Wednesday 22 March 2017 14:40

6 dead 35+ injuries

76mph 1,500 potential witnesses

Post Incident Report: Westminster Attack

82 seconds

Approximate route of attacker’s vehicle Approximate route of attacker on foot Location of injured or dead

Pool ReTerrorism Research and Analysis Centre

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Car drives into people along the pavement

Masood enters Carriage Gates, stabs police officer and is shot

Multiple peopleinjured or killed

Car crashes into railings

Westminster Bridge

Portcullis House

Palace of Westminster

As the UK threat level was not raised after the attack it is a likely sign Khalid Masood acted alone and the incident was not part of a coordinated campaign. This may be corroborated as the 12 people arrested after the attack have now all been released without charge.

Prior to the incident, Islamist extremists appeared to have shown little interest in mounting attacks against the Government Security Zone or Government Estate. Whilst iconic government sites and individuals have featured in Islamist extremist media, overseas encouragement for their targeting appeared aspirational and not linked to credible attack planning in the UK. Masood, however, specifically targeted Westminster above other locations after driving from Brighton that day.

It is highly likely Masood sought maximum casualties by using the vehicle in the manner he did. His approach over Westminster Bridge afforded an acceleration route not possible from the opposing Parliament Square direction. By driving the full length of the bridge (around 250 metres) in a zig-zag formation and reaching a reported speed of 76mph, Masood was able to intentionally use the kinetic energy of the car to cause mass casualties. Armed-police vehicle check points, previously held on both Westminster and Lambeth bridges, were absent which is noticeable considering other road based mitigation measures recently implemented in the capital. Those include road closures and barrier installations around Buckingham Palace for the Changing of the Guard ceremony.

Hostile vehicle mitigation measures have been a long standing part of security architecture in the UK, either overtly with bollards and fences or covertly with concealed protection afforded through innovative and decorative building designs. The attack highlights the extent to which those designs may now need to be extended around buildings or sites to include the approach roads and pavements, thereby affording protection to members of the public and potentially

employees attending the site, rather than the actual building which has been the traditional target for attacks.

The timing, audible impact of the vehicle against the perimeter fence and the likely surge of pedestrians towards Parliament Square are relevant factors in the attack. The timing may lead to a review of the police patrol strategies. The noise and location of the impact could have been an initial distraction to the police, potentially directing their attention away from Carriage Gates. The likely surge of pedestrians away from the vehicle would have been in the direction Masood ultimately ran, thus potentially concealing him within a crowd. An indication of the amount of people present in the area may be derived from the 1,500 potential witnesses cited at the opening of the inquest into Masood’s death at Westminster Coroners Court.

The staffing of Carriage Gates by unarmed police was routine, with their primary role likely to be affording the entrance or exit of vehicles from the Palace grounds and managing the pedestrians at the roadside. Close-armed support would be provided by both static and patrolling armed officers nearby. Numerous media reports suggest the gates were subject to an existing security review, awaiting local authority planning permission for physical changes.

Whilst it is not currently clear if police officers were Masood’s intended target, it is likely considering the probable Islamist extremist rhetoric to the incident, supported by the attack in Paris on 20 April 2017. Notably, whilst Daesh claimed Masood as ‘a soldier of the Islamic State’, he was not specifically named unlike the Paris attacker, Karim Cheurfi. This may suggest that whilst Masood was inspired by Islamist extremism, he was not under overseas direction and control.

The use of knives in the attack is typical of current methodology in the UK. Such weapons do not require any formal training and the implements are easy to obtain. They have frequently featured in counter-terrorism cases, with a disrupted plot in Birmingham on 29 March 2017 involving a further intended knife attack by an Islamist extremist.

The methodology of the Westminster attack is consistent with the current trend across mainland Europe of extremists using a vehicle and weapons against crowded places at iconic sites, targeting figures of authority such as the police.

Use of firearms or explosives by extremists in the UK remains less likely, due to gun control laws and penetration of criminal networks by law enforcement agencies.

Extremists using vehicles and knives in a UK attack is not new, illustrated by the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. Al Qaeda (AQ), in the second edition of Inspire magazine in 2010, highlighted the use of trucks as “the ultimate mowing machine”. In 2013 al-Shabaab urged Muslims in the UK to attack with “a simple knife from your local B&Q will do the job”, whilst in 2014 Daesh spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani directed followers to “kill (the disbeliever) in any manner or way however it may be…slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car”. Since then, attack planning advice has been a common theme in extremist publications, including Daesh’s Rumiyah. As such, the ideological influence on UK extremists to adopt such methodology is strong, along with being relatively easy to access on the internet. It is likely Masood would have accessed extremist propaganda over many years.

The trigger for the attack is not currently known. It is reported in the media Masood was active on an instant messaging platform immediately prior to the attack, although the recipients and content of any potential messages have not yet been publically reported. These potential messages may give an indication of his exact mind-set, motivation and associations. Masood had connections to areas of known extremist activity in the UK, particularly Luton and Birmingham.

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Luton has strong links with Anjem Choudary and the al Muhajiroun network and considering Masood’s presence there, a historic association with al Muhajiroun is possible. Birmingham has been recognised as a focal point in UK attack plots in recent years. Masood’s age, however, is notably older than recent terrorists in Europe, which makes the profiling of likely lone actors harder for the police and MI5.

Whilst the UK is a desired target, it is a difficult environment for extremists to operate in. The police and MI5 have successfully disrupted at least 14 plots against the homeland since 2013, but with the frequency of low complexity attacks spreading across Europe, adjustments in protective security operations will be key in preventing further attacks. The intent and capabilities of UK extremists show no sign of declining. Successful mitigation of the terrorist threat seems to be focused around maintaining resilience through reducing vulnerability and the impact of an attack should it take place. Pool Re continues to work with agencies such as the National Counter Terrorism Security Office in identifying and supporting, through insurance discounts, the implementation of intelligence led protective security and risk mitigation measures minimising the impact of some attack types.

Defence against terrorism does not rest solely with the authorities. The public, communities and business all have a fundamental role to play in reducing the threat of contemporary terrorism.

2010Al Qaeda (AQ),

highlighted the use of trucks as “the ultimate

mowing machine”

2014Abu Mohammed

al-Adnani directed followers to kill with a knife or run

over with your car

2017 Westminster attack

2013Murder of

Fusilier Lee Rigby

2013al-Shabaab urged

Muslims in the UK to attack with “a simple knife”