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International Review of Applied Economics

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Producer collectives through self-help:sustainability of small tea growers in India

Debdulal Saha

To cite this article: Debdulal Saha (2020): Producer collectives through self-help:sustainability of small tea growers in India, International Review of Applied Economics, DOI:10.1080/02692171.2020.1773646

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2020.1773646

Published online: 10 Jun 2020.

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Producer collectives through self-help: sustainability of small tea growers in IndiaDebdulal Saha

Centre for Labour Studies and Social Protection, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Guwahati Campus, Assam, India

ABSTRACTCollective action through self-help among small tea growers (STGs) is considered as a sustainable alternative of producer collectives in tea plantations in India. Using the case study method, this article discusses that self-help groups (SHGs) among STGs are used as innovative functioning systems to access markets, obtain fair price and gain knowledge and information. Mutual ownership of the manufacturing units along with establishing close relations with capital and individual landholding not only empower the growers but also help them in moving upward in the value chain and provide them with the identity as rural entrepreneurs. While demo-cratic organisational structure, transparency, social cohesion, lea-dership and associational power in accessing various input and financial services are the main factors of success of such self- management model and collective actions, these could face threats owing to power asymmetry and overly pro-capital business strategies.

KEYWORDS Tea plantations; small tea growers; social and solidarity economy; producer collectives

1. Introduction

Considering three case studies from West Bengal and Assam in India, this article explores how, why and to what extent independent tea growers with the help of various stakeholders, including individuals, organisations and institutions, orga-nise themselves economically and politically, as producers for sustainability and upgradation. Two models of producer collectives – Self-Help Group (SHG) and Producer Company Limited (PCL) – have been discussed in this paper to under-stand collective actions. While the SHG model is being practiced in West Bengal, the PCL model is being introduced in Assam. The role and functioning of two existing SHGs for production from West Bengal are critically examined whereas the processes and challenges involved in the development of a PCL are discussed in the context of Assam. The main commonality between these two models is that both the models are collectively organised by the small tea growers (STGs) through self-help. The nature of solidarity in group formation and collectivisa-tion processes is also similar in both the models. Our critical reflection on collectivisation, however, is limited to the SHG model because this model is

CONTACT Debdulal Saha debdulals@tiss.edu; debdulals@gmail.com

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED ECONOMICS https://doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2020.1773646

© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

being used and viewed as a successful alternative collective action not only by the members and their associations but also by the state.

A SHG denotes a collective organisation of individuals, who belong to the same socio- economic strata, share common concerns and problems and meet regularly to provide and receive mutual support and assistance (Katz and Bender 1976; Klaw and Luong 2010). Studies (Rappaport 1987; Mok 2001, 2004; Levy 2000) have shown that collective participation in SHGs empowers its members as well as helps them to deal and cope with problems and stress, and reduces burdens. Literature (Rappaport 1987; Steward 1990; Maton and Salem 1995; Mok 2004) discusses that the self-managed shared support structure, peer-based cohesive group and able leadership of the system have instilled a sense of empowerment, self-confidence, self-efficacy and self-responsibility among the members of the group. The joint liability model for group lending seems to have the maximum potential for overcoming the information asymmetries which have traditionally made lending to the poor difficult (Gadenne and Vasudevan 2007).

SHGs and their functions have been studied across various disciplines and in different fields of research. The SHG model came into effect in India since late 1980s. In 1992, the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Commercial Banks (CBs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) formed SHG as an effective strategy to provide banking services to the so-called ‘un-bankable’ vulnerable people (group). The SHG-Bank Linkage Model (SBLM) in India is the most effective institutional model of the SHGs that has mainly emerged through three different schemes. First, banks directly form and finance the SHGs. Second, SHGs are formed by NGOs, government and other agencies but financed by banks. Third, banks finance SHGs with NGOs and other agencies as financial inter-mediaries. SHGs are widely used in the field of microfinance where people are entrusted with finance through joint liability groups (JLGs). In general, JLGs consist of 10–20 female members who require savings deposits and mandatorily meet on a weekly or monthly basis (Gadenne and Vasudevan 2007). Loans, disbursement mechanisms and rates of interest can be internally and mutually decided (ibid.). SHGs are popularised to a great extent both in rural and urban India, especially among women as they are considered to be more loyal to repayments and disciplined beneficiaries (Bhowmik and Saha 2013).

Producer companies, on the other hand, are one of the newest forms of producers’ collective action in agricultural production and marketing in India since 2002 (Trebbin and Hassler 2012). Their roles are important in establishing business principles among farming communities, building networking channels for connecting smallholders to supply the value chain, reducing transaction costs, improving market access, informa-tion and performance, and creating an entrepreneurial culture among farmers to protect them from cartelisation of big companies (Barham and Chitemi 2009; Markelova et al. 2009; Bikkina, Rama, and Bhamoriya 2018). In case of overproduction or underproduction, these organisations give farmers a space to plan their mitigation of price volatility and market fluctuation. According to Markelova et al. (2009), the government has a vital role to play in facilitating development and creation of an enabling environment for farmer groups to flourish, by removing market imperfections espousing pro-poor policies.

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The tea industry in India is undergoing structural changes. Since the 1980s, one of the developments in the sector has been production through smallholders known as STGs. The STGs are peasant farmers who possess up to 10.12 hectares (ha) of land and cultivate their own land using family and casual labour (Saha 2018). They operate outside the regulatory framework which limits accessibility to state support or any formal financial institutions. Various models of farmer producer organisations such as cooperatives, primary producer societies (PPSs), SHGs and PCLs are adapted by STGs as innovative methods of functioning that provide access to market and obtain fair price, input knowledge and information (Mansingh and Johnson 2012; Ramachandran 2016). However, the SHG model seems to have drawn attention in recent times especially in West Bengal and is also being promoted by the state through the Tea Board of India (TBI) as an alternative collective form of production and empowerment among small-holders in the region. In addition, the TBI has been focusing the development of STGs by dedicating a separate department to address issues related to STGs through the intro-duction of registration, provision of smart cards, encouraging the formation of SHGs, partially supporting financial services to producer’s societies in setting up primary producers’ factories, initiating various capacity development programmes for STGs, and conducting awareness and training programmes on the process of scientific manage-ment of crops for growers. SHGs and PCLs have been formed by the members, supported by government and partially financed by banks under SHG-Bank Linkage Model. SHG model in tea sector is exclusive in nature. Unlike other SHGs existing in India, group members predominantly are male. This is mainly because ownership of land is one of the primary criteria for forming SHGs among STGs. Land is mainly owned by head of the household who is generally male1 member of the family in India.

