic rationality. It may be "justified" to him in other "metaphysical" terms.

patible his attitude will be a disinterested, "moral" attitude, but in this case the opposite of the former type. That is, he will tend to re- gard non-conformity as good in itself, and will actively resist enforcement of the norm on himself, or in the more radical case, on others also, not from motives of interest, but of moral obligation.

Now, since the control of institutional norms over individual conduct from moral motives is always imperfect, since it is stronger over some individuals than others, and since there are always more or less strong tendencies to the divergence of value-attitudes from the common system, on the part of larger or smaller elements in the community, there is always room for a secondary type of control to supplement the first. And the weaker the first becomes the more important the secondary is. This secondary control takes the general form of an ap- peal to interest which has two aspects, a positive and a negative. In the first place, there may be attached to conformity with a norm certain advantages with reference to other, personal ends, which would be lost through non-conformity. On the other hand, there may be attached to non-conformity certain positively disadvan- tageous consequences not inherent in the act of non-conformity itself, but arising out of the attitude of the community toward it, which would outweigh the advantages to be gained by non-conformity. These disadvantages may be called "sanctions." The line between the advantages of conformity and the sanctions attached to non-conformity is of course indis- tinct in practice.

It is not to be supposed that the fact that it is to the personal advantage of the members of a community to conform to its institutional norms is proof that these norms depend primarily or exclusively on interest and sanctions for their effective enforcement. For the very strength of the moral attachment of the community to these norms will on the one hand tend to canalize interests in conformity with them. Thus the principal personal rewards, above all in social esteem, will tend to go to those who do conform with them. On the other hand, the same strength of moral attachment will tend to visit disapproval and sometimes overt punishment on those who violate them.

But this very fact, of fundamental importance, means that, once really established, a system of institutional norms creates an interlocking of interests, both positive and negative, in its main-




tenance, and to a certain point its supports in the form of moral attachment may dissolve away and still leave it standing supported by the complex of interests, ultimately of sanctions since once positive interests are diverted from conformity only sanctions can take their place. There would seem to be a limit to how far this process can go without breaking down the system, since the strength of sanctions and the willingness to apply them is to a large, though not exclusive, extent an expression of moral attitudes. Moreover the application of sanctions on a large scale depends upon organization, and it is questionable how far that in turn can rest upon sanctions alone.

The answer to these questions, however, can be attained only by extensive empirical study. The present concern is to point out the importance in the empirical study of the functioning of institutions, of finding out the relative roles of these primary and secondary motives to conformity with them. No other question is of equal importance in determining the degree of stability of institutional systems.

We may now turn to the other main approach to the study of institutions, the "objective." It goes almost without saying that rules or norms may be observed independently of their actual operation relation to action, that is, in abstraction from the subjective point of view of the actor. They may be found recorded in codes and statutes and in oral tradition and may in these forms be subjected to various kinds of analysis. Many of these would be merely sup- plements, however necessary, to the kind of study the methodological basis of which has already been outlined.

Here I wish to point out certain features of institutions which do not come out readily in terms of the "subjective" analysis. For that analysis is inherently limited in that it can deal only with a single individual at a time, seen in relation to his ends, the conditions of his actions and the norms regulating it. But the moment we conceive a plurality of individuals acting in the same environment it becomes evident that their actions will give rise to, and be in various ways involved in, a set of relations to each other.

Then the norms which regulate the actions of individuals will at the same time, as one of their most important functions in performing this regulation, lay down norms of what these relations of individuals ought to be. And in so far as these norms are lived up to they will

define what some at least of the relations actu- ally are. Thus, institutions, in so far as they regulate the relations of individuals to each other, become a fundamental element of social structure which consists precisely in such a set of determinate relations of individuals. One element of social structure then is a system of norms defining what the relations of individuals ought to be. This relation of institutions to social structure does not appear prominently in the "subjective" analysis since its full import is only brought out by considering all the individuals in the community in relation to each other.

If we apply the general viewpoint arrived at in the previous discussion, it is clear that the institutional element does not alone account for the concrete forms of relationship. In fact, all the factors operating on concrete human behavior play a part. Thus, in the relationship "marriage" the biological difference of the sexes is naturally fundamental. It is only in so far as forms of relationship are determined by normative control in the above sense that they are institutional.

