Project MIMEVA - Geneva International Centre for ... · Project MIMEVA Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining ... 5.2.2 Experimental set-up

Project MIMEVA

Study of generic Mine-like Objects

for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining

Final Report

Prepared for DG Information Society (DG INFSO) Unit E-6Contract reference (administrative agreement): AA 501852

European Commission, DG Joint Research CentreInstitute for Systems, Informatics and SafetyTechnologies for Detection and Positioning UnitTP 272, Via E. Fermi, 1I-21020 Ispra (VA), Italy

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MIMEVA: Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining

This final project report is based upon the contractually deliverable items listed below:

D 1.2: Final List of mines for which Validation Tests will need to be Conducted with AdvancedAPL Detection Equipment

D2.1:Report on the Available Methods for Replication of Landmines

These documents, together with background text and supplementary information identified as relevantto the project have been edited together to form a coherent final report of the project.

Compiled and edited by: John T. Dean, Ispra, July 2001

With contributions from: Joaquim Fortuny-Guasch

Brian D. Hosgood

Athina Kokonozi

Adam M. Lewis

Alois J. Sieber

All experts are with the Unit TDP of the Institute of Systems Informatics and Safety, JRC, Ispra.


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page i of vii

Executive Summary

The MIMEVA project aimed to assess available methods of production of mine simulants andsurrogates in terms of the similarity of these replicas to real mines when viewed by a range of sensorsidentified most frequently as candidates for components in multi-sensor systems, namely: metaldetectors, thermal infrared and a ground penetrating radar.

The simulant designs resulting from this project may be used to support the testing of new equipmentintended to detect anti-personnel (AP) mines – with particular attention to the difficult to find “low-metal content” designs.

The main threat mines, affecting areas in where EC humanitarian aid programmes have beenundertaken, were identified. In these areas the presence of mines has required action beyond the normalprovision of development assistance.

Mine types, which pose a post-conflict threat and against which detectors will be required to operate,are listed. Emphasis is placed on South East Europe.

Tests that were conducted on surrogates and real mines using three classes of electromagnetic sensorare described. Metal detectors were used to establish the low frequency match between the surrogatesand the live mines, radar measurements established the correlation in the microwave region andinfrared measurements addressed the thermal properties.

A number of surrogate designs were identified including new constructions based on the assembly ofcommonly available parts. The new designs include air gaps, which are demonstrated to be importantin the microwave and infrared regions. Several designs have the possibility to exchange inserts thatrepresent the fuze. It is shown that this is a valuable feature.

The results confirm correlation between the electromagnetic features of surrogate mine designs and realmines in the identified spectral regions and thus confirm that the surrogates are appropriate for initialtesting of the performance of new mine detection sensors in a controlled manner.

The surrogates are completely inert, and are not subject to legal control over their movement allowingthem to be used in a wide range of situations.

The report is supported by annexes which

• Describe the threat mines,

• Detail the features of the main high explosives used,

• Consider the designs of various surrogate solutions

• List possible sources of mine surrogates

References used in the compilation of this report are listed to support further investigations.


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page ii of vii

Table of contents1 Introduction.................................................................................. 1

1.1 The MIMEVA Contract ....................................................................................... 1

1.2 Scope of work .................................................................................................... 1

1.3 Applications for mine replicas ......................................................................... 1

1.4 Work undertaken ............................................................................................... 1

1.4.1 Initial Research 1

1.4.2 Simulants 2

1.4.3 Measurement plan 2

1.4.4 Execution of measurements 3

1.5 Structure of this report...................................................................................... 3

2 Initial research ............................................................................. 5

2.1 Landmines affecting EC projects – compilation strategy ............................. 5

2.1.1 Identification of threat objects 5

2.1.2 Scope of the threat list 5

2.2 Mine Types against which Detector Validation Tests will need to beconducted........................................................................................................... 6

2.2.1 Locations considered 6

2.2.2 Categorisation by mine characteristics 6

2.3 Occurrence of landmines in designated territories ....................................... 7

2.3.1 Study 7

2.4 Full List of Mines for equipment to be evaluated against ............................. 7

2.4.1 Mine List in alphabetic order 8

2.4.2 Cylindrical shape mines - detectability by metal content 9

2.4.3 Cylindrical shape mines – listed in order of increasing body diameter 10

2.5 Selection of mine types against which mine detection systems must becapable to operate in South East Europe ..................................................... 11

2.5.1 Cylindrical Shape mines, occurrences in SEE 11

2.5.2 Box Shaped AP blast mines occurring in SEE 11

2.5.3 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: Detectability by metal content 12

2.5.4 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: By body diameter 12

2.5.5 Common AP mines in SEE: Explosive type 13

2.6 Overview of the study into mine types that must be identified .................. 13

3 Applications and possible solutions ....................................... 14

3.1 Mine awareness training ................................................................................. 14


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page iii of vii

3.1.1 Applications of replicas for mine awareness training and validation of models. 15

3.2 Replicas for mechanical demining systems................................................. 15

3.2.1 Test and validation of the simulants for mechanical demining machines 15

3.3 Targets to evaluate electromagnetic sensor systems for mine detection 15

3.3.1 Test and validation needs 16

4 Proposed construction for replica mines................................ 18

5 Validation of surrogate mines .................................................. 19

5.1 Radar Measurements ...................................................................................... 20

Background 20

5.1.2 Equivalence Criteria 21

5.1.3 Results 22

5.1.4 Conclusions from the measurements at radar frequencies 30

5.2 Evaluation of mine surrogates in infrared .................................................... 31

5.2.1 Introduction 31

5.2.2 Experimental set-up 31

5.2.3 Results for mines and their direct surrogates 32

5.2.4 Measurements with simulant mines 39

5.2.5 Conclusions from the Infra-red measurement 40

5.3 Metal detector measurements........................................................................ 42

5.3.1 Introduction 42

5.3.2 Detectors 42

5.3.3 Targets 43

5.3.4 Method of measurement 44

5.3.5 Results from Comparison of explosive filled and silicone RTV filled mines 45

5.3.6 Discussion 54

5.3.7 Investigation of responses to ITOP SIM model fuzes 54

5.3.8 Discussion 63

5.3.9 Discussion 68

5.3.10 Conclusions from metal detector measurements 68

6 Replication of mines for test and evaluation of detectors ..... 69

6.1 Methods ............................................................................................................ 69

6.2 Recommendations........................................................................................... 69

6.3 Benefits and limitations .................................................................................. 70

Annex 1 : Distribution of mines by country. ........................................ 72

Annex 2: AP blast mine descriptions ................................................... 74


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page iv of vii

Annex 3: Summary of properties of principal main explosives used inanti-personnel landmines ....................................................... 105

Annex 4: Example model mines from Maquettes Sédial .................. 106

Annex 5: Example posters .................................................................. 110

Annex 6: US mine simulants - ITOP.................................................... 113

Annex 7: Australian mine simulants................................................... 116

Annex 8: New simulants ...................................................................... 124

Design Outline 125

Annex 9: Acquisition times and file names relating to the Infraredmeasurements ......................................................................... 136

Annex 10: Theoretical Interpretation of relative size of signals for the twodetectors .................................................................................. 143

Annex 11: Sources of mine replicas................................................... 147

References............................................................................................ 149

Reference: jtd/G07/1233


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page v of vii

Glossary

2D Two dimensional

3D Three dimensional

A to D Analogue to Digital

ABS Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (plastic material)

AISI American Iron and Steel Institute

AP / APL Anti-Personnel (mine) / Anti-Personnel Landmine

AT Anti-Tank (mine)

CKA Colin King Associates Ltd.

comp. Composition (B)

CROMAC Croatian Mine Action Centre

Cu Copper (chemical element)

CW Continuous Wave

Czech Czechoslovakia

DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik - Former East Germany

DG Directorate General

DND Department of National Defence (Canada)

EC European Commission

EMSL European Microwave Signature Laboratory

ESB Explosive surrogate block

EU European Union

F France

FFT Fast Fourier Transform

FP Framework Programme (of the European Commission)

g gram

GPS Global positioning System

H Hungary

Hexogen Explosive (RDX )

HH Horizontal – Horizontal (transmit and receive polarisation)

HV Horizontal – Vertical (transmit and receive polarisation

I Italy

IBS Integral with Belleville spring

IP Integral Pressure (Fuze)

IP2 Integral double percussion type, pressure

IPAL Integral Pressure (Fuze) with anti-lift device

IR Infra-red

IS Information Society

JRC Joint Research Centre (of the European Commission)

kg Kilogram

m Metre

MCI Metal Component Insert

MEDS Mechem Explosive Detection System

MIMEVA Acronym for Project AA 501852


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page vi of vii

mm Millimetre

MsMs Multi sensor Mine signature (project)

N No

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

OTS Off the Shelf

PTFE Polytetrafluorethylene

R&D Research and Development

RDX 1,3,5-triaza-1,3,5-tri-nitrocyclo-hexane

ROM Romania

RSA Republic of South Africa

RTV Room temperature Vulcanising

RU Russia

s Second

SAI Space Applications Institute

SEE South East Europe

Sn Tin (chemical element)

TIR Thermal infrared

TNT Tri-nitro Toluene

Trialene Equivalent to Tri-nitro Toluene

Trotyl Equivalent to Tri-nitro Toluene

USA United States of America

UXO Unexploded Ordnance

v.low very low

VV Vertical – Vertical (transmit and receive polarisation)

Y Yes

YU Yugoslavia


AA 501852: Final Report Summary and Contents - Page vii of vii

Terminology relating to alternative targets:

Generic class Relating to, or characteristic of, a whole group or class. In this case the term impliesmines of broadly similar size and shape. Metal or explosive contents may differ andinterchangeable parts on the replicas may address these aspects.

Specific (mine) A particular mine type

Model Mine Targets that have been manufactured to replicate the appearance of specific mines.They will usually be reverse-engineered from available samples of the original. The extentof realism will depend on the manufacturer and the purpose. For example they may beexternally, visually correct, or they may be fully accurate internally and thus suited for awide range of training tasks. Model mines are free from explosives.

Replica Mine Any target that may be used for the purpose of testing equipment designed for minedetection. The replica mine may represent a specific mine or a generic class of mine.This terminology encompasses all other target descriptions in this list (models,simulants, surrogates and training mines). Replica mines are normally free fromexplosives – exceptions to this could be where the target will be used to exercise multi-sensor systems including an explosive detector. No fuzes will be fitted and it will not bepossible to detonate the replicas.

Simulant Mine Targets that have been manufactured to replicate the physical and electromagneticcharacteristics of a generic class of mine. Simulant mines contain no explosive,however the quantity and position of metal and the distribution and quantity of theexplosive substitute will be well specified.

Surrogate Mine Targets that have been manufactured to replicate certain physical andelectromagnetic characteristics of specific mines. They may be reverse-engineeredfrom available samples of the original. Surrogate mines will normally be free fromexplosives. The sensors for which a surrogate has been designed to exercise must bespecified.

Training mines Military targets used for training purposes. They may be replica mines (see above) or theymay be modified production mines where the fuze and explosive charge have beenreplaced by a benign substance of similar visual appearance. In some training mines themetal content will replicate closely that of the original live mine.


Introduction

AA 501852 Final Report Page 1

1 Introduction

1.1 The MIMEVA Contract

The MIMEVA project was part of a programme of support actions initiated by the EuropeanCommission (EC) Directorate General (DG) III under the EC Framework Programme IV (FP IV). Itaimed to provide information and materials of use to contractors undertaking R&D in the field ofhumanitarian demining.

1.2 Scope of work

The objective was to study and compare different ways to simulate landmines, which could be used tosupport research, training and development needs in humanitarian demining [1].

The technical annex to the contract specified that:

• Types of mine for which surrogates (or simulants) are needed to support R&D should beidentified.

• In the context of R&D into landmine detectors, benefits and limitations of differentapproaches to replicate landmines should be evaluated. Methods were to be identified to validatethe candidate surrogate and simulant landmines.

Thus, the work requested, in the context of testing new sensors and systems included:

- Identification mine types which represent a threat, against which sensors should be proven, and

- Design and evaluation of mine replicas appropriate for the testing of new sensors.

Procurement of targets for test of ongoing R&D projects did not form part of the MIMEVA activity.

1.3 Applications for mine replicas

Replicas are needed to address a number of needs including

• Mine awareness training

• Evaluation of mechanical demining systems

• Evaluation of electromagnetic sensor systems for mine detection.

Other needs include the training of military personnel on the handling and placement of mines; fordemining personnel, both military and civilian, on the ways to destroy or render-safe landmines thathave been detected, in order to clear the area of the threat. Aspects that determine the methods ofclearance include safety to demining personnel and others, the location with respect to property, theimpact of local detonation in polluting other areas being cleared. Non humanitarian clearance needswere not considered in this study.

1.4 Work undertaken

1.4.1 Initial Research

Initial research was conducted to identify the types of landmine that are predominant in mine-affectedcountries. In addition, an external specialist in humanitarian demining was commissioned to provide upto date information on mines and experience gained from humanitarian demining actions conducted inmany countries. The result has been developed into a summary of the main mines that may be found in


Introduction


various geographic areas. These mine types are analysed and classified in terms of their shape,dimensions, fuze characteristics, and type and quantity of high explosive.

1.4.2 Simulants

The role of simulants and other representations of mines was considered with respect to the overallproject requirement “to study and compare different ways to simulate landmines for research, trainingand development needs in humanitarian demining”.

With respect to the main task, the replication of landmines, for the purpose of providing test objectsappropriate to the reliable testing of new sensor and systems, was addressed in detail. The design ofexisting simulants was examined with respect to a number of criteria including:

• Availability,

• Safety

• Appropriateness of the replica as a test object (from the electromagnetic standpoint)

• Transportability

• Cost

• Possibility to build from easily obtainable parts

Existing simulants address some of these issues well – especially safety, transportability, and in respectof metal detectors, representing the signature of a wide range of mines.

Proposals were made for new targets, which can offer improved features in respect of cost, sourcingfrom low-cost components, and, from the electromagnetic standpoint, the inclusion in the model ofcertain voids, a features of many landmines that may contribute to their identification, particularly byradar sensors.

1.4.3 Measurement plan

A measurement plan was drawn up to address how example simulants were to be assessed for a numberof sensors. Consideration of the R&D contracts awarded by the EC, and other work current in 1998-9indicated that the most likely sensors, which could be offered as new humanitarian demining tools,would be:

• Improved metal-detectors, including detector arrays and detectors with enhanced signalprocessing features;

• Ground penetrating radar, including radar arrays and signal processing features added tothe radar system;

• Thermal infrared systems.

Other systems proposed or under test at that time included nuclear back-scatter systems, mechanicalresonance sensors, olfactory explosives-sensors and quadropole resonance systems.

From this analysis, and with the support of DGIII, the contract activity focussed on the developmentand assessment of replica mines suitable for the assessment of the three primary classes of sensorhighlighted above together with multi-sensor systems employing one or more of these sensors.

The measurement plan developed for this project [2] ensured a defined methodology was used tocharacterise the both simulants and original mines.


Introduction


1.4.4 Execution of measurements

All measurements for this project were made at the JRC. The European Microwave SignatureLaboratory was used to assess the radar performance. Infrared and metal detector measurements weremade at the demining test facility and in the Karl Friedrich Gauss Laboratory.

Measurements were made with standard laboratory test equipment coupled to calibrated antennas andcalibrated positioning systems. This was supplemented, for the metal detector measurements, by twoproprietary detectors each working with a different technology (pulse-induction and continuous-wave)from which response signals were taken early in the processing chain avoiding some of the filteringeffects and delays associated with audio output for the man-machine interface. For the infrared astandard thermal infrared camera (AGEMA 570) was used to record images. Where appropriatestandard measurement thermocouples were used to measure temperatures of the objects underinvestigation.

Targets used included:

• Simulants from the ITOP series,

• Simulants based on designs supplied by Colin King of CKA Limited,

• Live mines (but without an active fuze) made available

1.5 Structure of this report

This project final report addresses the topics identified in the previous section. Main results arepresented in the text. Supporting information provided in annexes to this report.

Section 2 - Initial research – provides a catalogue of mine types that have been identified in countriesthat have been the subject of EC demining actions. By agreement with DG III the project is limited toAP blast mines, as these were seen to represent targets that are most difficult to detect reliably.

The results are tabulated by mine type and also presented for the South East Europe (SEE) region,ordered by the characteristics of the mines.

Section 3 - Applications and possible solutions – considers the range of applications for which minereplicas may be used. Possible solutions for replicas for mine awareness training are discussedfollowed by consideration of the approach and an identified solution for the evaluation of mechanicaldemining systems.

The main focus of this section addresses targets that are suitable for the evaluation of electromagneticsensor systems for mine detection.

Section 4 - Proposed construction for replica mines. – In this section generic mine surrogatesdeveloped for NATO (under ITOP) and for the Australian defence forces are reviewed and theirstrengths and limitations discussed.

A proposal for two simulant designs is presented that shows improvements compared to the ITOPdesign, with respect to radar signatures.

Section 5- Validation of surrogate mines - The measurement plan developed under the MIMEVAproject is presented. Changes to the plan, introduced during the project, are discussed.

The measurements made for each of three sensor classes on a range of mine targets, simulants, andsurrogates derived from actual mines is presented. Correlation between characteristics of real mines inthe electromagnetic spectrum and the mine simulants was established. The number of (actual) minetargets available limited the number of comparisons that could be made. Nevertheless the measurementprinciples were established and the extent of the validity of the existing and proposed designs isdiscussed.


Introduction


Section 6- Replication of mines for test and evaluation of detectors -

The conclusions discuss the design of mine simulants and show that this approach can result in simplerinitial testing with reduced need for site security and a significant increase in safety for the initial testphase. Further the results from the initial testing using the simulants can contribute to early designimprovements thus lowering risks later in the development projects.


Initial research


2 Initial research

2.1 Landmines affecting EC projects – compilation strategy

2.1.1 Identification of threat objects

In this section the mines found in a selection of mine affected areas, globally, are catalogued.

Mine types against which detectors will be required to operate were identified by considering thosemines that have been found in areas where EC sponsored demining actions had taken place. Physicalfeatures including size, shape and explosive content are used to further classify the mines.

During this project, the Mine Action Co-ordination Group (MACG), chaired by DG RELEX requestedthat emphasis in mine actions should be placed on South-East Europe, in order to support the StabilityPact. The initial mine lists are refined in section 2.5 to highlight those AP blast mines that present themajor threat in SEE.

2.1.2 Scope of the threat list

Mines discussed in this document are limited to AP blast mines with non-metallic cases. This limitationis applied on the assumption that metal-cased are generally larger mines (and incidentally more lethal)which should be more easily detectable than the low-metal mines considered in this report. The absenceof these mines from this threat list does not imply that no attention should paid to their detectability.

Final testing must verify that any new detector system is capable of identifying all threat mines, notonly those deemed to be hard to detect.

The threat list was compiled from research undertaken by the JRC, complemented by informationprovided by Colin King of CKA Limited, under contract to the JRC. Details of mines and images werederived information in the public domain, principally including

• Norwegian Peoples Aid, http://www.angola.npaid.org/mines_database.htm [5];

• Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines [6];

• King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance [7].

Primary sources of information listed by country are:Countries Information sources

Bosnia and Herzegovina Colin King Associates,

Croatia CROMAC

Kosovo

Angola Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Mozambique Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Somalia/ Uganda (South Saharareference)

Norwegian Peoples Aid

Afghanistan Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Cambodia Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Iraq Norwegian Peoples Aid

Laos Norwegian Peoples Aid


Initial research


2.2 Mine Types against which Detector Validation Tests will need tobe conducted.

This section lists the plastic cased AP mines that pose a humanitarian threat and are ones against whichnew sensors and multi-sensor systems will be required to operate.

2.2.1 Locations considered

The following areas were considered in this study. The list includes countries where significantdemining actions sponsored by the European Commission have taken place.

SouthEast Europe Area Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatia

Kosovo

Africa Angola

Mozambique

Somalia

Uganda

Zimbabwe

Asia Afghanistan

Cambodia

Iraq

Laos

2.2.2 Categorisation by mine characteristics

The initial study [3] resulted in a general categorisation for AP mines. This classification makes a basicdiscrimination between mines that are difficult to locate using a metal detector and those that are easilyfound, again using the metal detector as the primary search tool.

From this general categorisation three types of mine were identified that could be considered asrepresentative of certain groups of AP mine. While not identical it was considered that the designfeatures of these three mines (designated “Representative mines” in the following table) could beconsidered as a basis for the design of surrogates.

Using de-activated examples of the “Representative mines” was not considered to be an option as allmines and component parts are military controlled items under the Ottawa agreement.


Initial research


Category Mine types Comments Representative mines

1 MI AP DV 59

Type 72

PMA-1

PMA-2

R2M1

R2M2

Small plastic cased AP blastmines, broadly similar inconfiguration. Most have very lowmetallic content. (MI AP DV 59has no metal content at all).

PMA-2

R2M2

2 PPM-2

PMD-6

PMN

PMN-2

SPM

Large AP blast mines (SPM is atime delay limpet mine). There area variety of casings andconfigurations. All mines containmoderate amounts of metal.

PMN

2.3 Occurrence of landmines in designated territories

2.3.1 Study

The CKA report to the JRC (Full List of Mines for Validation Tests) included a list of the main minesdeployed in the territories of interest except Croatia and Kosovo.

For Croatia a list with approximate numbers was obtained from the Croatian Mine Action Centre(Hvartski Centar za Razminiranje). This information is summarised in Annex 1.

The deployment of mines in Kosovo is believed to be broadly similar to the profile of use in Bosnia asa result of the common history of both areas, being formerly parts of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia.

The mines distributed in the affected countries are the ones against which new detection systems mustwork.

Annex 1 shows details of the full set of mines distributed by country. For ex-Yugoslavia there has beenhigh usage of PMA-3, PMA-2 and PMA-1A mines, and data is provided that gives an indication of therelative distribution of these mines.

Mine Characteristics are described in Annex 2.

