ProfQuilop_Responding2Disasters

7/27/2019 ProfQuilop_Responding2Disasters

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Civil-Military

Cooperation in

Emergency Relief

Rosalie Arcala Hall, editor



Contents

Disaster in a Conflict Area:The Indonesian Military’s Role in the 2004 TsunamiResponse in Aceh Province

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Transnational Civil-Military Interface: . . . . . . . . . . . . 9New Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Disaster Relief and the Changing Roles . . . . . . . . . . . 18

of the Indonesian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18The TNI on the Ground:

Disaster Response in Conflict Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Civilian or Military or Both? An Introspection . . . . . 28References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Civil-Military Cooperation in International DisasterResponse: the Japan Self Defense Forces’ ( JSDF)

Deployment in Aceh, Indonesia

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34The Military in Non-Traditional Roles:

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Overseas Deployment and the SelfDefense Forces Reinvention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Japan as Sending Country: Framework of Overseas

Deployment for Disaster Relief Missions . . . . . . . . . . 40Indonesia as Receiving Country: Disaster ResponseFrameworks and the Role of International Actors . . 47The JSDF in Action at Aceh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49International Actors in Aceh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Military versus Civilian Roles in Disaster Relief:

A Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66(Endnotes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71



The Role of Transnational Society in Tsunami

Humanitarian Aid

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Humanitarian Assistance Following Disasters:The Role of Transnational Societies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Disaster and Conflict: The OperationalConundrum at Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85What Legal Framework?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Military Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98Local Engagements and Public Acceptance . . . . . . . 104Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Responding to Disasters: Framework, Challenges

and Prospects for the Philippines

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114The Philippine Disaster Response Framework . . . . 116

The Military in Disaster Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Challenges and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134



Responding to Disasters:

Framework, Challenges

and Prospects for thePhilippines1*

Raymund Jose G. Quilop Associate Professor of Political Science

University of the Philippines Diliman andSenior Analyst of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies

Armed Forces of the Philippines

Introduction

While the Philippine military has come to beknown more for prosecuting an insurgency campaign foralmost the past four decades, against both the communist

insurgents and Muslim secessionists, its role in otherareas, particularly in disaster response, has likewiseconsistently grown and expanded.

This is particularly true considering that thePhilippines is regularly struck with calamities anddisasters, which the government has officially defined

as “a situation usually catastrophic in nature, in whicha number of persons are plunged into helplessnessand suffering, and as a result may be in need of food,clothing, shelter, medical care and other basic necessitiesof life” (NDCC : 27). Calamities and disasters are oftentimes the result of typhoons and storms that regularly hitthe country annually as well as the occasional volcaniceruptions and earthquakes the country experiences.

1 * This essay is a revised version of the discussion paper prepared for Work -

shop on Civil-Military Cooperation in Emergency Relief in Tokyo, Japan on January

21-22, 2008. The views expressed by the author in this essay are his personal views and

do not necessarily reflect the official position of the institutions he is affiliated with.



Responding to disasters is actually not somethingnew for the military. Its involvement in disaster responsedates back during the Marcos administration with

included “transporting people from areas struck bycalamities and delivering food and medicines” (Hall2004: 115). This role became “more pronounced” in 1992-98 with the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in Central Luzon. AsHall notes, “[t]hey built houses, classrooms and clinics invictim relocation areas. They completed the constructionof the Mount Pinatubo Megadike and de-silted/dredgedrivers congested by lahar flow. They constructedbunkhouses and bathrooms in urban poor resettlementareas. They built schools under the president’s schoolbuilding program. In the realm of disaster preparedness,the military took the lead in organizing local evacuationsystems” (Hall, 2004: 118)

The government as a whole and the defense

department where the AFP is embedded has frameworksand guidelines regarding the military’s involvement indisaster response. In fact, disaster response is officiallyspelled-out as a mission area for the entire Philippinedefense establishment, indicating that it is actuallyconsidered as a priority area for deployment of forcesand allocation of limited resources which the defensedepartment receives from the national government. The

six other mission areas are internal security, territorialdefense, national development, international defenseand security engagement, peacekeeping operations, andcommand and control.

