Collective action problems

and pathways of change

Tim Kelsall

The Framework: Getting to Step 4

• Refresher: what do we mean by a plausible pathway of change?

• A broad sequence of events that is easily imaginable given what we know about

the existing distribution of power and incentives, or relatively small changes

thereto.

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How do we identify them?

1. Identify the problem in which you are interested;

2. Run through steps 1-3, ie: map foundational factors, actors, rules of the

game;

3. Analyze what type of a problem it is;

4. Map the actors’ relationship to the problem, and whether they have an

interest in solving it.

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Now, think about the nature of the problem, and whether

small changes might resolve it, eg.

1. If this is a simple capacity problem, then increased resources and knowledge might solve it;

2. If a simple coordination problem, then increased communication among stakeholders might lead

to a joint commitment to change;

3. If a simple principal-agent problem, then increased information might lead to better performance;

4. If a vested interest/free rider problem, then increased consciousness about the importance of joint

action might lead to more effective mobilization;

5. If a nested or complex problem, the solution might be more difficult to foresee.

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Step Four: Use this to think about implausible and

plausible pathways of change

1. Eg. If we have a clientelistic political settlement and strong vested interests around reform in a

specific sectoral problem area (eg inappropriate textbooks in schools), then it is hard to imagine

the public (or parents) making effective demands for reform via the electoral route or the

affected Ministry (eg Education) self-reforming (eg by making changes to procurement);

2. If, however, there are at least some potentially powerful actors (eg a Principal Secretary, quality

textbook suppliers, sections of business, Principals of Teacher Training Colleges) with an interest

in reform, we can imagine that reduced barriers to collective action among them might help tip

the balance of power against blockers in the Ministry.

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Step Five: Implications for policy

1. Probably ‘No’ to public information campaigns or TA to the Ministry (at least

when undertaken in isolation);

2. Probably ‘Yes’ to convening, brokering and enabling stakeholders with an

interest in reform.

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An (optional) case study

follows:

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Example: Informal payments in the health sector in Guinea Bissau

• https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12949.pdf

Example: Informal payments in the health sector in Guinea Bissau

National factors:

1. Foundational: GB is small, poor, sparsely populated;

2. Actors: rival, party-based political elites, criminal networks, civil

servants, the military; DPs, though it is not a ‘donor darling’;

3. Institutional: an unstable (narco) state, with an elitist political settlement;

elections, though ostensibly democratic, are clientelistic; health spending

is low

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Key actors in the health sector:

1. National level politicians

2. Health service managers

3. Frontline health workers

4. Wealthier patients

5. Poorer patients

6. DPs and NGOs

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Key rules of the game

1. To subsist, health workers must elicit informal payments;

2. They can do this with little fear of punishment;

3. Staff know better than patients what services should be free and what should be

charged, and the relevant prices;

4. At least some types of informal payment are seen as culturally legitimate;

5. Some health professionals are nevertheless dismayed by the situation

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What type of problem is it?

This is a complex or ‘wicked problem’:

1. Lack of monitoring + ignorance of proper fees = principal-agent/information;

2. Health workers and wealthier patients benefit from informal payments = vested

interest;

3. Poor patients can’t change the system = collective action;

4. Cultural issues = coordination problem with misaligned preferences?

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Who wants to change the practice of informal payments?

High influence

Low influence

For the

changeAgainst

the change

Standard

stakeholder

mapping

Most politicians

Most frontline staff

Health managers

DPs and NGOs

Most poorer patients

Most wealthier patients

Scenarios and pathways of change

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Scenario Pathway Probability

No change If all the main actors carry on doing what they’re doing and there are no unexpected exogenous shocks.

High

Positive change

If salaries could be raised, health worker

resistance might weaken; if information about

charges increased, patients might be less

inclined to pay; if cultural norms changed,

popular mobilization around the issue might

increase.

Low probability that all can be attained simultaneously or even consecutively

Negative change

If monitoring of and sanctions for informal payments increased, absent an increase in salaries, it could prompt staff exodus from the public health system.

Low, given unlikelihood of monitoring increasing

Step 5: implications for development agencies:

• We have a wicked problem with numerous potential entry points but a

low overall probability of success;

• However, if the potential gains from success are high, it is appropriate to

ask:

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Step 5: implications for development agencies:

• Who are the actors with an interest in change? Can they be facilitated?

• Are there examples of positive deviance that can be built on? Are there

savvy ideas or ‘second best solutions’ for context-sensitive reform?

• Is it worth making a ‘small bet’ on a locally led solution and seeing

where it goes?

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Summing up:

• Combining our framework with some concepts from collective action

theory, we can identify more and less plausible pathways of change;

• Sometimes, we have to accept that change may not be feasible.

• But don’t rule out the possibility of politically smart, change against the

odds

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