2.4 Full List of Mines for equipment to be evaluated against

The following table is list of mines which have been deployed in quantity in the countries identifiedearlier. It is ordered by type designation.

It is clear that, when considering the performance of equipment that will be deployed in a particulartheatre, the mines list can (and should) be limited. In each theatre, where possible the sensors should beproven to respond effectively to the known threats. A summary of APL blast mines which have beenwidely used in South East Europe is given in section 2.5.


Initial research


2.4.1 Mine List in alphabetic order

This list summarises the AP blast mines with their main characteristics that represent the main threat in the countries listed in section 2.2.1.


Initial research


2.4.2 Cylindrical shape mines - detectability by metal content

This table summarises the expected detectability of cylinder shaped mines by a metaldetector. It correlates approximately to the relative weight of metal components in the mine –however as the shape, electrical conductivity and magnetic permeability, of each part,contribute to the response there is not a simple relationship.

MineReference

Height Diameter Weight Explosive Weight Explosive Detectability (bymetal detectors)

GYATA-64

61 106 520 300 TNT Y

M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y

MAI-75 61 95 300 120 TNT Y

MD82-B 55 55 128 28 Y

MN79 40 56 99 29 Y

P4 Mk1 38 70 140 56 TNT Y

PMN 56 112 600 240 TNT Y

PMN-2 54 125 450 115 TNT Y

PPM-2 63 125 371 110 TNT Y

PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y

DM-11 34 82 231 122 RDX/TNT Y (low)

PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low)

R2M1 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low)

R2M2 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low)

SB-33 32 88 42 35 comp. B Y (low)

M14 40 56 100 30 Tetryl Y (v,low)

T 72-A 40 70 150 34 TNT Y (v,low)

T 72-B 40 76 150 28 TNT Y (v,low)

TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low)

VAR-40 45 78 105 40 Comp B or T4 Y (v,low)

AUPS 36 102 300 115 Comp B Y (v,low)

PMA-2 61 68 135 100 Trotyl/Hexogen(70/30)

Y (v,low)

VS-MK2 32 90 135 33 RDX Y (v,low)

VS-50/TS-50

45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very lowmetal)


Initial research


2.4.3 Cylindrical shape mines – listed in order of increasing body diameter

This table summarises the cylinder shaped mines by relative size. It is offered as a guide tothe level of difficulty that detectors such as those using radar or thermal infrared mayencounter in the detection process.

MineReference


TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low)

MD82-B 55 55 128 28 Y

MN79 40 56 99 29 Y

M14 40 56 100 30 Tetryl Y (v,low)

PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y


Y (v,low)

R2M1 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low)

R2M2 56 69 130 58 RDX/WAX88/12 Y (low)

P4 Mk1 38 70 140 56 TNT Y

T 72-A 40 70 150 34 TNT Y (v,low)

T 72-B 40 76 150 28 TNT Y (v,low)

VAR-40 45 78 105 40 Comp B or T4 Y (v,low)

M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y

DM-11 34 82 231 122 RDX/TNT Y (low)

SB-33 32 88 42 35 comp. B Y (low)

VS-MK2 32 90 135 33 RDX Y (v,low)

VS-50/TS-50


MAI-75 61 95 300 120 TNT Y

AUPS 36 102 300 115 Comp B Y (v,low)

PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low)

GYATA-64

61 106 520 300 TNT Y

PMN 56 112 600 240 TNT Y

PMN-2 54 125 450 115 TNT Y

PPM-2 63 125 371 110 TNT Y


Initial research


2.5 Selection of mine types against which mine detection systemsmust be capable to operate in South East Europe

2.5.1 Cylindrical Shape mines, occurrences in SEE

This list focuses on cylindrical AP blast mines found in SEE. This subset includes the mines that have acylindrical form. Some have protrusions, fins or flat surfaces, which aid assembly or camouflage.Mines are listed with an indication of the country in which they are found. Numbers are given whereavailable and represent the quantity removed by 2000, otherwise the “+” sign indicates that this minetype has been found in that territory.

MineReference

Origin Bosnia andHerzegovina

Croatia Kosovo

GYATA-64 (PMNequivalent)

H + +

M1 AP DVM59 F + +

M409 B + +

PMA-2 Ex YU 30587 17400 +

PMA-3 Ex YU 40503 13000 +

PPM-2 DDR + +

PRBM 35 B + +

TM-100 Ex YU + + +

VS-50 /TS-50 I + +

2.5.2 Box Shaped AP blast mines occurring in SEE

This list focuses on those mines found in SEE that are box shaped.

MineReference

Origin Bosnia andHerzegovina

Croatia Kosovo

PMA-1A Ex YU 18950 1300 +

PP Mi-D Cz + +

TM –200 Ex YU + + +


Initial research


2.5.3 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: Detectability by metal content

This table summarises the cylinder shaped mines found in South East Europe grouped inorder of expected detectability, by a metal detector.

MineReference


GYATA-64

61 145 520 300 TNT Y

M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y

PPM-2 125 63 371 110 TNT Y

PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y

PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low)

TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low)


Y (very lowmetal)

VS-50/TS-50


2.5.4 Common Cylindrical AP mines in SEE: By body diameter

This table summarises the cylinder shaped mines in SEE by relative size. It is offered as aguide to the level of difficulty that detectors such as those using radar or thermal infrared mayencounter in the detection process.

MineReference

Height Diameter Weight ExplosiveWeight

Explosive Detectability (bymetal detectors)

TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low)

PPM-2 125 63 371 110 TNT Y

PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y

PMA-2 61 68 135 100 TNT (Trotyl)/Hexogen(70/30)

Y (very low metal)

M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y

VS-50 /TS-50

45 90 185 42 RDX Y (very low metal)

PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low)

GYATA-64 61 145 520 300 TNT Y


Initial research


2.5.5 Common AP mines in SEE: Explosive type

This table summarises the AP blast mines found in SEE by explosive type.

MineReference

Height(mm)

Diameter(mm)

Weight(g)

ExplosiveWeight (g)

Explosive Detectability (bymetal detectors)

VS-50 /TS-50


PMA-3 36 103 183 35 TNT Y (low)

TM-100 107 33 180 100 TNT Y (v,low)

PRBM 35 58 64 158 100 TNT Y

PPM-2 125 63 371 110 TNT Y

GYATA-64 61 145 520 300 TNT Y

PMA-2 61 68 135 100 TNT(Trotyl)/Hexogen(70/30)

N

M409 28 82 183 80 Trialene Y

Clearly the predominant explosive to be detected is TNT. However the lesser used VS50 and M 409mines require that any explosive detection system must either

• include the possibility to identify the other explosives included in the table above or

• at least ensure that mines not armed with TNT do not result in a declaration that the area isclear.

Characteristics of the explosives are given in Annex 3.

2.6 Overview of the study into mine types that must be identified

This section of the report has summarised the characteristics of small AP blast mines in order toconsider future test strategies for mine detectors.

• For the MIMEVA study only non-metal cased targets are listed.

• For some detection systems it may be necessary only to prove the performance against themost challenging targets in each group. For others performance against each target may need to bevalidated. The actual case will depend on the sensors used and the basis of any decision algorithmsused to achieve a detection decision.

• The metal content of each mine is listed as it is considered that some future detectionsystems may use this fast responding detector as first indicator of the possible presence of a mine.Other detectors (either slower responding or requiring significant data processing) may giveconfirmatory information.

• The tabulations are designed to aid the selection process – but must be used with cautionas the full circumstances of the test procedure of future sensors and systems are not known at thistime.


Applications and possible solutions

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3 Applications and possible solutions

In this section the possible applications of the different types of replica are discussed and solutionsproposed. While this project addresses primarily the application of replicas to test and validation, otherapplications are included for completeness.

3.1 Mine awareness training

When models of mines are used for mine awareness training, the primary need is visual realism.Internal structure is not important, but the shape and colour are.

The following approaches were identified:

• Recovered mines that have been rendered safe, thorough an approved procedure.

• Model mines that do not have the possibility to be an explosive object.

• Computer based models which show the external structure, colour (or colours) and whichmay be a three-dimensional model – thus allowing each target to be viewed from any angle.

• Photographs or drawings of real mines or true replica models.

The first two approaches suffer the disadvantage that the resultant objects will become controlled items- that is they will be subject to export controls in all countries that are signatory to the Ottawaconvention. The first method may however be the lowest cost solution in a mine-affected country andtherefore may be used despite the security implications.

R&D is mainly undertaken in countries unaffected by landmines where the availability of recoveredmines will be limited. These items are prohibited from importation and the only legal holders are likelyto be the military, which has a legitimate need to train personnel to recognise the various mines thatmay be a threat both in wartime and in peacekeeping activities.

Some sources of landmine models are listed here.

Model mines are available from several sources. As an example, JRC has purchased copies of anumber of mine types from Maquettes Sedial of Nantes, France. ( http://www.sedial.com/ ). It shouldbe noted that these models are externally realistic and their movement is subject to export controlagreements with the French government. These models are inappropriate for use as controlledreferences as it is usually not possible to dismantle the model to verify the internal structure. Further,the materials used for the components are not specified. Examples are shown in Annex 4.

Another source of mine models is Miltra Engineering in the UK. This company produces models for arange of military training applications, including, but not limited to, landmines.

Model (training) mines are also produced by KIK Chemical Industry in Slovenia. These are intendedfor training in mine awareness and render safe procedures and may not be appropriate for validatingdetectors. (Within the time-scale of this project no samples of these replicas were examined).

Databases of mines do exist and can be applied for training. Usually these are based on militaryinformation – indeed a searchable database may contain various levels of detail that are appropriate fordifferent applications. This may mean that for mine awareness training in Humanitarian Demining onlylimited information may be relevant. Generally the databases include information on dimensions,colour, type of mine (blast/ fragmentation. Anti-personnel, anti-tank etc.) and photographs (often fromseveral perspectives) for each included mine.

Some examples of mine databases are listed in Annex 11.

Three dimensional computer models have also been developed. One example was developed by EssexCorporation as part of a US led initiative with DARPA. This has been used in some HD applications.IT is part of an interactive suite of training aids.



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Photograph or sketch based training aids are listed by Global Information Networks in Information (atthe following web address http://ginie1.sched.pitt.edu/ginie-crises-links/lm/ ) for Afghanistan, Angola,Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Yemen, Zaire. Some examplesare given in Annex 5.

3.1.1 Applications of replicas for mine awareness training and validation ofmodels.

These models and images are appropriate for training deminers in recognition.

For test applications this type of model is of limited use. Generally, they may a lack a realistic internalstructure. The weight of the original mine may not be reflected in the model. It may not be possible todismantle this type of model. It is therefore also not feasible to make changes to the amount of includedmetal or to change the material of the simulated explosive block (to modify the dielectric constant).

The models are realistic, and subject to similar import and export restrictions as a weapon.

These factors make this method of replicating landmines unsuitable for use as targets on which to basean evaluation of the performance of demining sensors.

For this class no testing and validation is appropriate except to confirm by visual inspection againstcertified data (normally, military records) that the model or image is an accurate representation andthus any training may start from a sound base.

3.2 Replicas for mechanical demining systems

Mechanical demining systems require a specific type of mine replica to prove their effectiveness. Thetargets should contain a remotely readable marker. After clearance by a demining machine the markermay be identified as present (indicating that a mine would have survived intact, and thus the threatwould not have been removed) or absent, in which case the mine is considered destroyed.

One surrogate of this type was identified during the MIMEVA project. This was developed in Canadafor the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND).

The surrogates were developed by CCMAT and Amtech Aeronautical Limited of Medicine Hat,Alberta. (http://www.amtech-group.com/ )

3.2.1 Test and validation of the simulants for mechanical demining machines

The Amtech surrogates have been proven on the Mechanical Mine Surrogate Site in Canada. This testsite is an area of prepared ground prepared by the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies(CCMAT) to test mechanical demining assistance devices proposed. The surrogate mines, developedby Amtech, react to the same pressure inputs as mines, are buried in the soil to record and compare theperformance of different systems being evaluated. The surrogates include magnetic induction tagtechnology – if the transponder coil is damaged by the mechanical demining equipment (which willoccur if the mine body is destroyed there will be no response in a subsequent electromagnetic scan. Ifthe replica is mainly intact (or only partly damaged the transponder will give a response. Each replicahas a unique serial number – thus in a trial, where a large number of surrogates should be deployed it ispossible to identify the remaining targets rapidly as well as to record their individual positions withoutfalse alarms.

These mine surrogates are specific for mechanical mine clearance systems.

3.3 Targets to evaluate electromagnetic sensor systems for minedetection

Investigation of possible targets suitable for evaluation of electromagnetic based sensors and multi-sensor systems formed a major activity of the MIMEVA project. Ideally a target would be suitable to



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evaluate any type of detection system – but there are several reasons why this appears to be not beachievable in practice. The formats of the targets and the possible solutions are discussed below.

• Recovered mines that have been rendered safe, thorough an approved procedure,

• Model mines with realistic internal structures,

• Replica mines, which may not be direct copies of mines, but do offer similarelectromagnetic signatures to that of the live targets. This class includes the (generic)Simulant mines and Surrogate mines. The latter aim to represent specific mines in respectof the response for particular sensors.

Different approaches are preferred for the various applications.

The first two approaches suffer the disadvantage that the resultant objects will become controlleditems. This means that they will be subject to export controls in all countries that are signatory to theOttawa convention. The first method may however readily available solution in a mine-affectedcountry despite the security implications. Importantly, for any final test of sensor systems beforetesting in a real demining situation, evaluation of the sensors against targets based on safe (butotherwise original targets) is the best way of gaining confidence in a sensor equipment. This is animportant consideration to deminers who would work with any future equipment. A high level ofconfidence is needed on performance under realistic conditions and thus the final tests should alwaysbe against targets that are as realistic as possible, while preserving the necessary levels of safety.

Legal constraints, together with safety issues determine that the preferred approach any testing thatmay have to be replicated by international partners on a range of test locations is by the use of thesegeneric surrogates.

3.3.1 Test and validation needs

Test scenarios include proving that the sensor will be able to detect the particular component within amine. A range of sensors has been considered. Required features of the surrogate are shown intable 3.1.

From the point of view of testing with reproducible targets it is important that test objects will not besubject to controls on their movement that result from being classified as an armament. The surrogatesproposed do not contain any parts that originate from mines or directly copy mines. As such they are noconstraints on anyone constructing the design. There are also no controls on the movement of theseobjects – they may therefore be freely moved inside countries and across national borders greatlysimplifying the concept of initial testing. If targets are required to contain blocks of explosive then theywill be subject to security controls – nevertheless a surrogate design could allow for the local insertionof the explosive block thus simplifying the control process.

These replica targets can be completely specified in materials and construction. They form a series ofreproducible targets that are free of any legal restrictions on where they may be used.



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Table 3.1. Required characteristics of different replicas for a range of sensors (Terminology is defined on page vii).

Sensor type Characteristicschecked

Essential components of target Recovered targets Modelmines

Simulants andsurrogates

Generic surrogatesincluding Explosive

Magnetometer Presence of ferrousmetal

Ferrous metal parts similar to those found in theintended targets

Good match May notmatch

Can match Neither Explosive norsubstitute required

Metal Detector (MD) Presence of metalparts in mine

Metal parts with similar material (in respect of σand µ) and shapes as the intended mine-targets

Good match – Must add asubstitute for the fuzecontainer on low metalmines

May notmatch

Will match Neither Explosive norsubstitute required

Imaging MD Shape of metal parts Metal parts with similar material (in respect of σand µ) and shapes as the intended mine-targets

As above May notmatch

Will match Neither Explosive norsubstitute required

Radar – SAR andground penetrating(GPR), includingarrays andpolarimetric variants.

Dielectric contrast,dielectric interfaces

Overall shape; case material similar to original;metal parts with similar material and shape as theintended mine-targets. Explosive blockrepresented by block of similar shape and valuesof εr and loss tangent (δ) at radar frequencies


Generic shape –cylinder or rectangularsolid. Internal structuremay reflect a solid orinclude air gaps

Non-explosive substitutepossible

Thermal Infraredcamera

Thermal contrast Overall shape; case material and colour generallysimilar to original. Significant parts have similarmaterial thermal capacity, conductivity and shapesas the intended mine-targets.


Shape. Internalstructure may be solidor include air gaps.


Polarimetric TIRcamera

Specular Reflectance As above plus outer surface should have paintwith similar IR radiance properties to the originalmines.


As above Non-explosive substitutepossible

Optical system Visible features, colour Replica shall have the similar same shape andcolour to the original target

Good match Good Limited match. Shapecan be mapped intothe sensor’s memory


Optical + polarimetry Visible features,colour, reflectance

As above, but the surface qualities shall matchwell with those of original targets


As above Non-explosive substitutepossible

Electronic nose Presence of explosive Construction may affect the rate of leakage of thevapour from the explosive.

Good match Nomatch.

Lacks explosive Essential for this sensor

Quadropoleresonance

Presence of explosive Targets may contain limited quantities of metal.There must be no electromagnetic screening of theexplosive.

Good match Nomatch.


Nuclear detection ofexplosive

Presence of explosive Few constraints on the construction of the model. Good match Nomatch.



Proposed construction for replica mines

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4 Proposed construction for replica mines

The priority identified for this project was to match results from replicas to those obtained from selectedrepresentative mines.

The planned approach was to measure sample mines (less fuze) from one of the ex-Yugoslavia countries.After discussions with local and national representatives of the Italian Authorities it became clear that therewas no legal way in which this could be done since importation and movement of mines and mine –likeobjects was precluded by law. During these discussions however it was identified that the authorities werewilling in principle to lend to the JRC some mines form their training stock (permitted under the Ottawatreaty). Again, however the law specifically prohibited the movement of the training mines by others thanthe military, also the release of any mine like objects to non-military personnel or organisations. It took untilNovember 2000 before authorisation and delivery could be completed.

At that point two samples of each of 4 types of Italian mines (less fuze), together with training mine sampleswhich contained no explosive were available. It was then feasible to create a replica of identical form to theoriginal but with a substitute for the explosive.

Surrogates were obtained from the USA. These were the SIM series –also known as NATO ITOP series -described in Annex 6. This design represents the explosive by a solid cylinder of silicone RTV contained inan ABS plastic case. The construction means that any air-gaps in a real mine are not reflected in this design.The cylinders are made in six diameters. Each diameter cylinder is a different height. Three smallerdiameters represent AP mines and the three larger sizes represent anti-tank mines. The metal components arerepresented by a series of inserts – one set for the AP simulants and one set for the AT simulants. The seriesof inserts are marked with a code letter, which indicates the metal content of the inserts. Each insert (with itsappropriate metal parts) is filled with silicone RTV (similar to the simulant body). The purpose of thedifferent amounts of metal is to allow the representation of mine targets with different amounts of metalfrom zero to a fairly high metal content. This design, where the metal parts are all fitted in a verticalcylinder) does not address the representation of mines like the PMN where there is a large metal componentlaid horizontally in the mine body.

Advice was obtained from the Department of Defence, Defence Science and Technology Organisation(DSTO) Australia on the design of mine simulants. These are described in Annex 7. They are somewhatsimilar in concept to the US SIMs but include details of paint specifications that may be used to ensurecorrect IR performance in respect of the reflectance.

Colin King (under the earlier mentioned contract) made recommendation to construct surrogatesrepresentative of generic classes of mine. There are two basic designs. Each includes air gaps and thepossibility to represent different mine classes by altering the metal parts and the representation of theexplosive block. It is considered important from the point of view of responses from radar or from TIRsensors that air gaps are considered since they can significantly affect the responses seen by such sensors.

These simulants are based on the use of standard components to avoid fixed costs in production. Thereforethe surrogate mine bodies are made from a combination of plastic plumbing parts with a small amount ofcutting to reduce the length, or machining to adjust diameters. Similarly fize parts are based on theprocurement of standard mechanical engineering parts including tube, rod, machine screws, nuts andsprings. The resulting simulants suitable for test applications are shown in Annex 8.

Measurements made on the Italian mines and the surrogates obtained for this project (Annex 8) with themetal targets selected from the ITOP SIM simulants are described in the following section 0 - Validationmethods for mine surrogates

Simulants described and tested are cylindrical. This reflects the geometry of the majority of AP minesdeployed. (The number of box mines in the field is relatively low). The approach suggested here allowsmine replicas to be built based on easily obtainable parts - however it does mean that some care will need tobe taken to ensure that any sensors under test do perform adequately against box mines.


Validation of surrogate mines

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5 Validation of surrogate mines

The objective of this section of the study was to validate simulant and surrogate designs againstrepresentative threat mines. Following confirmation of the design of a surrogate mine it could be consideredsuitable for procurement for the testing of demining detection equipment – both current and in development.

The measurement strategy was defined early in the project [2]. During the project some adjustments weremade to the plan. These changes were made to accommodate the types of live mines that were accessible tothe project (legal issues prevented access to live examples of mines from ex Yugoslavia), and to allow theuse of commercially available metal detectors (See section 5.3).

Where feasible, sensor independent measurement systems were used. In practice this has meant that radarassessments were made using the wide-band, calibrated facilities offered by EMSL which is described athttp://demining.jrc.it/emsl.htm .

Metal detector comparisons have been made by the use of pulse and continuous wave detectors usingoutputs early in the processing chain to reflect changes in field levels. As these measurements are not sensorindependent, a reference object has been included in each test to ensure that any drift or set-up differencesmay be eliminated the measurement in subsequent data analysis. Metal detector and infrared measurementswere made taken at the JRC outdoor test facility described at http://demining.jrc.it/electromagnetic.htm .

Infra red measurements have been restricted to the TIR band (λ = 7.5 - 13µm) using an AGEMA 570camera. This is considered to be a representative instrument as technology driven cost factors currentlydictate that this will be the preferred sensor band. The level of sensitivity (discrimination to 0.1K isconsidered adequate for humanitarian demining applications.



