POWER PLAYS: EXPLORING POWER AND INTERVENTION IN PROXY WARS

By

Ryan Justin Youra

Under the guidance of

Professor Benjamin Jensen,

School of International Service

Submitted to the

University Honors Program

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Bachelor of Arts

University Honors

In

International Studies

Spring 2014

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

Power Plays: Exploring Power and Intervention in Proxy Wars

Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Literature Review ............................................................................................................................ 2 Proxy Warfare .................................................................................................................................. 9

Dataset Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 17 Data Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 24

Case Study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War ...................................................................................... 32 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 36

Works Cited ................................................................................................................................... 39

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Abstract

Surprisingly, there is little academic study devoted to proxy wars, though proxy wars are a common occurrence throughout history. Focusing on the proxy supporter, this study examines the involvement of different types of actors in proxy wars in the Middle East to build the proxy war literature. What role does power play in proxy supporter-proxy fighter relationships? How do states’ different levels of power influence their interventions in local conflicts? This research explores these questions by building a dataset on proxy conflicts in the Middle East from 1945 to 2009 from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, the Non-State Actor Dataset, and open-source newspapers: The New York Times and The Washington Post. After examining several correlational relationships between the conflict type and the power, location, intensity, and variety of support of proxy supporters, this study finds that weak powers heavily participate and engage in proxy wars, particularly in intrastate and extrastate wars. Such findings stand contrary to the great power emphasis of the study the proxy war. The study then examines the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to explore possible mechanisms for supporter involvement in proxy wars and discovers that weaker powers can even play a role during the initial phases of a proxy relationship and thereby influence proxy wars much more than previously considered. Minor power states augment their power through the use of proxies. Though the Cold War dominates thought concerning proxy relationships, it is clear that minor powers largely dominate this type of war.

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Introduction

Surprisingly, there is little academic study devoted to proxy war. As Andrew Mumford

states, proxies are “historically ubiquitous and yet chronically under-analyzed.”1 This gap in the

international relations literature misses a rather common feature of statecraft in the Westphalian

system.2 Without an understanding of proxy wars, an understanding of intervention is incomplete.

The general perception of proxy wars is one of great power interference, as perpetuated

by the cold war. Dominant thinking in international relations also confirms this power bias; if

“international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,”3 then we should expect to see the

struggle in all forms of international relations—both above and below the surface of overt state

action. While proxies are often dismissed as the work of major powers, they reveal a whole range

of actions that occur under the surface level of international relations.

This study attempts to add to the body of existing proxy war literature with a focus on the

actors that support proxies. What explains actors’ active involvement as third parties to a

conflict? What role does power play in proxy supporter-proxy fighter relationships? How do

states’ different levels of power influence their interventions in local conflicts?

This study explores the correlations between power, location, intensity, and variety of

proxy supporters with their involvement in different types of wars. This study specifically

examines the involvement of different actors in different types of proxy wars in the Middle East.

This research explores these questions by building a dataset on proxy conflicts in the Middle

East from 1945 to 2009 from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, the Non-State Actor Dataset,

and open-source newspapers: The New York Times and The Washington Post. The study then

1 Andrew Mumford, "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict," The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 (2013): 40. 2 See Geraint Hughes, My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics (Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic Press, 2012). 3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967).

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examines the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to explore possible mechanisms for supporter involvement

in proxy wars.

The study demonstrates that weak powers heavily participate and engage in proxy wars,

contrary to the great power emphasis previously designated to proxy wars. Weaker powers can

even play a role during the initial phases of a proxy relationship and thereby influence proxy

wars to a higher degree than previously considered. Re-conceptualizing proxy wars as tools

available for any state has implications for the continued study of proxy wars and future security

threats.

Literature Review

In order to understand the role of proxies and their supporter states, it is necessary to first

examine the intervention literature. Proxy warfare is inherently a form of intervention in that it

involves the actions of a third-party state in an external conflict. While a later section will

expand on this rather basic definition of proxy warfare, this focus on intervention serves as a

starting point.

External intervention presents a challenge to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty.

Under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the European powers affirmed the separate jurisdiction

of each state over its own territory. This understanding can even be traced back to the Treaty of

Augsburg in 1555, when the absolute right of sovereigns in religious matters was confirmed.

According to David Armstrong, interest, rules, and institutions maintain order, and therefore the

international system is maintained by a general pattern of interaction among states and

international actors.4 Under the practice of sovereignty, states have exclusive control over their

territory. This has led to the converse norm of non-intervention in state affairs. Essentially, rights

4 J. D. Armstrong, Farrell Theo, and Lambert Helene, International Law and International Relations (Cambridge [U.K.]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5-6.

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to sovereign domain belong to the state as a participant in the international system.5 This

principle has been reaffirmed in the League of Nations and later the United Nations Charter, and

thus, there appears a general preference against intervention within the international system.6

While the English school sees this imposition of order as the foundation of an international

society, the Realist tradition views the continual violation of the rule as evidence of an

international system less grounded by rules than a society.

While this preference for sovereignty exists, it is impossible to dismiss interventions

throughout the international system’s history. Hans Morgenthau dates intervention back to the

Greeks.7 Hedley Bull states that coercive intervention is endemic to the international system.8

Several of the studies reviewed here make similar claims about the pervasiveness of intervention

in international affairs.

There are several slightly differing definitions of intervention, though they generally

agree on the violation of another state’s sovereignty and the intertwined aspect of power. If

sovereignty is the control of one’s own domestic affairs and exclusion of others from this

jurisdiction, intervention is defined as action outside of a state’s jurisdiction or territory and

within the sphere of another state’s jurisdiction or territory.9 As the root word implies,

intervention is the act of one or more countries figuratively ‘coming between’ another state and

its existing territory/jurisdiction. Intervention implies that the ideal of sovereign, autonomous

actors is not completely reachable.10

5 Friedrich Kratochwil, "Soveriegnty as Dominium: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?," in Beyond Westphalia?: National Sovereignty and International Intervention, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Mastanduno Michael (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995). 6 Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics (New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984), 3. 7 Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967). 8 Bull, Intervention in World Politics. 9 Ibid., 1. 10 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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Intervention can take several different forms. It can be forcible or non-forcible, direct or

indirect, and overt or clandestine.11 All inter-state wars can be considered interventions, but

states can also intervene in other wars. Bertil Dunér and Richard Little discuss third-party

intervention in civil wars.12 In this case, a state that is not a warring faction in the civil war may

join in the fight for one side, either directly or indirectly. John Stuart Mill even legitimizes this

form of intervention in “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” stating that third parties (either

multiple neighbors or a powerful neighboring country) can act as arbiters and mediators to

demand an end to conflict.13 Additionally, when there is a movement against “a foreign yoke or

against a native tyranny upheld by foreign arms,” a counter-intervention is justified.14 Though

Mill references international law, legitimacy, and morality—aspects of an international society

and rules—Mill also discusses the imbalance that such a foreign yoke represents. For Mill,

“intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always

prudent.”15

Intervention may also focus on changing domestic affairs or changing foreign policies,

though the foreign policies approach is more nuanced. In Intervention in World Politics, Bull

limits intervention solely to domestic affairs, but this limits the study of intervention.16 Outside

entities, including states, international organizations, and non-state actors, may act outside of

their jurisdiction in order to assist or manipulate either the formation or outcome of foreign

11 Bull, Intervention in World Politics, 1. 12 Bertil Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975). 13 John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in International Relations in Political Thought, ed. Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and N. J. Rennger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 (1859)). 14 Ibid., 492. 15 Ibid. 16 Bull, Intervention in World Politics.

