Poverty, Peace, and China:PKSOI and World Bank Perspectivesby Dr. Mike Spangler, PKSOI

Poverty and Peace

Since 1990, despite slow growth and financial crises, pover-ty has been falling dramatically in the world. By 2010, the number of people living under $1.25 per day – the World Bank’s definition of extreme poverty – fell 50 percent below the 1990 number, thus meeting the UN target of halving poverty between 1990 and 2015 (five years ahead of sched-ule). In developing regions as a whole, the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day fell from 47 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2010.1

About 700 million fewer people lived in extreme poverty in 2010 than in 1990. Why? Most of the progress was made in China. Measured from 1981 when China’s reforms began to take hold, it managed to lift 660 million (about half of its current 1.3 billion population) out of extreme poverty, while in the rest of the world fell much less -- only 10 percent of the population escaped extreme poverty.2

In tandem with China, many developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa recorded faster economic growth, while attracting greater foreign direct investment (FDI). These economies boosted agricultural output and raw material exports while moving into semi-skilled manufacturing and commodity processing, expanded their middle classes and bolstered con-sumer demand.

Driven by stronger growth in Asia and elsewhere, some of the largest recipients of World Bank soft loans and grants – avail-able to poor countries with a per capita income under $1,195 – will graduate from this category by the end of this decade. China led the way by becoming too prosperous to borrow in 1999.4

China’s economic reforms and opening up to foreign invest-ment have produced remarkably strong and steady growth. In particular, the Chinese government’s bottom-up approach, gradualism, and piloting of reforms have proven to be pragmatic and effective. China’s kick-off for reform was modest: eighteen peasants in Anhui province decided to break away from the cen-trally-planned economy and signed a secret contract in 1978. They divided the land at their disposal into small plots, and each farmer took responsibility for his plot. This compact coupled with the profit-motive proved to be a powerful incentive. At the same time, in Guangdong province, private manufacturing businesses often linked to Hong Kong were launched with the provincial government’s tacit agreement. Other provinces were initially skeptical, but Anhui and Guangdong provinces began producing more by 1981, and others followed suit.

Competing with these regions for FDI, China nevertheless maintained its lead as the top destination for corporate expan-sions through 2012 (attracting $121 billion or 9% of the total that year) even as a troubled world economy cooled investor enthusiasm for such deals. Of total FDI made in 2012 ($1.35 trillion), Asia (including China) absorbed about 40%, heralding further economic gains there in the future.3

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Poverty, Peace, and China: PKSOI and World Bank Perspectives

Among others, India, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya may join China in graduating from the Bank’s soft-loan window during this decade. The Bank could lose half of its soft-loan clients by the end of the next decade, if positive trends continue.5

Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (FCAC)

Which regions are least likely to graduate from the World Bank’s soft-loan window (known as the International Develop-ment Association - IDA)? Led by China, the East Asian and Pacific region has already halved the number of their people living on less than $1.25 a day. In addition, the Middle East, North Africa and South Central Asia regions are on track to meet this target by 2015, but South Asia’s high population growth means the number of extremely poor people there will not significantly decline. Latin America, the Caribbean, and South Central Asia are in danger of falling short of the target. Sub-Saharan Africa is still way off track and unlikely to meet its target.6

Trends also indicate that over half of the IDA’s soft-loan win-dow will be devoted to fragile or conflict-affected countries (FCAC) by 2025.7 Poor people in these countries are extreme-ly hard to help because of criminal activity and civil strife. In particular, countries such as Chad and Haiti are likely to remain primary recipients of IDA assistance. While most of the rest of the world’s poor live in countries that can lift themselves out of poverty chiefly due to their improving access to foreign capital, FCACs remain a major development challenge. About 1.2 billion people are estimated to live in this group, from about 45 countries, and none of them is expected to reach any of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015. In-security, violence, exploitative elites, and weak and illegitimate institutions act as major obstacles to reducing poverty.

Indeed, if present trends continue, 52 percent of the world’s poor will live in FCACs by 2015.8 These countries host most of today’s conflicts, generally found in an arc of instability that stretches from Central America to Central Africa, through the Middle East, and across southwest Asia into central Asia. This arc is where peace stakeholders are challenged and where they must continue to focus their attention.