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5.1 Radar Measurements

5.1.1 Background

The radar signatures of the surrogates and the corresponding live mines were measured in the anechoicchamber of the EMSL. Since the wavelength in the soil is generally shorter than that in the free space, afrequency range significantly higher than that used by a GPR (typically 0.5-1.5 GHz) must be selected. Thedielectric contrast between the mine and the surrounding medium when the mine is measured in-air isexpected to be higher that that with the mine buried in the ground. However, in backscatter measurements,the dielectric contrast will basically affect the power level of the backscattered signal, not its waveform. Thesignature waveform will mostly depend on the constituent materials and internal structure of the mine. Thus,in-air measurements are perfectly appropriate to estimate the degree of resemblance between surrogatemines and the corresponding live mines.

The frequency range selected for these measurements was 1.5 to 9.5 GHz. The range resolution associatedwith this frequency range is about 2 cm. Therefore, it can be expected that differences in the inner structureof the surrogates and the live mines will strongly modulate the backscattered fields. The measurements wereall fully polarimetric. The mines under test were placed at the focus of the chamber as shown in figure 5.1.1.

Both the live mines and the surrogates were laid horizontally at the same position with a high degree ofaccuracy. During the tests, the backcattered fields were collected at different aspect angles in azimuth φ, and

in elevation θ. The results shown in this section were obtained with an incidence angle of θ=90 deg.

Four landmines provided by the Italian Army were characterized: a Tecnovar-VAR40, a Tecnovar-MAUS, aTecnovar AUPS and a Valsella MK2 (see figure 5.1.2). For comparison purposes, two simulant minesprovided by Colin King Associates were also characterized. All mines and simulants were positioned withtheir vertical axes oriented to the z axis of the chamber. The antennas were positioned so the angle ofincidence was along the x-y plane (i.e., θ=90 deg). The CKA-B simulant had the fuze pointing towards theantenna, at the initial azimuth position (φ=0 deg).

Figure 5.1.1. Sketch of the measurement set-up: top view (left) and side view (right).



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5.1.2 Equivalence Criteria

The measurable used to characterise the targets is the complex backscattered electromagnetic field as afunction of the frequency. This is a vector with a number of complex values equal to the number offrequencies measured. The comparison was performed using data that was previously calibrated.

As a result of the measurement we get two complex arrays of frequency domain data (in practice thesearrays will have two dimensions: CW frequency of the radar and azimuth aspect angle of the sample). Thefirst one is the reference corresponding to the measurement with the real mine. The second measurement isthat using the surrogate. In order to assess the level of equivalence between the two measurements weapplied the following procedure:

1st. For each azimuth angle we computed the normalised cross-correlation in the frequency domain usingthe following formula:

[ ]∑∑

−

=

−

=

∗

⋅

⋅=

1

0

21

0

2 timetime N

nn

N

nn

kk

YX

YXkS

Figure 5.1.2. Photographs of the Tecnovar-Var40 (upper-left), a Tecnovar-MAUS (upper-right), aTecnovar AUPS (lower left) and a Valsella MK2 (lower right).



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Xi and Yi are the two frequency-domain sequences corresponding to the measurements with the real mineand the surrogate, respectively.

2nd. Frequency to time domain transformation of the complex vector S[k] using the Chirp-Z transform. Thisis needed to get the cross-correlation in the time domain. Thus,

[ ] [ ]kStXcorrFFT

⇔

From its definition Xcorr[t] is a sequence of complex numbers whose amplitude will range between 0 and 1.The higher the value of Xcorr[t] is, the better (i.e., it will indicate a high resemblance between the surrogateand the real mine). It’s important to keep Xcorr[t] as a sequence in order to detect any error in thepositioning of the samples. Note that a displacement between the two measurements would result in asequence Xcorr[t] with the maximums slightly shifted from the origin.

5.1.3 Results

The backcattered fields in the time domain for the Tecnovar-Var40 are shown in figure 5.1.3. It can beobserved that the radar signatures of the surrogate and the live mine are quite different. A possiblejustification for this disagreement may be the presence of an additional spring in the fuze of the surrogate.The documentation we got from the Italian Army on the live mines indicates that there is a spring in the fuzemissing.

The results corresponding to the characterisation of the Tecnovar-MAUS are shown in figure 5.1.4. Here itis clearly seen that the radar signatures of the surrogate and the live mine are almost identical. This indicatesthat, within the measured range of frequencies, the used surrogate mine replicates the live mine with a highdegree of accuracy.

Figure 5.1.3: Time Domain backscattered fields of the Tecnovar VAR40 at the initial aspect angle in azimuth(φ=0 deg): surrogate (left) and live mine (right)



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Figure 5.1.4: Time Domain backscattered fields of the Tecnovar MAUS at the initial aspect angle in azimuth(φ=0 deg): surrogate (left) and live mine (right)

As an example, figure 5.1.5 shows the cross-correlation function Xcorr[t] obtained with the measurementsof the Tecnovar-Var40 and the Tecnovar-MAUS in the HH polarisation. As expected, the higher cross-correlation (or degree of resemblance) is obtained with the Tecnovar-MAUS. The highest value of the cross-correlation for the Tecnovar-Var40 is about 0.7.

Figure 5.1.5. Time domain cross-correlation between the responses of the surrogate and live mines.Technovar VAR40 at the initial aspect angle in azimuth (φ=0 deg): (left) and Technovar MAUS (right).

The resulting cross-correlations in the HH and VV polarisations for the five aspect angles in azimuth aresummarised in Table 5.1.1. Measured cross-correlations for other aspect angles were found to be of the sameorder than those presented in Table 5.1.1 and therefore are not listed here. In fact, the Tecnovar MAUS, theTecnovar AUPS and the Tecnovar-VAR40 present a high degree of azimuthal symmetry (i.e., they arebodies of revolution). Consequently, the cross-correlations are expected not to change with the aspect angle.On the other hand, the Valsella-MK2 is not a body of revolution and its backscatter shows a strongmodulation with the aspect angle. This modulation is however replicated by the surrogate quite precisely.



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These results further confirm the fact that the surrogate and live Tecnovar-MAUS are almost identical andtherefore not distinguishable with a wide-band radar. The lower degree of resemblance observed with theTecnovar-Var40 is probably due to a difference in the inner structure of the mine and not to the explosive.

The resulting cross-correlations for the Tecnovar-AUPS and the Valsella-MK2 in the HH and VVpolarisations for the five aspect angles in azimuth are summarised in Table 5.1.2.

For these two types of landmine, the degree of resemblance is slightly lower than that of the Tecnovar-MAUS. From a practical viewpoint, the backscattered signal by the surrogate and the live mine are still notdistinguishable with a wide-band radar.

As an example, Figure 5.1.6 shows the cross-correlation in the time domain between a PMA-3 and asurrogate from Colin King Associates (CKA-A). It can be seen that the degree of resemblance (apart from ascaling factor) is quite high. The maximum cross-correlation is about 0.8. This result indicates that thissurrogate shows a signature very much like that of a real mine. Therefore its use in laboratory measurementsas a simulant for this AP mine is appropriate.

Another important aspect in this comparison between the responses of live mines and surrogates is thedependence of the signatures on the aspect angle in azimuth. Two series of signature measurements varyingthe aspect angle in azimuth have been performed. In the first one, the aspect angles ranged from 0 to 350deg., sampling a total of 36 points. This measurement was intended to estimate the degree of rotational

Tecnovar-Var40 Tecnovar-MAUS

Aspect Angle(deg) HH Pol VV Pol HH Pol VV Pol

-2 deg 0.674087 0.719865 0.987364 0.978406

-1 deg 0.672946 0.717655 0.987307 0.978850

0 deg 0.648199 0.697055 0.986747 0.978494

+1 deg 0.650276 0.695594 0.986448 0.977940

+2 deg 0.644475 0.672047 0.986076 0.977023

Table 5.1.1. Cross-correlations for the Tecnovar-Var40 and Tecnovar-MAUS

Tecnovar-AUPS Valsella-MK2

Aspect Angle(deg) HH Pol VV Pol HH Pol VV Pol

-2 deg 0.856192 0.849133 0.899670 0.854839

-1 deg 0.858165 0.847202 0.907831 0.864753

0 deg 0.851593 0.843920 0.882812 0.837591

+1 deg 0.856443 0.849126 0.888317 0.851869

+2 deg 0.851910 0.851905 0.895107 0.857844

Table 5.1.2. Cross-correlations for the Tecnovar-AUPS and Valsella-MK2



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symmetry of the objects as seen by the radar. In the second measurement, five closely spaced aspect angleswere measured from –2 deg to +2 deg.

The results of the first series of tests are shown in the Figures 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 for the HH and VVpolarizations, respectively. As expected, it can be seen that the CKA-B and the Valsella-MK2 are clearlynon-symmetric and show a clear modulation as a function of the azimuth aspect angle. On the other hand,the PMA-2 and the Tecnovar-AUPS show no dependence on the aspect angle, which indicates that they arebodies of revolution.

The results of the second series of measurements varying the aspect angle are shown in Figures 5.1.9 and5.1.10 for the HH and VV polarizations, respectively. The time domain responses for the a CKA-A, a CKA-B, a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, a Tecnovar MAUS, and a Tecnovar Var40 are presented asexamples. Here the variation of the response as a function of the aspect angle is almost negligible due to thesmall electrical size of the objects. These results further confirm the validity of the use of surrogates toreplace real landmines in initial evaluation of detection equipment.

Figure 5.1.6. Time domain cross-correlation between the responses of a PMA-3 and the surrogateCKA-A at the initial aspect angle in azimuth (upper-left); backscattered signals in the time domain(upper-right); pictures of the PMA-3 (lower-left) and the surrogate CKA-A (lower-right) in thechamber of the EMSL.



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Figure 5.1.7. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the HH polarization for aPMA-2, a modified PMA-2 (metal ring added), a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, and a CKA-B.



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Figure 5.1.8. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the VV polarization for aPMA-2, a modified PMA-2 (metal ring added), a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, and a CKA-B.



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Figure 5.1.9. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the HH polarization for aCKA-A, a CKA-B, a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, a Tecnovar MAUS, and a Tecnovar Var40.



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Figure 5.1.10. Time domain responses as a function of the azimuth aspect angle in the VV polarization for aCKA-A, a CKA-B, a Tecnovar-AUPS, a Valsella-MK2, a Tecnovar MAUS, and a Tecnovar Var40.



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5.1.4 Conclusions from the measurements at radar frequencies

Radar signatures of the surrogates and the corresponding live mines were measured in the anechoic chamberof the EMSL. Four landmines (Tecnovar-Var40, Tecnovar-AUPS, Tecnovar MAUS, a Valsella-MK2) , twosimulants provided by Colin King Associates (CKA-A and CKA-B), and a PMA-3 surrogate werecharacterized. The degree of resemblance between these signatures has been estimated from the time domaincross-correlations. From the results, it can be concluded that:

• The signatures corresponding to the surrogate and live version of the Tecnovar-AUPS,Tecnovar MAUS, and the Valsella-MK2 showed a maximum cross-correlation above 0.85 both in theHH and VV polarizations. This indicates that constituent materials and internal structure of thesurrogate match quite precisely those of the live mine.

• The signatures of the two simulant mines provided by CKA are close to those of some mines.As an example, the CKA-A has a radar signature close to that of a PMA-3, with a maximum cross-correlation close to 0.8.

• As expected, the Valsella MK2 and the CKA-B show a strong modulation with the aspect anglein azimuth. This is mostly due to the shape and position of the fuzes (metallic cylinders in the case ofthe CKA-B), which “break” the azimuthal symmetry of the mine.



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5.2 Evaluation of mine surrogates in infrared

5.2.1 Introduction

Thermal infrared responses of anti-personnel landmine surrogates were compared with those of thecorresponding live mines [8]. The experiments were carried out in the Gauss Laboratory of the JRC, whichhas a large internal sandpit.

This section describes the infrared measurements made on two pairs of mines VAR-40 and MAUS/1 andsurrogates constructed as training mines in the same cases. Results show that infrared signatures of themeasured mines are comparable with those of the surrogates.

5.2.2 Experimental set-up

Pairs of mines, consisting of a surrogate and the corresponding live mine, were positioned on the sandsurface. The area was heated using a 2 kW tungsten halogen lamp. The lamp was mounted off-nadir at aheight of 120 cm, providing an illumination of 43000 lux on the sand surface. The responses of the testobjects were observed during the heating and cooling phases using an Agema 570 camera, operating in thelong-wave infrared range (7.5 to 13 micron). The camera was mounted vertically over the area of interest ata height of 180 cm. A further experiment was conducted with the same pair of mines buried, each at thesame depth, in dry sand.

Figures 5.2.1.(a)-(d) show some photographs of the test arrangement.

Figure 5.2.1. (a) The experiment set up Figure 5.2.1. (b) Leveling test objects (VAR 40)



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Figure 5.2.1. (c) The test objects on the surface Figure 5.2.1. (d) Yellow spot indicates explosive

5.2.3 Results for mines and their direct surrogates

Two types of mine were measured: Tecnovar VAR40 and Tecnovar MAUS. The measurements were madefor targets over one cycle comprising a heating phase and a cooling phase. To eliminate effects of position,the measurements were repeated with the mine and surrogate transposed.

5.2.3.1 Tecnovar VAR-40 (Heating Phase)

A surrogate and a live Tecnovar VAR-40 (with explosive but without a fuze capsule) were positioned on thesurface of the sand and heated by the halogen lamp (see Figure 5.2.2). The thermal responses of these targetsduring the heating phase were measured. The resulting temperatures on the surface of the two mines areshown in Figure 5.2.3.

• The live mine is closer to the heating source

• Heating for 12 mins

• Image acquisition: image /2 mins

Figure 5.2.2. Measurement set-up used in the first series of infrared measurements.

Initially, the live mine was closer to the lamp. Consequently the temperature of this mine was 0.4°Chigher than that of the surrogate. This was due to the targets having passed through several cycles ofheating and cooling prior to this measurement. After a 12 minutes heating period, the differencebetween the temperature rise on the surface of the live mine and that of the surrogate was 0.7°C.



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LIVE SURROGATE Tlive-Tsurrogate

T1 (initial temperature) 25.7 25.3 0.4

T2 (final temperature) 50.3 49.2 1.1

Temperature rise (T2-T1) 24.6 23.9 Difference: 0.7°C

Surface temperature variation - mines on the surface(Var-40) -explosive on left-12 mins

heating

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

image

Tem

per

atu

re(C

)

Live minesurrogatebackground

Figure 5.2.3: VAR40 Heating (12 minutes) and cooling cycle showing surface temperatureas a function of elapsed time.

The thermal contrast at the start and end of the heating period are shown in the false-colour infrared imagesof Figures 5.2.4 and 5.2.5.

Figure 5.2.4. Thermal image of the live mine (right)and surrogate (left) at start of heating phase.

Figure 5.2.5 Thermal image of the live mine (right)and surrogate (left) at end of heating phase (12minutes).



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5.2.3.2 Tecnovar VAR-40 (COOLING PHASE)

The targets were measured during the cooling phase in order to observe the cooling rate for the live mineand the surrogate. During this phase, see Figure 5.2.3, a total of 11 images spaced 2 minutes in time wereacquired.

Initially, the live mine (closer to the lamp) was 0.5°C warmer than the surrogate. After 20 minutes of coolingthe difference in the temperature decrease on the surface of the live mine was 0.9°C lower than that of thesurrogate. The live mine was 0.2°C warmer than the surrogate.


T1 (initial temperature) 50.3 49.2 0.5

T2 (final temperature) 21.6 21.4 0.2

Temperature decrease (T2-T1) 28.7 27.8 Difference: 0.9

Figure 5.2.6. Thermal image of the live mine (right)and surrogate (left) at start of cooling phase.

Figure 5.2.7. Thermal image of the live mine (right)and surrogate (left) at end of cooling phase (20min).

To eliminate the effect of the relative position of the mines to the energy source the measurement wasrepeated with mine and the surrogate transposed (as shown in Figure 5.2.8).



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• The surrogate is closer to the heatingsource

• Heating for 27 mins

• Image acquisition: image/10 sec

Figure 5.2.8. Measurement set-up used in the second series of infrared measurements.

After 12 minutes of heating the temperature rise for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live minewere 19.8°C and 19.4°C, respectively. After 27 minutes the temperature rises went up to 24.1°C and23.9°C, respectively. The temperature rise on the surface of the surrogate was 0.5°C higher than that ofthe live mine. It was noted that this temperature rise was lower than that in the previous case (before thepositions were inverted). This is considered to be due to the different initial temperature of the mines.Initially, the surface of the live mine and of the surrogate one were 6.1°C and 5.3°C cooler respectivelythan in the first measurement.

LIVE SURROGATE Difference (Tlive-Tsurrogate)

T1 (initial temperature) 19.6 20 -0.4

T2 (after 12 mins) 39 39.8 -0.4

T3 (final temperature) 43.5 44.1 -0.6

Temperature rise (T3-T1) 23.9 24.1 -0.5

Figure 5.2.9. Thermal image of the live mine (left)and surrogate (right) at start of heating phase.

Figure 5.2.10. Thermal image of the live mine (left)and surrogate (right) at end of heating phase (27min).



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As shown in figures 5.2.9 and 5.2.10, the behaviour of the surrogate and the live mine during theheating phase are very similar. The heating rate is the same. Differences in temperature rise of thetargets were found to be due to different positions with respect to the lamp.

The false colour images corresponding to the start and end of the cooling phase are shown in Figures5.2.11 and 5.2.12, respectively. During the cooling phase (30 min), see Figure 5.2.13, the images wereacquired at a rate of one image every 10 sec. After 20 minutes of cooling the temperature decrease forthe surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live mine were 22.2°C and 21.7°C, respectively. After 30minutes the decreases in temperature were 25.7°C and 25.2°C, respectively. The differences intemperature decrease on the surface of the surrogate was 0.5°C lower than that of the live mine. Thetemperature decrease was lower than that in the previous case (before the positions were inverted) butthis was found to be due to the different initial temperatures.


T1(initial) 43.5 44.1 -0.6

T2 (after 20 mins) 21.8 21.9 -0.1

T3(final) 18.3 18.4 -0.1

Temperature decrease (T3-T1) 25.2 25.7 -0.5

Figure 5.2.11. Thermal image of the live mine(right) and surrogate (left) start of cooling phase.

Figure 5.2.12. Thermal image of the live mine(right) and surrogate (left) at end of cooling phase(30 min).

According to the above results, we can conclude that the presence of the explosive does not make anydifference to the cooling phase.



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Temp.difference between the mine and its background-mines on thesurface (Tecnovar Var-40)

-explosive on right-27 mins heating

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

image number

Tem

p.d

iffe

ren

ce(C

)

for the surrogatefor the live mine

Figure 5.2.13: VAR40 Heating (27 minutes) and cooling cycle (30 min) showingsurface temperature as a function of elapsed time.

5.2.3.3 Tecnovar MAUS (HEATING PHASE)

A surrogate mine and a live MAUS were placed on the surface and heated by the halogen lamp. Thethermal response of the targets was observed. In the first measurement, the live mine was closer to theheating source. The temperature responses for the surrogate and the live mines during the heating andcooling phases are shown in Figure 5.2.14.

Initially, the live mine was 0.1°C warmer than the surrogate. After 10 minutes of heating, the differencein the temperature rise on the surface of the live mine was 0.4°C higher than that of the surrogate.


T1(initial) 15.3 15.2 0.1

T2(final) 33.6 33.1 0.5

Temperature rise (T2-T1) 18.3 17.9 0.4

As in the case of the Tecnovar VAR-40, to eliminate the effect of the relative position of the mines tothe energy source the measurement was repeated with mine and the surrogate transposed.

After 10 minutes of heating the temperature rise for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live minewere 35.3°C and 34.6°C, respectively. The difference in the temperature rise on the surface of thesurrogate was 1°C higher than that of the live mine. As expected, the mine close to the heating sourcewas warmer.



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T1(initial) 16 15.7 -0.3

T2(final) 34.6 35.3 -0.7

Temperature rise (Tmax-Tmin) 18.6 19.6 -1.0

5.2.3.4 Tecnovar MAUS (COOLING PHASE)

At the start of the cooling phase, see figures 5.2.14 and 5.2.15, the live mine (closer to the lamp) was0.5°C warmer than the surrogate. After 17 minutes of cooling, the difference in the temperaturedecrease on the surface of the live mine was 0.2°C higher than that of the surrogate.


T1(initial) 33.6 33.1 0.5

T2(final) 16.6 16.3 0.3

Temperature decrease (T2-T1) 17 16.8 0.2

Concerning the results with the positions of the surrogate and live mines inverted during the cooling phase.After 15 minutes of cooling the temperature decrease for the surrogate (closer to the lamp) and the live minewere 17.6°C and 17.3°C, respectively. At the end, the difference in the temperature decrease on the surfaceof the surrogate was 0.3°C lower than that of the live mine.


T1(initial) 34.6 35.3 -0.3

T2(final) 17.3 17.7 -0.4

Temperature decrease (T2-T1) 17.3 17.6 -0.3

temperature variation mines on the surface (Tecnovar Maus)-explosive left- 10mins heating, 17 mins cooling

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

134 136 138 140 142 144 146 148 150 152 154

images

tem

pera

ture

(C)

Live mine

SurrogateBackground

Figure 5.2.14: Tecnovar MAUS (explosive on the left side) heating (10 minutes) andcooling cycle (17 minutes) showing surface temperature as a function of elapsed time.



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temperature variation - mines on the surface (Tecnovar Maus) -explosive on the right- 10mins heating, 15 mins cool down

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185

images

tem

per

atu

re (

C)

Surrogate(B)

Live mine (B)Background

Figure 5.2.15: Tecnovar MAUS (explosive on the right side) heating (10 minutes) andcooling cycle (15 minutes) showing surface temperature as a function of elapsed time.

5.2.4 Measurements with simulant mines

The performance of simulant mines from the MsMs program were evaluated in comparison to theperformance of mines type VS 50, MAUS and VS MK2.

The mine simulants used were from the MsMs programme. The M3A body is equivalent to the B bodysurrogate described in Annex 8 but without the cylindrical protrusions on the side. The M2A body is asurrogate intermediate in size between the A and B body surrogates.