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policy decisions.17 While any attempt to affect the domestic affairs of a country is considered

intervention, attempts at foreign policy changes can only be considered interventions if actions

change the domestic condition. Changing the international conditions without an intention to

change the domestic condition of a state is not intervention. This may have the perceived effect

of an intervention, but the action did not specifically target another state or its foreign policy

outcomes. For example, if a country manipulates its currency exchange rate on the international

market in order to increase exports, its action may decrease sales of a similar commodity

produced by a different country. While this has the effect of impacting a country’s economy, the

action was not intended or directed as such and therefore cannot be considered interventionary.

In the increasingly globalized world with increasingly intermestic issues, policy decisions

by one state may appear as interventions in another state’s affairs. At the same time, these

actions are not interventions since they are not intended as such. Intention and targeting plays a

role in intervention. Intervention exists in dyadic relationships, with an intervener party and an

intervened party. Though a state’s intention may never be fully discovered, actions directed

specifically at one country without reversal may be considered intentional and therefore

interventionary. For Bull, it was simpler to declare that all interventions must remain limited to

domestic affairs in order to capture intervention through the war, but this misses the possibility

for states to aid, assist, and affect the foreign relations between other states.

The act of intervening breaks down into many types of classification. While Bull

categorizes interventions in a general sense based on role of power,18 Mumford classifies each

specific form of intervention, ranging from the addition of manpower to financial assistance.19

17 It is important to note that non-state actors do not have defined jurisdiction in the international system, although some may have granted jurisdiction on the domestic level, such as Hezbollah’s control of South Lebanon. 18 Bull, Intervention in World Politics. 19 Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013).

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Mumford bases his classification on the actions taken by the intervener. Using a similar approach,

Dunér creates a hierarchy of interventionary techniques to capture the instruments and levels of

involvement in interventions.20 The lowest level is “direct supporting activities” such as threating

of military intervention, transporting external forces, or providing safe haven. The next level is

“indirect para-combat involvement,” including military training, armed blockades, and financial

support. The level above that is “direct para-combat involvement,” including advising and supply

arms. Above that is “indirect combat involvement” such as irregular invasion and shelling, and

finally there is “direct combat involvement,” which captures regular invasion and special

operations. Using this hierarchy, Dunér is able to classify intervention acts based on high levels

(direct and indirect combat involvement), middle levels (direct and indirect para-combat

involvement) and low levels (direct supporting activities). This paper intends to use a modified

version of Dunér’s intervention classification as well as his hierarchy to examine the proxy

warfare subset of intervention.

Beyond the general range of actions, definitions of intervention focus on the role of

power. There is an asymmetrical distribution of power between the intervener and the

intervened.21 The intervener is able to subvert another’s sovereignty with its overwhelming

resources. This power dynamic is clear when the intervener initiates a conflict, such as Nazi

Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939. This is a paradox in the international system: the practice

of intervention in the face of a system organized by sovereignty. While this paper does not delve

into the tension from these two concepts, it is important to recognize the existence of these

competing concepts.

20 Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s, 169. 21 Bull, Intervention in World Politics; Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s; Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy; Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene."

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At the same time, the extent to which the intervener affects sovereignty is less clear when

intervening in an existing conflict. There are two theories to explain such interventions. The first

theory focuses on the intervener and states that outside powers have a propensity to intervene.22

Interveners are ‘pushed’ to intervene by their general power politics.23 This is consistent with the

Realist tradition and realpolitik. Intervention is another form of coercive politics in order to

exercise power and make other states change behavior. As formulated by Morgenthau, these

interventions are strictly in the interests of the intervener and against the will of the intervened.24

Power politics are constantly at play in this formulation of intervention since the strong exercise

power over the weak. Under this “push-theory,”25 strong states intervene to acquire territory;

protect social groups; protect economic, diplomatic, or military interests; act in accordance with

a specific ideology; and create or maintain regional power balances.26 Strong states are

continually working to gain additional power vis-à-vis one another.27 This suggests that small

states are always at risk of intervention by larger states. Kenneth Waltz states, “This imbalance

of power is a danger to weak states.”28 Stanley Hoffmann reinforces the claim: “For a small

power the balance of power could be a mixed blessing because instead of being eaten by one

great power, one could be gnawed by all five or six.”29

The push-theory was not originally formulated to apply beyond states, but the focus on

power relations can be expanded to discuss intervening in affairs of non-state actors. For

example, Israeli intervened in southern Lebanon in 2006 with the intention to forcefully change

22 Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s, 61. 23 Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, 3. 24 Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene." 25 Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars. 26 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 31. 27 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace. 28 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 131. 29 Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention," in Intervention in World Politics, ed. Hedley Bull (New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1984).

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the behavior of Hezbollah. While Israeli action had the effect of intervening in Lebanese territory,

the direct intervention was a result of a stronger entity (Israel) intervening in the affairs of a

week entity (Hezbollah). This theory appears to work well when the intervener and the

intervened are opposing forces, but this is not always the case.

When the intervener does not violate the will of the intervened, what explains the

intervention? Can it be considered an intervention? The opposite side of the intervention coin is

the “pull-theory” of intervention, and it attempts to address those questions.30 Richard Little

traces this back to Thucydides, who detailed the ways that local rivaling parties called in either

the Spartans or the Athenians to strengthen their own position.31 Instead of great powers

intervening, this theory focuses on the ways in which small states and/or non-state actors request

outside intervention, thereby ‘pulling in’ interveners to the conflict. Interveners respond to a

stimulus, not simply a “general propensity” towards intervention.32 In the pull-theory

formulation, the situation must meet a pre-existing condition, namely conflict, while the push-

theory only requires a power imbalance, which inherently exists in the international system.

Realism strongly emphasizes the role of strong states over weak ones, but there both Bull

and Dunér discuss the role of weaker, developing states in intervention. In contrast to

Hoffmann’s belief that weak states become even more open to intervention with a balance of

power, Bull suggests that balances of power provide weaker states with an opportunity to play

the great powers off one another.33 In this conception, the weaker state forges the path of

intervention and uses superpowers for their own strategic reasons. Weak states show an ability to

exert agency in the international system.

30 Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, 3. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.; Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s, 61. 33 Bull, Intervention in World Politics.

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Additionally, great powers are not the only interveners. According to Dunér’s study on

intervention in civil wars in the 1970s, developing states greatly involved themselves in

interventions.34 He finds, “A low intervention capacity does not hold the LCDs [least developed

countries] as might be easily thought on theoretical grounds.”35 As Dunér states, this is surprising

given the large resource commitment required of interventionary forces. From Dunér’s study,

developing states are willing to commit resources to intervention based on their own strategic

determinations. While individual resource commitments may not be large, the weaker states

appear to have an impact as a group. In fact, the study finds that developing countries comprised

68% of all the intervening actors in the 1970s.36 Within the scope of a decade, this is only a

snapshot of interventions, but the large share of interventions by developing countries even in the

midst of the Cold War potentially points to an outsized and unjustified focus on only the strong

powers in interventions.

As will be discussed below, the push and pull theories regarding intervention will inform

the hypotheses regarding proxy wars. Before reaching that, a greater discussion of the unique

features of proxy wars is required.

Proxy Warfare

The study of proxy war suffers from definitional ambiguity. Geraint Hughes defines

proxy wars in a narrow sense. Hughes asserts, “A proxy is defined…as a non-state paramilitary

group receiving direct assistance from an external power.”37 This means that states cannot serve

as proxies. Hughes appears to grant states the power of autonomy and self-interest but not to

non-state actors. While his study is incredibly thorough on the characteristics of proxies, Hughes

34 Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s. Dunér uses the term “least developed countries” to connote all developing and weaker powers. 35 Ibid., 71. 36 Ibid. 37 Hughes, My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics, 11.