The Fund for Peace, a U.S.-based nongovernmental organiza-tion, compiles a Failed States Index (at its eponymous web-site, FailedStatesIndex.Org). Not surprisingly, the index tracks closely with the World Bank’s low-income FCAC list but has

greater granularity because it breaks FCACs down into Alert, Warning, Stable and Sustainable sub-categories along with the rest of the world. For 2012, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are on very high alert followed by high alerts for Sudan and South Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, Afghani-stan, Haiti, Yemen, Iraq, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Pakistan, and Nigeria.9

While some FCACs evince dim prospects, others have blazed a path out of fragility and conflict.

Following periods of conflict or severe political instability, countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uz-bekistan and Vietnam have attained growth rates averaging 4 to 7 percent per year. Their economic growth has led to significant drops in poverty. Vietnam is a case in point: it cut its poor pop-ulation from 64 percent in 1993 to 17 percent in 2008. Other countries facing similar challenges also recorded progress:

• Ethiopia increased access to safer water from 13 percent of the population in 1990 to 66 percent in 2010. • Mozambique more than tripled its primary school comple-tion rate from 14 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2007. • Rwanda cut the prevalence of under-nutrition from 56 per-cent of the population in 1997 to 40 percent in 2005. • Nepal received the Millennium Award in 2010 for significant progress in reducing maternal mortality, falling from 770 to 170 per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2010.10

These improvements, however, can be contrasted with other countries that moved out of and then back into the FCAC group due to slower economic growth and uneven reforms (e.g., Djibouti, Gambia and Tajikistan). Poverty reduction in FCACs is therefore not easy and far from universal.

Breaking the Mold

Is there a vicious, self-supporting nexus between poverty and conflict in the FCACs? 21st-century violence has, so far, broken out of the 20th-century mold predominated by inter-state war. Such wars are becoming less common throughout the world. Psychologist Steven Pinker has argued that in developed countries interstate war may only get underway on “rare occasions when it is certain to prevent even greater costs to human well-being.” If so, interstate war could be “going the way of customs such as slavery, serfdom, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, bearbaiting, cat-burning, heretic-burning, witch-drowning.”11

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Pinker’s assertion about peace is encouraging. He has associ-ated this trend toward peace with (1) the emergence of strong governmental authority claiming a monopoly on the use of force; (2) the interconnectivity of cultures through trade; (3) increased literacy, urbanization, mobility and access to mass media; and (4) the spread of democracy and intergovernmental organization.12 We may add, too, that recent U.S. interven-tions to reverse aggression by force in Kuwait and Afghanistan have also played a role in establishing the “new peace,” albeit one that remains fragile.

Interstate war and insurgency remain threats in some regions but have declined appreciably over the past twenty-five years. Deaths from civil war are one-quarter what they were in the 1980s.13 Nonetheless, one in four people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, live in FCACs with very high levels of criminal violence. Because of the decline in interstate war, the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into “war” or “peace,” or even clearly into “criminal or political violence” but rather are blended categories.

Vicious Cycles

Many FCACs now face cycles of violence, weak governance, and instability. This cycle appears to be self-supporting, vicious, and repetitive: 90 percent of the past decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that already had a civil war in the past thirty years. In addition, some countries that successfully negotiated political and peace agreements, such as El Salva-dor, Guatemala, and South Africa, currently face high levels of violent crime, limiting their development. Paradoxically, other countries such as Zimbabwe – blessed with natural resources such as diamonds and strategic minerals – appear trapped in vicious “winner-takes-all” struggles as domestic groups periodi-cally vie for control over the resources.14

In addition, political movements obtain financing from crim-inal activities, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland. Criminal gangs often support political vio-lence during electoral periods, as in Jamaica and Kenya. Inter-national ideological movements make common cause with local grievances, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Social grievances can escalate into acute demands for change and into violent conflict—as we have seen in the Middle East and North Africa where political, social, and economic change lags behind mostly urban-based expectations. Thus, the large majority of countries currently wracked with violence face it in multiple forms.