In this article, the mobilisation process through self-help among STGs is under-stood from the concept of social solidarity economy (SSE) used by Peter Utting (2015). The SSE refers to the economic activity that involves producers, workers, consumers and citizens acting collectively and in solidarity. Besides traditional socio- economic associations including cooperatives, grant-dependent and service-provider NGOs; it also involves SHGs that produce goods and services, fair trade networks, consumer groups for collective provisioning, associations of informal sector workers, new forms of profit-making social enterprises and social entrepreneurs, and self- sustaining NGOs undertaking income-generating activities (ibid.). STGs use various forms of solidarity especially to access finance, community-based saving schemes and other services to interact with the state and markets. One of Utting’s (2015) proposi-tions on SSE is to look at ‘integrative scaling up’ through its alternative potential, by measuring its scale, documenting its good practices and examining its regional manifestations. Thus, this paper aims to examine how the SHG and PCL models are trying to mobilise tea growers in promoting sustainable tea cultivation within the framework of the SSE and to understand to what extent the producers have been able to organise themselves. Drawing from Markelova et al. (2009) and Trebbin and Hassler (2012), seven services – organisational, capacity building, marketing, financial, transaction, policy advocacy and information – are considered to critically evaluate the function of producers’ societies among STGs.

The article has been synthesised into eight sections. The introductory section begins with the central question on how a new form of producers’ collective through self-help

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 3

has emerged in two major tea-producing states – Assam and West Bengal. Empirical and theoretical lines of enquiries are outlined in this section. The next section deals with data collection process and methods that have been applied to conduct this study. The third section explains the emergence of smallholders in tea plantations and their features in Assam and West Bengal based on the study undertaken by the author during 2016–18. The changes in ownership in the tea sector are briefly discussed in the fourth section. Producers’ collectivisation among tea growers began with the formation of PPSs which eventually led some of the societies to set up collectively owned manufacturing units through various models. Three cases of two producer collective models are presented in the fifth section. While processes of collectivisation are examined in the sixth section, success of such collective ownership is elaborated in the seventh section. The questions on sustainability and the future of these forms of producers’ collectives are addressed in the last section.

2. Data and methods

As the objective of the study is to understand interaction among various stakeholders, individual, organisational, social and the state, the case study method has been used to collect the data (Yin 1984). This paper examines functions and sustainability of two SHGs – Panbari and Jai Jalpesh – from West Bengal and one PCL, namely, Rwdwmsha (meaning revive in the local Bodo2 language) Tea Producer Company Limited from Assam. The main reason behind selecting these three societies was that they have interactions with all the major stakeholders (state, market and people) in the sector. I made periodic visits during 2016–19 to these SHGs and PCL to understand the development process of these models, their journey from being mere groups to the formation of society/company-owned factories and their interactions with other key stakeholders in the process. In-depth interviews with 20 growers across different size of landholdings from these three producers’ collectives, 15 key informant interviews from members, government officials and executive members from different associations and societies were conducted, focusing on their membership criteria, internal governance and the benefits enjoyed by members. Based on seven services drawn from Markelova et al. (2009) and Trebbin and Hassler (2012), nine broad codes and indicators were taken into account to analyse the functions and processes of collectivisation (see Table 1). The

Table 1. Coding and analysis framework of case studies.Types of services Coding and Analysis Framework Indicators

Organisational services

Organisational structure and function StructureNetworking and leadership Various market linkages

Capacity building Technical services Training and development programmesServices in access to

marketAccess to market Access to auction market and other actors in the

marketFinancial services Financial services Working capital, loans, facilitatorTransaction Input supply Collective investment on inputs such as fertiliser,

pesticides and othersProcurement services Storage, packaging and transportation

Policy advocacy Access to state and formal institutions

Various institutional supports (subsidy or seed money)

Information Information to the price and products Minimum benchmark price (MBP)

Source: Developed by author based on Markelova et al. (2009) and Trebbin and Hassler (2012).

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background of the STGs has been presented from the survey conducted during 2016–18 in Assam and West Bengal under the Global Agriculture Production System (GAPS) project of the International Center for Development and Decent Work (ICDD), Germany.

3. Small tea growers in India: growth and features

Tea is traditionally grown mainly in four states in India, namely, Assam and West Bengal in the East and Northeast India and Kerala and Tamil Nadu in South India. Assam is the largest tea-growing area and it produces 50% of the country’s tea followed by West Bengal (17%). With around 1.2 million permanent workers, the tea industry is the largest employer in the formal private sector. Over the last two decades, this industry has witnessed dramatic changes, particularly, in terms of land utilisation, ownership, produc-tion, consumption, and price fluctuations. It is also believed that the tea industry is currently facing a crisis. However, the ‘crisis’ in the industry has been paradoxically triggered by the decline of its exports and not by a shrinkage of its production, price or sale in the domestic market. Over 80% of the total tea produced in India is consumed by the domestic market (TBI 2018). Tea produced by STGs is manufactured either by the factory of the estate or by bought leaf factories (BLFs). Thus, independent factories have grown across tea-producing states like Karnataka, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Sikkim, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Bihar and Orissa. Most of the land conversion for tea growing took place about four decades ago. The reason could be decline in food price during the 1980s and rise in price in tea during the same period. According to TBI (2018), around 25% green leaves produced by STGs are purchased by tea estates to meet their daily capacity. A study interestingly reveals that separate machines are kept in the large estates to process tea purchased from STGs (Saha, Bhue, and Singha 2019). Thus, the growth of STGs is not by its own but also embedded with large plantations. Currently, around 175,000 STGs contribute over 50% of the total production in India (GOI 2019) (see Table 2).