As for the measurements on the VAR40 and the MAUS, the targets were measured over a period of time. Inthis case instead of using a local heat source (halogen lamp) the observation was made with the minesilluminated by sunlight. For this measurement the mines were situated within the Gauss Laboratory at JRCwhich is fully illuminated by the sun. The mines were placed on the surface of the laboratory sandpit.

Measurements were started at 09h45 on a March day, and recorded every hour. The plot on figure 5.2.16shows that the simulants and the live mines performed in a similar way.



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5.2.5 Conclusions from the Infra-red measurement

The first tests have shown that it is possible to perform this type of test under various conditions (e.g.different soil types, object depth, orientation, illumination conditions) and that one test alone is notconclusive. It would also be possible to carry out further tests including a comparison of the thermaltransmission properties of the mines, for example. The tests conducted to date, however, indicate that thethermal properties of the surrogates are very close to those of the originals.

Some observations were made which should help to improve the set-up for future experiments of this type.

• Positioning of test objects: The objects were very carefully positioned for these tests. The sand surfacewas carefully smoothed and levelled after positioning of the test objects in order to minimise eventualdifferences in the thermal images which are due to surface variations and roughness. The sand itself hadbeen previously sieved to remove any foreign objects which could cause imperfections in the topsurface or which could obstruct or deviate the heat flow. Furthermore, the air temperature and relativehumidity inside the laboratory were continuously monitored and recorded, before during and after thetests. From this point of view, the environmental conditions can be said to be satisfactory and suitablefor further tests of this type.

• Illumination and heating of test objects: Although the lamp used to heat the surface and objects werecarefully selected, the heating pattern produced by such a lamp is not sufficiently homogeneous to allowvariations in the heat distribution to be ignored. This distribution is well documented by the thermalimages. This problem is currently under investigation, however there are no immediate solutions.

• The use of solar energy is to be avoided too since it does not allow for further testing under identicalconditions. The energy provided by the source was sufficient, however relatively long periods ofheating and observation (30 minutes to one hour) were required in order to obtain best results. Invertingthe position of the objects at least shows what is due to the object itself and what is due to the variationin illumination intensity. During the tests, the surface temperature was regularly monitored with asecond non-contact IR thermometer (Omega OS 86). When a surface temperature of 60 to 65 ºC wasreached, the heating was interrupted and the cool down phase was then monitored. This temperature was

Figure 5.2.16. Surface temperatures of mines and simulants over a 24 hour period under solar radiation

Period: 09:45 14 /03/2001 until 09:39 15/03/2001

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Observation time (h)

tem

pera

ture

(C)

M3A

VS-MK2

MAUS-1

VS-50

2A



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considered to be similar to that found in real conditions under strong sunlight and not enough to inducedeformations or damage in the test objects or to cause any reaction in the explosive itself. The surfacetemperature of the buried test objects was also monitored with a separate temperature probe (Hannainstruments HI 9065).

• The images also show how the responses from the objects are strongly influenced by the angle ofillumination or heating. This phenomenon could be of use in order to compare the response of differentobjects (shallow buried and surface laid) in the thermal IR range and will be investigated outside theMIMEVA activity.

• Image acquisition: The images were acquired using various time intervals for the first tests. The resultsshow that each object or object set has an particular time during the test at which best contrast can beobtained. This has been verified on previous occasions during other tests in the laboratory. Until thesetime factors are better understood, it is considered prudent to continue to make relatively long imageacquisition series in order to cover the whole period of temperature variations between the objects andtheir surroundings. These times can be optimised however before further experiments. The spatialresolution of the images is satisfactory and the thermal resolution seems to be quite sufficient for thesepurposes. The field of view of the IR imager was verified by means of copper corner markers, whichwere then removed for the duration of measurements. The actual acquisition times and file names areprovided in a separate document Annex 9.

• In order to provide a comparable data, future experiments should be performed in an identical manner assoon as the further replicas become available.



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5.3 Metal detector measurements

5.3.1 Introduction

This section describes in-air measurements made with two metal detectors on AP landmines fitted with fuzesurrogates. The measurements complement the radar and infra red tests made within this project.

5.3.2 Detectors

Detectors were selected to represent two technologies used for metal detectors: continuous wave and pulseinduction.

Model: Foerster Minex 2FD 4.500

Coils: 1 elliptical excite coil

2 semi-elliptical receive coils, connected differentially

Signal type: Two frequency continuous wave with

phase-sensitive demodulation.

Frequency: 2.4 and 19.2 kHz active simultaneously

Modifications: Analogue output fitted by manufacturer.

The output signal is proportional to a weighted difference of the quadratureparts of the response at the two frequencies. The weights are selected togive immunity to magnetic soils. The audio alarm sounds when the outputexceeds positive or negative voltage thresholds, according to which half ofthe head is nearer the target. Different sound pitches are used for the two.

Fig.5.3.1 Foerster metal detector

Model: Guartel MD8

Coils: 1 circular excite coil

2 semi-circular receive coils, connected differentially

Signal type: Unipolar pulsed induction

Frequency: 1 ms between pulses

Modifications: Analogue output fitted at JRC consisting

of a tap at the output of the correlated receiver

The audio-alarm frequency is the same for the two sides of the head, butthe tapped signal is bipolar.

Fig. 5.3.2 Guartel Metal Detector



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5.3.3 Targets

The following targets were measured as part of the MIMEVA investigation.

De-fuzed Mines

Type with original explosiveblock main charge

with silicone-rubberexplosive block substitute

AUPS + +

VAR 40 + +

Valsella Mark II + +

MAUS + +

Replica fuzes

ITOP: simulant AP mine fuzes, types C0, E0, G0, I0 and K0

ITOP: simulant AT mine fuzes, type M0 and O0

JRC: fuze-can surrogates, numbers 1, 2 and 3 (see below)

Mine simulants

CK Associates Ltd. type M1A

The M1A simulant was manufactured for the JRC specifically for multi-sensor measurements [9]. 28examples of this are currently buried in the Ispra test lane.

Calibration spheres

9.525 mm diameter phosphor bronze (92-94% Cu, 6-8% Sn), on a PTFE support

19.05 mm diameter AISI 316 non-magnetic stainless steel, in a silicone rubber support

Scanning and acquisition apparatus

5.3.3.1 Positioner

Metal detectors utilise a position scan to differentiate areas where metal is present from clear areas.Normally this is done by the operator at a speed, which he sets (although the operating procedure shouldguide him to sweep within a specified range of speeds). To scan under controlled conditions an x-ymotorised positioning frame was used to physically move the detectors. Sweeps were made over 1350mmand 600mm in the x and y directions respectively. To allow for acceleration during the x sweep data wasrecorded for 1200mm of the sweep. The x scan was made in alternate directions, each at 200mm/s.Acceleration was measured as 0.3g. The y direction was incremented in 5mm steps.

5.3.3.2 Acquisition

The signals measured were taken from the receive circuits of the detectors – avoiding the processing factorsassociated with the audio output.



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Data was acquired using a National Instruments AI-16-XE50 PCMCIA 16 bit analogue to digital converter(A to D) board, at 1000 points/s corresponding to 0.2mm spacing in y direction. Signals were filteredthrough a low-pass filter and the data was decimated before storage to 4.44 mm spacing.

5.3.4 Method of measurement

The measurements were conducted over the dry sand reference plot of the Ispra test lane and on the edge ofthe sandy soil plot.

In all cases, the targets were positioned as far away as practical from any of the existing buried metal targets,on non-metallic support, a few cm above the sand. These precautions were intended to avoid interferenceboth from other targets and from the ground.

The following test protocol was followed:

1. Check detector head and target supports are horizontal using spirit level.

2. Place calibration sphere on support.

3. Set height of detector approximately and tighten the telescopic handle firmly.

4. Adjust calibration sphere height using mm graduated rule and card shims.

5. Place target on support and record orientation.

6. Adjust target height using mm graduated rule and card shims.

7. Send positioner to home position.

8. If detector has been switched off, allow it at least ten minutes to warm-up.

9. Set volume of audio o/p to minimum (to conserve battery).

10. Check sensitivity setting is correct.

11. Check low battery indicator.

12. Re-zero detector.

13. Check scan parameters.

14. Start scan.

The protocol was developed in a preliminary study. Improvements include are the use of calibration spheres,better accuracy on the height adjustment and the introduction of the warm-up time for the detectors (tomaximise circuit stability).

The sensitivity adjustment on the Foerster detector appears to have no effect on the analogue output.Nevertheless it was always set to the maximum (position H). The ground learning button was never used.Calibration checks were performed each day according to the manufacturer’s procedure and the detector wasconfirmed to be functioning normally.

The Guartel detector has three sensitivity settings and changing them does affect the size of the tappedsignal. Medium sensitivity (position II) was used, except where stated otherwise. On the highest sensitivity,there was an interference signal, possibly due to feedback between the detector and the motor drives.

The Guartel detector initiates a self-diagnostic test, automatically, each time it is switched on.



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5.3.5 Results from Comparison of explosive filled and silicone RTV filled mines

5.3.5.1 General remarks

In the following figures, the calibration sphere is on the left-hand side of the image.

The images are as seen from above, with the bottom left hand corner nearest the home position of thescanning frame.

The false colour scale corresponds to the measured signal in volts. It is the same for all images in a group butmay be different from group to group. In certain cases, the images are shown with a compressed falsecolour scale, to show up weaker signals.

The median signal value was subtracted from all images, which has the effect of removing any D.C. offsetpresent. In the majority of cases, this was done globally but, where noted, the median was subtracted line byline, to show up weak features above drift.

A calibration sphere is included in every measurement to allow verification that the detector was operating atthe same sensitivity on each measurement.

The line plots are sections through the maximum/minimum of the 2D scan, normalised so that thecalibration sphere signal is ±1.

The height of the scan is quoted from the top of the target to the sole (bottom flat surface) of the detectorhead.1 The spatial scale is the same for all images. It is also the same in both x and y directions, so thefeatures have the correct aspect ratio. The plots from the Guartel detector are cropped on the bottom edge,except where indicated.

All images were constructed by interleaving data from the forward and reverse passes. The offset wasadjusted in order to register the two data sets.

Two different sized calibration spheres were used according to the metal content of the target (and hencesize of received signal). The two calibration spheres were also calibrated between themselves. This is shownin Figure 5.3.20.

1 The Foerster detector has a raised heel and two small raised discs on the sole of the head, but the heighthere is quoted with respect to the main flat surface.



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Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500

Target: AUPS silicone filled

Surrogate detonator can: Number 2

Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze

Height: 50mm


Target: AUPS explosive filled

Model detonator can: Number 2


Height: 50mm

Fig.5.3.3 Response of Foerster detector to AUPS mine



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Detector: Guartel MD8

Target: AUPS silicone filled



Height: 50mm


Target: AUPS explosive filled



Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.4 Response of Guartel detector to AUPS mine

Note: There was an angular misalignment of the detector in the plot of the silicone RTV filled AUPS, but itdoes not affect significantly the section plots.



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Target: VAR40 silicone filled



Height: 50mm


Target: VAR40 explosive filled



Height: 50mm

Median subtracted line by line

Fig. 5.3.5 Response of Foerster detector to VAR 40 mine.



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Target: VAR40 silicone filled



Height: 50mm


Target: VAR40 explosive filled



Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.6 Response of Guartel to detector to VAR 40 mine



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Target: Mark II silicone filled



Height: 50mm


Target: Mark II explosive filled



Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.7 Response of Foerster detector to Mark II mine

Notes In the case of the explosive filled mine, the peak appears offset from the calibration sphere in the ydirection (vertical on page).

The additional plot marked “displaced” is a section through the scan at y= + 40 mm with calibration spheremaximum.



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Target: Mark II silicone filled



Height: 50mm


Target: Mark II explosive filled



Height: 50mm

Fig. 5.3.8 Response of Guartel detector to Mark II mine



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Target: MAUS silicone filled


Calibration sphere: 19 mm AISI 316

Height: 50mm above target

40mm above sphere


Target: MAUS explosive filled


Calibration sphere: 19mm AISI 316


40mm above sphere

Fig. 5.3.9 Response of Foerster detector to MAUS mine



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Target: MAUS silicone filled




40mm above sphere


Target: MAUS explosive filled




40mm above sphere

Fig. 5.3.10 Response of Guartel detector to MAUS mine



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5.3.6 Discussion

In figures 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, the silicone filled copy of the AUPS mine gives somewhat weaker signals than theexplosive filled copy for both detectors, indicating that the internal metal parts are slightly different. Infigures 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 for both detectors, the signals from the VAR 40 with real explosive and siliconerubber fillings are almost identical. In contrast, the signals in figures 5.3.7 and 5.3.8. from the Valsella MarkII mine with the silicone rubber filling are much stronger than the signals from the mine with the explosivefilling, for both detectors. Two versions of the Mark II (mechanically fuzed and electrically fuzed) are notedin [7], with substantially different metal detector response. It appears that the explosive-filled and silicone-filled Mark II mines here are of these two types respectively, or of some other differing variants. Thedisplacement of the peak in the signal from the explosive filled Mark II mine for the Foerster by about40mm is due to the fuze can and striker pin, which are offset in this direction. Note that the size of thedisplacement, 40mm, is too large to be explained by inaccurate positioning. For the Guartel detector, thedisplacement is less apparent to the eye because the peak is very broad in the y direction. In figures 5.3.9and 5.3.10, for the MAUS, the explosive filled mine gives a stronger signal, in both detectors. The ratiomeasured here is 1: 0.86 for the Foerster detector and 1: 0.89 for the Guartel detector2. This mine has two 85mm diameter ferromagnetic retaining rings, and so gives a particularly strong signature. The small differencebetween the explosive filled and silicone filled MAUS mines can be explained by small differences in thethickness, permeability or conductivity of these rings.

From this it may be inferred that dimensional tolerances and material specification of the components of thismine (at least) may allow significant variation. This seems to be quite possible, as the function of the mine isunlikely to be affected by (for example) small changes to the properties of the steel ring.

For all the mines, the strength of the signal relative to the calibration sphere signal is less for the Foersterthan for the Guartel.

5.3.7 Investigation of responses to ITOP SIM model fuzes

One of the most systematic attempts so far to develop safe and convenient but representative targets fortesting demining equipment was made within the ITOP programme [10]. Families of simulant AP and ATmines were designed with model fuzes having a range of different metal contents. These ITOP “SIMS” arecurrently under consideration as a NATO standard. A description of the model fuzes is reproduced overleaf.Signatures for these objects have already been measured in Project MINESIGN (Contract No. AA 501 032)[11] using the Guartel MD8 detector and are also reproduced here.

In addition, signatures were measured with the Foerster detector.

The main trend of increasing signature strength is clearly shown and consistent for the two detectors. Thiswas a principle design aim for the ITOP SIMS.

Both detectors successfully found the fuze simulant with the smallest metal content C0 at 50mm.

The following table (5.3.1) lists the characteristics of the SIM inserts. A picture of the metal parts is given inAnnex 7.

2 A value of 0.79 was found in the preliminary study for the Foerster detector. The value obtainedin this present work is more reliable because of the greater care taken in setting the height, andbecause a calibration sphere was used



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Table 5.3.1 PM-MCD/ ITOP SIM Inserts

Levels ofDetectability

AP SIM 12, 9 & 6cm

AT SIM 30, 25& 20 cm

Contents **

Zero* A0 A0No Metal. Only Dow Corning RTV3110 Silicone.

Very Difficult C0 NONE1/8 inch diam [0.131g] carbon steelball.

E0 NONE 0.100g carbon steel pin, 0.27 inchlength x 0.062 inch diam. Vertical

Hard to Detect G0 G0Very small copper tube, 0.5 inchlength x 0.125 inch O.D x 0.016 inchwall thickness [0.393g]. Vertical

I0 I0Small aluminum tube, 0.5 inch lengthx 0.187 inch O.D x 0.015 inch wallthickness [0.172g]. Vertical.

ModeratelyDifficulty

K0 K0Two (2) parts: 0.100g steel pin as forE0 and small aluminium tube, 0.50inch length x ¼ inch O.D x 0.015inch wall thickness [0.22g]. Vertical.

NONE M0Large aluminium tube, 1.5 inchlength x ¼ inch diam x 0.015 inchwall thickness [0.66g]. Vertical.

Easiest toDetect

NONE O0Four (4) parts: 0.200g steel pin 0.54inch length x 0.062 inch diam, largealuminium tube as for M0, 1.61gcarbon steel spring, 1.00 length x11/32 inch O.D with 0.041 inch diam[Vertical] and a ¼ inch diam [1.060g]carbon steel ball.

* Expected to be undetectable with a metal detector

** Levels C0 to O0 are also potted with Dow Corning RTV 3110 Silicone

Simulant fuzes carrying the same letter code contain identical samples of metal. The plastic fuze containersare in two sizes - for AT and AP simulants respectively.

The signatures shown here are for the surrogate fuzes shown in the white cells in the table.



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SIM insert C0 SIM insert K0

SIM insert E0 SIM insert M0

SIM insert G0 SIM insert O0

S IM insert I0

Figure 5.3.11. Signatures for the simulant fuzes for the Guartel detector, as measured in theMINESIGN project.



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SIM insert C0 SIM insert K0

SIM insert E0 SIM insert M0

SIM insert G0 SIM insert O0

SIM insert I0

Figure 5.3.12. ITOP SIM fuze surrogate signatures for the Foerster detector.

(In each image, the left-hand signature is from the 9.5 mm bronze sphere. Calibration sphere andtarget both at 50 mm height).



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5.3.7.1 Study of three surrogate detonator cans

The following figures are shown on a compressed scale to bring out the small signals from the detonator cansurrogates.



Height: 50mm

Target:

Model detonator Can: Number 1

Orientation: open end up

Target:



Target:



Figure 5.3.13 Signatures of surrogate detonator cans for Foerster detector



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Height: 50mm

Target:



Target:



Target:



Figure 5.3.14 Signatures of surrogate detonator cans for Guartel detector



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Figure 5.3.15 Section plots through peaks of signatures of surrogate detonator cans



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5.3.7.2 Effect of orientation of surrogate detonator can



Height: 50mm

Target:



Detector: Foerster Minex MFD 2.500Calibration sphere: 9.5 mm bronze

Height: 50mm

Target:


Orientation: closed end up

Figure 5.3.16 Signatures of surrogate detonator can number 2, open end up and closed endup.



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Dimensions

Figure 5.3.17 Dimensions of the surrogate detonator cans

Table 5.3.2 Values of Dimensions

Modeldetonator can

Outerdiameter

Innerdiameter

Outer height Inner depth OuterVolume

Metal

Volume

Mass Density

(mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm3) (mm3) (g) (kg m -3)

Number 1 6 4.6 8.45 7.6 238.92 112.61 0.304 2699

Number 2 6 4.95 8.5 7.5 240.33 96.00 0.2374 2473

Number 3 6.5 5.6 8.45 7 280.40 107.99 0.2101 1946

No training mines, neither those with nor those without explosive, contained fuzes. Since this factor willcertainly affect the response seen by a metal detector (especially where other metal parts are small) it wasdecided to model the fuze. The approach was to use thin walled cylinders described above.

Outer diameter

Inner diameter

Inner depthOuter height



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5.3.8 Discussion

The responses of the Foerster detector are somewhat different for each of the three surrogate detonator cansbut the responses of the Guartel detector to each can is almost identical. It may be shown theoretically, forthe case of solid spheres, that the low frequency system in the Foerster detector gives signals that are moreaffected by changes of conductivity and diameter. For a squat cylinder, the geometric constants will bedifferent, but the overall trends the same. In this sense, the result for the model fuze cans is consistent withtheory. However, a proper analysis should also take into account the presence of the cavity.

Surrogates 1 and 2 are made from aluminium alloys. The density of Surrogate number 1 is typical forcommercial aluminium and its alloys [12], [13]. Surrogates numbers 2 and 3, especially the latter, are madeof lighter metal, possibly alloys containing magnesium. The exact alloy composition is not known and is,anyway, insufficient to define an accurate conductivity value: this would have to be measured independentlyto compare with a detailed mathematical model.

Detonators normally have only a thin foil facing the striker pin and a relatively thicker base on the oppositeend. Therefore the orientation with the open end of the can facing the pin is more realistic. As would beexpected, a slightly stronger signal was obtained with the base facing the pin, closer to the detector, but theorientation made only a small difference.



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5.3.8.1 Low Metal Surrogate Mine



Height: 50mm

Target:

CK Associates surrogate mine

Type M1A



Height: 50mm

Target:


Type M1A

Figure 5.3.18. Signatures of the CK Associates M1A simulant for the two detectors



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5.3.8.2 Introduction

The M1A surrogate is a low metal content surrogate mine procured from CK Associates Ltd. for the Multi-sensor Mine-signature (MsMs) measurements project started during the year 2000. Further information maybe seen at http://demining.jrc.it/msms 28 surrogates of this type are currently buried in the Ispra test lane atdepths between 0 and 15cm.

ResultsBoth detectors were unambiguously able to detect the surrogate at 50mm in air, (fig. 17) but the signature isthe weakest of all the objects scanned here and, as noted in the preliminary study, detection of the deeplyburied M1A’s in the test lane represents an excellent challenge. Fig. 19 is a simple example of how contrastenhancement can be used to reveal the presence of such a weak object in the image. The algorithm used togenerate the compressed colour scale is to divide the range into positive and negative halves and compressthe standard colour sequence logarithmically in each half.

An extensive programme of multisensor measurements on the JRC test lane is currently ongoing. It will beof great interest to see if data fusion techniques can also help in detecting these objects.