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ignores a large occurrence of proxy war—namely states serving as proxies. Therefore, his

conclusions are incomplete. At the same time, Hughes provides an excellent list of criteria for

proxy wars. He discusses the need for a direct relationship of assistance, a common enemy for

both the sponsor and the proxy, and a sustained relationship over time between the supporter and

the proxy force.

Of these three criteria, the most interesting is the common enemy. Absolute control

would provide the supporter with the ability to choose the enemy and disregard the interests of

the proxy. Instead, this refutes the notion that a proxy supporter is in full control of the proxy

force. What happens in the case of divergent interests? Can proxy war exist in the presence of

uncommon enemies? It seems imprudent to discount this possibility, though the assumption that

both supporters and proxies have autonomous interests is certainly valid.

Like Hughes, Chris Loveman defines proxy wars and interventions through a set of

criteria instead of providing a definition in one sentence. This includes the provision of material

aid, coordination of activities, basis in a local conflict, and a resulting conflict escalation.38 The

definition of proxy wars based on their end result, however, may be conceptually problematic.

By these criteria, if indirect third party intervention does not result in conflict escalation, then it

is not considered a proxy war.

Another scholar, Jeffrey Bale, argues that a proxy relationship must change a proxy’s

objectives or target in order to be considered a proxy.39 Essentially, proxies do not exist only

with a coincidence of interests. This is problematic because such a conception of proxy

intervention relies solely on push theory suggestions. Greater powers are viewed as sole parties

38 Chris Loveman, "Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention," Conflict, Security & Development 2, no. 03 (2002): 32-33. 39 Jeffrey M. Bale, "Terrorists as State "Proxies": Separating Fact from Fiction," in Making Sense of Proxy Wars States, Surrogates & the Use of Force, ed. Michael A. Innes (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012), 28.

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directing proxies in each position. The pull theory necessitates considering the interests of the

proxies. With a relationship of assistance, corresponding interests fostered organically and not

through forms of power pressure still create proxy relationships. It is conceivably possible for

one state to still receive support from another state while having a coincidence of interests.

Dunér also attempts to define proxy wars with parameters: a compatibility of interests,

support, and the exercise of asymmetrical power. He finds that only support and power are

necessary components.40 He argues that the exercise of power is central to the conception of

proxy wars. A proxy must be “pressured to intervene.”41 This becomes the defining characteristic

of proxy relationships since without pressure, the proxy force is not a proxy and instead serves as

a partner. The transfer of resources does not necessarily need to occur because a proxy may not

be dependent on material support to carry out the interests of the supporter.42

It is impossible to separate a state from the support it receives. While it is true that there

are other forms of assistance that a proxy supporter can provide for proxy forces such as

economic aid, it is not clear that any resources provided outside of a power relationship can be

eliminated from inspection. In fact, with an international system organized around power, it is

difficult if not impossible to ever have a relationship of assistance without some component of

power. If the supporter chooses not to directly engage, it still has a presence on a battlefield

through the use of its material by another state.

A hypothetical example can help here. Imagine there are three states: State A, State B,

and State C. State B and State C are two powers at war with one another. Though State B is

losing, with heavy manpower and territorial losses, State A decides to send State B material

support in the form of arms. Is State B considered a partner with State A or a proxy of State A?

40 Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s, 107. 41 Ibid., 109. 42 Ibid.

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State A decided to indirectly intervene in the conflict and have a presence through State B. As

the word “proxy” implies, State B is fighting in place of State A.

Adding interests into this does not change the outcome of State B as a proxy. For

example, imagine that both State A and State B are opposed to the policies of State C and

therefore State A decides to support State B. In this case, the interests are not only compatible

but also congruent. An alternative formulation is also possible: imagine that State B is generally

more favorable to the policies of State A and therefore, State A decides to support State B. While

the interests are different (State B’s interests concern State C while State A’s interests concern

State B), they are certainly compatible and can exist together. Divergent interests would be

problematic because such an instance would not provide an incentive for State A to provide

assistance for State B. Even if the pull theory was realized and State B requested aid from State

A, there would still be no incentive if State A could not attempt to attain its own interests.

Presumably, if State B requested aid from State A, there is some compatibility of interests on

which State B can draw for persuasion.

Power does not seem to change the outcome of State B as a proxy either. Should State B

exist in a true power equity with State A, then there would be no need for material support.

Alternatively, differences in power only strengthen the proxy dynamic. For example, imagine

that State B and State C are two weaker powers at war with one another, while State A is a

developed, military superpower. Power plays a role in that State A has an excess of power in the

form of resources that it can provide to State B. Additionally, state A could pressure State B to

continue fighting and make assistance contingent on a refusal to ceasefire. This only strengthens

the assertion that State B serves as a proxy for State A.

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In each scenario, material support appears essential to the proxy relationship. This

support can only be material or immaterial. Immaterial support such as raising political favor or

creating a coalition of politically supporting states is extremely hard to measure. Dunér’s lowest

rung on the instruments of intervention ladder includes military warning by an outside force, but

this cannot be considered tangible, material support. Immaterial support contains the rhetoric of

action but no identifiable action, while material support signifies the action of support. Power

and interests both play an important role but once a state makes the decision to intervene

indirectly and thereby provide a form of support, it has decided to play a role in a conflict as a

proxy supporter. Power plays a necessary but not sufficient role in the proxy relationship by

serving as the foundation for resource assistance. This stands in stark contrast to Dunér.

The implications of this conception are great. If the transfer of support plays an integral

role in a proxy-supporter relationship, is all support considered a form of proxy support? When is

support not working to build a proxy relationship? Morgenthau may argue that any support is

directed at achieving one’s own interests and therefore all support is aimed at developing proxies

for one state’s bidding. For him, controlling others actions (through either force or support)

provides the avenue for increased power, which is the ultimate and central aim of international

politics.43 At the same time, labeling all support as proxy support is not useful as a concept for

examination. The study of proxy wars requires a clear delineation between proxy support and

other forms of support.

To start, it may be useful to outline the difference between proxy support and support in

direct war. Returning to the hypothetical example above provides some insight. If State A were

to intervene directly and send troops to fight alongside State B, then it is no longer using State

B’s forces in place of its own. Even if State A sends arms in addition to troops to State B, the 43 See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace.

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arms are no longer serving as State A’s presence on the battlefield. Instead, the arms are merely

supplemental.

Therefore, the context in which assistance is given appears to have an impact on the

classification of a proxy relationship. The above analysis, however, only focuses on support

during conflict. Can proxy support consist of assistance provided outside of the bounds of a

conflict? Modifying the hypothetical examples above, if State B is not in conflict with State C

and still receives material support from State A, does it serve as a proxy for State A? It is not

clear that this is the case. Without conflict, State B may serve as a trading partner of State A, but

there is no current conflict in which to fight. Context is important. Without State B fighting,

State A cannot have presence on a battlefield through its material support.

Andrew Mumford, another proxy war researcher, captures this issue of context.

He defines proxy wars as “the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to

influence its strategic outcome.”44 This definition highlights several important factors:

intervention must be indirect (with no men representing the third party in an on-the-ground,

fighting capacity); third parties can be either non-state actors or states; the conflict must have

started before outside intervention; and the conflict can be between states, between states and

non-state actors, or between non-state actors. Although Mumford asserts that the intervention

must be indirect for it to be considered a proxy situation, he examines proxies that use both direct

and indirect forms of intervention. This becomes complicated because a warring party will likely

use all tools at its disposal, including proxy fighters, once it has committed to directly engage.