3.1. Characteristics of small tea growers in Assam and West Bengal

This section is based on the primary survey of 300 STGs conducted during 2016–18 in Assam and West Bengal. Findings show that about 86% male growers fall in the age group of 22 to 50 years. Only 3% of the growers are older than 65 years in Assam and West Bengal. These growers had started cultivating tea after their retirement from regular jobs. In both Assam and West Bengal, the majority of the growers (70% in Assam and

Table 2. Production break-up for big estates and small growers.

Region

2019 2018

Production from Big Estates in M. kg and

its share (%)

Production from STGs in M. kg and its share

(%)

Production from Big Estate in M. kg and

its share (%)

Production from Small Growers in M. kg and

its share (%)

North India 27.06 (45.49) 32.43 (54.51) 21.62 (46.28) 25.10 (53.72)South India 8.22 (54.44) 6.88 (45.56) 8.22 (57.40) 6.10 (42.60)

Source: Tea Board of India 2018, 2019.

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57% in West Bengal) possess up to 12 years of schooling as educational qualification, and 19% in Assam and 15% in West Bengal are graduates. This signifies a trend whereby many claim that conversion into small tea cultivation has opened up an avenue for self- employment, thereby securing self-reliance among the unemployed youth.

Landholding patterns define the size of tea cultivation and the nature of employment. Till 2016, 52% and 38% of the growers had registered in Assam and West Bengal, respectively. This registration implies recognition and inclusion of the growers in governmental records. This, however, does not make them eligible to access different government schemes. About 95% growers in both states have private ownership over their land of cultivation. The unregistered growers are marginal growers who possess small landholdings for their tea cultivation. Around 39% in both states possess land in the category of 0.10–1 acre.3 This group implies a marginal set of growers who have limited access to means of cultivation, and in many instances, they are seen to be dependent on the local agents for supply of cash during lean season or for supply of fertilisers and medicines that are not accessible to the growers. Around 26.5% growers in Assam and 25% in West Bengal possess 1.5–3 acre of land. Only 2.67% growers have more than 10 acres of land, are active members of national federations and associations, and can influence price settings and other innovations (see Table 3).

More than half of the STG owners use more than half of their land for tea cultivation (see Table 3). Not surprisingly, the majority in the sample had prior engagement with agriculture (see Table 3), though in around 46% of the cases, no activity had been carried out in the land prior to tea cultivation. What is interesting, however, is that about a third

Table 3. Landholding pattern of tea growers across Assam and West Bengal.Assam West Bengal Total

Registration Yes 104 (52) 38 (38) 142 (47.33)No 96 (48) 62 (62) 158 (52.67)

Total 200 (100) 100 (100) 300 (100)Type of land holding Private ownership 187 (93.5) 98 (98) 285 (95)

Lease-in 10 (5) 2 (2) 12 (4)Government land:

Encroached3 9 (1.5) 0 (0) 3 (1)

Total 200 (100) 100 (100) 300 (100)Land under tea cultivation (in

acre)0.10–1.00 78 (39) 40 (40) 118 (39.33)1.00–1.50 17 (8.5) 13 (13) 30 (10)1.50–3.00 53 (26.5) 25 (25) 78 (26)3.00–5.00 31 (15.5) 10 (10) 41 (13.67)

5.00–10.00 15 (7.5) 10 (10) 25 (8.33)10.00–25.00 3 (1.5) 2 (2) 5 (1.67)

25.00–100.00 3 (1.5) 0 (0) 3 (1)Total 200 (100) 100 (100) 300 (100)

Percentage of land utilisation for tea cultivation (Land under Tea Cultivation *100/Total Land Holding)

3.5–10 6 (3) 0 (0) 6 (2)10–25 36 (18) 7 (7) 43 (14.33)25–50 56 (28) 30 (30) 86 (28.67)50–75 43 (21.5) 21 (21) 64 (21.33)

75–100 59 (29.5) 42 (42) 101 (33.67)Total 200 (100) 100 (100) 300 (100)

Activities before Tea Cultivation

Bamboo 32 (16) 1 (1) 33 (11)Paddy 67(33.5) 31 (31) 98 (32.67)

Vegetables 15 (7.5) 17 (17) 32 (10.67)Nothing 86 (43) 51 (51) 137 (45.67)

Total 200 (100) 100 (100) 300 (100)

Source: Field survey conducted during 2016–2018. Note: value within parenthesis represents share (%) of the respondents.

6 D. SAHA

of the growers in the sample moved into tea growing from other occupations. The reason for a shift in cultivation ranged from market instability to environmental factors to making more profit.

Marginal growers claimed that growing tea was a better option as it was a one-time investment and required less effort compared to the high maintenance cost and effort required for growing other food crops. Moreover, many of the growers are seen to be swayed by the trend of small cultivation; they learn the art of such cultivation through their neighbours, community and friends. At present, many growers own such plots of land where they had started with the cultivation of different food and cash crops. However, the entire land was not converted for tea cultivation as it required a substantial amount to be invested. Thus, the land which was slightly elevated was converted from food crop to tea cultivation and traditional food crops were grown in other portions of the land as they did not have to invest heavily on land filling. About 70% growers have taken up tea cultivation as the main occupation and around 55% have converted more than two-thirds of the land for tea cultivation since 2006. Further, 54% growers have changed from traditional food crop to tea. This posits a different question – whether this alternative model of plantation economy is sustainable or not in the region.

