Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta,Pangasinan_Case Digest

7/22/2019 Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta,Pangasinan_Case Digest

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TOPIC: CHAPTER V SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTIONC. OTHER ISSUANCES WHICH HAVE THE BINDING FORCE AND

EFFECT OFLAWS

TITLE: AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.(264 SCRA 19, L - 116422 04 NOVEMBER 1996)

FACTS: Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser were both former employees ofSSS who availed of compulsory retirement benefits provided forunder RA No. 660. Both also claimed with the SSS financialassistance benefits as provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56,Series of 1971.

The subject SSS resolution was disallowed by COA in its ruling

issued on July 10, 1989 stating that the scheme of financialassistance authorized by SSS is similar to separate retirementplan or incentives/separation pay plans adopted by othergovernment agencies which in turn results in the increase ofbenefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws.

The SSS thereafter sought presidential authority to continueimplementing Res. 56 to which the Office of the ExecutiveSecretary replied that the Office of the President is not inclinedto favorably act on the request or let alone overrule COAs earlierruling.

Petitioners Conte and Boiser sought reconsideration of COAsruling disallowing their claim and also sought payment from SSSof benefits as prescribed under Res. 56, both of which weredenied by COA and SSS.

ISSUE: Whether or not the benefits provided for under SSS ResolutionNo. 56 be considered simply as financial assistance for retiringemployees, or does such a scheme constitute a supplementaryretirement plan prescribed by RA 4968.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that SSS Resolution No. 56 constitute asupplementary retirement plan, thus, within the ambit of Sec. 28(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 which bars the creation ofany insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS forgovernment officers and employees, in order to prevent theundue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. Resolution No.56 is therefore invalid, void and of no effect.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, the assailed COAdecision is upheld, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is declared illegal,void and of no effect.


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TOPIC: CHAPTER V SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTIOND. ORDINANCES

TITLE: JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OFURDANETA,PANGASINAN, ET AL.(93 SCRA 462, G.R. No. L-26702 18 OCTOBER 1979)

FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff Primiscias forviolation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 after beingapprehended by a member of the Municipal Police for overtakinga truck. Primiscias thereafter filed for the annulment of thesubject ordinance with prayer for issuance of preliminaryinjunction to restrain defendants from enforcing the said

ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered Ordinance No. 3,S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA 4136 also known asthe Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Appellant appealed thedecision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 enacted by theMunicipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is null and void.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that subject ordinance has beenrepealed by the enactment of RA 4316 and has therefor, becomenull and void stating that a later law prevails over an earlier law.

The Supreme Court further averred that local ordinances, in thiscase, a municipal ordinance, are inferior in status andsubordinate to the laws of the state and whenever there isconflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance mustgive way.


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TOPIC: CHAPTER VI LAWSD. PARTS OF A LAW; 1. TITLE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 2 (1) 1987CONSTITUTION

TITLE: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO,SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA,CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL,FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO and ROMAN OZAETA vs. PEDRO M.GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA, and JOSE AVILES(15 SCRA 479, L-23326D 18 OCTOBER 1979)

FACTS: The House of Representatives enacted into law RA 3836 entitled An Act Amending Subsection (c), Section 12 of CommonwealthAct Numbered One Hundred Eighty Six, as amended by RA 3096,

which will enable members of congress to retire regardless ofage after having served as such for at least twelve years ofwhich not less than four years have been rendered as electiveofficer. After enactment of RA 3836, PHILCONSA, a non-stock,non-profit civic organization duly incorporated under Philippinelaws instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminaryinjunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines anddisbursing officers of both congress from passing in auditvouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasurywarrants for the payment to any former Senator or members ofthe House of Representatives of retirement and vacation

gratuities pursuant to RA 3836; and likewise restraining therespondent disbursing officers of both houses, and theirsuccessors in office from paying said vacation and gratuities.

ISSUE: Is the enactment of RA 3836 constitutional in so far as the saidact allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation andsick leave to Senators and Congressmen and to the electiveofficials of both houses of Congress.

HELD: No, the enactment of RA 3836 is unconstitutional as it violatesthree provisions of the constitution, namely Art. IV, Sec. 14, the

prohibition of increase in the salaries of members of congress, asthe act provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senatorand members of the House of Representatives without awaitingthe expiration of the full term of all is members approving suchincrease; Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 1 as it is patently discriminating;and, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Par. 1, the title of a bill shall not haveembrace more than one subject as the title of the said bill is notin any way related to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186(establishing the GSIS, providing for both retirement andinsurance benefits of its members).

RA 3836 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.


