Presidential Party Affliation and Women's Pay Inequality

7/28/2019 Presidential Party Affliation and Women's Pay Inequality

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THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

PRESIDENTIAL PARTY AFFLIATION AND WOMENS PAY INEQUALITY

MEGHAN ANN GILLIESSPRING 2013

A thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirementsfor baccalaureate degrees

in Political Science and Public Relations and

with honors in Political Science

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

David Lowery

Professor of Political ScienceThesis Supervisor

Gretchen CasperAssociate Professor of Political Science

Honors Adviser

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College.


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i

ABSTRACT

Previous scholars and data obtained from the U.S. Census have proven that a definite

gender inequality exists within female pay in the American workforce. Though there has been an

exhaustive amount of research on the reasons why this inequality continues to exist, no previous

researcher has studied the effect of the presidential party affiliation on female pay. This thesis

uses an interrupted time series analysis to research this link using the data from 1960-2010 of the

U.S. Census. From the data, I conclude that Democratic presidents increase the female pay wage,

while Republican presidents keep the rate constant in which they were elected into. However,

through further investigation, this increase of female pay wage during Democratic presidents

seems to taper off during the course of their administration.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures iii

List of Tables iv

Acknowledgements v

Chapter 1

Women Pay Inequality Over Time.............................................................................1

Chapter 2

Theories of Political Control..................................................................................... .4

Chapter 3

Analysis....................................................................................................................16

Chapter 4

Conclusion.......................................................................................................... .....25

REFERENCES.........................................................................................................28


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iii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1..14Figure 2..16

Figure 3..20


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iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1..17


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v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my greatest gratitude to Dr. David Lowery and Dr. Gretchen

Casper for all of their guidance and advice during the process of writing this thesis. I could not

have done it without their help. In addition, I would like to thank my family and friends for all of

their support.


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Chapter 1

Women Pay Inequality Over Time

Womens pay in comparison to their male counterparts has varied throughout the

history of women in the workforce. In 2010, the U.S. Census revealed that women make

77 cents for every one dollar that a man earns. This statistic was up from 60 cents when it

was first annually recorded in 1960. Since 1960, there have been ten different presidential

administrations, five Republicans and five Democrats, that have all treated equal pay for

women at different severities on their agendas (Getz, 2010).

President John F. Kennedy was the first president to sign into law legislation

concerning wage discrimination in 1963. The Equal Pay Act made pay discrimination on

the basis of gender illegal. It stated that a man and woman performing the same job with

the same skill and experience must be paid in equal wages. The next piece of legislation

that was passed one year later in 1964 was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting

discrimination by employers on the basis of race, gender or national origin. President

Barack Obama signed the most recent piece of legislation, The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay

Act, in 2009. The Ledbetter Act amended the Civil Rights Act by extending the statute of

limitations for those filing discrimination cases on the basis of gender pay inequality

(Equal Pay and Compensation Inequality 2012).

Looking at all of the legislation that is in place to prevent gender discrimination,

the question then arises: why does it still continue to exist if there are measures in place


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to prevent it? This topic is important to research because it helps explain not only how

policy is put into action, but how each individual presidential administration and their

party affiliation plays a role in executing that policy. It must be studied to not only

understand the pay inequality, but also the power of the executive branch. In addition, it

must be studied and understood so that women will not be held a handicap compared to

their male colleagues, moving into the future.

In order to effectively answer this question, this paper will begin by dissecting the

previous literature on political control of the executive branch and party power, as well as

the literature on pay inequality. Researchers common trends and discrepancies will be

organized and grouped together. This will allow me to gain a more holistic approach to

the topic. I will also be paying special attention to the way in which previous researchers

conducted their research designs to build off of them. The next section of the thesis is the

analysis of the research design. It is important to delve into the results manipulating,

exploring every possible variable. I will be using a switching interrupted time series to

measure the effect of individual presidents and their party affiliation between 1960 and

2010 has on female pay. This research design will allow me to isolate the individual

presidential administrations to see the change if any before, during and after their term.