However, much needs to be done if the armedforces were to be more effective in responding to disasteras will be elaborated in the succeeding sections of this

essay. Furthermore, how the growing role of the armedforces in responding to disasters impacts on its corecompetence of managing violence and prosecuting warsneed to be examined as well.



It is in this context where this essay attempts toexamine the growing role of military personnel in thisspecific non-traditional area for militaries to operate in

an attempt to flesh out where exactly does and should thearmed forces fit in the overall elaborate disaster responseframework of the government. This is particularlyimportant amidst apprehensions that with the growingrole of the military in disaster response, not only is itscore competence as a military force being sacrificed andlimited resources being spread too thinly but its influence

in the wider Philippine polity might unnecessarily growas well.

The Philippine Disaster Response Framework

The government has a policy framework foras well as a seemingly too elaborate institutional

mechanism for responding to calamities and disaster.The policy framework is embodied in Presidential Decree1566 (“Strengthening the Philippine Disaster ControlCapability and Establishing the National Program onCommunity Disaster Preparedness”) issued by thenPresident Ferdinand Marcos on June 11, 1978.

The decree established the so-called DisasterCoordinating Council system as the Philippines’institutional mechanism for responding to disasters andcalamities. Through this system, disaster coordinatingbodies are established at all levels of government in thePhilippines, from the national to the barangay (village/community) level, to facilitate coordination amongthe various government agencies and between the

government and non-government organizations thatare involved in responding to disasters and calamities.Apparently, through this system, the Philippines is able to“utilize all available means for disaster response” which



are “ordinarily used for military and police missions,public service or commercial purposes” (Capistrano: 2).At the highest level, the national disaster coordinating

council (NDCC) is composed of the defense secretaryas chairman, with the secretaries of public works,transportation and communication, social welfare anddevelopment, agriculture, education, finance, laborand employment, justice, trade and industry, interiorand local government, health, environment and naturalresources, and budget as members. The Chief of Staff of

the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the administrator ofthe Office of Civil Defense (OCD), which incidentally isanother bureau within the defense department, and theSecretary-General of the Philippine National Red Crossare also members.

The NDCC is actually the “highest policy making,coordinating and supervising body” regarding disaster

management. It could recommend to the Presidentwhether a state of calamity in certain areas struck bydisaster or calamity including the entire Philippines needto be declared. The declaration is crucial as it enables thenational government to release the so-called NationalCalamity Fund to support disaster response operations-related activities.

The decree specifies that the Office of Civil Defensewithin the defense department provides secretariatservices to the national disaster coordinating council.More importantly, it is responsible for coordinatingthe “activities and functions of the various agencies[of the government] and private institutions and civicorganizations” in implementing policies drawn by

the NDCC as regards disaster management. It is alsotasked to “prepare and disseminate disaster controlmanuals and other publications” pertaining to “disasterprevention, control and mitigation”. As such, the OCD



is actually the operating arm of the NDCC. Below theNDCC, the various DCCs are given the responsibility toestablish their respective “operating facilities” or disaster

operations centers.

Considering that the “region” is not actually apolitical subdivision but merely an administrative one, itis the regional police director that serves as the chairmanof the DCC at this level, with the executives of the regionaloffices and field stations of the different line agencies of

the government serving as members.

At the provincial, city/municipal and barangaylevel, the elected local chief executives namely theprovincial governor, city/municipal mayor andbarangay chairman serve as chairmen, respectively, oftheir respective DCCs. The chief of police in these localgovernment units serve as vice-chairman and the action

officer. Officials and officers of national governmentagencies assigned in these areas including the localofficials themselves serve as members.

A set of implementing rules and regulations wassubsequently issued by then Defense Minister JuanPonce Enrile who was also the chairman of the National

Disaster Coordinating Council. The IRR defines theresponsibility of every agency, office or entity in relationto disaster response. It also establishes the “proceduresand guidelines for inter-agency coordination anddissemination of information before, during or after adisaster/calamity”. What is more important though isthe fact that the IRR enumerates the various “disastermanagement activities” that will be undertaken in the

various phases of disaster management namely: pre-disaster phase, emergency phase and post-emergencyphase.