Given this backdrop, no low-income FCAC has yet achieved a single UN Milliennium Development Goal (MDG) including the “poverty-halving” one. Poverty appears to be a clear imped-iment to stability in most FCACs. In fact, most of the current armed conflict in FCACs has taken the form of looting, extor-tion, reprisal, and rampage by gangs of otherwise unemploy-able young men serving politicians, warlords, and/or criminal kingpins. In many cases, political leaders deliberately leave parts of their countries largely unconnected with established or more urbanized regions and thus abandon them to relative anarchy, inviting further predation and warlord-driven conflict.15

As a result, the correlation between poverty and armed conflict in the world today seems clear. Countries with a per capita GDP under $1,195 have a 3 percent probability of new conflict breaking out within five years, and this rate rises appreciably as income drops, according to the Human Security Center in the UK. This correlation is much stronger in countries with large populations, mountainous terrain, and new or fragile govern-ment. In a 2003 study, Fearon and Laitin found that $1,000 less in per capita income corresponds to a 34 percent greater chance of civil strife in the former colonies of Africa, Middle East, and Asia. Surprisingly, income inequality, ethnic diversity, and minority discrimination were not significantly correlated with conflict although large proportions of young unemployed males appear to be a significant factor enabling conflict.16

How can FCACs embark on a path to sustainable develop-ment?

The World Bank’s central message in its 2011 World Develop-ment Report on Conflict, Security and Development is that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance addresses FCAC instability by focusing on security, justice, and jobs.17 The report points out that the process of restoring confidence and building institutions requires strong national leadership with support from international actors to help manage stresses

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that could derail progress. The risk of inaction by donors may be greater than the risk of supporting FCACs to the extent that FCAC conflicts spill over, infecting neighboring countries.

Locking In Change?

In FCACs, efforts are needed to restore confidence in collective action before embarking on wider institutional transformation. Much of the literature on peace-building up to now has emphasized multidimensional, complex, and gradualist approaches that move conflict-affected countries from high- to low-intensity violence. However, persuading different parties in FCACs to work collaboratively often requires signs of an abrupt rather than a gradual break from the past – for example, pro-viding a swift demonstration that warlords or extremist parties can no longer exclude other groups from power-sharing, while ending human rights abuses, fostering free media, and apprecia-bly dampening extractive practices by elites. Just as importantly, constitutional and legislative efforts must “lock-in” these chang-es and show that they will not be reversed. More study needs to be done on how civil-military operations can foster a meaning-ful “break from the past” and “lock in” such gains.

“Lock-in” strategies appear to be much more important that tactical, short-term improvements (such as the restoration of essential services) to bolster confidence in the FCAC gov-ernment’s ability to deal with violent threats and implement institutional changes. Throughout this process, the FCAC government must take ownership for the “break from the past” and be widely perceived as staying the course. Paradoxically, the more external donors do in FCACs, the more dependence they may foster, eroding the legitimacy of the FCAC government and planting the seeds of stability’s decline once the donors downsize.18

Breaking out of “dependency” can last generations

Successful institutional transformation requires not only a decided and credible “break from the past” but also sustained effort possibly over several decades to consolidate reform gains and foster self-reliance. Several countries that moved away from fragility and conflict accomplished the transition through many stages often involving intergenerational change. National leaders had to build confidence in the state and to transform institutions over time, as in the case of South Korea after the Korean War and transitions from military rule in Ghana, Chile and Argentina, where several internal contests unfolded over governance. More gradual economic and political reforms in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia now joined by Myanmar have led to more than a decade of peace, prosperity and stability in southeast Asia, but the jury is out on the region’s longer-term stability in the absence of a perceived “break from the past,” viz., in their case, the widespread social acceptance of the justice apparatus of those countries.

Once a break from the past is accomplished, a self-supporting process of building success upon success enables social trust to widen. For each phase, national leaders need to build confi-dence that positive change is possible and deepen institutional transformation. A lack of trust and capacity in fragile societies thus requires sequential and paced institutional transformation coupled with public-private partnerships that increasingly bring the private sector forward to support the long-term sustainabil-ity of both jobs and security. At the same time, national lead-ership must increasingly ensure the impartiality and fairness of the machinery of justice. Failure to seize the high ground and take ownership for the transparency and impartiality of justice is likely to doom most societies to continuing instability in the event that the national leadership’s monopoly over the use of force is questioned, challenged, and ultimately ignored by its own people.

The Long Term Haul in FCACs

A group of FCACs and donor agencies recently called for change through their endorsement of “The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.”19 The New Deal challenges the development community to support peace- and state-building goals that are essential for achieving sustainable poverty reduc-tion and growth and calls for a new approach to delivering assis-tance with a strong emphasis on country ownership, strength-ening civil administration, and coordinating donor support around a country-led effort.