Once foreign troops are present, proxy warfare becomes a tool for a larger fighting strategy. It is

a type of warfare instead of war itself. This stands in contrast to proxies as the sole means of

44 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 11.

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engagement. In these such instances, the proxy fighters become the proxy supporters’ sole means

of fighting. Only this fully indirect approach isolates proxy war as a strategy within itself.

Even with some flaws, Mumford’s definition is certainly the most simply stated. “Indirect

engagement in a conflict” captures the importance of material support while also highlighting the

central role of context.45 Three things, however, are unclear. First, Mumford does not clearly

state that the indirect engagement is the sole form of engagement for a third party in proxy wars.

Second, power is taken as given in the indirect engagement, though this may not be a large issue

since power may be captured by the fact that there is an engagement in the first place and

therefore the third parties must be able to support such an intervention. Third, there is no mention

of a compatibility of interests, which is necessary for two parties to work together. Moreover,

there is no mention of a warring party receiving the support. Hughes captures it well when

discussing a direct relationship of assistance, but this is missing from Mumford’s definition.

Indirect engagement could be non-targeted and therefore falls outside of the bounds of

proxy wars. For example, imagine that instead of working with State B, State A indirectly

engages in the conflict between State B and State C by imposing embargoes on all warring

countries. If State B is economically stronger than State C, then State A has helped State B

weaken State C without engaging with State B. In such an instance, State B cannot be labeled as

a proxy of State A. This highlights the importance of direct assistance to a warring party. Proxy

wars involve more than simply third parties indirectly engaging since the third parties must be

engaging with directly warring parties. These actions must be positive in nature. Essentially, the

indirect engagements of third parties must be directed through a warring party.

To summarize, the above definitions each appear inadequate to capture the concept of

proxy wars. From this analysis, the present study defines a proxy relationship as a dyad of 45 Ibid.

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material support between an outside party and a warring party based on a compatibility of

interests and an asymmetry of power in a context of conflict. The third party entity, the warring

entity, and the conflict is left ambiguous to apply to any issue; the third party or warring party

can be a state or non-state actor in an interstate, intrastate, or extrastate46 conflict. This definition

captures Dunér’s three components of interests, support, and power, while including Mumford’s

focus on the context. The proxy relationship of direct support is necessary to examine the ways

that all of the components come together. Regarding the compatibility of interests, while it is

difficult to pinpoint one guiding interest in a country’s foreign policy, a proxy war requires a

relationship in which an outside supporter and a warring party’s interests work in harmony. This

is essential to defining proxy wars in relation to other forms of intervention because unlike other

forms of intervention, proxy intervention requires the establishment of this relationship.

When the relationship is applied surrounding war, the result is a proxy war. Therefore, a

proxy war is a conflict through the use of an entity receiving material support based on a

compatibility of interests and an asymmetry of power. This is an indirect intervention in a

conflict through another entity. To use Dunér’s hierarchy of intervention instruments, any

material support below indirect-combat involvement may be part of a proxy relationship.

It is important to state here the difference between proxies and forces of international

organizations. Some of the definitions can theoretically capture international organizations.

Conceptually, states provide resources to forces headed by international organizations in order

achieve larger strategic objectives. These are NATO forces, AU forces, or UN forces operating

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. While the member states donate troops, the forces operate

as independent actors. While Mumford explicitly excludes international organizations from his

46 The term “extrastate conflict” is taken from the Correlates of War Project, which defines an extrastate war as a war involving a state actor and non-state actors located outside of the warring state’s territory.

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proxy war definition, he only considers balanced, peacekeeping forces, not peace-making forces

that inherently favor one warring side over the other.47 The central reason for removing

international organizations from this discussion is their structures. The international

organizations mentioned above do not pose as fully independent actors. In the case of NATO, the

consensus-based North Atlantic Council ensures that each country has a crucial vote in the

engagement process and therefore should be viewed as merely an extension of the state. There

are no independent interests/actions afforded to these organizations without state consent. Even

in the Security Council, a permanent member must at least abstain and not oppose an action for it

to come to fruition.

Dataset Methodology

This study sets out to examine proxy wars in greater detail, with a specific focus on the

proxy relationships themselves. Before examining a specific case study, it is important to garner

a sense of the larger macro proxy war context. Hughes produced the most comprehensive study

regarding state supporters and their non-state actor proxies, but the study uses each instance as a

case study in narrative form. This does not suit macro-level analysis.

Understanding the larger picture of proxy relationships and wars requires an examination

of the component parts of the definition. First, a proxy dataset should be organized in proxy

dyads based on conflicts since the dyad is the organizational unit through which support flows in

a proxy relationship. As discussed above, any evidence of material military support between a

warring party and an outside third party marks a proxy dyad. These dyads can be state-state,

state-non-state, non-state-state, or even organization-state or organization-non-state.

In order to gain a general understanding of the relationship between proxies and their

supporters, this study builds a subset of a larger proxy war dataset, focusing on the Middle East 47 Mumford, Proxy Warfare.

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region from 1945 through 2009.48 The Middle East was chosen because it has a high prevalence

of local conflict and contains no great power. The presence of a local great power has the

potential to change the dynamic of proxy wars by acting as a passive deterrent for outside

intervention. If an actor planned to use an actor located close to a great power as a proxy, it may

be deterred from doing so simply because the reaction of the great power would enter into its

cost-benefit calculation. As illustrated by the Monroe Doctrine, stronger states first view their

power projection on the local level and therefore indirect intervention may be seen as undesired

intervention nonetheless. Without a great power, the Middle East provides a clear, isolatable

opportunity for proxy support.

To build the dataset and refine variables, the study started with Uppsala’s Conflict Data

Program’s External Support Data Disaggregated/Support Dataset from 1975-2009. The

disaggregation ensured different entries for relationships between one warring party and multiple

supporters, and therefore it suited the study of the exact relationships between each warring party

and third parties. The coding scheme for the type of external support was especially useful. The

dataset includes a dummy variable for whether external support existed, thus even taking account

of conflicts not involving external support. UCDP coded each type of external support in a

categorical scheme similar to Dunér: troops, joint operations, access to territory, weapons,

materiel/logistics support, training/expertise, funding/economics support, intelligence materiel,

other forms of support, and unknown support. Each of these variables served as variables

denoted with a ‘0’ if such support did not occur and a ‘1’ if such support did occur.

To these variables, as well as general information on conflict year, conflict name, name

of warring party, and the name of the external supporter, the present study added dummy

48 2009 is the latest available data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Stina Högbladh, Therése Pettersson, and Lotta Themnér, "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009," ed. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2011).

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variables for the location of the external supporter (whether in the region or outside of the

region), the type of conflict (intrastate, intrastate, non-state, or extrastate), and the power level of

each external supporter (great power, major power, minor power, international organization, the

level of involvement according to Dunér’s hierarchy, and the number of forms of support.

In order to gain a macro-level picture from 1945 to today, this study combined UCDP’s

External Support Data with the Non-State Actor Data developed by David Cunningham, Kristian

Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan.49 The UCDP dataset begins in 1975 so the Non-State Actor Data,

which uses the UCDP dataset, expanded the survey to include conflicts involving non-state

actors from 1945 to 1975.