Activities undertaken under the first phase includeplanning for disasters, drills, public information drive,stockpiling of basic materials, organizing and training

programs, and communication and warning activities.In the emergency phase, the crucial services that mustbe made available include the following: rescue andengineering, evacuation of affected people, first-aid andmedical services, disaster relief services, police auxiliaryservice, auxiliary fire service, emergency transportationservices, and assessment of resulting damage. In the

post-emergency phase, data must be cross-checked,requirements for rehabilitation have to be determined andthe availability of labor to restore, repair and constructdamaged infrastructures must be ensured.

Consequently, a Calamities and DisasterPreparedness Plan was prepared, the latest version havingbeen issued in August 1988. The plan’s primary objective

is to “ensure effective and efficient implementation ofcivil protection program through an integrated, multi-sectoral and community based approach and strategiesfor the protection and preservation of life, property andenvironment”. The plan details the specific tasks andfunctions of the various agencies involved in the councilas well as those of the various tiers of the council.

The Philippine disaster response frameworkinvolves four phases namely mitigation, preparedness,response and rehabilitation. According to the NDCC,the mitigation phase pertains to implementing measuresto minimize the impact of disaster or calamity in termsof casualties and damage to properties. These includeinsurance coverage of properties, implementation of

safety regulations, land use and zoning, building and firecodes, among others. The preparedness phase involvespre-disaster actions that would minimize the loss of livesand properties such as formulating contingency plans,



informing the public adequately, educating and trainingindividuals involved in disaster response.

In the event that a disaster or calamity strikes,response becomes crucial. This refers to the “concertedeffort by two or more agencies, public or private to provideemergency assistance or relief to persons” affected by thedisaster or calamity. Finally, rehabilitation of the affectedarea needs to be undertaken. This refers to the process ofrestoring to a normal condition the public infrastructures

damaged by the disaster or calamity.

The Military in Disaster Response

The Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan of1988 spells out the following specific tasks for the armedforces: (1) organization of reaction teams in all military

installations, (2) establishment of communicationlinkages and their availability for disaster operations, (3)assistance to the national police in securing disaster areas,(4) assistance in the reconstruction of damaged nationaland local roads and/or bridges, structures and facilities,and (5) assistance in providing transportation facilitiesfor the quick movement of relief supplies and personnel

as well as the evacuation of victims of disasters.

In 1990, the Department of National Defenseand the Armed Forces of the Philippines came up witha Crisis Management Manual. This manual “prescribesthe concept, policies and procedures” to equip militarycommanders with a “basic understanding of crisismanagement” and to guide their actions during crises.

While the manual acknowledges two types of crisesnamely man-made and natural, it focuses more on man-made emergencies, specifically as regards crises createdby insurgent and terrorist groups.



Nonetheless, the crisis management proceduresspelled out in the manual is also applicable in handlingnatural calamities. The manual details what ought to

be done in various phases of managing a crisis namelythe proactive and reactive phases. These two phasesinvolve what the government calls the 4-P Model namelyprediction, prevention and preparation for the proactivephase and performance for the reactive phase.

What is interesting to note here is that another sys-

tem for handling crises is actually to be utilized accordingto the crisis management manual -- the Peace and OrderCouncil. These councils are established along the variouslevels of government, namely national, provincial, city/municipal and barangay. The composition is the same asthat of the disaster coordinating council. In addition to thePOC, a Special Actions Committee (SAC) at all tiers has alsobeen constituted. The SACs are supposed to take “decisive

action” in emergency situations.

In accordance with PD 1566 and the Calamitiesand Disasters Preparedness Plan, the GeneralHeadquarters of the AFP published in 1995 StandardOperating Procedure (SOP) No. 15, which created theAFP Disaster Response Task Force whose mission is to

assist the NDCC in conducting search, rescue, relief andrehabilitation operations. It is this task force that providesgeneral direction and control over all disaster responseoperations of the AFP.