The final section will conclude the paper by summarizing the major findings, and stating

the contribution of the results to the literature. The work of social scientists is meant to be

built on top of each other. My goal in completing my research is to build off those before

me, as well as give those future researchers a springboard for their own research into pay

inequality. In order to do this, I will discuss my limitations and future advice for those

studying the topic.


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Chapter 2

Theories of Political Control

One theory that explains the variation in womens pay inequality throughout the

years is a direct result of the different party affiliations of presidential administrations and

the power they choose to use to move the issue forward. Both the president and the party

hold a great share of power in moving policy forward or holding it back. Republicans and

Democrats nominate presidential candidates on the basis that these individuals will push

their platform and goals forward into action through the different agencies in the

bureaucracy.

Before moving on to why pay variety occurs among women full time workers, it

is important to establish that a definite foundation of variety exists. The 2010 U.S.

Census clearly revealed that women were not earning equal wages for equal work

compared to men. The statistic revealed that full time, year round women above the age

of 15 were only making 77 cents for every one-dollar that a full time, year round working

man makes under similar working conditions and job title. This statistic has seen

variation throughout its first measurement in 1960. In 1960, women were recorded as

making 60.7 percent of a mans wage. Even after the Equal Pay Act was passed in 1964,

the statistic decreased to 59.9 percent in 1965. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor

Statistics, this statistic saw steady progressive growth through 1981-1990, ending at 71.6

percent. Between 1991-1993 the ratio lost momentum hovering around the 60 percent


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mark. In more recent years, the ratio reached it highest peak in 2007 with women earning

77.8 percent of what men make (Getz, 2010). Through this data, there is no denying that

variety occurs and we now can move on to further investigating the role of presidential

and party affiliation.

Presidential Power

The president has the constitutional power to nominate individual persons for

executive office, dismiss them once they retain their fixed term positions, and veto bills

that were previously passed by Congress. These tools have given the president the power

to control the bureaucracy, and demonstrate power over the fluctuation of female pay

rates.

Hammond and Knott (1996) and Moe (1982) state that the greatest artillery that a

president has in the battle over the bureaucracy is the power of appointments. In 1950,

the Hoover Commission proposed giving the president the power to appoint and remove

commission chairmen. The presidents have a great amount of discretion when it comes to

these appointments because Senate committees rarely feel that they have the power to

intervene. In addition, many senators believe that the president should be given the power

to appoint the individuals that will help them accomplish the goals that they sought out to

complete. Moe (1982) added that in most regulatory commissions, the average

commissioner leaves when a new party takes over even if it is before their term ends.

This allows the president to appoint new members early in their term to make the changes

they want.

Presidents also assume power through agenda setting for congressional

deliberations on agency appropriations. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) found that the


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final appropriations on agencies are greatly influenced by the budget estimates that the

president constructs and submits to Congress for approval. In addition, the president has a

great power of persuasion over the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The

OMB, the largest office within the executive branch, regulates the budgets and quality of

performance of the independent agencies. The OMB approval is crucial for the

bureaucracy to receive financial and legislative assistance, giving the president great

influence over their actions (Moe 1982).

With power given to the president, and the different agencies that are responsible

for executing stability of female pay, the question still remains why there is instability.

The answer lies in the fact that some presidents use their power over agencies, while

others choose to be laissez faire. Hammond and Knott (1996) and Moe (1982) both argue

the fact that some presidents are not interested in influencing individual agencies even

though they have the power to do so. Presidents are not responsible for the actions of

these agencies, and do not receive credit for their achievements. Therefore, they have

little incentive to push forth the bureaucrats agenda and choose to focus their attention on

other avenues. Weingast (1981) supports these claims by calling presidential influence

sporadic or unimportant.

Party Power

One of the main reasons that a president chooses to exert their power over the

agency is correlated with their party affiliation. Democrats and Republicans are divided

over which areas they believe the government should control and the level of that control.

