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©2010 Centre for Crime and Justice Studies10.1080/09627251.2010.505402

In common parlance ‘risk’ refersus to both the probability of beingexposed to harm and the

possibility of an unpleasant eventoccurring. Risk, therefore, isdistinguished by futurity. Theproblem of risk is not that it ishappening – nor indeed that it willhappen – simply that it might. Thismakes what constitutes a risk, forwhom and why, infinitelycontestable. As Ulrich Beck (2009)remarks: ‘the category of risk exhibitsan expansive logic. It embraceseverything’. Taking a historical view,it is difficult to disagree. Risk hasbecome a popular way of speakingabout the world and conceptualisinghuman experience. In the context ofcrime control and criminal justice,risk assessments inform a range ofpolicies and practices, from thesentencing of child sex offenders tocounter-terrorism strategies and drugminimisation programmes.

While risk has been alongstanding factor in crimeregulation (O’Malley, 2009), inrecent years the anticipatorydimensions of risk appear to havebeen accentuated (Mythen andWalklate, 2008). Where riskassessments traditionally relied onpast events to gauge probabilities,the contemporary calculus of riskappears to have accelerated beyondreflecting on the past or counting thepresent and veered off instead tofocus on predicting the future. Sincethe events of 9/11 the logic ofanticipatory risk has acted as

ideological support for an assortmentof pre-crime interventions.

The term ‘pre-crime’ is the namegiven to a specialised police unit inPhillip K Dick’s (1956) sciencefiction short story Minority Report. Itis the primary duty of pre-crimeofficers to track down and arrestperpetrators before crime happens.Interventions are made on the basisof information about future crimesgiven by three ‘pre-cogs’ – beingswho are able to visualise impendingcriminal incidents. Many of thedilemmas posed in Minority Reporthave resonance in the contemporarycontext. The reliability of horizonscanning, the perils of pre-emptiveintervention, the capture andutilisation of personal data, the

evidential standard of proof, and thedifficulty of establishing innocencein a febrile environment are keythemes in the book. In reflecting onthe resonance of such themes in thecontemporary world, the regulationof counter-terrorism serves as an apttouchstone. There can be no doubtthat focal incidents such as 9/11 and7/7 have substantially alteredprocesses of securitisation aroundterrorism, both domestically andinternationally. Accompanying theraft of legislative changes that haveemerged, dominant politicaldiscourses have becomeprogressively more projective andtilted toward the ‘What if?’ question.Prior to announcing plans to extendthe period of detention withoutcharge in the 2008 Terrorism Bill,Security Minister Tony McNultyprompted the British public to‘imagine two or three 9/11s. Imaginetwo 7/7s’ (Roberts, 2008). Suchinvitations are symptomatic of atrend to draw upon the culturalimaginary to develop a revisedcalculus of risk which hyper-extendsthe anticipatory dimensions (seeAmoore and de Goede, 2008).

What is interesting anddisquieting is the extent to whichpre-crime measures depend uponboth future predictions derived fromrisk assessment procedures andspeculative imaginings. RichardGrusin (2004) has aptly dubbed thetendency to relay hypotheticalfutures in the present as ‘pre-

Pre-crime, regulation,and counter-terrorism:

interrogatinganticipatory risk

Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate explorethe extent to which risk is being utilisedmore intensively in the development of

crime control policies.

© Kim McMahon. ‘January 23 2010; Mass rally of photograghers’

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Emediation’. As the erroneouspredictions of the ‘pre-cogs’illustrates, pre-mediation is anuncertain, creative occupation asmuch as a neutral science. Withinmedia culture, popular televisionprogrammes such as 24 and Spooksconstruct a world in which thecatastrophic threat of terrorismrequires pre-emptive action in thepresent in order to maintain globalgeo-political stability.

Post-modern thinkers such asBaudrillard (1988) propose thatmediated signs, symbols, andmessages are productive of ‘hyper-reality’, a state in which fantasy andreality become indistinguishable. Inthis context, the key question iswhether the assemblage of pre-mediations that have emergedaround terrorism has stretched publicsensitivities to the point where fear ofhypothetical attacks has come todirect contemporary policies ofsecuritisation. Where hyper-realitydescribes the simulation of the real,the danger with the construction ofterroristic futures is that they result ina condition of ‘hyper-riskality’, wherecreative visions of risk influencemeanings to the extent that theprobability of threat is eclipsed by(imagined) fear of harm. In a climateof ‘hyper-riskality’ it is culturalrepresentations and politicalnarratives of risk that mould materialdecisions about crime and securityregulation as much as firm evidenceof tangible threats. What is requiredthen at the level of culturalrepresentation, political discourse,and regulation is a balancedresponse. While certain terroristgroups do present a threat to publicsafety, we need to keep sight of thefact that just 52 people have beenvictims of terrorism in the UK in thelast decade. If we compare this withthe numbers killed each year in roadtraffic accidents, in the course ofworking duties, falling down thestairs, or simply slipping over in thebath, then we have to ask whetherthe degree of intervention,surveillance, and regulation isbroadly proportionate with the risk ofharm.