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Improvement in IDA’s portfolio performance in FCACs

Ten years ago, the World Bank’s FCAC projects were twice as likely to fail as those in the rest of the World Bank’s IDA portfo-lio. At present, the quality of projects in FCACs has improved considerably and is now on par with the rest of the IDA portfo-lio.20 While it is uncertain whether this trend can be sustained over the medium term especially through increasing private sector activity, the results, so far, suggest that targeted efforts at the project level can have a concrete impact, for example, in:

• Afghanistan, where – over the period 2003-2010 – about 22 million people in rural areas benefitted from better access to water, electricity and roads through the National Solidarity Program.

• Ivory Coast, where an assistance project financed labor inten-sive public works, community rehabilitation activities, and voca-tional training to reconstruct communities and help reintegrate 18,000 ex-combatants, other armed groups, and youth at risk.

• The African Greater Lakes region, where as part of a multi-agency effort IDA helped demobilize and re-integrate over 300,000 ex-combatants in seven countries.

• Liberia, where the IDA-funded Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program helped build the basic systems and institutions in the areas of public financial management, budget preparation and execution, accountability, civil service and capacity building.

• Sierra Leone, where an IDA-financed safety nets program helped 700 thousand people to gain access to health facilities, 400 thousand children to educational facilities, and over 100 thousand people to markets and other economic infrastruc-ture.21

More Work to be Done

To contribute to the peacebuilding agenda and provide great-er support to address the drivers of fragility and conflict in FCACs, the World Bank established the Global Center for Conflict, Security and Development (CCSD) in Nairobi in 2011.22 Among other projects, the World Bank’s CCSD is in: • Yemen. Following the 2011 crisis, IDA conducted a Joint Social and Economic Assessment of Yemen in coordination with the UN, the European Union, and the Islamic Develop-

ment Bank. The IDA team identified how individual opera-tions could be adjusted to address specific transition priorities and underlying causes of conflict. In the areas of public sector governance, the focus was on supporting institutional reform linked to the broader national dialogue process.

• Democratic Republic of Congo. In recognition of the desta-bilizing impact of ongoing low intensity conflicts in the eastern provinces of the Congo, the World Bank conducted a study in November 2012 to evaluate the root causes and drivers of con-flict, and identify possible areas of Bank support. This exercise led to the formation of a multi-sectoral strategy of assistance, addressing key impediments to peace consolidation and durable economic development in eastern Congo.

• Other FCACs. In Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan, Niger, Bu-rundi, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, Somalia and Liberia, Bank teams are working with the support of the CCSD to launch assistance strategies. Addressing not merely investment and capacity deficits, these strategies directly confront the underlying drivers of fragility and propose a combination of financial and technical assistance to help build stability based on the examples of Yemen and the Congo.23

PKSOI’s Role

FCACs are the focus of the Peacekeeping and Stability Oper-ations Institute (PKSOI) at the U.S. Army War College. We were originally founded in 1993 as the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, eighteen years before the World Bank’s Center for Conflict, Security and Development. What do we contribute to the growing dialogue as the World Bank begins to engage with the UN and other international actors on peacebuilding?

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Poverty, Peace, and China: PKSOI and World Bank Perspectives

We believe combined civilian-military collaboration is vital to effective peace keeping and stability operations. In particular, we have observed that growing prosperity can help lift FCACs out of conflict by giving people a greater stake in productive, cooperative enterprises rather than the destructive “zero-sum” games that define many internal ethnic, religious, and polit-ical-economic conflicts. We constantly monitor the global peacekeeping community to ensure U.S. civilian-military coop-eration is adapting to and adopting the most relevant, best-fit approaches to transform conflict situations. We are also sifting through lessons learned in peacekeeping and stability opera-tions to formulate more effective analyses, options, and plans to address emerging conflict situations.