Though past researchers have not specifically studied party control and the effect on

female pay, the following studies are relevant to the theory of the power of the party.


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Brown (1982) provided evidence for this claim of party power. In the study,

Brown analyzed the percentage of major presidential appointees from their own party. He

found that Republican presidents, Nixon and Ford appointed their highest percentage of

fellow Republicans to posts in the Department of Interior. The Democrat presidents,

Kennedy, Johnson and Carter appointed their highest percentage of fellow Democrats to

the Department of Labor, Commerce and Transportation. According to Brown, the

president will fill the independent agencies with fellow party members to help ensure

agreement with his regulatory philosophy (Brown, 1982).

Party affiliation also helps understand why presidents spend more money in some

areas of government, and ignore others. Amenta and Poulsen (1996) stated that

Democratic leaders increase social spending compared to their Republican foes. The

research cited that Democrats drafted, sponsored, supported and implement the social

spending from the New Deal, one of the most breakthrough pieces of social legislation in

our countrys legislation.

The Agencies

From the research, a president and his party controls the most power through the

bureaucracy when it comes to female pay inequality. The purpose of the independent

agencies in the government is to stabilize policy in a permanent setting in order to

achieve action. With the government locked in a never-ending power struggle between

different actors wanting different results, we look to the bureaucracy to keep constant the

policies put into law. The three bureaucracies that regulate and prosecute gender

discrimination in the work place are the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

the Department of Justice, as well as the federal judges overseeing the individual


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discrimination cases. These agencies are important to see how the president and his party

have affected their influence on gender pay inequality.

EEOC

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created when

President Johnson signed into law Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Title VII

made it illegal for employees to be discriminated against on the basis of their race, color,

religion, sex or national origin. However, the EEOC had no judicial or legislative power

until the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which gave them to right to file

suits on behalf of discriminated employees. Seven years later in 1979, Congress approved

an executive reorganization that made the EEOC responsible for enforcing all federal

employment discrimination laws, including the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age

Discrimination Act of 1967, Section 501 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973

and several executive orders(Equal Pay and Compensation Discrimination, 2012).

The EEOC primary responsibilities are to investigate, research and prosecute

charges of employment discrimination in federal court. Since 1965, there have been

twenty-one different EEOC commissioners and fourteen different chairs, with six acting

chairs. The financial budget and growth of the agency have varied over time with the

different ideologies of each president(Equal Pay and Compensation Discrimination,

2012).

B. Dan Wood researched the effect that politics have on the EEOC in 1990. In

his study, he found that the president and Congress have significant power within EEOC

and the direction that the agency goes towards. Wood (1990) agreed with Moe (1982)

that the presidents greatest source of power is found in his ability to appoint leaders to


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the commission, including the chairman and the general counsel, who manages litigations

on behalf of the commission.

Wood compared the appointments of the Carter and Reagan administrations to

show how the individual president can influence policy in both positive and negative

directions. Carter nominated Eleanor Holmes Norton to the Chairperson of the EEOC.

Norton had experience in both the civil rights field as well as held many managerial

positions. In addition, Carters administration has displayed the intention of restructuring

and strengthening the functions of the EEOC before Nortons initiation. Within the four

years under Nortons direction, she appointed a Civil Rights Reorganization Task Force,

centralized the EEO functions into a single entity, and instituted a Rapid Change

Processing System (Wood, 1990).

In contrast, Reagan first appointed William Bell for the chairperson during his

term, which was later withdrawn because it was met with serious objection due to his

lack of experience in the government, as well as no managerial experience. Reagan then

appointed current Supreme Court Justice, Clarence Thomas. Thomas supported ending

hiring quotas and supported individual discrimination cases over systematic suits. Reagan

also nominated one of the most controversial general counsels in EEOC history, Michael

Connelly. Connelly, who had previously represented General Motors in cases against the

government prior to his appointment, added controversy when he told his staff that he

would no longer prosecute sexual harassment, age discrimination, equal pay, and class

action suits (Wood. 1990).