Neither the UCDP External Support Data nor the Non-State Actor Data captured the

possibility of external or proxy support in all of the interstate wars in the Middle East. To

compile this information, the study used the historical archives of The New York Times and The

Washington Post. These two papers were chosen based on their relatively large focus on politics

and international affairs, increasing the likelihood that outside third party state involvement in a

conflict would be covered. Since most external support activities are covert, the two newspapers

acted as fact checkers for one another by confirming, clarifying, or denying an actor’s external

involvement while also ensuring as wide a coverage as possible. The often-covert nature of these

interventions means the use of open source investigation is one of the only feasible means to

capture data, though it is admittedly imperfect at best. All war coverage for the eight Middle

Eastern interstate wars was examined in an attempt to gather references and specifics on external

involvement in these wars. These wars include: the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, 1956 Sinai War, the

1967 Six Day War, the 1969-1970 War of Attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1974 Turco-

49 David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "Non-State Actor Data," ed. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2012).

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Cypriot War, the Iran-Iraq War, the 1982 War over Lebanon, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003

Invasion of Iraq.

Any states that participated directly by sending troops were not considered part of a

proxy dyad, even if they used proxies as a supplementary tool in their intervention. Such an

action moves beyond the use of a proxy relationship as the sole means of intervening in a

conflict. This fits with Dunér’s instruments of intervention ladder. Sending troops is certainly

above indirect combat involvement..

Another aspect of the definition is power. All literature reviewed above discusses the

necessary role of power in the proxy interventions. Supporters of the pull theory of intervention

may even assert power as a sufficient cause of interventions. Either way, power as a variable

appears important. In an international system of anarchy, it is assumed that greater powers have

more mobility and flexibility in their actions than weaker states and thus leads to the following

hypothesis:

H1a: If a proxy war occurs, it is more likely that the actors are strong actor in the

international system.

Should the data should show that a larger percentage of weaker states support proxies

than powerful states, this hypothesis would be provided wrong. At the same time, this may be

supported by the idea that proxy wars lessen the risks associated with breaking state sovereignty

since these supporting actions are less visible and direct than complete intervention,50 and these

actions are less financially costly. While powerful states have the ability to directly intervene,

weaker states may be reliant on indirect intervention to achieve their interests. Therefore, another

hypothesis is the exact opposite:

50 See Bale, "Terrorists as State "Proxies": Separating Fact from Fiction."; Hughes, My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics; Mumford, Proxy Warfare.

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H1b: If a proxy war occurs, it is more likely that the actors are weak actors in the

international system.

This study operationalizes power as the capabilities of a state, as measured by the

Correlates of War Project’s national capabilities index. The index creates Composite Index of

National Capability (CINC) rankings for each country by examining a country’s energy

consumption (pec), iron and steel production (irst), military expenditures (milex) and personnel

(milper), total population (tpop), and the number of inhabitants in urban cities compared against

all other countries (upop). The CINC ranking is a percentage of one country’s capabilities

compared to that of the entire international system. While the CINC rankings place a large

emphasis on demographic size and traditional measures of industrialization,51 it provides a far-

reaching overview of a country’s overall capabilities: military, economic, and demographic. This

is more useful than examining GDP or another single-measure of power. As Waltz states, “States

are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on

how they score on all…items.”52

While non-material forms of power, such as Joseph Nye’s soft power may be useful in

other areas of study, proxy support concerns the ability of a state to give material support. The

CINC rankings capture this emphasis on material support. While military advising and therefore

“brainpower” is part of proxy support, it would be problematic to capture such military

brainpower as a percentage of the soft power overall. For the purposes of this study, it can be

assumed that great and major material powers are correlated with high degrees of military

training because these powers have more resources to devote to training and war games.

51 Steve Chan, "Is There a Power Transition between the U.S. And China? The Different Faces of National Power," Asian Survey 45, no. 5 (2005). 52 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131.

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To apply power positions to the proxy dyads, each recipient of support and each proxy

supporter is organized by type: great power, major power, and minor power states; international

organizations; and non-state actors. This study considers great powers as comprising at least 12%

of the world’s capabilities. Both the Soviet Union from 1946 until 1990 and the United States

from 1945 through today fit this definition as great powers. Major powers are those countries

individually capturing at least 2% of the world’s capabilities. These include the United Kingdom,

France, China, and Germany. Minor powers comprise any country with a CINC ranking of less

than 2%.

While it is assumed that great powers are able to intervene more due to a greater access to

resources, it is interesting to note the ability of non-state actors to serve as proxy supporters

specifically because they do not have the resources of a state. Instead of operating on the state

and systemic level, which is constrained by international rules of sovereignty and non-

intervention, non-state actors operate on the sub-state level and often outside the rules of the state

system. In this way, they may have more flexibility regarding proxy support. At the same time,

these non-state actors are often weaker than states and may be unable to gather a sufficient

amount of resources to substantially assist a warring party. Regarding data collection, it is harder

to map the resources and operations of non-state actors, especially since their activity may occur

on the illegal, covert black market. This has the possibility of displaying a smaller role for non-

state actors’ as proxy supporters than is actually the case.

The ability to provide material support may not be dependent on the capabilities of a

country alone; it may also be linked to the location of a state. Sending capabilities (arms,

materiel, advisors) across far distances is a financially costly endeavor. Shorter distances provide

decreased transportation and shipping costs. Therefore,

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H2a: If a conflict occurs in a given region, then it is likely that actors in the region will

serve as proxy supporters to a greater degree than actors located outside of the region.

Moreover, neighboring countries are more concerned with sub-state or localized conflicts.

The “multiple hierarchy model” proves informative here since it conceptualizes different power

projection ‘cones’ in the international system.53 In each cone, there are great powers, major

powers, and minor powers. This can be extended to include international organizations and non-

state actors. According to the model, the largest cone is the global hierarchy itself, followed by

regional cones, though one could also add a state-level cone. Countries have a direct interest in

the affairs of their neighboring state since an intrastate conflict has the ability to impact the

regional cone and potential local power projection. Major and great powers not located in the

region may only be concerned with a conflict once it has reached the point of the regional or

international cone. Previous studies on intervention support this claim. Examination by Ronald

Tammen et al. shows, “The great powers have intervened in minor power interstate conflicts in

just over 1 percent of all opportunities to do so.”54 If that is the case for interstate conflict, then

the percentage is likely less for intrastate and extrastate conflicts. Local conflicts involving non-

state actors are not likely to draw foreign great or major powers. Therefore, there is a potential

refinement to hypothesis 2a:

H2b: If an intrastate or extrastate conflict occurs in a given region, then it is likely that

weaker actors in the region will serve as proxy supporters to a greater degree than actors

located outside of the region.

It is not assumed that weak countries located outside of a given region are likely to act as

proxy supporters simply because the cost of involvement is too high. For Dunér, the

53 Ronald L. Tammen et al., Power Transitions Strategies for the 21st Century (New York, N.Y.: Chatham House Publishers, 2000); Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 54 Tammen et al., Power Transitions Strategies for the 21st Century, 70.

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geographical proximity of an intervener to its spot of intervention provides a compensatory

benefit.55 If the data shows a large percentage of non-regional weak powers, then this hypothesis

would be proved invalid.

Unpacking the support provided in the proxy relationship can illustrate the extent and

depth of proxy war dyads. The level of material support must not exceed providing arms or

advice, which is classified as “direct para-combat involvement,”56 but there are two other types

of lower level support that can be considered proxy support: indirect para-combat involvement

and direct supporting activities. These were coded as ordeal variables: the lowest level (direct

supporting activities) received a ‘1’ while the highest and therefore most intense of the three

levels (direct para-combat involvement) received a ‘3’. Additionally, the number of forms of

support was recorded. If a supporter provided arms and training, then that was considered two

forms of support. Based on the above discussion of power, another hypothesis regarding forms

and intensity may arise:

H3: If a proxy supporter is more powerful, then they are likely to provide a greater

quantity of support and more types of intense support.