4. Changes in ownership in tea plantations

Currently, there are two types of producers in the tea plantations, namely, large planters and smallholders. However, ownership varies. Ownership for the large tea estates can broadly be classified into four groups – public limited companies, proprietorship, partnership and government undertakings. In government undertakings, there are public sector enterprises under Government of India and state governments. In 1970s, workers’ cooperatives had been emerged as an alternative form of ownership in the plantation. During the 1980s, with the emergence of STGs and independent BLFs, the industry witnessed a rise in individual ownership of cultivated green leaves and individual-owned private factories which processed leaves. In mid-2000, with the help of the state through TBI and financial institutions, collective producer ownership had been formed within the ambit of ownership of tea plantations. This section discusses about the various types of ownership in the sector and their changing forms across time and space.

4.1. British enterprise to Indian company

The tea industry in India was started by the British as sterling companies registered in the Great Britain. The industry was owned by foreign companies who employed agents in Calcutta (now Kolkata) to execute their policies and programmes. Under British rule, big managing agencies were formed to control major industries including tea, coffee, rubber, jute plantations, textiles and jute mills among many others in India. Besides British- owned managing agencies, namely, Andrew Yule, Macneill and Barry, Mackenzie and Co., Tata, Birla and other Indian business houses also formed their own agencies. Later, the domestic managing agencies were promoted by Parsi and Marwari entrepreneurs. While British managing agencies controlled 75% of all industries in India by the end of the First World War, Marwari and Parsi-led agencies started taking charge during the Second World War. After independence, the Nehru government did not promote the

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 7

agency system and it was formally abolished by the Indira Gandhi-led government in 1970 (Rungta 1970; Gupta 2014).

These Marwari and Parsi-led management agents were instrumental in promoting trade and commerce, sponsoring tea estates registered in India and purchasing some of the sterling tea estates as their own. This saw a growth of rupee companies which were managed by the managing agents. This is how Indian business houses started their functions in the tea plantation industry. During 1911–21, the total share of foreign public limited companies-owned tea estates in India declined from 66% to 55% and privately owned tea estates fell from 19% to 11% (Buchanan 1966). This is mainly due to over-supply in tea production and steep decline in tea prices, which arose from the growth of the export market and domestic consumption. The transfer of ownership of foreign tea companies continued till 1932 and post Second World War, fear of nationalism in foreign companies led them to transfer their companies to Indian business houses (ibid).

Post independence, the Indian state’s intervention through the Capital Issues (the Control Act 1947, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, the Import-Export Control Act 1947) imposed restrictions on all companies registered in India. As a result, foreign companies experienced difficulties in expanding tea cultivation and were forced to sell their estates to Indians. Various acts and institutions like the Calcutta Auction Market in independent India caused rapid changes in ownership, leading to the emergence of Indian companies in tea plantation industry. Between 1947 and 1970, 56% tea estates changed their ownership from foreign to Indian companies owned by individuals hailing from Marwari and Bihari communities (Dasgupta 1989).

4.2. Workers’ cooperatives

Worker cooperatives, formed to process tea and run the industry in India, however, did not turn out to be a successful alternative model of ownership. Worker cooperatives in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura are worth to mention as far as self-management in plantations is concerned. During the 1970s, many tea estates were declared sick in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura where owners either closed down or abandoned manufactur-ing units which led workers to be unemployed for many years. The government was not in a position to take over mainly due to financial obligation and, as a result, workers in those plantations started taking over these gardens, and their management and produc-tion process. The Saongaon Tea and Allied Plantation Workers’ Co-operative Society Limited in the Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal formed in 1974 was the first tea workers’ cooperative in India, which comprised workers of Sonali Tea Estate. Following West Bengal, the cooperatives in Tripura were started between 1978 and 1986. Tachai Workers’ Cooperative in the northern district of Tripura was the first one in Tripura. Durgabari Tea Estate Workers’ Co-operative Society Limited in West Tripura district and Ludua Cha Bagan Sharamik Samabay Samity in South Tripura district were started in 1979. In Assam, the workers’ cooperative was formed in different mode. The workers’ cooperative was initiated and formed by the tea employees’ co-operative. Woka Tea Estate (Assam) was obtained by the Assam Tea Employees Co-operative Organisation Limited (ATEICOL) in 1975. Although conditions of plantation and workers of Woka Tea Estate improved, neither were the workers aware about their ownerships status in the cooperative nor were they represented in the management (Bhowmik 1988). The failure

8 D. SAHA

of this cooperative was mainly due to the hierarchical structure of management and a control mechanism that resembled the structure of a typical large company-owned estate (ibid.) which clearly defeated the purpose of a cooperative.

The success of Durgabari workers’ cooperative in Tripura can be ascribed to group integrity, cohesiveness, smaller group size and support from the state and trade unions. The reasons behind the failure of the workers’ cooperatives in West Bengal are mainly ideological. Insofar, around 25 tea gardens have closed down in West Bengal (The Hindu 2017). The lease is crucial to the operation of tea garden so that land can be used as collateral to access finance from banks. The government has remained indecisive whether to lease out the land of the gardens to the cooperatives or not. After the left front government came into power in 1977 in West Bengal, the cooperative had to stop its activities because of an interim order from a lower court evoked by a petition made by one claiming to be the new owner of the plantation (Bhowmik 1988, 1992). The left front government, on the other hand, in Tripura had promoted the workers’ cooperative model. Till date, it is seen as an alternative sustainable model in the closed/abandoned large plantations to improve the living conditions of workers in West Bengal. In fact, workers from closed gardens in West Bengal visit Durgabari Tea Estate in Tripura to learn about the mechanisms and methods used to successfully run a cooperative.

4.3. Individual ownership: Tea growers and private factory owner

As mentioned, over 50% of tea production in North India is produced by STGs. These growers are independent growers and they own their land. They sell leaves either to BLFs or to tea estates. Along with STGs, BLFs (manufacturing units) privately owned by independent businessmen have also been proliferated in the region.