The Department of Justice


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The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the next agency to deal with litigation

concerning discrimination in the workplace. The EEOC will issue a formal complaint on

a discriminated employees behalf through the Department of Justice. If the Department

accepts the complaint, an impartial investigation will be completed within 180 days.

During this investigation, the Department must make attempts at settlement, provide a

copy of their findings, as well as notice the employee of their rights. The employee then

may choose to pursue a hearing from the EEOC, as well as the Department of Justice, in

which an administration judge oversees the case. If a judge finds sufficient evidence of

discrimination in the workplace, they then offer a suitable remedy for retribution. The

Department then, within 40 days, then offers a decision of whether they accept the

remedy offered by the administrative judge (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012).

The Department of Justice, as well as the Attorney General have the discretion

to bring the gender discrimination cases to court, as well as they can choose to put them

on the backburner. The leadership with the DOJ, as well as the Attorney General is at the

hand of the president and usually follows the ideology of the executive branch (U.S.

Department of Justice, 2012).

The DOJ is important when looking at the effect of president and their political

party on policy execution because the president can replace the activities of the OMB

with the DOJ. The appointed attorney general has great leeway in making the decisions

of who to prosecute, courtroom strategy and legal argument. Since this position is

appointed by the president, it gives him another avenue in executing his priorities (Moe

1982).

Judges


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Finally, the judges that rule on the case play a role within gender discrimination.

These judges, who were appointed by the president, can be either sympathetic to the

employee or the employer. Though these positions are to be free from politics, they often

resonate with the presidents ideology or agenda.

Hammond and Knott (1996) found that the courts may constrain the

bureaucracy through procedural and substantive constraints. The Administrative

Procedure Act of 1946 requires that agencies give courts public notice of impending

decisions, and decide outcomes based in fair and non-arbitrary ways. The courts can

challenge these outcomes of agencies, which some delay and even kill their policies and

procedures.

Alternating Theory

Though the president is the executive and has the power to enforce the laws,

Congress, comprised of a Senate and a House of Representatives, is given all legislative

powers. According to precedent by the Supreme Court, Congress has the power to limit

the Presidents power to remove executive officials by requiring that the president

provide a substantial reason for such removal (Hammond & Knott, 1996).

In addition, the courts have limited the Take Care Clause of Article II of the

Constitution. The Take Care clause states that the president has the right to take care

that the laws be faithfully executed. However, The Supreme Court has defined it as an

obligation to execute the laws that Congress has already passed. It is not the right to

decide how and when the laws should be carried out. Therefore, the president needs the

support of Congress in order to pass new legislation (Weingast, 1981).


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Capture theory supports this alternating theory by stating that politics is an

important aspect of policy creation, however it also states that the president plays little or

no role. The theory states that the modern day president has become merely serving as a

clerk to other peoples priorities, especially Congress. Through Congressional

Committees, such as the Ways and Means Committee, as well as the Appropriations

Committee, Congress holds a great amount of power. These committees and other ones

are an indispensible part of legislation formation, in which the president has little role

(Hammond & Knott, 1996).

Pay Inequality

Through the research of presidential, party and bureaucracy control, there seems

to be a gap concerning pay inequality. Though, no previous researcher has investigated

the link between party affiliation and pay inequality between males and females, the topic

has been intensively investigated through other means. Blau and Kauhn (1994) serve as

one of the most condensed works on pay inequality. Through their study, they found that

though the United States has had a longer and stronger commitment to pay inequality, the

pay gap is larger than most other industrialized countries. The reason for this gap is that

those at the top are found to be paid extremely high, while putting a penalty on those

below the wage distribution.

In addition to Blau and Kauhns research, Darity and Mason (1998) researched

the narrowing wage gap between the period of 1980 and 1990, and analyzed why such

variety occurs in pay inequality. From this research they found three reasons why the gap

decreased during this period. First, men who were earning around the 78th percentile of

the male wage discrimination suffered decreases in their wages, while all women


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workers wages rose. Second, gaps in female-male human capital declined. Third,

increased legal pressure expanded the different occupations that women could enter,

increasing their wages.