If a greater percentage of minor power states, international organizations, or non-state

entities provided a higher level of intensity of support or a greater quantity of types of support,

then this hypothesis would be proved null.

Data Analysis

Once assembled, the dataset is useful to gain a macro-level picture of proxy wars in the

Middle East. To start with the large picture, this study found 164 proxy dyads in 43 conflict

dyads out of a total of 52 conflict dyads from 1945 to 2009. It is important to note that proxy

55 Dunér, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s. 56 Ibid., 16.

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relationships in the 43 conflict dyads were visible in the UCDP External Support Data, the Non-

State Actor Data, The New York Times or The Washington Post. The other 9 conflict dyads may

have involved proxy relationships and it is impossible to rule out proxy involvement at this time.

Still, the overwhelming percentage of confirmed proxy involvement clearly shows proxy wars

are prevalent over an extended period of time. Examining the breakdowns shows a more detailed

picture of the exact supporters in each proxy relationship.

Proxy supporters funded different types of conflicts. Table 1 shows that as a group, proxy

supporters mostly funded intrastrate wars, followed by interstate conflicts.

Table 1 Proxy Dyads in Differing Types of Conflicts

Conflict Frequency Percent (%) Interstate 49 29.9 Intrastate 99 60.4 Non-state 0 0 Extrastate 16 9.8 Total 164 100

Interestingly, there was no data regarding proxy relationships in non-state conflicts. It is

possible that these conflicts were captured by the intrastate conflict code and therefore did not

appear as a percentage of conflicts involving proxies. As potentially expected in a region

recently decolonized along colonization’s arbitrary borders, intrastate conflicts represent a

majority of the proxy dyads.

When examining the interveners, the picture is slightly different. Table 2 reveals actor

preferences for intervening with proxies in specific wars based on the actor’s level of power.

Table 2 Proxy Dyads in Differing Types of Conflicts

Great Power Major Power Minor Power International Organization

Non-State Actor

Interstate 18 11 19 0 1 Intrastate 29 2 59 5 4

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Non-state 0 0 0 0 0 Extrastate 7 1 7 1 0 Total 54 14 85 6 5

It is clear that power correlates with a focus on different types of wars. While the great

powers have a somewhat widespread split in their attention, with 33.3% of their proxy

relationships tied directed toward interstate conflict, 53.7% directed toward intrastate conflict,

and 13.0% directed toward extrastate conflicts, this differs from the other types of actors. In fact,

great powers are the only type of actor without one type of conflict accounting for over 60% of

their proxy interventions. Major powers mostly formed proxy relationships directed toward

interstate wars, with 78.6% of its fourteen proxy dyads. Minor powers mostly forged proxy

relationships in intrastate conflicts, with 69.4% of its 86 interventions directed towards these

conflicts. Of what is discussed in open source documents, non-state actors supported proxies in

intra-state wars 83.3% of the time, though this percentage may be shared more evenly across

intrastate, non-state, and extrastate wars with more data since non-state actors in the recorded

intrastate and extrastate wars provided assistance for non-governmental forces a vast majority of

the time.

There are a number of factors potentially at play here. First, it is possible that great and

major power countries comprising ‘powerful’ countries have a greater disposition for the

international system. Even though great powers supported intrastate proxy wars a small majority

of the time, both the US and/or the Soviet Union intervened in every interstate war after the

Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948. As discussed in the multiple hierarchy model, these countries are

concerned with the world cone, and interstate conflicts inherently involve the international

system. Intrastate conflicts, however, may not directly threaten the international system. Great

powers may have an interest at all levels of the hierarchy cones simply because they are involved

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in operations everywhere. While appears as a tautology—great powers are interested in all levels

because they are interested in their operations at all levels—it is because some countries have

developed capacities and operations all over the world that they have garnered enough power to

be considered great. Once they become great powers, these states work to respect their interests

abroad.

Minor powers clearly have a disposition towards intrastate conflict. These states may

have a greater interest in the regional level since events in one particular country may impact the

stability of their own country. It is also likely that the location of these supporter states may play

a role in proxy involvement. Of all minor powers supporting proxy wars, 72.9% were located

within the Middle East region, compared to all major and minor powers, which were located

outside of the region for any given conflict. Table 3 shows the minor powers located outside of

the region that supported proxies engaged in interstate conflict:

Table 3 Foreign Minor Powers in Intrastate Proxy Wars

Country Frequency Percent (%) Algeria 5 41.6 Cuba 1 8.3 Greece 1 8.3 Libya 2 16.6 North Korea 1 8.3 Pakistan 1 8.3 Sudan 1 8.3 Total 12 100

Examining the breakdown of foreign minor powers yields interesting insight into their

perspectives. Approximately 74.8% of the foreign minor powers intervening in intrastate wars

(Algeria, Libya, Pakistan, and Sudan) were closely tied to the Middle Eastern region through

religion, culture, and/or trade and therefore had direct stakes in the conflicts occurring there.

Country-specific interest likely played a role. Though the in-the-region/out-of-the-region binary

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delineated location in this study, another interesting operationalization would be to examine

location based on neighboring states. This would capture Greece’s provision of land as a safe

haven for PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which fought with the Government of Turkey for

almost 30 years. In this case, Greece did not have to devote resources to overcome distance and

in fact, devoted very little materials to the intrastate war.

Foreign minor powers may also follow the lead of allied stronger states. Cuba and North

Korea were tied more ideologically to the larger Cold War and may have supported proxies

already supported by the Soviet Union. In fact, both Cuba and North Korea supported the same

proxies in intrastate war as the Soviet Union; Cuba and the USSR supported the Rejectionist

Front against Israel in the late 1970s, while North Korea and the USSR supported the PLO

during the same time period.

On the whole, entities located within the Middle East region supported proxies in

intrastate or extrastate wars to a far greater extent than entities outside the region. Those within

the region supported proxies in intrastate or extrastate wars in 86.9% of their 69 proxy

interventions while entities outside the region supported proxies in intrastate or extrastate wars in

57.9% of their 95 proxy supporting interventions. The majorities in both cases may be due to the

larger number of intrastate and extrastate wars than interstate wars; when combined, intrastate

and extrastate proxy dyads comprise 70% of all total proxy dyads and therefore, a control group

of entities supporting every proxy warring group would support proxies 70% of the time. If the

percentage of proxy support from entities outside the Middle East was at 70%, then this would

indicate an indifference to the type of conflict. Because the percentage for this group is

noticeably lower than 70%, this indicates a preference for interstate wars. The reverse is also true.

Because entities located within the Middle East devoted more than 70% of the instances of proxy

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support to intrastate and extrastate wars, it appears that they have a preference for these type of

wars.

Because the supporters in the Middle East are minor states, non-state actors, or the Arab

League, the next step is to unpack the percentages of each of these groups. Table 4 shows the

breakdown of each type of actor within the Middle East and their respective instances of support

for inter-, intra-, and extrastate wars.

Table 4 Middle East Actors in Interstate, Intrastate, and Extrastate Wars

Minor Power International Organization

Non-State Actor

Interstate 9 0 0 Intrastate 47 2 4 Extrastate 6 1 0 Total 62 3 4

As the table shows, there is a clear correlation between location, power level, and

involvement in certain conflicts. While minor powers within the Middle East were generally

more involved in supporting proxy dyads, comprising 62 of the 85 total proxy dyads with a

minor power support, the specific numbers show their preference. Minor powers outside of the

Middle East only supported 12 proxy dyads in interstate wars.57 Therefore, minor powers outside

of the region comprised 20% of all minor powers supporting intrastate wars, falling well below

the control. Minor powers within the region, however, comprised approximately 80% of all

minor powers supporting intrastate conflict. Therefore, hypothesis 2b appears valid. Though the

data only established a correlation, it appears strong.