But there is a sense in which, in social structure, institutions may be regarded as the form- giving element par excellence. For in terms of the other factors the relationships arising from them are, as it were, "resultants" of the immediate elements of the actions of the parties concerned. That is, given the elements of the individual acts taken alone, the ends and conditions, the relationships result. Thus, in economic analysis the division of labor and exchange are thought of as resultants of the various econo- mies of specialization. But in so far as institutional norms are "external" to the individual acts, they operate to specify relationships still further. They constitute a "form," a "mold" into which these individual acts fit. So that to a great extent, the specific differences of social structures from each other, that is, in so far as they are not due to differences of heredity and environment, can be derived in the first place from this form-giving element of institutions, more fundamentally of course from the ultimate values of which it is an expression.

This is an approach to institutions much more in accord with sociological tradition than the "subjective" approach. Professor MacIver, for instance, defines institutions as forms of social relationship sanctioned by common will. It is also in accord with much of the work of the so- called Formal School. But only tying it up with




a theory of the elements of action gives it a deeper methodological foundation and makes it possible to distinguish adequately the institutional from other factors involved in the determination of concrete forms of social relationship. Otherwise there is grave danger of slip- ping back into the empiricist view we rejected at the outset which identifies institutions with those concrete forms of relationship themselves and forever shuts the door on any attempt to use institutions as an explanatory category. Thus, above all, such a view tends to obscure the normative character of institutions.

Both of the main aspects discussed have re- sulted in a view of the theory of institutions such as to raise the question of its very close relationship to another science -jurisprudence. It is significant that the sociological use of the term institution is apparently of juristic origin, though I have made no attempt to trace its history in detail.

The jurist may well interpose at this point and ask whether, since he is concerned with law and custom precisely as normative rules, the sociologist is not invading his territory. It may readily be admitted that here the jurist and the sociologist are concerned with the same concrete phenomena, but their points of view are different. The jurist's concern is, I take it, with the systematic inter-relations of the different elements in a body of law, and in comparative jurisprudence with the logical relations of different legal systems to each other. The sociological interest, on the other hand, is in law (and custom) in relation to action. In that sense, then, the theory of institutions may be regarded as precisely the sociology of law. Similarly, the fact that the sociologist may study the relation of religious ideas to action in society does not make him a theologian. The theologian stands, in my opinion, in much the same relation to the sociology of religion as does the jurist to the sociology of institutions.

This jurisdictional question well illustrates the importance of approaching the study of institutions from the "subjective" point of view as well as the "objective." For here it is that the complexities of the relation to action come out most clearly. The other approach, with its emphasis on relationships as such, is very apt to be biased in the direction of regarding the prime function of a theory of institutions to be a formal classification of types of relationship. This has indeed happened in the case of some representatives of the formal school of sociol-

ogy.20 Professor Sorokin is quite right in point- ing out2' the fact that a very great deal of excel- lent work of that kind has been done by jurists, and that it is futile for sociologists to ignore this and try to start all over again. Sociologists must, in dealing with institutions, make use of such formal systematics, just as they must make use, in dealing with religion, of theological systematizations. Perhaps, on occasion, when no such systematization is found at hand in a form suitable for a particular sociological pur- pose, they must venture into the field themselves. But to make of the sociology of institutions, or as some even do of all sociology, a formal systematics of relations is to identify it with jurisprudence. That is essentially to de- prive it of its character of an empirical, explanatory science and to make it a normative science.22

These considerations lead over to the question of the bases of a sociological classification of institutions. Such a classification is evidently necessary as a basis for the organization of a systematic treatment of the subject. There are indicated by the preceding analysis, I think, three principal kinds of classification. One may be termed the structural classification of the normative types of relationship. This is the type which is to be derived mainly from juristic sources. Its usefulness is mainly for the detailed classification of particular institutional forms in the various concrete branches of the subject- matter. A main task of the detailed work of the sociologist, in dealing with concrete institutions, is, with juristic help, to push these classifications further and to perfect them.

The other two classifications yield a basis for the general organization of the subject. One, which I call the relational, is in terms of two different fundamental modes in which the institutional norm is related to the specific acts which it may be regarded as regulating. These may be spoken of as the- explicit and the implicit relationships' respectively. It will be re- called that we spoke of institutional norms as an element in a sense "external" to the primary

20 Notably [Leopold] von Wiese, [Systematic So- ciology, adapted and abridged by Howard Becker, New York: Wiley, 1932].

21 [Pitirim Sorokin,] Contemporary Sociological Theories, [New York: Harper, 1928].