According to the literature and previous research, if a president is Democrat, then

the male to female pay is likely to increase. In order to test this hypothesis, I will be

performing an interrupted time-analysis from 1960-2010. Throughout this time there

have been ten presidents- five Democrats and five Republicans. I will be looking at the

U.S. Census female-to-male earnings ratio of full time, year-round workers 15 and older

to define pay inequality.

In order to explore the relationship between the party affiliations of the president,

I need measure the effect of the party of the presidential administrations, quantitatively.

It is important to define how I will measure pay inequality and what I expect to see. Pay

inequality will serve as the dependent variable and will be measured using the data from

the U.S. Census between 1960-2010. The Census has effectively measured demographic

information about the entire population of the United States since 1790. The Census is

the most used and recognized data set by labor employee relations scholars while

measuring pay inequality. From the Census data, a worker will be defined as full-time,

year round, and older than fifteen years of age. Each new presidential administration will

serve as an intervention in an Interrupted Time Analysis.

From this research, I expect that with every Democratic president, we see a

increase in female wages. For the Republican presidents, I offer two theories. The first

theory states that when a Republican president is in power, pay wages will remain the

same, while when a Democrat is in power it increases, the Ratchet Theory. The second


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theory, Switching, states that when a Republican is in power the level of pay will

decrease from those years of Democratic presidents.

To test this theory, I will be implementing an interrupted time analysis. The

equation for the research follows:

Yt =b0 + b1X1t + b2X2 t + b3X3 t + b4X4t + et

where Yt = annual observations on the female-to-male earnings ratio; X1t = a

counter for years, from 1 to N, the number of observations; X2 t =a dichotomous variable

scored 0 for a Republican presidential administration and 1 for a Democratic presidential

administration; X3 t =a counter for years scored increasing numbers for observations with

a Democrat and scored decreasing numbers for observations with a Republican president;

X4 t = a counter for years scored increasing numbers for observations with Democrats and

for those observations with Republicans the number remain stagnant; b0,b1,b2, b3 =

parameters to be estimated; et= error. The parameters indicate the level of slope of the

time-series prior to the each administration. To evaluate whether these parameters were

altered by these new administrations, we must look for statistically significant data to

determine an influence on pay inequality. Figure 1 represents what we expect to find

before performing the research. Counter theory represents a control that female wage has

increased over time to a variety of factors, but not presidential party. Switching Theory

represents the theory that Democrats increase the female pay compared to males, while a

Republican leader decreases the value of the ratio. Ratchet represents the other theory

that while Democrats increase the pay of women, Republican leaders make no change

positively or negatively.


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Chapter 3

Analysis

To evaluate the impact of presidential party affiliation on the variety of pay

inequality statistics, I will be employing an Interrupted Time Series analysis. In an

Interrupted Time Series Analysis, data is collected at multiple instances over time before

and after and intervention has taken place. It allows the researcher to see if the

intervention has a causal relationship with the outcome. In this case, each intervention

will be a new presidential administration. Through the period of 1960-2010, there were

10 different presidents, 5 Republicans and 5 Democrats. Using an Interrupted Time

Analysis will allow me to look at each administration independently of the data, as well

as in conjunction with the rest of the presidents. A Republican president will be recorded

as 0, and a Democrat president will be recorded as 1.

To test the theory that a Democrat president will increase the female wage, while

Republicans will either decrease or keep the wage stagnant, I will implore a switching

Interrupted Time Analysis. Through this research design, I will be testing for two

theories: the Ratchet Theory and the Switching Theory .

The Ratchet Theory states that when a Democratic president is in power female

pay ratio will increase. However, when a Republican president assumes power that ratio

will remain the same. To illustrate this theory, the variable will increase one unit for


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every one year that a Democrat president is in office. When a Republican president is

sworn in that number will stay the same.