Correspondingly, the Army, Navy and Air Forcehave created their respective Disaster Response TaskGroups (DRTGs). The Unified Commands (those that

employ the various forces coming from the Army, Navyand Air Force) also have their corresponding DRTGs.In addition, they have put up Disaster Coordinating



Centers, which are collocated with the Regional DisasterCoordinating Councils. The DCC automatically servesas the AFP’s Advance Command Post (ACP) in areas

struck by calamities or disasters. Depending on where acalamity or disaster strikes, the armed forces’ division/brigade or battalion is expected to respond. Of course,the corresponding air force and navy units in the saidarea, if available, are also expected to respond.

The functions of the DRTF are actually those

enumerated in Calamities and Disaster PreparednessPlan but with the added function of providing medicalassistance to victims of calamities and disasters. Thisfunction is performed by the AFP Reserve Command’sTechnical Service Battalion composed of doctors, nursesand medical aidmen.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the armed forces serves

as the Task Force commander and therefore exercisescommand and control over it. Next in command is theDeputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who exercisesfunctional supervision over the task force. The assistantdeputy chief of staff for logistics heads the administrativeand resources section, the assistant deputy chief of stafffor civil-military operations heads the disaster monitoring

and public affairs section, and the Chief of the AFP’sCommand Center serves as the head of the task force’splans and operations section.

In addition to the regular force of the AFP, reservistunits are also utilized during calamities and disasters.These include the Ready Reserve (15th ID) and RegionalCommunity Defense Group of the Army and the Reserve

Centers of both the Air Force and Navy.

With disaster response being one of the sevenmission areas for the Philippine military, it is also



instructive to look at the resources allocated; specificallythose that relate to what are mode of operatingexpenditures (MOE) for this concern. For the year

2008 and in terms of the PHP 9 billion allotted for thesix mission areas, excluding force level command andcontrol, disaster response received PHP 157 million,making it rank number 4 out of the 6 mission areas.

Of course, what has been allocated is still smallcompared to internal security operations, which received

the biggest (PHP 7.8 billion). This is followed by supportto national development (PHP 496 million) and territorialdefense (PHP 300 million). Humanitarian assistance gotthe smallest (PHP 7.3 million).

The nature of insurgencies, which necessitate“winning the hearts and minds of the populace”, explainswhy support to national development gets the second

biggest allocation after internal security operations. Theseare the resources utilized by the military in undertakingcommunity projects that are intended to bring peoplecloser to the government.

Challenges and Prospects

The Philippines indeed has an elaborateframework compared to other countries in respondingto disasters. But even with this response framework,the assistance of other countries when calamities anddisasters strike is still necessary, particularly because ofthe increasing magnitude of disasters. Timely assistanceand effective response from other countries is of course

greatly facilitated if a regional response frameworkexists. Developing such a framework is difficult, as thefindings of two landmark seminar-workshops hosted bythe Philippines in 1999 and in 2002 and which were namedSAGIP (the Filipino word for rescue).



Brought together participants from the Philippines,the US and Australia, primarily to exchange informationon the disaster relief structures of the three countriesincluding the role of defense authorities in responding todisasters. It was also meant to enhance cooperation among

the three states as regards delivering disaster relief. Themain purpose of the exercise was to “develop commonprocedures for cooperative disaster relief operations in theevent of a major disaster as a means to enhance regionaldefense relationship”. Unfortunately, the desired set ofcommon procedures was not developed.