5. Primary producer societies: three cases

Small growers have the advantage of low-cost access to labour because of the availability of household labour, less supervision and more flexibility. On the other hand, high transaction costs in procurement of inputs, access to output markets, proliferation of middlemen, poor quality of leaves, access to credit and market information have been identified as obstacles for these growers to move upwards in the value chain. In this context, collectivisation among small farmers can make the business sustainable. Six broad factors – self-realisation, problems of middlemen, asymmetric information on market and price, collectiveness and solidarity, aspiration towards upward mobility, and market linkages – play significant role in group formation (see Table 4). Producers’ collectivisation was initiated by forming PPSs registered under the The Societies Registration Act, 1860 mainly at the village levels. Till 2016, 600 PPSs were formed at the village levels (Ramachandran 2016). The collectivisation ensures fairer terms of trade and scientific cultivation of tea. Through PPS, direct negotiation with tea estates and BLFs took place to eliminate the leaf trading agents in the supply chain so that their own collectives can be managed efficiently and they can move up the supply chain by establishing their own processing and marketing infrastructure under the collective ambit.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 9

The following section presents three case studies while the first two case studies elucidate on the SHG model, the last case study describes the PCL model. The three distinct cases highlight the promise, hope and challenges to new forms of ownership through collective action. The SHG model describes the growth, expansion and different strategies to sustain the collectives. The PCL model, on the other hand, stresses on the struggles to form the collectives.

5.1. Panbari Small Tea Growers Society (Self Help Group) in West Bengal

Four SHGs in Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal – Panbari Small Tea Growers Society, Jai Jalpesh Small Tea Growers Society, Nabajagaran Small Tea Growers Society and Kawagub Khudra Cha Swanirvar Gosthi – are noteworthy as collectively they have over 1,500 producers and processing units which started as PPSs. They have also showcased their teas for the first time during the World Food Moscow in Russia in September 2016 (The Hindu 2016) and various other exhibitions. The structure and methods of STGs, SHG- owned factory in case of all four producer collectives, are similar. Subsidy from the TBI, self-contributions from producers and bank loans have helped in setting up of the factory, enabling it to develop as micro, small and medium enterprises under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act, 2006. However, sustenance and success vary from one to another. All these four ventures are set up in one district in West Bengal. We will discuss the process and structure of two SHGs, namely, Panbari Small Tea Growers Society (PSTGS) and Jai Jalpesh Small Tea Growers Society (JJSTGS). These two SHGs make for an interesting comparison because of their con-trasting membership patterns. PSTGS started with large membership but over time, their membership and production have declined, whereas that of JJSTGS, set up after PSTGS, has increased.

PSTGS, registered under the West Bengal Society Act 26 of 1961 in 2004, set up a factory in 2013 with a processing capacity of around 4 million kg green leaf per annum to produce 0.8 million kg CTC (crush, tear, curl) tea in 2012 with 343 members in the group having around 670 acre plantation that ensures full capacity utilisation of the factory. The TBI gave a subsidy of Rs 12 million, i.e., 40% of the project cost, to set up a factory. Besides the subsidy and a loan of Rs 10 million from banks, PSTGS members contributed Rs 16 million towards the project. In the first seven years, the bank loan was repaid on priority and now members are given small dividends against their financial contributions. In 2019, the members of the collective have gone down to 299 (decreased by 12%) and production has also been

Table 4. Factors behind group formation.Factors

Self-realisation Collective realisation of non-sustainability after huge investmentProblem identification Share of multiple middlemenInformation Proper information on the priceCollectiveness Raising collective voice with solidarityAspiration Towards upwards mobility (Farmers to Producers)Linkages Becoming producers from raw-material to finished products (Linking Industry-Agriculture

within same framework)

Source: Emerged from the fieldwork.

10 D. SAHA

declining at the rate of 6% every year. However, members did not see this as a failure. Rather, they mentioned that the fall in membership had been mainly due to geographical location. As the SHG-owned factory was remotely located, it was difficult for the members to deposit the leaves; which added to transaction costs. Privately owned BLFs emerged in many places keeping growers in mind. Members pointed out the success of Durgabari Workers’ Cooperative (in Tripura) and how cohesively it functioned over the decades with a relatively smaller membership. Therefore, PSTGS has also been happy with the fact that their membership has remained comparatively small so that they can monitor and provide different input services to its members. They are focusing more on various innovations such as producing orthodox and having their own brand for export. This is also because market price is higher for orthodox as compared to CTC tea.

5.2. Jai Jalpesh Small Tea Growers Society in West Bengal

JJSTGS was also registered under the West Bengal Society Act 26 of 1961 and was set up in the year 2004. The JJSTGS set up a factory immediately after PSTGS did in 2013. The society, which started with a membership of around 10 STGs, subse-quently expanded to 522 STGs, owning collective land of over 335 ha covering 15 km radius as of 2019. For being a member of this SHG, the STGs needed to possess at least an acre of land under tea cultivation in Jalpaiguri district. The main objective to start the society was to collectively place their demands before the government. Within this SHG, there have been 17 groups, each comprising 30–31 members, headed by an elected member known as the group leader. This society has an Executive Body (EB) with 17 elected members and a General Body (GB) with 522 members. The tea leaves are collected together and taken to definite centres where they are weighed. Thereafter, they are taken to factories and the payment is received by the society after 15 days. Then, the SHG transfers the amount to individual growers’ accounts. In this transaction, the society deducts around 20 paisa per kg from the leaf rate and saves the amount for a different fund. During off season, the amount is disbursed as loans at no interest to the growers, to be returned within one year. To expand this system further, the SHG started thinking of setting up a factory and approached the TBI for help. However, when the latter did not agree to provide the entire money, the SHG decided to gather funds themselves by increasing its membership and raising more money from them. The group collected Rs 20 million from its members. The TBI granted permission to set up the factory and even granted Rs 20 million; the SHG took Rs 10 million loan from a nationalised bank. The emergence of the SHGs like PSTGS and JJSTGS is indeed an example of successful collective organisations. Following the success of setting up big processing units mainly by these two SHGs, other PPSs are aspiring to build the same model for sustainability, especially in West Bengal.