Height: 50mm

Target:


Type M1A



Height: 50mm

Target:


Type M1A

Figure 5.3.19. Signatures of the CKA M1A simulant for the two detectors plotted on acompressed false colour scale



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5.3.8.3 Relative size of signals from calibration spheres



Height: 50mm

Target: 19 mm stainless steel sphereHeight 40 mm



Height: 50mm

Target: 19 mm stainless steelsphere

Height 44 mm



Height: 50mm

Target: 19 mm stainless steel sphereHeight 40 mm

(Note that this image is rotatedthrough 180° so that the largersphere appears on the right handside. The polarities of the signalstherefore appear reversed. Thisimage is also uncropped: thefeatures in the corners are due tothe gantry legs)

Figure 5.3.20 Signatures of the two calibration spheres for the two detectors



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Detector: Foerster MinexMFD 2.500

Left hand target:

9.5 mm bronze sphere

Height: 50mm

Right hand target:

19 mm stainless steelsphere

Heights: 40mm and44mm

Figure 5.3.21 Effect of small increase of height

Detector: Foerster MinexMFD 2.500

and Guartel MD8

Left hand target:

9.5 mm bronze sphere

Height: 50mm

Right hand target:

19 mm stainless steel sphere

Height: 40mm

Figure 5.3.22 Comparison of signals for the calibration spheres for the two detectors

Table 5.3.3 Dimensions and materials of calibration spheres

Calibration sphere Outer diameter(mm)

Volume(mm3 )

Mass(g)

Density(g m –3)

Conductivity(Ω -1 m –1)

Phosphor bronze 9.525 452.47 4.0317 8910

Stainless steel AISI316

19.05 3619.79 28.7707 7948

Expected values [12]

Phosphor bronze 8900 7.41E+06± 1.7E6

Stainless steel AISI316

7960 1.35E+06±0.0E6



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5.3.9 Discussion

In these measurements, the calibration spheres were introduced to ensure that detector drift did not lead tofalse interpretation of changes of signal strength. All the section plots are normalised to the calibrationspheres for this reason. The variation in the maximum between one plot and another is of the order of±0.1mV, or 1% of the signal for the bronze sphere.

From the table, the spheres have exactly the densities expected for their nominal material composition. Onthe assumption that the compositions are correct, the conductivity for the stainless steel material is fixed towithin 6%, but uncertainty in the phosphor bronze conductivity is 23%. An ideal calibration sphere wouldbe easily reproducible and therefore the best material is one whose conductivity is relatively little affected bycomposition. In this sense, AISI 316 is a better choice than phosphor bronze. A possible disadvantage ofusing stainless steel is that ferromagnetic behaviour can be introduced by work hardening, so the propertieswill change if the sphere is dropped or similarly abused. The silicone rubber block (in which the sphereswere mounted for this measurement) helps avoid this effect.

Although not the primary purpose of the calibration spheres, it is possible to go beyond these basicobservations and relate the relative signal sizes to the theoretical response, at least approximately. This isdiscussed in Annex 10.

5.3.10 Conclusions from metal detector measurements

The measurements demonstrate that the surrogates based on the some mine case but with silicone rubbersubstituted for the explosive create a very similar response in both types of detector to that caused by anoriginal mine. It is concluded that the use of silicone rubber to simulate explosive does not have anynegative impact on the response of metal detectors and that this approach is therefore appropriate.

The use of a replaceable insert to represent the fuze (either of the ITOP design or an alternate) allows asurrogate mine body to represent a wider range of mine types with different quantities and distribution ofmetal parts.

From the point of view of the future assessments of metal detectors it is therefore concluded that surrogatesbased either on the ITOP (and DSTO) designs, or those from CKA Ltd., would be a valid approach.


Replication of mines

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6 Replication of mines for test and evaluation of detectors

6.1 Methods

The work undertaken in this project has demonstrated that the process of modelling mines by using materialswith similar electromagnetic and thermal constraints can create a close replica of a mine appropriate for testinghumanitarian demining sensor systems.

The recommendations made here cover the following classes of sensor:

• Metal detectors

• Radar

• Thermal infrared

The sensors gave different responses to different mines. In most cases the models that were replicas of the minewith explosive showed a good correlation in response. Where exceptions occurred it was attributed to changes inthe structure that were inherent in the production. This implies that there can be a range of responses fornominally the same mine. These differences are likely to be due to details of the construction that may occurduring the production through product development or through use of different sources for the components – asa result of procurement policies, factory location, or component changes due to manufacturing process changesby the supplier.

The measurements of the CKA A and B body simulants and comparison against the responses from theexamples of real mine showed that there is sufficient similarity in the radar domain to justify the use ofthese designs as generic simulants. The simulants are similar in shape and dimensions to the M14 and PMNmines. Within the time period of this project it was not possible to confirm that they represent good surrogatesfor these mines as no actual M14 or PMN mine was available to provide a reference.

In the metal detector test series the target type M1A from CKA was investigated. This is a similar design toCKA-A target – but manufactured at a later time.

The “realistic” model approach confirms that the substitution of silicone RTV type Dow Corning 3110 in placeof the main explosive block is an acceptable change as far as the radar and Infrared sensors are concerned.Importantly also for the metal detectors the presence of the RTV in place of explosive does not affect the Metaldetector results.

For sensors detecting presence of explosive (i.e. substance detection) or systems that include such sensors, norecommendations are made in this study relating to appropriate substitutes for the explosive. In this case it isrecommended that appropriately sized samples of the correct explosive (TNT, RDX, PETN, TETRYL or other)shall be included within the surrogate.

Models based on actual (or reproduction) mine cases are controlled items.

The assembly of a similar structure to a mine using commonly available parts creates a generic target withsufficient similarity to a mine to allow the initial testing. Further these targets may be fitted with alternativesized substitute explosive blocks and with different amounts of metal to represent different classes of minetarget.

6.2 Recommendations

• For the evaluation of sensors based on a single technology it has been shown that a wide range ofsurrogate designs may be appropriate.

• For radar and infrared sensors silicone rubber has been shown to be a good substitute for theexplosive block. Certain waxes also possess acceptable properties for use as an explosive substitute in suchsimulants.


Replication of mines

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• For radar the presence of an air-gap within the mine body will lead to additional reflectioninterfaces which in many situations will simulate more closely the response of a real mine.

• For infrared the presence of an air-gap within the mine body (and the possibility to change thevolume of the explosive block substitute) will model the thermal response in a manner that is closer to theperformance of a real mine.

• It is recommended that for laboratory evaluation of multi-sensor systems generic replicas of mines(simulants) should be used with design similar to those described in Annex 8 and in the description of theMsMs project [9].

• Usage of targets designed for the MsMs project has some benefits in that a significant level of datahas been accumulated already – allowing some (detector) performance comparisons to be made.

• The CKA design approach (as also used in the MsMs work) has some benefits over the SIM seriesof replicas, in that air gaps are provided (important for some sensors including radar and other systems thatmay use the presence of a cavity).

• A wider range of sensors may be accommodated by exchanging the inert “explosive blocksubstitute for a pressed sample of the selected explosive to evaluate systems that rely on substance detectionfor operation. In these cases real explosive is a prerequisite to a successful test).

• Consideration should be given to using identical metal components in the above recommendedreplicas, as those used in SIMs and in the Australian surrogate mines as these parts are already a de factostandard. The metal content of the recommended simulants may be adjusted using the metal componentsthat are used in the ITOP SIMs, according to the test requirement.

6.3 Benefits and limitations

Replicas described in Annex 8 will allow consistent testing to be carried out at any test site.

Results based on these targets are repeatable and thus may be compared independently of where they are taken.

The suggested design may be loaded with an inert substance (RTV 3110), or with samples of explosive,according to the needs of the test. In neither case is the target a potential weapon and will not be subject tomovement or export restrictions.

For final testing before trial in a live minefield candidate sensors should be proven against inert versions of themine types that are prevalent in the area foreseen for the live trial. This is because no replica can fully representthe characteristics of a real mine and therefore this should be seen as a final proof of a demining system.

During the project the JRC, in conjunction with a number of National laboratories within the EU, commenced aproject to assess sensors using a common test area. The project is called “Multi sensor Mine signature” (MsMs)project. The test protocol was developed from that used in MIMEVA and is available athttp://demining.jrc.it/msms .

The recommendations made in this report are based on comparison of the measured responses of selectedelectromagnetic sensor classes to the surrogate and selected landmines. They are used to indicate the validity ofthe surrogate for possible future use in the initial assessment of new sensors and systems.


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ANNEXES


Annex 1

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Annex 1 : Distribution of mines by country.Occurrence is indicated by “+” signs (or indicative numbers where available).

Bosnia andHerzegovina

Croatia Kosovo Angola Mozambique Somalia/Uganda

Afghanistan Cambodia Iraq Laos Origin

APPM-57 + N. Korea

AUPS + I

Cuban AP + Cuba

DM-11 + DDR

GYATA-64 + + + + H

M1 AP DVM59 + + + + + + F

M14 + + + + USA

M409 + + + + B

MAI-75 + ROM

MD82-B + Vietnam

MN79 + Vietnam

NO-4 + Israel

P2 Mk2 + Pakistan

P4 Mk1 + Pakistan

PFM-1/S + Ex YU

PMA-1A 18950 1300 + + Ex YU

PMA-2 30587 17400 + Ex YU

PMA-3 40503 13000 + Ex YU

PMD-6/M + + + + + RU

PMN + + + + + RU

PMN-2 + + + RU

PP MI-D + + + + Czech.


Annex 1

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PPM-2 + + + + + DDR

PRBM 35 + + + + + + B

R2M1 + + RSA

R2M2 + + RSA

SB-33 + I

Type 72-A + + + CHINA

Type 72-B + CHINA

TM100 and 200 + + +

VAR-40 + I

VS-50 /TS-50 + + + + + I

VS-MK2 + + I

(Other) 10522 5300 + +


Annex 2

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Annex 2: AP blast mine descriptions

APP M-57AP mine, Bakelite casing, Cuba and North Korea

GENERAL DESCRIPTIONThe APP M-57 is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The casing issimilar to the Yugoslavian PMA-1A but there are some significant differences. The hinged lid has a ridgeddiamond pattern on the top of the mine. The base has two compartments. The main charge, a 200g block of castTNT, is fitted into the rear compartment. The lid and the base are hinged with two plastic bolts at the rear end ofthe mine. The lid has an inner plunger placed parallel to the front side of the lid. A cross plate with a deepgroove is placed at the base of the mine, beneath the plunger. Various fuzes have been used including(Yugoslav) UPM-1, UPMAH-1 and Model 43 fuzes. It is screwed into the TNT block. The capsule with thefriction sensitive composition is placed in the groove at the front of the lower half of the mine case. When thelid is lowered, the plunger rests on the capsule.

METHOD OF OPERATIONPressure on the lid forces the inner plunger in the lid to crush the fuze capsule, which contains a frictionsensitive component. On detonation this ignites the main detonator that fires the main charge.

The mine has been actively deployed in Angola.


Annex 2

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AUPSAP blast mine, plastic (or metal) casing, Italy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE

The AUPS is a cylindrical plastic AP mine with a body consisting of two parts which are threaded together. Thelower part of the mine body has vertical ribs on the side and the diameter is decreased at the base. The upperpart of the mine has four grooves at the top edge to assist assembly and disassembly. A circular raised plasticpress button is located centrally at the top of the mine, in a raised well with external threads. A plastic safety capis screwed onto the raised well when the mine is in transit. The detonator well is placed centrally at the base ofthe mine and is closed by a plastic cap. The AUPS has an interchangeable fuze system that allows the use of anexternal pull fuze or hydrostatic fuze. The mine is delivered with a stake and a pre-fragmented metal jacketwhich converts the mine into an AP fragmentation mine with a lethal radius of 10 m. When the mine is used inpull mode, the pull fuze is screwed into the fuze well at the base of the mine which is turned upside down andmounted to a stake.

METHOD OF OPERATION

If the mine is used without an external fuze, required pressure on the press button shears four plastic connectionswhich releases the spring loaded striker. The striker initiates the detonator which in turn initiates the booster andthe main charge.


Annex 2

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PN-1AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Cuba


The PN-1 mine is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The lid hasan inner ribbed cross plate placed parallel to the front side of the lid. A deep groove is cut in the cross plate, sothat it fits over the MUV or RO-1 type fuze and rests on the winged striker retaining pin. The main charge,which consists of a rectangular TNT block, is placed at the back of the mine. The fuze is similar to the CISMUV.

The detonator is screwed onto the fuze, which is resting in a half circular groove in a thin plastic bulkhead at thebase of the mine. The detonator is fitted into a detonator well in the main charge. There are two drain holes atthe rear on each side of the base to allow water to escape. These also allow attachment of booby-trap devices.The mine is a successor of the Cuban PMM-1.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on the hinged lid presses the striker retaining pin out of its hole, releasing the spring loaded striker. Thestriker initiates the detonator which in turn fires the main charge.


Annex 2

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DM-11AP pressure blast mine, plastic casing, Former East Germany


The DM-11 is a small, cylindrical plastic mine with a rubber outer casing. The upper half of the mine body actsas the pressure plate. There is a detonator well centrally positioned on the top of the mine, closed with athreaded plastic cap. The detonator is surrounded by the integral booster charge. Beneath the detonator is aBelleville spring with a striker tip pointing upwards. The upper part of the mine beneath the black rubber cover,has a convex circular shape and is placed into the circular concave shaped lower part of the mine. The upper partis movable. The bottom of the upper part of the mine has a protrusion which fits into a groove in bottom of theconcave shaped lower part of the mine. The mine has two main charges, one in the upper part and one in thelower part of the mine. The DM-11 is delivered with a circular plastic cover, which is covering most of theupper surface and the mine sides when used.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure applied to the edge of the top of the mine moves the upper part of the mine sideways and presses theprotrusion in the bottom of the upper mine part out of the groove in the bottom of the lower mine part. Pressureis transferred to the protrusion, which is pressed upwards until the Belleville spring snaps into reverse. Thestriker tip initiates the detonator, which in turn fires the booster, the upper main charge and the lower maincharge. A direct vertical pressure on the top of the mine will not set off the mine because the protrusion will notbe pressed out of the groove in the lower part of the mine body.


Annex 2

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GYATA-64AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Hungary


The GYATA is similar to the Russian PMN mine but there are some differences. The mine body is made ofbrown Bakelite. The pressure plate on the top is made of black rubber. The detonator/booster well is placed onthe side of the mine body and closed by a circular brown Bakelite transport cap. Before the mine is deployed inthe ground, the well cap is unscrewed and replaced with booster/detonator cap which appears similar to the wellcap on the Russian PMN but it has a hole through the flat screw wing. The booster and the detonator is placedinside a plastic tube on the cap and cannot be removed from the assembly. The fuze assembly is screwed into awell on the opposite side of the detonator/booster well. The fuze is secured with a safety pin to prevent thestriker to move forwards. The fuze is delay armed, with a thin metal string attached to the back part of the strikerwhich is cut a lead strip upon arming. The GYATA can have two possible delay arming times. 90 and 150 sec.The arming delay time will, however, also depend on the temperature.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety pin is removed, the spring loaded striker is released and pressed forwards, causing the steelwire to start cutting through the lead delay strip. After the delay strip is cut, the striker is allowed to moveforward until is stops on a step in the actuating plunger. The mine is now armed. A pressure on the rubber platewill depress the actuating plunger until the striker is released. The striker fires the detonator and the booster,which in turn detonates the main charge.


Annex 2

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MI AP DV 59AP blast mine, polyethylene casing, France


The MI AP DV 59 (M-59) is a small AP pressure operated blast mine consisting of a ribbed plastic case with acentral fuze well into which screws the NM SAE 59 friction fuze. The detonator is located beneath the fuze, inthe fuze well placed centrally in the bottom plate of the mine body. A metal detector ring fits on the uppersurface on the mine, under the fuse assembly. The metal detector ring is removable. The mine has a threewinged plastic safety cap fitted on the top of the fuze assembly. When this safety cap is removed, the mine isarmed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When pressure is put on the top of the firing pin, the shear collar, holding the firing pin, fails. The firing pin,charged with a friction compound, slides downwards against the mating sleeve, producing a flame which firesthe detonator which in turn initiates the main charge.


Annex 2

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M14AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, USA, South Africa


The M14 is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine. It has a pressure plate with an indented yellow indicatingarrow on the top which accommodates the mine fuze wrench. The arrow and the pressure plate can be rotatedfrom safe (S) to armed (A) position. The letters A and S is embossed into the top of the mine body. When set inthe armed position, it allows pressure to be applied to the Belleville spring beneath. The detonator and the whitedetonator plug are screwed into the fuze well in the centre of the base. The pressure plate is secured with a U-formed safety clip, which is fitted into a slot on each side of the pressure plate. A pull cord is attached to theclip. The lower part of the mine contains the main charge. The upper and the lower part of the mine body arescrewed together. The lower part has six vertical ribs on the side of the body to provide strength and serve as ameans for identifying the mine in darkness. The only metal in this mine is the steel firing pin on the Bellevillespring.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed and the pressure plate is rotated to armed position (A), direct pressure on thetop of the pressure plate causes the Belleville spring to press down and snap into reverse, driving the firing pininto the detonator which detonates and fires the main charge.


Annex 2

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PRB M409AP blast mine, plastic casing, Belgium


The PRB M409 is the successor of the PRB BAC H-28. It has a circular plastic body with a pressure plate fittedwith a black plastic transit cover. The transit cover has six ribs and engages the top of the mine including the araised pressure crown located at the top centre of the mine. A steel safety clip is inserted through the transitcover and the pressure crown. The safety clip is retained in position by a clear plastic sleeve and the pressure ofthe spring loop against a rib of the transit cover. When laid, the safety clip and the transit cover is removed. Thedetonator retaining-plug is located at the side of the mine and is sealed with melted plastic. The only metalcomponents are two steel spring strikers, two copper-cased percussion caps and either an aluminium or clearplastic cased detonator. An exact Portuguese copy of this mine exists under the names M-969 or M-411. Itdiffers only in the colour which is brown on the M-969 (M-411). The transit cover is made of white plastic andthe transit cover is screwed onto a treaded pressure crown on the top of the mine. If the transit cover is rotated(unscrewed) as little as one turn, the mine is armed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

The mine is equipped with two steel spring strikers, which are held apart by a cylindrical plastic bolt with twoapertures. The bolt is connected to the pressure membrane of the fuze and moves freely along a groovecontaining two percussion caps. The detonator is placed in the slide, between the two percussion caps. Apressure of 8 kg or more will press the membrane down (minimum 1,5mm depression), and the plastic bolt willbe displaced releasing one or both the two strikers. The strikers detonate the percussion caps, which in turn firesthe detonator and the main charge.


Annex 2

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MAI-75AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Romania


The MAI 75 is a circular Bakelite AP mine with a small circular pressure plate on the top. The upper and thelower part of the mine body is screwed together and sealed with a black rubber ring to make the minewaterproof. The mine is conical shaped at the base and top, with a small circular flat area at the bottom of themine. The body has 18 ribs on the sides, to allow easier unscrewing of the upper and lower part. The pressureplate is secured with a metal safety clip, which is fitted into two small holes on each side of the pressure plate.When the safety clip is in position, it is resting on the mine body and prevents the pressure plate from beingdepressed. The fuze mechanism and the fuze assembly are screwed into a fuze well located centrally beneath thepressure plate.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed, the mine is armed. Required pressure on the pressure plate depresses it,transmitting pressure to the two corners on the plastic lugs pointing upwards. Depression of these two cornersrotates the plastic lugs and the two corners in the spring housing groove are lifted upwards until the spring-loaded striker is allowed to pass through. The striker initiates the detonator, which in turn fires the main charge.


Annex 2

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MD-82BAP pressure blast mine, plastic casing, Vietnam


The MD-82B is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine. It is similar to the United States M14 and theVietnamese MN-79 in shape but has a totally different fuze mechanism. It has a pressure plate on the top withfour lugs in the centre of the base, which keeps the fuze beneath in position. The pressure plate is secured with aU-formed safety clip, which is identical to the one at the MN-79. A metal ring is attached to a hole in the safetyclip. The safety clip fits into two sleeves on each side of the pressure plate and prevents depressing of thepressure plate. The fuze is made of metal and the fuze housing is square in shape and closed in one end. Insidethe fuze house is a circular tube, which covers the striker and the striker assembly.

The fuze head has a traverse slot which corresponds with a straight slot in the tube. A metal pin is fitted into thetwo slots from the side, keeping the spring-loaded striker in position. The fuze well is located centrally in thebase of the mine. It is closed with a transit plug which is screwed into the threaded well when the mine duringstorage. Before laying the mine, the transit cap is replaced with the detonator and the detonator cap. The lowerpart of the mine contains the main charge and is a plastic tube, which fits into the outer casing. The inner tube ismelted together with the mine casing at the bottom sides of the mine and cannot be removed. A green circularplastic plate is laid on the top of the explosive, with a hole in the centre to allow the firing pin to hit thedetonator beneath.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed from the pressure plate, direct pressure on the top of the pressure platedepresses it transferring the pressure to the top of the fuze house. Depressing of the fuze house allows the metalpin in the slot to be pushed out and upwards until the striker in the tube is released. The spring loaded strikerfires the detonator, which in turn fires the main charge.


Annex 2

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MN-79

AP pressure blast mine, plastic casing, Vietnam


The MN-79 is a small cylindrical plastic AP blast mine. It is a copy of the American M14 AP mine but differs insome ways. The main difference is the Belleville spring, which is made of metal on the MN-79 and plastic onthe M14. This makes the MN-79 easier to detect with a metal detector. It has a pressure plate with an indentedyellow indicating arrow on the top, which accommodates the mine fuze wrench. The pressure plate has threelugs on the side of the base which correspond with three other lugs which are attached to the inner side of themine body. The arrow and the pressure plate can be rotated from safe (K) to armed (M) position. The letters Kand M are embossed into the top of the mine body. When set in the armed position (M), the three lugs on thepressure plate are moved away from the three corresponding lugs which allows application of pressure to theBelleville spring beneath. The firing pin assembly is attached to the base of the pressure plate by three lugs onthe assembly base which correspond with three lugs in the centre of the pressure plate base. The assembly iskept in place by a plastic spider. The detonator and the detonator plug are screwed into the fuze well in thecentre of the base. The pressure plate is secured with a U-formed safety clip, which is fitted into a slot on eachside of the pressure plate. A metal ring is attached to the clip. The lower part of the mine contains the maincharge. A red circular plastic plate is laid on the top of the explosive, with a hole in the centre to allow the firingpin to hit the detonator beneath. The upper and the lower part of the mine body are screwed together. The lowerpart has six vertical ribs on the side of the body to provide strength and serve as a means for identifying themine in darkness. The only metal in this mine is the steel firing pin on the Belleville spring.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety clip is removed and the pressure plate is rotated to armed position (M), direct pressure on thetop of the pressure plate depresses the firing pin assembly down transferring pressure to the Belleville springwhich is pressed down until it snaps into reverse. This allows the firing pin to be driven into the detonator,which detonates and fires the main charge.