In 2002, the pool of involved countries was

expanded to twelve (12). These included Australia,Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore,Switzerland and Thailand. The 2002 Sagip attemptedto further develop a “common framework for disasterresponse, including management, infrastructure andprocedure to enhance coordinated multinational response

to disasters”. It was also meant to “identify linkagesamong national response agencies, regional warningcenters and multinational disaster responders”. Thismeant that what were involved were no longer simply thedefense forces of the participating states but their civilianagencies and thus, the framework should also providefor mechanisms where these agencies could effectivelycoordinate their actions with military and defense forces

in responding to disasters. The objective of Sagip 2002 wasto develop a set of policy recommendations, proceduresand mechanisms for implementing a regional frameworkfor enhancing multi-national cooperation in disaster

Sagip 99, as it was called, brought together partici-pants from the Philippines, the US and Australia, primarilyto exchange information on the disaster relief structures of

the three countries including the role of defense authoritiesin responding to disasters.



A positive development to date is the existenceof the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Managementand Emergency Response (AADMER) and the ASEANStandby Arrangements and Standard OperatingProcedures for disaster management operations. Whatneeds to be done is how to translate these arrangementsinto a mechanism that would allow for a coordinated

action from disaster response agencies of the various Asia-Pacific states. The Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Militaryand Civil Defense Assets in the Disaster Relief could serveas a takeoff point for developing a regional framework.But it must be noted that these set of guidelines merelyestablishes a “framework for formalizing and improvingthe effectiveness and efficiency of the use of military

teams and expertise in international disaster relief”.More effective disaster response needs the involvementof other agencies of government, as will be furtherelaborated below.

The difficulty of developing a common frameworkand once available, developing the correspondingregional infrastructure was already apparent in Sagip

1999 involving only 3 states. The attempt to developone became doubly difficult in Sagip 2002 with 12 statestaking part.

In fact, this is the same observation in therecently concluded ASEAN Regional Forum VoluntaryDemonstration of Response. Held in Manila in 2009 and

co-hosted by the Philippines and the US, 14 states aroundthe Asia-Pacific including the European Union took part.Eight other Asian countries were observers. The exerciseshowed that while some Asia-Pacific states (including

response. But again, the procedures and mechanisms forimplementing a regional framework for disaster responseremain to be developed.



to disasters is still to be developed. For those countrieswith the capacity to respond to disasters, their internalmechanisms are already well-developed. But externalmechanisms to find synergy among such internalmechanisms are still in various stages of development.In the meantime that a regional framework and

infrastructure is being fleshed out, what could be doneis to determine how foreign partners could practicallycoordinate with the Philippines and dovetail theirpresence in cases where disasters or natural calamitieshit the Philippines and foreign assistance is solicited bythe Philippine government.

Timeliness of response is, of course, important,

with the first 72 hours, being the most crucial. Medicines,food, drinking water, rescue equipment need to be madeavailable and a communications structure need to be set-up within the said time frame in order to increase thechances of rescuing affected persons.

Usually, the foreign ministries of other states

offer assistance to the Philippines through the country’sDepartment of Foreign Affairs. The DFA then conveys theoffer to the NDCC and the NDCC makes the assessmentas to what specific assistance is needed. Althoughcoursed through the Philippine Department of ForeignAffairs, the primary channel whereby foreign partnersproviding assistance to the Philippine personnel duringtimes of natural disasters and calamities remain to be the

disaster coordinating council system. The strategy, ofcourse, varies with each country. For the US, for example,the practice is to send a so-called Disaster AssessmentTeam composed of 2-3 members who coordinate with

the Philippines) have the framework for responding todisasters with a few having a demonstrated capability toaddress disasters, others simply don’t. More interesting

is the fact that a regional infrastructure for responding



How to facilitate coordination among the variousdisaster relief agencies and forces both at the planningand operational, i.e. deployment, levels consequently isanother central issue. Yet, the process for coordinatingthe execution of certain tasks related to disasterrelief operations is complex and often unclear. It wasacknowledged that in order for foreign partners toeffectively provide assistance to the Philippines, it is

necessary that they be informed of the command structurefor disaster-relief operations, which unfortunatelyis relatively complex. The structure also needs to besimplified.

It is also enlightening to note that while disasterresponse is often primarily undertaken by civilian

agencies of governments, coordination among militariesappears relatively easier. This is probably becausemilitaries across the region practically have the samecommand structure. Besides, each of these military forcesis practically familiar with how other military forces arestructured and how they operate.