22 See also H[ans] Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklich- keitswissenschaft, Chapter I, Section 6, [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1930].




elements of the action it regulates, its specific immediate end and the means and conditions for its realization. The case where this relationship can best be analyzed in its simplest terms is that where there is an explicitly formulated rule governing the action. In so far as this is the case, the regulatory function becomes essentially independent of any specific relations of the individuals involved in a complex of actions, except in so far as they grow out of the particular actions themselves. Thus, in a contractual relationship the rules of contract lay down explicitly and in relatively abstract terms certain limits and conditions of the actions and relations growing out of them. But it is a matter of indifference to the particular analysis whether the parties to a contract have relations other than those defined in the contract.23

But this situation is by no means universal. It exists most clearly only when we get a large place for highly rationalized law formulated in terms of abstract rules. But in the great major- ity of cases, where regulation is in terms of custom rather than law, the rule must be thought of as implicit rather than explicit. Explicit regulation is in general limited to the enjoinment or prohibition of certain specific acts. But there is, even here, a more general element which gives system and stability to the plurality of independent regulations. This lies in the fact that the individuals stand in certain stable relationships to each other, and the particular acts they perform may be regarded as governed by the general socially sanctioned characteristics of these relationships and the attitudes involved in them. Thus, within the family, the relations of husband and wife or of parent and child, in the particular forms sanctioned by the common value system of the community, may be thought of as governing the complex of particular actions, and thus the mutual exchange of services as between the individuals.

Whether such a relationship is entered into voluntarily or not is immaterial for present purposes. Of the two cited, in our own society one is and the other is not. What is vital is the relation of logical priority as between relationships between individuals and the immediate elements of their particular acts. In the case of contract, the relation between the contracting

23 Except that the very fact of their being subject to and acknowledging the force of certain rules of contract implies their common membership in a community transcending the particular transaction.

parties results from the pursuit of their ends by the most efficient means available. Institutional norms are, as it were, external conditions of action. In the other case the relation does not result from, it is rather prior to, the particular acts and all their immediate elements. These acts may be regarded as a concrete expression - at least semi-symbolic - of the relationship. There is, of course, nothing to prevent the norms implicit in such a relationship from being explicitly formulated - but their regulatory function is not dependent on explicit formulation in anything like the same degree as in the contract case. Specific rights and duties, hence the limits within which particular acts may fall, follow more or less "automatically" from a tra- ditionally accepted framework of relationships.

One other distinction is, though not identical with the above, closely related to it. It is one of the outstanding features of the contract type of relationship as generally defined that the content of it is specifically limited to the terms of the contract. That is, if one party wishes to claim a right in relation to the other or exact the ful- fillment of an obligation from the other, the, burden of proof is on him that the other is so obligated by his contract, or that he is entitled to the right. Such rights and obligations are regarded as excluded unless explicitly included. The ethics of the matter is essentially irrele- vant. Even though I may feel ethically obligated to- help a neighbor in distress, it is not part of my contractual obligation to him unless there is an official agreement that I will give him certain specified kinds of help in certain specified circumstances.

On the other hand, the specific content of a relationship may be essentially unlimited. Then the burden of proof is on him who would deny a right or refuse to accept an obligation, that this particular right or obligation does not in- here in the relationship. And in general this proof can only be furnished in terms of conflict with what is, in terms of the value-system governing the relationship, a higher obligation. Marriage is in general such an unlimited-content relationship. Husband and wife are required by it to perform whatever mutual services may be called for by the exigencies of their common life as they arise. Limits are set only by higher obligations as when in war-time a husband may neglect his general obligation to support his family in favor of that to join the fighting forces. For obvious reasons this type of relation tends to be prior to specific acts,




while the other tends to be a result of it. Every community may be regarded as pos-

sessing a framework of such stable relationships between its members - in Sir Henry Maine's term, relations of status. The degree to which these predominate over the contractual type, relations which are the ad hoc resultants of particular acts, or vice versa, may be exceed- ingly various. It should be noted this classification does not affect the concrete content of social relationships as such. Status and contract may both in principle affect any social relationship whatever. Their concrete distribution is a matter for empirical determination. In general terms it is a question which can only be dealt with by an integrative study of the whole institutional structure of a concrete community. It will be one of the most important theoretical problems for this kind of study.