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NO-4AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Israel


No. 4 is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The mine casing issimilar to the Yugoslavian PMA-1 and the mine is therefore often mistaken as a PMA-1. The hinged lid has fourrising grooves formed as a rectangle on the top of the mine. The name of the mine and the lot number is printedinside the rectangular area. The main charge is fitted into the rear part of the mine body and is covered by a greyplastic housing. Two models of the mine exist. The old model has a deep oval groove in the front end of the lid.The front end of the lower casing has a hole drilled through it, which accommodates the MUV type fuze. Thegroove fits over the MUV-type fuze and rests on the winged striker retaining-pin. The new model has the samehole in the front end of the lower casing. The groove in the lid, however, is square with a slot on each side,which will rest on a square slotted plate, which has the same function as the wings on the MUV fuzes. The fuzeincorporates a lead -shear arming delay. When the arming pin with the O-ring is removed, the spring-loadedstriker is released and will start to shear through the lead wire until it is cut. The arming delay time is unknownbut it is thought to take less than one hour. This will, however, depend on the temperature. In Angola only theold version of the No-4 mine has been encountered to date.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on the hinged lid, forces the retaining pin out of the fuze releasing the spring-loaded striker. The strikerfires the detonator which in turn fires the main charge.


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P2 Mk2, P2 Mk3, P3 MK1, P4 Mk1AT and AP pressure operated blast mines, plastic casing, Afghanistan


The P2 Mk2 is a square plastic AT mine with a large circular pressure plate screwed into the top of the mine.The pressure plate has radial and circular strengthening ribs at the top. The fuze well is located centrally on thetop of the mine, beneath the pressure plate. The mine is fuzed with the P4 Mk1 AP mine which is cylindrical inshape and made of plastic. It has a pressure plate on the top, which is screwed onto the top of the mine body.

The fuze is a sprung striker retained by a shearing pin. An aluminium disc is placed on the top of the detonatorbeneath the spring to secure the mine. When arming the mine the pressure plate is unscrewed and the disc isremoved. A canvas carrying-handle is attached to one side of the mine body. A secondary fuze well is locatedcentrally at the base of the mine and accumulates the No. 12 anti-lift device.

The P2 Mk3 AT mine is a newer version of the P2 Mk2 AT mine. It has the same appearance and structure asthe P2 Mk2 but is slightly bigger. The P3 Mk1 AT mine is similar to the P2 Mk2 and P2 Mk3 AT mines inworking principle but has a circular mine body.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the required pressure is applied on the top of the pressure plate on the P2 Mk2, P2 Mk3 or the P3 Mk1mine, the plate collapses transferring the pressure to the top of the P4 Mk1 AP mine causing the shearing pin inthe fuze to break. The sprung striker is released and pressed downwards initiating the detonator which in turnfires the main charge in the P4 Mk1 AP mine. The main charge in the AP mine fires the booster and the maincharge in the AT mine.


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PFM-1 and PFM-1 SAP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Commonwealth of Independent

States


This small, scatterable AP mine has a body made from low-density polythene. It comes in two varieties, bothidentical in external appearance other than a Cyrillic 'C' (English 'S') cast into the plastic on one side of the flatwing. In the centre of the mine is a cylindrical fuze made mostly of aluminium; the remainder of the bulboussection of the mine is filled with a liquid explosive. The fuze is sealed into the plastic casing by a metalcompression band, with the end of the fuze protruding a few millimetres. When the mines are packed together intheir dispenser, metal strips run through slots in the end of each mine's fuze to retain an arming plunger. Thesemines are manufactured in a variety of colours, including green, brown and white.

The self-destruct mechanism in the PFM-1 S is prone to malfunction, leaving the mine in a very delicate state.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Both varieties of this mine are pressure operated, but the PFM-1 S also incorporates a self-destruct mechanism.When the mine is ejected from its dispenser, the strip is pulled out from the slots in the end of the fuze, freeingthe plunger. This plunger, pushed by a spring at the far end of the fuze, moves through a viscous liquid, rotatingthe detonator into line to arm the mine. After this arming delay, pressure on the bulbous portion of the mineforces the liquid explosive into the hydraulic fuze. An internal sleeve is moved up until the striker retaining ballsare allowed to escape into a recess, releasing the spring-Ioaded striker onto the detonator. In the PFM-1 S, thisfiring action will be initiated by a spring-actuated viscous delay mechanism after about 24 hours.


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PMA-1AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former Yugoslavia


PMA-1A is a plastic box mine, rectangular shaped, with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. The plastic lid has acorrugated surface. The fuze with a chemical capsule is fitted into the main charge with the chemical capsuleresting on the inside recess of the mine body. The fuze body is made of Bakelite and consists of a sleeve ringand a threaded portion. In the sleeve the initiating composition is placed, which consists of the explosive massuniformly glued onto the inside parts of the sleeve. A retaining ring is placed in the sleeve to protect fromdamage during insertion of the detonator. A protective rubber washer is placed on the threaded portion to insurea hermetic seal between the fuze and the explosive charge. The rubber shock-absorber is pulled over the sleeveof the fuze body to protect the fuze from damage during transport and handling. On the front part of the body, asteel safety pin is fitted to prevent accidental closing of the mine lid and activation of the fuze. The lid has aprojection on the inside for pressure on the chemical capsule. Two drain holes are made in the bottom of themine to allow water to escape. Lethal radius is 1m. and hazardous radius is 25m.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on the hinged lid causes the projection on the inside of the lid to crush the capsule with the frictionsensitive chemical components, igniting the contents, which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.


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PMA-2AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former Yugoslavia


PMA-2 is a small, cylindrical plastic mine with a 6-horned pressure fuze screwed into the threaded fuze welllocated centrally on the top surface of the mine. The shape of the actuator gives a larger area for activation whileminimising the mines sensitivity to blast detonation systems using overpressure. In the absence of a fuze a blackprotective plastic cap closes the fuze well. The explosive charge consists of a main charge and an initiationcharge. The fuze body is made of Bakelite. On the lower section are internal and external threads. The internalthreads secure the initiator to the fuze body while the external threads secure the fuze to the mine. On theexternal threads is a rubber gasket, which makes the connection to the mine body water proof. The pressure staris made of plastic. The star and the shock needle are one piece. A rubber shield is affixed to the shock needleand prevents water from entering the fuze body. The safety pin is made of metal wire and is inserted through thehole in the shock-needle. A 1 m. string is secured to the eye of the safety pin.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Required pressure applied to the pressure star allows the shock needle to be forced downwards into the frictionsensitive chemical components, igniting the contents, which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.


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PMA-3AP pressure operated blast mine, rubber/plastic casing, Former Yugoslavia


PMA-3 is a small, cylindrical plastic mine. The casing is in two halves joined together by a protective rubbercover to seal the mine. The upper half of the mine body is the pressure plate. The mine is fuzed with theUPMAH-3, which is inserted into the fuze well located centrally on the bottom of the mine and covered with afuze well plug which has a rubber gasket to ensure a water tight seal. Except for the aluminium shell of thedetonator cap, all the components of the PMA-3 are non-metallic. A safety ring of polystyrene is mounted overthe rubber cover in the groove formed between the upper and lower half of the casing. Between the ends of thering is a compressed steel spring. The ring ends are held together with a safety clip, which holds the spring inplace. A string is connected to the safety clip and is wound about the circumference of the mine. The free end ofthe string is secured to the safety ring and rubber cover with tape.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure above the activation threshold applied to the pressure plate on the top of the mine will cause it to pivotabout the fuze which crushes the fuze with the friction sensitive chemical components, igniting the contents,which in turn fires the detonator and the main charge.


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PMD-6AP pressure operated blast mine, wooden casing, Former Soviet Union


The PMD-6 series and the PMD-7 AP mines have been used widely since the beginning of the World War 2.The PMD-6 appeared for the first time in the Soviet - Finland war in 1939. The mine is square in shape and iswooden cased with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. A deep slot is cut in the front end of the lid so that it mayfit over the fuze and rest on the striker retaining-pin. Many variations of this mine have been encountered. ThePMD-6 is fitted with a steel leaf spring in the lid, to prevent the lid from actuating the ignitor prematurely. Italso increases the operating pressure. The PMD-6M does not have this feature. The PMD-6 series and the PMD-7 mines will have limited operational time as the wooden lid quickly corrode or rot thereby offering no pressureto the winged retaining pin. The fuze, however, may remain operational for a considerable time. As a result themine may not detonate when direct pressure is applied to it but it can easily detonate if it is attempted removed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

The PMD-6 series and the PMD-7 can be used with a trip wire but is usually pressure activated. When pressureoperated, the lid rests on the wings of the striker retaining-pin. A pressure on the lid will press down the strikerretaining-pin releasing the spring-loaded striker. The striker initiates the percussion cap and the detonator that inturn initiates the main charge.


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PMNAP pressure operated blast mine, plastic, Former Soviet Union


The PMN is made of a circular Bakelite body with a rubber plate on the top. The rubber plate is secured to themine body by a thin metal band. The detonator/booster well is placed on the side of the mine body, opposite ofthe fuze assembly well. The booster housing is made of plastic and the detonator is fitted into the booster. Aplastic plug is screwed into the detonator/booster well to close it. Some PMN’s, are found with the Gyatabooster/detonator cap instead of the original well cap with the separate booster/detonator. The fuze assembly isscrewed into the well on the opposite side of the detonator/booster well. The fuze is secured with a safety pin toprevent the striker to move forwards. The fuze is delay armed. A thin metal wire is attached to the back part ofthe striker and is enclosing a lead strip. The delay arming time is from 15 to 37 min. depending on thetemperature.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety pin is removed, the spring loaded striker is released and pressed forwards, causing the steelwire to start cutting through the lead delay strip. After the delay strip is cut, the striker is allowed to moveforward until is stops on a step in actuating plunger. The mine is now armed. A pressure on the rubber plate willdepress the actuating plunger until the striker is released. The striker fires the detonator and the booster which inturn detonates the main charge.


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PMN-2AP blast mine, plastic casing, Former Soviet Union


The PMN-2 was designed as the replacement of the older PMN. Both the mines are similar in size. The minebody is made of light green injection moulded plastic with a black rubber cross plate on the top. A thin plasticplate screwed to the mine body secures the rubber plate. The PMN-2 has a delay armed fuse. The delay armingtime is approx. 6 sec. The PMN-2 is designed to be resistant to explosive clearance methods. The detonatorhousing cover is located on the side of the mine body, close to the arming handle. The booster plug is locatedunder the mine, on the right side of the arming handle. The filling plug is identical to the booster plug and islocated under the mine, in the front of the arming handle. The spring and striker plug is located on the side ofthe mine body about 90 degrees to the left of the arming handle.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the arming key is twisted and pulled out, the bellow is released. The bellow is slowly pressed together bythe spring pressure from the spring beneath. After approx. 6 sec, the bellows will free the spring loadeddetonator housing. Pressure on the rubber will allow the detonator housing to slide across until stopped by theactivating plunger. The striker is then released which fires the detonator and the booster, which in turn detonatesthe main charge.


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PP Mi-DAP pressure operated blast mine, Czech Republic and Slovakia


This simple blast AP mine is a copy of the Russian PMD-7, a smaller version of the PMD-6, which dates backto the Second World War. The mine consists of a wooden box with a hinged lid that overlaps the sides. Themain charge is a block of cast TNT into which an RO-1 or MUV Series fuze, fitted with an MD-2 detonator, isplaced. The fuze and retaining pin protrude through the end of the mine opposite the hinge. These mines may beassembled in the field and can therefore vary considerably in appearance.

METHOD OF OPERATION

PP Mi-D may be initiated by tripwire, but is more normally pressure-operated. The fuze assembly is insertedinto the end of the mine until the detonator is inside the TNT block. For pressure actuation, a winged retainingpin is used so that the lid rests on the wings of the pin, the fuze accommodated by a deep slot cut into the lid.Once armed, pressure on the lid simply pushes the pin out of the fuze to release the striker. A normal pin may beused in conjunction with a tripwire run to a securing point at right angles to the fuze.


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PPM-2AP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former East Germany


The PPM-2 is a cylindrical blast plastic mine consisting of a two piece threaded mine case with radialstrengthening ribs. On the flange around the circumference there are two lugs with holes, one often with a springcarrying clip fitted. A wrench designed to fit around the diameter of the mine, has grooves that will accept theexternal ribs. The wrench is used to tighten the two case halves so that the rubber gasket will fully water proofthe mine. A rubber sealing-ring is placed between the upper and the lower part of the mine body. PPM-2 uses apiezoelectric fuze system with delayed arming. It is kept safe by a short-circuit system which ensures that thedetonator cannot fire until the mine is fully armed. A safety steel pin is inserted through the sealing ring.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the safety pin is withdrawn, a tension spring causes a metal edge to start cutting through a lead delaystrip. After 1,5 - 3 hours the metal edge cuts through the lead strip and allows the spring to pull the short circuitcontact away from the firing circuit. After this stage, application of the required pressure to the pressure plate,depresses it transferring the pressure to the top of the plunger on the piezoelectric impulse generator. When theplunger is depressed, it generates an electric impulse which can no longer pass through the short circuit with lowresistance. The electric impulse passes through the connector strip as there is no other path to follow. Theconnector strip is made of metal-impregnated plastic and has a relatively high resistance. As the connector stripis in direct contact with the detonator, the electric impulse initiates the electrical detonator which in turn fires themain charge.


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PRB M-35AP blast mine, plastic casing, Belgium


The PRB M35 is a small circular plastic AP blast mine. A large recessed threaded fuze well is located centrallyon the top of the mine. The fuze well accommodates the M5 fuze. The fuze has a protruding pressure cap on thetop. A plastic safety pin is inserted through a hole in the pressure button and plastic ring is attached to the end ofthe safety pin. The fuze has two spring-loaded steel strikers separated by a cylindrical bolt with two apertures.The bolt holds the strikers apart and covers the percussion caps. The detonator is placed centrally at the base ofthe fuze. The only metal components are two steel spring strikers and the two percussion caps.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When sufficient pressure is applied to the pressure button on the top of the fuze, it will depress the plasticpressure bolt holding the two strikers apart and covering the percussion caps (minimum 1,5mm depression). Theplastic bolt will be displaced releasing one or both the two strikers. The strikers detonate the percussion caps,which then fires the detonator and the main charge.


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R2M2, R2M1, R2M2 VariantAP blast mines, plastic casing, South Africa


The R2M1 is a small cylindrical AP blast mine with a circular moulded plastic body. The pressure plate on thetop of the mine has 12 radial ribs with a circular projection in the centre surrounding the protruding striker knobwhich is red and visible as a red nipple. On the upper side of the mine body is a ribbed bellows which is made ofa PVC moulding forming a short lip at the bottom and a flange at the top. The short lip is engaged between thetwo parts of the mine body, to seal the mine, and the flange is forming the upper edge of the mine enclosing ared plastic bellows ring. A foam sponge is placed between the pressure plate and the body cap. The fuze consistsof the two part plastic fuze housing, the striker knob (housing) and the striker assembly with the striker thespring and the 6,5 g LZY detonator. The upper part of the fuze housing is screwed onto the lower part of thehousing. The detonator is glued into a recess beneath the fuze housing. Three holes are drilled in the body of thespring housing to accommodate three steel striker retaining balls. When the mine is unarmed, a safety clip isinserted into a slide in the protruding centre of the pressure plate and through a recess in the red spring knob, toprevent the pressure plate from pressing down the spring knob. The booster well is placed centrally in the baseof the mine. The threaded booster plug is made of red plastic and is screwed into the booster well. The mine isrelatively watertight but mines that have been buried for a long time, are often found with the striker pinsdamaged by water. The lower part of the mine body has vertical ribs on the sides and the bottom. Two variantsof this mine are known. One is named R2M2 which is the successor of the R2M1. The main difference is thatthe detonator on the R2M2 is water proof. The booster with the booster plug is also different on the R2M2. Thesecond variation differs mainly in the bellows on the side of the mine, which is reaching from the bottom edgeto the top edge of the mine. The bellows ring is also missing. The mine body is made as one part instead of twoand the mine generally appears as a simpler and cheaper model. The base has no vertical ribs but has three holesaround the booster well. There are also small differences on explosive content (TNT only) and the weight but allthree models uses the same fuze type.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure on pressure plate causes the projection to press down the striker knob which compresses the unloadedstriker. When the three holes in the body of the striker knob correspond to the three retaining balls, it allows theballs to fall away into the holes releasing the striker which is now loaded due to the downwards pressure of thespring. Once released the forward movement of the striker fires the detonator. The detonator initiates the boosterwhich in turn fires the main charge.


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SB-33AP blast mine, plastic casing, Italy


The SB 33 is a resilient plastic AP mine slightly irregular in shape but almost circular. The plastic is moulded inan irregular pattern to aid concealment. A circular elastic neoprene pressure plate cover makes up most of theupper surface. The detonator plug is located on the underside of the mine, offset from the centre and is made ofthe same material as the mine body. The detonator is fastened to the detonator plug, which is screwed into thedetonator well. In transit an inert blue detonator cap is used to neutralise the mine. On the side of the mine is asocket for an arming pin. Removal of the pin arms the mine. The SB 33 is entirely waterproof and contains aminimum of metal. An electronic version of the SB 33, the SB 33 AR, incorporates a sensitive anti-handlingdevice. It differs only in the colour of the transit detonator cap, which is red. Once armed with the detonator anddetonator cap, it is indistinguishable from the normal type.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Steady pressure on the pressure cover simultaneously compresses the striker spring and rotates its cylindricalsurround. When sufficient force has been applied, the cylinder brings a window around in line with thedetonator. The firing pin enters sideways through this window to initiate the detonator, which in turn fires themain charge. Should the mine be subjected to undue shock, the striker bounces straight down inside thecylindrical surround without rotating it so that the mine will not fire. This makes the SB resistant to counter-measures including flails.


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T-72AAP pressure operated blast mine, plastic casing, Former Soviet Union


The T-72A is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine with a soft rubber cap which covers the complete top ofthe mine. The diameter at the base is slightly smaller than the top. The booster and detonator plug are screwedinto the booster well in the centre of the base and the detonator is placed in the middle of the booster. A smallplastic screw is fitted offset on the base to deny unscrewing of the upper and lower body. The safety pin with asmall ring attached, is fitted into the side of the mine body. This ring is the only visual difference between the T-72A and T-72B. A pressure plate is placed beneath the rubber on the top of the mine. It is held above thediaphragm by a pre-wound retaining ring. Beneath the pressure plate is a Belleville spring with a striker in thecentre. The T-72A is waterproof and is sealed with a black rubber ring between the upper and lower body.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Once the safety pin is removed, the spring loaded retaining ring is released. The three lugs is moved from underthree corresponding lugs in the pressure plate. The pressure plate is now released and the mine is armed.Pressure on top rubber and the pressure plate causes the Belleville spring to press down and snap into reverse.The striker initiates the percussion cap which fires the detonator which in turn fires the booster and the maincharge.


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T-72BAP pressure operated blast mine with tilt mechanism, plastic casing, China


The T-72B is a small cylindrical AP blast plastic mine with a casing appearing identical to the T-72A except forthe safety pin which is triangular instead of round. It has a soft rubber cap which covers the complete top of themine. The diameter at the base is slightly smaller than the top. The booster, and detonator plug is screwed intothe booster well in the centre of the base and the detonator is placed in the middle of the booster. A small plasticplug is screwed into a well, offset on the base. The plug is only screwed into the well to close it, as the T-72Buses the same base as the T-72-A where the plug prevents separation of the upper and lower part of the mine. Apressure plate is placed beneath the rubber on the top of the mine and is resting on a spring loaded metal switch,located centrally on the electric control assembly beneath the pressure plate. The electric control assembly isequipped with two 1,5 V batteries which are thought to last for approximately 3 months. When the batteries areremoved, the mine can no longer function, not even on direct pressure. The anti-disturbance mechanism consistsof a small metal cylinder with a steel ball resting in a groove in the bottom centre. The arming mechanismconsist of a spring loaded plastic switch which is kept in loaded (unarmed) position by the safety pin which isfitted into a small hole on the upper side of the mine body. The T-72B is waterproof and is sealed with a blackrubber ring between the upper and lower body assemblies.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Pressure:

Once the safety pin is removed, the way switch is turned on by the pre-loaded spring. After a 3 – 4 minute delay,the mine is armed. Pressure on the electronic control assembly, depresses the spring loaded metal switch in thecentre of the electric fuze, allowing electrical contact, creating a flash in the burning wire which initiates thedetonator which in turn fires the booster and the main charge.

Anti-disturbance:

If the mine is disturbed by means of quick movements or tilted more than 10 degrees, the steel ball will moveaway from the groove and touch the walls of the cylinder allowing electrical contact, creating a flash in theburning wire which initiates the detonator which in turn fires the booster and the main charge.


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VAR-40

AP blast pressure mine, plastic casing, Italy


The VAR-40 is a waterproof AP mine with a circular resin-based plastic body with vertical ribs moulded intothe edge of the upper body. It has a centrally placed pressure button on the top. When deployed, this pressurebutton will normally be the only visible part of the mine. The VAR-40 can be delivered in various camouflagecolours. During transit, the pressure button is secured with a transit cap, which encloses the pressure button,thereby preventing it from being depressed.