In this regard, the Philippine armed forces,

for example, recognized that there is a need for closerdialogue and consultation between the Philippinemilitary and their foreign partners and for an enhancedliaison mechanism between Filipino and foreign militarycommanders. What was also recognized is the usefulnessof having the Philippine military serve as the focal pointof coordination between foreign military personnel and

local civilian authorities.

It is in this context that military to militarycooperation between the Armed Forces of the

the NDCC in determining what specific assistance couldbe extended.



cooperation. The recently created Security EngagementBoard composed of Philippine and US military officials,which focuses on Philippine-US cooperation in non-traditional security issues has formulated a concept of joint operations for disaster response that fleshes out themechanics of how the US could provide assistance to thePhilippines during disasters and calamities.

The concept involves the establishment of whatare called Combined Coordination Centers. Composedmainly of military personnel, the CCC covers issuespertaining to operations, civil-military operations andcommunication, transportation, mobility and manpower.While other civilian agencies could eventually beinvolved in operations, CMO and communications,

military personnel would be primarily concerned withtroop mobility and provision of the manpower requiredfor effective action. If the area struck by a calamity ordisaster happens to be a conflict zone between themilitary and domestic insurgents, AFP personnel wouldbe tasked of ensuring peace and order in support of policeoperations as well as force protection for both local and

foreign military personnel.

The February 2008 Balikatan Exercises betweenPhilippine and US troops also focused on humanitarianassistance and disaster response. Specifically, theexercises developed a concept for the formation andemployment of a joint task force (JTF) to command andcontrol joint operations in humanitarian assistance and

disaster response; examined how to establish, organize,and operationalize the joint task force; establishedcommand and control relationships between JTF andother agencies; and enhanced interoperability with otheragencies and US JTF among others.

Philippines and other armed forces, specifically the USforces, has increasingly considered disaster responsetogether with humanitarian assistance as one key area of



The prospect for foreign partners effectivelyinterfacing with the Philippines in responding to disasterscould be greatly enhanced if the Philippine’s unilateral

capability for disaster response is enhanced. Along thisline, the Philippines needs to go beyond merely relyingon the services of the armed forces in times of disastersand instead improve the capability of its Office of CivilDefense (OCD), which incidentally is another agencywithin the Philippines’ defense department and which ismandated to coordinate on the national level, the activities

and functions of various agencies and instrumentalitiesof the national government and private institutions andcivic organizations developed to public welfare so thatthe facilities and resources of the entire nation may beutilized to the maximum extent for the protection of thecivilian populace and preservation of property duringtimes of war and other national emergencies of equallygrave character (Office of Civil Defense).

However, with the Philippines not havingbeen engaged in war, specifically against a foreignaggressor although it has been fighting an insurgencywar, the OCD has evolved to focus more on the othernational emergencies of equally grave character. Theseare the disasters and calamities that regularly hit the

Philippines.

In the Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Planof 1988, the OCD is specifically tasked to perform thefollowing functions, to wit:

make available the National Disaster1.Management Center for use by the National

Disaster Coordinating Council duringdisaster operations and during conferencesof the NDCC Technical Working Group;



spearhead, in coordination with the2.Department of Interior and Local Government,the organization of Disaster Coordinating

Councils and with the other departments/agencies in the organization of DisasterControl Groups or Action Teamsdevelop and prepare programs of instruction/3.training modules for disaster preparednesstraining of disaster council and disastercontrol group members in coordination

with the Department of Social Welfare andDevelopment and the Department of Interiorand Local Governmentdevelop and prepare training programs4.and train the organic trainers of thosedepartments/agencies tasked with theorganization of disaster coordinating councils,disaster control groups or reaction teams.

In fact, the OCD is actually the operations center ofthe NDCC with the OCD’s administrator serving as theexecutive officer of the council and interestingly is theonly bureau within the defense department, aside fromthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, which has offices atthe regional level.

Efforts to enhance the capacity of the OCD havecommenced but much more needs to be done. Theincreasing frequency and magnitude of disasters affectingthe Philippines and the region makes it imperative that thedisaster response capacity of the office be prioritized.