There is, however, one sphere of concrete social life in which the element of status is and always has been peculiarly prominent - the family. For the two primary relationships out of which family structure is compounded, those of husband and wife and parent and child, both necessarily carry this characteristic to a marked degree. In the latter case the reasons are fairly obvious. Since neither chooses the other as a concrete personality, and since the helplessness of the infant shuts out, in the formative period of the relationship, the kind of rational re- ciprocity which is necessary for a contractual relationship, there is no other possibility. More- over, due to the unpredictability of the concrete exigencies of a long period, the concrete content of parental responsibilities is necessarily left relatively undefined, except negatively.

The case of marriage is at first sight not so clear. We think of it as entered into by a "contract" at least in our own society. But it is certainly not predominantly a contractual relationship in the above sense. The reasons may be sought above all in the relation of marriage to parenthood, and, closely connected with that, the fact that a married couple stands in a large proportion of their relations to the rest of society as a unit of solidarity. That is, they are treated as a unit whose interests are, as it were, fused. The major events and changes of the life of either are inevitably shared by the other. They share a common social fate. This arises from their sharing a common daily life, and home, and a common responsibility for children. In addition, the sexual relationship seems to be such as normally to exclude the contractual type.

The latter does, of course, develop in its most extreme form in prostitution, but that certainly cannot be regarded otherwise than as a departure from the main type. A certain disinterestedness which amounts to a degree of fusion of interests seems to be inseparable from normal sexual relations, and thus from marriage.

In my view, the principal theoretical reason for the inclusion of the family in a comparative study of institutions is as the most prominent example of this type of social relationship (substantially what Tonnies called Gemein- schaft) and of the institutional aspect of it. As long as the family continues to be the fundamental element in social life which it always has been (Sparta is to my knowledge the most radical historical case of its near-suppression), society can never be completely contractual- ized. The family is not, however, in my opinion a functional category in the classification of institutions on the same analytical level with those to which we shall now turn and which should constitute the main framework of a comparative treatment of institutions.

The other main classification of institutions which may serve as a basis for the systematic treatment of the subject is what has normally been called the "functional." The term may be retained, but there have been important disagree- ments in the interpretation of what it means. The preceding "subjective" analysis fortunately supplies us with a point of view from which a consistent scheme of such classification may be built up.

The most prevalent view of the nature of what are generally called the functional categories - the economic, the political, the religious, the educational, etc. - is that they form the basis of a classification of concrete human acts. The only view of institutions with which such a scheme would be consistent is that which regards them as the concrete forms of relationship between human beings which arise in connection with such concrete activities.24 Economic institutions, for example, would then be those forms associated with the concrete activities classed as economic, and so on.

Such an approach may be of value up to a certain point, but it soon runs into grave diffi- culties. Our whole treatment of institutions thus

24 This view makes the theory of institutions formal sociology in Simmel's sense. While there is sound insight behind Simmel's methodological position, taken literally, it is not tenable.




far implies a radically different one. According to it the functional categories do not denote classes of concrete actions, but rather different elements in concrete action. One element may be predominant in any particular concrete act - the economic, for instance, in that of a bro- ker on the stock exchange - but not because of the absence of the other elements, rather because of a particular constellation of them and a particular set of relations of the economic element to them.25

The basis of the functional classification, then, is the analysis of the elements [of] action in terms of the means-end schema and its ramifi- cations and implications. The functional categories thus derived fall into four groups. First, there are those which constitute the sub-division of the intrinsic means-end chain, the technological, economic, and political elements. Taken by themselves in abstraction from the institutional factor, these elements of action are all oriented to norms of efficiency.

Then there is the group which falls outside the intrinsic means-end chain, where the means- end relationship is hence symbolic - magical and religious ritual. But both of these types constitute action in the strictest sense - the attainment of specific ends by means thought to be intrinsically adapted to them - in the former case empirical, in the latter transcendental ends. We may speak of them as governed also by norms, but in this case of another type - those of ritual obligation.