The next variable will define the Switching Theory, which states that when a

Democratic president is in power the female pay ratio will increase. However, when the

Republican president is in power this ratio will decrease. To illustrate this theory, the

variable will increase one unit for every year that a Democrat president is in office. When

a Republican president is sworn in that number will decrease by one unit for every year.

Figure 2 reports the actual data from the U.S. Census concerning womens pay

and the variety that has occurred throughout 1960-2010. Its appears to support the

Ratchet theory because it has a steady upward trend, with no dramatic decrease as the

Switching Theory suggests.


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Table 1 shows the results of the interrupted time analysis for presidential party

affiliations and the impact on female pay. To interpret the findings deriving from the

ordinary least squares regression, the coefficients, standard error and t values are all

reported. I ran five different models, all for the purpose of yielding different information

to hone in on concerning the factors of the variety of female pay. The first model, Model

1 serves as a control to measure for certain factors that may play a role such as


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maturation, history, increase polarity between the parties and increased female power. It

is important to look at female pay without the theories added into the regression to ensure

that they play a role. Model 2 serves as an explanation for the Ratchet Theory. The theory

states that when a Democratic president is in power, the female pay will increase. When a

Republican president takes over the executive branch, the pay will remain stagnant and

not increase or decrease. Model 3 serves as an explanation for the Switching Theory.

The theory states that when a Democratic president is in power, the female pay will

increase. When a Republican president assumes power, however, this figure will

decrease. Model 4 serves to measure the Ratchet Theory without the aforementioned

controls. Model 5 measures the Switching Theory also without the controls.

In order to properly measure the different models, it is important to define the

variables. The dependent variable was data attained from the U.S. Census between the

years of 1960-2010 on female wage percentages compared to men. The independent

variables measured in this model were the trend variable, presidential party, Ratchet

Theory and Switching Theory. The trend variable should account for extraneous variables

such as history, maturation, and other variables. Presidential party was a dichotomous

variable, defining every year that a Republican president with a 0, and every Democratic

president with a 1.

Model 1 represents neither of the Switching nor Ratchet Theory and accounts for

only the control factors that may occur over time due to outside factors. The dependent

variable is U.S. Census data. The independent variables are the trend variable, as well as

the Presidential party. From the data in Table 1, Model 1, the trend variable coefficient

was recorded as .475 (SE=.023, t-value= 20.323). This value illustrates that when the


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Trend variable increases one unit, female pay increases .475, and is statistically

significant. The Presidential Party variable coefficient was .023 (SE=.695, t-

value=20.323). For the dichotomous variable of Presidential Party, when there is a

Democratic President, female pay increases .023. This value was not found to be

significantly significant. The Constant for the Model is 53.528. The R-Squared value

indicates that Model 3 explains 89.2 percent of the variance of female pay. The total

number of observations for Model 3 is 51.

Model 2 is to measure the Ratchet Theory. The dependent variable is the U.S.

Census data. The independent variables include the Trend, Presidential Party, as well as

the Ratchet Theory variable. The ratchet variable was defined as increasing one unit for

every year that a Democrat is in power, and the number staying constant during every

Republican in power.

As you can see in Table 1, Model 2, the Trend variable was found to have an

unstandardized coefficient of .752(SE=.095, t-value 7.948). This value was found to

statistically significant, meaning that it did not just occur by chance. This value states that

when the Trend variable increased one unit, female pay inequality increased .752. The

Presidential Party variable was found to have a coefficient of 1.059 (SE=.647, t-value=

1.635). This value, statistically significant, states that when a President is a Democrat,

the female pay wage increases 1.059. The Ratchet Theory variable was found to have a

-.729 coefficient (SE=.242, t-value -3.007). This value, also statistically significant, states

that when the Ratchet Theory variable increases by one unit, the female pay wage

decreases by .729. The Constant for the Model is 55.105. The R-Square value ranges


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from 0 to 1 and indicates the overall model. According to Table 1, Model 1 explains 90.8

percent of the variance of female pay over the time of 1960-2010.