The last relationship to examine is between power and intensity of support. Table 5

shows levels of support based on Dunér’s hierarchy provided by actors at different power levels

while Table 6 shows the number of forms of support organized by power level.

57 See Table 3.

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Table 5 Intensity of Support: Dunér’s Hierarchy

Great Power Major Power Minor Power International Organization

Non-State Actor

High proxy (III) 44 10 51 0 0 Mid proxy (II) 10 4 19 6 5 Low proxy (I) 0 0 15 0 0 Total 54 14 85 6 5

Table 6 Variety of Support: Number of Forms of Support

Great Power Major Power Minor Power International Organization

Non-State Actor

Five forms 2 0 1 0 0 Four forms 1 0 3 0 0 Three forms 22 0 7 0 0 Two forms 14 3 19 0 2 One form 15 11 55 6 3 Total 54 14 85 6 5

State power level does not appear to play a large role in the intensity of involvement. All

three groups of states followed a similar trend regarding Dunér’s hierarchy, committing a vast

majority of their support to direct para-combat involvement, labeled in Table 5 as “High Proxy

(III).” This means that most great, major, or minor powers provided proxies with arms or advice

during combat, compared to other means of support. For international organizations, it is not

surprising that they provided training or financial support since organizations such as NATO

specialize in skills-based knowledge and organizations such as the Arab League are a pool for

financial resources. An organization does not have territory to offer as safe haven nor does it

have full control over any of its weapons, unlike sovereign states. It is perhaps surprising that the

data only displays financial or military training support by non-state actors, but this could due to

the difficulties involved in transporting large amounts of arms. Financial support or military

trainers are much easier to smuggle to a warring party than large crates of arms.

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Regarding the number of forms of support, it is unsurprising that the general tendency is

toward support through one form of intervention. While it may first be assumed that states may

not have the broad capacity to provide more than one form support, the data in Table 6 shows

otherwise. Minor powers and non-state actors were able to provide two or more forms of support

a combined total of 32 times, comprising 35.5% of their instances of proxy support and 19.5% of

all instances of support. Additionally, such a suggestion would need to reconcile the high

numbers of ‘high proxy’ involvement in Table 5 with the low variety of forms in Table 6.

An alternative explanation may hold more weight and account for the differences

between intensity and variety: actors use proxies in conflicts when they want to influence the

conflict’s outcome but do not want to commit their own forces, as discussed by Mumford.58

Once actors commit to supporting a proxy, they often commit to the highest extent. In the case of

the Middle East, 64.0% of all proxy dyads were ‘high proxy’ relationships, reaching direct para-

combat on Dunér’s ladder.

When considering the highest level of power where resources are more easily attained, a

large percentage (46.2%) of great power proxy dyads involved three or more forms of support. In

this case, the former explanation may serve a secondary reason. These great powers have both

the overwhelming interest and the available resources to provide several forms of support and

can therefore devote more resources to ensure their interests are met.

Overall, the dataset has shown the prevalence of proxy relationships in the post-WWII

international system, the greater resources of great powers in participating at all levels, and the

higher propensity of states closer to a country to make use of proxies. Strictly focusing on the

proxy supporter side of the proxy relationship already shows a deviation from the literature.

While the international focus of major powers, the global focus of great powers, and the state 58 See Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 11.

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focus of minor powers and non-state actors cannot be ignored, the macro-level picture illustrates

the importance of minor powers in proxy wars. A theory of great power dominance underpins

both the push and pull theories of intervention, but weak powers clearly can fuel and fund wars

as well.

Case Study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

At hand, however, is still the question of proxy support. The dataset focused solely on

proxy supporter impetus. The idea that the proxy relationship is a one-way street—the push

theory—underpinned the previous analysis. Such analysis proved weak states can influence the

international system, but this still appears as a relationship stemming from the proxy supporter

down to the proxy, following the same flow as assistance. Can the proxy relationship be more

equitable in the sense that the proxy supporter does not dictate the entire relationship? Does the

pull theory operate in proxy wars or does the push theory reign supreme?

To examine this question, this study will briefly examine the proxy relationships between

the great powers and the warring parties in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (also known as the Yom

Kippur War). This case is especially interesting since it is considered “the Soviet Union’s first

massive intervention during the postwar era on behalf of a non-Communist client engaged in all-

out conflict.”59 On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel in the

Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights respectively. Fighting continued until the Security Council

called for a ceasefire in SC Resolution 340 on October 25. During the days of fighting, both the

US and the Soviet Union supplied massive amounts of arms and trainers to the warring parties,

with the US supplying Israel with arms and materiel and the Soviet Union providing Egypt, Syria,

and Iraq with arms, materiel, and military training. While there were other supporters involved,

59 Bruce D. Porter, The Ussr in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 113.

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including Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea, and Libya, the following analysis focuses on the

large proxy support role of the two great powers. Should it be shown that the warring parties,

which are were minor states and therefore radically different in terms of power level from the

great powers, were able to influence their support, then clearly the proxy relationship is not one-

way.

Beyond power level, the differences between the proxy supporters and the proxies were

large. Before the war, the superpowers began to ease their competition through a policy of

détente. Their support for opposing sides stands in sharp contrast to this policy. After the war,

The Washington Post remarked, “For the Mideast presents a conflict on two levels. There is the

Arab-Israeli situation and there is the superpower investment in relaxing tensions.”60 The two

levels of conflict provided the great powers with the motivation for lower level conflict while

providing the minor warring powers with an opportunity for support.

Differences were especially great between the Soviet Union and the Arab states. Egypt

was strongly anti-communist and both Egypt and Syria were solely focused on engaging Israel to

retake the territory lost in the 1967 Six Day War. The Soviet Union, however, saw Israel as an

ally of the US and therefore, aided Arab engagement in order to cull Arab favor and weaken the

US position in the Middle East. Unlike its proxies, the USSR recognized Israel and never

withdrew its recognition throughout the Cold War.61 In order to align with the Arabs, the Soviet

Union lessened its pro-Communist stance in the Middle East and heightened its focus on Arab

nationalism.62 The conflict was reframed as one of “liberation” of the Arab countries from US

imperialism, following the similar logic of statements by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel

60 Marilyn Berger, "Some Pitfalls for Detente in Mideast," The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973), Dec 16 1973. 61 Porter, The Ussr in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-1980. 62 Edward Crankshaw, "Israel Is Kremlin's Decoy," The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973), 1970 Jul 19 1970.

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Nasser before the war.63 Clearly, the proxies themselves were able to influence the rhetoric and

therefore the focus of the war. In 1972, when the Soviet Union attempted to maintain its power

over Egypt and ignore Egyptian demands for ‘offensive weapons,’ Egyptian President Anwar

Sadat expelled all Soviet military officials from the country.64 It appears the Soviet Union’s

involvement was not a complete violation of a proxy’s sovereignty as discussed in the power

dominance foundation of the push theory of intervention. Even as close to the outbreak of the

war as three months away, Arab countries were wary of Soviet assistance. According to The New

York Times on July 10, 1973, Syrian officials discussed their opposition to further Soviet

cooperation “while the Russians did not take a tougher line toward Israel and the United

States.”65 The Arab states collectively pushed the USSR to take a harder stance against Israel and

the US in its attempt to build a foothold stronger presence in the Middle East, even in the

surrounding environment of détente.