The OCD needs to work closely with local

government units and local officials, who are actuallythe first responders in times of disaster. Furthermore,the OCD also needs to work closely with militarycommanders and troops in the field as they, together



with the local officials, are also usually the first to beon the site of disasters. Beyond working closely withlocal executives and the military, the OCD also needs to

strengthen its linkages with both domestic and foreignresponse-related organizations. Non-governmentalorganizations, organized reserves as well as other privateinstitutions also need to interface with the OCD for aneffective and efficient response to disasters.

Conclusion

The disaster coordinating council (DCC)framework from which disaster response proceedsassigns a limited and ancillary role to the military. TheDCC is civilian agencies’ dominated and led. The armedforces is represented in the national coordinating body,but its presence is not axiomatic in the local DCCs. It

must be noted that while the defense secretary chairs thenational tier of the DCC, the lower-level tiers are headedby local chief executives with the corresponding chiefs ofpolice serving as vice-chairmen.

The AFP’s role specified in the Calamities andDisasters Preparedness Plan is limited to establishingcommunications linkages, providing assistance to

the police in handling security of the affected area,reconstruction of roads and similar infrastructure andproviding transport support for aid distribution andevacuation of victims.

The Philippine disaster response framework is alsoconfigured for small-scale natural disasters, which thecountry experiences with regularity (typhoons, flooding,

landslides). In this type of disaster, it is assumed thatthe civilian government apparatus in the affected arearemains operational, and therefore able to coordinateresponses under the DCC framework.



Nonetheless, the AFP’s organization of a DRTFindicates that the armed forces takes its role in disasterresponse seriously. While disaster relief may have the

least mature structures and guidelines in conductingoperations relative to its other mission areas suchas internal security operations, territorial defense,international defense and security engagement, nationaldevelopment, the structure and the concept of operationsfor disaster response exist. What needs to be done isfor these structures and processes to be refined and of

course, simplified, to facilitate the entry of civilian bodiesin disaster operations, particularly foreign partners, ifnecessary.

The good thing is that there exist frameworksfor the armed forces participation in these so-calledoperations other than war, although they need to befurther refined, particularly in consideration of the

involvement of foreign forces. But, as previously pointedout, it is equally necessary that the capacity to respond todisasters of the Office of Civil Defense, which is civilianstaffed although another agency within the defenseestablishment, needs to be enhanced. This is to enablethe Philippine to respond to disasters without relyingtoo much on the armed forces.

The involvement of the armed forces inresponding to disasters in something expected andactually something the wider public would welcome. Itis indicative of the realization within government thatthe role of its armed forces is no longer solely confinedwith prosecuting military operations in times of conflictwhether internal or with other countries. But overly

relying on the military to respond to disasters not onlydiverts limited resources away from the thrust to enhancethe armed forces’ own capability to perform its primarymandate of addressing armed challenges to the nation’s



and people’s security. More disturbing is the possibilityof having the military playing a dominant, althoughhopefully not a domineering role, in other affairs of the

country, affairs which are better left to civilian agenciesof the government.



References

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Hall, Rosalie Arcala “Exploring New Roles for the PhilippineMilitary:Implications for Civilian Supremacy,” PhilippinePolitical Science Journal Vol 25 No. 48 (2004) : 107-130.

Capistrano, Melgabal. “Natural Disaster Reduction: NationalResponse and International Cooperation”. Paper presented atthe 3rd International Working Group Seminar and Exercise on

Multilateral Disaster Response and Humanitarian Assistanceheld at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel, Makati City, Philippineson July 22-26, 2002.

Department of National Defense. “Defense Policy:Transforming Defense through Reforms”. 2007.

Department of National Defense. “Strategic Defense and

Security Outlook: The Emerging Defense and the FutureDefense Security Environment”. 2007.

Department of National Defense. “The Defense Department:Declaration of National Policies, Mandate, Mission, StrategicGoals and Structures”. 2007.

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Documents

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