5.3. Rwdwmsha Tea Producer Company Limited (RTPCL) in Assam

The third case study presented in this paper is a case of a producer company limited. In Assam, four tea producer companies, namely, Rwdwmsha and Rwdmkhang (Udalguri

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district) and Swmkhwr Valley and Alupara (Sonitpur district) can be mentioned. These producer collectives comprised indigenous community of the state, called Bodo. While meaning of Rwdwmsha and Rwdmkhangis is more or less similar to ‘revival’ in Bodo language, Swmkhwr refers as ‘green’. The philosophy of these three names is to never give up and always stand up after failure to achieve a person’s goal or objective. However, this case study is based on Rwdwmsha Tea Producer Company Limited (RTPCL), which is located in Barengabari village in Udalgudi district of Assam. It is a private company that was registered in July 2016 with 68 members covering 42 ha of land and is classified as a company limited by shares. Notably, this company is not functional as the process got stuck with some bureaucratic hassles, and did not receive couple of clearances from the different state agencies following proper channels. Since production has not yet started, it is difficult to assess the success or challenges of this producers’ company. Notwithstanding, the process of becoming a producer’s company is important to high-light while discussing the collectivisation.

Before setting up RTPCL, with aid from Centre for Education and Communication (CEC), in 2012, the Rwdwmsha Small Tea Growers Society was formed as the primary producer society constituting 54 members (Grassroots 2020). Later, the TBI supported through separate funds for STGs under tea development and various promotional schemes. This society was started with the objectives of supporting and practicing community and collective farming. Members collectively decided to keep similar production methods so that they can collectively produce and process the same quality products. In 2013, the growers collectively sold the green leaf to McLeod Russel and obtained a higher price of Rs 19 per kg. The society collectively traded 162,441 kgs of green leaf for a revenue of around around Rs 3 million (ibid.). The main reason for forming the society was to secure individual agreement by marginal growers with the estates for the selling of their leaves. Each member contributed towards registration which was used for maintenance, savings for the society, building of tea shades, and so on. The growers were required to bring their leaves to the society and from there they were taken in the society’s auto van to the estates. The society was managed by six members and an elected president and a secretary to look after financial decisions. The society arranged meetings at an interval of two to three months and organised training sessions for application of pesticides, spraying, and so on. Officials from the TBI and estates came to train the growers. The Society had a Revolving Fund whereby it lent out funds for pruning activities of the growers. The society is strict in terms of leaf quality as the estates lay clear guidelines in this regard.

Later, with the help of the CEC, the society decided to form its own company. With the subsidy from TBI, bank loan and contribution from the members, the society set up a mini factory having the capacity to produce up to 500 kg made tea per day within the ambit of producer-owned company. The focus of the society was to produce green and organic tea. This is mainly for three reasons. First, market value for green (Rs 300/kg) and organic/orthodox (Rs 200/kg) tea was much higher as compared to CTC (Rs 110). Second, most importantly, pesticide and chemical are not used to produce green and organic tea that make environment friendly. Third, to process green and organic tea, manual labour and smaller investment were

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required. In this way, community can work together. And, it is manageable and sustainable in long run with relatively less investment. The objective of the members is to build ‘organic cash crop village’ and emerge as ‘responsible rural entrepre-neurs’. Members of this society do not want to increase its membership as society having fewer members is more dedicated to address the issues of small and marginal growers.

The following two sections discuss the various processes required for collectivisation according to the SHG or PCL models, the challenges encountered while implementing such processes and the various strategies that these collectives have sought to overcome, and an assessment of the success and sustainability of such processes.

6. Processes of collective ownership

There is a need of a well-coordinated system among various stakeholders to set up collectively owned factory. Identifying common interest and forming solidarity among members is the first process for these collectives. Besides support from formal institu-tional rules, informal and shared codes of conduct are identified as important processes to sustain in long term.

6.1. Common services

The first step of collective ownership is the identification of the required common input and output services that are realised collectively by the primary producers. There are eight common services – organisational, market linkages, capacity building, branding and advertising, financial, transaction, policy linkages, and information and knowledge – based on nine coding indicators (see Table 1) found among these collectives (see Table 5).

Table 5. Types and outomes of services.Types of services Indicators Processes and Outcomes of Services

Organisational services

Structure Organisational services: Mobilising strategy in line of ethnicity, common issues, goals and emotions; hierarchical structure with leaders; setting up the internal monitoring system

Various market linkages Market linkages: Links with various stakeholders in the sector as collective organisational strategy

Capacity building Training and development programmes

Capacity building: Training, skill enhancement and knowledge about the product

Services in access to market

Access to auction market and other actors in the market

Price setting, branding and advertising services: Access to auction market to know the price setting mechnisms, branding, advertising the product through various platforms, certifications

Financial services Working capital, loans, facilitator Financial services: Loans and financial managementTransaction Collective investment on inputs

such as fertiliser, pesticides and others

Transaction: Common transport and procurement services but individualised/personalised other input services

Storage, packaging and transportation

Policy advocacy Various institutional supports (subsidy or seed money)

Policy linkages: Institutional supports for subsidy, quality control through plant protection code (PPC)

Information Minimum benchmark price (MBP) Information and knowledge: Fair price by strategic plans in absence of MBP and awareness of input use

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These common services are strategic among members towards mobilising, training, establishing branding and status, self-managing financial inputs, reducing transport cost, assuring and certifying quality product and proving perfect knowledge and information.

6.2. Institutional procedures

There are various institutional procedures and requirements while setting up a collectively owned factory. These include obtaining no-objection and registration certificates from the TBI, auction certificate for auctioning of tea which is being super-vised by the TBI under the Tea Marketing and Control Order (TMCO, 1984 and 2003), a factory licence from state government, a license from the state pollution control board, permission from the fire and safety department of the respective state government and a certificate from the food safety standard authority of India (FSSAI).