There were also differences between the Americans and Israelis. The US was hesitant to

provide weapons to Israel, even while heavy airlifts to Egypt and Syria continued. Israel charged

the US with bowing to Egyptian pressures to cull their favor and attempted to push the US to

intervene by framing the conflict as one against the massive influx of arms.66 In the early 1970s,

the US helped modernize the Israeli air force as a bargaining chip to reopen the Suez Canal.67

There was a clear understanding that Israel had its own interests and could not be forced into

making a change in policy simply by US command.

63 Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré, and Mose L. Harvey, The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War; the Implications for Detente (Coral Gables, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974); Raymond H. Anderson, "Nasser Charges U.S. Endeavors to Help Israel Hold Arab Areas," New York Times (1923-Current file), March 6 1970. 64 Henry Tanner, "Sadat's Ouster of Russians Called Cool and Deliberate," ibid., Jul 22 1972. 65 Juan de Onis, "For Arabs, a Reappraisal of Soviet Ties," ibid., Jul 10 1973. 66 T. A. D. Szulc, "Egypt and Syria Said to Get More Planes from Soviet," ibid., Jul 12 1971. 67 William Beecher, "U.S. May Sell 110 Planes to Israelis over 4 Years," ibid., Aug 04.

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Even in the midst of great power competition through proxies, the proxies themselves are

able to exert agency. Once the war began on October 6, the two great powers engaged in a zero-

sum game, each providing arms to the warring parties in response to the other’s proxy support.

Less than a week after the Soviets began airlifting materiel and weapons to Egypt and Syria, the

US announced it would resupply Israel “to prevent what it termed ‘a massive airlift to Egypt and

Syria by the Soviet Union from upsetting the military balance in the Middle East.”68 Only a few

hours after the announcement, the USSR pledged its full support to the Arab warring parties in

whatever ways necessary.69 In each report on proxy assistance, the USSR or US framed its own

actions in relation to its competitor. In the words of the then-Senate majority leader, Mike

Mansfield, the policy was one of “what the other side does, we should do.”70 Neither side

mentioned an opposition to Israel or the Arab states and thus viewed the conflict as one of

international importance. While it appears that the great powers were able to drive the conflict

with these massive airlifts, the minor powers influenced even the specific arms to be sent. Israel

prioritized Phantom jet replacements and M-60 tanks,71 and Syria pressed for the MIG-23 fighter

jet and more advanced weapons.72 In a purely push conception of proxy wars, the minor powers

would not have the level of input enjoyed by either warring side.

Finally, the minor powers even had the autonomy and agency to seek out other proxy

supporters. Immediately after the war, Syria approached Western states, seeking to build radar

and air-defense systems, even while receiving “large amounts of new Soviet weapons.”73 The

68 Bernard Gwertzman, "Transports Land," ibid., Oct 16 1973. 69 Ibid. 70 Marilyn Berger and Michael Getler, "Resupply of Israel," The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973), Oct 11 1973. 71 John W. Finney, "U.S. Rushing 25 Phantom Jets to Israel, Replacing Some Lost in Mideast War," New York Times (1923-Current file), Oct 17 1973; Michael Getler, "U.S. Tanks Reported Set for Israel," The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973), Oct 16 1973. 72 "Syria Asserts Her Forces Have Taken Mt. Hermon," New York Times (1923-Current file), Oct 07 1973. 73 Juan de Onis, "Syria Gets Soviet Arms and Seeks New Equipment from West," ibid., Nov 19.

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minor power state perfectly exhibited the pull theory of intervention as it willingly sought and

welcomed different proxy supporters—possibly with conflicting ideologies and positions—in

order to build up its own defenses. In this case, Syria’s actions supported Mohammed Ayoob’s

claim that weak states were able to develop “leverage in their individual dealings with the

superpowers that might not have been possible had the distribution of power been more

diffuse.”74 Though the Soviet Union was certainly its main supporter, Syria remained an

independent actor and not a dependent proxy as traditionally conceived. As Ayoob discusses, the

context of the Cold War was incredibly important, though it is interesting to note that the Cold

War is also the context for the perception of great power dominance. Instead, minor powers like

Syria were able to exploit the situation and assert their autonomy in relation to the great powers.

In sum, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrated that proxy supporter, no less great power

states, may not always direct and fully control the relations with the proxy fighters. In fact, the

strength and agency of proxies, including minor power states, may guide the relationship. No

proxy fully shaped the larger conflict, but each proxy was able to influence the involvement of

the great powers in regional interstate conflict waged at the time. Additionally, the proxies and

proxy supporters had different but compatible enemies. This may have increased the influence of

the proxies simply because the conflict occurred on two levels instead of all on one level.

Conclusion

Concentrating on only the role of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the US in

the post-WWII system in order to understand proxy wars is misleading. Fully preserving the

same power-centric paradigm for the study of proxy wars in the face of evidence otherwise is

misleading. This study shows the agency of minor power states and their high level of

74 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995), 94.

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involvement as proxy supporters. It appears that minor powers will find ways to compensate for

their power disparities and lessened access to resources through other means, whether by limiting

their focus more narrowly on actors with which they have close ties (as was the case with

Algeria, Libya, and Pakistan) or by centering their attention on their immediate localities. It is

certainly possible that proxy wars are most popular with minor powers because they provide an

avenue for “war on the cheap,” and in this way, weaker actors’ involvement in proxy wars may

be to compensate for their lack of resources.75 Though the Cold War dominates thought

concerning proxy relationships, it is clear that minor powers largely dominate this type of war.

The case study showed that proxy supporters do not make the decision to support warring

parties in isolation. Instead, warring parties—usually minor powers or non-state actors—may

pull proxies supporters to their side and “borrow power from their superpower patrons.”76 In this

way, minor powers also compensate for their weaknesses while directly engaged in fighting.

Which theory better explains the proxy-supporter interaction: the push or pull theory?

From the above analysis it is evident that both the push and pull theories play a role in

interventions. The binary between the two is less useful then the analytical framework the

theories provide.

This study hopes to help generate additional interest in the field of proxy war through

further development of empirical evidence. Unlike the study of other types of war, the study of

proxy wars does not yet have a comprehensive dataset to conduct fully international studies. An

interesting avenue for future work could be the correlation and potential causation between

supporter power level and different conflict outcomes. A larger sample size should provide more

75 Mumford, Proxy Warfare. 76 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, 94-95.

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wide-reaching results. As a region with an unfortunately rich history of conflict, the Middle East

may prove to be an anomaly in the larger study of proxy wars around the globe.

Moreover, the negotiations between proxy supporters and proxy fighters highlighted in

the 1973 Arab-Israeli War should be explored in other conflicts. It is possible that states use

proxies as an alliance of sorts. Even informal alliances require dialogue between two or more

sides, no matter the power disparity. Waltz found, “Alliance strategies are always the product of

compromise since the interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never

identical.”77

Regarding the security implications, the above analysis shows that a traditional, Realist

view of great power threats may be limiting. Though great powers may still pose threats to one

another, minor powers are also able to compensate for their weaknesses and potentially magnify

their involvement in conflicts through indirect means. Though the Cold War dominates thought

concerning proxy relationships, it is clear that minor powers largely dominate this type of war.

Power may be augmented for conflict, especially when the outbreak of local war directly clashes

with a state’s interests. This study found that proxy wars were a common occurrence over an

almost 55 year period. Therefore, proxy wars are likely to remain part of the tools available to

states in the future.

77 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 166.

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