To address the needs of FCACs, PKSOI is focused on facilitat-ing the creation of more agile civilian-military operations that respond to high risk environments; building a stronger com-munity of practice around FCAC issues across regions to foster “best fit” solutions; and identifying the peace- and state-build-ing goals of FCACs that go hand in hand with development needs. In support of these requirements, PKSOI offers U.S., foreign, and international military and civilian agencies, private companies, and nongovernmental organizations a website that compiles lessons learned through stability operations and a way to collaborate within a growing community of interest on the understanding of lessons learned. This website is dedicated to sifting and resifting through conflict lessons to derive the most cogent analysis and plans as we go forward. PKSOI’s Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) website is at: https://www.pksoi.org/.

Back to China

Among its key outreach initiatives, PKSOI liases with foreign military partners including China to advance peace and stability cooperation. We believe China’s growing role in global poverty reduction, international investment, and peacekeeping has been constructive and deserves greater study. In recognition of these trends, PKSOI in concert with our parent organization, the Army War College, is offering an elective to Army War College students on China beginning this year. We also hope to host China at the U.S. Army War College in the coming year when peacekeeping experts from both countries plan to share lessons learned and look to the future.

China Helps Keep the Peace

With nearly 1,900 troops deployed worldwide in late 2012, China’s peacekeeping troop contribution is relatively small compared with those of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. How-ever, it remains to date the largest troop contributor of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.25

China’s peacekeeping engagement increased gradually over the last three decades of the twentieth century but surged in the twenty-first century. From 2000 to 2008, the number of Chinese personnel deployed worldwide to U.N. peacekeeping operations rose from 52 to 2,146. As of July 2013, China was ranked eighteenth among top troop-contributing countries. This amounts to 1,773 troops, policemen, and military observ-ers deployed across nine peacekeeping operations in North and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus.26

China, amassing $3.3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, has emerged as a main source of development aid. In 2010, China lent more to developing countries than the World Bank -- $110 billion compared to the Bank’s $100 billion.24 China’s money went abroad with few strings such as environmental safeguards and reform conditionality. Unlike its economic assistance, how-ever, China’s peacekeeping operations do not directly protect or expand its economic interests. With the exception of Sudan, China’s peacekeeping deployments have been in countries with little substantial trade although trade and investment can follow troop deployment. United Nations regulations prevent inter-national peacekeepers from independently pursuing national interests.

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China has come a long way

In the early 2000s, China began to expand its economic and diplomatic influence overseas through international organiza-tions. In particular, peacekeeping operations were tapped to demonstrate China’s commitment to peaceful development as “a responsible power.”27

Initially, China’s attitude toward peacekeeping was largely deter-mined by its strategic policy towards Taiwan. It viewed foreign recognition of Taiwan as a challenge to its “one China” princi-ple and in the nineties vetoed several peacekeeping operations in countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In 2003, China again appeared ready to veto the U.N. Observer Mission mandate in Liberia. After Liberia’s break from Taiwan, however, China authorized UN peacekeeping operations and dispatched peacekeepers to assist in that country’s reconstruc-tion. By 2005, China’s deployment in Liberia hit almost 600.28

In 2004, China showed greater flexibility in its peacekeeping commitment. That year, it dispatched peacekeepers to Haiti, despite Haiti’s continued recognition of Taiwan. Evidence so far points to continued flexibility on the part of Chinese lead-ership in peacekeeping without tying it to such policy consider-ations.

China and Mali

China’s announced deployment of UN peacekeepers to Mali this July includes a large combat contingent for the first time.29 Once avoiding such missions, China has committed to deploy 500 combat troops for the force protection of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This constitutes one of China’s largest UN

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deployments since it began participating in peacekeeping oper-ations in the early 1990s. The Security Council, which unan-imously approved a force of 12,640 peacekeepers for Mali in April of this year, decided that security conditions were right for the overall mission’s deployment beginning on July 1, 2013.30

China’s decision to participate in Mali indicates it is becoming less risk-averse in its peacekeeping commitments by shouldering a combat responsibility in a potentially dangerous peace mis-sion.

While China continues to refuse to deploy in the absence of host-country consent and has studiously avoided participating in “all-in,” decisive actions in favor of a particular side, it also remains wedded to using force only in self-defense and as a last resort. China’s adherence to these principles in peacekeeping operations has been firm. The UN mission’s rules of engage-ment for force protection of MINUSMA facilities will allow China to maintain these principles. PKOSI looks forward to China’s continuing commitment to peacekeeping responsibil-ities in the future and to sharing lessons learned on this and other operational aspects as we engage with China in the future.