Thus, this collective organisation has significant interactions with the state and its various agencies (Utting 2015). These interactions often lead to rent-seeking behaviours, while obtaining these official certifications. Some of the permissions are taken at the beginning of the setting up of the factory, while others are obtained on an annual renewal basis (fire and safety, pollution control, FSSAI among others). Obstacles are viewed as challenges towards the growth of these organisations. However, some of these societies (especially in West Bengal) have accepted these obstacles and developed informal mechanisms and moved ahead with extra-legal arrangements (de Soto 1989). In a country where 92% workers are associated with informal economy and of which 56% are self-employed, sustenance of informal sector workers is invariably determined by informal/unwritten rules, regulations and ad-hoc arrangements (Saha 2017). Nevertheless, even these informal rules/regulations are extremely structured (ibid.). Members of collective organisations pay their contributions in a manner in which the unwritten demands are met, and the organisation can function without any hassles. This can be considered as a strategy of sustainability of the organisations and perhaps is one of the reasons why some of them are functioning smoothly while others are not.

6.3. Shared rules of conduct

There are five broad pre-requisite processes for setting up a factory under collective ownership. First, members set up land ceiling rules under which each farmer can be provided with a maximum of 10 acre (4.05 ha) land. Second, to obtain a development fund from TBI, registered producer societies have to show initial investment to set up factory. Therefore, contribution from each member as seed capital is considered to be mandatory for membership. For instance, JJSTGS had mutually decided that a minimum contribution for a landholder should be Rs 5000 but cannot exceed Rs 200,000. Third, at the beginning as a collective, it is decided that the profit-sharing model will be followed. Members collectively decided that profits will be distributed annually which will be based on initial capital investment of members and annual deposit of green leaves by the members. For instance, JJSTGS decided as a clause that 75% profits generated annually will be redistributed on the initial investment of the grower and 25% on the annual submission of green leaves. Fourth, the cost of setting up a factory is estimated at Rs

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50 million. Thus, the producer society requires significant monetary support from the TBI in order to set up a factory. Generally, the maximum amount that TBI provides equals to the contribution that a society collectively accumulates from its members. This provides significant motivation for the members to enhance their individual contribu-tions. In many cases, it is seen that farmers put all their lifetime savings, pawning their movable and immovable assets with moneylenders, which has landed many of them (especially marginal growers) in a debt-trap situation. Fifth, after collective accumulation and support from TBI, societies approach nationalised banks to fill in the remaining capital requirements. In all cases, member contributions and TBI support jointly do not exceed 50% of the requirement. The remaining 50% is taken as a loan from the bank. In the case of JJSHG, the ratio of members’ collections to TBI contribution to bank loan has been 1.5:1:2.5.

7. Success and sustainability

7.1. Profit sharing business model and mutual ownership

The aspiration among farmers for profit making is the key motivation for tea growers. According to the president of JJSTGS, ‘sustained profit and its redistribution among the producers is the success story for the collective organisation’. One of the ways in which it is achieved is through direct market linkages after producing processed tea. The average cost of producing 1 kg CTC tea in the factory is about Rs 80; farmers do not receive more than Rs 95 if it goes via the auction market. On the contrary, if the tea is sold directly to the retail market through Challan (tax receipt/invoice), the profit margin goes up about Rs 12–15 per kg. Therefore, it is obvious that selling tea outside the auction market is more preferred. Being an expensive affair, farmers convert their land for tea production plot-wise. Further, growers do not provide green leaves to their producer-owned factory if they do not receive higher price. Many independent private BLFs are set up in and around the society-owned factories which creates competition. Besides profit sharing, social status and mutual ownership are other key motivations for these growers (Utting 2015). They are viewed as social entrepreneurs as they create jobs, not only for themselves but also for the next generation to produce and deliver products and services that have not been sufficiently provided by the public or the traditional profit-bearing private sector (Utting 2017). They earn income through innovation, risk- taking, plan and manage projects and solve problems.

7.2. Role of institutions and innovations

Although the TBI views the growth of STGs in rural tea-producing states as a threat to large tea estates, it promotes STGs to enhance empowerment, business and employment opportunities for rural population and their empowerment. Looking at the integrity and growth of producer societies mainly through SHGs in different states, the TBI considers this as a successful alternative to the tea development model. TBI encourages growers to produce organic and green tea which has momentum in the international tea market. Unlike, workers’ cooperatives in West Bengal, SHG model is promoted by the state as there is no other commitment except initial subsidy and grant, and no problem related to

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 15

land litigation. In this case, the farmer has individual ownership of his land but mutual ownership of the factory.

7.3. Geographical location and transportation cost

Growers’ proximity with the processing units is desirable as this helps growers to reduce their transportation costs. This was evident in the case of PSTGS, where growers were given a price subsidy as compensation; however, as a result, the factory suffered loss. Initially, growers tried to adjust but failed to sustain and started selling their green leaves to BLFs in their neighbourhood. In the context of JJSHG, geographical location worked as an advantage as over 85% of the growers were in and around 6 km from the factory. Once the factory is set up, further entry of additional members is restricted to limit membership size.

7.4. Good governance, leadership and linkages with others

In governance structures, trust, transparency, accountability, management within groups, and embeddedness and cohesion within same socio-religious groups are factors that facilitate successful group formation in collectives. Transfer of shares of the existing growers to other growers was stopped in 2018 in JJSTGS, which in turn has led to increased selling of green leaves to the society-owned factory. In the case of JJSTGS, shared religious beliefs have fostered a sustainable organisational structure. Most of the members are from the same socio-cultural groups. In West Bengal, over 80% of the members are either from the category of scheduled castes (SCs)4 or other backward classes (OBCs)5. Ethnically, they are dominated by the Rajbanshi community.6 In select cases in Assam, the members of the society are from the Bodo indigenous community. Creating a group with indigenous people fulfils certain criteria set by the GOI and helps them to avail development funds from the TBI.