METHOD OF OPERATION

N/A


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VS-50AP blast mine, plastic casing, Italy


The VS-50 is a scatterable AP mine which consists of a circular plastic body with vertical ribs moulded into thecircumference. It can be laid manually or scattered by helicopter. The mine body consists of two parts which arethreaded together. The top of the mine has a black circular rubber pressure plate which is linked to the frame ofthe mine through a ring nut. A detonator well is located centrally at the base of the mine and is closed by a blueplastic transit cap when stored. When arming the mine, the transit cap is removed and the detonator holding plugwith the detonator is screwed into the detonator well. The safety pin is then rotated 90 degrees and pulled out.The mine is fitted with a removable safety pin for manual laying or a safety cap for helicopter scattering. Thesafety cap will be removed by air drag during the free-fall thus arming the mine. Anti-shock protection isprovided by an integral pneumatic device. The VS-50 is completely water proof.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Steady pressure on the pressure plate, depresses it, transferring pressure to the top of the striker housing. Thespring-loaded striker is kept in position by the striker housing and a protruding arm on a lever. The strikerhousing is depressed until a second protruding arm on the lever, on the opposite side, slips into a recess in thestriker housing. This allows the lever to be moved sideways until the spring-loaded striker can bypass theprotruding arm and be released. The striker initiates the detonator which in turn fires the main charge. If thepressure plate is depressed by a sudden pressure, the air in the chamber compressed between the pressure plateand the body of the mine is compressed and inflates a flexible bellows which becomes rigid and prevents thelever to move sideways and release the spring loaded striker. The mine will therefore not detonate when it issubjected to rapid shocks and is not sympathetically detonated by other VS-50 mines placed down to 10cmdistances. After a few milliseconds, the compressed air will leak through a pinhole. The bellows is deflated andthe lever is free to rotate.


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VS-MK-2AP blast mine, plastic casing, Italy


The VS-Mk-2 is a scatterable non-metallic AP mine with a circular resin-based plastic body with vertical ribsmoulded into the circumference. VS-Mk-2 can be delivered in various camouflage colours. It can be laidmanually but is designed to be scatter laid from helicopters, vehicles or low flying aircraft. The mine is fullywaterproof and has a long storage- and life time. It is fitted with a removable safety pin for manual laying, orwith a drag extractable safety cap locking the firing mechanism, for helicopter, vehicle or air-craft scattering.The VS-Mk-2 has a circular pressure plate on the top and it provided with a double anti-shock device whichmakes the mine from explosive countermeasures. The anti-shock device prevents the mine from being triggedwhen an impulsive load is applied onto the pressure plate caused by an accidental drop when scattered, by theexplosion of a nearby or suspended charge, or by the action of fuel explosive mine clearance systems. Adetonator well is located offset at the base of the mine and is closed by a plastic transit cap when stored. Whenarming the mine, the transit cap is removed and the detonator holding plug with the M41 detonator is screwedinto the detonator well.

METHOD OF OPERATION

When the activation load is applied to the pressure plate, the pressure plate and piston is depressed, which loadsthe striker. The striker is kept locked by the tooth of a lever and is released only when the lever has rotated of agiven angle. The rotation of the lever allows the alignment of a proper hole in the stem of the pressure plate withthe tooth of the lever, which releases the loaded striker which fires the detonator which again detonates the maincharge.

A sudden pressure (shock) on the pressure plate, inflates the air-pressure inside an anti-shock bellows due to anextra pressure in the upper chamber. This prevents the rotation of the lever.


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References and Acknowledgements:

Data for this annex was compiled from information:

A2.1: On the Internet site of Norwegian Peoples Aid (landmine database)http://www.angola.npaid.org/ supplemented with information from the following sources:

A2.2: Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines, recognising anddisarming, Brassey’s London and Washington 1997.

A2.3: King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, Jane’s Information Group Limited,London, Third Edition 1998-1999.


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Annex 3: Summary of properties of principal main explosives usedin anti-personnel landmines

RDX (Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (1,3,5-triaza-1,3,5-tri-nitrocyclo-hexane))

Also referred to as cyclonite, or hexogen, RDX is a white crystalline solid usually used in mixtures with otherexplosives, oils, or waxes; it is rarely used alone. It has a high degree of stability in storage and is considered themost powerful and brisant of the military high explosives. Chemical formula: C3H6N6O6, molecular weight:222.1, melting point 205oC.

RDX compositions are mixtures of RDX, other explosive ingredients, and desensitizers or plasticizers.Incorporated with other explosives or inert material at the manufacturing plants, RDX forms the base for thefollowing common military explosives: Composition A, composition B, composition C, HBX, H-6 andCyclotol.

Of these composition A, and composition B have been used as the explosive in landmines.

Composition A is a wax-coated, granular explosive consisting of TDX and plasticizing wax. Five varieties ofcomposition A have been developed and designated as composition A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5. CompositionsA-4 and A-5, with desensitizer added, have been developed, but these explosives are not widely used.Composition A is used as the bursting charge in Navy 2.75- and 5-inch rockets and land mines.

Composition B consists of castable mixtures of RDX and TNT; in some instances, desensitizing agents areadded to the mixture. Composition B is used as a burster in Army projectiles and in rockets and land mines.

Source: http://www.ordnance.org/rdx.htm

Trinitrotoluene,

A generic name including any of several nitro substitution compounds produced by the substitution of threenitro (NO2) groups for three hydrogen atoms in toluene (C6H5CH3). Because hydrogen atoms can be replacedin both the C6H5 group and the CH3 group, it becomes possible, through the different positions these three NO2groups may occupy relatively in the molecules, to produce 16 different tri-nitro-toluenes. Each of these exhibitsindividual characteristics, such as melting point, boiling point, specific gravity, solubility, and sensitivity todetonation. All are produced by nitration of the hydrocarbon or its products or by indirect reactions.

Symmetrical, or 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene, is commonly called TNT, the best known of the compounds. It forms paleyellow crystals of specific gravity 1.65 and with a melting point of 82° C (180° F). Its low melting point allowsit to be melted and poured into artillery shells and other explosive devices. It burns in the open at 295° C (563°F), but it may explode if confined. In the absence of a detonator, it is a rather stable material, does not attackmetals, does not absorb moisture, and is practically insoluble in water. TNT dissolves in benzene and in acetoneand, like all nitro compounds, reacts readily with substances that surrender electrons, that is, with chemicalreducing agents. High-velocity detonators, such as mercury fulminate and nitramine, induce its violent andexplosive decomposition. TNT can be absorbed through the skin, causing headache, anemia, and skin irritation.

Source: http://www.iversonsoftware.com/reference/chemistry/Trinitrotoluene.htm

Tetryl

The chemical name for tetryl is 2,4,6-trinitrophenyl-N-methylnitramine. Some commonly used names arenitramine, tetralite, and tetril. Tetryl is an odorless, synthetic, yellow crystal-like solid that is not found naturallyin the environment. Under certain conditions, tetryl can exist as dust in air. It dissolves slightly in water and inother liquids.

Tetryl was used to make explosives, mostly during World Wars I and II. It is no longer manufactured or used inthe United States.

Source: http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts80.html


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Annex 4: Example model mines from Maquettes Sédial

Model PMA-2 AP blast mine


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Model VS-MK2 AP blast mine


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Model PMN mine AP blast mine

Model M-14 AP blast mine


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Model PMN-2 AP blast mine


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Annex 5: Example posters


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Annex 6: US mine simulants - ITOP

WHAT ARE SIMULANT MINES?

• A Set of Standard Test Targets that simulate the range of characteristics found in many landmines bythe most commonly used mine detection sensors

• SIMs are proposed NATO and International Standard Test Targets for Countermine andHumanitarian Demining

CHARACTERISTICS OF SIMs

• SIMs accurately and consistently interact with metal detection, radar and infrared detection sensors ina way representative of actual live mine target categories

• Have generic characteristics, do not replicate any specific mine

• Safe to store, issue, transport and use

• SIMs do not replicate explosive fill chemical content for Nuclear, NMR, NQR, Acoustic or Trace gasdetectors

• PM-MCD development as part of 4 Nation T&E Working Group (FR/GE/UK/US) fordevelopment of International Test Operation Procedures for Countermine and Humanitarian DeminingEquipment

SIM TARGET SETS

• Rugged, durable design and construction

• One Target Set consists of six (6) size non-metallic SIMs and 36 Metal Inserts

• Three (3) Anti-Tank (AT) SIMs

30 cm diameter; 10 cm high

25 cm diameter; 8.33 cm high

20 cm diameter; 6.67 cm high

18 AT size metal inserts


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• Three (3) Anti-personnel (AP) SIMs




18 AP size metal inserts

WHY SIMULANT MINES?

• Live or inert land mine characteristics often vary from year to year and lot to lot

• Large number of mines in the world - you can't test with them all

• Lack of available live or inert land mines

• Increasing restrictions on live mines

• High explosive loaded mines have:

costly precautions

safety hazards

rigid accountability

safeguards against theft

• Increasing need for mine targets - decreasing supply

SIMs - THE TARGET OF TODAY AND TOMORROW

• For mine detection equipment test and evaluation or mine detection training

• Six (6) size SIM targets cover range of AP and AT mine diameters and provide sequence of targetarea and target volume

• Dielectric match with TNT and Comp B

• Accurate match of thermal diffusivity

• SIMs furnished with metal inserts containing small metal parts with increasing Levels of DetectionDifficulty (LDD)

BENEFITS OF SIMs

• Improved Data Exchange

Provides confidence in the accuracy and quality of test data

Allows acceptance of data by other countries for evaluation

Facilitates interchange of data between Universities, Non-Government Organizations, Industry, Military andGovernments

Reduces requirement to retest during foreign equipment evaluation


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• Reduces test costs

• Safer testing

• Facilitates technology and data transfer between the Countermine and Humanitarian Deminingcommunities SIMULANT

SIMULANT MINE DEVELOPMENT

• Previous standard mine target work done by the US Army at Fort Belvoir, the National Institute ofStandards, VSE Corporation, the Canadian Army (small metal targets) and other organizations

• SIM development focused on low metallic mines difficult to detect with current mine detectors

• All size SIMs have a diameter/height ratio of 3.0 except for the smallest AP (6 cm) which has 2.0

• SIM bodies are ABS plastic

• High Explosive (HE) fill simulant is RTV silicone rubber

• Electromagnetic property testing of HE simulants was conducted from 50 MHz to 26 GHz by Dr. J.Curtis at the US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station

METAL INSERT DEVELOPMENT

• Metal parts tested based on type, material, size, shape and orientation of parts found in mines

• Other parts, smaller and larger, used to establish and bracket upper and lower detection range

• Hundreds of tests of small metal parts with five of the worlds leading mine detectors

• Laboratory detectability testing at Auburn University by Dr. L. Riggs

• Detonation tube/cup detectability modeling by Dr. L. Carin of Duke University

• Five (5) levels for AT SIMs and five (5) levels for AP SIMs with an overlap of three (3) levels wereselected

• SIMs can be changed from entirely nonmetallic to five levels of metal by the simple change of theinsert

• Special metal inserts with actual or surrogate metal parts or intermediate levels of detection difficultycan also be used

• Live or inerted mines can be calibrated to determine and catalog their LDD

• Tomorrow's mines can be evaluated against today's tests

• As more mines are calibrated the utility of SIMs increases

• SIMs also furnished with one (1) zero metal insert

• Metal inserts can be used as stand alone targets in testing metal detector sensors

PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION

• If lost, the SIM can be identified years later as an inert simulant

• The word inert is permanently marked on the SIM in three languages - avoids EOD/police hassle


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Annex 7: Australian mine simulants


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TargetDesignation

Description Rational

SIM APNM S AP mine simulant, cylindrical,small, non-metallic case

Challenging target for GPR/Thermal,variable metal content

SIM APNM L AP mine simulant, cylindrical,large, non-metallic case

Size and shape of vast majority of deployedAP/AV mines. Variable metal content.

SIM APNM X AP mine simulant, box, non-metallic case

Similar to APNM L but square shape forIR/EO

SIM APWD X AP mine simulant, box, woodcase

Simulates wooden ‘Shu’ mines, variablemetal.

SIM ATNM C AT mine simulant, cylindrical,non-metallic case

Large variable metal content AT mine.Cylindrical for IR/EO

SIM ATNM X AT mine simulant, box, non-metallic case

Large variable metal content AT mines. Boxshape for EO/IR.

SIM ATNM B AT mine simulant, bar mine,non-metallic case

Track cutting mine variate. This simulant is½ the size of a metal Bar mine but twice thelength of an air scatterable variant.

SIM APM X AP mine simulant, box, metalcase

Metal cased AP mine

SIM FRM C AP bounding fragmentationmine simulant, cylindrical,metal case

Bounding mine class such as Valmara 69 etc.

SIM ATM C AP mine simulant, cylindrical,metal case, tilt rod capable

Large metal cased mine such as commonM12.

SIM ATM X AT mine simulant, box, metalcase, tilt rod capable

Large box metal cased mine.

Table A7.1: Landmine simulants used in DSTO detection trials. US NVESDmetal component set is used with these targets.


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Example of one DSTO simulant


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Metal parts for inserts used by DSTO and US


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Annex 8: New simulants

(This is extracted from a study conducted for JRC by the independent deminingconsultant Mr C. King of CKA Ltd.)

SUPPORT TO STUDY OF GENERIC MINE-LIKE OBJECTS FOR R&D INSYSTEMS FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

PROVISIONAL DESIGNS FOR SURROGATE MINES

20 December 1999


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PROVISIONAL DESIGNS FOR SURROGATE MINES

Design Outline

The surrogates are based on a modular system in which some components and assemblies are interchangeable.The A body surrogate is broadly representative of small, minimum-metal blast antipersonnel mines; a cutawaydiagram and list of components are at part A of this Annex. The B body surrogate is more typical of large anti-personnel blast mines with plastic casings, which may have either a low or medium metal content.

Both design use readily available materials and entail the bare minimum of machining operations. MetalComponent Inserts (MCI) are firmly located using good interference fits, while most of the joints are currentlymade using either Cyanoacrylate adhesive or hot-melt glue. In some cases, alternative components would besourced and better assembly techniques evolved for larger-scale production.

The 2 major replaceable assemblies are the MCI and Explosive Substitute Block (ESB), although a number ofother components could also be changed. MCls can be produced in a wide variety of configurations to offergeneric metal targets or accurately represent the metallic components of specific mines; more information isgiven in part C of this annex. Explosive substitute blocks can be moulded from any substance, enabling anyphysical or chemical property that is critical to detection to be represented.

The A Body

Unscrewing the base (G) of the A body casing allows access to the MCI (K) and ESB (F), which can both bereplaced in a matter of seconds. With a differently designed holder (I), MCls could also be emplaced horizontallyto represent transverse fuze mechanisms. The body will accept ESBs of different sizes to represent the range ofexplosive weights (30 -50 g) typical for this type of mine. The pressure plate assembly (A) can be replaced, andwith it, the assemblies within the internal void beneath. Collars can be placed around the cylindrical body (C) toallow, for example, external fins such as those found on many Italian AP mines. With the pressure plate sealedinto place, the A body surrogate is robust and fully waterproof.

The B Body

The B body surrogate has been supplied in the form of a Russian PMN I Chinese Type 58 AP blast mine,however it can be adapted for a number of other configurations. The side plugs can be unscrewed and blankedoff to leave a basically cylindrical casing that can be placed either way up. The metal securing band (R) andplunger spring assembly (K and L) are then extracted to remove all remaining metal.

When inverted, the white base cap (I) is removed to reveal a small cavity (J) which will accept ESBs; there is alsoa central holder (P) which will accept MCls inserted from either direction. Thus the B body can be reconfiguredas, say, the minimum-metal Yugoslav PMA-3 using a 2-component MCI and a small ESB.

The B body is also robust, but more difficult to fully waterproof. .

Supplied MCis and ESBs

Each of the sample A body surrogates is supplied with a Polyurethane ESB and 3-component MCls. For moredetails of this MCI. A clear tube containing the components of the MCI has also been included.

The B body samples contain wax ESBs and, as mentioned previously, have a metal content representative of theRussian PMN mine. This entails the use of a 1-component MCI as the stab receptor of the detonator assembly.

MCIs are shown in part C of this annex.


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SUPPORT TO STUDY OF GENERIC MINE-LIKE OBJECTS FOR R&D IN SYSTEMS FORHUMANITARIAN DEMINING

METHODS OF REPLICATING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

Requirement

This report details the methods for replicating anti-personnel (AP) mines, together with the process followed toarrive at the proposed design concept. The benefits and limitations of the optional methods, including off-the-shelf (OTS) solutions, are to be outlined.

DESIGN CONCEPTS

The study (and common sense) suggests that there are broadly 2 ways to approach the production of minesurrogates: specific mines can be selected and replicated with great accuracy, or characteristics can berepresented in generic surrogates. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages which affects theirsuitability for different applications.

Specific Replicas

For this method, in principle, the most appropriate mine types are identified and then copied with the highestdegree of accuracy possible. There are, however, practical limitations: they must be inert (contain no explosivewhatsoever) and mechanically non-functional (otherwise they become ‘mines’ under the definitions withininternational law). It is also virtually impossible to replicate every component using exactly the same material asthe original.

Advantages

Confidence. If a detection technique works well against an accurate replica, there is every reason to believe thatit will be effective against the real mine. This minimises the chances of misdirected or wasted effort.

Credibility. Success against accurate replicas is more likely to convince those within and outside the researchteam that the results are significant.

Specific problems. Certain types of mine are well known for being difficult to detect. With this method, specific`problem’ mines can be singled out for attention. Similarly, the most difficult mines within a given region can beaddressed as a matter of priority.

Disadvantages

Selection. There are hundreds of mine designs across a variety of types, making it very hard to select the toppriorities. Even among the top candidates, there are often many distinct variations that demand consideration.Unless entire categories are ignored, a large number would have to be replicated in order to represent the threat.

Expense. Most types of mine would be extremely expensive to replicate. The specialist tooling of moulds,variety of plastics and industrial techniques (such as ultrasonic welding) virtually rules out the option of workshopfabrication. With a large combination of materials and operations, it is also highly unlikely that any single


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manufacturer could undertake the task. During initial enquiries, a UK plastics workshop estimated the cost ofmould production for a simple AP mine casing (with no screw threads) at 15,000. An accurate replica or morecomplex approximation would be substantially more expensive.

Applicability. There is no guarantee that detection data against a specific mine can be extrapolated to other,different types. There is always a possibility that the chosen mine has a unique characteristic which makes itmore susceptible to detection using a given technique.

Generic Surrogates

The ‘generic’ method abandons the idea of accurately reproducing mine characteristics, representing generalfeatures instead. Manufacturers have generally identified approximate size, shape and metal content as theprimary features to represent. Most have been designed primarily for metal detection, though they may have afilling intended to represent some of the characteristics of TNT.

Advantages

Cost. Since it is not necessary to slavishly reproduce every feature, the generic surrogate is a considerablycheaper option than the replica. Existing Off-The-Shelf (OTS) mouldings and components can be sourced,substantially reducing the need for special fabrication and machining.

Versatility. Features and characteristics found to be unsatisfactory can often be modified quickly and cheaply.The ability to alter or replace components also allows some variations to be produced without the need for newdesigns.

Proof of principle. The ability to create and vary a given characteristic may allow better overall assessment ofdetection techniques than a specific example, which may or may not be representative of other similar mines.

Disadvantages

Confidence. Success of a detection technique against a generic surrogate does notguarantee the same result against a live mine. This decreases the level of confidence in data and, under somecircumstances, might necessitate an additional confirmatory stage (against accurate replicas or real inert mines)in the proving process, before live field trials are conducted.

Selection of features. The generic approach requires appropriate features to be selected andreproduced in order to adequately represent the detection signatures of a real target. Existing genericsurrogates, for example, do not attempt to reproduce any of the voids or internal structures of a real mine, whichmay render them unsuitable for use with certain detection techniques. It is also possible that some seeminglyinsignificant feature (or combination of features) within the real mine has an unforeseeable implication fordetectability.

AVAILABLE OPTIONS

Real Mines

Although not strictly within the scope of this report, some notes on the use of real mines are relevant. Under theOttawa Treaty, international law does make provision for the use of real mines for detection research. Since it is


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clearly unsafe to use fully armed mines in laboratory tests, either ‘neutralised’ or ‘inert’ mines are needed.Demining teams (military or civilian) have no difficulty obtaining live mines from, for example, the Balkans; theproblem is transporting them to European destinations and gaining authority for their use.

Neutralised mines will normally have the most sensitive elements of the fuze train removed. These are theigniter, detonator and possibly the booster, all of which may be incorporated into a single ‘detonator’ assembly.The missing parts can be easily and accurately replicated to give a truly authentic target. The remaining highexplosive main charge (often TNT) is very stable, constituting no more than a moderate fire risk, and may behandled in complete safety. But despite the inherent stability of properly neutralised mines, security, handlingand transport regulations are extremely stringent and may create a major administrative and logistic obstacle.

Inert mines have all of the explosive removed. They therefore require a substitute main charge as well as thereplicated components of the initiation train. Although with each replacement component, the mine becomes lessauthentic, the materials, fit and finish of the inert mine will still be far superior to most replicas. Although beyondthe scope of the contract and therefore not a formal recommendation, the use of inert mines should be thoroughlyinvestigated if specific types are identified for research.

Off The Shelf (OTS) Solutions

Current and former OTS mine surrogates were reviewed and are either mine-specific or very generic. However,it is interesting to observe that all of those currently available are generic, while mine replicas are eitherdiscontinued or claimed to be ‘available on request’. The probable reasons for the non-availability of replicas arethe large production costs and the minimal commercial market. The biggest potential market for the replicas arethe military and commercial demining teams, who both have access to real, inert mines for training purposes.Where dummy mines are required solely for visual identification, they are invariably supplied in the UK by MiltraEngineering, who found little market for working models. Although this level of detail is not available from thepotential manufacturers, it is highly unlikely that all of the materials used would be the same as those in theoriginal mines.

The two available generic OTS options (from Military International and the Night Vision and Electronic SensorsDirectorate at Fort Belvoir, USA) are primarily intended for metal detection and make no attempt to reproduceany detailed features or characteristics of real mines. Even the metal content is generic, using targets such assteel balls and short lengths of tubing.