From the data, the Ratchet theory explains that when a Democratic president is

elected, the female pay wage increases, as we see in the Presidential Party variable in

Model 2. However, over time female pay decreases after this interruption of Democratic

control of the executive branch. This model is extremely important when looking at

female pay inequality. It proves that politics does play a role, as well as outside forces, as

measured by the trend variable.

While this data supported my original theory that Democratic presidential

administrations help increase the female pay inequality, it is important to double-check

the validity of the data before moving on. In order to do so, I ran the predictive values of

Model 3, as illustrated in Figure 3. As you can see in this Figure, the data predicted is

closely paralleled to the actual data obtained from the U.S. Census from the years of

1960-2010, and therefore can ensure validity.


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Model 3 represents the Switching Theory. To capture the theory, the dependent

variable was the U.S. Census data. The independent variables were the trend variable,

Presidential party and the Switching Theory. For every one year that a Democrat was in

power, the Switching variable would increase by one unit. However, when a Republican

was in power, the variable would decrease by one unit. From the data in Table 1, Model

3, the trend variable coefficient was recorded as .388 (SE=.976, t-value 10.707). This

value, statistically significant, illustrates that for every one unit that the Trend variable

increases, female wage increases .388. The Presidential party variable coefficient was

recorded as 1.059 (SE= .036, t-value=1.635). This value illustrates that when a Democrat

is in power, the rate of the female wage increases 1.059 and is also statistically

significant. The Switching Theory variable was measured as having a -.364 coefficient

(SE=.121, t-value=-3.007), and having statistical significance. The Switching Theory

variable states that when it is increased by one unit, female pay rates decreases .364.


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Compared to Model 2 Ratchet Theory, this coefficient is half the value, so causing half

the change that Model 2 The Constant for the Model is 55.469. The R Squared value is .

908, meaning that Model 3 also explains 90.8 percent of the variance of female pay. The

total number of observations for Model 3 is 51.

Model 4 represents the Ratchet Theory, without any set of controls. The

dependent variable is the U.S. Census data. For this model no trend variable was

included, only leaving the President party and the Ratchet Theory as independent

variables. The Presidential Party coefficient in this model was recorded as .343 (SE=.971,

t-value=.353). In this Model, when the President is Democratic, womens pay increases .

343. However, this data was not proven to be statistically significant. The Ratchet Theory

coefficient was recorded as 1.147 (SE=.084, t-value=13.657). The statistical significant

value illustrates that for every one unit that the variables of the Ratchet Theory increase,

female pay increases by 1.147, the largest increase of the table. The Constant for the

Model is 52.136. The R-Squared variable states that Model 4 accounts for 78.8 percent of

the variance of female pay.

Model 5 represents the Switching Theory, without any set of controls. The

dependent variable is the U.S. Census data. The independent variables included in this

model are Presidential Party and the Switching Theory. The Presidential Party coefficient

was recorded as 1.139 (SE=.1.188, t-value =.959). When the President is a Democrat, the

female pay rate increases by 1.139. This value was not found to be significantly

significant. The Switching Theory coefficient was -1.405 (SE=.133, t-value=-10.575).

When the variables of the Switching Theory were put into play, female wage decreased

by 1.405. This was the largest decrease in the table, as well as being statistically


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significant. The Constant for the Model is 64.848. The R-Squared value explains that

Model 5 accounts for 68.9 percent of variance of female pay in comparison to their male

counterparts. The number of observations is 51.


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Chapter 4

Conclusion

The empirical research began with the question of Why does female pay vary

over time? To provide an answer to this question, I employed a switching interrupted

time analysis, a procedure that would provide me with the opportunity to account for the

interruption of different presidential administrations party affiliations. Through research,

I developed the hypothesis that Democratic presidents would account for positive growth

of the female pay ratio, while Republicans would either decrease this ratio or keep it the

same. The research supported my original hypothesis that Democratic administrations

increase the female pay wage, while evidence from the data supports that while

Republican presidents are in office, the female pay ratio does not change.