The third group constitutes elements of action which fall outside the means-end schema altogether in the sense that the complexes of action involved cannot, taken as a whole, be held to serve any specific end. In this class fall the two elements, art and play. The qualifica- tion "taken as a whole" is necessary because both, of course, employ techniques, often highly complex and rationalized ones. Each of these techniques serves specific ends within the complex, such as winning the game or achiev- ing certain effects in painting, but the same cannot be said of the whole. These categories must be spoken of rather as "forms of expression" of value-attitudes than as activities in

pursuit of ends. They also are measured in terms of norms, but of still different characters - aesthetic norms in the case of art, the subjective norm of "pleasure" in the case of play.

The last category should perhaps be classed as technology, but it has features which seem to make it advisable to keep it separate - it is education. It may most broadly be defined as the process by which culture elements are transmitted from one individual or group to another - the most important being of course from the elder to the younger generation. Naturally the nature of education will differ greatly according to the content, whether it is a technique or a moral value that is being transmitted.

It should be noted that the term functional as applied to this classification does not refer to differences in the function of institutions, but rather to differences in the other elements to which the institutions are related. The function of institutions is always the same - the regulation of action in such a way as to keep it in relative conformity with the ultimate common values and value-attitudes of the community. But the theory of institutions deals with a relation - and this relation may be very different according to the functional character of the elements of action involved. This is sufficient ground for classifying institutions according to these categories.

But this terminology should not be allowed to lead us astray on another point. The fact that we speak of economic institutions, religious institutions, etc. does not mean that the institutions in question constitute an economic element in the causal sense. On the contrary, the whole position here taken up implies that the institutional element constitutes a causal factor in its own right, distinct from each of those formulated in these functional categories.

Before closing, I should like to make explicit reference to a basic concept of the theory of institutions, the full import of which does not become evident until the treatment of all the institutions of a society taken together is attempted. It is evident from the previous discussion that there is in every society a more or less coherent system of common ultimate value-attitudes, and that institutions are primarily an expression of these attitudes in certain particular relations to action. It follows that the institutions themselves will constitute a system that is, a system of regulative norms.

Now, what is meant by a system in this con- text? I should like to distinguish two concepts

25 Great care should be exercised in defining precisely what is meant by saying one element is predominant. For a discussion of the economic case, and some of the fallacies which may easily creep in, see my article referred to above in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1934. [This is a reference to the article by Parsons cited in footnote 12.]




- that of a functional system and a normative system. The former is typified by the physicist's conception of a physical system or the economist's of the system of economic equi- librium. It consists essentially in a plurality of functionally interdependent variables, the relations of which are capable of formulation in terms of a determinate system of simultaneous equations. The order involved in its determi- nateness is a "factual" order.

A normative order on the other hand is something different - or at least involves something more. It is a system of interrelationships of entities which, once the basic principles or assumptions on which it rests are given, constitutes an harmonious whole. To use Professor Kohler's term, the relation of the different parts to each other is one of mutual "requiredness." It is possible and meaningful to say that in terms of the structure of the system as a whole, one element is "right," fits, while another is "wrong." Thus, in the system of feudal law the conception of a plurality of dominia in the same thing fits, while the modem conception of ab- solute ownership is "wrong" - it does not "belong."26

In so far as a system of institutions possesses this quality of harmony, of the mutual requiredness of its parts, I should like to speak of it as "integrated." In so far as its elements are not thus harmonious but are mutually incompatible this denotes a lack of integration. A very strik- ing case of this lack of integration is brought out in the medieval relations of Church and State. It was essentially an insoluble problem, because feudalism and the bureaucratic hierar- chy of the Church represented mutually incompatible types of structure. Therefore each claimed an allegiance which inevitably en- croached on the requirements of the other. Hence, their relation was not one of integration but of an unstable "balance of power." It is clear that the question of the structural integration of a system of institutions cannot be an- swered in terms of any one set of its elements, but only of the system seen as a whole. Hence, its full import is not clear in comparative but only in integrative studies. This question is indeed the main theoretical reason for supple- menting comparative with integrative studies. In this connection, it should be noted that such

integrative studies may be made the starting point for comparative studies on a higher plane - the extremely difficult attempt to work out the systematic and genetic interrelations of different types of institutional structures taken as a whole. This is the goal the evolutionary school thought [it] had reached. We still recognize it as the goal, though not the obligation to reach an evolutionary solution. But it must be approached only after a far more thorough job on the lower levels of theoretical generalization than the evolutionary school thought necessary.