CKA Proposal

CKA considered the drawbacks of both the purely generic and the modelling approaches to the production ofsimulant and surrogate mines. The resultant proposal is an attempt to minimise the disadvantages byestablishing an acceptable compromise between the two techniques. This is achieved through the use of amodular system in which critical characteristics are replicated accurately, while less important aspects arerepresented generically. For example, metallic components can be replicated relatively easily to create anauthentic signature, while an OTS casing with basic modifications eliminates the need for a special moulding.

The principle is simple, however, in order for it to succeed, the scientific community must specify which minecharacteristics they consider to be critical and which are not. Since different detection technologies will focus ondifferent characteristics, lists of key components and characteristics should be drawn up for each of the likelydetection techniques. These lists can then be used to enhance the surrogate design by identifying thosecomponents and characteristics that need to be interchangeable, and those that do not.


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CKA GENERIC SURROGATE DESIGN

Casings

Since it is important to minimise the number of types to be produced, the major decision is over the choice ofcasings. The casing is normally the single most expensive part to accurately replicate, particularly if complexshapes, such as screw threads, are to be formed. Three sizes of cylinder would offer a reasonablerepresentation of a broad cross-section of mines, though a box section should also be considered. The CKAsystem proposes the use of plumbing fittings, which are available in a wide variety of cylindrical configurations.

These fittings are relatively cheap, easily available and manufactured to very close tolerances; many also havethreaded caps which are watertight, yet allow easy access. Most fittings are available in at least two types ofplastic: the ‘solvent weld’ fittings are generally based on PVC while the non-solvent types are normallypolypropylene or polybutylene. These plastics are easily machined, allowing them to be cut to any length, forexample.

Main charge

Although the original concept was to have replaceable moulded inserts to represent explosive fills, it is preferableto have a material permanently cast into place. This will eliminate unwanted voids and prevent movement. If asingle substance (such as RTV 3110) adequately represents all of the explosive characteristics necessary fordetection, this should be specified as the permanent fill.

Metallic components

The proposed design uses standard ‘metal component inserts’ to represent small assemblies such as detonatorcapsules, firing pins and small springs; these can contain either generic metal targets (Simulants) or accuratemodels of mine components where a specific mine surrogate is needed. They are easily replaced and can beused in any of the mine bodies, which have vertical or horizontal holders positioned inside. Larger components(such as the transverse striker assembly) are fitted to screw-in plugs for the PMN-type surrogate. These can beremoved and blanked off, or replaced by other transverse assemblies.

Internal structures

Some additional internal structures should be mounted in the casing to represent the non-metallic parts of thefuze mechanism. These need not be complex, but should be appropriate to the type of mechanism beingrepresented (eg a shallow plastic cone to represent a Belleville spring). Fabricating and fitting new internalstructures is relatively simple and could probably be done either by the JRC or the contractor.

CKA REPLICAS

As a result of contracts with other research groups and detector manufacturers, CKA have designed and builtreplicas of the Russian PMN, Yugoslav PMA-1, PMA-2 and PMA-3, and the Chinese Type 72 (AP). These minesstill use casings based on plumbing fittings, but selected or altered to represent the relevant mine with muchgreater accuracy than the generic version. Major internal structures are present, and individual metalcomponents are represented in the shape and configuration of the original as far as possible. This type ofsurrogate should be considered for specific applications.


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RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

a. For general research and development, the modular generic approach should be taken, with critical featuresrepresented as accurately as possible.

b. For the modular generic approach, three cylindrical casings should be used: an evenly proportioned cylinder(approximately 50 mm diameter by 60 mm high), a shallow cylinder (approximately 60 mm diameter by 30 mmhigh), and a larger cylinder corresponding to the size of a PMN mine (approximately 110 mm in diameter by 60mm high).

c. A box-type casing (around 140 mm long, 60 mm wide and 50 mm high) should also be seriously considered,since a significant number of minimum- and medium-metal mines have casings in this configuration.

d. Since there are only 3 minimum-metal anti-personnel mine types of mine commonly found in the formerYugoslavia (PMA-1, PMA-2 and PMA-3), closer replication of these types should be considered for researchspecific to the Balkans.

e. The JRC should establish the features and characteristics that they consider to be critical to detection, so thatthe designs can take account of these priorities.

f. The detection of tripwire should given equal priority to the detection of AP mines; real tripwire should besourced from the Balkans for use in detection trials.

C KING February 2000


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Annex 9: Acquisition times and file names relating to the Infraredmeasurements

A summary of the activities and relevant time periods for the measurement seriesundertaken for MIMEVA are recorded in the tables on the following pages.


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MIMEVA Test3 (13 DEC 2000 / Gauss lab.) Mine type : VAR-40 File base name : MIM3

Height 45 mm Diameter 78 mm Mine weight 105 gr. Explosive weight 40 gr. Composition B or T4 Casing material and colourPlastic. Khaki, green, black

Time File number Interval Note 1 Note 2

10 :29 038- 039 Mines on surface Explosive on left

10 :40 – 11 :05 040- 053 2’ Mines covered 2mm dry sand

11 :07 – 12 :07 054- 084 2’ 2kW lamp ON (60 minutes heating)

12 :09 – 13 :53 085 - 137 2’ 2kW lamp OFF (106 minutes cool down)

14 :13 – 14 :15 138 - 139 Mines placed on surface

14 :17 – 14 :29 140 -146 2’ 2kW lamp ON (12 minutes heating)


15 :18 158 Inverted mine positions on surface Explosive on right

15 :18 – 15 :46 159 - 324 10’’ 2kW lamp ON (27 minutes heating) Temp. = 55°C

15 :46 – 16 :15 325 - 500 10’’ 2kW lamp OFF


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MIMEVA Test4 (14 DEC 2000 / Gauss lab.) Mine type : MAUS/1 File base name : MIM4

Time Filenumber

Interval Note 1 Note 2

09 :50 001 Mines on surface Explosive on left

10 :02 002 Mines covered 2mm dry sand

10 :04 – 11:04 003- 033 2’ 2kW lamp ON (60 minutes heating) (43k Lux on surface)


13 :00 – 13 :20 091 - 101 2’ Inverted mine positions (under 2mm sand) Explosive on right

13 :46 – 14:18 105 -121 2’ 2kW lamp ON ( 32 minutes heating)


15 :00 136 Mines placed on surface Explosive on left

15 :00 – 15:10 137 -142 2’ 2kW lamp ON (10 minutes heating) Temp. = 50°C


15 :34 153 Inverted mine positions on surface Explosive on right

15 :34 – 15 :44 154 - 165 1’ 2kW lamp ON (10 minutes heating)

15 :45 –16 :00 166 - 181 1’ 2kW lamp OFF (15 minutes cool down)


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MIMEVA Test7 (18,19 JAN 2001 / Radiometry lab.) Mine types : C. King simulants 1-4 File base name : MIM7

Time Filenumber


16 :15 001 30 s Mines on surface See photo

16 :15 002 – 50 30 s 2kW lamp ON (24 minutes heating)

051 – 150 30s

10 :15 151 Mines buried under 2mm sand – lamp OFF See photo

10 :23 – 11 :25 152 – 276 30s 2kW lamp ON (62 minutes heating) See #280,287,302

11 :26 – 14 :14 277 – 613 30s Lamp OFF (168 minutes cool down) #323,368,440


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MIMEVA Test8 (22 JAN 2001 / Radiometry lab.) Mine types : US SIM simulants + MAUS1 File base name : MIM8

Time Filenumber


10 :20 001 30s Mines on surface See photo

10 :21 – 10 :46 002 – 050 30s Mines on surface (25 minutes heating)

10 :46 051 – 150 30s Mines on surface

13 :30 151 Mines buried under 2mm sand – lamp OFF

13 :30 – 14 :32 152 – 276 30s 2kW lamp ON ( 62 minutes heating) See #154,200,265

14 :32 – 16 :44 277 – 540 30s Lamp OFF (132 minutes cool down) 286,309,329

Lamp : 20° off nadir and 130 cm from sand surface Detector (Agema 570): Vertical and 150 cm from sand surface


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MIMEVA Test 5 ( 24 JAN 2001 / Gauss lab.) Mine type : Tecnovar AUPS-AS(1) File base name : MIM5

Time Filenumber


11 :20 001-20 30s Test5A (No mines- verified heat pattern onsurface)

See #20

11 :45 – 12 :16 024 – 083 30s Test 5B. Mines on surface. Explosive EAST. LampON

See #82

12 :16 – 13 :16 084 – 177 30s Lamp OFF. 60 minutes cool down See #94,117

13 :16 – 14 :06 178 – 277 30s Test 5C. Mines buried –2mm. Lamp ON 50minutes

See #180,211

14 :06 – 15 :00 278 – 387 30s Lamp OFF 54 minutes cool down See #202, 278,319

Lamp : D=130cm Detector : H=150 cm vertical

Verified FOV A570 (@ 8m = ~ 242*300 cm)


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MIMEVA Test6 ( 31 JAN 2001 / Gauss lab.) Mine type MK2 File base name : MIM6

Time Filenumber


12 :00 001 Test6B : Mines on surface (Lamp OFF) Sand temp. 12º C

12 :00 – 12 :30 002 - 060 30s Lamp ON, Mines on surface/ Explosive EAST Heating 30minutes

12 :30 – 13 :30 061 - 181 30s Lamp OFF Cool down 60 minutes

14 :00 182 Test 6C : Mines under 2mm sand / ExplosiveEAST

14 :00 – 15 :00 183 – 303 30s Lamp ON, Mines under 2mm sand Heating 60minutes

15 :00 – 15 :45 304 – 392 30s Lamp OFF, Cool down 45 minutes

Lamp : D=130cm Detector : H=150 cm vertical


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Annex 10: Theoretical Interpretation of relative size of signalsfor the two detectors

In the measurements of section 5.3, the ratio mine signal/calibration signal is, for almost all targets,larger for the Guartel detector than for the Foerster detector. (The only exception is model detonator cannumber 3, where the Foerster signal is slightly higher).

In general, the response of a metal detector to a given object is characterised by the ratio of theelectromagnetic skin-depth d to the size of the object. Two limits arise, the thin-skin limit where the skin-depth is much smaller than the object size, and the thick-skin limit, where it is much greater. An exactsolution exists for the impedance change ?Z in a nearby coil, caused by a small metallic sphere ofradius a [14]. For non-magnetic spheres it is

−+=∆ zVZ

zzIIBB

re

re coth33

12

0µω (9)

the limits being

+−=∆ .....

31512

153

4

4

2

2

0

iδδµ

ω aaII

BB VZre

re (10)

for a<< d and

..........49

)1(23 ii

0

+++−=∆

aVZ

IIBB

re

re δω

µ (11)

for a>> d

z = (i+1) a / d

where

V is the sphere volume

? is the angular frequency

Ie is the current in the exciting coil

Be is the magnetic field due to the exciting coil in the neighbourhood of the sphere

Ir is the current in the receiving coil

Br is the magnetic field due to the receiving coil in the neighbourhood of the sphere

The formulae above are numbered as in [14].

The forms given here are modified so as to be appropriate for detectors with separate excite and receivecoils. Note that the quantity Br / Ir is a constant determined by the geometry of the coil and is finite evenwhen the receive coil carries negligible current, as would normally be the case.

The Guartel detector is a pulsed induction instrument and so both the real and imaginary partscontribute to the output signal SG. However, the contributions of the higher frequency terms will tend todominate, because of the factor of ? in (9a).

The two-frequency system of the Foerster detector is designed so that the output signal is proportionalto the weighted difference of the imaginary part of the impedance change at the two frequencies. Theweights are chosen to be inversely proportional to the frequency i.e. the term in front of V is the same for


Annex 10

AA 501852 Page 144

the two frequencies [15]. Now, for the Minex 2FD 2.500 used here, f2 = 8 f1 exactly, so the signal SF is

+−= )8coth(

81

coth18/7

Im 2 zz

zKVzz

S F

Table A10.1 Values of a/d

Sphere Guartel detector Foerster detector

f eff ~ 500 kHz f1=2.4 kHz

Bronze 9.5mm diameter. 18 1.3

Stainless steel 19 mmdiameter.

15 1.1

The response of the Guartel detector to the calibration spheres is determined by the spectrum of itspulsed field and the overall curve of impedance change against a/d (figure A10.1). But from the table, itis clear that the signal is dominated by terms with large a/d i.e. the detector is essentially operating inthe thin-skin limit. In this region, the normalised impedance change is relatively small and slowly varyingwith a. On the other hand, the Foerster detector is operating close to the maximum of the SF /(KV)curve shown in figure A10.2, which is at a/d = 1.50.

Therefore, the fact that the ratios (target signal)/(calibration signal) were found to be lower for theFoerster detector than for the Guartel detector can be explained theoretically as being because thecalibration spheres happened to have been of size and material such as to produce relatively largesignals for their volume in the Foerster detector. Choice of different calibration spheres could produce adifferent result.

The Foerster detector was operating on a steep part of its response curve, whereas the Guartel wasoperating in a flatter region, so that the signals in the Foerster were more affected by small changes ofvolume or conductivity. This partly explains why the model detonator cans all showed different signalsfor the Foerster, but all gave similar signals in the Guartel (see section 8 on surrogate detonator cansabove).

Table A10.2 (Response to large sphere)/ (Response to small sphere)

Detector Height above top oflarge sphere (mm)

Height above centreof large sphere (mm)

Ratio of signals

Foerster 40 49.5 9.45

Foerster 44 53.5 7.67

Foerster 45 54.75 7.11 (linearlyextrapolated)

Guartel 40 49.5 10.1

The height of the detector was always 50mm above the top of the small sphere, corresponding to54.75mm above the centre of the small sphere.

The relative sizes of the signals from the two spheres may be related to the theory as follows. In thethird row of the table, the response ratio is extrapolated to the height at which the centres of the twospheres would be on the same level. The ratio of the signals, 7.11, is less than the ratio of the volumes,


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8, because the bronze sphere lies closer to the maximum of the signal/volume curve. For the Guarteldetector, the interpretation is less direct, because the response will be affected by the spectrum offrequencies present in the pulse and also because data was measured only at one height. However, it isclear that the ratio is larger than for the Foerster, and at equivalent height, would be closer to the volumeratio 8. For this detector both spheres lie in on the flatter part of the curve well beyond the peak, wherethe signal is more nearly proportional to the sphere volume.

A suggestion for further work is to make measurements with a familiy of different sizes of sphere, allmade from the same material, and plot the curve of signal/volume against sphere diameter. From thescale factor required to fit the horizontal axis to the theory, the conductivity of the material might beinferred.

More challenging would be to attempt the same experiment with ferromagnetic spheres to obtain alsothe effective permeability.

Figure A10.1 Variation of impedance change per unit volume with sphere radius/skindepth


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Figure A10.2 Variation of signal/volume with sphere radius/skin depth for the Foerster2-frequency continuous wave detector


Annex 11

AA 501852 Page 147

Annex 11: Sources of mine replicasThis annex identifies some sources of mine training aids and replicas. Since prices depend on manyfactors, including type of surrogate, quantity needed, and delivery details, they are subject to change. Itis recommended to contact the source to agree prices for specific needs. The suppliers are categorisedunder the headings:

• Models

• Databases

• Computer Simulations

• Simulants

• Surrogates

Models

Model mines are available from several sources.

• Maquettes SEDIAL 16 Rue des Granits 44100 NANTES - FRANCE - Telephone: -+33 (0) 2 40 43 91 11 - Fax : +33 (0)2 40 43 66 03 ( http://www.sedial.com/ ).

It should be noted that these models are externally realistic and their movement is subject to exportcontrol agreements with the French government. These models are considered inappropriate for use ascontrolled references as it is usually not possible to dismantle the model to verify the internal structureand materials used.

• Miltra Engineering Ltd, 207 Chester Road, Watford, Hertfordshire WD1 7RH, UnitedKingdom. e-mail to: [email protected]; Telephone + 44 1923 818342, Fax: + 44 1923 818342(http://www.xga42.dial.pipex.com/ )

• KIK Chemical Industry, Fužine 9, 1240 Kamnik, Slovenia. E-mail: [email protected] Telephone +386 1 839 1011; Fax: +386 1 839 2735

Databases

• MINEFACTS CDROM Interactive database program. V1.2 contains over 675landmines from all over the world. Developed and published by the US Department of Defense.

• ORDATA II Enhanced International deminer’s guide to UXO identification,recovery and disposal. Canadian Department of Defence – includes strong catalogue of UXO. Thedata in the recovery and disposal sections are password protected to allow distribution to mineawareness programmes.

• EODIS, SWEDEN This system includes IT security and safety routines; an Ammunitiondatabase; an Identification tool including 3D image presentation. It is available in variouslanguages and is suitable for mission planning. In support of operational management it includespositioning (GPS + laser range finder) and localisation methods; render safe procedures; warningsystems and mission reporting sections.

• Base de Données, MINEX;. École Supérieure et d’Application du Génie, 106, rue Eblé,Angers, France. Restricted issue french military training database of mines.


Annex 11

AA 501852 Page 148

• Janes Defence Equipment Library – Section on Mines A commercial database,comprehensive, but the cost per copy makes it uncompetitive compared with the databases sourcedfrom the national agencies above,

Computer simulations

• Essex Corporation, 9150 Guilford Road, Columbia, Maryland 21046-189, USA.Telephone: 301-939-7000, e-mail: [email protected]

Essex Corporation produced a computer based training system as part of a US led initiative withDARPA.

• JRC – but only to a limited extent (examples of 3D computer models)

• Thales (F) – developed some computer models of mines for training applications.

Photograph or sketch based training aids are listed by Global Information Networks in Information(at the following web address http://ginie1.sched.pitt.edu/ginie-crises-links/lm/ ) for Afghanistan,Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Yemen, Zaire.

Simulants

The following sources of Mine simulants were identified:

• VSE Corporation, 2550 Huntington Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22303-1499, USA. E-mail:[email protected], telephone +1 (0) 703 329 3239, fax +1 (0) 703 960 3748.

Manufacturers of ITOP SIMs – see Annex 6.

• Colin King Associates Ltd. Wych Warren, Forest Row, E Sussex, RH18 5LP, UnitedKingdom, e-mail to: [email protected] , telephone + 44-1342 826 363, fax: + 44-1342826 363

Development and manufacture of mine simulants.

• Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Electronics Surveillance Laboratory,Surveillance Systems Division, PO Box 1600 Salisbury, SA 5108, Australia.

DSTO developed simulants for internal use. There are restrictions on the availability and useof the design data.

Surrogates

• Colin King Associates Ltd. As noted above for mine simulants – however simulantsproduced have not yet been validated as exact surrogates.

• CroMAC has the capability to produce surrogates based on modification of real mines.There are safety considerations to the approach used which must be carefully evaluated. Due to thenature of these surrogates they are appropriate only for use in controlled test areas within Croatia.


References

AA 501852 Page 149

References

1 MIMEVA – contract technical annex. EC DG III reference AA 501852

2 Title: Measurement plan for MIMEVA, Report No: SAI-AA501852/MEAS_PLAN; SAI, TDP. July1999

3 MIMEVA D1.1 Initial list of mines for which validation tests will need to be conducted withadvanced APL Detection Equipment. JRC delivery to DG INFSO for contract AA 501852 MIMEVA

4 MIMEVA D1.2 – Final list of mines for which validation tests will need to be conducted withadvanced APL Detection Equipment. JRC delivery to DG INFSO for contract AA 501852 MIMEVA

5 On the Internet site of Norwegian Peoples Aid (landmine database)http://www.angola.npaid.org/mines_database.htm

6 Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines, recognising and disarming, Brassey’sLondon and Washington 1997.

7 King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, Jane’s Information Group Limited, London, ThirdEdition 1998-1999.

8 Carter L. J., Kokonozi A., Hosgood B., Coutsomitros C., Sieber A. J., Landmine detection usingstimulated infrared imaging. IGARRS July 2001 (IEEE, 0-7803-7033-3/01

9 Joint Multi-sensor Mine –signature measurements project. Described athttp://demining.jrc.it/msms/protocol/protocol.htm (Annex E describes the test mine replicas).

10 U.S. Army Project Manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions (PM-MCD), Fort Belvoir,Virginia; Four Nation (FR/GE/UK/US) Test and Evaluation (T&E) Working Group for developmentof International Test Operation Procedures (ITOP) for Countermine and Humanitarian Demining

11 MINESIGN: data accessible at: http://apl-database.jrc.it

12 Goodfellow Cambridge Ltd. On line catalogue; http://www.goodfellow.com

13 Matweb, The On-line Materials Information Resource; http://www.matweb.com

14 Impedance changes in a coil due to a nearby conducting sphere, G R Hugo and S K Burke; J. Phys.D Appl. Phys. 21 (1988) pp. 33-38

15 Phase angle based EMI discrimination and analysis of data from a commercial differential twofrequency system, C Bruschini and H Sahli; SPIE Aerosense 2000, 24-28 April 2000 Orlando,Florida, Detection and remediation technologies for mines and mine-like targets, Proc. SPIE 4038paper number [4038-156]


References

AA 501852 Page 150

Mine data has been compiled using data from the following sources:

Countries Information sourcesBosnia and Herzegovina Colin King Associates,

Croatia CROMAC

Kosovo

Angola Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Mozambique Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Somalia/ Uganda (SouthSahara reference)

Norwegian Peoples Aid

Afghanistan Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Cambodia Colin King Associates, Norwegian Peoples Aid

Iraq Norwegian Peoples Aid

Laos Norwegian Peoples Aid

Data for annex 2 was compiled from the following sources of information:

A2.1: On the Internet site of Norwegian Peoples Aid (landmine database)http://www.angola.npaid.org/mines_database.htm

A2.2: Banks E., Brassey’s Essential Guide to Anti-personnel mines, recognising and disarming,Brassey’s London and Washington 1997.

A2.3: King C. (Ed), Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, Jane’s Information Group Limited, London,Third Edition 1998-1999.

Documents

Project MIMEVA - Geneva International Centre for ... · Project MIMEVA Study of generic Mine-like Objects for R&D in Systems for Humanitarian Demining ... 5.2.2 Experimental set-up