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TOPIC: CHAPTER VI LAWSD. PARTS OF A LAW; 1. TITLE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 2 (1) 1987CONSTITUTION

TITLE: BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS(21 SCRA 496, l-28089D 25 OCTOBER 1967

FACTS: RA 4790 creating the Muncipality of Dianaton in the Province ofLanao del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads:

" xxxSECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and

Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalitiesand constituted into a distinct and independent municipality ofthe same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton,Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of themunicipality shall be in Tagalogxxx

Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Electionsciting that the said law included two barrios from the Municipalityof Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts

and parcel of the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province ofCotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby changing the boundaries ofthe two provinces. Since election are forthcoming, the COMELECissued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts the twelvebarrios from Cotabato Province under the new Municipality ofDianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of the Presidentthereafter recommended to COMELEC that the operation of thestatute be suspended be suspended until clarified by correctinglegislation but the COMELEC declared that the statute must beimplemented unless declared unconstitutional by the SupremeCourt.

ISSUE: Does the title of RA 4790 conform with the constitutionalrequirement that no bill which may be enacted into law shallembrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in thetitle of the bill and whether RA 4790 is null and void.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, to wit:

1. No, the title of RA 4790 does not conform with theconstitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since itis misleading and deceptive as the legislation combines two

purposes in one statute, namely, creates the Municipality ofDianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios fromthe Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, both of Lanao delSur, and dismembers two municipalities of the Province ofCotabato.

2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void.


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TOPIC: CHAPTER X - SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS F. NATURALIZATION LAWS

TITLE: DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY AND

ASSURANCE CO., INC.(1 SCRA 1324, L-16138 29 APRIL 1961)

FACTS: The case pertains to an appeal made by the Republic inconnection with the granting of certificate of naturalization infavor of petitioner and appellee, Benjamin Co, issued by theCourt of First Instance of Abra.

Petitioner Co was born on 13 March 1931 in Bangued, Abra toChinese parents, Go Cham and Yu Suan. He is married to LeonorGo and has a two-month only child. He is a merchant dealing in

the buy and sell of tobacco which he says has a working capitalof P10,000.00 he claims to have accumulated thru savings andpart owner of Go Tian Store also in Bangued, Abra. In the year1956, he earned P1,000.00 from his tobacco business andexpects to earn P2,000.00 in an undetermined time frame. Aspart owner of Go Tian Store, he receives a sum of less thanP3,000.00 from his father, representing of the sales of the saidstore aside from his monthly salary of P120.00 as salesmantherein.

Petitioner Co claims that he has never been delinquent in the

payment of taxes but admitted that he failed to file his incometax return for his earnings from the Go Tian Store and histobacco business. On cross examination, he was asked if hebelieved in the principle underlying the Philippine constitution towhich he replied that he believed in the laws of the Philippineswithout mentioning what principles of the constitution he knew.When asked about which law of the Philippines he believed in, heanswered democracy. When asked why he failed to file hisincome tax return, he claims that his father has already filed hisincome tax return and promised to file his. He was only able topresent his alien certificate of registration but failed to present

those of his wife and child.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner/appellee Benjamin Co should beissued a certificate of naturalization.

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision of the CFI ofAbra granting petitioner/appellee issuance of certificate ofnaturalization.

Benjamin Co failed to comply with the requirement of the lawthat one must believe in the principles underlying the

constitution. It averred that the scope of the world law inordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include theconstitution which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does itcover all principles underlying the constitution.


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DIFFERENT LAWS F. INSURANCE

TITLE: DIOSDADO C. TY vs FIRST NATIONAL SURETY &ASSURANCE CO., INC.

(1 SCRA 1324, L-16138 29 APRIL 1961)

FACTS: The case pertains to an appeal on the judgment rendered by theCourt of First Instance of Manila dismissing the claim forinsurance benefits of plaintiff Diosdado Ty who was employed asOperator Mechanic Foreman at the Broadway Cotton Factory inCaloocan City with a monthly salary of P185.00. On December24, 1953 two months after the plaintiff got for himself a total of

18 insurance policies, a fire broke out at the factory whereplaintiff worked which caused him physical injuries leading to thetemporary total disability of his left hand. Plaintiff then filed anotice of accident and notice of claim with all the defendants torecover indemnity under Part II of the policy, which provides forindemnity for total or partial disability due to loss of either hand.Loss of a hand as defined in the insurance policy meant the lostby amputation through the bones of the wrist.

Plaintiff/appellant contends that since the injuries he obtainedfrom the fire of December 24, 1953 has prevented him fromperforming his work or labor necessary in his occupation, he isqualified to claim his benefits on the insurance policies issued tohim.