The assorted modes of pre-crimeintroduced in law over the lastdecade have been based around the

principle that terrorism is a ‘unique’case. Under the penumbra ofcatastrophic attack the ubiquitousdefence for the introduction ofextraordinary measures is that therights of the few have to be sacrificedto protect the lives of the many. Yetattempts to reduce the terrorist riskby pre-emptively restricting thefreedom of suspects, monitoring thebehaviour of populations andinciting watchfulness in ‘risky’communities engender threats toboth liberty and security. Theintroduction of Control Orders in the2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act isillustrative in this regard. ControlOrders impose strict limits on thefreedom of those suspected ofplanning terrorist attacks, includingmeasures such as home curfews forup to 16 hours per day, travel andmeeting restrictions, monitoring ofphone calls, and denial of internetuse. Putting questions of efficacyaside, such drastic measures havebeen controversial since theirinception and have been judged bythe House of Lords to contravene theEuropean Convention on HumanRights. Other attempts to pre-emptively intervene on the basis ofanticipatory risk include Section 44of the Terrorism Act 2000 by whichthe police are granted powers to stopand search individuals withoutgrounds for suspicion. The use ofSection 44 powers escalateddramatically from 33,177 instancesin 2004 to 117,200 in 2008. Thedisproportionate number of Blackand Asian people stopped underSection 44 – four times the rate ofthe White population – suggests thatrisk profiling is being used to unjustlydiscriminate against ethnic minoritygroups (Travis, 2010). In our ownresearch with young British Muslimswe found that Section 44 wascommonly cited as a source offrustration for young men such asSaif and one which caused tensionbetween Muslim communities andthe police (Mythen, Walklate, andKhan, 2009).

I’ve been stopped three or fourtimes for questioning … and Irealise, yes, they’ve stopped mebecause of how I look, becausethey think I look a bit suspicious.

Each time they’ve checkedwho I am, tried to see if I havea criminal record. I don’t mindbeing stopped if I was doingsomething that looked suspicious,but all I’ve been doing is walkingdown the street or waiting for abus, things like that. You can’thelp feeling they’re just pickingon you for some reason. Soit’s really embarrassing beingquestioned like that. It makesyou feel like you have donesomething.

What is striking in this narrative isnot simply the iniquitous natureof the procedure, but also thehumiliation, guilt, and shame causedto those that it targets. Like ControlOrders, Section 44 powers havebeen declared illegal by Europeancourts. There is no evidence tosuggest that such measures serveeither as an effective deterrent toterrorism or increase the chance ofapprehending would-be terrorists.Up to press, Section 44 powershave not led to a single convictionfor terrorist offences. These are buttangible examples of the pitfallsof pre-crime, whereby not onlyevidence but projection, suspicionand speculation fall into the mixas legitimate drivers of sanctions.Considering the prescience of othersocial problems, we might wonderwhy pre-crime is so readily deployedin counter-terrorism and so absentin the regulation of environmentalcrime or corporate crime. Given thatthe 2008 economic bubble explodedas a result of reckless lending,irresponsible investment, anddubious financial practices, mightsecurity agencies productively rollout a systematic pre-crime regimeto monitor and intervene in thepractices of bankers, stock-brokers,investment companies, and mortgagelenders?

Connecting to the evolution ofpre-crime, the wider process ofgathering information, data, andimages to inform judgments about aperson’s relative safety/risk isproblematic. The heady mix of publicand private endeavours in deliveringsuch security only serves to add to theconcern (Zedner, 2009). Theprevalence of data-mining practices

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E that classify according to discretesocio-biological factors – such asethnicity, religion, gender, age, andconsumption – is disquieting. Suchmodes of social sorting andmonitoring do not so much producesuspect individuals as riskypopulations whose movements,actions, and practices are perpetuallysubject to scrutiny. It would seem thatevidence-based decision making hasbeen compromised by fears of adangerous future, leading to apre-emptive delirium in which riskyothers are indelicately identified,branded, and discriminated against.What is unique about the presentsituation is the pervasive deploymentand the temporal extension of risk inthese processes. In Minority Report(1956) the endemic flaws in thepre-crime system are exposed and theunit is disbanded. In the clamour topre-emptively counter terrorism, thelessons of the book are not being

heeded. Moreover, the embedding ofpre-crime strategies in the regulationof terrorism is proving to be divisivein the quest to secure a safe future. n

Gabe Mythen is senior lecturer in sociologyteaching and researching on risk, and SandraWalklate is Eleanor Rathbone Chair ofSociology teaching and researching on criminalvictimisation at the School of Sociology andSocial Policy, University of Liverpool.

ReferencesAmoore, L. and de Goede, M. (2008),‘Governing by risk in the War on Terror’,in Amoore, L. and de Goede, M. (Eds),Risk and the War on Terror, London:Routledge.

Baudrillard, J. (1988), ‘Simulacra andsimulations’, in Poster, M. (Ed), SelectedWritings, Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress.

Beck, U. (2009), World at Risk,Cambridge: Polity.

Dick, P.K. (1956), Minority Report, NewYork: Gollancz.

Grusin, R. (2004) ‘Premediation’,Criticism, 46(1), pp. 17-39.

Mythen, G. and Walklate, S. (2008),‘Terrorism, risk and international security:The perils of asking what if?’, SecurityDialogue, 39(2-3), pp.221-242.

Mythen, G., Walklate, S. and Khan, F.(2009), ‘I’m a Muslim, but I’m not aterrorist’: Risk, victimization and thenegotiation of risky identities’, BritishJournal of Criminology, 49(6), p.755-771.

O’Malley, P. (2009), ‘Experiments in riskand criminal justice’, TheoreticalCriminology, 12(4), pp.451-469.

Roberts, B. (2008), ‘Minister warns of“peril” as he pushes for 42-day lock-up’,Daily Mirror, 23 January. www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2008/01/23/minister-warns-of-peril-as-he-pushes-for-42-day-lock-up-115875-20294998/

Travis, A. (2010), ‘Stop and searchpowers illegal, European court rules’,The Guardian, 12 January.

Zedner, L. (2009), Security, London:Routledge.

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