Notes:

1 United Nations Development Program Website, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg_goals/mdg1/ (accessed August 20, 2013).2 See the Guardian’s poverty matters blog article, “How pro-gressive is the push to eradicate extreme poverty?,” for a detailed treatment of China’s push to eliminate extreme poverty. Web-site: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/pov-erty-matters/2013/jun/07/eradicating-poverty-shift-in-focus

Poverty, Peace, and China: PKSOI and World Bank Perspectives

(accessed August 20, 2013).3 The New York Times reported a 2012 decline in foreign direct investment into China, “Investment into China De-clined during 2012,” January 16, 2013. (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/business/global/investment-into-china-de-clined-during-2012.html) However, this decline was minimal. See the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment paper entitled “FDI in Figures,” published in April 2013: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf4 See International Development Association. “IDA Gradu-ates”. World Bank Group, for a list of the countries that no longer qualify for IDA loans (http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida-graduates.html). 5 The CIA World Factbook provided statistical series that were extrapolated to identify the possible graduates over the coming decade. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/6 See the World Bank’s regional Poverty Assessments at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMD-K:20210352~menuPK:435735~pagePK:148956~piP-K:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html. Accessed August 20, 2013.7 See the World Bank paper done by the IDA Resource Mo-bilization Department entitled “IDA Support to Fragile and Conflict Affected States,” March 2013, for a fuller discussion. (Website: http://www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/IDA17_Re-plenishment/FCS%20paper.pdf )8 See the World Bank paper, “Ending World Poverty Hing-es on Progress in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations,” April 30, 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/fea-ture/2013/04/30/ending-extreme-poverty-hinges-on-prog-ress-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations9 See the Fund for Peace website on failed states in 2012 at http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cfsir1210-failed-statesindex2012-06p.pdf. (Accessed August 20, 2103.)10 See the World Bank’s World Development Report for 2011, “Conflict, Security and Development,” 2011, p. 11. Website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf11 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of our Nature. New York: Penguin. 2011, Page 291.12 Ibid., Chapter 26: The New Peace, pp. 295-377.13 The World Bank. World Development Report for 2011, “Conflict, Security and Development,” 2011, p. 2. Website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf14 Ibid, p. 4-5.

15 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 152.16 Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civ-il War,” American Political Science Review, 2003, p.76.

17 The World Bank. World Development Report for 2011, “Conflict, Security and Development,” 2011, p. 8. Website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf18 See Daniel Wroe’s “Donors, Dependency, and Political Crisis in Malawi,” African Affairs, 2012: 111/142: pp. 135-144 for a case study of this point. 19 Communique for the Third International Dialogue Global Meeting, “The New Deal: Achieving Better Results and Shap-ing the Global Agenda,” April 19, 2013. Website: http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Wash-ington-Communiqu%C3%A9-19-April-2013.pdf20 World Bank: IDA Resource Mobilization Department paper, “IDA Support to Fragile and Conflict Affected States,” March 2013, pp. 5. 21 Ibid., pp. 7. 22 Ibid., p. 6.23 Ibid., p. 7-8.24 See Martin Viero, “Chinese (Un)official Development Aid,” Americas Quarterly. Website: http://www.americasquarterly.org/Vieiro. (Accessed August 20, 2013.)

25 See UN peacekeeping troop statistics compiled monthly by country at the website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jul13_1.pdf. (Accessed August 20, 2013.)26 Ibid.27 See Colleen Wong, “China Embraces Peacekeeping Opera-tions,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2013. Website: http://thedip-lomat.com/china-power/china-embraces-peacekeeping-mis-sions/28 Ben Wong, “The Dragon Brings Peace? Why China Became A Major Contributor to UN Peacekeeping,” Stimson Center Paper, July 12, 2013. Website: http://www.stimson.org/spot-light/the-dragon-brings-peace-why-china-became-a-major-con-tributor-to-united-nations-peacekeeping-/29 Ben Wong, “The Dragon Brings Peace? Why China Became A Major Contributor to UN Peacekeeping,” Stimson Center Paper, July 12, 2013. Website: http://www.stimson.org/spot-light/the-dragon-brings-peace-why-china-became-a-major-con-tributor-to-united-nations-peacekeeping-/30 Refer to the official UN website for MINUSMA at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/ for China’s troop contribution.

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