One final problem may be brought up which is, I think, best dealt with as an aspect of integration. The aspect just discussed concerns the mutual harmony, or requiredness, of the different elements of a system of institutions, that is, of the many specific normative rules which make it up. This aspect may be called structural integration. But normative rules gain their social significance in terms of their regulatory relation to action. There is thus the question of the degree to which and the means by which this regulation is made effective. This may be termed the aspect of regulatory integration.

Applying our previous analysis it would appear that the pole of perfect integration on this plane was that where enforcement of institutional norms was entirely by moral authority. The intervention of sanctions marks a stage of weakening of integration, a process which, carried to the opposite pole, ends in the state of complete absence of control - Durkheim's anomie.27

Thus, from the institutional point of view, a perfectly integrated society is one which meets the double criteria of possessing a completely harmonious system of institutional norms which are effectively enforced by moral authority. This is, of course, not a descriptive category but a polar concept, and "ideal type." It is, however, an absolutely essential concept. For the institutional study of any concrete society it is necessary to work out this ideal type of perfect integration - it is what, according to the best thought of the society in question, it ought to be and will often be found expressed in the social writings of the society itself. Or, in so far as there are conflicting systems of institutions, a plurality of such types must be worked out.

This ideal type may then be thought of as deviated from, in the actual concrete reality, in

26 The factual order of concrete human society is partly due to the normative order of its institutional system.

27 See [Emile Durkheim,] Le Suicide, Book 2, Chapter V, Section 2, [Paris: Alcan, 1897].




two directions, of which the first is the lack of structural integration. The polar antithesis here is a state where individual norms have only random relations to each other - where no normative system exists. It is easy to see that this implies the complete negation of institutional control. In the other direction the devia- tion is in terms of the breakdown of moral authority and its replacement by interest as a motive of conformity - finally loss of control even by that means. In both cases the extreme polar antithesis to perfect integration will turn out to be Hobbes' state of nature, or Durkheim's anomie (they come down to the same thing) which, while it might well constitute an order in the functional, natural-science sense, is the complete negation of order in the normative, social, institutional sense. Naturally all concrete societies will fall somewhere between these two poles.

Finally, beyond this analysis, the theory of institutions must be concerned with the dynam- ics of institutional change. The above considerations enable us to distinguish two fundamen-

tal sets of problems - those connected with changes in the degree of effective enforcement, and those connected with structural change. The latter especially will be concerned with the processes by which existing value-systems change and new elements come in. This is the most formidable and difficult task of all, and hardly more than very highly tentative experi- mentation can be attempted by anyone considering the limitations of the current state of the literature of the subject. Before we get very far in developing a theory of change, it is necessary to know what it is that changes - the principal task of this paper has been to supply that gap. It does not constitute a theory of social institutions - rather some of the necessary prolegomena to such a theory.

TALCOTT PARSONS wrote "Prolegomena" while he was an Instructor in the Department of Sociology at Harvard University. He died in 1979, after a distinguished career that included the Presidency of both the American Sociological Association and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. -ED.

COMMENTARY: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL THEORY

JAMES S. COLEMAN The University of Chicago

In his paper, "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions," Talcott Parsons ad-

dresses a problem on which little headway has been made since 1934 when he submitted the paper for publication to the Journal of Social Philosophy. This problem is the development of a theory of institutions, or a basis for such a theory. Parsons called his paper a "prolegomena" to a theory; but the prolegomena never led to the development of the theory itself, either by Parsons or by others. The surfacing of "Prole- gomena" now provides an opportunity to ask just how that theory might most profitably be developed.

PARSONS'S SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS

First, it is useful to get a sense of what Parsons was attempting in this paper, what direction he wanted to establish, what ideas he was arguing

against. Parsons devotes much of the paper to what he describes as a subjective analysis of institutions "from the point of view of the individual acting in relation to institutions" (pp. 319-20). He contrasts this with the objective approach to the study of institutions, "their study from the point of view of a sociological observer" (p. 319), thattreats institutions as "forms of social relationship sanctioned by common will," a definition he attributes to Robert Mac- Iver (p .327). This "objective" approach, says Parsons, "with its emphasis on relationships as such, is very apt to be biased in the direction of regarding the prime function of a theory of institutions to be a formal classification of types of relationship .... But to make of the sociology of institutions, or as some even do, of all sociology a formal system of relations is to identify it with jurisprudence" (p. 328).

"Prolegomena" can be seen as an attempt by Parsons to establish a footing for the subjective



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