ISSUE: Whether or not DIOSDADO C. TY is qualified to claim insurancebenefits under Part II of the insurance policies issued to himwhich provides for indemnity for total or partial disability due toloss of either hand.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the decision rendered by the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila stating that the insurance contract is the

law between the parties. The terms in the insurance policiessecured by Diosdado Ty were clear, express and specific, thatonly amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss.It added that an interpretation that would include the injuriessustained by Diosdado Ty which are mere fractures would beunwarranted.


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DIFFERENT LAWS F. INSURANCE

TITLE: SIMON DELA CRUZ vs. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND

SURETY CO., INC.(17 SCRA 559, L-21574 30 JUNE 1966)

FACTS: The case pertains to an appeal filed by Capital Insurance andSurety Company, Inc. on the judgment rendered by the Court ofFirst Instance of Pangasinan awarding indemnities to Simon DelaCruz on the insurance policy of his son Eduardo Dela Cruz ofwhich the older Dela Cruz was a beneficiary. The younger DelaCruz died on January 1, 1957 while he was engaged in a boxingmatch which was part of the New Years celebration of Itogon-Suyoc Mines where Eduardo was employed. During the match,

Eduardo accidentally slipped giving his opponent the opportunityto hit him at the back of his head. After being struck in the head,Eduardo fell and hit the rope of the ring. He was brought to thenearest hospital but expired the next day.

Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc. denied the claims ofSimon Dela Cruz which led to the filing of the instant case beforethe CFI of Pangasinan. Capital Insurance contends that thedeath of the insured which was caused the boxing match heparticipated in, was not accidental in nature and therefore, notcovered by the insurance policy. The insurance company claims

that the voluntary participation of the younger Dela Cruz in theboxing match was the means that produced the injury, which inturn, caused his death. Therefore, the circumstances of his deathshould not be considered an accident or accidental.

ISSUE: Whether the death of EDUARDO DELA CRUZ was accidental innature or not as prescribed by the insurance policy issued in hisfavor by Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of FirstInstance of Pangasinan granting Simon Dela Cruz indemnity from

the insurance policy of his son. It stated that the circumstancesof Eduardo Dela Cruz death was not among those declaredoutside the protection of the insurance contract. It added thatwhere the death or injury is not the natural or probable result ofthe insureds voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs inthe doing of the act which produces the injury, the resultingdeath is within the protection of policies insuring against deathor injury from accident.

The decision of the CFI of Pangasinan is AFFIRMED.


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DIFFERENT LAWS

F. NATURALIZATION LAWS

TITLE: RICHARD VELASCO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES(108 PHIL 234, L-14214 25 MAY 1960)

FACTS: The case if a petition for naturalization which was denied by theCourt of First Instance of Manila due to the failure of thepetitioner to meet the requirements of the law.

Petitioner and appellant Richard Velasco was born to spousesPeter Velasco and Miguel Tiu on 12 May 1932 and has sinceresided, finished school and worked in the Philippines. Althoughhis father has been naturalized as a Filipino citizen, petitioner did

not follow his fathers citizenship as he was already 23 years oldat the time of naturalization and continues to be a citizen ofFormosa, Republic of China. He earns P150.00/month from hiscurrent employment at Wilson Drug Store, which was partlyowned by his mother, and has savings in Philippine banks andshares of stocks in two Philipppine companies.

In the course of the trial, petitioners moral character wasattested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant at the Manila PoliceDepartment and who was also a character witness in the petitionfor naturalization of petitioners brother, and, Mrs. Paz Eugenio, a

housekeeper and soon-to-be mother-in-law of the petitionerwhich led the trial court to believe that the petitioner has alimited circle of Filipino friends. The trial court also founddiscrepancies in the documentary evidence presented bypetitioner with regards to his full name, Richard Velasco, RichardChua Velasco, and Richard C. Velasco. No evidence wassubmitted to prove that all three names are one and the sameperson. His income of P150.00/month was also not substantial tomeet the requirement of the naturalization law considering thelow purchasing power of the peso and high cost of living in thePhilippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner/appellant should is qualified to becomea naturalized Filipino Citizen.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of FirstInstance of Manila denying the petition for naturalization ofpetitioner/appellant Richard Vealsco.

The Court averred that his employment was merely a convenientarrangement planned by the petitioner and his family in order tocomply with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino

citizen, one must have a lucrative income or occupation. Thecourt further stated that naturalization laws should berigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of thegovernment and against the applicant.

Documents

Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta,Pangasinan_Case Digest