Leadership is indeed an important key for the success of any organisation. Looking at producer societies which have come up with factories across West Bengal and Assam, educated and knowledgeable leadership and their networks have played important roles. In the case of JJSTGS, the current leader (president) is a retired bank officer who has been instrumental in obtaining a bank loan while setting up the factory. The president, who also belongs to the same community, is highly regarded, hence, was easily trusted when he proposed to form the group and factory. Further, he is an influential personand is well recognised by other key stakeholders in the tea sector such as the auction market, the broker house, growers’ and large planters’ associations and the TBI, and also members of some of the key regional committees in the sector.

8. Concluding observations

Easing business through SHG is a pro-capital model among STGs. The main objective of forming SHGs and PCLs is to set up manufacturing units so that middlemen can be avoided and direct access to the market established. The systematic input services (see Table 5) through mutual trust, value and commitments are the key elements of the success of these collectives. Although the broad objective of SHG and PCL models is the same, the PCL model is considered to be more structured and is under formal

16 D. SAHA

institution such as the Companies Act, 2013. It is too early to conclude that marketing, branding and access to financial institutions are better under the PCL model. Notwithstanding, the SHG model is being promoted and proven as a successful model among tea growers from the perspective of empowerment, solidarity and collective action. The collective is formed of growers preferably from the same socio- economic, landholding patterns and geographical location. Self-mobilisation and self- reliance among members within collectives are the main reasons for their existence. The members accumulate and manage 25% venture capital before approaching the tea board and banks. NABARD, Small Farmers Agribusiness Consortium (SFAC), and the RBI have formulated policies to extend credit as venture capital to these producer collectives through various financial inclusion programmes. The TBI also provides credit to STGs through its promotional programmes. Collectives follow the demo-cratic process of electing members, maintaining transparency and providing different services, namely, input-supply services (pesticides, fertilisers), financial services (working capital), technical services (training and development programmes), market linkages (obtaining fair price) and networking services (collectivisation and socialisa-tion among growers). Social cohesion, associational power and social embeddedness within the organisation are the key elements of its success. Employment generation along with asset holding and investment on human capital at both individual and household levels are certainly the indicators of the successful outcome among the members.

8.1. Questions on sustainability

Setting up factories is an indicator of the success of producer collectives by following SHG and PCL models. Though the SHG model is considered to be successful in the tea sector, their operation raises a set of questions around sustainability. Over profit sharing among growers is the main threat to its sustainability. Not all members of the collectives are committed to give their green leaves to the society-owned factories, including the leaders. There are cases where members of the collective sell their leaves either to large estates or BLFs, depending on where they receive a higher price. As a result, society- owned factories experience a shortage of green leaves and purchase leaves from non- members to meet the daily capacity of the factories. This certainly raises questions on the model of self-help, self-managed and producers’ collectives. Land ceiling is mutually decided but executive members of the collectives are found to be large landowners who overpower the groups’ decision-making process. Small and marginal growers often are not aware of the actual price of the green leaves. Although good governance, leadership and individual’s access to markets, information and contacts with key stakeholders play important roles in the self-help model of collectivisation, second generation of leadership is not being encouraged. These are the challenges of ‘integrative scaling up’ and ‘inclu-sivity’ in the process of collective action.

Notes

1. The only exception is the state of Meghalaya located in North East India. Meghalaya is a matrilineal society where ownership of landed property is vested with the female members

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of the household. Youngest daughter or a female relation inherits the property (Nongkynrih 2014, 4).

2. The Bodo (classified as Scheduled Tribe) is one of the largest ethnic and linguistic groups of the Brahmaputra valley of the state of Assam. They are one of the dominant indigenous groups in Assam. As per Census 2011, in Assam, 12.4% of the total Assam population and 5.8% of the total population of West Bengal comprise Scheduled Tribes (STs).

3. One acre is equal to approximately 0.404686 hectare of land.4. The Scheduled Castes (SCs), recognised in the Constitution of India, are officially designated

groups of people in India. According to the Census 2011, it comprises about 16.6% of India's population. As per Census 2011, 7.15% and 23.51% of total population belong to SCs in Assam and West Bengal respectively.

5. As per National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 2011–12, 41% of India’s total population belongs to Other Backward Classes (OBCs) whereas 25.3% of the total Assam state popula-tion belong to OBCs, and 8.7% belong to OBCs in West Bengal. The Government of India has not enumerated OBC population in Census as yet; it is declared that OBC population will be enumerated in 2021 Census.

6. The Rajbanshi is an ethnic group inhabiting mainly northern West Bengal and some parts of Assam, Meghalaya and Bihar. Although the Rajbanshi in West Bengal can be referred as indigenous community, they are categorised as Scheduled Castes (SCs). As per Census 2011, about 61% of total SC population belong to the ethnic group of Rajbanshi in five districts of northern West Bengal where the study was carried out.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks to two anonymous reviewers and editors for their comments and suggestions on the article. The earlier version of the article entitled ‘Self-Help Tea Growers: A Case Study of Producer Collectives in India’ was presented in a workshop on ‘Alternative forms of Ownership and Business Enterprise in the Global South’ organised by the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies (SCIS), University of the Witwatersrand (WITS), Johannesburg, South Africa held on 4–5 June 2019 at SCIS, WITS, Johannesburg, South Africa. The author is indebted to the organisers and the participants for their valuable comments and suggestions on the paper. The author also acknowledges Professor Christoph Scherrer, University of Kassel, Germany for his feedback on the initial version of the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

The present paper is a part of the project entitled ‘Value Chain and Decent Work: Study of Small Tea Growers in India’ supported by the International Center for Development and Decent Work (ICDD), University of Kassel, Germany funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through the exceed program of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

ORCID

Debdulal Saha http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3545-653X

18 D. SAHA

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