The data also states that though female pay increases with the election of a

Democratic president, that this increase is not constant over the course of their

presidency. In fact, it begins to decrease as they enter the end of the first or second term.

We see this illustrated through the Ratchet and Switching Theories in Model 2 and 3.

This is important finding because it appears that when a Democrat president is elected

womens rights is at their highest concern in their agenda. As time continues, this seems

to fade.

What are the implications of the presidential party affiliation relationship to

female pay inequality? With three branches of government, American politics seems to


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always been in a battle for power. Through this research, we are confidently able to say

that the president has influence when it comes to moving policies forward. Many

researchers focus their attention of Congresss role on policy, however we cannot leave

out the president. In addition, the focus of this research was highly centered in on the role

of the party. The research was able to uncover how powerful the party is in moving

policy forward. Therefore, it is important as voters to not only research the personal

preferences of the presidential candidate, but also their stance on their individual party

platform because they have great influence in creating the agenda.

These findings also lead to another major implication- politics matter. Today, our

society is often penetrated with messages that Congress and the president do not change

anything substantial or that all politicians are the same. This research design directly

contradicts these claims. With the information derived from the data, politicians and

lobbyists can learn how to effectively change the female pay rate by learning who and

when to broadcast their message.

Though there was no previous research in the literature review analyzing the

relationship between party affiliation of the president and female pay wage, the findings

from this research design are parallel with previous researchers who have studied

political control. Hammond and Knott (1996) and Moe (1982) both found that presidents

are a great source of power when it comes to enacting policy, though constantly

overlooked compared to Congress. This research strengthens their claim that presidents

party affiliation alone can help predict female pay rates.

The findings also supported Amenta and Poulsen (1996) research that Democratic

presidents have historically spent more attention and financial resources on social issues


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than those Republican leaders. From the Table as well as the Model 1 and 2, this finding

is illustrated. For Model 1 and 2, when a President is Democrat, the female pay rate saw

an increase in 1.059.

Though the research shows a statistically significant relationship between,

presidential party affiliation and female pay, there are some limitations that future

researchers must analyze when continuing the study of female inequality. The data that

was used in this set was from 1960-2010, for full time workers above the age of 15. It did

not account for part-time workers, in which female employees make up the majority.

Future researchers may want to include this data to get a holistic view of female work.

Another limitation derived from the data set is that the number is nation-wide. It may be

important to look at the statistic state by state to see if there are any outliers causing to

shift the data. Another limitation is the time period. The data covers 1960, however the

U.S. Census has provided data concerning womens pay since 1950. This data was

excluded from my data set because from the years 1950-1960 the data did not account for

population growth. It was important to have the data as consistent as possible. However,

this information may be important to future researchers to include in their work.

The future of female pay is unclear. However, as researchers continue to study

this topic it is key to remember the party affiliation role of the president factor on the

female pay wage. Future researchers can build off this study by looking more closely into

the reason why the increase in female pay seems to taper off as the presidency of a

Democrat continues. These researchers should also make a special effort to identify the

reasons why females continue to make less than their male counterparts, and offer

solutions to ensure equality in the American workplace.


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Politics Theory and Social Spending at the End of the New Deal. Social Forces.

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Blau, Francine, and Lawrence Kahn. 1994. Rising Wage Inequality and the U.S.

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Science Quarterly. 97.2 279-294.

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Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation:

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U.S. department of justice.Equal Employment Opportunity Strategic Plan (2012),

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ACADEMIC VITA

Meghan A. Gillies

213 Woods Road

Glenside, PA 19038

[email protected]

________________________________________

Education

B.A., Political Science, 2013, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

B.A., Public Relations, 2013, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

Honors and Awards

Paterno Fellows Program

Charles Dewey Prutzman Scholarship, College of the Liberal Arts, August 2012

Association Memberships/Activities

Pi Sigma Alpha- Political Science Honors Society

Documents

Presidential Party Affliation and Women's Pay Inequality